CHAPTER-I

TRANSCAUCASUS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Armenia and Azerbaijan are two of the three former Soviet

republics that occupy the geographic area known as the

Transcaucasus- the isthmus south of the Caucasus Mountains and

between the Black and Caspian Seas. Although rugged and

mountainous, the Transcaucasus is important geographically in that

it represents a strategic land bridge between Europe and Asia. Over

time, this geo-strategic location has made the Transcaucasus a

crossroads of major human movement and a battleground of clashing

empires. 1

Owing to its location, Transcaucasus served from earliest times

as a funnel through which traders, travellers, and entire peoples

moved. The earliest wave of migration occurred sometime in the first

millennium B.C., when Indo-Europeans, probably of the Hittite

branch, entered the area and expanded south and eastward into

1 Shireen T. Hunter, TheTranscaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p.3.

Anatolia, Iran, and India. 2 The Hittites were followed later by a group

of Indo-Europeans of Iranian stock, whose social and political

influence left a deep imprint upon the culture of the Transcaucasus

that survives up to the present.3 Over the centuries that followed,

scores of other peoples passed through or settled in Transcaucasia,

including the Romans, Arabs, and Turks. While none of these groups

eradicated completely the deeply rooted influences of pre-Islamic Iran,

each left a lasting impact upon the area.

Although the entry of the Romans into the Transcaucasus dates

back as early as 69 B.C., Roman influences did not become pervasive

in the region until the fourth century A.D., when the Roman Empire

adopted Christianity en masse. The Christianization of the region

under Roman rule was uneven, however, centering mainly on what is

now Georgia and Ar.menia. Islam took root in what is now Azerbaijan

and the North Caucasus region following the invasion of Arab armies

in 642 A.D.4 Although the spread of Islam into Transcaucasia did not

2 Charles Burney and David Marshall Lang, The Peoples of the Hill§: Ancient Ararat and Caucasus (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1971), p.88.

3 Nina G. Garosian, "Iran and Caucasia", in Ronald G. Suny, ed., Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change {Ann Arbor: Slavic Publications, 1983), pp.7-23.

4 Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth Century Iran (London: British Academic Press, 1993), p.7.

2

alter the indigenous peoples' cultural attraction to pre-Islamic Iran, it

deepened significantly the existing split between the Christian and

non-Christian peoples of the area. 5

The next major wave of migration came in the eleventh century,

when Turkic tribes began to flow through the area in great numbers

as part of their large-scale migration into Asia Minor.6 The Turks did

not merely pass through the Transcaucasus, however; many tribes

settled in the area, and H was incorporated wholly into the Seljuk

Empire in 1071.7 As was the case with each of the other major

migrations through the area, the Turks left a lasting mark on the

Transcaucasus: The linguistic Turkification of a number of Muslim

peoples of the region.s Over the centuries, this Turkification led many

of the linguistically Turkified, but ethnically non-Turkic, peoples of

the region to identify themselves as Turks.9

5 Shireen T. Hunter, n.l, pp.9-10.

6 Touraj Atabaki, n.4, p.9.

7 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Islam and Identity in Azerbaijan", Central Asian Survey, 3, N.2 (1984), p.31.

8 Charles Warren Hostles, The Turks of Central Asi~ (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p.l8.

9 Shireen T. Hunter, n.l, pp.l0-11.

3

Since the earliest times, Transcaucasia's geographic position as

a bridge between continents has made it a crossroads for the

movement of migrating peoples. Some of these peoples settled in the

area, while others merely passed through or were forced out by

warfare or other upheavals. Whatever the case, a gradual process

occurred over history in which aspects of the migrants' identities,

ranging from religion to language and · culture, were adopted to

varying degrees by the indigenous peoples of Transcaucasia. The

main result of this process, which was accentuated by extensive :inter-

marriage and cross-breeding between the newcomers and local

populations, was to make the Transcaucasus one of the most

ethnically and culturally heterogenous areas of the world.

Regional geography has influenced the area's historical

evolution in another significant way. In light of its strategic location,

the Transcaucasus has been coveted by external powers almost

continuously throughout history. Foreigners have eyed the region not

only for the potential overland access it offers between Europe and

Asia but also for its situation as a buffer zone between rival empires.

To complicate matters, the historical process of migration and the

intermingling of population also made it inevitable that surrounding

powers would share certain ethno-linguistic or cultural links with the

peoples of Transcaucasia, often causing their interests in the region to

4

transcend merely imperialistic motives. On countless occasions

throughout history, these phenomena have made the Transcaucasus

the locus of competition, and often battle, between surrounding

powers.

