transforming power relationships: building capacity for ecological security

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This article was downloaded by: [Universite Laval] On: 10 October 2014, At: 08:33 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Gender & Development Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cgde20 Transforming power relationships: Building capacity for ecological security Mary Jo Larson Published online: 01 Jul 2010. To cite this article: Mary Jo Larson (2002) Transforming power relationships: Building capacity for ecological security, Gender & Development, 10:2, 92-101, DOI: 10.1080/13552070215901 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13552070215901 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ terms-and-conditions

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This article was downloaded by: [Universite Laval]On: 10 October 2014, At: 08:33Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Gender & DevelopmentPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cgde20

Transforming power relationships:Building capacity for ecologicalsecurityMary Jo LarsonPublished online: 01 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Mary Jo Larson (2002) Transforming power relationships: Building capacity forecological security, Gender & Development, 10:2, 92-101, DOI: 10.1080/13552070215901

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13552070215901

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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In this article, I propose a holistic,integrated, flexible approach to ecologicalsecurity, which would strengthen the

power (symbolic, social, and material) ofdisadvantaged groups. This would potentiallyenable them to overcome barriers tohealthy, sustainable development. Systemstheory suggests that capacity-building cancontribute to ecological security byenabling low-power groups to appreciate,influence, and manage their strategicinterests. Lessons from analyses of multi-lateral negotiations are relevant to women,and to any group whose lack of powerresults in threats to their ability to live anddevelop sustainably.

The article is structured in three sections.The first describes the risks of climatechange to vulnerable small islandcommunities in the Pacific . Island andcoastal nations are among the populationsmost at risk of the effects of climate change.

The second uses a conflict resolutionsystems approach to investigate thepriorities of 43 small island nations fromthe Pacific, Caribbean, and Indian oceans,in UN climate change negotiations. Situatedin a position of low power within theinternational system, these nations haveformed the Alliance of Small Island States(AOSIS) to heighten global awareness ofthe threats to their ecological security. Thesection maps the ways in which AOSIS triesto transform threatening and unequalrelationships. The third section analyses thesmall islands’ proposals , in order toidentify their strategic interests, beforeadopting a systems approach to discuss theways in which capacity can be built inorder to promote ecological security. Thearticle is based on a combination ofacademic research on cl imate changenegotiations, and international developmentexperience.

Transforming powerrelationships: building capacity for ecological security Mary Jo Larson

The risks that climate change poses for the environment and for development are well-documented,yet it has been difficult to build a consensus on measures to reduce global threats to ecologicalsecurity. How can communities, NGOs, and policy-makers representing less powerful nationsovercome objections to measures that aim to mitigate the global threat to environment anddevelopment? In climate change negotiations, vulnerable communities and disadvantaged groupsmeet around the same table as more powerful interests. Using systems theory,1 this article analysesthe ways in which low-power groups can transform disadvantageous power relations to overcomethreats to sustainable development.

Gender and Development Vol. 10, No. 2, July 2002

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Building capacity for ecological security 93

Threats to basic needs inthe Pacific islands

Climate change is associated with majorhealth risks and irreversible environmentaldamage. In the Pacific islands, warming isdestroying coral reefs, reducing precipi-tation, and causing sea levels to rise. Eachof these environmental changes has directand indirect social consequences. Climatechange threatens the basic needs of islandcommunities for land, fresh water, foodsources, and livel ihoods. This in turnaffects community health. Poor women,men, and children, who have limited accessto land, potable water, cash, or credit, areleast able to adapt. The effects of climatechange were reported by small islandrepresentatives as follows:

Warming trends cause rising sea levels.

>> Rising tide tables cause lands to be

inundated.

>> Salt infiltration destroys farm crops.

Warming trends reduce precipitation.

>> Drought dries water reservoirs.

>> Drought destroys root crops.

Warming trends in water temperatures cause

extensive coral bleaching.

>> As coral reef communities die, the loss

affects marine habitats.

