tragic experience in hegel.pdf

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00373.x

A Theory of Tragic Experience Accordingto Hegel

Julia Peters

Abstract: Hegels theory of tragedy is often considered to beprimarily a theory of the objective powers involved in tragicconflictsfor Hegel, these are paradigmatically competing ethicalnotionsand of the rationality which underlies and drives suchconflicts. Such a view follows naturally from a close reading ofHegels discussion of classical Greek tragedy in his Lectures onAesthetics. However, this view gives rise to the question of whetherHegels theory of tragedy can account for the significance of tragicexperience, in particular the experience of tragic suffering; it hasbeen argued repeatedly that it cannot. In contrast, I want to suggestin this paper that a theory of tragic experience can be derived fromHegels Phenomenology of Spirit. This Hegelian theory of tragicexperience, I argue, should be understood as complementing ratherthan challenging Hegels theory of objective tragic conflict.

Oh Ive learned/through blood and tears!(Creon, Sophocles Antigone)

1.

According to Hegels Lectures on Aesthetics, classical Greek tragedy typicallyrevolves around a conflict between diverse ethical spheres which complementeach other in the ethical life of the Greek polismost importantly, the sphere ofthe family on the one hand, and of political and public life on the other. Tragicprotagonists are heroic individuals who identify with only one sphere of ethicallife, and pursue their one-sided ethical purpose in an absolutist anduncompromising way, such that it excludes and conflicts with its complementaryethical force. In the very attempt to act ethically, they thereby end up not onlyacting unethicallybecause they are violating the complementary ethical lawbut moreover destroying themselves. Through this self-destruction, however,the original ethical unity of the polis is restored and affirmed, over and above astate of imbalance in which one-sided purposes are defended in an absolutistfashion. This abolition of one-sidedness and restoration of unity manifests acertain kind of justice. In coming to see a tragic play as a manifestation of suchjustice, its spectators can feel reconciled with the destruction of the tragicprotagonist. More specifically, they can feel reconciled with the world that brings

European Journal of Philosophy 19:1 ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 85106 r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

about his or her destruction, since, in doing so, this world proves to befundamentally just.1

Following this representation of the Hegelian understanding of tragedy, itwould seem that from Hegels point of view, the essential content of a tragicplaythe content in virtue of which it is a tragedyis a conflict between equallyjustified ethical powers. In a tragic conflict, these powers enter a state ofimbalance which is subsequently restored to balance. However, if this werecorrect, Hegels theory of tragedy would appear to be neglecting what is certainlyone of the most important aspects of every tragic play: the experience which thetragic protagonist undergoes, in particular, his or her tragic suffering. Thedepiction of an individuals tragic suffering would seem to be accidental totragedy. Moreover, according to Hegels theory, the value of tragic theatre for itsspectators would be grounded solely in the rationality of the tragic conflict and itssolution, and in the sense of reconciliation which the observation of such rationaljustice affords. But there would be nothing valuable, from Hegels point of view,in the spectators exposure to the tragic protagonists experience of suffering.

The complaint that Hegels theory of tragedy fails to do justice to the fact thatindividual suffering belongs to the essence of the tragic, and that it is at least inpart the spectacle of such suffering which makes tragic theatre valuable for us,has been made repeatedly. Thus in his classical piece Hegels Theory of TragedyA. C. Bradley cautiously points out that Hegel might have been slightlyneglecting the significance of the tragic protagonists experience of suffering:[Hegel] seems to be right in laying emphasis on the action and conflict in tragedyrather than on the suffering and misfortune. [. . .] But, sufficient connection withthese agencies being present, misfortune, the fall from prosperity to adversity,with the suffering attending it, at once becomes tragic; and in many tragedies itforms a large ingredient, as does the pity for it in the tragic feeling. Hegel, I think,certainly takes too little notice of it; and by this omission he also withdrawsattention from something the importance of which he would have admitted atonce; I mean the way in which suffering is borne.2

In a similar vein, Sebastian Gardner, in his essay Tragedy, Morality andMetaphysics argues that Hegel fails to give a satisfying account of the value oftragedy. Gardner defends the view that at the heart of tragedy lies a subjectsexperience of his or her opposition to the objective world: tragedy is constitutedby an experience modelled on the traditional, unmediated opposition of subjectand object.3 It follows that if there is such a thing as tragic value, it must arise inrelation to the subjective experience of the individual who faces the world in atragic conflict. Now for Hegel, the value of tragedy is grounded in the rationalityand justice of the solution to which tragic conflicts necessarily proceed, and thesense of reconciliation which the observation of such solution affords. However,this rational and just solution is not itself part of the tragic experience of theindividual involved in tragic conflict. Therefore, Gardner concludes, Hegelstheory fails to give a satisfying account of tragic value: [. . .] Hegel does notdemonstrate the attunement of tragic and moral consciousness [i.e. theconsciousness which observes and comprehends the rationality and justice of

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tragic conflict], if this is supposed to belong to the experience of tragedy, and notto be the result of subsequent, extraneous reflection on the experience. In order toknow that, as Hegels account implies, tragic loss and suffering is not in vain andcan be recuperated, we need to refer to Hegels speculative metaphysics [. . .].Thus in the context of tragedy, if in no other, there appears to be reason forthinking that natural consciousness resists the upward movement towards thestandpoint of speculative philosophy: all that Hegel may justifiably claim,therefore, is that his account describes the revisionary interpretation of tragedywhich the speculative standpoint demands.4

There can be no doubt that Hegels theory of tragedy, as it is presented in theLectures on Aesthetics, downplays the significance of tragic experience and tragicsuffering, placing almost exclusive emphasis on tragic conflict and the particularlogic underlying it. It would have to be considered a serious weakness of Hegelstheory, however, if it had nothing substantial to say about the phenomenon oftragic experience. Gardner and Bradley are right to point out that the tragicprotagonists experience is an essential part of tragedy. However, I would like tosuggest that there is a way of both adhering to Hegels theory of tragedy, andescaping devastating criticism. This can be achieved, I shall argue in the following,by appreciating that Hegels theory of tragedy as it is presented in the Lectures onAesthetics has its complement in a Hegelian theory of tragic experience, which canbe derived from Hegels discussion of tragic conflict in the Phenomenology of Spirit.While the Phenomenology is in agreement with the Lectures regarding theparadigmatic constitution of tragic conflicts, it moreover presents a perspectiveon such conflicts which is absent from the Lectures, by bringing into view thepeculiar nature of the experience of those individuals who are involved in them.More specifically, I shall try to show that the Phenomenology can be used as a basisfor formulating a Hegelian theory of the peculiar nature of tragic suffering.

According to the account I wish to propose, tragic experience consists for Hegelof two sequential elements. Tragic experience begins with alienation, followed byrecognition. This recognition is self-recognition: recognition that what onepreviously considered alien or hostile is in reality ones own or part of onesidentity. Such tragic self-recognition is achieved through suffering. By violating onessupposed enemy, one inflicts pain and suffering on oneself, and in feeling this pain,one realizes ones error and thereby comes to know ones own identity. Within thisaccount, the value of a subjects tragic experience lies in the self-recognition whichsuch experience affords; through tragic suffering, one achieves self-knowledge. Thisself-recognition has typically no reconciliatory effect, because it comes too late: itoccurs only once one has inflicted devastating and irredeemable harm on oneself.