Transcaucasia first became a sustained center of imperial

rivalry in the frrst century B.C., when the region became a major

battleground between the Roman Empire and the Arsacid dynasty of

Iran.l° For several centuries thereafter, the area, and Armenia in

particular, continued to be an object of heated contention between

Rome and successive Iranian dynasties. 11 . With the passing of time,

the Roman presence in the Transcaucasus was replaced by

Byzantium and the Iranian presence by the Arabs; then, in 1071, the

Byzantines were defeated by the Turks at the Battle of Manzikert, and

Transcaucasia fell under the sway of the Seljuk Empire. 12

Following the replacement of the Seljuks by the Mongols and

then the Ottomans in the thirteenth century, the Transcaucasus

10 Ibid,, pp.7-8.

11 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire. 1801-1917 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p.59.

12 Sydney Nettleton Fisher and William Ochsenwald, The Middle East: A History. 4th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p.l48.

5

became a locus of competition between an expansionist Ottoman

Turkey and Safavid Iran by the early sixteenth century. 13 As a result

of two successful wars with Iran in 1578 and 1603, Ottoman

occupation of Transcaucasia was consolidated. 14 But with the coming

of Shah Abbas to power, Iran was able to take back Transcaucasus

from Ottoman occupation. However, Iran was not destained to keep

Transcaucasus under its rule for a very long period primarily because

a new power - Russia entered the competition for control of the

region.

Czar Peter I ( 1689-1725) had set himself the aim of reaching the

Mediterranean and the warm seas. 15 But after the disaster of Purt

( 1711) Peter avoided any military encounter with Turks and instead

chose to dominate the Caspian sea oasis and in particular Caucasus

13 ibid., pp.184-185.

14 Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), pp.276-77.

15 "The urge to extend his territories and free himself from physic'al encumbrances such as lack of access to the sea, from dependence on other states for engaging in foreign trade, was the chief aim of Peter the Great's foreign policy. In the early eighteenth century he accomplished what Selim the Grim and Suleiman the magnificent had done for the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century when they opened the way to the East and the Mediterranean." M. Philips Price, A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956), p.67.

6

which afforded a most suitable position for the realization of his

plans.

In fact Peter's policy was essentially no different from the

policies of the imperialist states of the 18th century. Russia also

needed colonies for raw materials and outlets. "Roughly speaking

there was plenty of gold along the banks of the Amu Derya and Sir

Derya ... there was also raw silk in the western and southern shores of

the Caspian. From this standpoint the Caspian Sea (with its eastern

and western shores) was seen by Iran, Turkey and even by India as a

key area." 16

In 1715 Peter commissioned Artemii Volynskii to travel to the

Safavid court at Isfahan, then capital of Persia, for the purpose of

strengthening the relation with Persia. This mission coincided with

the events in Persia that resulted in the downfall of the Safavids and

the temporary ascendency of the Afghan rulers. In fact in 1722,

Afghan's invasion under Mahmud Ghiljai captured Isfahan. Artemii

Volynskii observed the chaotic state of affairs in Iran and reported to

his master that there could be no better opportunity for Russia to

attack Iran and take possession of the coveted lands that would make

16 Alton S. Donnely, "Petter the Great and Central Asia", Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol.XVII, No.2-3 Ottawa, 1975, p.207.

7

possible Russian access to the warm southern water. 17 Peter realized

that his long-cherished ambition was within his grasp, and in 1722

himself led an army that captured part of the Caucasus {Derbend and

Baku). 18 Peter's aggression on Persian territory came to an end with

the signing of an agreement in September 1723, known as the St.

Petersburg Treaty. This agreement is also regarded as the first official

Russian aggression on Persian territory.

On the other hand, parallel with these developments, the

Ottoman Empire, taking the advantage of opportunity offered by the

chaotic state of affairs in Persia, attacked the Persian territories of

Transcaucasus in 1723 under the pretext of safeguarding the region

from further aggression of Russian Empire. And as a result Ottoman

forces occupied Georgia, Armenia and threatened Azerbaijan.

Later on, however, on becoming aware of the Petersburg

agreement { 1723) between Russia and Iran, Ottoman leadership

demanded Russia's immediate withdrawal from the Caucasus and

even threatened to break off relations with Russia. At this stage the

17 L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah: A Critical Study Based mainly upon Contemporary Sources (London: Luzac and Co., 1938), p.S.

18 John F. Baddeley, The Russian Congeust of the Caucasus (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969; reprint 1908), pp.23-24.

