Trade and Threat Perception

Abstract

Liberal theorists have long held that the opportunity cost of trade lost due to military conflict will lead states to avoid such conflict with their trading partners. This line of argument is plausible, but it is not obvious that trade actually influences attitudes on security issues enough to influence policy in this way. Economic interests are rarely considered in research on assessments of political-military threats. Moreover, because trade creates domestic losers as well as winners, it might actually increase threat perception among those whom it negatively affects. This paper tests these arguments in the case of American trade with China using data from both a survey of the general public and roll-call voting in the House of Representatives. As liberals expect, we find evidence that trade indeed influences American attitudes toward China. However, there are substantial differences among individual survey respondents based on whether their income can be expected to rise or fall as the trading relationship grows. The winners have more positive attitudes toward China and express less support for aggressive foreign policies toward the country than do the losers. Aggregate differences along these same dimensions among their constituents also influence roll-call voting in the House of Representatives. Paper prepared for presentation to the Conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy, Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance, Woodrow Wilson

School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, April 18-19, 2008. Benjamin O. Fordham Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY)

Katja B. Kleinberg Department of Political Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

In his memoirs, the former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull related the

following anecdote: "When I was a boy on the farm in Tennessee, we had two

neighbors—I'll call them Jenkins and Jones—who were enemies of each other. Then one

of Jenkins' mules went lame in the spring just when Jenkins needed him most for

plowing. At the same time Jones ran short of corn for his hogs. Now it so happened that

Jones was through with his own plowing and had a mule to spare, and Jenkins had a bin

filled with corn. A friendly third party brought the two men together, and Jones let

Jenkins use his mule in exchange for corn for the hogs. As a result, it wasn't long before

the two old enemies were the best of friends (Hull 1948, 364)."

Does economic exchange foster positive feelings among trading partners? Hull's

anecdote implies that it does. This conjecture is at the core of many liberal arguments

about the pacifying influence of international trade on relations between states. The

exchange of goods and services leads to mutual welfare gains, economic

interdependence, and increased communication, all of which arguably make armed

conflict between the trading partners a costly and generally unattractive proposition (e.g.,

Viner 1951; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). Critics of this optimistic

view have noted that gains from trade may be distributed unevenly among trading

partners, giving rise to concerns about shifts in relative power and influence (e.g., Gilpin

1981). Similarly, asymmetric dependence on trade and a growth in the number of

potentially contentious issues involving both trading partners may serve to aggravate

rather than improve relations between these states (Hirschman 1980 [1945]; see also

Barbieri 1996). Arguments in this vein suggest that under certain conditions, commercial

relations contribute to the perception of trading partners as a threat.

1

The possibility of a commercial peace has generated much scholarly interest and

empirical research.1 We contribute to this debate in two ways. First, this paper

investigates how these competing claims play out at the level of the individual. We

examine the impact of economic interests on individuals' threat perceptions vis-à-vis a

major trading partner. This endeavor is motivated by our suspicion that the liberal

argument is too simple because international commerce creates both winners and losers

within the economies of trading states and the attitudes of these winner and losers toward

the trading partner may differ significantly and systematically. The second part of the

paper links these individual-level perceptions of threat to foreign policy making at the

national level through the influence of constituent interests on legislative voting. Unlike

the vast majority of studies investigating the commercial peace, our project does not aim

to predict the onset of militarized interstate disputes. Instead, by disaggregating the

effects of trade and by testing their influence on foreign policy views, we uncover factors

that may contribute to a decrease (or increase) in the likelihood of armed conflict between

states.

We will test our argument with evidence concerning United States relations with

China. Plausible arguments can be made on both sides of the claim that China poses a

security threat to the United States. China's economy is growing far faster than the United

States' economy, while the country remains a communist autocracy. At the same time,

trade between the U.S. and China has expanded dramatically in the last three decades. Its

dual role as a major trading partner and a growing international rival generates substantial

uncertainty about China's future status as friend or foe. Using data from a recent survey

1 Influential early studies include Polachek 1980 and Pollins 1989. For an overview, see Mansfield and Pollins 2001.

2

by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), this paper argues that economic

interests help explain individual Americans' assessment of China as a threat and support

for hostile policies toward the country.

The Sources of Threat Perception

What determines an individual's foreign policy views? In particular, which factors

make a person more or less likely to view another country as a potential threat? Studies of

threat perception in international relations have predominantly focused on the views of

key policymakers. Few consider the role of economic interests. As a result, current

research provides only limited insights into the individual-level causal mechanisms

postulated by liberal arguments, making it difficult to assess their validity.

Inquiries into how decision makers identify threats and implications for policy

choices have proceeded along two main paths. Beginning in the 1950s, research has

drawn on theories of cognitive psychology to investigate the impact of belief systems,

heuristics, and biased information-processing in organizational and political contexts on

threat perception (Holsti 1962; Pruitt 1965; Allison 1971; Jervis 1976; Knorr 1976; Betts

1977; Cohen 1979). An example is the work on the role of the "enemy" image in world

politics (e.g. Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen 1967; Hurwitz and Peffley 1990). Leaders are

likely to perceive another state as a salient threat if that state is seen as strong, proximate,

actively engaged policies that are hostile to one's interests, and representing the antithesis

of one's core values and beliefs. The idea of the "enemy" is maintained and fed by the

selection of information which tends to support the initial judgment. Most importantly,

this line of argument suggests that once another state is perceived as an enemy, the

3

perceiver ascribes negative intentions to that state's actions, and expectations change for

future interactions (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen 1967, 6).

