transnational terrosrism
DESCRIPTION
terrorismTRANSCRIPT
-
1
Transnational Terrorism:
Theoretical approaches and policy
discourse
12 November 2008
Deliverable 3, Work package 2
Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society
-
2
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................4
CZECH REPUBLIC ...............................................................................................................................7
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY.....................................................................................................................7 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE.....................................................................................................................8 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE............................................................................8 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................9
DENMARK .............................................................................................................................................10
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................10 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................11 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................11
FRANCE ..................................................................................................................................................13
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................13 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................14 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................14 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................15
GERMANY..............................................................................................................................................16
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................16 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................17 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................18 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................19
ITALY ......................................................................................................................................................20
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................20 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................21 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................21 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................22
THE NETHERLANDS.........................................................................................................................23
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................23 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................24 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................24 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................25
POLAND .................................................................................................................................................27
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................27 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................27 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................28 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................28
PORTUGAL............................................................................................................................................29
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................29 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................29 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................30 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................30
SPAIN .....................................................................................................................................................31
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................31 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................32 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................32
-
3
CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................33
SWEDEN ................................................................................................................................................34
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................34 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................34 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................35
UNITED KINGDOM...........................................................................................................................37
DIMENSIONS ON SECURITY ..................................................................................................................37 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................38 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................38 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................39
QUICKSCAN: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE US.........................................................40
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY...................................................................................................................40 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................41 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................42
CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................44
DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY ..................................................................................................................44 CENTRALITY OF THE STATE...................................................................................................................45 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SECURITY ISSUE..........................................................................46
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................49
-
4
INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this study is to compare the findings of Deliverable 1
(Notions of Security: Shifting concepts and perspectives) with the results
obtained from the analyses of national media discourses on terrorism in EU
countries for Deliverable 2 (The evolving threat of terrorism in
policymaking and media discourse), and to further complement these
results with qualitative research.
Using quantitative PARANOID outcomes (Deliverable 2), we identified
the main trends in the media discourse on terrorism in order to better
understand the underlying security issues, based on the assumption that
the media mirrors the political and social discourses of the day and so
serves to reflect political and social perceptions of terrorism. By pinpointing
the main trends in the medias coverage of terrorism in the sample
countries, we tried to identify avenues where theoretical knowledge has - or
has not - been incorporated into policy discourses and how they have been
represented in the media. This was our main objective.
Following 9/11, terrorism became a major global security concern,
and this is reflected in the European media discourse on the subject. We
identified the main aspects of this discourse, contextualized it and
compared it to new theoretical developments in the academic field.
The aim of this study, as stated above, has been to determine
whether the discourse on terrorism found in different European countries
reflects new conceptions and dimensions of security (referring primarily to
the matter of terrorism) as analyzed in Deliverable 1. This deliverable
studied the nature of security and how its conception has evolved since the
end of the Cold War, identifying three important aspects: new dimensions of
security; the central role of the state as the main security actor; and the
emergence of transnational terrorism as a security issue.
-
5
In relation to the new dimensions of security, we sought to determine
whether terrorism features on the different states security agendas and in
the discourses of the main political powers. We also analyzed whether
military and judicial issues in relation to terrorism have been discussed in
the media and assessed whether media discourses have tended to reflect a
classical understanding of security, in which military considerations
constitute the core element, or whether new, non-military security
dimensions have also been a feature. To this end, we focused our work on
the security agenda of each state to determine whether terrorism is present
and consider the way in which it is framed.
A second aspect of the new conceptualization of terrorism, according
to Deliverable 1, is the centrality of the state as the principal security actor.
This aspect has been analyzed by comparing whether the media discourse
on terrorism has been considered in national terms (classical approach) or
in European terms (beyond the nation-state paradigm).
Finally, the extent to which transnational terrorism has emerged as
the main post-Cold War security threat in a post-9/11 world has been
gauged by what we have described as the sense of urgency vis--vis this
phenomenon as it is reflected in the media. We sought to identify whether
terrorism is considered a threat by the media and, if so, whether it has been
reported as a primarily national or international issue.
All of these elements have been combined in this deliverable in order
to analyze and identify gaps in security discourses in relation to terrorism.
Our intention is to determine whether new conceptions and dimensions of
security are reflected throughout the European media and the policy
discourses of each state, or whether they are largely absent. Using the
detailed information about the media discourse on terrorism obtained in
Deliverable 2 (complemented with qualitative information) and the
theoretical findings of Deliverable 1, we intended to determine whether
theoretical developments in this field were reflected in the media when they
refer to terrorism as a security threat.
-
6
This study is based on a country-by-country approach in order to
reach both specific (state level) and general conclusions (European level or
cross-country analysis). 11 European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom) have been analyzed and three Quick Scans
(Australia, Canada and the United States) have also been carried out.
Terrorism features prominently on the security agendas of some
states (such as Spain, the United Kingdom or France), while in others (such
as Portugal, Sweden or the Czech Republic), it is a peripheral issue. In some
European countries, the military dimension has considerable impact on the
framework of counterterrorism policy (for example, in the United Kingdom),
while the legal approach constitutes the basis for other national
counterterrorism policies (for example, in Spain). There are states that treat
terrorism as a national issue (Spain, The Netherlands and France, among
others), while others (including Italy, Portugal and Poland) deem it to be a
transnational issue.
It is thus clear that terrorism is a complex policy phenomenon in
Europe and so a simple, monolithic approach to the topic would be
insufficient.
-
7
CZECH REPUBLIC
This section discusses the perception of terrorism in the Czech Republic,
according to the framework developed in the deliverable 1 of the TTSRL
project. In particular, the dimensions of security, the centrality of the state,
and the transnationality in terrorism perception will be analyzed. In
answering the questions, both quantitative (TTSRL deliverable 2) as well as
qualitative research methods are used.
Dimensions of security
Terrorism has not been elevated into the realm of the securitized issues in
the Czech Republic (TTSRL, 2007: 44). Documents produced by the
government and related bodies, however, address terrorism extensively and
regard it as a serious threat. Indeed, the Security Strategy of the Czech
Republic of 2003, the basic document for all Czech security policy-making,
considers international terrorism together with WMD proliferation the most
serious threats of the present (Government of the Czech Republic 2003: 2).
It is argued that terrorism and counterterrorism prove the
interconnectedness of internal and external security in todays world and
require a complex approach (Ibid.: 5). Accordingly, the updated National
Action Plan for the Fight Against Terrorism, adopted by the Government in
February 2008, expects a number of ministries and state agencies to take
part in counterterrorism, including the ministry of defense, interior or
justice (Government of the Czech Republic, 2008). However, it is the
ministry of interior, which has been tasked with the co-ordination of the
state action. We can therefore argue that although seen as a complex issue,
terrorism remains a primarily internal security threat from the Czech
Governments point of view.
The media debate, however, has connected terrorism predominantly
with military (external security), instead of the rights/law (internal
security), as the quantitative research in the framework of TTSRL revealed
(TTSRL 2008: 51). This was the case in all the years analyzed with the only
exception of 1999. The difference between the Governments approach and
the media reflection can be explained by the absent securitization of
-
8
terrorism in the Czech society. Whereas the Government takes the steps
necessary to prevent a possible terrorist attack on the Czech territory, the
society does not consider such threat as serious enough and focuses on the
war on terror abroad. This war is being conducted in Afghanistan and in Iraq
with military means, thus explaining the media context of the terrorism
debate.