2.

This account of tragic experienced just outlined can be developed, I shall now tryto show, from Hegels reading of tragedy in sections a and b of the chapterentitled The true Spirit. The ethical order in his Phenomenology of Spirit.

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The Phenomenology represents the ascent from consciousness to Spirit, and itdoes this by on the one hand depicting how this ascent is experienced from thepoint of view of consciousness itself, and on the other hand revealing thedialectical logic which underlies this ascent, and which is not visible from thepoint of view of the ascending consciousness.5 The Introduction suggests that theascending movement sets out from the assumption of an essential divisionbetween subject and objectwhich is later on seen as manifesting itself in allkinds of contexts, epistemological, ethical, religious etc.and culminates in theovercoming of this division after having attained the position of Science.6

However, the movement also occurs in the reverse order: as an ascent from animmediate unity of subject and object to a reflective division between the two. ForHegel, the world of the Greek polis of Athens and its ethical life is theparadigmatic manifestation of such an immediate unity of human subjectivityand objective world. In this respect, the Phenomenologys chapter on the Greekspirit is in accord with the portrait of the ancient Greek world which Hegel offersin his Lectures on the Philosophy of History,7 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,8

and Lectures on the History of Philosophy.9 However, in contrast to the Lectures, thePhenomenology, since it is dedicated to the task of delivering the Science of theexperience of consciousness,10 is concerned with depicting how the Greekcitizens unity with the objective ethical order of the polis is experienced by theGreek individual him- or herself. According to the reading I wish to propose, thepowerful thesis put forward and demonstrated in the Phenomenology is thatwithin the world of the Greek polis, tragedy is the medium through which theidentification of the Greek individual with the ethical order of the polis is turnedfrom an immediate, quasi-natural unity into genuine knowledge. It is throughtragic suffering that the Greek individual ascends from immediate to reflectedidentification with the ethical order. Thus the Phenomenology shows how tragicexperience is an essential, or at least an integral part of the overall education anddevelopment of Spirit towards ultimate self-knowledge.

The Phenomenologys account of tragic experience thus follows a complexanalysis of Greek ethical life and the individual citizens relation to it in thesection entitled The ethical world. Human and Divine Law: Man and Woman.On this basis, Hegel then develops and analyses in the following section (Ethicalaction. Human and Divine Knowledge. Guilt and Destiny) the tragic experienceof one of the most famous protagonists of all of Greek tragedy: the heroine ofSophocles play Antigone. For Hegel, the world depicted in Sophocles play, andin Greek tragedy in general, reflects the essential political and ethical structure ofthe world in which these plays are performed and watched: the world of thepolis. However, while this ensures that the Greek spectators of tragedy canidentify with the tragic protagonists, the real world of the polis does notusually, at leastitself contain tragic heroes and tragic conflicts. Tragedy has aneducational significance because the spectators can learn from the sufferings ofthe tragic protagonist without having to suffer themselves.

At the heart of the ethical life of the Greek polis, on Hegels account, lies theidentification of the citizen with the ethics of the polis. This is what Hegel calls

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the Greek citizens ethical disposition: they identify with the customary laws ofthe polislaws which are designed to foster the good of the political communityas a wholeto the extent that they regard them as absolute ethical norms.11 Theyare therefore essentially ethical beings, citizens, and have no conception of thegood as apart from the way it is defined by the ethical laws of the polis.12 Thisidentification with the political community and its ethics is achieved throughcustom and habit. Greek individuals are educated in such a way that followingthe ethical laws of the polis becomes second nature for them, as Hegel puts it.13

Thus for them, the ethical laws of the polis assume the status of quasi-naturallaws, which admit of no rational justification.14 This is why Hegel calls Greekethical life beautiful: for the Greek citizen, it is natural, rather than just aburdensome duty, to behave ethically. His or her actions therefore manifest aperfect unification of spirit and nature;15 the unity of both is what beauty consistsin for Hegel. In this aesthetic, immediate, non-reflective sense, Greek citizens arealso free as participants of ethical life. For they are naturally disposed to followthe political laws; for them, following the laws of the polis is a naturaldisposition, rather than constraint.

In Hegels reading, the figure of Antigone in Sophocles play is a perfectexemplification of the Greek citizens ethical disposition. She accepts thecustomary laws of the polis as authoritative without seeking to justify themrationally.16 However, the fact that these laws therefore have a quasi-naturalvalidity for her is expressed in a more specific way in Sophocles play. In theethical life Sophocles depicts (it is not clear whether Hegel thinks that thisdepiction is faithful even to the specific realities of the Athenian polis), the ethicalroles that the citizens are supposed to perform are allocated on the basis of theirsex, hence on a natural basis. The female role is associated with the family andburial rites, the performance of which is considered to be demanded by the godsof the underworld. Thus the ethical action of women represents the citizen withregard to his or her most existential features of being born and dying, as a purehuman particularity in its most universal, eternal and unchanging nature. Thesphere of the male citizen, on the other hand, is the political and public one, thesphere of laws created by humans, rather than eternal, existential law. Theexistence of these two ethical spheres is necessary and sufficient for thepersistence of the polis; they complement each other: each preserves and bringsforth the other.17 Hegel explains this by means of the terms of ground andpurpose:18 The male, public, political sphere is the purpose of the citizensexistence, since it represents the freedom of the polis, expressed in the citizensparticipation in political decisions, lawgiving and administration. The female,existential sphere, on the other hand, represents the eternal or divine aspects ofhuman existence, birth and death, and is therefore the ground of the citizensexistence. Both of these ethical spheres are justified only as complemented by theother; it is only in this way that they form an ethical whole, in which both thefreedom of human beings, and their subjection to eternal, natural, divine laws isactualized. Consequently, as citizens perform distinct ethical actions, dependingon their sex, they are thereby constituting a part of a larger ethical whole, to



which the opposing ethical sphere is just as essential as the one they arethemselves representing.

3.

