transfer pricing - final
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8/6/2019 Transfer Pricing - Final
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Good Afternoon FriendsGood Afternoon Friends
Group 7 PresentsGroup 7 Presents
³Transfer Pricing´³Transfer Pricing´
TodayToday
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Batch XXI SMBA
Roll No. 56
Roll No. 13
Roll No. 31
Roll No. 50
Roll No. 02
Roll No. 38
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IndexIntroduction - Transfer Pricing· Objectives in Sound Transfer Pricing· General Transfer-Pricing Rule
Methods -
1. Transfers based on the External Market Price2. Cost Based
(a) Variable Cost(b) Actual Full Cost(c) Full + Profit Margin
(d) Standard Full Cost
3. Negotiated Prices4. Dual Prices
� Why MNCs use transfer pricing?
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Transfer Pricingy A transfer price is that notional value at which goods &
services are transferred between divisions in a
decentralized organization.y Transfer Prices are normally set for intermediate
products which are goods & services that are suppliedby the selling division to the buying division.
yIn divisionalised companies, where profit orinvestment centers are created, there is likely to beinter-divisional transfer of goods or services and thisinternal transfer create the problem of transfer pricing.
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Objectives in Sound Transfer Pricing A question arises as to how the transfer of goods & services between divisionsshould be priced. The price charged to the interdivisional transfer of goods andservices is revenues to the selling division & cost to the buying division. Thereforethe price charged will affect the profit of both divisions; benefit (revenue) to onedivision can be created only at the expense of the other division. Whiledetermining transfer prices a number of criteria (objectives) should be fulfilled.
y Transfer prices should help in the accurate measurement of divisional performance(Profitability) measurement.
y Transfer prices should motivate the divisional managers into maximizing the profitability of their divisions and making decisions that are in the best interests of the organization as a whole.
y
Transfer prices should ensure that divisional autonomy and authority is preserved. The mainpurpose of decentralization is to enable divisional managers to exercise greater autonomy and to measure the overall results achieved on profit centre or investment centre.
y Transfer prices should allow goal congruence to take place, which in effect means that theobjectives of divisional managers are compatible with the objectives of overall company.
y A transfer pricing system, if properly established, can check multinational companies and
international groups which may try to manipulate transfer prices between countries in orderto minimize the overall tax burden.
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General Transfer-Pricing Rule
Managements' objective in setting a transfer price is toencourage goal congruence among the division
managers involved in the transfer.The general Rule specifies the transfer price as the sum of
two cost components.
General Rule
Transfer Price
outlay cost perunit incurredbecause goodsare transferred
Opportunity costper unit to theorganization
because of thetransfer
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First component -Outlay cost
The first component is the outlay
cost incurred by the division thatproduces the goods or services to betransferred.Outlay costs will include the directvar iable costs of the product orservice and any other outlay coststhat are incurred only as a result of the transfer.
Second component Opportunity cost
The second component in the
general Transfer-pricing rule is theopportunity cost incurred by theorganization as a whole because of the transfer.
An opportunity cost is a benefit thatis forgone as a result of taking aparticular action.
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IllustrationCompany Sun coast Food Centers Company
Food ProcessingDivision produces Breadin its Bakery
Gulf Division AtlanticDivision
Sells some of its productsto other companies
External Market Underdifferent Labels
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Scenario 1:No Excess CapacityThe following variable costs are incurred to produce bread and transport itto buyers.
Per rack = 1 dozen bread packaged
Production:Standard variable cost per rack(including packaging)
Transportation:Standard variable cost per rack to
transport bread
Total outlay cost
Rs. 7 per rack
Rs.1 per rack
Rs.8 per rack
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Suppose the Food Processing Division can sell all the bread it can produce to
outside buyers at a market price of Rs.15 per rack.Since the divisioncan sell all of its production, it has no excess capacity.
Opportunity cost:Selling price per unit in External Market
Less: Variable cost of production andTransportation
Opportunity cost (forgonecontribution margin)
Rs.15 per rack
Rs.8 per rack
Rs.7 per rack
The Opportunity Cost incurred by Suncoast Food Centers when its FoodProcessing Division Transfers a rack of bread to the Gulf Division instead of selling it in the External Market is the forgone contribution margin from thelost sale, equal To Rs.7 per rack.
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General Transfer Price Rule:Outlay cost
+
Opportunity cost
Transfer Price
Rs.8
Rs. 7
Rs.15
Why does the company lose a sale in the external market for every rack of breadTransferred to the Gulf Division?The sale is lost because there is no excess capacity in the Food Processing Division.