Centrality of the state
Counterterrorism in the Czech Republic is almost entirely a centralized
state-governed and state-conducted issue. The National Action Plan for the
Fight against Terrorism (Government of the Czech Republic, 2008) sets
down a number of concrete measures, but the overwhelming majority of
them are tasks for state authorities. In some policies, the assistance of
regional and local authorities is required, such as in preventing
radicalization of immigrant communities or in drafting emergency plans. The
private sector does not play any significant role in the Czech
counterterrorism, with the only exception being the critical infrastructure
protection where the co-operation of the critical infrastructure operators is
indispensable.
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
As already noted, terrorism does not belong among securitized topics in the
Czech Republic. With no major terrorist attack on the Czech territory so far,
the issue does attract much attention neither among the population nor,
consequently, among the political parties, as an analysis of their program
documents suggests (cf. ODS, 2006; SSD, 2006; KDU-SL, 2006; Strana
zelench, 2006; KSM, 2006).
In the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, the Government made
clear that it is the international terrorism (Government of the Czech
Republic, 2003: 6) that poses a threat to the Czech security and which
should be fought as a matter of Czech strategic interests. Similarly,
international co-operation constitutes one of four major sections of the
Czech national counterterrorism action plan (Government of the Czech
Republic, 2008).
-
9
The media discourse reflects the perception of terrorism as an
international issue. As the quantitative analysis revealed, terrorism has
been framed as a European rather than a national issue in all years
observed (TTSRL, 2008: 52).
Conclusion
Comparatively low level of securitization of terrorism in the Czech Republic
explains much of the findings of this analysis. Terrorism is regarded as an
international issue by the Czechs, which leaves the Government fully in
charge, shapes the debate towards external security problems and tools,
and discourages political parties to address it more thoroughly in their
programs. Although the Government pursues all paths to counter terrorism,
such adopting judicial or internal security measures, this does not show up
in the public discourse, which is preoccupied with the external dimension of
the phenomenon.
-
10
DENMARK
Like its neighbor Sweden, Denmark has, generally, had very little
experience with terrorism. Until recently, Denmark had historically only had
experiences with terrorism where Denmark was the scene of the act but not
the target of it in 1985 three bombs directed against American and Israeli
interests exploded in Copenhagen. Nonetheless, Denmark has since a total
of four terror-cases since 2005. These cases represent an entirely new set
of challenges for Denmark, a country whose security perceptions like most
of the rest of Europes until the early 1990s were closely linked to the
dynamics of the Cold War.
Dimensions of security
After 9/11 and the subsequent Framework Decision by the EU, however,
changes in Danish legislation with regards to counterterrorism were
initiated. In 2002 the first version of a new and stricter law on terrorism,
which became known as the terrorism packet, was presented by the
Danish government. On the basis of these suggestions and a 2005 task
group report, final suggestions for changes in Danish law in order to counter
terrorism were passed in June 2006 (Vestergaard, 2006). The new law
allowed the two Danish security services PET (police intelligence services)
and FE (defense intelligence services) to communicate with each other
and exchange information relevant to counterterrorism, which was not
possible prior to the passing.
9/11 and the subsequent changes in EU cooperation on terror was
also the starting point of a major change in the Danish perception of the
threat of terrorism. Only months later, and after a change of government in
late 2001, Denmark decided to take part in the war on terrorism in
Afghanistan. Later Denmark joined the US-led coalition in Iraq in March
2003. Overall, Denmark regards it self as an activist country with regards to
international cooperation on security matters and has signed and ratified all
major international treaties concerning counterterrorism.
-
11
As regards the sense of urgency vis--vis the phenomenon of
terrorism in Danish media discourse, it was profoundly elevated, but also
peaked in the years following the attacks in New York and Washington on
9/11. However, after the initial effects wore off, the sense of urgency found
a level considerably higher than before 2001. And even though the focus on
terrorism in relation to Denmark has increased in the years after 2001 and
there has been an increase in the focus on and feeling of urgency in relation
to terrorism, terrorism is still primarily reported on as foreign news in the
Danish media debate. This possibly stems from the Danish cartoon crisis,
where events to a large extent to place outside Denmark, and from the first
Danish cases related to charges on terrorism, where the alleged links to al-
Qaida was at the forefront of the cases.
Centrality of the state
Concerning the discussion in Danish media discourse related to judicial
issues and/or legal texts, this has generally not received much attention in
the period analyzed according to PARANOID. However, in 2002 and 2005
discussions of judicial issues in relation to terrorism received heightened
attention in Danish media according to the PARANOID results which
analyzed the use of the term law in articles related to terrorism. This
increase was probably caused by the introduction of the first suggestions for
changes to Danish legislation in relation to terrorism in 2002 and the first
arrests related to terrorism in Denmark and possibly also the London
bombings in 2005.
Finally, PARANOID results seem to indicate that a general increase of
the term government is visible in Danish media discourse from 2000
onwards and particularly after 2002. This increase might be explained by
the debate about the war in Iraq, where the Danish government for
apparent reasons played a central role, as well as by the bombings in
Madrid and London.
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
As regards the debate in Danish media on terrorism, the PARANOID results
of deliverable 2 seem to indicate that terrorism mostly has been discussed
in military terms in Danish media from 2001 until 2005. The Danish
-
12
involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq may explain the focus on military
matters in relation to terrorism until 2005. Further, the fact that Denmark,
until 2005 had had no experiences with terrorism directed towards Danish
soil, could also be a viable explanation. 2005 saw the first Danish cases
related to terrorism and these cases as well as the terrorist bombings in
London may have served to draw attention towards the risk of terrorism
coming from within Denmark rather than from outside. This change could
be the cause of a decrease in the focus on military responses and a focus on
other responses since military responses are generally not accepted as a
response to threats coming from within the Danish society.
Conclusions derived from deliverable 2 indicate that terrorism is
discussed as much in relation to Denmark as in relation to the EU. In the
years immediately after September 11 the focus seemed to be tilting
slightly towards the EU in the Danish media debate, which could be caused
by an aspiration in Denmark for international cooperation on the issue of
terrorism. From 2005 onwards, however, the discourse shifted and focused
more on Denmark and less on the EU. This change is likely to have been
caused by the first Danish court cases related to terrorism that year.
-
13
FRANCE
The French government has been familiar with terrorist attacks for several
decades. The anti-colonial violence of the 1950s marked a significant take-
off in this field, whereas the presence of small, but self-conscious ethnic
minorities within its borders formed an important premise for the
emergence of separatist groups, who did not eschew the use of violence.
Basques, Bretons and Corsicans were each involved in some sort of terrorist
action throughout the years. In the 1970s separatist terrorism was
accompanied by other forms, who sought their motivations in Marxism-
Leninism. The religious terrorism of the current era has also struck on
French soil.
This section will base itself on the findings of deliverable 1 and the
quantitative and qualitative research results in deliverable 2. The following
lines will be discussed: dimensions of security, centrality of the state and
the role of transnational terrorism as a security issue.
