GLOBALIZING AFGHANISTAN Terrorism1 War1 and the Rhetoric ofNation Building

EDITED BY ZUBEDA JALALZAI & DAVID JEFFERE

Duke University Press Durham & Lo11do11 2011

© 2011 Duke University Press All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper x

Designed by Jennifer Hill Typeset in Arno Pro and Chestnut

by Keystone Typesetting, Inc_

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data appear on the last printed page

of this book.

For my parents Abdur Raheem e'7 Am ina Jalalzai

-ZJ

AnJ.erican Encounters/Global :Interactions

A series edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Emily S. Rosenberg

This series aims to stimulate critical perspectives and fresh interpretive frameworks for scholarship on the history of the imposing global presence of the United States. Its primary concerns include the deployment and contestation of power, the construction and deconstruction of cultural and politi-cal borders, the fluid meanings of intercultural encounters, and the complex interplay between the global and the local. American Encounters seeks to strengthen dialogue and col-laboration between historians of U.S. international relations and area studies specialists.

The series encourages scholarship based on multiarchival historical research. At the same time, it supports a recogni-tion of the representational character of all stories about the past and promotes critical inquiry into issues of subjectivity and narrative. In the process, American Encounters strives to understand the context in which meanings related to nations, cultures, and political economy are continually produced, challenged, and reshaped.

Contents

Ackno'W'ledgn1ents

ix

Introduction: Globalizing Afghanistan

Zubeda Jalalzai & David Jefferess

It's the OpiUDJ., Stupid

Afghanistan, Globalization, and Drugs Nigel C. Gibson

31

Afghanistan in a Globalized World

A Longer View Rodney J. Steward

51

The "Afghan Beat"

Pukhtoon Journalism and the Afghan War Altaf Ullah Khan

79

\'iii Contents

Veiled Motives

Women's Liberation and the War in Afghanistan Gwen Bergner

95

Transnational Fe:r:nin.iszn and the Woznen's Rights

Agenda in A£ghanistan

Maliha Chishti & Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims 117

Global Fraznes on A£ghanistan

The Iranian Mediation of Afghanistan in International Art House Cinema after September 111 2001

Kamran Rastegar 145

Conclusion: The Current Azna.zeznent

Afghanistan, Terror, and Theory Imre Szeman

165

Bibliography

187

Contributors

201

Index

205

Ackn.o"W"ledg:zn.en.ts

We first conceptualized Globalizing Afghanistan in 2002 as the theme for Rhode Island College's October Series, an annual art, film, and lecture se-ries of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. We would like to thank all of those who helped to bring issues of globalization and Afghanistan to the fore at that critical historical moment. For this opportunity I thank Rhode Island College and in particular the Rhode Island College Foundation, the School of Arts and Sciences, the College Lectures Committee, the Committee on General Education, the Bannister Gallery, the Artists' Co-op, the Depart-ments of Arlthropology, Art, English, History, Political Science, and Sociol-ogy, and the Film Studies Program for financial as well as creative support. I thank my colleagues Paola Ferrario, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard Lob-ban, Spencer Hall, Claus Hofhansel, Donna Kelly, Laura Khoury, Marlene Lopes, Eung-Jun Min, Dan Moos, Dennis O'Malley, Katherine Rudolph-Larrea, Robert Shein, Arnritjit Singh, Claudia Springer, Bryan Steinberg, and Dave Thomas for helping to bring the series into being. For her administrative support I am greatly indebted to Bernadette Doyle. Most of all I would like to thank the dean of arts and sciences at that time, Richard Weiner, for not only supporting this October Series but for establishing the series in the first place. His tenure as dean did much to encourage faculty

ll6 Cwe11 Hcrgncr

of modernity suggests that \'\'estern humanist values have achieved a state of full realized women's rights; it glosses over the neoconservative erosions ofAm · y . encan women s reproductive rights in the past couple of decades for example d h ' 'an t e lack of commitment .in the U.S. to international women's rights, exemplified by the fact that the U.S. 1s one of only two countries not to ratify th ,., . . . e nomens ConventiOn (the other is Afghanistan; "Unveiling Imperialism," 774 _ 78).

2-;- Whitlock, "The Skin of the Burqa," 55· 2X Ibid., s8, 7o. 29 Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, "U.S. Supporters Wel-

come RAWA at V-Day in New York City and Washington, DC:' )0 Steve "Sharbat Gula, the 'Afghan Girl,' Holds the Image of Herself,"

Natrona/ Geographic News, online. '' Braun, "How They Found National Geographic's 'Afghan Girl.'" 32 Fan on, A Dying Colonialism, 35-36.

33 Nelson, "The AI-Mehdi Army Protests the Occupation in Iraq," New York Times, 4 April. 2004, sec. A, published with the caption ''A Show of Strength in Baghdad: Iraq1 women who belong to a Shiite militia, the Mahdi Army, marched yesterday m a Baghdad neighborhood to protest the U.S. occupation oflraq. The march also drew thousands of other protesters:·

.l4 Human Rights Watch, ''Afghanistan." 35 Human Rights Watch, "Women and Elections in Afghanistan."

Transnational Fe:aninis:an and the Wo:anen's Rights Agenda

in Afghanistan

Maliha Chishti e'7 Cheshmak Farlwumand-Sims

Globalization has invariably contributed to reconfiguring the international political landscape by enabling international nonstate actors to exert greater influence and decision-making capacities within the domestic af-fairs of states. New methods and systems of governance have emerged to transcend borders, linking states and nonstate actors in complex and inter-dependent relationships, from the supranational to the local level. 1 In Afghanistan new patterns of authority and power are taking form, mani-fested by the unprecedented growth and entrenchment of international actors (donor governments, multinationals, the UN, the World Bank, and international NG os) operating in the country to pick up where the state has ostensibly left off. These international networks are constructed as the long-awaited "corrective" to decades of conflict in Afghanistan and the former belligerent state practices of the Taliban government. Neoliberal marketization alongside immediate political democratization are the domi-nant blueprints for postconflict recovery in Afghanistan, entailing an exter-nally directed reordering and restructuring of the Afghan state. Integrally part of this new international apparatus is the transnational feminist move-ment advocating for gender reform as a sociopolitical corrective to the history of exclusion and oppression endured by Afghan women. Although

118 Chislzti and Lu·lw

zmw

nd-\i111s

er-w

omen's organizations based in Europe and N

orth Am

erica have p sistently increased international attention to the plight of A

fghan wom

en since the 1

99

0S

1 advancing the rights of Afghan w

omen is by no account the

original and exclusive domain of transnational fem

inist networks. In con-

trast1 the vast and impressive A

fghan wom

en's movem

ent is only recently receiving m

ore scholarly attention. Although the A

fghan wom

en's move-

ment in the post-Tali ban era is still in its infancy1 the A

fghanistan context reveals a diverse and extensive netw

ork of Afghan w

omen's resistanc e/

organizing/ public participation1 and political activism. 2

Since the fall of the Taliban many have sought to structurally im

prove the situation of w

omen and girls across m

any parts of Afghanistan. Al-

though not exhaustive and most certainly fraught w

ith tension1 many in-

roads have nevertheless been made; there are new

institutional instru-m

ents to facilitate and support wom

en's rights1 such as the Ministry of

Wom

en's Affairs1 the G

ender Advisory G

roup1 and the Office of the State

Minister for W

omen; 3 increased attendance of girls in schools; im

prove-m

ents in formal-sector fem

ale employm

ent; and a burgeoning of nonprofit w

omen-centered organizations. M

ost significant perhaps are legal and gov-ernance reform

s pertaining to wom

en's rights as well as constitutional

provisions to promote and protect their active political participation.; For

example/ in the parliam

entary elections of 20051 sixty-eight wom

en won

parliamentary seats; 25 percent of the seats w

ere reserved for them under

the new constitution. A

fghan wom

en represent roughly 27 percent of the N

ational Assem

bly and hold 16 percent of the seats in the Upper H

ouse.' These rather im

pressive developments require the caveat acutely observed

by Valentine A

zarbaijani-Moghaddam

1 reminding us of the history of both

intermittent gains and losses of A

fghan wom

en's rights since the late nine-teenth century under m

any different regimes. She w

arns that current cele-brated successes should not occlude sustained strategies to ensure far-reaching transform

ations in gender relations that will inevitably require

more tim

e/ comm

itment1 and resources. 6 Indeed the ongoing challenge

remains translating the w

ell-intentioned framew

ork for gender equality into m

eaningful practice that is actualized each day by the lived experience of both urban and rural A

fghan wom

en. How

ever1 by all estimations the

constraints and limitations for A

fghan wom

en remain trem

endous (as seen after the elections in 2009)1 and A

fghan wom

en activists and parliamen-

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

119

tarians have publicly questioned the intentions and strategies of the Af-han governm

ent and foreign powers operating in the country1 particularly

failed agenda to improve the lives and livelihoods of w

omen.