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Goal CongruenceContribution to Suncoast Food
Centers from sale in ExternalMarket
Contribution to Suncoast FoodCenters from Transfer to Gulf Division
Retail Selling
price per Rack(a loaf of breadRs.2 x Rs.12 dozen= Rs.24)Less: Variablecosts
ContributionMargin
Rs.24 per rack
Rs.8 per rack
Rs.16 per rack
Wholesale
selling price perrack
Less: Variablecosts
ContributionMargin
Rs.15 per rack
Rs. 8 per rack
Rs.7 per rack
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The best use of the bakerys limited production capacity is toproduce bread for transfer to the Gulf Division.
Transfer Price Rs. 15 per rack = External Market Rs.15 per rack
[Goal congruence is maintained]
The Gulf Division manager is willing to buy the bread, because herdivision will have a contr ibution margin Rs.9 on each rack of bread
transferred .
Rs.24 retail sales price - Rs.15 Transfer price = Rs.9 per rackThe general transfer pricing rule result in goal congruent decision
making.
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Scenario 2-Excess CapacityExcess capacity means that the total demand for its bread fromall sources, including the Gulf and Atlantic Divisions and theexternal market, is less than the bakerys productioncapacity.
T ransfer Pr ice = Outlay Cost + Opportunity Cost
Rs.8 per rack =Rs.8 per rack + Rs.O per rack
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G
oal Congruence
Special price per rack(special order)Less: Transfer price paid by Gulf Division
Contribution to Gulf Division
Rs.10 per rack
Rs.8 per rack
Rs. 2 per rack
Suppose a local organization makes a special offer to the Gulf Division Managerto buy several hundred Loaves of bread to sell in a promotional campaign.Gulf Division accept the special offer, this is in the best interests of Suncoast FoodCenters. The company, as a whole, also will make a contribution of Rs.2 per rack onEvery transfer red to the Gulf Division to satisfy the special order.
Once again, the general Transfer pricing rule maintains goal congruentdecision making behavior.
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Methods
Market Based Transfer Prices
Cost Based Transfer Prices
Negotiated Transfer Prices
Dual Transfer Prices
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M
arket Based Prices
External Supplier
Buying DivisionSelling Division
External Buyer
Rs. 20/unit Rs. 20/unit
Rs. 20/unit
When the selling division does not have unused capacity (Total capacity 50,000 units)
50000 units 50000 units
50000 units
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Uses of External Market Based Transfer Pricing
y Encourages division managers to focus on divisionalprofitability
y When aggregate divisional profits are determined for the year, the market-based transfer price help to assess thecontributions of each division to overall corporate profits
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Example: Market Based Price
A company has 2 divisions, A and B. Division A manufactures acomponent which is used by Division B to produce a finished product.For the next period, output and costs have been budgeted as follow:
Division A Division B
Component units 50,000 -
Finished units - 50,000
Total variable costs Rs. 2,50,000 Rs. 6,00,000
Fixed Costs Rs. 1,50,000 Rs. 2,00,000
Please advise on the transfer price to be fixed for Division Ascomponent if it can sell the component in a competitive market forRs. 10 per unit and Division B can also purchase the component from
the open market at that price.
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Example: Market Based Price
Solution:
Transfer price = Incremental (marginal) cost + Opportunity
cost of the company = Rs. 5 + Rs. 5
= Rs. 10
Hence, the transfer price of Rs. 10 is also equal to theto the market price of the component a v ailable at thesame price.
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Cost-Based Pricesy Used when external markets do not exist or
information about external market price not readily
available
Variable Costctual ull
Cost
ull Cost PlusProfit Margin
StandardCost
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Cost Based Prices: Variable Cost
External Supplier
Buying DivisionSelling Division
(unused capacity
20000 units)
External Buyer
Rs. 20/unit Rs. 20/unit
Rs. 10/unit(Variable cost)
30000 units 20000 units
20000 units
When the selling division has unused capacity (Total capacity 50,000 units)
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Cost Based Prices:Actual Full Cost
Transfer Price = Full Cost of transferred product or
service
Full Cost = Variable Cost + allocated portion of fixedoverhead
y Selling division no longer has any incentive to improveits operating cost.
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Cost-Based Prices: Full Cost plus
Profit. This method overcomes the weakness of Actual Full Cost
method, wherein the selling division cannot realize a profit ongoods and services.
Under this method, the transfer price includes the full cost perunit (direct materials, direct labor and factory overhead) plus amark up or profit allowance.
