transparency and accountability in nrega a case study of ... and audit-nrega.pdfthe nrega guidelines...

AIWorkingPaperNo.1,February2009TransparencyandAccountabilityinNREGA

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TransparencyandAccountabilityinNREGA

ACaseStudyofAndhraPradesh

YaminiAiyar*

SalimahSamji

*[email protected]


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ENGAGINGACCOUNTABILITY:

ACCOUNTABILITYINITIATIVEWORKINGPAPERSERIES

TransparencyandAccountabilityinNREGA

ACaseStudyofAndhraPradesh

YaminiAiyar

SalimahSamji

*Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisdocumentareentirelythoseoftheauthor(s).YoumaychoosetoreproduceorredistributethecontentsinpartorinfulltoanyotherpersonwithdueacknowledgementoftheAccountabilityInitiative.


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TableofContents

Abstract………………..……………………………………………………………………………………..4

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………..5

TheCaseStudy:UnderstandingSocialAudits……………………………………………......8

AnalyzingtheAndhraPradeshexperience:KeyFindings……………………………..17

UnderstandingtheroleoftheAPgovernment……………………………………………..23

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………….27


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Abstract

This paper documents the Andhra Pradesh experience of institutionalizing social audits

into the implementationof theNationalRuralEmploymentGuaranteeAct, anduses it to

analyze the social audit process. It draws on empirical work aimed at measuring the

effectivenessofsocialauditsconductedinAndhraPradeshbetweenMarchandDecember

2007.


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Introduction

InAugust2005, the IndianParliamentpassed theNationalRuralEmploymentGuarantee

Act (NREGA), which mandates the provision of 100 days of guaranteed employment

(unskilledmanualwork) toanyruralhousehold in India.Thepassageof theActsawthe

culmination of a lively debate with many (including the Acts most ardent supporters)

predicating that corruption and poor service deliverymechanismswould together undo

anypotentialbenefitsthattheActcouldhaveonthepoor.SomuchsothatoneofIndia’s

mostwellknowneconomists infamouslysuggestedthatthelikelihoodofmoneyreaching

thepoorwouldbehigher ifwe ‘simplydropthemoneybyhelicopterorgasballoon into

ruralareas’thanrouteitthroughemploymentprograms1.

TheseconcernsovercorruptionandpoordeliverystemfromIndia’spastexperiencewith

deliveringwelfareprogramstothepoor.RajivGandhifamouslyestimatedthat15paiseof

everyrupeeallocatedactuallyreachesthepoor.Thiscouldnotbetruerthaninthecaseof

ruralemploymentprograms.Pastexperiencesuggests thatgreatestbeneficiariesof rural

employmentprogramswereprivatecontractorswhoreceived‘workorders’andtogether

with the local political bosses officials fudged muster rolls (attendance registers that

determinewagestobegiven)toproduceinflatedfiguresandmisappropriatefunds. Asa

resultmostparticipantsintheseprogramsrarelyaccessedtheminimumwage‐according

toestimates fromanIndiawidestudyofruralemploymentprograms,65%of thosewho

participatedintheseprogramswerepaidbetweenRs.30andRs.60perday.Thisisfarless

than theminimumwage set by the government.2An important reason for this appalling

scenariohasbeenthelackoftransparencyandaccountabilityinourdeliverysystemsthat

haveallowedcorruptiontoproliferateunchecked.1Aiyar,SwaminathanAS(2004),‘PovertyReductionbyHelicopters’,December19,2004,TimesofIndiahttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/963942.cms

2GovernmentofIndia(2003),‘ConcurrentEvaluationofSampoornaGrameenaRozgraYojana(SGRY)’,Ministryof

RuralDevelopment,www.rural.nic.in;GovernmentofIndia(2005),‘10thFiveYearPlanMidTermAppraisal’,PlanningCommission,www.planningcommission.nic.in,GovernmentofIndia(2005),‘ConcurrentEvaluationof

SampoornaGrameenRozgarYojana(Orissa)’,MinistryofRuralDevelopment,GovernmentofIndia


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Inresponsetothecorruptionproblemandtoensurethatbenefitsreachthosewhoneedit,

a numberof transparency and accountabilitymeasureshavebeenbuilt in to theNREGA

making theNREGAoneof India’smostunique experiments in strengthening governance

systems.Therearethreepillarsaroundwhichtheseaccountabilitymechanismshavebeen

constructed:

1. Decentralized planning and implementation: Decentralization of governance

systemsliesatthecoreofanaccountablesystem.TheNREGAdrawsstronglyonthis

principle.Accordingly,section13(1)oftheNREGAmandatesthat‘Panchayatsatthe

district,intermediateandvillagelevelswillbetheprincipalauthoritiesforplanning

and implementation of the schemes’. Further empowering theGramPanchayat, it

stipulatesthataminimumof50%ofthefundsandrelevantworksbeexecutedby

theGramPanchayat.Toensurethatplanningandworksselectedreflecttheneeds

and priorities of the local citizens, section 16 (3) (4) of theAct states that ‘every

GramPanchayatshallprepareadevelopmentplanandmaintainashelfofworks.’

This shelf of works is prepared based on recommendations of the Gram Sabha.

These recommendations are in turn forwarded to the Program Officer. A similar

systemisfollowedattheintermediateanddistrictPanchayatlevel.

2. Proactive disclosure: Access to regular, reliable and relevant information is an

important pre‐requisite for accountability. Accordingly, the NREGA guidelines

mandate that all levels of government maintain proper records containing

informationon inputs,processes,outputsandoutcomes related to theNREGA.To

ensurethatthisinformationisproactivelydisclosedandmadeavailabletocitizens,

theNREGAguidelinesstipulate thatall informationwillbedisplayedto thepublic

through display boards and paintings on the walls of the Panchayat offices. In

addition, all Gram Panchayat level NREGA accounts and summaries of these

accountsaretobemadepubliclyavailableforscrutiny.Theguidelinesalsomandate

thatallruralhouseholdsareentitledtoajobcardintowhichemploymentandwage


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detailsmusttobeentered,andmusterrollsaretobekeptontheworksiteandread

outinpublicatthetimeofpayments.