8

French ambassador, the Marguis de Bonnac, intervened and

consequently the two empires (Russia and Ottoman) came to an

agreement which provided for the partition of Iran between Russia

and the Ottoman Empire. 19 This agreement, signed on 24 June 1724,

is known as Istanbul agreement. And as per this agreement each of

the two parties became definite possessor of the part of Iranian

territory that was at the time under its control. Thus according to

this agreement all Iranian territories lying between the junction of the

rivers Kur and Aras towards the north u pto the Caspian Sea as far as

Asterabad were recognized as Russian share of the booty, while all the

land lying to the South of the above junction, as far as Kermanshah,

went to the Ottoman empire. Thus whole of present day Georgia,

Armenia and parts of Azerbaijan and Daghistan came under Turkish

control and on the other hand Baku and Derband came under

Russian control.

Fortunately, for Persia this adverse agreement was soon to be

nullified when a strong leader and warrior, Tahmasp Quli Khan.

Qirqlu Afshar, later called Nadir Shah, came to power. 20 He disposed

of the Ghiljais and restored Safavid rule at Isfahan in the person of

19 L. Lockhart, n.17, p.12.

20 Nadir Shah ascended the throne of Persia in March 1736.

9

Shah Tahmasp ( 1729-30).

The emergence of Nadir Shah in Persia not only temporarily put

a stop to the Russian assaults on the Caucasus but it also helped to

lessen the Ottoman impact on that region. First Nadir Shah sent his

envoy to the court of Empress Anna Ivanovna of Russia, requesting

her to return all the Caucasian territories taken over by her

predecessor failing which Persia would side with Ottoman Empire.

Realizing that Nadir was not the kind of Iranian royalty to be ignored

and, being inclined to secure a strong neighbour as a counterbalance

to the Ottoman Etnpire, the Russian Empress agreed to return all the

Caucasian territories to Persia. As a result, a Treaty was signed

between Persia and Russia, known as treaty of Ganja in March 1735.

As per the terms of treaty Persia got back Caucasian territories (Baku

and Derband) from Russia which had been occupied by the latter 13

years ago. 21

Similarly, Nadir Shah was able to get back the Caucasian

territories captured by Ottoman Empire. In 1733, Nadir Shah

attacked Ottoman Empire and defeated the Turkish army led by

Ahmad Shah of Baghdad. The defeat of Turkish army led to the peace

21 L. Lockhart, n.17, p.86.

10

settlement signed between Nadir and Ahmad Pasha on 19 December

1733.22 By the terms of peace treaty Turkey agreed to relinquish all

the Persian territories captured by it during last ten year. Accordingly

orders were sent to Pashas of Ganja, Shirvan, Erivan and Tiflis to

hand over the respective territories to Persia.23 However, the terms of

treaty between Nadir Shah and Ahmad Pasha were not approved by

the Porte and this led to the second attack by Nadir on frontiers of

Ottoman Empire resulting in recapture of all the above mentioned

Caucasian territories by Persian army in 1735-36.

After the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 A.D. whole of Iran was

torn by internal struggles for power among tribal chieftains and local

vassals. But the situation was brought under control by one Agha

Muhammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty. He not only

maintained peace in Iran but was also able to keep in check the

Russian and Ottoman advances in Caucasus. But soon after his

death Russians attacked Caucasus and annexed Georgia (1801) from

Persian Empire. The annexation of Georgia was a turning point in the

history of Caucasian region. The Russian Empire now set up a goal to

22 ibid., p.75.

23 ibid., p.75.

11

convert whole of Caucasus into its colony. 24

The wars ( 1807 -1813) between Russia and Persian Empire over

Caucasus resulted in one after the other defeat of Pesian army. And

finally in the end in 1813 Russians forced Persians to sign a

humiliating treaty known as the treaty of Gulistan. As per the term of

treaty the parties concerned were to take final possession of all the

territories that each of them had under its control at the time of

signing the treaty. Thus the treaty of Gulistan confirmed, Caucasian

territories of Darband, Baku, Shirvan, Shakhi, Ganja, Tabsh and

Moghon as Russian possessions, to the great Chagrin of Iran. 25

The Treaty of Gulistan brought a 10-year war to an end, but the

hostilities between Iran and Russia did not cease and the frontier

disputes remained unsolved for years to come. Throughout the years

following the treaty of Gulistan, Russia continued to advance further

south, and in 1825 claimed the district of Gokcha. This claim was

dismissed by the government of Iran. Consequently, the second

24 L.H. Rhinelander, "Russian Imperial Policy. The administration of the Caucasus in the first half of the Nineteenth Century", Canadian Slavonic Papers (Ottawa), Vol.XVII, Nos.2-3, 1975, pp.218-235.