Dimensions of security
In the French case, Islamist terrorism is closely linked to the anti-colonial
violence carried out by Algerian separatist movements. Although Algeria
had gained independence in 1962, French influence on the country
remained considerable. This is clearly visible in the support France lent to
the Algerian secular regime in the beginning of the 1990s. As a result of this
policy, the Groupes lslamistes Armes (GIA) combined its struggle for an
Islamist Algeria with attacks on French soil (Cettina, 2005: 73-74).
Due to Al-Qaidas successful infiltration of the leadership of the GIA,
France was the main European area of operation of the former in the 1990s
(Gunaratna, 2002: 121). Currently, France regards Islamist terrorism as the
countrys largest terrorist threat (Archik et al., 2006: 9). Quantitative
research results show that terrorism is framed in military terms after 2000.
The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
provide the main causes (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 79).
-
14
On the legal level, the French government still applies an anti-
terrorism act from 1986, which created special judicial and police authorities
and provided for the persecution of all terrorist acts (Block, 2005).
Quantitative research shows that the concept of terrorism was especially
coupled to rights in the 1990s, when both a Corsican separatist movement
(FLNC) and the GIA were highly active. The fact that many suspects were
arrested shortly after these attacks has contributed considerably to the link
of terrorism with its judicial aspects. It is therefore that terrorism was often
coupled with rights in the 1990s (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 79).
Centrality of the state
France has been relatively successful in combating terrorism. In fact, its
counterterrorism policies have been recognized as one of the most effective
in Europe (OBrien, 2005: 37; Block, 2005: 6). One of the key factors that
have contributed to this efficiency is the fact that counterterrorism policy
has always been conducted from a state level (Gregory, 2003: 143) as a
logical consequence of Frances centralized state model in general.
Another important factor has been the intensive international
cooperation that evolved throughout the years. This reached its peak in the
aftermath of 9/11, when France intensified its cooperation with both its EU-
partners and NATO-allies. It also committed itself to an increased
intelligence-sharing with neighboring states (Gregory, 2005: 140). As a
result of a shared preoccupation with ETA-terrorism, France even went so
far as to create a joint anti-terrorism investigation team with Spain, which
permitted both countries to operate on each others territory (Block 2005).
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
As mentioned in the previous section, France has shown a strong tendency
to recognize the transnational nature of the current terrorist attacks. After
9/11 the government was even more inclined to improve its coordination
with other possible target states. Apart from the aforementioned joint
investigation team with Spain, an Alliance Base with the United States
intensified the scale of international cooperation (Block 2005).
-
15
Nevertheless, quantitative research on media coverage of
transnational terrorism presents a different situation. Although 9/11 and its
immediate aftermath received the attention one might expect, given the
seriousness of the attacks, the attacks in Madrid and London were
attributed much less relevance in the articles. This could be due to the
increasing urgency of domestic problems, especially the inflammable
situation in the French banlieus. The fact remains, however, that
quantitative research contradicts the results of its qualitative counterpart,
by showing a country that has turned inward, instead of confirming the
image of a country that increases international cooperation in order to
combat terrorism (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 76, 77).
The results also show an increased attention for domestic terrorism,
especially at those instants that a serious terrorist attack occurred abroad
(Ibid.: 77, 78). An explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the fact
that an internalization of external threats took place (Ibid.: 78). France may
acknowledge the transnational character of terrorism, but directly relates its
importance to its own domestic experiences with terrorism. The EU being
underrepresented in media coverage on terrorism fits into this picture
(Ibid.: 80).
Conclusion
France has had a long tradition of terrorism after the Second World War,
due to its preoccupation with anti-colonial violence in the 1950s. Since the
attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
phenomenon has been increasingly linked to the military.
Its centralized state structure allowed the country to conduct a
national counterterrorism policy, whereas it deliberately increased its
cooperation with other states.
Quantitative research confirms the link with the military, but shows a
more inward counterterrorism policy when it comes to international
cooperation. This discrepancy can be explained by pointing out that France
might have had a strong preference for international cooperation, but only
in order to prevent a possible attack on its own soil.
-
16
GERMANY
German policy towards terrorism can be traced back to the turbulent 1970s,
when the Federal Republic was plagued by numerous terrorist attacks
carried out by the left-wing Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction,
hereafter: RAF) and its sister organizations. This is the reason that a
general counterterrorism script, taking into account the different forms of
terrorism, has existed for several decades by now.
This particular section will mostly be based on the findings that have
already been presented in the deliverables 1 and 2. The following aspects
will be discussed below: dimensions of security, centrality of the state and,
finally, a general overview on the nature and threat of transnational
terrorism as a security issue and how Germany reacts to this. Most
assessments are presented from a qualitative perspective, but quantitative
research results will be used in addition to this.
Dimensions of security
As mentioned above, the emergence of radical left-wing terrorism in the
1970s formed a major incentive to the federal government to develop a
counterterrorism strategy. When the attacks by the RAF became less
frequent in the beginning of the 1990s, the necessity of such a strategy did
not diminish; a series of attacks, carried out by right-wing organizations
and individuals, kept the problem on the agenda. In 1992, the German
government reported more than 800 attacks by these groups (Watts, 2001:
601). Since juvenile perpetrators were overrepresented, the authorities
decided to combine repression with the creation of a number of pedagogical
and social preventive programs for local youths (Malthaner and Waldmann,
2003: 121). The necessity to take such measures became especially clear in
the Lnder that had belonged to GDR territory prior to the German
reunification. There might be a correlation between the hollow anti-fascist
rhetoric that had always been displayed by the GDR authorities and the
abundance of incidents inspired by racism after 1989 (Melching, 2004:
310). Social concerns were clearly taken into account in the assessment of
-
17
countering terrorism, which in itself was considered as a serious threat to
German security (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2006: 3).
After the attacks of 9/11, it is the threat of Islamist terrorism that
dominates the security agenda. The measures that the federal government
took involve the so-called Rasterfahndung, which implies the ability to
search through and link different databases. Beforehand, a profile is created
of pre-fixed terrorist. Then, this profile is applied to individuals that display
its typical characteristics. Rasterfahndung was regularly used in the 1970s
as a means to tackle terrorism from the RAF, and is currently used again
against the Islamist threat. However, the method is controversial, because
it immediately targets immigrants from Muslim countries as possible
terrorists. Accusations of discrimination were the result. The fight against
terrorism became interlinked with immigration- and integration-related
issues (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 85, 86).
Quantitative research shows that the military is occasionally linked to
terrorism, especially when terrorist violence abroad (the attacks in Dar-as-
Salam and Nairobi in 1998 and the attacks of 9/11) provides incentives for
such a linkage (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 89).
Centrality of the state
In this case the state is not the only actor in counterterrorism, since
Germany has a federal state model and is a member of the EU. This
membership has stimulated the German government to cooperate with
several international organizations in order to combat terrorism. In the
aftermath of 9/11, willingness to coordinate counterterrorism policy with
other states increased even more (Katzenstein, 2003: 733). This eventually
led to the first deployment of German troops since the Second World War in
Afghanistan.