>> Access to coastal fish decreases

accordingly.

The patterns above demonstrate thecomplexity of the links between theenvironment and development. The declinein agriculture and fishing limits people’saccess to cash. Reduced access to cashlimits the availability of technical goodsand services. The socio-economic risks ofthese changes are exacerbated by poverty,and women are disproportionatelyrepresented among the poor and less-educated. They and their dependants areamong the most vulnerable communitymembers.

The inter-relationships between environ-mental habitats and human security extendbeyond the issues noted above. Small

islands are susceptible to hurricanes,typhoons, floods, and tidal waves. The lossof coastal habitats, such as mangroves andcoral reefs, reduces the natural barriers toocean fluctuations. People, homelands,local cultures, and political independenceare at risk. As the Vice-President of Palauhas stated, ‘This high sea level rise hasliterally caused islands to disappear andothers are in eminent danger of disappearing.’(Remengasau 1999, 4)

Analysing power andrelationships

AOSIS faces three major challenges inclimate change negotiations. The firstchallenge has a symbolic dimension. Thisalliance is concerned with the creation ofglobal ecological understandings andcommitments. The effort to mobilise theinternational community in support ofsustainable ecological policies restsprimarily on the capacity to generate acommitment to shared meanings (Rapoport1997).

Climate change is an abstract threat tosecurity, and the needs of the 43 coastal andsmall island states in AOSIS do not havehigh international visibil ity. The 1992Framework Convention on Climate Changedoes acknowledge that climate change is ahuman-induced threat, and that theenvironmental changes adversely affectcoastal and small islands nations. However,the powerful parties most responsible forhigh levels of greenhouse gas emissionshave used contradictory studies to disputethe scientific analyses of global environ-mental changes. Reports purveying mixedmessages contribute to public confusion,and have undermined efforts to mitigatethe threats through policy-making.

The second major challenge to AOSIShas a social dimension. Small island andcoastal states are often isolated geograph-ically, and they function on the margins ofinternational policy-making structures.

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Gender and Development94

Despite the fact that 43 nations haveenhanced their social power by forming theAOSIS alliance, AOSIS lacks the politicalmechanisms to regulate the internationalpractices that threaten its constituents’ecological security. Powerful industrialisednations have resisted international effortsto regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Theyare keen to avoid policies, laws, regulations,or other structures that might reduce thebenefits of current practices.

Finally, there are tangible constraints tothe security of small island nations. AOSISdoes not have the technical or financialresources to mitigate the threats of climatechange. While attempting to build ecologicalsecurity, small islanders face the mostpowerful corporations on Earth – in particular,those in energy, transport, and agriculture.These powerful groups have differingperspectives on the causes of climatechange, the extent of environmental threatsto human security, and the most effectiveresponses to undesirable conditions.

To summarise, the parties engaged inclimate change negotiations are in conflict,struggling for significant symbolic, social,and material resources (Docherty 1998). As noted above, the effort to reduce fossilfuel emissions is just one dimension of the complex negotiations. Other factorscontributing to the conflict and its resolutioninclude differing beliefs and values, anddiffering approaches to authority.

Conflict is a means of responding to thesecurity threats associated with climatechange. ‘As a stimulus for the creation andmodification of norms, conflict makes thereadjustment of relationships to changedconditions possible.’ (Coser 1956, 128)Reactions to conflict can be viewed on acontinuum, with aggression on one end of thespectrum, and collaboration at the other.Between these extremes are flexible options,including co-operation and competition.Parties prefer differing levels of integration(inclusion and exclusion), depending on theform of power under consideration.