The challenge for national and transnational feminist netw

orks is to connect to the very m

aterial1 complex1 and m

ultifaceted lives of wom

en in Af. hanistan1 w

hile at the same tim

e ensuring that national and foreign g

d '

. h interests hold true to their com

mitm

ents on a vancing wom

en s ng ts. This essay exam

ines the intersections between the transnational fem

inist a paratus and the A

fghan wom

en's movem

ent in terms of political/ socio-

P c

d 1..

. cultural1 religious1 and ideological contexts that im

orm gen er po 1tiCs m

A

fghanistan. We define transnational fem

inism as the spectrum

of actors/ instrum

ents1 policies1 and programs that bring gender issues into the fore-

front of politics and society in Afghanistan that have either been form

u-lated or supported by those located in the W

est1 often within a W

estern liberal fem

inist discourse. We distinguish transnational fem

inism from

the A

fghan wom

en's movem

ent. Many A

fghan wom

en and Afghan w

omen's

organizations are1 however, part of the transnational fem

inist apparatus, w

hich consists of the gender policies and programs alongside individual

consultants, advisors, international wom

en's rights NG

Os, international

agencies such as the United N

ations Developm

ent Fund for Wom

en ( UN

I-FE

M), and international instrum

ents such as the Convention on the Elim

i-nation of A

ll Forms of D

iscrimination against W

omen (cEDAW

), UN Security C

ouncil Resolution 1325 (scR

1325), and the Beijing Platform

for A

ction that have arrived more or less in A

fghanistan after the fall of the

Taliban government.

Examining the relations that exist betw

een the transnational feminist

apparatus and Afghan w

omen's organizing is critical not only to assess the

front lines of collaborative and supportive work practiced am

ong wom

en, but to help identify and overcom

e gaps in understanding and to promote

wom

en's rights in the country. This analysis is imperative given current

discussions within the fem

inist comm

unity over what is increasingly con-

sidered a systemic failure of gender m

ainstreaming in international policy

initiatives to secure wom

en's full participation in conflict and postconflict states. A

lthough aid interventions in Afghanistan m

ay have shifted tradi-tional gender roles to som

e degree, they do not necessarily indicate re-negotiated gender relations. M

ore research is needed to examine how

aid

120 C

hishti and Farhoumm

rd-Sims

interventions have modified the specific roles of and relations behveen

men and w

omen.

Based on our ow

n research and work w

ith Afghan w

omen's organiza-

tions, we argue that the presence of the transnational fem

inist apparatus is m

ost certainly not separate or distinct from the larger international aid

nor is it disentangled from the active m

ilitary campaign w

aged m

the country as part of the global war on terror. Those w

orking in the field of gender equality m

ust reflect on the implications of the increased m

ilita-rization of the international aid apparatus, in addition to the latter's un-precedented decision-m

aking power w

ithin the politico-economic struc-

tures of the Afghan state and civil society. As C

handra Talpade Mohanty

emphasizes, "W

estern feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of

situating itself and examining its role in such a global econom

ic and politi-cal fram

ework. To do any less w

ould be to ignore the complex interconnec-

tions behveen First and Third W

orld ... and the profound effect of this on the lives of w

omen in all countries:' 7 In this sense, w

e argue that the gender agenda in A

fghanistan likewise does not escape the underpinnings typi-

cally associated with the interactions behveen the outsider "givers" and the

insider "receivers" of aid. Focusing on gender reform and the aid regim

e, w

e argue that the types of relationships forged most often operate from

un-equal and neo-im

perial power relations typically characterizing outsider-

insider dynamics. In A

fghanistan, however, w

e believe these relationships are prem

ised on a tension behveen promoting the universal applicability of

gender reform and the im

pulse to resist all forms ofW

estern imperialism

that seek to transform

Afghan cultural, political, traditional, and religious

paradigms. T

he politics of gender in Afghanistan once again thrusts Af-

ghan wom

en into the larger ideological, political, sociocultural, and re-battlefields unfolding in the post-Septem

ber 11 environment, pit-

tmg the highly sim

plified binary of an "us" against "them," against the

backdrop of a highly visible international presence in the country. C

ertainly these tensions need not exist in all interactions behveen the A

fghan wom

en's movem

ent and the transnational feminist apparatus, nor

are they the only barrier to improving gender relations in the country. W

e do insist, how

ever, that the tensions behveen insider and outsider, Afghan

and and indigenous and neo-im

perial directly or indirectly contnbute to gender politics in A

fghanistan. We trace these tensions first

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

121

from the transnational fem

inist campaign to rescue and reform

Afghan

wom

en leading up to the fall of the Taliban, to international aid in rebuild-ing A

fghan society and efforts to promote gender equality w

ithin an Af-ghan context. G

reater understanding of the broader relationships forged in the pre-

and post-Tali ban periods is a necessary starting point to address the potential im

pact, efficacy, and nature of the wom

en's rights agenda. A

new com

municative and political practice m

ust be forged among w

omen

across their diversities that works in principled solidarity and critically

moves aw

ay from the traps of neo-im

perialism.

The Politics of R

epresentation: R

eforming and R

escuing Afghan W

omen

The transnational wom

en's movem

ent has made significant inroads in

prioritizing wom

en's rights internationally. Over the past three decades the

movem

ent has realized several impressive accom

plishments, w

hich include codifying w

omen's socioeconom

ic and political and civil rights in inter-national conventions ( C

ED

AW

), gender reform in policies and program

s at national and international levels (such as donor aid policies and the w

ork of the United N

ations and World B

ank), and advocating for wom

en's rights in international law

(scR 1325). A

lthough the transnational wom

en's m

ovement has heightened gender sensitivity am

ong many W

estern states and international institutions, very seldom

do international wom

en's orga-nizing and advocacy directly im

pact interstate relations by exerting direct pressure on pow

erful states to formulate foreign policies and regulate their

interactions with other states based on the violations of w

omen's hum

an rights. C

ertainly the rather persistent and high-profile advocacy campaign

against the Tali ban government w

aged by wom

en's rights activists since the m

id-1990s contributed to successfully persuading powerful governm

ents, such as the U

nited States, to officially not recognize the Taliban govern-m

ent and urged the UN

to practice greater gender inclusion in peacemak-

ing and humanitarian efforts in the country. T

he tragic events of 9 I 11 and the subsequent w

ar on terror rapidly recentered the plight of Afghan

wom

en, culminating in the rather sw

ift initial military defeat of the Taliban

government by the U

nited States in late 2001. Although the overthrow

of the Taliban governm

ent was certainly not instigated by the concerns and

122 C

hishti m1ci Farlzoumand-Sim

s

campaigns of W

estern feminist netw

orks, the task of liberating Afghan w

omen w

as nevertheless conveniently grafted onto the war agenda as

a positive outcome. This m

oral impetus to "rescue and reform

" Afghan

wom

en from w

hat was constructed as a "backw

ard and arcane" culture justified w

ar, inevitably sparking debate within fem

inist academic and

activist circles over what appeared as the tem

porary engagement of wom

-en's rights discourse w

ithin the nexus of militarization, racism

, and imperi-

alism that characterized the content as w

ell as the context of the new global

security framew

ork. The m

ilitary defeat of the Tali ban government by the

United States brought to the forefront the racialized and gendered dim

en-sions of the w

ar on terror and the need to raise critical questions about how

feminist rhetorical and political practices are taken up and im

plicated in broader geopolitical contexts. T

he Afghanistan context is im

portant in the study of global w

omen's rights advocacy in exam

ining not only the very high profile and rather sensationalist politics of representations of A

fghan w

omen leading up to the w

ar, but also how subsequent international pres-

sure to structurally "reform and rescue" A

fghan wom

en even in post-Taliban A

fghanistan is fraught with com

plexities, particularly in the con-text of globalization.