Alongside this strong tendency to international cooperation, Germany
has also emphasized its domestic views on counterterrorism, which may
differ from the view of other states. The Schrder administration held the
view that war was less suitable for defeating global terrorist networks than
-
18
paying attention to the underlying social and economic causes of terrorism
(Ibid.).
Due to Germanys federal structure, the Bundesamt fr
Verfassungsschutz (Germanys main intelligence service) operates on a
federal level, which means that there is one state agency alongside sixteen
federal agencies. However, a joint coordination center under the ministry of
the interior was established in order to develop a more national coordination
(TTSRL Deliverable 2: 86).
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
Prior to 9/11, the German government did not have a particular preference
to combat transnational Islamist terrorism. Although it paid considerable
attention to attacks in the domestic field, from a left-wing and right-wing
signature, transnational terrorism was relatively neglected (Malthaner and
Waldmann, 2003: 123).
This attitude changed significantly after the attacks in New York and
Washington. Especially Germany felt a strong urge to contribute to
combating transnational terrorism, because the attacks of 9/11 had for a
large part been prepared in Germany (Burleigh, 2008: 444). The attacks in
Madrid and London increased the willingness to acknowledge the (often)
transnational character of Islamist terrorism and to make a German
contribution to its defeat. An attack on German soil is considered a likely
possibility (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2006: 3). Although such an
attack has not occurred yet, the death of 14 German tourists in Tunisia as a
result of an attack on a synagogue, supported the statement that German
citizens might be targeted as well, within or without Germanys borders
(Malthaner and Waldmann, 2003: 116).
As a result of the altered international situation after 9/11, a new law
was established, the New Terrorism Act (1 January 2002). This new law
took the transnational nature of Islamist terrorism into account by
preventing terrorists from entering Germany and by improving information
change between different authorities (Linde et al., 2002: 66).
-
19
Quantitative research seems to reflect the results of its qualitative
counterpart, because it also indicates an abrupt swift after 2001, when
Islamist terrorism, previously designated as foreign news, was depicted as a
domestic problem (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 88). From 1999 until 2004,
terrorism was often framed in EU-terms as well (Ibid.: 90).
Conclusion
We can conclude that the fight against terrorism in Germany is linked with
other political and social issues. Whereas right-wing terrorism is countered
by focusing on the lack of adequate education (especially in the eastern
Lnder), Islamist terrorism is linked to migration-related problems. This is
shown clearly in the collision between Rasterfahndung on the one hand,
which targets immigrants beforehand, and the anti-discrimination laws that
protect immigrants on the other.
Concerning the centrality of the state, we see a clear tendency to
tackle terrorist attacks at a high level. This implies both a limitation of the
independence of the several Lnder on the national level and an increase in
transnational cooperation, especially on the EU-level.
And even though international terrorism existed in Germany prior to
9/11, transnational terrorism as such is now regarded as a serious security
issue. This emphasis on the transnational aspect of terrorism is also
reflected in the results of quantitative research.
-
20
ITALY
Throughout the 70s and 80s, Italy faced a leftist terrorist campaign (the
most important group was the Red Brigades) and also had to deal with the
ensuing reactions from right-wing and paramilitary groups. Italian
counterterrorism institutions and laws were originally designed to deal with
this particular form of terrorism, hence they needed to be modified and
updated after the 9/11 attacks.
Dimensions of security
Terrorism is deemed to be a criminal offence in Italian legislation, which
takes a classical approach towards terrorism as politically-motivated
violence. However, terrorism does not feature on the Italian security agenda
or in the political discourses of the main political powers.
As Italy has not suffered from any attack on its own soil, Italian CT
policy is entirely preventative in nature. When discussing domestic
terrorism, the Italian media tend to make special reference to the
radicalization of Muslim immigrants and the problems involved in this
process, thus lending support to the notion that the Italian media are
generally more focused on domestic terrorism (and its relationships with
organized crime groups) than on international terrorism.
In relation to the above, it may be argued that the perceptions of the
media (and, consequently, social perceptions) differ from those of the
official security forces. While Italian officials repeatedly insisted on the
significance of the threat of international terrorism during 2004 and 2005,
the results of our quantitative analysis based on PARANOID outcomes
reflect a decrease in media attention on the issue. For example, Prime
Minister Berlusconi publicly announced that Romes airspace was closed
over Christmas in 2003 due to the possibility of a terrorist attack, as the
Italian authorities feared that an attack on the Vatican was highly probably
at the time (see, for example,
http://www.borrull.org/s/noticia.php?id=25478&id2=1349).
-
21
Aside from declarations of this kind, terrorism does not feature
heavily on the Italian political agenda, for as we have stated above, it tends
to be treated as a peripheral issue related to immigration and therefore
comes under the remit of the police (Human Rights Watch, Letter to the
Italian Government Regarding the Expulsion of Sami Ben Khemais Essid, 9
June 2008).
Centrality of the state
Like many European countries, Italy also had to deal with terrorism before
9/11, but it was terrorism of a different kind. Throughout the 60s and 70s,
right-wing and left-wing groups were active, thus constituting a threat to
the Italian security forces and society, and Italian legislation on terrorism
was primarily intended to deal with this particular problem. After 9/11 and
the Madrid attacks, major changes therefore needed to be made to adapt
this framework to deal with international terrorism. Owing to its internal
political situation after 9/11, Italy focused on increasing its level of
cooperation with the United States in the international fight against
terrorism, but sometimes this cooperation did not recognize basic
guarantees and procedures (CIA flights).
As a consequence of the way in which the Italian institutional system
is organized (the territory is divided into 20 regions and each region into a
number of provinces), the security and intelligence system is highly
centralized. There are no provincial or regional forces that deal with
terrorism; the National Police and the Carabinieri (a militarized police)
share law enforcement responsibilities (military forces do not have any anti-
terrorism function in the Italian territory).
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
Italy was one of the European countries that supported the US in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not experienced transnational or
Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks on their own soil. Italian troops were,
however, attacked in Iraq from the beginning of the operations in 2003.
From 2003 to 2006, 31 Italian soldiers and 7 civilians were killed in Iraq
(http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2006/06_Giugno/05/scheda38.s
html).
-
22
From 2000 to 2005, terrorism was, to some extent, associated with
the armed forces in Italy a factor which could be explained by 9/11 and its
global consequences, i.e., Italian participation in Afghanistan and Iraq. We
cannot conclude that the Italian approach to terrorism is exclusively a
military one, but the military dimension was undoubtedly important during
those years. At the same time, however, proxy rights are also present in
the PARANOID results, as are other proxies such as the Law and Senate.
For the period analyzed, these proxies reflect the debates generated in the
Italian legislative bodies in order to update the existing legal framework and
develop new laws to bridge legislative gaps in relation to terrorism (for
example, new legislation on the financing of terrorism), as well as the
efforts made to reach an equilibrium between rights (such as privacy) and
security (Privacy e sicurezza l'equilibrio possibile, GNOSIS n. 1 ottobre -
dicembre 2004 (available at
http://www.sisde.it/Gnosis/Rivista1.nsf/ServNavig/13). Thus, Italian anti-
terrorism policies were generally conceived of in the context of external and
defense-related threats and perceived from a domestic rather than a
European view throughout the period 2000-2004.