Another group of scholars emphasizes the domestic and international environment

within which interests and threats are defined. For them, threat perception is a function of

the strategic position of the state in the international system, defined not only in terms of

its relative capability but also in terms of vested interests beyond its own borders

(Meernik 1994; Yoon 1997). These interests may be driven in part by economic factors

such as patterns of trade and investment (Frieden 1994; Fordham 1998). Scholars such as

Peter Trubowitz (1998) and Etel Solingen (1998; 2003) have sought to uncover the

economic foundations of national policies. However, few studies assess the link between

commerce and foreign policy views directly. One endeavor of this type is Hermann and

Keller's (2004) study of US elite attitudes toward other great powers. Using survey data,

the authors report findings indicating that leaders who support free trade and reject

mercantilism are more likely to support cooperative foreign policies and less likely to

support hostile options such as containment and the use of force.

While the views of decision-making elites are clearly consequential for the

conduct of foreign policy, there are good reasons for looking beyond elites to mass public

opinion. For one, it has been shown that perceptions and foreign policy opinions of elites

and masses differ substantially and systematically (Kull and Destler 1999; Page and

Barabas 2000). Individual workers and business owners are also the political actors most

directly affected by shifts in prices, production, and employment as a consequence of

increased international trade. Here we should be able to observe most clearly the link

between economic fortunes and a person's view of the trading partner.

4

What drives the perception of foreign policy threats among the public? Current

scholarship includes studies on causes and consequences of perceived threat among

individuals and groups involved in protracted militarized conflicts such as the Arab-

Israeli conflict (Rouhana and Fiske 1995; Gordon and Arian 2001). Recently, there has

also been a renewed interest in the individual perception of risk in response to large-scale

natural disasters and acts of terrorism, and its impact on policy preferences. Perhaps

unsurprisingly, direct personal experience emerged as a powerful predictor in these

studies (Fischhoff et al. 2003; Huddy et al. 2005). In addition, research investigating the

sources of broader foreign policy views has identified political ideology (Hurwitz and

Peffley 1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993), ethnicity (Giles and Evans 1985), gender

(Conover and Sapiro 1993; Lerner et al. 2003), religion (Daniels 2005), and information

processes (Hiscox 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006) as significant contributors to

American public opinion. However, very few studies explicitly consider the impact of

economic interests on threat perception and related policy preferences in particular.

Most research on the influence of economic interests on individual foreign policy

preferences investigates the issue of trade liberalization. Applying standard economic

theory and focusing primarily on income effects of commercial exchange, the bulk of this

work suggests that to the extent that individuals make rational decisions based on their

economic interest, those who stand to gain from more open trade tend to be more

supportive of liberalization than those who are disadvantaged by trade (Rogowski 1989;

Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Beaulieu 2002; Mayda and

Rodrik 2005). One important question left unanswered by previous work is how an

5

individual's position in the economy influences that person's perception of the trading

partner as well as his or her support for the use of force against that country.

Trade and Threat Perception

The reason international commerce could reduce perceptions of threat among

trading partners is clear enough in liberal arguments about its influence on international

conflict. Trade provides benefits to both parties in the relationship. Regarding the trading

partner as a threat and adopting conflictual foreign policies to deal with it jeopardize

these benefits. Although international trade provides aggregate benefits to both states, it

does not follow that all individuals within the two trading states also benefit. In

particular, individuals whose incomes are tied to industries that do not compete

effectively with industries in the trading partner will suffer if they are not able to move

into more competitive economic endeavors. Even if one makes the generous assumption

that they can do this, the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that owners of

the relatively scarce factor of production in their country should see still their income

decline under free trade. Just as those who benefit from trade have a material incentive to

view their trading partners as friends, and to oppose conflictual foreign policies that

threaten the relationship, those who are harmed by international trade have reason to see

those same trading partners as threats, and to support correspondingly hostile foreign

policies. To the extent that hostile policies disrupt trade, they may be expected to produce

results similar to a protective tariff.

The second pathway through which trade influences public opinion is affect.

Psychological accounts of attitude formation stress the role of personal experiences in

6

particular. It is plausible that individual experiences with the consequences of free trade,

such as employment lost due to outsourcing or financial gain through international

investment, may contribute to a person's view of the trading partner. To the extent that

people generalize from such experiences, they are more likely to believe that those

countries with which one has had positive encounters tend to do things one will like, such

as support goals one favors and oppose things one would also oppose. Conversely,

individuals tend to believe that countries with which one has negative experiences tend to

do "make proposals that would harm us, work against the interests of our friends, and aid

our opponents" (Jervis 1976: 118). Put differently, negative economic experiences can

contribute to an "enemy image" of the trading partner.