Since the 1990s the relentless and sensationalist images of burqa-clad

Afghan w

omen and accounts of their struggles have sym

bolized oppres-sion and served as dem

onstrable proof of the oppressive political rule of the Taliban. T

he pervasive images of the veiled, secluded, and oppressed

Afghan w

omen w

ere politically mediated by fem

inist groups (including the R

evolutionary Association of the W

omen of A

fghanistan and the Femi-

nist Majority) to bring international attention to the plight of A

fghan w

omen. (For a detailed analysis, please see G

wen B

ergner's essay in this book.) O

perating with the best of intentions, these w

omen's rights activists

dedicated tremendous resources to consistently revealing the brutal vio-

lations of basic rights endured by Afghan w

omen, w

hich arguably would

not otherwise have registered on the radar of international concern. H

ow-

ever, the campaigns invoked an archetypal im

age of the downtrodden,

oppressed, and veiled Afghan w

oman that very problem

atically muted the

historical, sociocultural, religious, and political complexities that shape the

lived realities of the majority of A

fghan wom

en. The fem

inist gaze thereby obstructed not only the m

ultiple forms of resistance and resilience that

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

123

informed the lives of m

any Afghan w

omen, but displaced a m

ore textured reading of their lives that w

ould not have positioned gender as disassoci-ated from

the multiple locations they inhabit-across ethnicity, class, geog-

raphy, and historical experience. .

Furthermore, in assessing the politics of fem

inist representations of Af han w

omen w

e need to make salient the historical and political legacy

racially minoritized w

omen and M

uslim w

omen in particular have

been represented in order to advance imperial relationships, particularly

between the W

est and the Islamic w

orld. Leila Ahm

ed's historical analyses of M

uslim w

omen across the M

iddle East, for example, show

how w

omen

were used as political paw

ns to warrant colonial intervention in the nam

e of civilizing and em

ancipating other cultures. 8 Colonial w

ritings of Muslim

w

omen as oppressed and victim

ized reinscribed European dominance over

the Orient by advancing colonial expansionist agendas that m

asqueraded as euphem

istic expressions to civilize and tame barbaric societies. In this

sense images of w

omen w

ere historically constructed as politicized sites of contestation, control, and conversion. A

s Jasmine Zine notes, the result of

the 9111 tragedy revived Orientalist im

ages of Muslim

societies, such that the liberation of M

uslim w

omen served to justify all form

s of military

action. She writes, "O

nce again, Muslim

wom

en's bodies are being posi-tioned upon the geopolitical stage not as actors in their ow

n right, but as foils for m

odernity, civilization, and freedom:' 9 T

he feminist cam

paign to liberate A

fghan wom

en colludes with O

rientalist tropes by constructing a singular, m

onolithic Afghan W

oman, w

hose agency and heterogeneity is appropriated and controlled to advance a neo-im

perialist agenda as part of the w

ar against terror. In the absence of a nuanced political analysis the U

.S. and other out-side agents positioned culture and religion as the key culprits fueling the oppressive nature of the Taliban regim

e. The representations of A

fghan w

omen w

ere thereby conveniently packaged in a dichotomized sim

plicity of equality versus inequality, freedom

versus oppression, and civilization versus barbarism

. 10 The events of 9 I 11 and the im

mediate w

ar-mongering

brewing in the U

nited States and in Europe widely appropriated these

existing images to legitim

ize a war that w

ould pit the civilized world against

the uncivilized. Images of the oppressed and dow

ntrodden Afghan w

omen

that were long part of the dossier of fem

inist advocacy against the Tali ban

124 C

lllshtland Far-hownand-Si111s

regime m

erged into the jingoism and patriotism

fueling the U.S. govern-

ment's efforts to gain support for the w

ar on grounds of promoting liberty,

freedom, and an end to evil and terror. A5 G

wen B

ergner examines in this

book, the Bush administration, and Laura B

ush in particular, promulgated

an Am

erican rescue of Afghan w

omen in such a w

ay as to infantilize them,

thereby masking the true m

otivations for the war. This m

erging of wom

en's rights discourse into the agenda of m

ilitarization, racialization, and imperi-

alism w

as self-evident and rightly resisted by a vast number of fem

inist academ

ics and organizations around the world.

11 VVhile many W

estern fem

inist groups debated the issues, the images of A

fghan wom

en neverthe-less w

ere reinscribed to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy that did

not question the racist and imperialist m

otivations of the war or elucidate

the historical and political complexities that inform

ed the conflict. Instead the fall of the Tali ban regim

e was situated in an "us" versus "them

" binary, placing A

fghan wom

en at the center of the mission to reform

Afghanistan

under the supervision and watchful eye of the W

est. This fram

ing of Afghan w

omen to legitim

ize the war requires m

ore scholarly attention, particularly in term

s of how this (m

is)information

influenced and determined the w

omen's rights agenda in the country and

the types of relationships fostered between the transnational fem

inist ap-paratus and A

fghan wom

en in the postwar period of reconstruction and

rebuilding. Inevitably the sensationalized stories of Afghan w

omen leading

up to the war precipitated particular kinds of interventions. T

he stereo-typical im

ages created misleading, sim

plistic, and superficial understand-ings of gender relations and A

fghan wom

en. In many w

ays the archetypal im

age succeeded in dislocating Afghan w

omen's agency and w

as hence re-inscribed into m

any of the post-Tali ban gender policies and programs. For

instance, gender programs assum

e that culturally and religiously conserva-tive w

omen are less likely to advance w

omen's rights com

pared to more

educated, nonreligious wom

en (or, for example, rural w

omen com

pared to urban w

omen, or w

omen w

ho wear the burqa com

pared to those who do

not). As Azarbaijani-M

oghaddam notes, international fem

inists were set

on working w

ith wom

en who shared their values, w

ho could converse and engage in w

ritten English comm

unication, and who w

ere less outwardly

religious. In doing so the transnational feminist apparatus initially focused

on a small group of A

fghan wom

en who m

irrored their own politics,

Transnational Fem

inism in A

fglunist,m

125

thereby comprom

ising Afghan w

omen's agency and access to the w

o_men's

rights agenda. Azarbaijani-M

oghaddam is convinced that gender

have been oversimplified by advisors w

ho lack a general understandmg of

the complexities of religion, culture, and history. She argues that w

eak analyses, oversights, and oversim

plifications can make interventions very

disruptive: "Badly conceived and facile analyses based on the assum

p-tion that A

fghan wom

en are vulnerable individuals living in a vacuum

may eventually isolate rather than reintegrate w

omen:' 12 Elaheh

Povey's study of Afghan w

omen provides a m

uch needed correct1ve to the history of w

omen's organizing. In her research she "w

rites back" by reposi-tioning A

fghan wom

en's agency and ownership of their struggle and by

highlighting the history of wom

en's secret organizations and netw

orks under the Taliban regime. H

er study counters the domm

ant sensationalist im

ages of Afghan w

omen and hence im

plores the trans-national fem

inist apparatus to build on existing capacities and work w

ith all A

fghan wom

en-conservative and moderate, urban and rural, literate

and illiterate.I3 Clearly an accurate reading and engagem

ent of the com-

plex lives of Afghan w

omen across their diverse locations w

ill ensure _social and political gender reform

that acknowledges their struggle and m

cul-cates m

ore nuanced approaches required to advance wom

en's rights across

Afghanistan. T

he Wom

en's Rights A

genda and International A

id Apparatus in A

fghanistan after 9 I 11

Afghan w

omen quickly becam

e the trophies of liberation, their images

paraded around the world as proof of a just and m

oral victor; over Tali ban regim

e. VVhile the media presented stories of w

omen s clothm

g stores and beauty salons reopening in K

abul, the swift m

ilitary defeat of the Taliban regim

e was accom

panied by the unprecedented arrival of inter-national agencies setting up shop, m

any for the first time, in a country now

w

itnessing an unprecedented influx of foreign expatriates and substantial donor funds. D