Since, the selling division obtains profit contribution underthis method, it benefits if performance is measured on thebasis of divisional operating profits.
However, the buying division of the organization would notreally agree to such a type of transfer pricing as the cost of buying would rise and will adversely affect the performance of the buying division.
Another challenge here is to determine the percentage of markup (profit rate) which ideally should cover operating expensesand provide a target return on sales or assets (investment).
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Example:
The total investments of division A in a company is Rs. 10,00,000.
The volume of production is 4,00,000 units and the variable costper unit is Rs. 10. The fixed cost of production is Rs. 8,00,000. Thecompany desires 15% return on investment in Division A. What will be the transfer price for Division A.
Desired return on investment = 1,50,000 (15 % of 10,00,000)
Volume of Production = 4,00,000 units
Profit Margin/unit = 1,50,000/4,00,ooo = Rs 0.375
Cost-Based Prices: Full Cost plus
Profit.
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Cost-Based Prices: Full Cost plus
Profit.
Amount (Rs.)
Variable Cost per unit - A 10.00
Fixed Cost per unit (8,00000/4,00,ooo) - Y 2.00
Profit Margin per unit - Z 0.375
Transfer price per unit (X+Y+Z) 12.375
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As mentioned before, in actual cost approach, all product costsare transferred to buying division and hence, selling division isunder no pressure of controlling costs.
This results in cost variances or cost inefficiencies in the sellingdivision, which are thereby transferred to the buying division. Todistinguish these variances that have been transferred to thebuying division becomes extremely complex.
Hence, to eradicate this problem and to promote responsibility of cost control in the selling division, standard costs (decided costs)are usually used as basis of transfer pricing. It also helps increaseefficiency in the selling division.
Use of standard costs reduces the risk to the buyer as it helps avoidbeing charged with suppliers cost overruns.
Cost-Based Prices: Standard Costs
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� Negotiated prices are generally preferred as middle solution between
market prices and cost-based prices.
� The Divisional Managers act the same as managers of independent
organizations or companies.
� Negotiated transfer prices is likely to be close to external market prices (as
explained earlier) when the Divisions are free to trade between each other as
well as in the external markets.
� However, it will be less than market price when the Selling Division has an
obligation of selling some of its total capacity to the Buying division (same
concept as unused capacity).
� The objectives of goal congruence, autonomy and perf ormance evaluation
can be achieved if Selling and Buying divisions can agree upon a mutual
transfer prices.
� However, this method requires a great deal of management eff orts and the
final negotiated price may depend on a Managers ability and skill to
negotiate rather than on the other factors.
Negotiated Transfer Price
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Dual Transfer Pricing� Under this method, the Selling Division transfers goods at a profit (f ull cost
plus profit method) but the transfer price f or the Buying Division is the
market price.
�
The difference in the transfer price f or the two divisions is accounted f or by a special centralized account.
� The balances in the centralized account are then accounted f or against the
total profit of the organization as a whole.
� The main motive of this kind of transfer pricing is to provide incentives to
the Selling Division and also market price can be considered to be the most appropriate transfer price f or the Buying Division.
� This helps in the overall goals of decentralization goal congruence,
accurate perf ormance management , autonomy and adequate motivation to
divisional managers.
�
However, such a method is rarely used in deciding the transfer prices f or various division in the or anizations.
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Dual Transfer PricingSelling Division Buying Division
Centralized Account
Organizational Profits
Balance transferred
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Why MNCs use Transfer Pricing?Since each country has different tax rates, MNCs can increase their profits with the help of transfer pricing. By lowering prices in countries where tax rates are
high and raising them in countries with a lower tax rate, MNCs can reduce their
overall tax burden, thereby boosting their overall profits. That is why one often
finds that corporations located in high-tax countries hardly pay any corporate
taxes.
Transfer pricing, a very controversial and complex issue, requires closure scrutiny
not only by the critics of MNCs but also by the tax authorities in the developing
world. Transfer pricing is a strategy frequently used by MNCs to obtain huge
profits through illegal means. The transfer price could be purely arbitrary or
fictitious, theref ore different from the price that unrelated firms would have had
to pay. By manipulating a few entries in the account books, MNCs are able toreap obscene profits with no actual change in the physical capital.
For instance, a Korean firm manufacturers an MP3 player for $100, but its US
subsidiary buys it for $199, and then sells it for $200. By doing this, the firms
bottom line does not change but the taxable profit in the US is drastically
reduced. At a 30% tax rate, the firms tax liability in the US would be just 30 cents instead of $30.
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