With the two ethical spheres complementing each other, the citizens life in thepolis thus embodies a tranquil harmony, not only between the two ethicalspheres, but also between the individual citizens and the polis as the ethicalwhole in which they reside. However, human error now disturbs and shakes thisbeautiful ethical life19this is where the tragic conflict begins. In regardinghuman error as an essential element in the emergence of tragic conflict, Hegelstheory of tragedy has a strong Aristotelian component.20 Like in Aristotle, inHegel this great mistake21 is not a moral transgression, but a lack of knowledge,in particular knowledge of ones own identity. Sophocles play Antigone, inHegels reading, presents two central characters, who both commit this error.Creon, recently appointed king of Thebes, issues the decree that Polynices,Antigones brother who attempted to attack the city and usurp the throne, andwas killed in the attempt, shall not be buried; because a traitors corpse is not tobe honored through burial, but left to be devoured by dogs and birds. In issuingthis decree, Creon shows obliviousness towards the divine necessity of burial; hispolitical decree violates a divine law. Antigone, on the other hand, is determinedto bury her brother in spite of Creons decree, because of her devotion to thedivine law. She thereby proves to be ignorant of or at least negligent to thepolitical necessity to punish traitors and to ostracize them from the ethicalcommunity. Creon is oblivious towards the divine, Antigone is oblivious towardsthe political.22

There follows a clash between Creon and Antigone. Antigone, denied anycooperation by her sister Ismene, goes ahead and performs the burial rights forher brother. She takes no precautions to hide her action;23 consequently she issentenced to death by Creon. He decides that she is to be put to death by beingwalled up alive in a cave outside the city walls,24 rather than, as Antigone hadenvisaged in the beginning, through public stoning inside the city walls.25

However, before she is taken away alive to her own grave, Antigone faces theChorus of old Theban citizens one more time. This scene is most remarkable,because it introduces the moment of Antigones self-recognition. In her greatspeech to the Thebans,26 Antigone pleads that she be recognized and, above all,remembered by her city as a heroine who died for a just, divine causealmost asa mythical figure.27 This is the expression of a wish she had been harboring allalong: the wish for a noble death.28 However, one cannot have a noble deathwithout cooperation by the city. To die a noble death means to be honored in andafter ones death: to be honored publicly by the city. The point at which Antigonerealizes that she is being denied a noble death by the citizens, that she is literallyall alone and ostracized, is the point at which she breaks. No longer is she nowthe fiercely determined heroine, looking death into the eye without flinching. The

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death she is now facing is not the one she had been envisaging. Hers ought tohave been a public, noble deathpublic stoning rather than being hidden in acave outside the city, a heroines fame, rather than being wiped from publicmemory. Antigone now begins to lament her fate and, for the first time in theplay, expresses genuine fear of death, and the wish to live. Only now doesAntigones suffering begin.

It is easily overlooked that as it turns to this point in Sophocles plot, Hegelsanalysis shifts its attention from the conflict between objective ethical powers toAntigones subjective tragic experience. However, in making this shift, Hegelsanalysis makes one of its most powerful observations, bringing out how closelyAntigones suffering is linked to her self-recognition. Again, Hegels theory has astrong Aristotelian component here. For Aristotle, the tragic charactersrecognition is as essential to the tragic plot as his reversal of fortune,29 and arecognition is most beautiful when it comes to be at the same time as a reversal.30

This is precisely what occurs in Antigone. Her suffering, induced by the rejectionof the citizens, makes her realize her political nature: she is a citizen of the polis,and being respected and recognized by the polis even in her death, is an essentialpart of her identity. It is the hope for such political respect which had beendriving her actions all along, the hidden motive underlying them. This is whatshe had been oblivious to by conceiving of herself as a lone warrior for the divinelaw who defies the political sphere altogether. In reality, Antigone expects to behonored by the city, but as a fighter for the divine law. It is through her suffering,then, that Antigone realizes who she really is, and that she recognizes thepolitical to be an essential part of her own ethical identity. But it is also at themoment of her self-recognition that Antigones fortune is reversed. Despite herdepraved heritagebeing the offspring of an incestuous unionand her fataldecision to bury her brother, she remains a shining figure of unearthly resolutionthroughout the play, up to the point at which she realizes that she will not die anoble, but a lonely death. This is what Antigones reversal consists in: beingtransformed from a heroine into an outlaw.

Hegel describes Antigones moment of self-recognition and acknowledgmentof the political power as ethical, rather than hostile and alien, in the followingway, quoting a line from Sophocles play: The ethical consciousness must [. . .]acknowledge its opposite as its own actuality, must acknowledge its guilt.Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred. With this acknowledgmentthere is no longer any conflict between ethical purpose and actuality; it signifiesthe return to an ethical frame of mind, which knows that nothing counts butright.31 The first time Antigone feels genuine pain is when she finds herselfdeprived of political reward for her action. But it is through this pain that she forthe first time realizes that she has such a political identity. Her suffering leads herto understand who she really is. However, this self-recognition and self-identification with the polis is qualitatively different from the unity betweencitizen and polis which manifests itself in the unquestioning, quasi-naturalparticipation of the citizens in the ethical order. Antigone is no longer aparticipant, but condemned to be ostracized from the city, hidden in a tomb



outside the city walls. She has achieved knowledge of her political identity, butlost the right to participate in the ethical life of the polis through ethical action.Her painfully acquired self-knowledge thus has the form of unreality32 andmere sentiment or disposition (Gesinnung)33a mere frame of mind.

One might object at this point that even if Antigone has to realize that she hasbetrayed and thwarted her political side, could she not still find courage in thefact that at least she remained faithful to the divine law throughout? However, itis important to note that as Antigone learns about her political identity, thischanges her understanding of the divine and its law, too. In acknowledging theethical legitimacy of the political, Antigone likewise accepts the politicaldefinition of the divine, the definition which is accepted and established in thepolis.34 Antigone must therefore accept that she has not merely betrayed thepolitical, but that in so doing, she has also betrayed the divine as ethical power.She thus feels that she has put herself in the situation of having severed herbonds both with the city and with the gods, of being totally abandoned: I haveno home on earth and none below,/not with the living, not with the breathlessdead.35 The insight that she has lost her ethical identity altogether is ultimatelythe reason why Antigone kills herself. It is noteworthy that Antigones changingrelation with the divine law therefore follows roughly the dialectical model ofexperience which Hegel maps out in the Introduction to the Phenomenology.Antigone has a notion of what the divine law is in itself, but as she acts in accordwith that notion, she realizes that her action is mixed with political motives.However, instead of holding on to her standard of the divine and acknowledgingthat her own action fails to meet it, she changes her standard, too, and nowaccepts the political definition of the divine.36

Antigones tragic experience then, to summarize, begins with her dedication tothe divine law, which she understands as being in opposition to the law of thecity.37 In acting in accord with the law as she understands it, she clashes with thepolitical power and is sentenced to death. Realizing that she is being deniedpolitical reward for her supposedly pious action by the citizens of Thebes, shesuffers, and therein realizes that in violating the political law, she has violatedherself. She thus comes to recognize the political as an essential element of herown identity. Her alienation from the polis thereby turns out to be an alienationfrom herself. In realizing her political nature, and moreover accepting thepolitical definition of the divine, Antigone returns to what Hegel calls the ethicalframe of mind: she identifies herself again with the ethics of the polis. However,this identification is different from the immediate, unreflective, aesthetic unityof Greek citizen and polis which is constitutive of the traditional ethical order ofthe polis: it is reflected rather than immediate, and cognitive rather than practical.