BuildingontheprovisionsoftheRighttoInformationAct,theNREGAstipulatesthat

all information requests related to theNREGAbemade available to the applicant

within7days,asopposedtothestipulated30daysintheRTIAct.

To facilitate ease and access to information, an integrated Monitoring and

Implementation System has also been developed. The guidelines stress that all

NREGArelateddocumentsbedigitizedandregularlyuploadedontotheMISsystems

bothatthesateandcentralgovernmentlevel.

3. Social audits: Social audits or the process of cross‐verification of government

records with realities on the ground completes the feedback loop in the

accountabilitychain. Itcreatesaplatformforthepoorestandmostdisempowered

toparticipateingovernance.Section17oftheNREGAmandatesthatregularsocial

auditsbeconductedintheGramSabhasatleastonceeverysixmonths.TheNREGA

guidelines dedicate an entire chapter to the social audits process. It identifies 11

stagesoftheprogramwhereanindividualorgroupcanintervenetoensurepublic

vigilance.Thelaststageisthemandatorysixmonthlysocialauditforum,wherethe

gramsabhacomestogethertoassessandverifyprogress.

TheaccountabilityandtransparencymeasuresenshrinedintheNREGAhaveprovedtobe

a catalyst for some state governments and civil society organizations to take innovative

steps towards developing and institutionalizing accountability tools into the governance

system.Oneofthemostinterestingexamplesoftheseinnovationscanbefoundinthestate

of Andhra Pradesh (AP) where the government has initiated a systematic process of

undertakingsocialauditsforallNREGAworksacrossthestate.TheAndhraexperienceis

uniquebecauseitmarksthefirsttimethatthegovernmenthasproactivelytakenstepsto

openitselfuptoscrutinybycitizens.Thishasfacilitatedtheconductofsocialauditsatan

unprecedented scale and thus offers some extremely important insights in to the


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effectivenessofasocialauditasatooltostrengthenaccountabilitysystemswithinthestate

aswellasforcitizenstodemandaccountability.

ThiscasestudydocumentstheAndhraexperienceandanalysesthestrengthsofthesocial

auditprocess. Itdrawsonempiricalworkaimedatmeasuring theeffectivenessof social

auditsconductedinAPbetweenMarchandDecember2007.

TheCasestudy

UnderstandingSocialAudits

Theideaofthesocialauditwasbornintheearly1990soutofalargerstruggletoensure

minimumwageregulationindroughtreliefworksandavailabilityofsubsidizedfoodand

otheressential commodities to thepoorest through thepublicdistribution system (PDS)

spearheaded by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) a grassroots organization

basedinRajasthan.Earlyoninitsstruggles,theMKSSencounteredwidespreadcorruption

both in the provision of wages in relief works and the supply of essential commodities

through the PDS system. The MKSS surmised that the primary reason this large scale

corruptionproliferateduncheckedwas thatall governmentprogramswere implemented

underashroudofsecrecywhichmaskedthemisuseoffunds.Officialrecordswerenever

sharedwithcitizensasaresultofwhichtheywereunabletoquestionofficialsanddemand

accountability.Most often, citizens remained unaware of the quantumof corruption and

pilferingthattookplaceintheirname.Therightofpeopletoknowwhattheirgovernments

aredoingandhowgovernmentfundsarebeingspentthusbecamethecentralpointofthe

MKSS’s struggle. Through their activism, the MKSS began to demand access to official

records and information related to local development works. With the support of

sympatheticofficials,orbypressurizinglocalofficials,theMKSSwasabletoaccesscopies

of official records. These records were analyzed and cross checked with residents of

relevantvillagesandfinallysharedwiththepublic.Animportantinnovationinthisprocess

wasthe‘JanSunwai’orpublichearingwheredetailsoftheofficialrecordswerereadoutto

assembledvillagers.Localresidentsthatwerevictimsoffraudulentpracticeswereinvited


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to give testimonies as were government officials and local politicians who are given an

opportunitytopublicdefendtheiractions.3

This process of reviewing official records and determining whether state reported

expenditures reflect theactualmonies spenton theground is referred toas a socialaudit.

Evidence is gathered through interactions with participants in development programs,

verification of schemes and interviewswith Panchayatmembers and local officials. The

firststepinasocialauditistheprocurementofofficialrecords.Withtheenactmentofthe

Right to Information Act in 2005, this has beenmade possible with relative ease. Once

procured, these records are studied, de‐mystified and made accessible to the general

public. Findings from the Social Audit are then shared with citizens and local officials

througha‘JanSunwai’orpublichearing.

While the direct objective of the social audit process is to expose corruption, the social

audits are a critical mechanism through which to empower citizens and strengthen

democraticaction.Chandoke, inheranalysisof thepublichearingargues, that thepublic

hearing perform three functions intrinsic to democracy. First, it produces informed

citizens,second,itencouragescitizenstoparticipateinlocalaffairsthroughtheprovision

ofinformationandsocialauditingandthird,ithelpscreateasenseofcivicresponsibilityby

bringingpeopletogethertoaddressissuesofcollectiveconcern.4Thesocialauditprocess

enables people to be aware of their rights and entitlements and offers a space and

mechanismthroughwhichtheserightscanbeexercised.