Conclusion
Our findings can be summarized as follows: terrorism is not an issue on the
Italian political agenda, and our analysis of the impact of terrorism on the
media indicates that the latter was influenced more profoundly by 9-11 than
by the Madrid attacks in 2004 or the London attacks in 2005. Since no
major terrorist attack took place on national territory, terrorism did not
attract much attention and media attention was focused, rather, on the
attacks suffered by Italian troops abroad (in Iraq and Afghanistan). In the
Italian case, terrorism was mainly treated by the media throughout the
period analyzed as a domestic issue, with particular importance being
granted to the legal framework (and the ways in which it needed to be
developed and updated). The state also included military power as a
potential tool to fight terrorism.
-
23
THE NETHERLANDS
As has been noted, the Dutch policy in the field of counterterrorism has
changed markedly over the last couple of years, following the adoption of
the EU Framework Decision of June 2002. This section will explore what
areas or venues should still be included in the present debate and
development of security discourse in order to offer a balanced view. This
section will base itself on the findings of deliverable 1, and the qualitative
and quantitative research results on the Netherlands contained in
deliverable 2. The following lines will be discussed: dimensions of security,
centrality of the state, and finally a general overview on the nature and
threat of transnational terrorism as a security issue.
Dimensions of security
In the context of the fight against terrorism, this section will look at what
other dimensions of security have been included in the debate. Questions
that arise are whether judicial and social concerns for instance, have also
been taken into account in the assessment of countering terrorism while
providing security. In this aspect, the research results for the Netherlands
differ in terms of qualitative and quantitative assessments.
Studying governmental sources such as AIVD publications (BVD,
2001; AIVD, 2006) and governmental plans of action (Higher Chambers
2003/2004) it would appear that the government focuses on security in the
broad sense. When this is taken in combination with the quantitative
research results, a clear focus on the military in the years 2001, 2005 and
2006 can be seen. Rights in the assessment of counterterrorism only show
in 2004 and even then, these results are still lower than the emphasis put
on military rights.
Regarding the issue of terrorism being one of the many threats to
security, amongst which could also be included environmental and
immigration issues (Notions of Security, 2007: 35-37), only qualitative
analysis took place. The AIVD stated that the Islamist terrorist threat will
-
24
continue to dominate the security agenda of the national and international
political arena during the next few years (AIVD, 2006: 55). Yet, this
statement only pertains to the political arena and when analyzing the
organizational implementation of threat assessments, it is clear to see that
the Dutch government focuses on other threats as well (see for instance:
Dutch program on National Security).
Centrality of the state
In contemporary society, the Dutch state is not the only actor in the
security domain. Other players include several international organizations
and institutions, such as the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as local players and
individuals. In the context of terrorism and counterterrorism, the Dutch
government and most other political actors have rightly emphasized this
component (see for instance: NCTB, Nederland tegen terrorisme, national
campaign against terrorism). In terms of international cooperation, the
results will be more elaborately discussed in section 10.3, but regarding the
inclusion of other national and local actors, this has clearly been contained
within Dutch counterterrorism policy.
Two concrete examples of this are the public-private partnership
institution for critical infrastructure protection (See TTSRL, Deliverable 9 on
Protecting European Vulnerabilities) and the attention given to the
development of programs for teachers and other educational facilities in
order to recognize radicalization (Dutch government: Programma eerstelijns
medewerkers). Both initiatives open the development and creation of
providing security by more and other players than the state and
governmental agencies. Unfortunately, no assessment from a quantitative
perspective can be given, as this question could not adequately be
assessed.
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
When overseeing the national debate on transnational terrorism, it is clear
that a sense of urgency for the terrorist threat originated from the attacks
on September 11, 2001 (Dutch government: Actieplan
Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid). This was further exacerbated by the
-
25
attacks on Madrid and London (AIVD, 2006: 51). The quantitative research
results do not, however, fully support this statement, as the only year
where threat was significantly increased appears to be 2006.
It is to be expected that a fight against transnational terrorism would
require international cooperation and thus the aforementioned emphasis on
international organizations in order to regulate this. Qualitative analysis
shows that the Dutch government pays attention to this international
aspect, in the form of mentioning it in governmental plans of action
(Ministry of Internal Affairs 2006). In letters to Parliament by the
government the actions of counterterrorism in international context are
separately detailed (Look up number and quote sources). It should be
noted that these letters usually detail the actions of Dutch military forces in
Afghanistan or elsewhere outside the Netherlands, and that the European
actions against terrorism are usually contained within the letters discussing
national counterterrorism efforts (see for instance introduction of Law on
Terrorist Crimes which makes explicit mention of the EU FD of June 2002).
Unfortunately, the quantitative analyses do not support this
qualitative assessment. The quantitative results show an emphasis on this
debate in relation to the EU only in 2000 and 2001, so before the
introduction of specific national legislation or action plans. From 2003
onwards, a very small, yet growing number of articles is related to the EU.
Conclusion
In the Netherlands, the changing aspects in the policy discourse on security
and the attention of the media for the concept of terrorism and how this has
been reported, appear to be reasonably balanced. Even though at times
qualitative and quantitative research results appear to contradict each
other, this is not the case. Especially when taken in conjunction with the
findings of deliverable 1, the case of the Netherlands appears to be fairly
balanced. Following both the academic as well as political debate and
discourse, with certain areas open for exploitation by politicians. These
opportunities for politicians do not appear to have massively affected the
policy in the sense that other threats were overlooked. If anything, from the
research results stated above, the Netherlands appears to have attempted a
-
26
broad approach in terms of conceptualization of security. This meant that it
has focused on other threats than terrorism alone. Additionally, the
Netherlands appears quite aware of the fact that multiple players of various
sorts, both at the local and the international level, are needed for an
effective fight against terrorism.
-
27
POLAND
This section discusses the perception of terrorism in Poland, according to
the framework developed in deliverable 1 of the TTSRL project. In
particular, the dimensions of security, the centrality of the state, and the
transnationality in terrorism perception are analyzed. The analysis is based
on the comparison between quantitative and qualitative research results.
Dimensions of security
While not very pronounced before, terrorism became one of the most
important security threats in the Polish National Security Strategy of 2003.
The strategy argued that Poland was directly facing this risk as a member of
the Euro-Atlantic community (Government of the Republic of Poland, 2003).
The newest strategy of 2007 continues to label terrorism as a threat to
Europe, including also to Poland (Government of the Republic of Poland,
2007: 9). Terrorism is seen as a multifaceted phenomenon that shall be
fought with various tools. It is mentioned almost 30 times in the National
Security Strategy, in literally all contexts: national defense, internal affairs,
external relations, intelligence, public administration, justice, financial
matters, transportation, or health (Government of the Republic of Poland,
2007). This broad range of ways to tackle terrorism is not, however,
reflected in the media debate in Poland. According to the quantitative
research conducted in the framework of the TTSRL project, terrorism is
connected to rights/law rather than to military in the media (TTSRL, 2008:
142). This disproportion is difficult to explain, especially in the light of Polish
participation in the operation Iraqi Freedom and Polish presence in Iraq. A
plausible explanation might be offered by taking into account the name of
one of the strongest political parties (Law and Justice, Prawo i
Sprawiedliwo), which may have distorted the results.