Figure 1: Levels of flexibility2

IntegrativeCollaboration: high integration

valued; concern for coreshared values; addressingissues within interdependentsystems;

Co-operation: equity valued;concern for group rights;acknowledging and respondingto common but differentiatedgroup capabilities andresponsibilities;

Co-ordination: equality valued;concern with harmonisingparty values and interests;interactions based onsovereign positions andresponsibilities;

Competing: relative Party gainsand status valued; strugglingover the distribution ofexclusively held interests;accepting unequal access anddevelopment;

Avoiding: autonomy valued;preference for separatenessand non-participation;

Distributive

The figure above demonstrates a continuumof options in response to conflicts .Integrative responses, such as collaborationand co-operation, develop commonunderstandings, structures, and interests.An example is the UN’s recognition ofclimate change as a common global concernto humankind. Distributive approaches,such as competition, reinforce autonomyand relative advantages.

Research indicates that flexible(integrative and distributive) behaviour isat the heart of the conflict resolution takingplace in negotiations (Druckman andMitchell 1995). My analysis of the 1992 and1997 climate change agreements supportsthe proposal that multilateral negotiationscontribute to the resolution of ecologicalconflicts through functions that are bothintegrative (collaboration and co-operation)

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and distributive (co-ordination andcompetition). Most of the statements in the1992 Framework Convention on ClimateChange and 1997 Protocol are integrative.

Technical experts, particularly NGOrepresentatives, are uniquely situated tofacilitate flexible, multilateral approaches toecological conflicts. Respected facilitatorsare women and men with access to bothpolicy-makers and stakeholders at thegrassroots levels (Lederach 1997). They aremost effective when they are able to buildrelationships across diverse interests, ages,regions, professional groups, genders,cultures, and socio-economic classes.Mediated interventions contribute toconflict resolution when agreementsstrengthen the most vulnerable groupswithin the multilateral system (Clements1993).

Analysing strategicinterests

What are the strategic preferences of smallisland nations as they negotiate to buildecological security? I analysed the 1994

AOSIS Draft Protocol to the UNFramework Convention on Climate Change(AOSIS 1994). Figure 2 shows the conflictresolution systems framework that I choseto use. The conflict resolution systemsframework is a tool used to categorise andcompare the interests of various parties innegotiations. It can be used to monitorchanging preferences over time. Theapproach recognises that preferences mayvary, depending on the substantive issuesunder consideration.

The nine options in the matrix relatethree dimensions of power to three levelsof flexibility.

Most of the statements in the 1994 positionpaper proposing to enhance AOSIS symbolicpower (28.6 per cent) are at the collaborativelevel of integration. The 1994 positionpaper begins with statements of principles,common ecological understandings, anddefinitions. ‘Acknowledging the ultimate objective of theConvention is to achieve stabilization ofgreenhouse gas concentrations at a level thatwould prevent dangerous anthropogenicinterference with the climate system…’(AOSIS 1994, 3)

Building capacity for ecological security 95

Symbolic power Social power Material power

28.6% 0% 1%

Collaboration Common ecological Centralised laws Core UN funding

understandings with sanctions

9.2% 44.9% 4.1%

Co-operation Equitable group rights Equitable roles Equitable exchanges

and responsibilities and rules of technical, financial,

and other materials

1.0% 11.2% 0%

Co-ordination and Equal stakeholder Sovereign authority Equal benefits and

competition rights and relative and responsibility competitive interests

interests

Figure 2: Using the conflict resolution systems framework to analyse the strategic interests of AOSIS

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‘The Meeting of the Parties shall review andrevise the commitments of the Annex IPart ies… in accordance with theprecautionary principle and the bestavailable scientific information…’ 3

(op. cit., 5)

AOSIS is reaffirming meanings establishedin the 1992 Convention.