With theNREGA, theconceptof thesocialaudithas takenroot.Section17of theNREGA

mandatestheregularconductofsocialauditsonallaspectsofthescheme.Inaddition,the

Governmentof Indiaoperational guidelinesprovide implementers stepby step guidance3ForadetailedaccountandanalysisoftheMKSSJansunwai’sandthestrugglefortherighttoinformationsee

Goetz,A.MandJenkinsJ(1999),‘AccountsandAccountability:TheoreticalImplicationsoftheRighttoInformationMovementinIndia’,ThirdWorldQuarterly,Vol.20,No.3(1999).SeealsotheMKSSwebsitewww.mkssindia.org

4Chandoke,N(2007),‘EngagingwithCivilSociety:ThedemocraticPerspective’,Non‐governmentalPublicAction

Program,CenterforCivilSociety,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience


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onhowtoconductasocialaudit.SincethelaunchofNREGAinFebruary2006,civilsociety

organizations,ofteninpartnershipwithlocaladministrativeofficialshavebeenconducting

social audits all across the country. These audits have been instrumental inmaintaining

publicpressureforaccountabilityandtransparencyintheimplementationofNREGA.

TheAndhraPradeshExperience

Likemost of India, Andhra too had a dismal record of implementing rural employment

programs.Researchonfoodforworkprograms(FFW)inthestatetoldthealltoofamiliar

story of large scalemisappropriations by contractors, local political bosses and officials.

These abuses are well documented in a study on Rs. 3 billion worth of FFW programs

conductedbyDeshingkarandJohnsonbetween2001and2002.Theirresearchshowedthe

widespread presence of contractors in all study villages. The contractors made illegal

profits by inflating employment figures, submitting inflated proposals for works, and

claimingricequotasforincompleteworks.Insomeinstances,contractorswentsofarasto

claim funds for old works that had been constructed under a different program. The

researchexposedthenexusbetweenthecontractorsandlocalpoliticalbosses‐infiveout

ofsixcasesthevillageSarpanches,wardPanchesandtheirfamilymembersdoubledupas

contractors.Consequently,largeamountsoffundswerepilferedandworkersweredenied

theirwages.5

Against this background, NREGA posed a serious challenge for the AP government.

PoliticalcompulsionsputAPonthespotlightforimplementingNREGA‐inFebruary2006

theschemewaslaunchedinAnantpurdistrictofAndhraPradesh.Withthespotlighton,the

political climatewas ripe for a serious re‐think of the corruption problem.AP’s political

class was supported by an extremely efficient and committed top level bureaucracy‐ in

particular theprinciple secretary for rural development (thedepartment responsible for

5Deshingar,P.andJohnson.(2003),‘StateTransferstothePoorandBack:theCaseoftheFoodforWorkProgram

inAndhraPradesh’,WorkingPaper222,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,www.odi.org.uk).


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implementingtheNREGAisthestate)whowasreadytoexperimentwithinnovativeideas

toplugallpotentialsourcesofleakage.

The first step in this directionwas to computerize the entire implementation process of

NREGA. With the help of an information technology company‐ the Tata Consultancy

Services, the government of AP developed an end to endMIS system throughwhich job

cards,workestimatesandpaymentordersareissued.Thedataiscollectedandinputtedat

the Mandal (the lowest administrative unit‐ a collection of 21 Gram Panchayats) and

consolidated at the state level. Informationon each job cardholder includingnumberof

daysworkedandtotalwagesreceivedisaccessiblethroughtheMISsystem.Allthedatais

publicandavailableforscrutiny.Tostreamlinepaymentprocesses,wagesarepaiddirectly

throughpostofficeaccountsorbankaccountsoftheworkers.

But the AP government was well aware that e‐governance is no panacea. It offered no

guaranteeson thequalityofdata thatwasentered in to thesystem. Systematicchanges

neededtobeinstutionalizedinordertoensurerealchange.TheAPgovernmentrecognized

that in order to tackle corruption it was critical to attack it at its roots for which local

monitoringandverificationarecritical.Socialauditsofferedthebestmechanismtodothis.

InstitutionalizingtheSocialAudit:Firststeps

ThesocialauditprocessbeganinMarch2006withagovernmentinitiatedpilotsocialaudit

on12NationalFoodforWorkProgram(theprecursortoNREGA)works.Tofacilitatethis

process,thegovernmentsoughtthecollaborationoftheMKSS.TheMKSStrainedofficials

and interested civil society activists and worked with the government to design the

conductofthesepilotsocialaudits.Theobjectiveofthesepilotswasbothtotestthewaters

anddevelopacadreoftrainedresourcepersonswhocouldmanagetheimplementationof

socialauditsinthestate.Thepilotsocialauditsprovidedthemomentumnecessaryforthe

bureaucracytocrystallizetheideaof institutionalizingsocialauditprocessessothatthey

couldbeconductedregularlyonallNREGAworksinthestate.


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Theinstitutionalspacefordevelopingateamandmanagingsocialauditsinthestatewas

found in the Strategy and Performance InnovationUnit (SPIU) of the rural development

department.6 Between March 2006 and July 2006, a series of training sessions were

conductedby theMKSS tohelp thegovernmentbuilda teamof resourcepersons.These

trainings culminated in the setting up of a 25 member strong state resource team. In

addition,260(20perdistrict)district levelresourcepersonshavealsobeentrained.The

actualauditisconductedbyeducatedvillageyouthwhoareidentifiedandtrainedbythis

poolofresourcepersons.ThefirstsocialauditonNREGAworkswasconductedJuly2006.

Sincethen,Andhraanaverageof54socialauditsareconductedeverymonthacrossall13

NREGAdistricts. This is a first ‐ nowhere else in India have social audits takenplace on

suchalargescalewithsuchfrequency.