uring the Taliban period Afghanistan received on average

U.S.$

25

0 m

illion annually in aid, with only a couple of hundred inter-

national expatriates working in the country. In contrast, since the fall of the

Taliban aid money pledged in the billions at large donor conferences is

126 Chislzti and Farhow11r.md-Sims

transforming the country into an expatriate haven for seasoned postw

ar expert agencies, consultants, and organizations. It w

as anticipated that the "liberators" w

ould prioritize the needs of ordinary Afghans, yet after six

years of foreign intervention many A

fghans are frustrated and disenfran-chised due to the lack of sustained and visible im

pact, particularly in the rural areas. T

he hopefulness we observed in 2

00

3 has transform

ed into the im

pression that outsiders are politically ambivalent tow

ard the needs of local people. T

he Foundation's national survey in 2

00

6 revealed grow

-ing skepticism

and animosity am

ong Afghans tow

ard the international and the A

fghan government. T

he key issues raised in the survey m

clude concerns over security, the lack of reconstruction, the weak econ-

omy, and high levels of unem

ployment. 14 B

oth the illicit economy and the

informal econom

y continue to account for So to 90 percent of the total econom

y, and according to the World B

ank, among others, the deteriorat-

ing economic condition threatens governm

ent legitimacy and stability and

in many regions helps to increase the pow

er of the warlords.'s

Transnational feminist netw

orks are not isolated from the m

essy terrain of real and perceived failures of aid interventions in the country. Frustra-tions about the national interests of foreign pow

ers are looming, specifi-

cally against the outright political bargaining with w

arlords, which signifi-

cantly undermines any efforts to advance w

omen's rights. D

espite aid flow

ing into the country wom

en's formal rights are not translated into

lived experience, particularly since forced marriages, dom

estic violence, 16 threats and intim

idations, kidnappings, honor killings, and daily harass-m

ents are all major obstacles to the safety and security of w

omen across

the country. The lack of security has been identified as a significant prob-

lem for the m

ajority of Afghans, but w

omen and girls bear the brunt of it as

it impairs their active participation in the reconstruction and developm

ent process, clearly corroborated by the events after the second presidential elections.

In 2

00

6-7

the security situation deteriorated significantly, with an

increased number of explosions, suicide bom

bings, and armed attacks.

In Kandahar the assassination in Septem

ber 20

06

of Safiye Am

ajan, the head of the D

epartment for W

omen's A

ffairs, illustrated the dangers facing w

omen, especially those active in hum

an rights organizing. It has been repeatedly stressed that in public spaces all w

omen and girls are potential

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

127

targets of resurgent opposition forces, local warlords, and pow

erful crimi-

nal groups, who threaten, intim

idate, and enact physical and sexual vio-lence. In this fraught environm

ent gender programm

ing will have only a

superficial impact if the m

ajority of wom

en continue to be constrained and the underlying political changes are not m

ade. The foreign agenda in the

country, and the transnational feminist engagem

ent with it, m

ust take greater responsibility for w

hat Azarbaijani-M

oghaddam describes as a sit-

uation in which w

omen's rights are being "transacted" by foreign pow

ers to pursue their m

ultiple and contradictory agendas in the country.17 Efforts

to support Afghan w

omen becom

e trapped inside the complex w

eb of political and m

ilitary objectives, priorities, and criminalizing partnerships.

Transnational feminist advocacy needs to reveal the dangerous im

plica-tions of im

perial play in Afghanistan and the role of internationals that, on

the one hand, engage the rhetoric of gender equality and promote safety

and security for all wom

en, but on the other simultaneously underm

ine state legitim

acy and the rule of law through their continued direct and

indirect support of warlordism

. In this sense the end of the first Tali ban regim

e ushered in a new and different era of challenges for w

omen. T

he situation, as D

enize Kandiyoti acutely observes, is one in w

hich "wom

en continue to be w

ards of their comm

unities and households and have little recourse to protection or justice outside these dom

ains:' 18

Provincial Reconstruction Team

s and the M

ilitarization of Aid

The m

ilitarization of aid found expression in Afghanistan in 2

00

3, w

hen the U

nited States established the first provincial reconstruction teams

( p R T s) in the three provinces of G

ardez, Kunduz, and B

amiyan. 19 This w

as follow

ed shortly by Britain's establishing P R

T s in Mazar-e-Sharif in the

north and Canada's establishing PR

TS in K

andahar in the south. Over the

past several years more than fourteen countries have established PR

TS

across Afghanistan, em

blematic of the new

security face of postconflict developm

ent operations. Am

ong the aid comm

unity in Afghanistan, the

purpose of the PRT

S remains unclear even though their official and stated

objective is to "advance the central government's presence throughout

h .

a: "20

Afghanistan and to provide direct support to t e reconstructiO

n euorts.

128 Clzislzti and Farhoum

and-Sims

Observers argue that the PRTs w

ere primarily created to engage soldiers in

aid, development, and reconstruction in order to "w

in the hearts and m

inds" of the people and promote the success of the m

ilitary campaign.

Feminists too have had m

ixed responses to the growing politicization and

securitization of aid in Afghanistan that very quickly blurred distinctions

between strictly political, m

ilitary, and humanitarian m

otivations. The m

ultiple and arguably contradictory motivations of PRTs have created

frustration and concern among aid w

orkers and recipients. Aid and de-

velopment N

GO

s, researchers and activists alike, argue that the militariza-

tion of aid is not conducive to sustainable peace or development and

threatens the integrity of this important w

ork for decades. They argue that

the militarization of aid has greatly dim

inished humanitarian space, and

aid agencies are finding it increasingly difficult to distance themselves from

the w

ar on terror's active combative cam

paigns in the country. Any efforts

on the part of aid actors to interact and establish trust and good relations w

ith comm

unities on exclusively humanitarian term

s is met w

ith suspicion or am

bivalence. The blurring of lines betw

een military and hum

anitarian w

ork has consequently comprom

ised the safety and security of aid work-

ers, as demonstrated by a noticeable and disturbing increase in violent

attacks against foreign aid workers and their M

ghan colleagues, who are

accused of collaborating with the foreigners. As a result m

any NG

Os w

ith a long history of w

orking in the harshest and most challenging of tim

es in M

ghanistan have suspended their operations. Fem

inist scholars and practitioners must pay closer attention to the

authoritative presence of internationals, particularly in terms of the im

-plications of the w

ar on terror's varied geopolitical and military interests

that not only frame the postconflict agenda, but im

plicate (by extension) gender program

s in Mghanistan. A

cross the country the current foreign (m

ilitary as well as civilian) presence has evoked concern and a desire to

"protect" Mghan w

omen from

the "foreign gaze," thereby not only hin-dering w

omen's participation in aid projects, but further restricting their

access to public space. The PRTs in particular reinforce w

orking primar-

ily with M

ghan men as the key developm

ent partners, since wom

en are largely prohibited from

engaging with m

en who are not directly related to

them by blood or m

arriage (such as soldiers). Although the m

ilitarization of aid is posited as creating m

ore peace and security for comm

unities, these

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

129

goals are highly suspect given the premise that the use and threat of

are the means to conflict resolution. U

nless these fundamental

contradictions are all taken into account and addressed, the militarization

of aid will hinder rather than serve the cause of peace in Afghanistan and

negatively impact the local populations, particularly the w

omen.