Views of a trading partner may also influence one's preferences over different

policy options, including the use of force. Our theoretical argument suggests that those

who lose from trade will be more likely to perceive the trading partner not only as a

detriment to their own economic welfare but also as a political-military threat. In past

research, perceived threats of this kind have been shown to increase support among

Americans for the use of armed force against the source of the threat (Jentleson 1992;

Jentleson and Britton 1998). Using an experimental survey design, Herrmann, Tetlock,

and Visser also find that certain situational factors are related to increased support among

Americans for military intervention, most likely because they cause the opponent to be

perceived as a threat (1999, 558). More broadly, their study lends support to the argument

that enemy images play a significant role in mass foreign policy attitudes. To the extent

that economic interests have a systematic effect on how individuals view the trading

7

partner they may also influence how like a person is to favor hostile rather than

cooperative policies.

Perceptions of economic self-interest may be based not only on one's own

fortunes but also on the fortunes of the local community. Some regions contain more

industries that gain from international trade and investment than others. The economic

well-being of a region affects the individual materially, for example through its impact on

taxation, social spending, and property values. It is plausible that individuals who see

their local community influenced by trade should adopt foreign policy attitudes based on

the nature of this impact. Additionally, people who are not directly affected by the

consequences of international trade may adopt positions as a result of frequent

interactions with those so affected. A region's economic interests are likely to be reflected

in the local political climate as well. Opinion leaders such as local politicians and local

media have incentives to advocate foreign policy positions that benefit the community.

By doing so, they may generate additional support for these policies among the local

population. We argue that economic self-interest and attitudes that stem from personal

economic experience should influence individual threat perceptions by giving rise to such

attitudes directly and also by making individuals more receptive to arguments about a

Chinese threat which are already present in the public discourse. In the next section, we

will outline a strategy for testing these arguments in the context of United States trade

with China using survey data on individual foreign policy attitudes.

Testing the influence of trade on threat perception using survey data makes sense

from the standpoint of theories about the winners and losers from the trading relationship,

but it begs an important question about the influence of these patterns on policy makers.

8

There are reasons to suspect that policy makers may view the world somewhat differently

than the general public does. Those close to the decision making process have broader

responsibilities than ordinary citizens, and should ideally have access to better

information. They are also relatively insulated from the immediate economic effects of

international trade. These considerations may limit the effects of economic considerations

on their assessment of international threats. Many realist writers are suspicious of the

general public's influence on foreign policy for precisely this reason. For example,

Morgenthau (1993, 160-1) quotes Tocqueville's doubts about democratic foreign policy

making, commenting that the "thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign

policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and

their representatives are likely to be moved." Even if the world looks somewhat different

to those in positions of power, these policy makers still must rely upon the support of

societal constituencies that do not share their Olympian perspective. In order to test

whether trade interests influence those with policy making responsibilities, we will

examine congressional roll-call voting on a recent security issue arising in United States

relations with China. If trade shapes the views of their constituents, then policy makers

may be politically obligated to make it a priority. The question, then, is whether their

position in the state overrides the demands of their constituents on questions concerning

international security threats.

Research Design

Because China is both a potential security threat and a major trading partner,

American attitudes toward the country offer a useful setting for testing claims about the

9

influence of trade on threat perception. The fact that China remains a communist

autocracy leads some Americans to view its rapid economic growth with trepidation.

Congress requires the Pentagon to issue a public assessment of Chinese military power

each year, a report that is generally greeted with concern.2 At the same time, Chinese

military spending remains a small fraction of the American military budget, and China

rarely attempts to project its military power far beyond its borders. Whether or not China

poses a genuine security threat to the United States or its Asian allies remains

controversial. Surveys of American elites suggest that perceptions of a Chinese threat

have risen substantially since the end of the Cold War, but that there are still enormous

divisions on this question. Table 1 presents aggregate responses to several survey items

that illustrate this pattern. During the 1990s, more of the influential Americans included

in these surveys came to view China as an expansionist power and a critical threat to the

United States. An increasing number also expressed support for defending Taiwan

militarily against a Chinese attack. At the same time, a substantial proportion of

respondents remain skeptical about claims of a Chinese security threat.

[Table 1 about here.]

While Americans have argued about the implications of Chinese power since the

end of the Cold War, trade with China has boomed. As Figure 1 illustrates, China has

risen rapidly to become the United States' second largest trading partner. From essentially

nothing during the early 1970s, Chinese imports grew to more than two percent of U.S.

GDP by 2006. American exports to China have also grown, though not as much. Just as

Chinese military potential is enough to prompt serious discussion about a Chinese

2 The latest such assessment suggests that Chinese commercial space technology might also be used for military purposes ("Pentagon Says China's Boost to Space Plan Poses a Threat," The New York Times, March 4, 2008).

10

security threat, Chinese trade is sufficient to have real economic consequences for

individual Americans. These conditions make American attitudes toward China a good

case for testing the effects of economic interests on threat perception. In the remainder of

this section, we will use survey data to test whether the winners and losers in this

expanding commercial relationship characterize Chinese power differently.