Centrality of the state
Polish counterterrorism policy has been dispersed among many state bodies
and agencies. The Inter-Departmental Centre for Combating Organized
Crime and International Terrorism established in 2002 did not change much
in this respect. Sub-state actors do not take part in Polish counterterrorism
-
28
a public-private partnership is expected in critical infrastructure
protection, but the plans have not been drafted (National Security Office,
2008).
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
The National Security Strategy of Poland addresses terrorism
overwhelmingly as an international phenomenon. The strategy recognizes
the threat of terrorism as an external problem, which is currently urgent not
least because of the Polish involvement in the anti-terrorist campaign
(Government of the Republic of Poland, 2007: 9). The internal effect of the
external events is not seen as pressing by the political parties, though.
Among the main Polish political parties, only several mention terrorism in
their 2007 programs at all (cf. LiD, 2007; PiS, 2007; PO, 2007; PSL, 2007).
And even among those that do, only the Civic Platform has conceded that it
is not possible to rule out attacks on Polish soil (PO, 2007: 81). For the rest,
terrorism is at most an abstract international threat that is good to mention,
but not necessary to elaborate upon (cf. PiS, 2007: 9).
The quantitative analysis reveals that when comparing the context of
the Polish media debate on terrorism, the national dimension always
overrides the European framework. This can be explained by the attention
paid to the Polish participation in Iraq. Therefore, it can be interpreted
neither as a contradiction to the low profile of counterterrorism in Polish
parties programs, nor as an evidence of a Polish concentration on Poland-
based terrorism.
Conclusion
Our analysis has revealed a mixed record of terrorism-related debates in
Poland. Whereas the Government regards terrorism as a multifaceted
phenomenon, which should be addressed by almost all components of the
state power, political parties do not pay much attention to it. An analysis of
the media shows out confusing results that cannot be easily interpreted
without further research. In conclusion, we can argue that terrorism does
not belong to securitized issues in Poland, but it plays an important role in
Governments deliberations at the same time.
-
29
PORTUGAL
Even though Portugal faced certain problems regarding terrorism in the
1970s, public perception before 9/11 was that terrorism did not feature on
Portugals political agenda. After 9/11, the government made a considerable
effort to develop a legal structure to counterterrorism and, as this structure
was almost non-existent prior to 2001, new laws were developed and based
on EU parameters.
Dimensions of security
As terrorism was not perceived as a real danger in Portugal before 9/11 and
the country lacked a comprehensive legal framework for anti-terrorism
measures, the increased focus on terrorism after 9/11 did not entail a need
to update Portuguese laws to meet the new security threat, but rather to
establish an almost completely new framework.
After 9/11, as in other European countries, terrorism became a key
issue on the security agenda. The bombings in Madrid also had an impact
on Portugal in this regard, but in comparison with other European countries,
the attacks on the US influenced Portugal to a greater degree than those on
European soil. Our analysis indicates that, as a result, the Portuguese media
accepted the idea that terrorism is an international as well as a domestic
threat. Nevertheless, terrorism was not the most important issue on the
security agenda.
Centrality of the state
Over the last five years, Portugal has had to face two new terrorist
challenges, the first being that of ETAs terrorist activities, as the Basque
group has used Portugal to carry out various operations that they have
been unable to perform in Spain (such as renting cars that were later used
in bomb attacks in Spain). The second challenge has been to address the
need to prevent Islamic-inspired terrorist activities in Portugal, which have
been a growing danger since the Madrid attacks.
According to SIS (Security and Information Service), the main
Portuguese Intelligence agency, there has been an increase in Islamic-
-
30
inspired terrorist activities in Portugal over the last five years, and security
measures have therefore been taken (Grupos terroristas islmicos
aumentaron su actividad en Portugal durante 2005,
http://cyberterrorism.blogspot.com/2006/03/grupos-terroristas-islmicos-
aumentaron.html).
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
As in other countries, two approaches to the debate on how to fight
terrorism were considered: the legal vs. the military. The Portuguese
case is very interesting in this regard. The importance of the legal approach
was twofold: not only was attention focused on the need to pass new laws
to develop a legal framework for counterterrorism, but also on the rights of
the victims of terrorist attacks conducted in Portugal during the 1970s. As
for the military approach, the Portuguese participation in international
operations (Afghanistan and Iraq) and the internal tasks given to the
military were reflected in the strong presence of this particular proxy (the
military) throughout the period analyzed.
Conclusion
In the Portuguese case, terrorism does not occupy a central place in the
media discourse because Portuguese society does not currently consider
terrorism a threat to its system. One of the assumptions of our study is that
the media reflects social concerns and perceptions, and the analysis of
Portugal seems to confirm this, as is reflected in the PARANOID outcomes,
where terrorism is almost absent before 9/11.
-
31
SPAIN
Spain has had to deal with terrorism over the past 30 years and the threat
of separatist ethno-nationalistic terrorism is very central to the Spanish
perception of security. Consequently, terrorism and the policy options
available to address it constitute one of the most important issues on the
Spanish political agenda. What is more, the Madrid attacks in 2004 marked
a turning point for Spanish counterterrorism policy, widening its scope to
incorporate not only domestic, separatist terrorism, but also transnational,
Islamic-inspired terrorism.
Dimensions of security
The Spanish experience with ETA and the consequences of the Madrid
attacks served to put terrorism at the top of the security agenda, as
confirmed by the PARANOID outcomes, which indicate the Spanish medias
degree of interest in and sense of urgency with regard to terrorism. This is
clearly true for the whole period analyzed, though it is necessary to
differentiate between two time frames, the first of which runs from 1997 to
2003, when ethno-nationalistic terrorism was the main concern, and the
second from 2004 to 2006, when Islamic terrorism became the main
security issue. Just after 9/11, the Spanish media reflected the increasing
attention paid to international Islamic-inspired terrorism, as in many other
countries.
The results of our quantitative analysis show the prominent status in
media discourses of proxies such as the Law and Congress, thus
reflecting the legal approach that was developed in Spain to fight terrorism.
Parliament members and officials from political parties often appear in the
media discussing national counterterrorism policy, which is also reflected in
the PARANOID outcomes, as stated above.
In 2004, the Atocha terrorist attacks in Madrid served to draw
attention to the transnational face of terrorism, particularly Islamic jihadist
terrorism, and the media reflected this change. Spain implemented many
measures to modify its ETA-oriented counterterrorism policy to address
-
32
Islamic-inspired terrorism too. Not only were new laws passed and
international cooperation improved, but the security system also established
new branches devoted to jihadist terrorism.
The near absence of the military proxy in the results stems from
the fact that the military approach was never emphasized in Spain. On the
contrary, a legal approach was developed and followed up. Spain supported
the war in Iraq and sent troops that were withdrawn by Prime Minister
Zapatero after he won the March 2004 elections because his party
established a relationship between the Spanish involvement in Iraq and the
Madrid attacks. The al-Qaida leadership alluded on many occasions to the
fact that Spain is the main target of this jihadist movement because Al
Andalus was once an Islamic territory and the jihadists therefore see it as
their responsibility to re-conquer it. As we can see, the terrorist threat
exists independently of the Spanish involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Centrality of the state
Even though the Spanish political system has a high degree of
decentralization (national level, autonomic level, provincial level and local
level), the security and intelligence systems do not reflect the same pattern.