25 Richard Tapper, "Nomads and Commissars on the frontiers of Eastern Azerbaijan" in Keith Mclachlan, ed., The Boundaries of Modern Iran (London: UCL Press, 1994), p.26.

12

Russo-Iranian war began in 1826. The Iranian armies fought

brilliantly in the early phases but were eventually defeated by the

stronger and better-equipped Russian army headed by a well known

General Paskievitch, who was able to capture Erivan and Tabriz. "26

This time, too, Iran had to sign a humiliating treaty. This treaty

known as Treaty of Turkmanchai was signed in the village of

Turkmanchai in the vicinity of Tabriz on 22 February 1828. "Under

its terms Qarabakh and parts of Moghan were finally separated from

Iran."27 However, Shah was given Tabriz and Ardabil and the present

day Iranian Azerbaijan.

As far as Ottoman Empire was concerned the Russian

expansion into the Caucasus during the period 1801-1813 and

subsequently during 1826-1828 did not find any resistance or

reaction. This was primarily because during this period Ottoman

state was pre-occupied with issues of internal and external concern.

For example, Ottoman state was busy with its own reform movements

initiated by Mahmud II ( 1808-1839) and it was much pre-occupied by

Serbian revolt and the French intervention in Egypt.

26 M.H. Ganji, "The Historical Development of the Boundaries of Azerbaijan" in Keith Mclachlan, ed., The Boundaries of Modern Iran (London: UCL Press, 1994), pp.42-43.

27 Ibid., p.43.

13

On the other hand Russia after the Treaty of Turkmenchai had

become the sole master of Caucasus and the only problem it had, was

its security from Anatolian flank. In other words, it was important for

Russia to settle issue of Caucasus with Ottoman Empire once and for

all which was in fact settled by the treaty of Edirne (1829). In fact,

the war between Russia and the Ottoman broke out in on European

front in 1827. This war which started with the battle of Navarino

ended with the treaty of Edirne (1829). In this war, Ottoman Empire

was defeated badly and in the eastern front it lost Anapa, Ahiska,

Kars and Bayezit. And by the peace treaty of Edirne ( 1829) the

Ottoman Empire accepted the Russian acquisition in the Caucasus,

including Georgia and the areas of Nakhichevan and Erivan recently

taken from Iran. In return, the Czar gave back Eastern Anatolian

cities of Erzurum, Kars and Bayezit to Ottoman Empire. 28 Thus with

the signing of the Edrine Treaty the Ottoman state lost all its

suzerainty rights over the whole of the Caucasus.

During World War I when Russian revolution broke out in

November 1917. There was a total break in relations between the

Bolshevik government in Russia and the Transcaucasus. And as a

28 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezelkural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.II: Reforms, Revolution and Repbulic: The · Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.32.

14

result the people of the Caucasus regained their freedom and became

self-governing. In fact, in a meeting of the representatives of Georgia,

Azerbaijan and Armenia which took place in Tillis, Georgian Capital,

an interim government for the region under the title of

Transcaucasian Commissariat was formed in November-December

1917.29

The new transcaucasian government declared its intention to

retain power until the Constituent Assembly would convene. The

delegates of the Transcaucasian Commissariat began to function

independently immediately after the dissolution of the Russian

Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks on 19 January 1918. A

representative assembly, the Seim, was formed with the participation

of the representatives of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In April

1918, the Seim proclaimed Transcaucasia an Independent Democratic

Federative Republic and a cabinet was formed with executive

powers.30

29 R.G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p.107.

30 Haider Bammate, "The Caucasus and the Russian Revolution (from a Political View point)", Central Asian Survey, Vo1.10, N.4, 1991, p.8. .

15

But the Independent Democratic Federative Republic,

comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, came to an end after a

month of its formation when Georgia declared its independence on 26

May 1918.31 And two days later, the independent republics of

Armenia and Azerbaijan were declared, with Erevan as Armenian

capital and Gandzha (Elizavetpol) the Azerbaijani. And by September

the same year all the three republics came under at least partial

occupation of Turkish forces. But the Turkish forces had to leave the

area as per the Mondros Armistice signed on 31 October 1918.32

The Turkish armistice put the Transcaucasus lands at the

mercy of British troop. To implement article XV of the Armistice, 33 the

31 "The conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany (Russia's treaty with Central Power) left the federation in difficult straits.... The Azerbaijani preference for cooperation with Turks and apparent hopes for restoration of Muslim rule over Transcaucasia split federation. These feelings which led to the ethnic clashes -including race riots and armed conflict - made meaningful cooperation among the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis impossible." Susan L. Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, "Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed forces: A Historical Overview" in Alexander R. Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army: Asset or Liability (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p.36.