[Figure 1 about here.]

We will use the 2006 American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy survey

conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) to test hypotheses about

the effect of trade on threat perception (CCFR 2006). The CCFR has conducted similar

surveys roughly every four years since 1974, and they have been widely used in research

on public opinion and foreign policy (e.g., Page and Bouton 2006). The most recent

survey was administered in July 2006 to a random sample of Americans aged 18 and

over. Of the 1,570 contacted for the survey, 1,227 completed it, generating an enviable

response rate of 78 percent. In addition to a wide range of questions on American foreign

policy, the survey gathered demographic information essential for testing our argument,

including respondents' income, education, and state of residence.

Our argument about the effect of trade on threat perception suggests several

hypotheses about American attitudes toward China. First, Americans with relatively

greater income and education should be less likely to view China as a threat. Compared

to China, the United States is relatively capital-abundant and labor-scarce. The Stolper-

Samuelson theorem indicates that Americans with more human and financial capital

should see their incomes rise as a result of trade with a nation like China. Those with less

human and financial capital, whose principal asset is labor, should see their incomes fall.

11

The Stolper-Samuelson theorem has proven useful in predicting individual attitudes

toward international trade (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The question to be

answered here is whether the economic stakes it identifies also help explain threat

perception.

Although our expectations about the effects of human and financial capital are

clear enough in theory, our decision to use income and education to capture these effects

requires some explanation. Although income is not equivalent to wealth, individuals with

higher incomes are more likely to have accumulated enough wealth to invest in

enterprises that can benefit from trade with China.3 Similarly, while education creates

human capital, it may also affect individual attitudes through what might be called its

"ideology effect." In addition to providing people with economically valuable skills, it

introduces them to ideas with important policy implications. Hainmueller and Hiscox

(2006) found that the effect of education on support for free trade was more consistent

with exposure to arguments in favor of free trade in college economics classes than with

increasing human capital. Increasing education below the college level had relatively

little effect, but there was a large increase in support for free trade among individuals

with at least some college education. Although both aspects of education may influence

attitudes toward China, the human capital effect is of primary interest here. We will

attempt to distinguish these two effects by controlling for the effect of interest in media

coverage of foreign policy.

3 Baker (2005) uses income as a proxy for individual propensity to consume skill-intensive goods. In the context of American trade with China, Baker's argument suggests that higher-income individuals should oppose free trade because it may increase the price of the high-skill goods they prefer to consume. Because our analysis concerns only trade with a single state rather than the broader question of free trade, we suspect that the association between income and access capital to capital is more important in this context.

12

The implications of the ideology effect of education for American perceptions of

a Chinese threat are not clear as they were in Hainmueller and Hiscox's analysis of

support for free trade. Economists are nearly unanimous about the potential value of free

trade, so the effect of exposure to economics classes on attitudes toward free trade is

obvious. The ideology effect of education on assessments of a potential Chinese security

threat is not so clear. Basic information about China arguably makes claims of a Chinese

threat more plausible. Many of the international relations theories students might

encounter in college classes, including both realist accounts of the balance of power and

liberal arguments about the democratic peace—not to mention power transition theory—

suggest that China's rapidly growing economy and non-democratic government are

danger signs. Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, an increasing proportion of American elites

view growing Chinese power with concern, something that is bound to affect discussion

of the issue in the media. If the human capital and the ideology effects of education run in

opposite directions, then education might appear to have no effect in the absence of a

control for information exposure.

A second set of hypotheses concerns regional economic interests. As we noted in

the last section, individual self-interest is not the only potential pathway through which

trade could influence threat perception. The aggregate economic impact of Chinese trade

on their community could also influence individuals' opinions about a potential Chinese

security threat. Even if they are relatively well endowed with human and financial

capital, those who live in areas where local industries are threatened by Chinese

competition could develop hostile attitudes toward China. These individuals are more

likely to see the negative consequences of trade on others, even if they do not experience

13

them firsthand. To the extent that proponents of trade protection use arguments about

national security to make their case, those living in regions threatened by Chinese

competition are probably also more likely to hear about these concerns in the local media.

Conversely, those living in areas that benefit from Chinese trade are more likely to see

and hear about these positive effects, and perhaps to adjust their views accordingly.

In order to capture the regional effect of trade, we computed indices of the export-

orientation and import-sensitivity of the survey respondent's home state to Chinese trade.

States are an imperfect representation of each survey respondent's home area, but more

precise information about their location was not available. These indices were

constructed using state-level data on sectoral employment and national data on sectoral

output and trade with China. We first grouped exports and imports into NAICS sectors

comparable to those used to record output and employment. We then created an export

orientation index for each of these sectors by dividing the volume of exports to China by

the total output of the sector. Similarly, we created an import sensitivity index by

dividing the volume of imports by the sum of domestic output and imports in that sector.

For each state, we then summed these indices across all the sectors for which we had data

using each sector's share of overall employment in the state as a weight.