A notable percentage of the symbolicstatements (9.2 per cent) are co-operativeproposals that apply principles of equity to the establishment of rights andresponsibil it ies. Examples of AOSIS’equitable approach include:

‘Reaffirming that per capita emissions indeveloping countries are still relatively lowand that the share of global emissionsoriginating in developing countries willgrow to meet their social and developmentneeds.’ (op. cit., 3)

Most of the statements in AOSIS’ 1994position paper address social power. Theseare statements prescribing policies ,procedures, roles, and dispute resolutionmechanisms. AOSIS is attempting toestabl ish predictabi li ty and regulatethreatening emissions levels . A highpercentage (44.9 per cent) of these prescriptionsfocus on equitable roles and rules. They areco-operative efforts to establish authorityand accountability. Examples include:

‘Each of the Annex I Parties shall reduce its1990 level of anthropogenic emissions ofcarbon dioxide by at least 20 percent by theyear 2005.’ (op. cit., 4)

‘A Meeting of the Parties shall at its firstMeeting, agree upon and adopt by consensus,rules of procedure and financial rules foritself and for any subsidiary body.’ (op. cit., 7)

The 1994 AOSIS position paper does notemphasise material power. Only 4.1 per centof the statements propose equitableexchanges of resources. They supporttechnology transfer, co-operative approachesto natural resources, and equitable access toeconomic incentives. The emphasis that

AOSIS gives to equity reflects a strategicinterest in maximising technical support todis-advantaged parties. For example:

‘Annex I Parties shall ensure that everypracticable step is taken to support thedevelopment and enhancement of theendogenous capacities and technologies ofdeveloping country Parties.’ (op. cit., 7)

It should be noted that AOSIS has notproposed that the UN have sanctioningpower. In fact, none of the statements in the1992 Convention or 1997 Protocol supportcoercive mechanisms. Instead, through UNclimate change negotiations, delegates fromAOSIS have formed a global alliance of 43nations, gained access to vital information,influenced conflict resolution mechanisms,and initiated preventative measures at locallevels. Some of their initiatives have beenmore successful than others. The challengeto AOSIS, and to other vulnerable groups,is to learn from this capacity-buildingexperience.

From research to practiceIn this section of the paper, I apply thelessons from the analysis of climate changenegotiations to the issue of capacity-building. The success of capacity-buildingis related to the leadership capacities of theparticipants. Local stakeholders require theconfidence, knowledge, and skills tostrategise and communicate effectivelywith policy-makers, the media, and otheropinion leaders. Policy-makers must becapable of understanding and respondingto the values, beliefs, and security interestsof disadvantaged groups.

Within the context of systems theory, Iview capacity-building as a flexible,multilateral approach to sustainabledevelopment. Capacity-building is flexiblewhen integrating strengths and respectingdifferent interests. Approaches aremultilateral when involving policy-makers,NGOs, and community leaders in self-determined approaches to development.This enhancement of knowledge, skills, and

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attitudes is supported through technicalresources, including basic tools andsophisticated systems, such as the Internet.

A conflict resolution systems frame-work provides a way of prioritising thecapacity-building interests of parties inmultilateral negotiations. It serves as aresource for identifying common ground,acknowledging differences, visualisingoptions, and strategic planning. Theframework is able to highlight strengthsand barriers within the negotiations. It alsoprovides support for monitoring andevaluation.

Ideally, the different parties inmultilateral negotiations can use thesystems framework to identify their owncapacity-building priorities. For illustrativepurposes, I wil l discuss the strategicinterests of AOSIS as they might relate tocapacity-building. I believe that theseinterests are relevant to many disadvan-taged groups. In Figure 3, the conflictresolution systems framework serves as agraphic organiser for the development of asystems approach to capacity-building.

What are the priorities of disadvantagedgroups as they respond to threats to theirenvironment and development? The fivestrategic interests of AOSIS are highlightedabove with asterisks (*). They are organisedunder three dimensions of power.

Symbolic power1. The first strategic interest is to improvecommon understandings. This symbolicform of empowerment establishes a rationalefor action. As noted above, NGO facilitatorsare able to contribute to ecological securityby build ing respectful commitmentsamong policy-makers and representativesof local stakeholders. The parties shouldestabl ish common ground early in theconsensus-building process. At this level,capacity-building is the inclusive enhance-ment of awareness, knowledge, respect,and commitments. The emphasis oncollaboration is an effort to increasetransparent access to knowledge aboutperceived security threats, scientific research,socio-economic indicators, political events,proposed policies, and technical initiatives.