Implementingthesocialaudit

Themanagementstructure

Thesocialauditprocess is facilitatedby theRuralDevelopmentDepartment through the

SPIU that provides the organizational backbone to the process. The SPIU is headed by a

director,whoisadrawnfromthestatecivilservicecadre.Thedirectorissupportedbya

teamof25resourcepersonsaswellasasocialdevelopmentspecialist.Allteammembers

aredrawnexclusivelyfromcivilsocietyorganizations.Thisextensiveinvolvementofcivil

societyorganizationsiscentraltothekeyelementofthesocialauditstructure.Anauditby

definition cannot be conducted by the implementing agency. By bringing civil society

organizationsintotheprocessthestategovernmenthascrossedthishurdle.Thepresence

of civil society ensures that there is a high degree of autonomy and objectivity to the

exercise.Itisoneofthemostimportantchecksandbalancesthathavebeenbuiltintothe

process.

6TheseweredepartmentssetupthroughaDFIDfundedreformactionplanaimedatinstitutionalizinggovernance

reformingthestate


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ThedirectorSPIUtogetherwiththesocialdevelopmentspecialistisresponsiblefortaking

allpolicyandmanagementdecisionsrelatedtotheconductofSocialAuditsonNREGA.The

state resource persons (SRPs) are responsible for managing the day to day aspects of

conducting the social audit. This includes drawing up the social audit schedule, training

districtlevelresourcepersons,liasoningwithdistrictlevelofficialsandensuringfollowup

tosocialauditfindings.Thedistrictresourcepersons(DRPs)areresponsibleformanaging

theactualconductof thesocialaudit.This includes identifyingthevillagesocialauditors,

trainingthevillagesocialauditorsalongwithstateresourcepersons,filingRTIapplications

for accessing government documents and interacting with the mandal level officials to

organizelogisticsandthepublichearings.Thesocialaudititselfisconductedbyvolunteers

from the villages. Thus far, the social audit team has developed a cadre of over 20,000

trainedvillagesocialauditors.

Figure1:ManagementStructurebehindthesocialaudits


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Theruraldevelopmentdepartmenthasplayedaverysupportiveroleinthisentireprocess.

The social audit team is given complete autonomy by the department in its everyday

operations.Toensurethesmoothconductoftheauditandthefullsupportandcooperation

fromlocallevelofficials,thegovernmentfromtimetotime,issuesvariousordersdetailing

rulesandprocessesrelatedtotheaudit.Theseordersareessentialastheyhavegiventhe

social auditors easy access to government records aswell asmade it incumbent of local

officialstoparticipateinthepublichearingsandrespondtosocialauditfindings.This,as

weshallseeinthediscussiontofollow,isthemostessentialelementoftheAPsocialaudit

process.

Conductingthesocialaudit

Alotofpreparatoryworkgoesintotheactualconductofthesocialaudit.Thefirststepis

toputinanapplicationundertheRighttoInformation(RTI)toaccessrelevantdocuments.

Next the SRPs and DRPs conduct gram sabha’s in villages where the audit is to be

conducted to recruit volunteers to conduct the audit. These volunteers are drawn

exclusivelyfromwage‐seekersfamilies.Onceidentified,thevolunteersundergoa3‐4day

training session. On average, about 100 volunteers are identified per Mandal. These

volunteersarethendividedintogroupsandassignedGramPanchayats‐aconsciouseffort

ismadetoensurethatvolunteersdonotgo intotheirownvillagestoconductthesocial

audit. Parallel to the trainings, meticulous research is conducted and all official records

pertaining to the NREGA works including muster rolls, technical sanctions, utilization

certificates,billsandvouchersarescrutinizedandconsolidatedintomanageableandeasy

tounderstandformats.

Armedwith thesedocuments, thevillagesocialauditors thengo in toconduct theactual

auditoverathreedayperiod.Duringthistime,theauditorsstayinthevillagesassignedto

them. To conduct the audit, the village auditors go from house to house cross verifying

officialrecords,scrutinizingjobcards,examiningtheworksites,takingmeasurementsand


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gathering information through interviews with wage seekers. Verification complete, the

auditorsorganizeavillagelevelmeetingwherefindingsfromtheauditaresharedwiththe

villagers. Local political bosses, the Panchayat members and local officials most

importantlythefieldassistant(governmentappointeewhomanagestheimplementationof

theNREGA at the village level) participate in thesemeetings. The village levelmeetings

begin with an information sharing session where details on the legal entitlements are

shared with the public. This helps villagers understand the scheme better and most

important acts as a catalyst for discussion and debate on the state of scheme

implementation.Duringthesemeetings,namesofwageseekersandamountsduetothem

arepubliclyreadout.Thisinformationtriggersadetaileddiscussionbetweenwageseekers

andthefieldassistantondifferentaspectsof implementation.Throughthisprocesspetty

forms of corruption are unearthed in full public view. For instance, wage seekers may

realizethatthattheyhavebeengivenonlyaportionofthetotalwagesthatistheredue,or

thatthefieldassistanthasinflatedthenumberofdaysthattheyhaveworkedonthesitein

themusterroll(attendanceregister).Orthattheyhavenotbeengiventhecorrectwagefor

every day or work done. Based on this information, villagers come forth and testify to

whether theyhaveorhavenot receivedwagesandwhether the information recorded is

accurate.

Thesocialauditprocessconcludeswitha socialaudit forumor Jansunwaiat theMandal

levelwheresocialauditteamsfromallvillagesintheMandalcometogethertocollectively

share their findings. It ismandatory for key NREGA officials from theMandal to attend

these meetings. Official participation includes the Mandal Development Officer, the

Program Director, Panchayat members and officials from the postal departments. In

addition, seniordistrictofficials including thecollector, theDistrictProgramCoordinator

forNREGA,officialsandonoccasionMembersof theLegislativeAssembly(MLAs)attend

the forums.Membersof thesocialaudit teampresideover themeetings.Typically, these

meetingsareattendedbyfivetosixhundredvillagers.Atthesemeetingsvillagesocialaudit

teamssharekeyfindingsfromtheauditwiththeforum.Villagersthathavebornethebrunt


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ofcorruptionareinvitedtotestifyandquestionNREGAfunctionaries.NREGAfunctionaries

arethencalledupontorespondtochargesleviedagainstthem.