Although it is our primary interest, trade is clearly not the only systematic

influence on threat perception. The models estimated below will also include an indicator

of political ideology. Previous research indicates that conservatives place a higher

priority on anti-communism and on national security more generally, so they should also

be more likely to see China as a security threat (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Kaltenthaler

et al. 2004; Herrmann and Keller 2004). Including this variable is useful because income

14

and education are likely to be related to liberal-conservative ideology. If ideology has

important effects on threat perception but is omitted from the model, income and

education may proxy its effects, possibly creating spurious support for our hypotheses

about the effect of economic interests. The estimated effect of ideology also offers a point

of comparison for assessing the substantive significance of education and income.

Gender is another individual-level factor consistently found to influence both

threat perception and attitudes toward open trade. While this hypothesis is rarely

discussed explicitly, a number of studies indicate that women support protectionist trade

policies at higher rates than men.4 It has been argued that women are more likely to

become unemployed as a result of trade liberalization and subsequently face greater

challenges finding new jobs at their previous income levels (Cardero 2000; Ozler 2000).

On the other hand, studies of threat perceptions related to war and terrorism indicate that

women perceive greater security risks (Arian and Gordon 1993; Huddy, et al. 2005). We

include this attribute to assess whether the strength of the hypothesized link between

economic interests and a perceived Chinese threat varies by the gender of the respondent.

Like gender, age could influence perception of the Chinese threat. Americans

whose attitudes toward China were formed before the normalization of relations with the

United States in the 1970s may have substantially darker views of Chinese intentions

than those who have little or no memory of Cold War hostility between the two states. In

order to capture this cohort effect, the models that follow will include variables indicating

both age and age squared. This specification allows us to estimate the age at which

4 Examples include O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Kaltenthaler, et al. 2004; Mayda and Rodrik 2005. For a focused analysis, see Burgoon and Hiscox 2003.

15

hostility to the Chinese peaks rather than imposing an assumption about where the Cold

War cohort begins and ends.

The extant literature suggests at least two potential determinants of threat

perception that cannot be captured here due to the limitations of the survey instrument.

Research indicates that cultural values such as national and ethnic loyalties as well as

attitudes toward social justice have an independent and significant impact on public

opinion regarding issues such as immigration and trade liberalization (e.g. Eichenberg

and Dalton 1993; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005). Despite its partial adoption of

capitalism, China remains a largely communist regime whose history and culture differ

dramatically from that of the United States. These differences may play a role in

Americans' perception of Chinese dispositions and intentions. To some extent, ideology

may capture their effects. The CCFR data do not permit more convincing controls for

them.

Secondly, and more importantly, negative views of China among Americans may

result in part from a broader economic anxiety due to stagnant wages, rising income

inequality, and shrinking benefits such as pensions and health care.5 The condition of the

macro-economy has been shown to influence foreign policy attitudes; economic

downturns tend to make voters more cautious regarding trade liberalization (Bowler and

Donovan 1998) and in their support for European integration (Jenssen, et al. 1998). As

one of the newest and largest US-trading partners, China may simply serve as a scapegoat

for Americans' concerns about the state of the economy. The available data currently does

not allow us to control for this possibility. Future research should include an analysis of

5 The Economist, May 17, 2007.

16

the correlation between respondents' assessment of the US economy as a whole and threat

perceptions.

Empirical Results Concerning Individual Attitudes

The first survey item we will model taps assessments of whether China is a

security threat to the United States quite directly. Respondents were asked about the

Chinese threat as part of a list of other potential concerns. The survey item reads as

follows:

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all…. The development of China as a world power. Aggregate responses to this question show substantial concern about a Chinese

threat, though less than that indicated in the recent elite surveys reported in Table 1.

Overall, 36 percent said China posed a critical threat, 54 percent said the threat was

important but not critical, eight percent said China was not a threat at all, and two percent

declined to answer. Table 2 presents the results of an ordered logit model of the

individual responses to this item including the independent variables discussed above.

For each of the categorical independent variables, we included a dummy for each

category except the lowest. The table reports a Wald test for the joint significance of

these dummies.

[Table 2 about here.]

The results support our hypotheses concerning individual self-interest but not

those concerning regional economic interests. Respondents with relatively higher

incomes tended to hold less dire views of the Chinese security threat. Although the

17

education variables are not jointly significant, this outcome is sensitive to the categories

into which the variable is divided. Respondents with at least a college degree perceived

significantly less threat than those without one. The effects of exposure to media

coverage of foreign affairs were the opposite of education. The fact that exposure to more

information about China tended to increase threat perception makes our claim that

education embodies the effect of human capital here more plausible. On the other hand,

the state export-orientation and import-sensitivity scores were not statistically significant.

Because these variables could take on only 50 values, this null result is not especially

surprising. It would be a mistake to conclude that the local impact of trade with China

had no effect on threat perception based on the failure to reject the null hypothesis here.

Nevertheless, our data offer no support for this claim.