2 . A second strategic priority is thedevelopment of equitable rights andresponsibilities. The emphasis on principlesof equity recognises that parties in complexecological negotiations have common yetdifferent needs, responsibil it ies , andcapabil ities . To address imbalances instatus and knowledge, capacity-buildingprovides opportunities for disadvantagedgroups to build research, strategiccommunication, and knowledge-managementsystems.

Building capacity for ecological security 97

Symbolic power Social power Material power

Collaboration Policies improving Policies and laws Policies managing common ecological with sanctions government and understandings* donor funding

Co-operation Establishing Developing Managing equitableequitable rights and equitable roles exchanges of technical responsibilities* and rules* and financial materials*

Co-ordination and Defining equal rights, Establishing local Managing sovereigncompetition and sovereign and authority and resources and

competitive interests responsibility* competitive interests

Figure 3: Relating the strategic interests of AOSIS to capacity-building

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It is important that the participantsexpect and explicitly recognise uncertainty,and have the capacity to cope withambiguity. ‘Courtesy is one of the greathuman inventions for bridging uncertainty.’(Bateson 1994, 13) The following questionshelp to elici t the multiple views ofsituations held by participants, includingperceptions of power relationships:

� What are the major concerns or issues?Are women’s and men’s perspectivesequally represented?

� Who are the significant stakeholders?What are their primary interests?

� What are the risks – from diverseperspectives? How are the risksdistributed among the parties?

� Who benefits from the current situation?What are the constraints to resolution?

� What are the optional solutions? What are the recommended next steps?

A multilateral approach expands the flowof information from high- and low-powerperspectives. Donor communities enhancecapacity-building by supporting transparentdata collection and analysis, and bydisseminating best practice. Accurate andtransparent data-collection systems reducethe possibility of wastage, corruption, andinefficiency. The challenge is to assure thatdialogue leads from information exchangeto strategic adaptations, including oppor-tunities for women and men to build theirown data-collection systems within theirown jurisdictions.

Social power3. The majority of the propositions inmultilateral negotiations are prescriptive.Disadvantaged groups are attempting toaddress their strategic interests through thedevelopment of equitable roles and rules.The emphasis on equity in policy-makinghas a re-distributive purpose. The strategicinterest is to create more balanced power

relationships. Those most responsible forthreats should take immediate steps tomitigate the risks.

The challenge to disadvantaged groupsis to transform the structures that supportexisting power imbalances. When high-and low-power groups are engaged inpolicy-making, the advantaged parties tend to defend their territory and status.Inclusive, transparent approaches to rule-making enhance the leverage ofdisadvantaged groups. By influencingpolicies and laws, they are able to improveaccess, predictability, and accountability.Questions relevant to the transformation ofsocial structures include the following:

� Who has authority? Under whatcircumstances?

� Do women and men participate equallyin the decision-making?

� Which policies and laws contribute tofairness and predictability?

� Which governance structures aremissing?

� Do laws foster equitable (fair)multilateral partnerships?

� How can threats to security beregulated more effectively?

It should be noted that disadvantagedgroups are not advocates for centralisedpower with sanctions. Instead, most of theproposals to regulate threatening behavioursinvolve consensual agreements. Strategicpriorities include developing the capacitiesrequired to mobilise coalitions.

4. The fourth strategic interest is theestablishment of sovereign authority andresponsibility. This priority addresses theneed to build effective local governancestructures. It suggests that all parties haveequal responsibility to mitigate ecologicalr isks within their own jurisdictions.Capacity-building initiatives enable

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disadvantaged groups when theystrengthen participatory approaches togovernance. Policies that are developed bywomen and men closer to the realities onthe ground are more effective than thosethat are based on distant versions of localpossibilities and preferences. By co-ordinating national and local exchanges ofinformation about best practices early inthe policy-making process, capacity-building reinforces effective structures andavoids unnecessary conflicts.