For Hegel, tragic experience thus follows the logic which underlies theexperience of consciousness in general, as it is presented in the Phenomenology: itexemplifies a progression towards self-knowledge, of something which isinitially merely in-itself becoming for-itself. Accordingly, in his introduction tothe Phenomenologys account of the Greek spirit and its tragic self-recognition,Hegel summarizes this movement towards self-recognition, of which tragic

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experience is a part, in the following way: Spirit is the ethical life of a nation in sofar as it is the immediate truththe individual that is a world. It must advance tothe consciousness of what it is immediately, must leave behind it the beauty ofethical life, and by passing through a series of shapes attain to a knowledge ofitself.38

On the one hand, this allows us to explain, within Hegels theoreticalframework, why tragic theatre is central to the political life of Athens. Tragedyhas an educational effect: it furthers the Athenian citizens knowledge of thenature of the ethical order of the polis and their own relation to it, hence theirself-knowledge. In particular, it allows them to understand the ethical order as aunity of particular ethical powers, and themselves as being a part of that unity.But while the tragic protagonists have to learn this lesson by going throughsuffering, the Athenian citizens can gain the same insight by merely watchingand identifying with the tragic protagonists.39 Their position is in this respectsimilar to that of the philosopher of the Phenomenology who follows and observesthe upward movement of consciousness towards absolute knowledge, gaininginsight into its identity without having to share its despair as it loses its truth.

On the other hand, however, it seems that in Hegels view, tragic theatre is notmerely affirmative of the Greek ethical order, but also contributes to its corrosionin the long run. While tragic experience culminates in self-recognition and returnto identification with the ethical order, this identification is a higher-order one, nolonger immediate and manifest in action, but cognitive and without immediatepractical implication. Through tragic experience, then, the germ of destructionhas been introduced into the ethical frame of mind: subjective reflection. It isonly with the rise of the sophists and ultimately the seminal figure of Socrates,that this power develops the fully destructive force that will eventually make theethical order of the polis implode. However, tragic theatre, too, whileconsolidating the ethical frame of mind, does so in a way which is at the sametime destructive.

4.

To return to the overall question of whether one can find in Hegel an account ofthe significance and value of tragic experience, according to the argument justoutlined, tragic experience as it is expressed in classical Greek tragedy, and inparticular tragic suffering, is an experience of self-recognition for Hegel: theexperience of coming to know oneself through suffering. This gain of self-knowledge is the value of tragic experience from Hegels point of view.

However, two important issues remain to be addressed at this point. One is thequestion of how Hegels theory of tragic experience, as it comes into view withinthe context of the Phenomenology, relates to his theory of tragic conflict, as it ispresented in the Lectures on Aesthetics. It is clear that they cannot be considered asalternative or even incompatible theories, since both of them are present in thePhenomenology. However, it must be explained why Hegel offers us two different



perspectives on the phenomenon of tragedy, and why the Lectures on Aestheticsfocus on one of them exclusively. The other concern is that even if Hegel presentsa convincing analysis of the tragic experience of Sophocles protagonist Antigone,does this theory of tragic experience apply to other tragic plays as well? And if so,would these be only ancient Greek tragedies, or could they be modern ones aswell? I shall begin with the first concern, and conclude with some considerationsregarding the second one.

I would like to suggest that Hegels theory of tragic conflict on the one hand,and his theory of tragic experience on the other hand, ought to be understood asrepresenting different perspectives from which the phenomenon of tragedy canbe considered within Hegels system. Hegels Lectures on Aesthetics discuss art asa form of Absolute Spirit, as such to be placed alongside Religion andPhilosophy.40 Hegel defines beautythe value he takes to be peculiar to artasthe sensuous manifestation of the absolute Idea. In this sensuous form, the Idea isthe Ideal, the unity of natural form and spiritual content.41 For Hegel, only thehuman figure can be an adequate sensuous, intuitable expression of spirit;42 themost important subject of all art is therefore the human being. By manifesting thereconciliation of spirit and nature, art affords us a sense of feeling at home in theworld, and hence of reconciliation with the world we live in. In this sense, art is apart of Absolute Spirit, and shares its contentalthough not its formwithphilosophy: through philosophical reasoning, we come to understand the rationaland spiritual essence of the world, and are thereby reconciled with it throughthought, rather than intuition.43 From the point of view of the Lectures on Aesthetics,it would therefore also be right to say that art manifests philosophical truth in asensuous medium. However, while art manifests, in its sensuous medium, a unityof spirit and nature, philosophical reason understands nature as being ideal andhence spirit, in being unified with nature, as being unified with itself.44 In this way,the difference between the two forms impinges on their content.45

Against this background, we can understand why in the Lectures on Aesthetics,Hegel looks at the phenomenon of tragedy, too, mainly with regard to how it canbe understood as a manifestation of reconciliation and unity over and abovediscord and opposition. His thesis is that while Greek tragedy, on the one hand,shows us the self-destruction of heroic individuals pursuing one-sided interests, itdemonstrates on the other hand the persistence and self-preservation of the ethicalorder or substance, as Hegel calls it.46 The negation of heroic but misguidedethical agents does not result in a state in which anything of ethical value has beendestroyed. On the contrary, through this negation, genuine ethical order, a balanceof mutually completing, rather than destroying ethical powers, is restored. ForHegel, it is in particular the Chorus which represents the self-preserving ethicalsubstance: the Chorus persists as individuals perish: It [the Chorus] is thesubstantial which persists in its substantiality.47 In contrast, the self-recognitiongained by the tragic individual through his or her suffering does not representsuch a reconciliation and restoration of unity. While the tragic individual comes torecognize his or her essential unity with the ethical order, this insight is a mereGesinnung. It does not itself imply or lead to a restoration of the ethical balance

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and substance, since the tragic individual has at this point irredeemably isolatedand alienated him- or herself from the ethical order, and can no longer participatein or substantiate it in his or her actions. He or she has gained knowledge, butknowledge which is impractical, from which no actions can issue.

On the premise, then, that the task of art is to demonstrate the persistence andreality of unity and reconciliation in a sensuous mediumis to exhibit, in thebroadest sense, beautyit is obvious that tragedy will be significant as a form ofart and of artistic value only as far as it can be seen and comprehended as anaffirmation of the ethical substance and its beautiful balance, over and against thetragic individuals who purport to embody ethical powers, but destroythemselves in the attempt. Only in virtue of this affirmation can tragedy makea legitimate claim to belong in the category of art as a form of absolute spirit.Tragic experience, on the other hand, is significant and valuable because itfurthers the education and development of consciousness towards self-knowl-edge; its natural place within Hegels system is therefore, as discussed above, inthe Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus from Hegels point of view, tragedy can be seenboth as a manifestation of the reality of reconciliation and affirmation of unity,and as a medium for self-knowledge.

5.

In the Phenomenology, Hegels theory of tragic experience is developed from aclose analysis of Sophocles play Antigone. But it is necessary to consider thescope of the theory at this point: does Hegels theory of tragic experience apply toGreek tragedy more generally, and to what extent is it compatible with moderntragedy?