The presence of senior government officials enables immediate and effective grievance

redressalalbeitonlywherecasesofpettycorruptionareunearthed.Consequenttosocial

audit forumsover500fieldassistantsand10technicalassistantshavebeendismissed,3

MPDOshavebeensuspendedand inquiries initiatedagainstat least6otherMandal level

officials.7 Administrative action apart, corrupt officials have actually begun to return

embezzled funds. Since the social audit process began as many as 60 Lakh worth of

embezzledfundshavebeenreturned.8

Aside fromunearthingcorruption, the social auditsalsooffera formal setting for senior

officials to interact with front line implementers andwage seekers. This allows for real

time feedback on the status of the scheme implementation. Asmany analysts of India’s

publicservicedeliverysystemarguecorruptionapart,oneof itsmainweaknesses lies in

thefactthatprogramsarepoorlymanagedandrarelymonitored.Lackofknowledgeand

technicalknowhowonthepartofthefrontlineworkercaninnosmallmeasurecontribute

tothefailureofgovernmentprograms.TherealtimefeedbackonprogressinNREGAhas

ensured that some of these problems are tackled. Through interactions with senior

officials, front lineworkers can clarify doubts, and resolve problems.Moreover, because

information on the NREGA is disseminated during the forum, both officials and wage

seekers come away with a better understanding of the NREGA. From the wage seekers

pointofyou, thisaccess to informationcangoa longway inensuring that theNREGA is

implementedeffectively.Afterallknowledgeispowerandwiththispower,wageseekers

areinabetterpositiontodemandtheirrightsfromtheimplementingagencies.Empirical

evidenceontheeffectivenessofthesocialauditcorroboratesthesehypotheses.

7ThesestatisticshavebeencompiledbytheSPIU,GovernmentofAndhraPradesh

8Akella,KandKidambi,S(2007),‘SocialAuditsinAndhraPradesh:Aprocessinevolution’,EconomicandPolitical

Weekly,November2007


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AnalyzingAndhraPradesh’sexperience

Whathappensafterasocialaudit?

In 2007, the World Bank, in partnership with the SPIU of the rural development

department of Andhra Pradesh conducted a study on the effectiveness of implementing

regularandsustainedsocialauditsinNREGA9.Theoverarchingobjectiveofthestudywas

to assess the efficacy of the social audits as an accountability mechanism. It did so by

focusingontheeffectivenessofthesocialauditonlaborersacrossthreeparameters:

Levels of awareness of NREGSAP nonnegotiables: Scheme entitlements‐guarantee,

wages,paymentprocesses

The implementation process:Worksite information, worksite facilities, measurement

processes,musterroll,wagepayments

Grievance redressal: Social audits as an effective mechanism to resolve problems,

perceptionstowardsofficials.

The study surveyed840 laborersacross threedistricts (Cuddapah,KhamamandMedak)

asking thesamesetofquestions to thesame laborers thriceovera sevenmonthperiod:

Round1beforethesocialaudittoestablishabaseline,round2,onemonthafterthesocial

audit to determine the immediate effect of exposure to a social audit and round 3, six

monthslatertoassesshowtheeffectschangeovertime.

Inadditionasetof surveyswereadministered to180 laborersoneweekafter thesocial

audittogaugelaborerperceptionsonthesocialauditprocess.

9Formoredetailsseestudysee:“SocialAudits:fromignorancetoawareness.TheAPexperience”,WorldBankstudycoordinatedbyAtulPokharelwithYaminiAiyarandSalimahSamjiinpartnershipwithIntellecapandSPIU

(APgovt),1February2008.www.rd.ap.gov.in/SAudit/Draft_SocialAudits_Feb08.pps


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KeyfindingSignificantjumpinawarenesslevelsabouttheNREGA

Toassesstheimpactthatthesocialaudithasonawarenesslevels,thestudyasked

labourerswhethertheyhadheardoftheNREGAandwhetherthatwereawareofits

specificcomponents‐100daysguarantee,nomachines,minimumwagesandsoon.

Throughitsanalysis,thestudyfoundthatthesocialauditshaveadramaticeffecton

awareness.

Whenasked‘HaveyouheardoftheNREGA’,only39%answeredpositivelyinround1

(beforethesocialaudit).Thisrosetoadramatic98%inround2andstayedat98%in

round3(sixmonthslater)

Whenqueriedonspecificaspectsofthescheme,theresultswereequallydramatic.

1) Only 31% respondents were aware that the APREGS offers a 100 day guarantee

beforethesocialaudit.Thisshotupto88%inround2andwentupto99%inround

3.

2) 30%respondentswereawarethatmachineswereforbiddenintheprogrambefore

thesocialaudit.Thisincreasedto88%and99%inrounds2and3respectively.

3) 27%respondentswereawarethattheschemebannedcontractors inround1this

roseto88%and99%overthenexttworounds.

4) 25% were aware that the APREGS is a demand driven scheme before the social

audit.Thiswentupto74%afterthesocialauditandincreasedto99%inround3of

thesurvey.


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Figure2:Dramaticimprovementsinlevelsofawarenessbeforeandafterasocial

audit

This data is significant as it reflects the critical role that social audits can play in

disseminating informationandensuring that it reaches thosewhoneed it.Asmentioned,

duringtheaudit, teamsspendaminimumofthreetofourdaysinthevillagesinteracting

withbeneficiariesanddiscussingvariousaspectsof theschemewith them.At theendof

this process, villagemeetings are organizedwhere information concerning the program

anddetailsofitsimplementationaresharedwiththevillage.Throughthisprocess,critical

informationissharedandasthisdatasuggests,thisknowledgeremainswiththevillagers

longaftertheauditteamshavegone.