32 For details of the Armistice of Mondros, S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, n.28, pp.327 -328.

33 For details of article XV of the Armistic, W.,J. Childs and A.E.R. McDonnell, "Outline of the Events in Transcaucasia from 1917 to 1921" (London: Public Relation Office:F0/371/7729/E8378, Records published in 'File ofTranscaucasus', 1980), pp.l0-12.

16

British war office ordered the British command in Mesopotamia to

occupy Baku and its surrounding oil fields. Acting Major General

William Montegomery Thomson, the commander of the British

Expeditionary force in north Persia, ordered the last Ottoman

contingents out of Baku in November 1918 and entered Baku the

same month. As far as western Transcaucasia was concerned Major

General G.T. Forestier-Walker of 27th Division was dispatched, from

the headquarters of the Army of the Black Sea in Istanbul, to

safeguard the vital centres m the western provinces of

Transcaucasia. 34 Thus in this way, by the end of 1918, the Turkish

armistice put the whole of Transcaucasia under British military

control, exercised by the Army of the Black sea.

It was now considered British prerogative to enforce the

armistice and preserve the peace. But to the surprise of Britain the

situation proved very difficult. The months following the armistice

proved that the task of securing British interests in the region was not

an easy task. The reason for this, however, did not stem from any

local resistance as was the case in constantnople and else where. It

was.mainly related to the complicated maze of regional problems that

34 Ibid., p.20.

17

the British soon found themselves to be enmeshed in.

The relations between the newly independent Transcaucasian

republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were far from

harmonious, mainly because of their territorial aspirations. After the

armistice the easing of the external pressures permitted the

hostsilities among the independent republics to resurface. As soon as

the Turkish armies left the region an armed struggle broke out

between Armenia and Georgia over the Borchalo region which both

sides claimed as theirs. The boundaries between Azerbaijan and

Armenia proved even more serious source of conflict. Many Azeri and

Armenian villages were located side by side and often used the same

common lands for cattle and sheep grazing. Both sides claimed such

districts as theirs. Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Karabakh districts

were major trouble spots. These tensions were a constant source of

ethnic conflict, seriously damaging the stability of the region. 35

35 For details of ethnic conflict in Transcaucasia during this period, Caroline Cox and John Eibner, Ethnic Cleansing inProgress: War in Nagorno-Karabakh (London: Institute for Religious Minorities in the Islamic World, 1993), p.29; James G. Mandalian, "The Transcaucasian Armenian Irredenta", Armenia Review, 14 N.2-59 (Summer 1961), pp.8-9; R.G. Hovennision, The Republic of Armenia, Vol.I: The First Year, 1918-1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p.85.

18

In addition to such ethnic and territorial clashes, there was the

issue of conflicting interests of Denikin's Volunteer Army and the

Transcaucasian republics. Denikin, who had the idea of a 'Great

Russia, one and Indivisible, had declared that he would not recognize

the independence of the Transcaucasian republics. The British

government had been supporting Denikin's anti-Bolshevik white

Russian armies from early December 1917. And when in early 1919

Denikin moved southward from the Kuban region; his armies came

closer to the borders of independent Azerbaijan and Georgia. The

British commanders in the region found themselves in between two

opposing parties; both of whom were supported by British

Government. (In fact, British were in favour of Independent Republics

in Tanscaucasian as against the Denkin idea of 'Great Russia1. The

invasion of the Sochi district of Georgia by the Volunteer of Army of

Denikin in January brought the two sides to the verge of a full-scale

war which was prevented only when the British army intervened.

Perhaps clear directives from home would h~ve eased the

situation. 36 But none was forthcoming. In fact, for London the

36 For details of different views in British Parliament over the question of presence of British troops in Transcaucasus David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol.V (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936), pp.2560-2580; W.J. Childs and A.E.R. Mcdonnell, n.33, pp.15-18.

19

involvement of the British troops in the regional disputes constituted

an additional source of confusion to the already unsettled state of

British policy. The victory over Turkey more or less automatically

initiated the British military control of the region but did not bring

any clarity to what the British troops would do in the region in the

long term. Thus the general trend of discussion in Britain over the

British policy in Transcaucasus was as follows: British forces should

not be withdrawn from the Caucasus until after the Turkish forces

had been withdrawn completely; a second British division should not

be sent to the Caucasus without the authority of the cabinet; and

British forces should not be maintained there longer than could be

avoided. The only clear policy seemed to be the determination to get

the troops out as early as possible. 37 .