Taken together, income and education had substantively large effects on

assessments of the Chinese threat. Figure 2 depicts the predicted responses of several

hypothetical respondents. Compared to respondents in the median category on education

and income, those in the highest categories on both these variables were roughly twice as

likely to say that China was not a threat at all, and about half as likely to say that it posed

a "critical threat." The effects of education and income were just as large as those of

political ideology or interest in media reports on foreign affairs. In assessing the Chinese

threat, a hypothetical respondent who said he or she was "very interested" in news about

foreign affairs, or who said he or she was "conservative," was roughly comparable to a

respondent who fell into the lowest categories on income and education. This

comparability across the three possible responses to the question is easy to see in Figure

2.

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[Figure 2 about here.]

Age also had substantial effects on perceptions of a Chinese threat. Our results

indicate that threat perception is highest among older respondents who had longer

memories of Cold War conflict between the United State and China. An eighteen year old

respondent had 0.20 probability of seeing China as a "critical threat." The effect of age on

threat perception was roughly constant for respondents between the ages of 48 and 68, all

of whom had a roughly 0.40 probability of seeing China as a "critical threat." These

individuals would have been old enough to remember the hostility that prevailed between

the two states before Nixon's opening to China in 1971.

Does threat perception translate into support for more aggressive foreign policies?

Two additional items from the 2006 CCFR survey help answer this question. The first

item is fairly general:

In dealing with the rise of China's power, do you think the U.S. should: 1. Undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China 2. Actively work to limit the growth of China's power

In the aggregate, support for an aggressive policy toward China was less than threat

perception. Overall, 67 percent preferred the more cooperative option, 27 percent selected

the more aggressive policy, and six percent declined to answer.

The second item concerns the use of force to defend Taiwan, which is arguably

the most likely scenario for a military confrontation between the United States and China.

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I would like to ask your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose using U.S. troops: If China invaded Taiwan?

19

Unlike recent elite opinion reported in Table 1, most Americans declined to

endorse this hypothetical use of force. Of those surveyed, 62 percent opposed it,

32 favored it, and six percent declined to answer.

Table 3 presents the results of two models of individual responses to these

questions. In both models, the dependent variable was coded "1" if the respondent

endorsed the more aggressive policy: option 2 in the first question, and the use of

American troops to defend Taiwan in the second.

[Table 3 about here.]

The results on the possibility of limiting the growth of Chinese power indicate

that respondents who were more likely to benefit from trade with China were much less

likely to endorse this course of action. As was the case with the threat perception

question, education and income had substantial negative effects on respondents' support

for limiting Chinese power. The model indicates that a respondent with in the median

category on all the categorical independent variables—a reasonable point of

comparison—would endorse this policy with a probability of about 0.22.6 A respondent

in the highest income and education categories would do so with a probability of 0.17. A

respondent in the lowest categories on these variables would do so with a probability of

0.48. These effects are larger than that of ideology. A self-identified conservative would

endorse the policy with a probability of 0.34. A very liberal respondent, the most

skeptical ideological category, had a 0.17 probability of agreeing.

The results concerning the deployment of American troops to defend Taiwan are

somewhat more complicated. As expected, high income respondents were less willing to

6 This respondent was a 47-year old male in the third income quartile, with some college but no degree, and moderate political ideology.

20

endorse such a military action. A respondent in the highest category had a 0.30

probability of endorsing troop deployment, while those in the lowest category as a 0.42

probability of doing so. Contrary to our expectations, however, more educated

respondents were actually more likely to endorse troop deployment. A respondent in the

highest educational category had a 0.47 probability of endorsing this policy, while those

in the lowest category had a 0.34 probability of taking this position.

Why would educated respondents be more likely to support the use of force in the

event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan? One likely explanation concerns the fact that the

policy in question concerns not just generalized hostility to China, but the deployment of

American "troops." Less educated Americans tend to take more isolationist position on

foreign policy questions in general, another pattern that can be linked to the consequences

of international trade (Fordham 2008). A question that explicitly mentions the use of

American troops, as this one does, is likely evoke these sentiments. The addition of a

variable indicating support for isolationism strongly suggests that this is the case.7 The

results are presented in the third column of Table 3. Isolationists had probability of

supporting the deployment of troops to defend Taiwan of 0.30, substantially lower than

the 0.48 probability associated with an otherwise identical non-isolationist respondent.

The effect of education in this specification is not statistically significant.

7 The question used is similar to that used by Fordham (2008) from the American National election Study. Respondents were asked the following: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" Those who responded that the United States should "stay out" were coded as isolationists.

21

Empirical Results Concerning Congressional Voting

The results presented thus far indicate that the economic implications of trade

with China influence individual attitudes about whether China poses a security threat, and

about the policies the United States should adopt toward this state. Do these patterns in

public opinion influence the positions taken by people in a position to influence actual

policy choices? In order to help answer this question, we turn to an analysis of

congressional roll-call voting. Evidence that the same factors predicting individual

attitudes toward China also predict the positions members of Congress take would

suggest that the economic influences on attitudes toward a potential Chinese security

threat could also influence policy outcomes.