KeyfindingImprovementsinworksiteimplementationprocesses

Whatdoesaccesstoinformationachieve?Canithaveasignificantimpactontheefficacyof

programimplementation?Moreover,doesregularmonitoring‐whichistheobjectiveofthe


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socialaudit‐leadtomidcoursecorrections?Toanswersomeofthesequestions,thestudy

investigated implementationprocessesof theNREGAacrossthe3rounds. Ineachround,

laborers were asked specific questions concerning work site management, muster role

maintenance,worksitefacilitiesandpaymentprocesses.Theresultswerelessdramaticbut

significant.Forinstance:

• Thestudyfoundthatentriesinjobcardsincreasedfrom39%inround1to99%in

round 3 indicating that there is some follow up to the social audit in key

managementareas.

• Knowledgeabout thewagepayment slips andwhat theyaremeant for rose from

62%to92%and96%respectively.Adirectconsequenceofthatwasthatlaborers

betterunderstoodthatthatpaymentslipsarelinkedtoquantumofwagesreceived‐

figuresrosefrom49%to60%inround3.

• Some visible improvements were noticed in worksite facilities. Drinking water

availability went up from 79% in round 1 to 83% and 95% in rounds 2 and 3

respectively.Thepresenceoffirstaidfacilitiesatworksitesrosefrom41%inround

1to52%inround2and83%inround3.Theprovisionoffacilitiesforshadeatthe

worksitesimprovedfrom16%to40%inround3.

Interestingly,therewasa10%jumpbetweenround1andround3inpeople’sperceptions

ofdelaysinwagepayments.Thiscouldbefortworeasons,onebecausethesedelaysindeed

didincreasebutthischangeinperceptioncouldalsobearesponsetothefactthatalarger

number of labourerswere now aware that payments had to bemadewithin 15 days of

workcompletion.

Keyfinding–socialauditscanredressgrievancesandstrengthenabilitytointeracts

withgovernmentofficials

Toassesswhether social audits areperceived as a usefulmechanism for resolvingpetty

grievances, thestudymeasured laborerperceptionsof thesocialauditprocess.Labourer


21

perceptionswereassessedthroughtwomechanisms.Firstwasthroughasetofquestions

in the main household survey administered over the three phases. Second, through a

perceptionsurveythatwasadministeredwithinaweekofconductingthesocialaudit.

Study results show that 88%of thosewho had participated in the social audit said that

grievanceswereraisedduringtheauditprocess.Ofthese,asmanyas84%saidthatthese

wereresolved.Whenaskediftheyfeltthatthesocialauditwasaneffectivemechanismto

resolvegrievances,asmanyas82%laborersrepliedintheaffirmative.

Onthedesirabilityofconductingsocialaudits,90%respondentssaidthesocialauditsarea

desirabletask.Ofthese,94%saidthatthesocialauditoughttobeconductedonaregular

basisandattheendofround3,95%respondentssaidthattheywerereadytoconducta

socialauditontheirown.

This data highlights one of the greatest strengths of the social audit process in AP‐

government supportwhich gives the process legitimate authority andmakes immediate

grievanceredressalpossible.Because theauditsaresponsoredby theruraldevelopment

department, senior government officials are obliged toparticipate in thepublic hearings

and take concrete action wherever possible. Moreover, the state social audit team has

initiated a follow up processwhere every 15 days, the village social auditor alongwith

relevantresourcepersonsvisit theMandalofficetoreviewactiontakenonfindingsfrom

the public meeting. The social audit team has also set up a website where social audit

reportsandfollowupactionsareuploadedandavailableforpublicscrutiny.

Thisimmediate,tangiblegrievanceredressalliesattheheartofthesocialauditprocess.It

helps build people’s trust in the process and can act as a spur for victims of petty

corruption to lodge their complaints. For the rural poor, who are most often locked in

exploitativepatron‐client relationships, to standup in front of local officials andexpress

theirgrievances isnoordinaryfeat.Thewillingnessofpeopletoparticipate inthepublic

hearings–insomeMandalsovera1,000peoplehavegatheredtoparticipateinthepublic

hearings‐andtoexpresstheirgrievancesistoalargeextentaconsequenceofthefactthat


22

correctiveaction is taken immediately.Aresponsiveadministration is thuscritical to the

successfulconductofthesocialaudit.

Analysts of social audits argue that the process challenges the remote culture of the

bureaucracy.Theveryactofplacinghithertosecretdocumentswithin thepublicdomain

serves to remove the shroud of secrecy that surrounds government operations, which

allows thebureaucracy todistance itself from its citizenry. In sodoing, it hasunveileda

culture of participation and openness. By mandating the presence of officials and

institutingmechanisms for regular follow up on social audit findings, the Andhra social

auditprocessisanillustrationofhowthiscanbereinforcedandstrengthenedfromwithin

theadministrativesystem.

Whateffectshasthishadonlaborerperceptionstowardsgovernmentofficials?Thestudy

triedtoassesswhethersocialauditsaffectthe

ways in which laborers interact and engage

with local officials? Over 90% laborers said

they felt more comfortable approaching

various local level functionaries. When asked

why,60%saidtheincreaseinawarenessabout

different aspects of the act had made them

more confident to approach the concerned

authorities.

Most crucially, the study also found that

people’s perceptions of their ability to

influence officials changed consequent to the

social audit. In round 1, a mere 43% of the respondents said that they were powerful

enoughtoinfluencetheAPREGsofficials.Thisnumberwentupto90%sixmonthsafterthe

socialaudit.