And by March 1919, less than three months after the dispatch

of British troops to the Trancaucasus, Lloyd George's cabinet decided

to withdraw from the region. As per the cabinet decision orders were

passed to call back all troops by the end of 1919, with the exception of

a garrison at Bantum. And on the other hand, British forces were

ordered to confine themselves to the control of the Black Sea and the

straits, bordering the sensitive southern flank of Russia.

37 W.J. Childs andA.E.R. Mcdonnell, n.33, pp.20-.21.

20

Whatever strategic balancing accounted for the decision, it was

obviously a drawback for the British. It was a clear indication that the

euphoria of victory in war was replaced by a defensive wait-and-see

role in the Caucasian affairs. "The ultimate aim was, however,

unchanged; to maintain British influence in the Caucasus. The

difference was that it was no longer through the troops on the ground

in the Caucasus that this was to be done but via an indirect

influence, through applying firm control in the straits and the Black

sea. After all the road to the Mediterranean and the Middle East

passed through the straits."38 The British thought that a firm-handed

policy in Turkish affairs would facilitate a quick settlement in Turkey

and the country could be isolated from the potentially dangerous

events of the Caucasus and South Russia; and could perhaps serve as

a positive catalyst in the affairs of Transcaucasus.

\1)51.\ lc,s;~4-'S(N1

Nt:t The order of withdrawal of Briitish forces from Caucasus came

as a great relief to the Bolsheviks. In fact, this was indeed what the

Bolshevik government had aimed to achieve both through diplomatic

means and the might of the Red Army for a long time. However, the

firm control over straits, Instanbul, and the Black sea by the British

38 ibid., p.23. THESIS

327.561047 0679 Tu

IIIII II II 1111111111111 Ill TH8333

(an area traditionally regarded as the most sensitive to the overall

security of Russia) was viewed with increasing concern by the

Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, Britain's intensified involvement in Turkey

and its announced intention to withdraw troops from Russia provided

an opportunity for the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power within

the Caucasian lands of the former Russian Empire. In other words,

the Caucasus offered an opportunity to fortify Russia's sensitive

southern flank against the tightening British grip in the Black Sea

and the Turkish straits. In light of these developments it was a

natural conclusion for the Bolsheviks regime to try to establish close

contacts with those elements in Turkey who were opposed to the

allied scheme in their native lands.

THE RAPPROCHMENT OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT WITH THE RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIKS AND THE FINAL SUBJUGATION OF TRANSCAUCASUS BY RUSSIA

The Caucasus in mid-1919 emerged as the strategic interface

between the events of Russia and those in Turkey. The two forces

hostile to the British Empire, the Bolsheviks of Russia and the

nationalists of Turkey, were soon convinced that the region could

provide a vital link in their struggle against the British. Therefore, it

was not a coincidence that the rapprochement of the Turkish national

movement with the Russian Bolsheviks was first materialised in the

region in the form of a Turco-Bolshevik co-operation for a Soviet-

22

controlled Caucasus. The region was to assume the role of a bridge. 39

During the winter of 1919-20, the region witnessed arnqjor

Bolshevik campaign building up for a 'Sovietized' Caucasus. The

Turkish nationalist cadres, sent from Anatolia, played an important

role in this campaign. For the Turkish nationalists an independent

Caucasus was nothing but an obstacle hindering the transfer of

precious war materials from Russia. It was hoped that the

· establishment of the Bolshevik's control in the region would facilitate.

much needed material aid for the Turkish struggle for independence.

Parallel to this development the winter month of 1919-20

witnessed the emergence of quite serious opposition to the British

control of Turkey. The profile of the Turkish national movement was

rising rapidly in both Anatolia and Istanbul. The political prestige

and military capacity of the Turkish nationalists were considerably

boosted as a result of antagonistic operations of the Greek army in

western Anatolia and the failure of British policy in the Caucasus. The

nationalist militants in Istanbul stepped up their activities by

organizing raids to the allied arm depots and shipping them to

Anatolia. Heavy fighting between the local nationalist forces and the

39 James Degros (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol.I, 1917-1924 (London: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1951), pp.109-110.

23

French in Mara, the south eastern part of Anatolia, ended by the

evacuation of the region by the French, and created extra panic

among the allied circles.