Material power5. Finally, disadvantaged groups have astrategic interest in the equitable exchangeof material resources. This requires thecapacity to manage technical, financial, andhuman resources. Historically, the transferof technologies has been criticised for beingdonor-oriented. There has been a tendencyto supply local communities with whatevertechnologies are available, rather than whatis actually wanted or needed. Investmentsin technical resources address the needs ofthe disadvantaged when they facilitatepartnerships and foster self-reliance.Questions relevant to effective, efficienttechnology transfer include:

� Which local technologies are working?What adaptations are needed?

� Are creative local initiativesencouraged? What are the incentives?

� What are the benefits of new financialand technical interventions?

� How are the benefits of technical and/orfinancial interventions distributed?

� Who gains? Who loses?

� Do women and men participate equallyin planning and managing? Do theyalso share equally in the benefits?

At the local level, the priority is to increasewomen’s and men’s capacities to adapttechnologies to their changing environ-ments. In order to build sustainable

systems, they need the attitudes, knowledge,and skills required for assessment,implementation, monitoring, trouble-shooting, and creative innovations. In orderto exchange goods and services, developingeconomies also need access to theconsumer markets of wealthier nations.

Lessons learned

The analysis of small island experiences inclimate change negotiations provideslessons for any vulnerable or marginalisedgroup determined to re-align powerrelationships. Existing power asymmetriesmay be the result of discrimination on thebasis of gender, race, religion, or someother categorisation. To summarise, theanalysis above indicates that disadvantagedparties addressing ecological securitynegotiate to enhance five strategic interests:

� common ecological understandings;

� equitable rights and responsibilities;

� equitable roles and rules;

� sovereign local authority andresponsibility;

� equitable exchanges of technical andfinancial materials.

The first strategic interest is the develop-ment of common understandings. Thissymbolic form of empowerment isaddressed through collaborative approachesto research and communication. Theestabl ishment of common meaningsprovides a rationale for action. Movingfrom rhetoric to action, the transformationof power relations takes place through theequitable exchange of resources.

Disadvantaged groups are advocates forequitable access to scientific knowledge, theconsensual construction of rules regulatingthreats , and the equitable transfer oftechnical resources from developed todeveloping nations. This co-operationtransforms power relations when

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disadvantaged women and men are able tomake choices that enhance the resourceswithin their own jurisdictions. The strategicinterests above are relevant to gender in awide range of development situations,including efforts to address complexenvironmental and health issues.

Conclusions

In climate change negotiations, small islandnations are contributing to the resolution ofecological conflicts through proactive, co-operative approaches. To transformthreatening systems, leaders are buildingregional alliances, developing extensivecommunication networks, and advocatingas one voice for the security interests of theEarth’s ecological system as a whole.4

Identifying the strategic interests of smallisland communities provides lessons forthe transformation of power relationships,including those between women and men.Disadvantaged groups in climate changenegotiations lack status, influence, andcontrol. These factors mirror gender-basedbarriers to health and development.

A systems approach to capacity-building ensures that disadvantagedgroups advance through self-determinedapproaches to development (adapted fromInternational Women’s Conference 2000). Itis an adaptive learning and relationship-building process. The most effectiveinterventions value and integrate thestrengths of diverse social groups. Theyfacilitate the transfer of knowledge andfoster the implementation of inclusivepolicies . Systems theory supports theproposition that capacity-building contributesto sustainable development when itstrengthens the most vulnerable sub-systems within the global ecological systemas a whole.

Conflict resolution research indicatesthat the first step in building sustainablemultilateral relationships is to developcommon understandings. In closing, I wouldlike to highlight the significance of this.