For Hegel, tragic experience as outlined above is particularly endemic to theworld of the Greek polis. The Greek polis, according to Hegel, is based on astrong and immediate identification of individual citizens with the polis and itsethical order. Since self-alienation can only arise where there is unity to beginwith, the polis and its relation to its individual citizens is in fact the perfectsetting for the development of tragic experience from unity to alienation and backto self-identification.48 It is not only the character Antigone who undergoes thisexperience in her relation to the polis. In the same play, her counterpart Creon,the political mirror-image of her fanatically pious determination, comes to learnabout his identity as father of a family in a painful way. As Antigone considersherself as wholly pious, Creon considers himself an all-political man, unaware ofthe strength of his family bonds. His son Haemon, Antigones fiance, is driven tocommit suicide by a mix of grief over Antigones death, fury about his fathersmercilessness, and disgust at himself for having almost committed parricide. In adramatical encounterwhich happens offstage and is only reported by amessengerHaemon raises his sword against his father, but misses him and,now in outrage about his own action, kills himself.49 As a consequence, Creonswife Eurydice stabs herself. It is only through these losses, and the pain they



inflict, that Creon realizes he has not merely a political identity, but depends onhis family, too.50

Another character of ancient Greek tragedy which it is obvious to mention atthis point is the Oedipus in Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus. The feature whichprimarily defines Oedipus character in this play is his unstoppable will to know,to uncover the truth: he first solves the riddle of the Theban sphinx, then resolvesto find the murderer of Laius, in order to set Thebes free from the grip of theplague. However, what he finds out as a result of his investigation is beyond hisimagination: unknowingly, he himself has committed the murder of his fatherand moreover married his mother and fathered his own siblings. In his case,gaining self-knowledge means gaining knowledge of unspeakable monstrosities.

Hegels own discussion of Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus in the Lectures onAesthetics is sparse,51 and it is difficult to find a convincing way of making the playfit with Hegels interpretation of tragedy as manifestation of rational justice andreconstitution of ethical order. The main reason for this seems to be that the conflictwhich drives the plot of Oedipus is not a conflict between universal ethical powerswhich are embodied by individuals and which persist beyond the destruction ofthese individuals. Rather, in Oedipus, we are faced with a conflict within Oedipushimself: a crucial aspect of his own identity is concealed to him, and the playshows him struggling to come to know this aspect. The plot culminates withOedipus self-recognition, but this self-knowledge is achieved by such terriblesufferingnot, however, the death of Oedipusthat it would be highlyimplausible to see this culmination as a restoration of balance and order. Oedipussurvives, but nothing is in order with him, nor will it ever be in order again.

However, if one focuses on the peculiar experience and suffering whichOedipus undergoes in the course of the play, an interpretation in accord withHegels theory of tragic experience comes into view. According to thisinterpretation, Oedipus act of blinding himself at the end of the play constitutesthe very culmination of the entire plot, the point at which the unraveling of itsknot is complete: that is to say, the point at which Oedipus finally achieves self-knowledge. A recurring theme within the play is different forms of knowledge:knowledge through hearing, through sight, through reasoning. Tiresias the seer isin fact blind; and throughout the play, as he pursues his investigations, Oedipusrelies much more on his skills of hearing and reasoning, rather than seeing. Hedismisses Teiresias even though the latter speaks the truth, and abuses himbecause of his blindness;52 he boasts that when he solved the riddle of the Sphinx,it was the flight of [his] own intelligence which hit the mark;53 and by relyingon a rumor and a simple mathematical equation, he tries to prove that he cannotbe guilty of having killed his father.54 However, when Oedipus eventually gougesout his own eyes, this is not merely an expression of his frustration with howuseless they have been for him.55 Rather, the content of the self-knowledge he isabout to acquire is of such a kind that it can properly be known only throughsuffering. It is too dark to hear, to see,56 unspeakable,57 not to be repeated.58 Noordinary form of knowledge is adequate for this content: one can neither speak ofit (and hence think it), nor hear it, nor see it. This is not just because Oedipus

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crimes are too abominable to be grasped in any conventional way. Rather, theyare moreover associated with a side of Oedipus which he had been systematicallyoblivious towards throughout the play: his actions. Oedipus had been trying toidentify himself almost exclusively through his intellectual faculties, his reasonand intelligence, and the knowledge these two faculties afford.59 The plot of theplay itself is the story of an investigation, and when Oedipus refers to his pastactions, he refers to his feat of having solved the riddle of the Sphinxagain, afeat of knowledge and intelligence. What he neglects is his physical identity, as itwere: the one which he acquires, and more importantly, has acquired, through hisactions. In order to make himself truly aware that he has committed the deeds helearns about, that he has a physical identity, he must violate his body, andrecognize his identity with it through the pain he feels.

Tragic knowledge, self-knowledge through suffering, thus steps into the placeof ordinary perceptual knowledge, knowledge through sight (in fact, Oedipussays he would have stopped his ears, too, if only it was possible).60 LikeAntigone, then, Oedipus attains self-knowledge through suffering; the differenceis that in his case, the suffering is voluntarily self-inflicted.61 In raging against theone who has committed the crimes of murdering his father and defiling the cityof Thebes, he rages against his own physical self, and thereby forces uponhimself the knowledge that he is not just an intellectual being, but someone whoacts and has acted, has committed deeds.62

In Oedipus, we can see even more obviously than in Antigone that tragic self-knowledge, since it is attained through suffering, has a twofold nature. On theone hand, since it consists in self-recognition, it constitutes a return to self-identity, retrieval of oneself. On the other hand, since this is achieved through thesuffering arising fromintentional or unintentionalself-violation, it obstructsand renders impossible at the same time any form of genuine reconciliation withoneself; the harm which makes this knowledge possible is irredeemable.

With the example of Oedipus tragic experience, it becomes obvious that theself-recognition achieved through tragic suffering need not consist in a self-identification with an existing ethical whole, such as the polis in Antigones case.However, on the other hand, the self-knowledge which Oedipus acquires is notknowledge of a mere contingency, of some random character-trait or particulardetail of his past life. Rather, Oedipus is forced to acceptor forces himself toacceptthat he has a physical, practical identity, not just an intellectual one.63

More generally, then, it seems that tragic self-recognition always takes as itscontent an essential feature of human identity, something which cannot be leftout in the constitution of a self.64

6.

If tragic experience as it occurs in classical Greek tragedy furthers self-knowledgethrough suffering, is this also true, from Hegels point of view, of the experienceundergone by the protagonists of modern tragedy?