Voicesfromthefield

“WewerewatchingtheFAssoscared,thatweforgottoreportourFA.”:ParticipantsatArepalliSocialAuditForum

“Wecametoknowmanythingsthatwedidn’totherwiseknowaftergoingtothemandalmeeting.Wearenowabletoquestionanymisdeedsthatthemate,FAandTAareindulgingin.”:ParticipantsatObulvaripalle

“Thesocialauditpeopleshouldcomeeverymonthtokeepthesewrongdoingsatbay.”Satyamma,ArepalliSJ

**


23

Figure3:Morepowerandmorerespect

In both instances, the numbers rose dramatically in the third round. This was mainly

because the state government instituted a system for regular follow up which required

village social auditors to go back and interacting with the social audit participants to

monitoraction takenonauditrecommendations.Consequently, laborerswereassuredof

feedback,whichisresponsibleforthechangeinperceptions.

UnderstandingtheroleoftheAPgovernment:

NodiscussionontheAPsocialauditexperiencecanbecompletewithoutdrawingattention

tothecentralroleoftheAPgovernmentinfacilitatingthisprocess.Asmentioned,themost

striking feature of the Andhra model for conducting social audits is that the state

government has willingly opened itself up for scrutiny and done so by proactively

mobilizing citizens tomonitor its programs.This has important ramificationson current

conceptualizations of state‐civil society relationships and their individual roles in

addressingaccountabilitydeficits.


24

Conventional conceptualizations of accountability distinguish between horizontal and

verticalformsofaccountability(therearealternativelyreferredtoassupplyanddemand

sideofaccountability).Horizontalaccountabilityreferstothehostofmechanismschecks

andbalancesinternaltothestate(judicialoversight,auditingandaccounting,performance

incentives)throughwhichstateagenciesareheldtoaccount.Verticalaccountabilityrefers

to the mechanisms through which citizens hold the state to account. Elections are the

classicformofverticalaccountability10.

Dissatisfaction with traditional horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms has

resultedinincreasedinvolvementofcivilsocietyinplacingdemandsforaccountabilityon

the state. The emphasis is on strengthening citizen ‘voice’ to directly demand

accountability.TheoristssuchasGoetzandJenkinsarguethatthereareagrowingnumber

ofcivilsocietyinitiativesthattranscendthehorizontal‐verticaldividebydirectlyengaging

with horizontal accountability mechanisms through public interest litigations, budget

analysis and social audits. These in turn can strengthen and energize horizontal

accountability11. The focus of much academic and policy work on strengthening

accountability isnowonstrengthening the roleof thesenon‐stateactorsor the ‘demand

side’ofaccountability.

Theonusofdemandingaccountabilityisincreasinglyseentoliesolelyoncivilsociety.Itis

forcivilsocietytoconscientize,mobilizeandorganizecitizenstoexercisetheirrightsand

demand accountability. The Andhra experience not only challenges this notion by

demonstratingthatthestatecananddoeshavearoleinmobilizingcitizensandfostering

10ForadetaileddiscussiononaccountabilitymechanismsseeGoetz,A.MandGaventa,J(2001)’BringingClient

VoiceandClientFocusinServiceDelivery’,IDSWorkingPaperNo.138,www.ids.ac.uk;GoetzandJenkins(2004);‘Accountability’,inAdamKuperandJessicaKuper(eds),TheSocialScienceEncyclopedia,NewYork,Routledge,

2004;andNewell,P.andBellour,S.(2002),‘MappingAccountability:origins,contextandimplicationsfordevelopment’,IDSWorkingPaperNo.168,www.ids.ac.uk

11Goetz,A.MandJenkins,R(2001),‘HybridFormsofAccountability:CitizenengagementinInstitutionsofpublic

oversightinIndia’,PublicManagementReview,Vol.3,No.3(2001)


25

participation but also adds a new dimension to this: the state can offer the most

disadvantagedanddisempoweredtheopportunitytoexercisetheirrights.

State society relations are mediated by the range of rights that the state extends to its

citizens.Thisdeterminesthenatureandformofcitizenparticipationinstateaffairsandthe

ways inwhichcitizensmaymobilize toexercise theirrights.Therelationshiphasalways

beena linearone‐ the stateextends rights to its citizenswhich it isobliged to fulfill and

citizensdrawondifferent formsofparticipation toexercise these rights.When the state

doesnotfulfillitsobligationsvisavisrightstocitizens,citizensusevariousmechanismsto

demand these rights. The AP experience transcends this linear relationship by

demonstratingtherolethatthestate,ifwilling,canplayinmobilizing,conscientizingand

organizingcitizenstooperationalizetheirrights.Afterall,thesocialauditisaboutcitizens

exercisingtheirrighttoknowandparticipateingovernmentaffairs.

Civilsocietyhasanimportantroletoplayinfacilitatingthisprocess.Itcan,astheAndhra

case has well demonstrated, enter in to strategic partnerships with the state and help

facilitatesocietalparticipationinthecoreactivitiesofgovernment.Thismarksasignificant

shift in themodeofcivicactivism in India.Historically,civil society in Indiahasengaged

with the state through broad based protest action and resistance. In its struggles, civil

society has drawn on the idiom ofmassmobilization and political agitation popularized

through the freedommovement. Gandhianmeans of civil disobedience characterized by

mass mobilization, rallies, petitions and direct confrontation have dominated practices

throughwhich civil society has engagedwith the state. In recent years, the civil society

landscape has witnessed some innovations that have moved beyond protest to a more

direct engagement with the state and its apparatus. Public interest litigation, budget

analysis, participatory budget planning and social auditing are examples of these new

formsof engagement. Strategies toohave shifted to includenetworking, interactingwith

themedia and lobbyingwithwellmeaning public officials to promote causes. One such

strategyistopartnerwiththegovernment.However,thenatureofthesepartnershipshas

been somewhat limited. Partnerships with government usually occur at the level of


26

implementation‐whenitiscosteffectiveandpracticalforthegovernmenttocontractout

some its core activities to civil society organizations. Civil society’s role in these

partnershipsisreducedtobeinganextended‘implementing’armofthegovernment.