International Aid and the Politics ofW

omen's O

rganizing

The lack of accountability not only of the multiple political m

andates in the country but also the billions of dollars entering the country is a key concern, especially in term

s of how this m

oney is being distributed and w

ho benefits. The failure of the international com

munity to m

aintain a consistent course of aid further exacerbates the w

eariness and suspicion am

ong Afghans, already troubled by the lavish and revolving presence of

the expatriate comm

unity. In our own w

ork in Afghanistan in the spring of

20

03

, we observed that A

fghan wom

en from both rural and urban areas

recognized the scattered international agenda and criticized aid agencies particularly for their distance from

the lives of the majority of A

fghans. Indeed the international aid apparatus has set its ow

n subculture and infrastructure, operating in w

hat Antonio D

onini calls the "Kabul B

ub-ble:'21 T

hey work w

ithin a hierarchical, donor-driven structure of policies and practices, dispensing aid m

oney unevenly across Afghanistan. T

he practices and politics of w

omen's rights are m

ost often defined the

international aid apparatus in terms of its relationship to transnational

feminism

networks. W

e have observed that in the context of Afghan w

om-

en's organizations, transnational feminism

, consistent with the interna-

tional aid apparatus, promotes the institutionalization of w

omen's orga-

nizing to encourage an urban-based humanitarian aid fram

ework in the

country. Wom

en's organizing is specifically directed to create "functional and efficient" NGOS that are structured like their international counter-parts. T

he transnational feminist apparatus needs to recognize that ten-

sions arise when policies and practices re-create dem

arcations made by the

international aid comm

unity between the secular and religious, the form

al and inform

al, the urban and rural, and so on. This agenda often disem-

powers the illiterate, rural-based A

fghan networks of w

omen organizers

and puts them in com

petition with the m

ore urban-based, educated, and

130 C

hishti and Farh01mum

d-Sims

professional Afghan w

omen's organizations. M

ore often than not, the in-form

al networks of w

omen are perceived as inexperienced, hindered by

their own cultural and religious conservatism

, and are assumed to lack the

skills to properly manage their financial resources. These perceptions can

further exacerbate the disparities among w

omen's groups and inevitably

challenge national and transnational feminist hopes for building a politics

of solidarity across the diversity of wom

en's locations and experiences. This can lead to a divisive fragm

entation of the wom

en's movem

ent if, for exam

ple, English literacy and donor history are the key determinants to

receiving support. Transnational fem

inists operating within the postconflict aid apparatus

in the country need to be diligent against donor-driven agendas, which can

nurture a rigid and privileged hierarchy of Afghan w

omen's organizing.

The protracted exclusion of these w

omen not only dislocates their agency

as co-constructors of a wom

en's rights agenda, but will have a detrim

ental im

pact on Afghanistan's overall capacity to instigate long-term

changes in attitudes and perceptions. To w

ork against the normative structures of the

international aid comm

unity, the transnational feminist apparatus m

ust im

plement flexible and creative approaches that depart from

normative

donor practices that all too often facilitate the entry of wom

en into institu-tionalized civil society at the expense of building alliances and pooling resources (financial and hum

an) in order to work tow

ard mutually agreed

upon goals and objectives.

The C

onvention on the Elimination of

All Form

s of Discrim

ination against Wom

en and the A

fghan Wom

en's Rights A

genda

In an effort to ensure that wom

en's rights are firmly entrenched in the

critical early stages of nation building in Afghanistan, the transnational

feminist apparatus actively sought to advance tw

o important international

United N

ations documents that ostensibly w

ould protect and promote

wom

en's rights and participation in peace building and reconstruction: the U

nited Nations International C

onvention on the Elimination of A

ll Forms

of Discrim

ination against Wom

en ( CE

DA

W) and the U

nited Nations Se-

curity Council R

esolution 1325 on Wom

en, Peace, and Security (scR

1325). 22 Although not perfect and certainly fraught w

ith limitations and

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

131

controversy, these documents are nevertheless considered instrum

ental in advancing and guaranteeing w

omen's rights, particularly in the form

ative period of social, political, and econom

ic state building in Afghanistan. T

he advocacy efforts of transnational fem

inist networks and of A

fghan wom

en them

selves enabled both CE

DA

W and S

CR

1325 to bear some influence over

the drafting of Afghanistan's new

constitution and in ensuring that Afghan

wom

en's rights were prioritized under the B

onn Agreem

ent. 23

The first of these tw

o documents, C

ED

AW

, was adopted on 18 D

ecem-

ber 197 9 by the UN

General A

ssembly and cam

e into force on 3 September

19 31 after tw

enty countries ratified it. Despite debates about and criticism

s of C

ED

AW

and its applicability in a diverse international comm

unity, 185 states w

ere party to the Convention. T

he Convention w

as the "culmina-

tion of more than thirty years of w

ork by the Com

mission on the Status of

Wom

en;' whose w

ork was "instrum

ental in bringing to light all the areas in w

hich wom

en are denied equality with m

en:' 24 Of all the U

N declarations

and conventions CE

DA

W in particular is the m

ost critical and comprehen-

sive document created to address the advancem

ent of wom

en and the fulfillm

ent of their human rights. It not only defines equality, but also

addresses a wide range of hum

an rights issues relating to wom

en. It also provides an agenda for action for those states w

ho are party to the Conven-

tion, often referred to as the Wom

en's Convention and International Bill of

Rights for W

omen. T

he Convention's pream

ble and thirty articles address civil rights and the legal status of w

omen; it is the first treaty in history to

consider issues relating to human reproduction and the im

pact of culture on gender relations. 25 T

he Convention discusses such varied topics as

freedom of religion; freedom

of movem

ent, opinion, and association; na-tionality; sexual and reproductive rights; 26 and rights to education, health-care, and the political arena. It defines discrim

ination against wom

en as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction m

ade on the basis of sex which has

the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoym

ent or exercise by w

omen, irrespective of their m

arital status, on a basis of equality of m

en and wom

en, of human rights and fundam

ental freedoms in

the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field:' 27

By ratifying CE

DA

W states com

mit to incorporating the principle of the

equality of men and w

omen in their legal system

, abolishing and revising all discrim

inatory laws, establishing tribunals and other public institutions

to ensure the effective protection of wom

en against discrimination, and

132 Chishtz and hnlzozm

wnd-Sim

s

eliminating all acts of discrim

ination against wom

en by persons, organiza-tions, and enterprises. A

lthough the UN does not have enforcement m

ech-anism

s, the strength of the Convention is rooted in the requirem

ent that state partie!> w

ho have acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put

its provisions into practice. As w

ith other treaty bodies the implem

entation of the Convention

is monitored by a com

mittee com

posed of "independent experts." The CEDAW

comm

ittee is composed of tw

enty-three experts who are nom

i-nated by their governm

ents and elected by the Economic and Social

Council to serve four-year term

s. Experts are chosen based on their "high m

oral standing and competence in the field covered by the C

onvention:'28 T

he comm

ittee meets three tim

es a year with a designated num

ber of state delegations w

ho have submitted their reports. States are expected to sub-

mit reports to the treaty body once every four years. In their reports

countries are expected to outline measures they have adopted to bring

their country's laws and practices m

ore in line with their obligations under

the Convention. A

t the reporting sessions the delegations from each coun-

try provide a summ

ary of their written report, including statistical infor-

mation and updates, w

hich allows the com

mittee to then question the

delegation on its progress in implem

enting CEDAW and to provide general

recomm

endations concerning the elimination of discrim

ination against w

omen. T

he comm

ittee reports to the Economic and Social C

ouncil and the G

eneral Assem

bly with a list of its activities and recom

mendations

based on its examination of reports and inform

ation received from state.

parties and NG

Os. States parties to CEDAW

present their first report to the com

mittee one year after ratification, and every tw

o years thereafter. A

fghanistan's history of engagement w

ith CEDAW began on 14 A

ugust 1980, w

hen the country signed onto the Convention. By signing, A

fghani-stan m

ade a salutary endorsement w

hereby it agreed not to undermine the

spirit of the Convention w

hile it carried out an internal review to deter··

mine w

hether or not to ratify. 29 Over the years of conflict and unrest,

however, the C

onvention was forgotten; it regained attention only after the

fall of the Taliban and the arrival of the international aid apparatus in the country. G

rassroots wom

en's organizations and UN

IFEM im

mediately be-

gan to provide training workshops on CEDAW

, and there was a grow

ing interest in the A

fghan wom

en's movem

ent to learn about the Convention

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

133

and consider ways it could be used as an advocacy tool for w

omen's rights

in Afghanistan. In addition to this grow

ing interest within civil society, the

interim A

fghan government w

anted to demonstrate its com

mitm

ent to gender equality in the face of intense international pressure to im

prove the situation of w

omen. It w

as in this climate that the interim

government

unexpectedly undertook measures to form

ally ratify the Convention on

5 March

20

03

. 30 Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW

was an im

portant m

ilestone for wom

en's rights, not only in that country but also across the M

uslim w

orld. Afghanistan m

ade history by becoming the first M

uslim

state to ratify CEDAW w

ithout reservations.-H

The tim

ing of Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW

was extrem

ely signif-icant given that it preceded the drafting and adoption of the new

Afghan

constitution in January 20

04

. The transnational fem

inist movem

ent along w

ith national actors within the A

fghan wom

en's movem

ent quickly mobi-

lized to lend support and help embed CEDAW

comm

itments w

ithin the new

constitution. In the months leading up to the constitutionalloya jirga

much of their advocacy centered on dem

anding that international human

rights principles pertaining to wom

en, such as equality before the law and

advances in political rights, be included in the constitution. Adoption

of CEDAW did have opponents, how

ever; there was a clear cam

paign to discredit the C

onvention as Western, un-lslam

ic, and incompatible w

ith A

fghan culture and religion. Despite great resistance by conservative ele-

ments before and during the constitutional loya jirga, how

ever, interna-tional and local fem

inists achieved some successes that w

ere celebrated by w

omen in A

fghanistan and their supporters around the world. T

he chair-person of CEDAW

, Ferida Acar, noted:

The new

ly approved Constitution explicitly guarantees that m

en and wom

en have equal rights and duties before the law

. This is a significant victory for wom

en and girls in A

fghanistan who barely three years ago w

ere completely excluded from

all spheres of life and faced system

atic violations of their human rights on a daily

basis. Gender equality is a crucial factor not only in achieving sustainable peace

but also in ensuring respect for human rights, dem

ocracy and the rule oflaw in all

societies. Enshrining the principle of gender equality within the C

onstitution is a vital starting point for the transform

ation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. It

legitimizes the im

portant role played by wom

en and girls in Afghanistan in reshap-

ing their future and in rebuilding their country. 32

134 Chi$hti and Farhozm

wnd-Sim

s

Still, Afghan w

omen w

ere only guardedly optimistic. W

hile they cele-brated the explicit inclusion of gender equality and other positive develop-m

ents in the constitution, according to Lauryn Oates and Isabelle Solon-

Helal, "they rem

ain[ ed] cautious due to other constitutional provisions that proclaim

[ed] Afghanistan an 'Islam

ic Republic' and declare[d] that

'the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion oflslam' [had J precedence

over any law in A

fghanistan:' 33 This apparent conflict will pose an obsta-

cle to the advancement of w

omen if extrem

ist interpretations of Sharia are used to determ

ine wom

en's rights and responsibilities in Afghanistan.

Their concerns are w

ell placed; the vast majority of the reservations to

CEDAW are entered by M

uslim governm

ents who argue that Islam

ic Sharia law

supersedes international law and therefore prevents them

from fully

complying w

ith CEDAW. 34 By attaching a reservation to a particular article

a state party articulates its decision not to be held accountable to that article.

Given the potential for w

omen's rights to be underm

ined, the trans-national fem

inist network's agenda in A

fghanistan sought to strengthen the w

omen's m

ovement there by creating aw

areness and generating wide-

spread grassroots support for CEDAW and SCR 1325 in public and legal

discourses. It was assum

ed that once Afghan w

omen's organizations be-

came fam

iliar with these international instrum

ents they would be able to

contextualize their own struggles and activism

from w

ithin these political fram

es and diligently monitor governm

ent accountability and compliance.

While training A

fghan wom

en on CEDAW in A

fghanistan in May 2oo3 ,'

we w

ere inspired by their intense interest in and serious consideration of the applicability and relevance of the C

onvention to Afghanistan. In w

ork-ing w

ith formal (urban-based) and nonform

al (rural-based) Afghan w

om-

en's organizations and networks from

across the country, we found that in

many cases introducing the contents of these international docum

ents generated an overall positive response by m

any wom

en, who felt these

documents w

ere useful tools for advocating wom

en's rights. In training sessions on CEDAW

we noticed that som

e of the participants were con-

fused about or opposed to it because of anti-CEDA

W propaganda they had

heard on the radio or read in local newspapers. U

pon a closer reading and exam

ination of the Convention, how

ever, many of these w

omen w

ere able to have som

e of their misconceptions and concerns addressed. 35 N

everthe-less the suitability and applicability of the C

onvention in helping to trans-

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

135

form gender inequities in the country produced intense discussions. This

is not surprising, as various other Muslim

states have raised concerns or opposed CEDAW

specifically around wom

en's rights to free movem

ent and nationality (article 9) and other rights related to m

arriage and family life

(article 1 6). Traditionally the desire to limit a w

oman's role to that of w

ife and m

other has prevented her from entering public life and being an active

mem

ber of society through social and political participation. While w

ork-ing in A

fghanistan we saw

some of the sam

e concerns raised by those apprehensive about CEDAW

's impact on that country. W

hile a great major-

ity of wom

en were eager to learn about these instrum

ents and use them to

their advantage, a very small group of equally passionate traditionalists

(men and w

omen) harbored suspicion of CEDAW

as part of a 'Western

imperialist agenda:' As in other M

uslim states, the forces of opposition led

by conservative clergy and their supporters invoked religious grounds for noncom

pliance. Ariane B

runet and Isabelle Solon-Helal of the organiza-

tion Rights and D

emocracy, w

ho have worked extensively in A

fghanistan,

suggest:

In Afghanistan, w

omen's rights are view

ed as part of a Western agenda; they are

used as a propaganda tool by all sides and linked to cultural and religious values. Every possible roadblock to the realization of w

omen's rights and to the par-

ticipation of wom

en in decision-making processes has been installed: the per-

petuation of warlordism

, the lack of security, and the lack of effective gender policy coordination. 36

One of the difficult tasks w

e encountered was how

to promote CEDAW

across the country w

ithout disavowing A

fghan culture and religion while

simultaneously not supporting patriarchal attitudes and structures that

undermine the rights of w

omen. A

lthough discussions of CEDAW are a

platform for dialogue and critical engagem

ent among w

omen, as one A

f-ghan w

omen's rights activist recently noted, the task is not easy:

Despite years of C

ED

AW

related activities in Afghanistan, m

ost wom

en's political activists w

ere not really aware of w

hat CE

DA

W is exactly about, but w

hen we began our activities and cam

paigns for wom

en's political rights, it became the

discourse among political activists. But due to the sensitivity of the topic, we w

ere always arguing based on all international hum

an rights conventions signed by A

fghanistan, and tried not to focus on CE

DA

WY

136 C

hishti and Farlzownmui-Sim

s

A critical challenge is to address the suspicions Afghan m

en and wom

en have about CEDAW

, primarily as a W

estern imperialist im

position that Will

abruptly modernize and secularize A

fghanistan's cultural and religious tra-ditions. C

learly, using international provisions to change and challenge w

omen's and girls' realities in A

fghanistan must therefore be predicated on

the ownership of these instrum

ents by Afghans them

selves. This entails a m

ultifaceted approach whereby national and international actors m

ust collaboratively w

ork through the messy terrain of dialogue and action to

engage CEDAW from

within a negotiated cultural and religious fram

ework.

This is not to say that Afghan w

omen m

ust concede to misogynist and

extremist perspectives, but if w

omen-and m

en-believe that interna-tional tools do not respect their religious and cultural traditions, they w

ill not support their application in dom

estic practice. What w

e found in A

fghanistan was a split betw

een those who thought these tools did not go

far enough in protecting and promoting w

omen's hum

an rights, and those w

ho were concerned about the im

pact of their application on the status quo. T

he former group challenged CEDAW

for not implicitly discussing

violence against wom

en in the private sphere as a human rights violation;

they believed the Convention should dem

and that states make dom

estic abuse a crim

inal offense. One w

oman com

mented, ''A

ll the rights in the w

orld are meaningless if I have to suffer abuse at the hands of m

y husband and his fam

ily on a regular basis. Why does this C

onvention not protect me

from this?" T

he other group believed that private sphere rights should not be codified in international law

in order to preserve Afghan and Islam

ic. cultural and religious practices pertaining to w

omen's fam

ilial and social roles. These w

omen seem

ed to be resisting wom

en's rights in order to protect their ow

n social status. As Rostam

i-Povey argues, "The responsibil-

ity for the injustice and violence lies not only with the im

mediate fam

ily but also w

ith individual comm

unities, religious organizations, health and education institutions, professionals and law