The National Police and the Guardia Civil are the main security forces that
deal with terrorism issues (gathering intelligence and conducting law
enforcement operations). These forces are part of the Ministry of the
Interior, the main antiterrorist institution in Spain.
One of the main antiterrorism problems after 2004 was how to
include jihadist specialists to fill the existing institutional gap, as since the
main terrorist threat had been ETA, there were not many Islamic specialists
or Arabic speakers working on the security apparatus. A considerable effort
was made to develop this area over that period. The National Intelligence
Center (CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) was also reorganized
according to these lines.
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
From our analysis, we can also conclude that terrorism was treated as a
national or internal problem up until 2003. In 2003, Spain supported the US
-
33
intervention in Iraq and Spanish troops also participated in operations in
Afghanistan, so the national framework evolved into an international one.
However, there was a drastic change in March 2004 when an
Islamic-inspired terrorist attack caused 191 deaths in Atocha Central train
station. As a consequence, important changes were made to the security
and intelligence systems and Basque terrorism was put to one side
throughout that period. The Centro Nacional de Coordinacin Antiterrorista
(National Counterterrorism Coordination Center) was established to
centralize and analyze information gathered by different national and
autonomic security institutions, and the level of cooperation between Spain
and some Arab countries (mainly Morocco) was improved.
Conclusion
Having analyzed the main characteristics of Spanish media discourse on
terrorism, we can conclude that terrorism is a central issue on Spains
political agenda. Until 2004, the focus was mainly on ethno-nationalistic
terrorism, but from then on, the crucial concern became Islamic-inspired
terrorism. Spanish CT policy is mainly based on a legal approach which has
a significant impact on parliamentary discussions; the EUs impact on this
issue is primarily related to the efforts made by Spain to adapt its legal
framework to the European one.
-
34
SWEDEN
Dimensions of security
Sweden has had very few experiences with terrorism. The experiences they
have had have largely been due to conflicts between non-Swedish groups
who carried out attacks against each other on Swedish soil. Two such cases
took place in 1971 and 1972, the murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador
and the hijacking of a domestic airplane by Croat activists. These events
had a direct effect on Swedish legislation. Thus, in 1973 the parliament
passed a law, which was made permanent in 1975, that facilitated the
expelling of foreign citizens and refusing of admission into Sweden in case
of suspicion or presumption of connections to terrorism. As such, since 1973
Sweden has had law aimed at protecting Sweden against political terrorism.
These developments entailed that the emphasis on terrorism as a
security issue increased during the 1970s, but it later declined again.
However, as in most other countries, a major change in focus arose in
Sweden after September 11 2001. The attacks had a major impact on
policy-making and threat perception in Sweden.
Centrality of the state
Sweden does not have a National Counterterrorism Policy and
Swedish responses to terrorism have, primarily, been focused at avoiding
that the country became a safe haven for terrorist groups. As such, Sweden
has also increasingly transferred the formulation of policies on
counterterrorism from the national level to the international level. In this
sense, it seems clear that international cooperation is considered an
important aspect of counterterrorism in the case of Sweden.
As regards the sense of urgency vis--vis the phenomenon of
terrorism in Swedish media discourse, it was profoundly elevated, but also
peaked in the years following the attacks in New York and Washington on
September 11 2001. And, after the initial effects wore off, the feeling of
urgency found a level considerably higher than before 2001.
In addition, it seems that terrorism in Sweden is still primarily
reported on as foreign news. Thus, despite a brief elevation in the reporting
-
35
focusing on terrorism related to Sweden immediately after September 11,
levels seem to be much the same as before 2001. This indicates that the
bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 did not affect the general
focus in Swedish media discourse.
Concerning the debate in Swedish media on terrorism it is striking to
what extent it seems to be discussed in military terms rather than judicial
terms according to the PARANOID scans. This could be explained by the
potential change from a criminal justice to a war model, as discussed
above. It seems likely, however, that it could also be explained in relation
to the fact that Sweden, unlike Denmark, has not had any experiences with
terrorism since the early 1970s and that society, as a consequence, does
not perceive terrorism as a threat directly to Sweden. This might entail that
terrorism in Swedish media discourse, therefore, is perceived as a foreign
affair to be solved through military means rather than judicial. For example,
the strong presence of the term military in articles related to terrorism in
2001, might be explained as a response to the US reactions in the
aftermath of September 11 and the decision to go to war in Afghanistan.
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
Conclusions derived from deliverable 1 and 2 also indicate that
terrorism was discussed primarily in relation to the term Sweden from
2001 through 2003, while from 2004 onwards the focus shifted and
terrorism was discussed slightly more in relation to the term EU. The
change that occurs in 2004, when EU becomes the dominant term, could
be explained in relation to the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London 7/7
bombings in 2005 as well as by The European Commission action paper in
response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid, the publishing of which gave
new attention to the EU as the primary actor in countering terrorism.
Although these events did not have any direct effect on the Swedish debate
on terrorism, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that they had
an effect on how terrorism is framed in this specific context. The events in
Madrid and London led to a greater focus on the risk of similar events
occurring in other European countries. This, thus, led to greater focus on
the individual countrys own role in countering terrorism in some countries.
-
36
In Sweden, however, it is possible that the renewed awareness of the
threat, instead, could have led to a greater emphasis on the need for more
cooperation among the EU-countries. This might help explain the emphasis
on the EU in Sweden after 2003 and underline Swedens long time focus on
countering terrorism in international terms rather than national terms.
Concerning the discussion in Swedish media discourse related to
judicial issues and/or legal texts, this has, according to PARANOID,
generally not received much attention in the period analyzed. However, in
2001 and 2002 discussions of judicial issues in relation to terrorism received
heightened attention in Swedish media according to the PARANOID scans
which analyzed the use of the term law in articles related to terrorism. This
increase in 2001 and 2002 might be explained as a reaction to the events of
September 11 and a general increase in the focus on countering terrorism
in the Swedish media debate.
Finally, turning to the presence of articles on terrorism related to
governmental issues, PARANOID scans indicates that a general increase in
the use of the term government is evident in Swedish media discourse
from 2001 onwards with the notable exception of 2003. This increase may
be explained by the debate following September 11 2001 and the terrorist
attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.
-
37
UNITED KINGDOM
In the United Kingdom (UK) the debate on dealing with the consequences
inherent to terrorism has changed after 9/11. Public and political debate on
societal security became externally focused whereas before only domestic
threats dominated the political security. This section will provide which
areas should still be included in the present debate and development on
security discourse in order to offer a balanced view. The sections below are
based on the findings of deliverable 1, and the qualitative and quantitative
research results on the United Kingdom contained in deliverable 2. The
following issues will be discussed: dimensions of security, centrality of the
state, and finally a general overview on the nature and threat of
transnational terrorism as a security issue.
Dimensions on security
Historically the United Kingdom experienced various forms of political
violence. For three decades the UK has been involved in the effort to
suppress terrorism in Northern Ireland and its spill-over to the British
mainland. The valuable experience gained in this struggle shaped a
significant part of British anti-terror policymaking and its security perception
(Chatham House 2005). In the context of combating terrorism this section
will look at what other dimensions of security have been included in the
debate.