For Hegel, what sets the modern age apart from antiquity is above all theprinciple of subjective freedom:65 the modern individual demands to find theirown particular interests satisfied, rather than identifying their own goodimmediately with the good as defined by the political community, the polis.This also means that the modern subject does not accept or succumb to the claimsof any external authority, such as the polis and its objective ethical laws. Rather,for the modern subject, all absolute authorities, norms or ends will be inward:love, [. . .], the eternal salvation of the individual as an end, etc.; morality andconscience.66 Consequently, in the central focus of modern tragedy stands anindividual subject and his or her particular interests and convictions based onlove, religious faith or moral conscience. Modern tragedies, for Hegel, are basedon conflicts between such convictions, values and interests of one individual. Itfollows from this that the conflict represented in a modern tragedy cannotculminate in a complete reconciliation of objective ethical powers, or a restorationof the ethical substance of the polis, as Hegel takes it to be typical of classicaltragedy. In classical Greek tragedy, the ethical substance of the polis survives theself-destruction of the tragic heroes; it is, according to Hegels interpretation,represented by the Chorus. In modern tragedy, the conflicting convictions andinterests of the tragic hero are not necessarily reflected or embodied in externalinstitutions and powers (although this may be the case; the heros ownconscience may for instance be reflected in an enemys army which comes tohis destruction). Thus if the hero perishes as a result of the tragic conflict, thisdoes not need to imply a restoration of objective order and balance beyond theheros death. Moreover, the interests and convictions which make up the moderntragic heros conflict, are not necessarily, or not even typically ethical ones in thesense that they constitute and underlie the order of a political community, such asthe principle of the family and the public, political law in the Greek polis. Rather,they are peculiar to this particular individual, and often enough they are evenimmoral interests. Hence in modern tragedy, the tragic hero can be a villain.67

Most importantly in our context, however, since modern tragedy arises in aworld governed by the principle of subjectivity, modern tragic experience, as arule, is unlikely to have quite the same structure as the experience undergone bythe protagonists of classical Greek tragedy. The modern tragic individual nolonger needs to acquire greater self-consciousness through tragic suffering.Rather, according to Hegel, he or she is already fully aware of his or hersubjective individuality, and even in most cases reconciled with his or hercharacter traits, and the actions and fate resulting from them. Unlike the classicaltragic protagonist, the modern one typically acts in full consciousness of his ownidentity. A figure such as Shakespeares Richard III, for instance, is motivated bynothing than ambition and a certain perverse pleasure in brutality, and knowsthis to be the case; unlike Antigone, Creon or Oedipus, Richard III does not learnanything about himself through his actions or experiences.

I would like to suggest, howeverto some extent going beyond Hegels owndiscussion of modern tragedy in the Lectures on Aesthetics in this respectthatfrom Hegels point of view, the self-knowledge of the modern subject is not

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necessarily so complete as to preclude his or her undergoing an experience whichis structurally similar to that of the protagonists of classical Greek tragedy. As wesaw above, tragic experience is the experience of acquiring self-knowledgethrough self-inflicted suffering: a suffering which arises from ones erroneouslyconceiving as alien or hostile what is in reality part of ones own identity. It seemsto me that from Hegels point of view, the modern individual may be subjected tothis kind of experience in two different ways. On the one hand, Hegel thinks thatit is one of the most poisonous tendencies of modern thought in general to holdon to a strict opposition between subject and object; it is in this opposition, andthe urgent desire to overcome it, in which the need for philosophy originates.68

Moreover, as the Phenomenology sets out to show, this opposition is not only self-imposed by the subject, but it initiates a series of painful experiencesthepathway of despair Hegel speaks of in the Introduction of the Phenomenologyin the course of which the subject learns that what it considered to be inopposition to itself, the object, is in reality part of the subject. Hence to the extentthat the Phenomenology, in part at least, relates the experiences of modernconsciousness, tragic experience of the kind outlined above cannot be entirelyalien to the modern subject.

On the other hand, even with regard to his or her own individual, subjectivecharacter and identity, the modern individual may not always be in possession offull self-knowledge, and may have to learn about him- or herself in a painful andtragic way. I would like to conclude by briefly suggesting how one might readShakespeares figure of Macbeth along these lines.

Macbeth, a successful general in the Scottish kings army, is driven by ruthlessambition, encouraged by his wife, to become king. In order to achieve this, he,together with his wife, murders Duncan, the present king; later on, because of hissuspicions that they may obstruct his aims, he arranges the murder of Banquo,and the wife and children of Macduff. The bloodiness of Macbeths deeds, andthe coldblooded calculation with which he arranges them, makes him a terrifyingcharacter. However, while Macbeth progresses towards his aim by shedding theblood of innocents and causing unspeakable grief and pain, in Shakespearesplay he himself is the one who suffers mostor rather, whose suffering the playis most concerned with. Macbeth suffers because he knowingly [makes] mortalwar on his own soul,69 as Bradley puts it. Macbeth is tortured by his ownconscience which abhors his deeds. This becomes most obvious with his firstmurder, the murder of king Duncan. The scene which precedes the murder (Act I,Scene VII) opens with a monologue of Macbeth, in which he reminds himself ofhis feelings of loyalty and friendship for the king. Moreover, he ponders that themurder will be all the more abominable because of the kings great virtues: hisvirtues/Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongud, against/the deep damnation ofhis taking-off.70 However, as long as Macbeths scruples are merely the object ofhis theoretical reflections, they have no strong impact on him; consequently, LadyMacbeth manages to dissolve his doubts quickly, and Macbeth changes his mindand gives in. But this scene shows, as Bradley puts it, how little [Macbeth] knowshimself.71 It is only after he has committed the murder, that Macbeth learns how



powerful the appeal of his own conscience is in reality. It begins to torture him inthe form of his own imagination:72 he hears voices crying Sleep no more, andhas visions of an ocean of blood, dyed red by his own hands.73 Having beenoffended in the most violent way, Macbeths conscience strikes back with its mostpowerful weapon, Macbeths own rich and ceaseless imagination. The painwhich this weapon inflicts on him forces Macbeth to acknowledge the reality ofhis own conscience. However, this realization comes too late to have any bearingon Macbeths action. Already after the murder of Duncan, Macbeth believesorrather, represents to himself in graphic images such as the one of the ocean ofbloodthat his guilt is too great to be ever redeemed. Macbeth realizes that forhim, there is no return to a sane and peaceful state of mind. After havingmurdered Banquo, he declares: I am in blood/Steppd in so far, that, should Iwade no more,/Returning were as tedious as go oer.74 In this respect, then,Macbeth is similar to Antigone and Oedipus: he learns a painful lesson abouthimself, but this insight comes too late and therefore remains a mere Gesinnung,having no bearing on Macbeths future course of action, and contributing in noway to his reconciliation or redemption. Macbeths experience thereforeexemplifies the Hegelian structure of tragic experience outlined above: Macbethacquires self-knowledge through suffering, but for the prize of inflictingirredeemable harm on himself (and, of course, on others).

This Hegelian perspective on the tragedy of Macbeth may also point towardsan answer to a question which is particularly urgent with regard to the figure ofMacbeth: is there anything of value being affirmed in this dreadful spectacle of avillain destroying the lives of innocents, and finally destroying himself? And ifnot, why do we appreciate watching it? The Hegelian answer, according to theinterpretation I am suggesting, would be that Macbeth attains a substantial pieceof self-knowledge through the sufferings he subjects himself to. He probablywould not have attained this self-knowledge, were it not for his pain. There isthus something of value being affirmed in the spectacle of Macbeths self-inflicted suffering: his achievement of self-knowledge. Of course it remainsquestionable, however, whether the value of Macbeths self-knowledge issubstantial enough to compensate for the suffering of others which is necessaryfor it to be attained.