The British were convinced that the Bolsheviks were to blame

for all such disturbances. British intelligence reports informed the

government on the role of the Bolshevik agents in Turkey and

intimate co-operation between these two 'anti-Entente and especially

anti-British movements. 40 The increasing nationalist activities in

Turkey were considered to be directly related to the Bolsheviks'

campaign in the Caucasus. The reports regarding the presence of

Turkish officers working hand-in-hand with the Bolsheviks in the

region especially in Azerbaijan led to a great concern on the part of

British government.

Several options were put forward by the British by the

beginning of 1920 in order to prevent the situation deteriorate any

further. A military solution to stop the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus

had already been reluctantly dropped- partly because of the difficulty

in finding the necessary troops. There was anxiety about the security

of British positions in Turkey. Under such circumstances it was

40 Ibid., p.152.

24

considered necessary to call more troops to the Ottoman capital to

ensure the security of the existing British forces.

Finally, the allied supreme council decided on a reinforced

occupation oflstanbul and firm control over the straits. On 16 March

1920 the allied corps under the orders of General Wilson entered the

Turkish quarters of the town and arrested the nationalists41 - together

with other communist activities. Those arrested were deported to

Malta. The Kemalists in Anatolia retaliated by arresting all British

officers and personnel in the provinces under their control.

The transformation to a hostile allied presence in Istanbul

including the. round up of prominent Turkish politicians represented

the beginning of the next crucial phase in the course of Turkish

national struggle. It had a decisive and convincing impact on the

Turks by proving that there would be no softening of the allied

attitude towards Turkey. Their response was equally momentous; the

convocation in Ankara of a Grand National Assembly which

established a provisional government on 23 April 1920.

41 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.246.

25

The Soviet Government followed the events in Istanbul with

great interest because these events had a prospect of an even more

intimate co-operation with the Turkish nationalists. And as expected

the Bolsheviks found an immediate response from the Kemalists who

were now convinced that only co-operation with the Soviet

government would provide the Turks with vital material and

diplomatic support at this stage.

While Istanbul under British occupation and the nationalists in

Ankara expressing full commitment to a close co-operation with

Moscow,42 the Sovietization of the Caucasus appeared to the

Bolshevik leaders in Moscow an easier task than ever before. And

from then on Bolshevik Caucasian offensive took off fast and with no

major obstacles on course.

The leading nationalists and Turkish officers played an

important role as intermediaries in manipulating Muslim public

opinion in Azerbaijan. They tried to convince the Azerbaijan

authorities and leading Muslim leaders that the Bolsheviks had no

desire to abolish the independence of the republic and that the basic

42 "As soon as Mustafa Kemal heard about the occupation of the Ottoman capital; he instructed Karabekir to initiate the necessary arrangements to establish immediate contact with the Bolsheviks for a united front in the Caucasus." Janes Degras (ed.), n.39, p.l23.

26

aim of their activities was to guarantee a safe passage for the

independence of Turkish lands. Turkish nationalists and Turkish

communists organized joint meetings in Baku to mobilize greater

public support in Azerbaijan.

On 27 April 1920, the central committee of the Azerbaijani

Communist party, the Baku Bureau of the Regional Committee of the

Russian Communist Party and the Central Workers' Conference of

Baku, handed the Azerbaijani government a joint ultimatum

demanding its surrender within twelve hours. And on the same day

the Eleventh Army of Russia crossed the border and the very next day

i.e. 28 April 1920, the power was declared to be in the hands of the

Temporary Revolutionary Military Committee of Azerbaijan

(AZREVKOM). 4 3

After the declaration of Soviet Azerbaijan the situation in the

Caucasus continued to be favourable for the Bolsheviks. In the

summer of 1920 the remaining troops of Great Britain were evacuated

from Transcaucasia and the last hope of the Allies, a proposed

American mandate over Armenia, was rejected by United States. The

43 For detailed discussion, Richard E. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp.226-227.

27

Russian Bolsheviks were left as the unchallenged arbitrators of the

fate of the region. From then on, the Bolsheviks with the support of

the Turkish nationalists, determined the course of the events with

Sovietization plan across the region.

As far as Armenia was concerned, the announcement of the

Treaty of Sevres made the Turkish nationalist extremely anxious

about the future of the Armenian provinces in eastern Anatolia. As

per the Treaty of Sevres, which was signed between the Allies and the

Ottoman government in Istanbul on 10 August 1920, Turkey was

asked to relinquish a substantial portion of eastern Anatolia to an

independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan. 44 Since the

summer of 1919 the dispute had been going on between the two sides

over the eastern provinces of Anatolia. But in October full-scale war

broke out between the Armenians and the Turks. An independent

Armenia had long been seen as an important obstacle which was

keeping apart Mustafa Kemal's army from their Azerbaijani brothers

and from the Bolshevik aid.