Members of Congress are not involved in the policy making process in the same

way as those in the executive branch, but they are frequently called upon to take positions

on matters of policy importance. Their constituencies are also easier to identify than those

of policy makers in the executive branch. Previous research suggests that members of

Congress behave more like realist decision makers than conduits for societal pressures

when it comes to national security. Most previous quantitative research about

congressional roll-call voting on defense and security matters suggests that constituent

interests are not as important as ideology (e.g., Bernstein and Anthony 1974; Lindsay

1991a; 1991b; Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Wayman 1985). Because ideological

explanations center on the internal beliefs of the members, they are usually compared

with alternatives stressing the external pressure of constituent interests. Indeed, in

principal-agent models of representation, ideology is commonly defined as the shirking

of constituent interests in the pursuit of the member's own preferences (e.g., Kalt and

22

Zupan 1984; Peltzman 1984; 1990; Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The conclusion that

ideology matters most fits well with realist and statist accounts of the policy making

process, in which broad ideas about the national interest trump narrower economic

interests (e.g., Krasner 1978). In keeping with most of the literature on roll-call voting,

we will use the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores developed by Poole and

Rosenthal (1997) to represent liberal-conservative ideology in the analysis that follows.

Although there is some evidence that constituent opinion and interests influence

the way members vote on security issues such as military spending (e.g., Bartels 1991),

these influences do not translate into congressional voting patterns in an unproblematic

way. There are at least two reasons for this. First, previous research has also found that

some constituencies are heavily committed to one particular party and thus largely unable

to influence legislators from the opposing party. For example, Bailey and Brady (1998)

found that union density in their districts influenced mainly Democrats against the

NATFA and GATT agreements. Republicans from heavily unionized districts were, if

anything, more pro-free trade than other members of their party, perhaps because of their

greater sensitivity to the countervailing interests of business. Fordham and McKeown

(2003) also found that many variables reflecting constituent economic interests

influenced only members of one party. In line with the conventional wisdom about the

parties' constituencies, we hypothesize that Republicans will be more sensitive to the

export and import interests of business with respect to China, while Democrats will be

more sensitive to the demands of constituencies with more limited access to human

capital for trade protection. We will use interaction terms to estimate separate effects of

our constituent interest variables on Democrats and Republicans.

23

Second, members of Congress may construct their reelection constituencies in

many different ways if they represent sufficiently heterogeneous constituencies (Goff and

Grier 1993; Bailey and Brady 1998). This consideration is especially important here

because those most intensely affected by American exports and imports to China

comprise a relatively small part of the population in most congressional districts, even

though China is a very important trading partner. Members of Congress may well pay

them little or no attention and instead rely on other groups for political support, especially

in diverse districts. In order to consider this possibility, we will follow the lead of Bailey

and Brady, estimating our model separately on relatively diverse and relatively

homogenous legislative districts.8

We will test our hypotheses about the influence of economic interests on the issue

using a particularly controversial measure, the East Asia Security Act of 2005 (H.R.

3100). Sponsored by Representative Henry Hyde (R-Illinois), the legislation was

intended to force American allies to continue the longstanding embargo on the export of

weapons and related technology to China. It would have required the president to monitor

the activities of European companies exporting weapons or dual-use technologies to

China. European companies would have had to obtain American export licenses when

doing military business with China or risk sanctions. Floor debate on the measure came

to a head on July 14, 2005, when the House defeated Hyde's motion to suspend the rules

and pass the measure, 215-203. (A two-thirds majority would have been required for

8 We computed an index of diversity within each congressional district using the method employed by Morgan and Wilson (1990). Their index, which was computed for each state, relied on indicators of education, income, occupation, housing ownership, ethnic stock, and religion. Data on religion were not available, so we employed indicators of income, housing ownership, race, rural residence, native birth, education, and occupation. Districts with diversity indices below the mean were considered homogenous in our analysis. Those with indices above the mean were considered diverse.

24

suspension of the rules.) This vote was selected as one of the key votes for 2005 by

Congressional Quarterly Almanac. The legislation, which risked antagonizing American

allies, was a costly response to a perceived Chinese threat. As such, previous research

suggests that conservative members should be more likely to vote in favor it. On the other

hand, our argument about threat perception suggests that members from districts where

local industries competed most intensely with Chinese imports, or districts with relatively

large numbers of low-income or less educated individuals who stood to lose from trade

with China, should favor it. Those from districts that benefited from exports to China, or

with relatively well-educated or high-income populations, should tend to oppose it.

Table 4 presents the results of several models of voting on this question. The first

simply uses variables indicating party, ideology, and constituent characteristics to predict

votes on the measure by all members. The second and third specifications split the

sample into diverse and homogenous districts. The fourth tests the hypothesis that the

effect of constituent interests depended on a member's party affiliation. Interaction terms

were used to estimate the fourth model, but conditional coefficients are reported for

members of each party rather than the interaction terms themselves. Because these

coefficients test the influence of each independent variable on members of the indicated

party, they are more informative than coefficients on the components of the interaction

terms. All of the models use an indicator of education, the percentage of persons aged 25

or over who had attended college, rather than median family income. For obvious

reasons, aggregate income and aggregate educational attainment are very closely related.

When both are included in the same specification, collinearity makes it difficult to

estimate the effects of either variable in a sample of this size. Because education

25

produces somewhat better model fit statistics than does income, Table 4 presents these

results.

[Table 4 about here.]