7.

To conclude, then: Hegels system considers tragedy from two different points ofview. One is the point of view presented in the Lectures on Aesthetics. Hegel hereconsiders tragedy as a conflict between complementary ethical powers whichenter a state of imbalance due to human error, and whose balance is restoredthrough the destruction of the individuals in whom the imbalance is embodied.From the point of view of the Lectures, then, tragedy is significant in so far as itmanifests the reconciliation of previously conflicting ethical powers. The otherpoint of view is the one which emerges when Hegel presents the tragic collision

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between two ethical powers within the context of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Inthis context, tragic conflict comes to be associated with a peculiar type ofexperience suffered by the individuals involved in such conflicts. Thisexperience, I argued above, is the experience of gaining self-knowledge throughthe suffering which arises from self-alienation. Such self-knowledge, too, impliesa certain kind of reconciliation with oneself. But since it is acquired only for theprice of significant harm and suffering, it comes too late in order for theindividual who achieves it to enter a state of genuine, livable reconciliation.

According to my argument, then, the charge that Hegels theory of tragedy isoblivious to the significance of tragic experience and suffering appearsunjustified. Hegels theory of tragic experience, which comes into view in thecontext of the Phenomenology, should be seen as an essential complement to histheory of tragic conflict.75

Julia PetersEuropean College of Liberal Arts [email protected]

NOTES

1 For an excellent account of Hegels understanding of the essence of tragic conflict,see Houlgate 2007: 146178.

2 Bradley 1961: 812.3 Gardner 2002: 242.4 Gardner 2002: 243.5 See PG: 87, 88, 89.6 See PG: 80, 82.7 VPG: Especially 275338/LPH: 232289.8 VPR: Esp. 96154/LPR: 455498.9 VGP: Esp. 441515/LHP: 384448.10 PG: 88.11 See VPG: 30710/LPH: 260266; VGP: 469/LHP: 408.12 See VGP: 469470/LHP: 408/9.13 See PR: 151; VGP: 469/LHP: 408; VPG: 308/LPH: 261/62.14 See PR: 144.15 See VPG: 308/LPH: 261/2.16 See PR: 144 Add.17 PG: 463.18 PG: 439.19 PG: 441.20 See Aristotle, Poet.: 33/34.21 Aristotle, Poet.: 33/34.22 See PG: 466, 467.23 Seth Bernadete has pointed out that Antigones actions have a peculiarly

ostentatious, symbolical air: she does not even do so much as burying her brother, but



merely sprinkles some dust over his corpse, which is enough for her purpose. SeeBernadete 1999: 16,17. Furthermore, even in her first exchange with her sister Ismene,Antigone derides Ismene when she implores her to keep her decision secretone shoulddo the opposite, Antigone exclaims. See Sophocles, Ant.: 64 [8699].

24 See Sophocles, Ant.: 100 [76680].25 Sophocles, Ant.: 60 [1836].26 Sophocles, Ant.: 102/103 [80671].27 Antigone compares herself to the mythical figure of Niobe, see Sophocles, Ant.:

102/103 [80671]. This comparison is being rejected and ridiculed by the assembledThebans.

28 See Sophocles, Ant.: 84 [498512].29 See Aristotle, Poet.: 3031.30 Aristotle, Poet.: 30.31 PG: 470/471.32 PG: 471.33 PG: 471.34 While Antigone fights in the spirit of her anti-political interpretation of the divine

law, the seer Teiresias, in contrast, functions as a mediator between the divine and the endsof the polis, working as a religious adviser to Creon. Accordingly, even thoughrepresenting the divine like Antigone, Teiresias shows no particular sympathy orunderstanding for her. His way of relating to the divine is contrary to Antigones: unlikeher, he is aware from the beginning that the divine is to be integrated into the polis, ratherthan held in opposition to it.

35 Sophocles, Ant.: 103 [83971].36 See PG: 66.37 It must be emphasized, again, that Antigone is not the only one in the play who is

painfully wrong about her own ethical dispositions and identity. If this were the case, herobliviousness towards the political would not have been fatal. However, Creon, herpolitical counter-part, shares her error in a reverse way, as it were. Through his decree notto bury Polynices, and by punishing Antigone for doing so nevertheless, Creon defines thepolitical as standing in opposition to the divine law. It is therefore not merely Antigonewho wrongly conceives of the divine as being opposed to the political, but it is the politicalpower, on the other hand, which conceives of itself as standing in conflict with the divinelaw. It is only because the error is shared on both sides, that a genuine clash anddestruction occurs.

38 PG: 441.39 Again, Hegels theory is close to Aristotles in this respect. The Athenian spectators

of tragedy will pity the protagonists for their suffering, they will identify with theminthe sense that they see them as citizens of a polis (even if not of Athens, but rather Thebesor Troy for example) and participants of an ethical order which is similar to their ownand therefore fear that they might encounter a similar fate. The experience of seeing thetragic hero suffering has therefore a kind of cathartic effect on them, although this must beunderstood in a slightly different way than in Aristotle. Not only will they be purged ofpity and fear, but they will have learned something about their own identity and relationto the polis which will make them refrain from courses of action that will end in tragiccollisions. See Aristotle, Poet.: 17/18. See also Aesth.: 228229, where Hegel emphasizesthat he would like to qualify Aristotles doctrine. Genuine fear, Hegel argues here, must befear of an ethical power which is not external to [man], but a part of his own reason andfreedom. Similarly, the form of pity which is relevant and appropriate for tragedy is the

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spectators sympathy with and admiration for the individual who identifies with theethical power, rather than simply compassion for any suffering creature.

40 See Aesth.: 323441 See Aesth.: 3840; Enz.: 556.42 See Aesth.: 3840, Enz.: 558, 411.43 See Aesth.: 34.44 See Enz.: 556, 557.45 See Enz.: 556, 557.46 See Aesth.: 227.47 Aesth.: 231.48 See Schmidt 2001: 112.49 See Sophocles, Ant.: 122 [120636].50 At first sight, Creon appears to represent something like a unity of the affirmative,

reconciliatory significance of tragedy, and the self-recognition acquired through tragicsuffering. Creon, after all, makes attempts to reverse his course of action and set Antigonefree before it is too late; he is persuaded to do so by Teiresias, the mediator between thecity and the gods. This could be understood as an effort on Creons part to restore and re-establish the ethical order of the polis through his actions. However, Creons actions arehalf-hearted. It is only when his family is affected that the hit strikes home, that he finallyunderstands and acknowledges his mistake. But once that has happened, Creon isparalyzed: I dont even existIm no one. Nothing., he laments. (Sophocles, Ant.: 126[130125].)