enforcers."38

To dispel fears and concerns about CEDAW local w

omen's N

GO

s in A

fghanistan have been engaged in educational campaigns that serve tw

o im

portant purposes: familiarizing w

omen w

ith these international provi-sions and allow

ing them to develop independent opinions about their

content and relevance, and encouraging locally based plans of action to im

plement these provisions and ensure that CEDAW

and SCR 1325 directly

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

137

relate to the needs of Afghan w

omen and not be perceived as e:x1:ernally

imposed. These efforts have resulted in increased dialogue, particularly

about Afghanistan's responsibilities as a signatory to CEDAW

, but these-curity situation and other barriers to w

omen's participation in public life

have made it only m

arginally possible for wom

en to demand changes to the

status quo. Lack of security is preventing wom

en from enjoying freedom

of m

ovement and dem

anding their rights without being threatened. This w

as clearly dem

onstrated in loya jirgas where w

omen delegates suffered verbal

abuse and threats to their physical safety because of their outspoken de-m

ands for rights and their criticism of the status quo. Public discourse

clearly impacted the C

onstitutional Drafting C

omm

ission whose m

andate called for "broad participation of w

omen in the constitution-m

aking pro-cess" and the inclusion of nine w

omen m

embers serving on the C

omm

is-sion.39 T

he mandate also m

ade a comm

itment to w

ork with the W

omen's

Ministry and U

NIFEM

to hold public education programs about the consti-

tutional rights of wom

en throughout the country in order to reach out to w

omen and to increase public aw

areness. Without a doubt, the develop-

ment of a national w

omen's m

ovement is critical to prom

oting change. B

runet and Solon-Helal reflect on their extensive w

ork in Afghanistan:

The elusive gains made w

ith Afghanistan's ratification of CEDAW

, the very new

concept of a Ministry of W

omen's A

ffairs, the weak coordination am

ong donor countries regarding w

omen's rights, the varied and contradictory gender policies

proposed in a variety of U.N

./ AT

A [A

fghanistan Transitional Authority] docu-

ments, and the lack of gender-focused staff appointm

ents at the United N

ations A

ssistance Mission to A

fghanistan (UN

AM

A), indicate that w

omen's hum

an rights also need to be protected by civil society organizations and by the building of a w

omen's m

ovement that is educated and capable of being a valuable interlocutor

to a State that should be governed by the rule of law. This cannot happen over a

few years, let alone over a few

months: 10

In our work w

e found wom

en expressing a desire to connect with

wom

en and wom

en's groups outside Afghanistan to share experiences and

lessons, particularly in addressing the issue of Islam and law

. Case studies

of wom

en's activism in other M

uslim countries and in the rest of the

developing world provide these organizations w

ith encouragement, sup-

port, and valuable ideas about how to m

eet the challenges they face as

138 C

hishti and Farhoumand-Szm

.<

Muslim

wom

en struggling to realize their rights within an Islam

ic frame-

work. O

ur references to the work of w

omen's m

ovements in Iran, Pakistan

Egypt, and other Muslim

states were m

et with great enthusiasm

and prid: by the A

fghan wom

en we w

orked with, w

ho felt that they shared similar

challenges and would benefit from

meeting w

ith other Muslim

wom

en on such issues.

this need for regional cooperation and networking

among w

omen s groups, the transnational w

omen's m

ovement has m

ade little effort to facilitate this process. A

small num

ber of NG

Os are spear-

heading this effort, 41 but without international financial support these

efforts will prove arduous.

The

of Afghan w

omen is absolutely critical to creating

framew

orks that Implem

ent CE

DA

W and other international instrum

ents that speak to w

omen's lived realities in A

fghanistan. Universal hum

an rights norm

s come to life only w

hen they find relevance to those they serve. A

ttempting to apply only one m

odel will not only fail, but w

ill give impetus

to opponents of these valuable tools. Efforts to promote C

ED

AW

and SC

R

I325 must not only educate w

omen but also sharpen their analytical abilities

so that they may interpret C

ED

AW

within the fram

ework of Islam

ic legal and cultural discourses.

Challenges to the C

onvention

Although m

isunderstandings of CE

DA

W abound, the follow

ing discussion of key articles illustrates that international hum

an rights need not be in-· com

patible with Islam

ic customary and legal discourse, and that dialogue

and education would serve to bridge the gap and benefit w

omen in A

f-T

he most challenged C

ED

AW

articles include article 4 , on spe-Cial m

easuresi article 51 on sex-role stereotyping and prejudicei article 6, on

prostitutioni article 9, on nationalityi article IS, on lawi and article I6, on

marriage and fam

ily life. In our training programs w

e were m

et with exten-

sive questions about the meaning and intent of articles 6 and 1 6, w

hich had received negative press in the m

edia and had been challenged by critics including various local and national Islam

ic scholars. Article 5 addresse:

the universality of wom

en's human rights and encourages state parties to

the Convention to m

odify social and cultural of conduct to elim

i-nate the idea of one sex as superior and stereotypical roles for m

en and

Transnational Fem

inism in A

fghanistan 139

wom

en. This is a particularly challenging article in the Muslim

world

because of the debate around wom

en's roles and responsibilities in Muslim

society and the need to preserve cultural norm

s}Z Some M

uslim scholars

who have debated this issue argue that the question is not one of the

universality of human rights but rather the application of universal norm

s to protect and preserve "legitim

ate" cultural traditions that do not pro-m

ote the suffering of groups based on ethnicity, sex, nationality, religion, or any other category. C

learly the solution to this dilemm

a lies within the

Muslim

world itself.

Another revealing discussion about C

ED

AW

dealt with article 6, w

hich requires states to take all appropriate m

easures, including legislation, to suppress the trafficking of w

omen and the exploitation of prostitutes. M

e-dia discussions of this article gave the im

pression that it "promotes" pro-

miscuity. \"/hen w

e began to discuss this article in detail, its relevance becam

e increasingly clear to our female participants, w

ho discussed the plight of w

idowed w

omen w

ho had to turn to prostitution to earn a living, and the increasing num

ber of trafficked wom

en who have w

orked in Af-ghanistan since the arrival of foreign troops. A

rticle 9, on the right of w

omen to hold nationality independent of their husband, is particularly

problematic in A

fghanistan and the Muslim

world, w

here a wom

an's-and her children's-nationality and freedom

of movem

ent are tied to the hus-band or father. A

rticle 16 allows w

omen to decide w

hether to get married

and to choose their spouse. It allows a w

oman the pow

er to decide the num

ber of children she would like to have and their spacing and gives her

an equal say in their custody and guardianship. She would also have equal

rights to ownership, acquisition, m

anagement, and adm

inistration of prop-erty. D

espite opposition to the rights articulated in this article, Afghan

wom

en noted that Sharia law already provides M

uslim w

omen w

ith many

of these rights. Some w

omen noted that only extrem

e interpretations of Sharia law

and wom

en's ignorance of their Islamic rights lead to disagree-

ments about the roles and responsibilities of M

uslim w

omen in the fam

ily. T

he Muslim

world is not a hom

ogeneous entity, and religious precepts are clearly influenced by historical, regional, and cultural factors, w

hich in turn im

pact the interpretation and the practice of religion. As Abdullahi

An-N

a'im argues, "It is not difficult to establish the responsibility of m

any Islam

ic states to change aspects of religious law in accordance w

ith their

140 C

hishti and Farlww

nand-Sims

obligations under international law. T

he question is how to effect such

change in practice."41

We w

ould argue that a good way to start effecting change is for trans-

national feminists w

orking in Afghanistan to build solidarity by creat-

ing more spaces for the exchange of ideas, critical reflection, and m

utual learning. By engaging, not disavow

ing, traditional religious sources of the Q

!.!ran and Sunnah, in addition to centering the nuances of culture, our discussions w

ith Afghan w

omen w

ere able to move into those difficult

spaces where a closer reading of each article helped to clarify and con-

textualize its varied meanings and purposes. O

ur collective assessment that

these principles could be applied in a culturally and religiously appropriate m

anner served to overcome m

any of the initial concerns and skepticism.-!-!