What makes the Andhra experience unique is that it offers a new dimension to these

partnerships.ToinstitutionalizesocialauditsinAndhraPradeshcivilsocietyorganizations

–includingtheMKSSwhichofferedallitstechnicalexpertisetothegovernmentofAndhra‐

haveenteredintoadynamicpartnershipwiththegovernment.Theengagementbeganat

theplanningandstrategyphaseandhascontinuedintotheimplementationstage.Atevery

step,civilsocietyhasoffereditsexpertise,experience,insightsandskillstothegovernment

to experimentwith social audits. In the long run, this partnership can go a longway in

guardingagainstcooptionofthesocialauditprocessbythestate.

This brings us to one of the most serious limitations with this state‐led model of

accountability: its vulnerability to co‐optionbyvested interestswithin the state that can

reducetheentireprocesstoasham.Thesuccessofthesocialaudit‐andforthatmatterany

otheraccountabilitymechanism‐iscruciallydependentontheautonomyandobjectivityof

theprocess.Thisrequiresthattheprocessbeconductedonthebasisofcertaincorenorms

andprinciplesthatremainuncompromised.Asdiscussed,inAPthecontinuouspresenceof

civilsocietyandthe fact that theaudit isconductedbyvillage levelvolunteersactsasan

important check and balance to the process. Administrative responsiveness forms the

backboneof theprocess.As has beendiscussed, in the absence of immediate, corrective

action,theprocesslosesitsrelevanceandrunstheriskofdegeneratingintoameaningless

exercise that elicits neither answerability from the government nor does it encourage

participation from citizens. The vulnerability of the social audits is best highlighted in

Akella and Kidambi’s commentary on the social audit process in Andhra. Akella and

Kidambi (2007) tellus thestoryofanMLA(state legislature)whoduringpublichearing

told thepresidingofficer: ‘Doyouthink if Ididn’twant it thepublicmeetingwouldhave

goneon?Therewouldonlyhavebeentablesandchairs’.Yet,asAkellaandKidambiargue,

theprocesshasacquiredanalmostunstoppablemomentum‐theyquote instanceswhere


27

wage‐seekers have participated in the hearings despite being threatened. Does this

momentumhavethepowertomakecooptionjustthatmuchharder?Onlytimewilltell.

Conclusion

TheAndhraPradeshgovernment’sexperiencewithimplementingsocialauditsisaunique

experiment in integrating accountability mechanisms in to the state apparatus. It offers

some interesting insights in to the effectiveness of regular, sustained social audits.

Emergingempiricalevidenceonthesocialauditssuggeststhatsocialauditsinfacthavea

significantandlastingeffectoncitizen’sawarenesslevels.Moreover,itdemonstratesthatit

hassomeeffectsonimplementationprocessesandinthisprocess,itsignificantlyenhances

laborer confidence and self respect and most important, ability to engage with local

officials.

Crucially, ithighlights some important lessonsonhow toensure long termeffectsof the

audit.Astheresultsinthethirdroundhighlight,socialauditsaremosteffectivewhen:

1. Theyareconductedregularly,

2. Haveinbuiltfeedbackmechanisms

3. Are undertaken in partnership with the state to ensure immediate, perceivable

grievanceredressal

These lessons are important for any state government or civil society organization that

wantstoundertakeasocialauditanddevelopastrategyfortheirconduct.


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AccountabilityInitiativeTheAccountabilityInitiativeisanindependentefforttostrengthenstateaccountabilityinIndiabyundertakingpolicyresearch,creatingnetworksofstakeholders,exploringnewareasandwaystocollectanddisseminateinformationonthequalityofpublicservicesinIndia.Theinitiative’sworkiscollaborative.Itseekstostrengthencurrentaccountabilityeffortsbygovernment,civilsociety,researchinstitutesandthemedia.Specifically,theinitiativeaimsto:

• Undertake policy research on the mechanisms of accountability in India’sgovernanceinstitutions

• Developnewareasandinnovationstoenhanceaccountability• Supportthecreationofbetterqualitydataonbasicpublicservices• Seekinnovativewaystodisseminatethisdatatothepublic• Encourage an informed, evidence‐based debate on accountability and improved

servicedeliveryoutcomesinIndia

TheCenterforPolicyResearch,NewDelhiistheinstitutionalanchorfortheinitiative.

Visitusatwww.accountabilityindia.org

EngagingAccountability:WorkingPaperSeries

In the last decade or so non‐state actors‐ social movements, non‐governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and the media‐ have emerged as a powerful force through whichdemands for state accountability are being articulated. Often referred to as socialaccountability,thesenewaccountabilityclaimssignalaprofoundshiftintheaccountabilitydiscoursebothintermsofwhodemandsaccountabilityandmechanismsthroughwhichitisdemanded.

Despite the proliferation of these efforts, analytical work on this engagement remainslimited. Weknowverylittleaboutthenature,form,effectivenessandchallengesofthesemodesofstate‐societyengagement:whatarethechief instruments?Whatworks inwhatcontexts?Andwhatarethelessonsthatcanbedrawnfromthem?

The ‘EngagingAccountability’workingpaper series is aneffort toaddress someof thesequestionsintheIndiancontext.Itfocusesonthreemainquestions:

• Whatarethefactors‐institutionalandpolitical‐thatcreateconditionsunderwhichcitizensengageinsocialaccountability?Andwhatarethepolicyimplications?

• What are instruments and strategies through which social accountability actorsdemandaccountability?

• Howdoesonemeasuretheeffectivenessofsocialaccountability?

transparency and accountability in nrega a case study of ... and audit-nrega.pdfthe nrega guidelines...

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