51 See VAe: 545/LAe: 121452 See Sophocles, Oed.: 181 [370379].53 Sophocles, Oed.: 181 [380407].54 Sophocles, Oed.: 208, [84262].55 Sophocles, Oed.: 237 [126385].56 Sophocles, Oed.: 239 [12971312].57 Sophocles, Oed.: 240 [131328].58 Sophocles, Oed.: 238 [128696].59 Seth Bernadete comments on this trait of Oedipus in the following way: Oedipus

knowledge is divorced from his own body, but the crimes he committed are bodily crimes.His crimes have their origin in the privacy of the body . . . , and they are detected throughhis body; but his own lack of privacy, which perfectly accords with the absence of alldesires in Oedipus, leads him to look away from the body. He somehow is pure mind(Bernadete 2000: 76).

60 Sophocles, Oed.: 243 [136997].61 Although it may be argued that Antigone, too, knows exactly what she is heading

for as she decides to bury Polynices; still, while she knows for certain that she will die, sheis still surprised by what kind of death awaits herand as we saw, this makes all thedifference.

62 Stephen Houlgate suggests an interpretation according to which the plot of Oedipuscan be read in accord with Hegels theory of tragic conflict: as manifesting an antagonismbetween two equally justified ethical powers which enter, due to human error andmisguided action, a state of imbalance which is subsequently returned to balance. But inthis case, the ethical powers are not, as in Antigone, the family and the state, but rather, onthe one hand, the right to know, and on the other hand, the right of the unknown, theunconscious. Oedipus is engaged in a relentless hunt for knowledge, and neglects thepossibility that there are things which would better be left unknown, and whose



knowledge will cause him harm. Continuing to ignore this principle, the right of theunknown, he presses further, to be eventually faced with the horrible truth. His atrociousself-mutilation can then be understood as an attempt to give due to the right of theunknown, the unconscious: in blinding himself and thereby closing off the most importantsource of self-knowledge, he acknowledges the power of the unknown. (See Houlgate2007: 156158.) However, while it is possible to find evidence for this interpretation inHegels Lectures on Aesthetics, it is not entirely convincing. For the reasons suggested above,it does not seem right to describe Oedipus self-recognition and self-mutilation as arestoration of a state of order and balance. Oedipus comes to recognize himself, but thisdoes not reconcile the conflicting aspects of his identity. Moreover, I would suggest thatOedipus conflict is one between his intellectual and physical or practical identity, ratherthan between the principle of the wide awake consciousness, and the principle of theunknown or subconscious on the other hand. If my reading is right, then Oedipushamartia does not lie in his excessive concern with knowledge and neglect of theimportance of ignorance, but rather in the particular ignorance which his apparentobsession with knowledge is paired with: Oedipus lacks self-knowledge.

63 Moreover, just like Antigone realizes that piousness amounts to nothing unless itrespects political laws, Oedipus realizes that a purely intellectual form of knowledgeaknowledge which is only based on non-corporeal evidence, and remains ignorant of theknowers own physical identityis not just a limited kind of knowledge, but noknowledge at all. That is to say, rather than holding on to a purely intellectual and non-personal knowledge as a standard even after having realized that the knowledge which isrequired in his own case does not conform with it, he abandons the standard altogether.After having become aware of his disastrous lack of self-knowledge, Oedipus no longerconceives of himself as a knowerand since his previous identity was exclusively basedon his knowledge, this means that he is reduced to nothingness.

64 In PR: 118, Hegel states, however, that the willingness and necessity to identifyoneself with ones actions, independently of whether they have been committed with fullintention or not, is peculiar to heroic consciousness, and alien to us moderns. Heroicconsciousness, moreover, is essential to tragedy because such consciousness does not shyaway from suffering as long as it is a consequence of ones own actions, but embraces itfully.

65 PR: 124 add.66 PR: 124 add.67 This contrasts with Aristotles demand that the tragic heroes should not be

distinguished by vice and wickedness, but should rather be in the middle between theparticularly virtuous, and the particularly wicked man; see Aristotle, Poet.: 33.

68 Differenz: 21/Difference: 89.69 Bradley 1956: 359.70 Shakespeare, Macb.: 44.71 Bradley 1956: 357.72 Bradley 1956: 357.73 Shakespeare, Macb.: 62.74 Shakespeare, Macb.: 112.75 I would like to thank Stephen Houlgate for inspiring discussions on the topic, and

Gernot Mueller and an anonymous referee for extremely helpful comments on earlierversions of this paper. I would also like to thank my students at the European College ofLiberal Arts Berlin, Fall Term 2008, for their contributions and discussions, and CristinaGroeger for proofreading.

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REFERENCES

Works by HegelHegel, G. W. F. (2004), Philosophie der Kunst oder Aesthetik. Muenchen: Fink (Aesth.). (1996), Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie, in G.

W. F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (Differenz). Translation: (1977), TheDifference between Fichtes and Schellings System of Philosophy, trans. H. S. Harris and W.Cerf. Albany: State University of New York Press (Difference).

(1991), Enzyklopaedie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830). Hamburg: Meiner.Translation: (2007), Hegels Philosophy of Mind, trans. M. Inwood. Oxford: ClarendonPress (Enz.).

(1988), Phaenomenologie des Geistes. Hamburg: Meiner. Translation: (1977),Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press(PG).

(1986), Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Translation: (2007),Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. Nisbett. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress (PR).

(1986), Vorlesungen ueber die Aesthetik III. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (VAe). Translation:(1998), Hegels Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press (LAe).

(1986), Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Philosophie I. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (VGP).Translation: (1999), Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. I, reprinted from the 1892-5edition, trans. E. S. Haldane. Bristol: Thoemmes Press (LHP).

(1986), Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (VPG).Translation: (1878), Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree. London: GeorgeBell & Sons (LPH).

(1986), Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Religion II. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (VPR).Translation: (2007), Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, ed. by Peter C. Hodgson.Oxford: Oxford University Press (LPR).

Other Sources:Aristotle (2002), On Poetics, S. Bernadete and M. Davis. South Bend, IN: St. Augustines

Press (Aristotle, Poet.).Bernadete, S. (1999), Sacred Transgressions: A Reading of Sophocles Antigone. South Bend, IN:

St. Augustines Press. (2000), Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus, in S. Bernadete, The Argument of the Action.

Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.Bradley, A. C. (1956), Shakespearean Tragedy. London: Macmillan. (1961), Hegels Theory of Tragedy, in A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry.

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.Gardner, S. (2002), Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics, in J. L. Bermudez and S. Gardner

(eds), Art and Morality. London: Routledge.Houlgate, S. (2007), Hegels Theory of Tragedy, in S. Houlgate (ed.) Hegel and the Arts.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.Shakespeare, W. (2001), Macbeth. Cadolzburg: ars vivendi (Shakespeare, Macb.).



Schmidt, D. (2001), On Germans and Other Greeks. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UniversityPress.

Sophocles (1984), Antigone, in The Three Theban Plays, trans. R. Fagles. New York:Penguin (Sophocles, Ant.).

Sophocles (1984a), Oedipus, in Sophocles (1984), The Three Theban Plays, trans. R. Fagles.New York: Penguin (Sophocles, Oed.).

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