Conclusion

Wom

en's organizing is not a new phenom

enon in Afghanistan. A

fghan w

omen have a long tradition of activism

and resistance in the face of insecurity and grave hum

an rights abuses. Their activities have continued

throughout twenty-three years of protracted conflict and have led to a

burgeoning wom

en's rights movem

ent that is comm

itted to the advance-m

ent of Afghan w

omen and their full enjoym

ent of their most basic rights,

including access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunity and

important civil and political rights. A

ccording to the Beijing D

eclaration and Platform

for Action, "Equality betw

een wom

en and men is a m

atter of hum

an rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundam

ental prerequisite for equality, development and peace:' 45 In Af-

ghanistan "the low social status of w

omen, and the consequent pow

er im

balances between w

omen and m

en that it generates, are the underlying reasons for harm

ful and discriminatory practices and physical and sexual

abuse against girls and wom

en:' 46 The international fem

inist movem

ent has a strategic role to play in supporting and building solidarity netw

orks w

ith the existing wom

en's movem

ent in Afghanistan. H

owever, it is critical

to note that the global and local complexities and contradictions that

underpin the rights agenda in Afghanistan can also backfire, w

ith the very real possibility of a backlash against A

fghan wom

en seen as betraying A

fghan culture and traditions by participating in foreign aid projects. At the

Transnational Feminism

in Afghanistan

141

very least the feminist international apparatus needs to be aw

are of percep-tions on the part of both A

fghan wom

en and men that equate w

omen-

centered and gender-targeted programs as a direct challenge to traditional

culture and religion. The e::.:pansive internationally directed rights agenda

across Afghanistan is perhaps already fueling and further legitim

izing rigid interpretations of sacred texts in order to "rescue" A

fghan wom

en from the

tyranny ofWestern neocolonial quests to reconfigure A

fghan wom

anhood. B

oth local and international actors must therefore be attentive to the m

essy terrain of advancing and im

proving the lives of Afghan w

omen and girls

in the current postconflict dynamics of outsider-insider politics. As Zine

acutely observes, we m

ust be aware of "the w

ay bodies and identities are scripted in service of neo-im

perialist goals and from w

ithin fundamentalist

worldview

s. Both ideological view

s limit [w

omen's] agency, autonom

y, and freedom

and seriously circumscribe their lived conditions, choices, and

experiences:' 47 Moving beyond this ideological battlefield is perhaps an

impossibility, but principled solidarity based on collaborative efforts and

genuine dialogue can help facilitate mutually defined goals to further pro-

mote the overall w

ell-being of Afghan w

omen in postconflict A

fghanistan.

Notes

The coauthors of this essay are listed alphabetically.

1 For an extensive discussion, see M

ark Duffield's G

lobal Govem

ancc and the New

Wars.

2 See Elaheh R

ostami Povey's study 'W

omen in A

fghanistan:· 3 W

e recognize that these institutions are still in their infancy and have yet to meet

their full potential. For example, see International C

risis Group, "A

fghanistan: W

omen and R

econstruction:· 4

For a concrete analysis of Afghan w

omen's participation in the constitutional

process, see Oates and Solon-H

elal, At the Cross-Roads of Conflict mrd D

emocracy.

s Afghan R

esearch Education Unit, A House D

ivided, 15. 6 A

zarbaijani-Moghaddam

, "Afghan W

omen on the M

argins of the Twenty-first

Century:'

7 M

ohanty, Feminism

witlw

ut Borders, 20

.

8 L. Ahm

ed, Wom

en and Gender in Islam

. 9 Zine, "M

uslim W

omen and the Politics of R

epresentation;· 2. 10

Chishti, "The International W

omen's M

ovement and the Politics of Participation

for Muslim

Wom

en;· 86. 11

Interview w

ith Lauryn Oates by C

heshmak Farhoum

and-Sims, 25 O

ctober 20

07

.

142 C

hishti and FarhowHand-Sim

s

12 A

zarbaijani-Moghaddam

, "Afghan W

omen on the M

argins of the Twenty-First

Century," 103.

13 R

ostami-Povey, "W

omen in A

fghanistan." 14

Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2006."

15 W

orld Bank, ''Afghanistan." See also Senlis C

ouncil, ''Afghanistan Five Y

ears Late " .

r and "Losing H

earts and Minds in A

fghanistan." 16

Oates, National Report on D

omestic Violence against W

omen: Afghanistan.

17 A

zarbaijani-Moghaddam

, "On Living w

ith Negative Peace and a H

alf-Built State."

18 K

andiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 32.

19 For a m

ore thorough discussion and analysis of P R Ts, gender issues, and A

fghani-stan, see Farhoum

and-Sims, "T

he Three Block W

ar:· 2

0

Peace Operations W

orking Group of the C

anadian Peace Coordinating C

omm

it-tee, "N

Go/G

overnment D

ialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Team

s (PRTs) in A

fghanistan and the Militarization of H

umanitarian A

ssistance:· 21

Donini, Nation Building Unraveled, 2004.

22 For a m

ore complete discussion of C

ED

AW

, see Cheshm

ak Farhoumand-Sim

s's dissertation, currently in progress, "Im

plementing C

ED

AW

in Afghanistan:·

23 For the U

nited Nations D

ivision for the Advancem

ent of Wom

en, see the UN

website.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 T

he Convention is very careful in addressing this issue and refers only to w

omen's

right "to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their

children and to have access to information, education and m

eans to enable them

to exercise these rights" (cED

AW

, article 16:1e). 27

CE

DA

W1 article!.

28 Their m

andate is outlined in articles 17-30 of the Convention.

29 M

edica Mondiale Basic G

erman W

omen's G

roup, "Information about

and CE

DA

W in A

fghanistan:' 30

Farhoumand-Sim

s's interviews w

ith Afghan w

omen activists and w

orkers in the M

inistry of Wom

en's Affairs and the M

inistry of Foreign Affairs reveal that no

one seemed to have know

n that the Ministry of Foreign A

ffairs was pursuing

CE

DA

W ratification until it w

as announced in March 2003.

31 Turkey is the only M

uslim country that has rem

oved all reservations to the C

onvention. 32

Wom

en's International League for Peace and Freedom, "cE

DA

W C

hairperson A

pplauds New

Afghan C

onstitution." 33

Oates and Solon-H

elal, At the Cross-Roads of Conflict and D

emocracy.

34 Farhoum

and-Sims, "Im

plementing C

ED

AW

in Afghanistan:·

35 O

ne of the major w

eaknesses of CE

DA

W that the w

omen highlighted w

as the absence of any discussion about dom

estic violence. We explained that this w

as due to resistance and opposition, largely by M

uslim states, against any inclusion

Transnatitmal Fem

inism ill Afghanistan

143

in the Convention of w

omen's private sphere rights. A

rticles dealing with other

"private" rights, such as marriage, are highly contested by M

uslim states and

continue to elicit reservations. The feeling w

as that if such an article about violence against w

omen w

ere added to CE

DA

W few

er parties would sign it. It

would be better to have countries sign on and w

ork toward full com

pliance rather

than alienate them.

3 6 B

runet and Solon-Helal, "Seizing the O

pportunity," 20.

37 Em

ail comm

unication with an A

fghan wom

en's rights activist who w

ishes to

remain anonym

ous, 16 Novem

ber 2007.

3 s Rostam

-Povey, "Wom

en in Afghanistan," 175.

39 B

runet and Solon-Helal, "Seizing the O

pportunity;' 12.

40 Ibid., 7·

41 See w

ebsite for Wom

en Living under Muslim

Laws, http:/ /w

ww

.wlum

l.org/. .p

For a fuller discussion of the challenge of w

omen's hum

an rights and cultural relativism

, see the works by A

n-Na'im

, Afshar (co-editor of D

evelopment, W

omen

and War: A Fem

inist Perspective), and Azarbaijani-M

oghaddam cited in this essay

as well as M

ayer, Islam and H

wnan Rights.

43 A

n-Na'im

, Hum

an Rigl1ts in Cross Cultural Perspectives, 182.

44 W

omen Living under M

uslim Law

s is an excellent organization doing work in

this area.

4 5 See Beijing D

eclaration and Platform for A

ction. 46

Rostam

-Povey, "Wom

en in Afghanistan;· 175·

47 Zine, "B

etween O

rientalism and Fundam

entalism;' u.