‘If we can find ways of responding asindividuals to multiple patterns of meaning,enriching rather than displacing thosetraditional to any one group, this can make amomentous difference to the well-being ofindividuals and the fate of the earth. Whatwould it be like to have not only color vision,but culture vision, the ability to see themultiple worlds of others?’ (Bateson 1994, 53)

A systems approach brings togetherdiverse policy-makers, NGOs, andcommunity leaders to enhance the ‘culturevision’ of all stakeholders. The multilateraldialogue offers less-powerful groups theopportunity to describe their ownsituations, prioritise strategic interests, andimplement meaningful adaptations. Themost effective capacity-building initiativesbuild long-term partnerships amongadvantaged and disadvantaged stake-holders. These relationships facilitate theequitable exchange of resources, and createthe synergy for innovative adaptations.

Mary Jo Larson completed her doctoral thesis atthe Institute for Conflict Analysis andResolution, George Mason University. She iscurrently Director of Capacity Building atCEDPA. Contact: 6427 Cavalier Corridor,Falls Church, VA 22044, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Notes

1 Systems theory is the holistic study ofhow systems and their sub-systems areorganised, how they adapt to changingsituations, and how the interests of thesub-systems fit or conflict with those ofthe whole. According to this theory, asub-system is a set of inter-relatedelements, each of which is connecteddirectly or indirectly to every otherelement, and often with extremesensitivity. Localised causes within sub-systems may have effects within thesystem as a whole. I should emphasisethat no system can be known completely(Richardson 1998). Any study of

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complex, multi-party negotiations bringscertain variables to the forefront, andmay overlook others. Significant factors,such as cultural influences or structuralmanipulation, may not be documentedin this analysis (Avruch and Black 1996).

2 I am grateful to Patrick Triano forhelping me to visual ise theserelationships.

3 The Annex I Parties include the 24original OECD members, the EuropeanUnion, and 14 countries with economiesin transition.

4 Interviews (1997-2001) with UN AmbassadorSlade from Samoa, Chair of AOSIS.

References

AOSIS (1994) ‘AOSIS Proposal for aProtocol on the Reduction of GreenhouseGases’, paper presented at Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee(INC) 10, Geneva

Avruch, K. and P.W. Black (1996) ‘ADR,Palau and the contribution ofanthropology’, in A.W. Wolfe and H. Yang (eds.), Anthropological Contributionsto Conflict Resolution, Athens: Universityof Georgia Press

Bateson, M.C. (1994) Peripheral Visions,New York: Harper Collins

Clements, K. (ed.) (1993) Peace and Securityin the Asia Pacific Region: Post-Cold WarProblems and Prospects, Japan: UnitedNations University Press

Coser, L.A. (1956) The Functions of SocialConflict, New York: Free Press

Docherty, J.S. (1998) When the Parties BringTheir Gods to the Table: Learning Lessonsfrom Waco, published doctoral thesis,Virginia: Institute for Conflict Analysisand Resolution, George Mason University

Druckman, D. and C. Mitchell (eds.) (1995)Flexibility in International Negotiation andMediation, London: Sage

International Women’s Conference (2000)‘International Women’s Conference toRedefine Security’, proposal developedby Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice,June 22–25 2000, Naja, Okinawa, Japan

Larson, M.J. (2001) ‘Conflict Resolution inEcological Negotiations: How Multi-lateral Negotiations Contributes to theResolution of Environment andDevelopment Conflicts’, unpublisheddoctoral thesis, Virginia: Institute forConflic t Analysis and Resolution,George Mason University

Lederach, J.P. (1997) Building Peace:Sustainable Reconciliation in DividedSocieties, Washington DC: United StatesInstitute of Peace

Rapoport, A. (1997) ‘Conceptions of WorldOrder: Building Peace in the ThirdMillennium’, paper presented at theTenth Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I.Lynch Lecture, Institute for ConflictAnalysis and Resolution, George MasonUniversity, Virginia

Remengasau, T. (1999) ‘Remarks by VicePresident of Palau on the Opening of the54th Session of the General Assembly ofthe United Nations’, Washington DC:Embassy of Palau

Richardson, K.A . (1998) ‘Towards anAnalytical Methodology for ConsideringComplex, Poorly Defined Problems’,paper for Defence and EvaluationResearch Agency, Salisbury, UK

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