44 "Armenia was recognized an an Independent state, with its boundaries to be determined by arbitration of President Wilson. The territory called Kurdistan, east of the Euphrates, was to gain autonomy with the right to opt for independence within a year if the Kurds wished." S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, n.28, p.356; M. Philips Price, n.lS, p.lOO.

28

The Turkish offensive caused extreme anxiety in Armenia and

the Armenian Social Democratic Party sent a letter to Lenin accusing

Karabekir and Kemal in person for pursuing an expansionist policy

with the aim of total extermination of the Armenian nation. 45 The

Armenian demanded from Soviet government the protection of the

integrity of the Armenian lands from the expansionist policies of their

arch enemy.

However, there is no evidence that Soviet government had any

intention to intervene to stop the Turkish armies. But it seems quite

clear from the following events that no immediate protection was

offered to the Armenians at this stage. Turks moved against Armenia

without serious opposition. Turkish forces advanced rapidly and took

over Kars on 30 October and soon after negotiations were opened in

Alexandropol. 46

While the Armenian government was discussing the stiff

conditions put forward by the Turks, the Bolsheviks finally decided

that they had to act. And on 29 November 1920 Legram, a

commander of Bolshevik army which had already arrived in Erevan in

45 W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p.462.

46 S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, n.28, p.357.

29

October, handed the Armenian government an ultimatum, demanding

the transfer of authority to a Revolutionary Committee of Armenia.

This was followed by advance of the Red Army which crossed the

Armenian border from Azerbaijan and proceeded toward the capital.

Having found itself between a Turkish and Soviet invasion, the

Armenian Dashnak government decided to come to terms with the

Bolsheviks and on 3 December it signed an agreement with Russians,

according to which Armenian was proclaimed an Independent

Socialist Republic.47

The invasion of Armenia by Red army in order to prevent

Turkish advance accounts for the first crash in the newly formed

relationship between Moscow and Ankara. But both acted with

reason and despite their apparent conflicting interests over Armenia

they could not afford to give up the special relationship. The Turks

did not attempt to go further towards the historically Russian held

parts of Armenia and the Russians did not move further down in to

Turkish Armenia. Having the misfortune to lie surrounded by the

Russian Bolsheviks from the north and the Turkish nationalist from

the south, the country of independent Armenia was effectively divided

into two.

47 Richard F. Pipes, n.43, pp.232-233.

30

After Azerbaijan and Armenia, Goergia was the third and the

final area in the Sovietization scheme. Since the mid-1920s the local

Bolsheviks were actively fermenting political unrest in Georgia.48 And

in Januwy 1921 instructions were issued to the Communist Party of

Georgia to organize an uprising. Similar to the Azerbaijani and

Armenia cases, local communist party cells were to be used to

facilitate the advance of Red army. And in mid February, with the

instigation of the Russians, an uprising broke out at Borchalo against

Menshevik Georgian government. As a result, the Georgian

Revolutionary Military Committee (REVKOM) was set up by the

Communist Party of Georgia to act as a parallel government.49

Subsequently the Central Committee of Communist in Russia ordered

the Red Army to go to the assistance of rebels i.e. REVKOM. And as a

result, the Red army of Russia crossed the Georgian frontier and

entered Tiflis, the ancient capital of Georgia on 25 February 1921.

Similar to the Soviet intervention following the Turkish offensive

against Armenia three months earlier, the Turkish nationalist army

intervened following the advance of Red army and annexed Bantum

48L. Beria, The Histmy of the Bolshevik Organisations in Transcay

on 8 March 1921.50 The Georgian government similar to that of the

Armenians and under fire from both sides was forced to make a

choice. And as a result on 18 March 1921 the cease-fire agreement

was signed between the Manshevik Georgian government and the

REVKOM.51 Subsequently, the units of Red army along with the

Georgian army advanced on Bantum and threw back the Turkish

troops to their former positions. Thus ended the independence of

Georgia and with the seizure of Georgia, the process of Sovietization of

the Transcaucasus was completed by the Bolsheviks.

With the establishment of the Soviet power in all the three

Transcaucasian states, the region ceased to be a crisis area, at least

on the international agenda till the disintegration of the USSR in

1991-1992.

50 The British army had withdrawn from Bantum some eight ·months back i.e. July 1920.

51 Richard E. Pipes, n.43, p.238.

32