Qualitative research shows that the security perception in the UK
changed dramatically after September 11th, 2001 and especially after the
attacks on the London subways in 2005. Previously, the focus was aimed at
national separatist terrorist threats from the IRA. Preoccupied with internal
affairs, the UK diverted attention away from international terrorism. 9/11
Changed this perspective. The UK government developed a broad and more
externally based approach on combating terrorism. Taken in combination
with quantitative research, a clear focus on the military in the years 2001,
2002 and 2003 can be seen (see TTSRL Deliverable 1: 198). These statistics
on countering terrorism show that rights are given less attention than the
military. Moreover, the attention to rights appears to be absent in the year
-
38
2003. In contrast with this, after the attack on London this image changes.
Studying the quantitative results learns that in the assessment significantly
more attention is given to rights than to military in the years 2004, 2005
and 2006. Regarding the issue of terrorism being one of the many threats
to security, amongst which could also be included environmental,
immigration and animal rights issues (Pearl 2006), only quantitative
analysis took place. Official government documents show that although the
threat is constantly changing, the security agenda will mainly be dominated
by Islamist terrorist threats (HM Government, 2008).
Centrality of the state
In contemporary society, the UK is not the only actor in the security
domain. Other players include several international organizations and
institutions, such as the European Union. As mentioned, security threats to
the UK were perceived as being mainly national separatist in character. But
as it has become apparent that terrorist threats manifest themselves in
transnational networks, unilateral counterterrorism appears to be
ineffective. Internal consequences of terrorism became externalized through
actors in the international security domain. The attacks on 9/11, and
especially the terrorist attacks on London and Madrid generated a common
security identity (See TTSRL deliverable 1: 52). In terms of international
cooperation the UK government participates in a bilateral cooperation with
the US, the so-called Joint Contact Group (JCG). Established in June 2003,
the JCG discusses issues of joint US and UK security including border
protection, transportation security and scientific and technological advances
related to security. In addition, the UK tightened the relations with other EU
member states. European integration and cooperation included, for
instance, harmonization of legislation, intelligence sharing and the
protection of critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, no assessment from a
quantitative perspective can be given as this question could not adequately
be assessed.
Transnational terrorism as a security issue
Overseeing the national debate on transnational terrorism, it is clear that a
sense of urgency for external threats of terrorism originated from the
-
39
attacks on September 11, 2001 (HM Government 2006: 16). The 9/11
events appeared to be an impetus for moving UK legislation and police in
relation to terrorism further from purely domestic concerns to a broader
basis with international dimensions. This was further exacerbated by the
attacks on London. A continuous increase in the number and powers of the
successive counterterrorism laws indicate that the threat perception
regarding national security was expanding beyond the scope of violence
that related to the decades of national separatist terrorism. The quantitative
research results seem to support this view to a certain extent. Statistics
show that the years following 9/11 and the attack on London are the years
where the perceived threat had significantly been increased (TTSRL
Deliverable 1). Moreover, an interesting trend can be discovered. The
attacks on New York, Washington, and London created an increased threat
to domestic security perceptions in the subsequent years, in which the
latter caused a relatively larger impact than the former on public security
perceptions (TTSRL Deliverable 1: 198). This is also reflected by the agenda
setting in the UK nowadays. As mentioned, the policy discourse remains to
be dominated by the threat of transnational terrorism.
Conclusion
As can be seen, the UK has a tradition of terrorism dominating the political
security agenda. The attention given by the media to the policy discourse
on the perceived security seems to be balanced. Quantitative and
qualitative research results give a fairly balanced view on the linkages
between military activities, the emphasis on rights and the perceived threat
in relation with security.
If anything, the research results show that the government
attempted to conceptualize security in a broad sense, meaning that
although terrorism dominates the agenda, focus has also been on other
threats. In addition, as it has become apparent that transnational terrorism
can only be fought effectively at the international political arena, initiatives
have been implemented to cooperate with other international actors.
-
40
Quickscan: Australia, Canada, and the US
This section summarizes the discussion on terrorism and security in our
three quickscan countries Australia, Canada, and the United States. We
have explored the differences in the discussion within this group as well as
positioned the general observations against the discourse in the EU member
states. The structure of this section follows the following dimensions:
dimensions of security, centrality of the state, and a general overview of
transnational terrorism as a security issue. For the results, we have relied
both on qualitative observations and the quantitative results from our
textmining efforts.
Dimensions of security
Each of the countries in our quickscans have produced major national
security strategy and underlying policy documents (Australias National
Security, A Defence Update 2007; Securing an Open Society: Canadas
National Security Policy (2004); The National Security Strategy of the USA
(2006). Each of these has an important focus on (counter)terrorism,
although the Canadian approach tends to be much broader and all hazard
than the others. At the same time, the intense focus on terrorism tend to
decrease in each country to a certain extent.
From the quantitative results, there is reasonable ground for the
assumption of a transatlantic gap in strategic thinking in the media. This
gap is characterized by the highly militarized and securitized character of
the discussion in the quickscan countries. The importance and prominence
of the words threat, military, rights and law reflect the differences
between EU and the non-EU countries in the ways in which terrorism is
framed. The most striking example is the difference in the salience of the
word military itself. In the discourses of all three quickscan countries, the
word military was more important than in the European countries,
primarily because of their considerable military presence in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The word threat, which we took as representing the extent to which
terrorism was framed as a threat, confirmed this impression. Again, the
orientation of the quickscan countries puts much more emphasis on a term
-
41
that implies a hostile framing of the phenomenon. The word threat is much
lower in the EU than in Australia, the United States and, less significantly,
Canada. While the concept of threat rises dramatically in the EU discourse
in 2002, it is not significantly affected by later attacks on European soil.
The word rights, on the other hand, is relatively speaking more
significant in the EU discourse. This is not to say that the term is more
important in EU countries, but the emphasis on military over both rights
and law is overwhelming in Australia, Canada and the US and virtually
non-existent in EU countries. These findings could be indicators of the fact
that EU member states generally adopt softer and broader approaches to
security, which might be explained by the kind of terrorist threats these
countries face.
Another notion that we can back up by our research result is the
perception that Canada is more inclined to European thinking than the US.
In the scores for military and threat, Canada was somewhere between the
US and Australia on the one hand and the European countries on the other.
Also, the impact of 9/11 on the salience of terrorism in the Canadian media
was about the same as in the European media.
A specific result derived from the analysis of the Australian and
Canadian dataset is that the Australian media seem to be shifting the focus
of their coverage from the military to the civilian side of counterterrorism
and from the international tot he national scene. The results for the US are
an accurate reflection of the important terrorism-related news in the US
over the last ten years.
Centrality of the state
Given the existence of the major security documents that are initiated at
high levels of government in the three countries, the state as a central actor
in dealing with terrorism comes clearly forward. At the same time, the
pivotal role of private actors and organizations is also explicitly mentioned.
In US media coverage, government is important (Bush, President,
administration), although many other issues receive coverage equally
intense. The Canadian and Australian discourses are focused more
exclusively on governance. Terms related to governance get the highest
-
42
scores in all three c