The results indicate that considerations influencing public opinion at the

individual level also influence congressional voting at the aggregate level, but that the

aggregate effects were influenced by party and district heterogeneity. Only educational

attainment is statistically significant in the simple model presented in the first column. A

Republican representative—the modal category in the 109th Congress—from a district

with the mean level of sensitivity to trade with China had a 0.49 probability of voting in

favor of the measure if he or she came from a district with an average level of educational

attainment. If he or she came from a district with educational attainment one standard

deviation greater than the mean, this probability would fall to 0.42.

Although ideology is generally held to be the most important predictor of roll-call

voting on security issues, it is not statistically significant in the first model. Although

ideology and party have been closely related in recent years as the two parties have

become more ideologically homogenous, collinearity between these two variables does

not account for this result. If party is omitted from the model, ideology remains

statistically insignificant.9 Conservative concerns about security and hostility to

communist China offer no simple explanation for voting on this issue.

A comparison among the first three sets of results indicates that the homogeneity

of the district alters the effect of constituent interests on members of Congress, as Bailey

and Brady (1998) argue it should. Their constituents' stakes in trade with China had

greater effects on roll-call voting in relatively homogenous districts. While import 9 The coefficient for ideology falls to 0.32, with a standard error of 0.22, in this specification.

26

sensitivity remains insignificant, export orientation makes a statistically significant

difference in relatively homogenous districts. In such a district, a one standard deviation

increase in export orientation above its mean value would reduce the probability of an

otherwise average Republican voting in favor of the East Asia Security Act from 0.60 to

0.48. District heterogeneity does not alter the effect of education, which remains roughly

the same in both types of districts.

In heterogeneous districts, ideology appears to be the most important determinant

of voting on this issue. As Bailey and Brady suggested, particular constituent economic

interests were not as important in these districts. Neither export orientation nor import

sensitivity with respect to China was a statistically significant predictor of voting in these

cases. An otherwise average Republican member with a somewhat liberal ideology (DW-

NOMINATE = -0.5) had a 0.14 probability of voting in favor of the measure. An

otherwise similar member with a somewhat conservative ideology (DW-NOMINATE =

0.5) had a 0.52 probability of voting in favor of the measure. These results make sense

when one considers the political circumstances confronting members of Congress in

diverse districts. They gain little from acting to support a narrow set of economic

interests. These members are therefore free to take the position suggested by their

ideological orientation, with conservatives taking a hard line position on security

questions with respect to a potential communist adversary, and liberals adopting a more

conciliatory approach. By comparison, members from more homogenous districts are

more constrained by their constituents' interests.

Like the relative homogeneity of their district, members' party affiliation mediated

the impact of constituent economic interests. The final set of results in Table 4 indicates

27

that Republicans were more sensitive to export interests within their district than were

Democrats, and that Democrats were somewhat more sensitive to the interests of less

educated voters than were Republicans. These effects are larger than those found in

homogenous districts. An average Democrat had a 0.50 probability of voting for the East

Asia Security Act, while an average Republican had a 0.52 probability of doing so. A one

standard deviation increase in export orientation would reduce the probability of

Republican support to 0.30 while having no statistically significant effect on Democrats.

On the other hand, a one standard deviation decline in the level of educational attainment

in their district would increase the probability of Democratic support to 0.64.

Overall, voting on the East Asia Security Act of 2005 suggests that their

constituents' stakes in trade with China had substantial effects on the positions members

of Congress took on matters related to the Chinese security threat. These effects were

clearest in relatively homogenous districts, where members had less discretion about the

composition of their reelection constituency. Party affiliation also acted as a filter on the

influence of constituent interests. Democrats were more sensitive to the interests of less

educated voters, while Republicans were more attention to the needs of the export sector.

As previous research suggests, liberal-conservative ideology also appears to have made a

difference. In this case, its influence was evident only in relatively heterogeneous

districts, where constituent interests were less influential.

Conclusion

The evidence reviewed here supports two general conclusions about the claim that

international trade promotes friendly relations between states. First, as liberals like

28

Cordell Hull have long suggested, we found evidence that trade influences individual

attitudes toward one's partner in a commercial relationship. Americans who benefit from

trade with China are less likely to view China as a threat, even though there may be

plausible grounds for doing so. This pattern is evident in both the 2006 CCFR survey of

the general public and in voting on the East Asia Security Act of 2005 in the House of

Representatives.

Second, even though trade influences threat perception, the claim that trade

creates more friendly attitudes is too simple. International trade holds aggregate benefits

for both nations in the relationship, but it still creates sub-national winners and losers.

The losers hold substantially darker views of the trading partner than do the winners. Our

analysis of the CCFR survey data found that Americans with relatively low levels of

education and income were more likely to see China as a threat, and to support

conflictual foreign policies for containing Chinese power than were their wealthier and

better educated fellow citizens. Related patterns were evident in congressional voting.

House members, especially Democrats, were more likely to support costly policies to

curb Chinese military power if they represented poorer or less educated districts.

Republicans, or representatives from homogenous districts, were more likely to oppose

these policies if their constituents benefited from access to Chinese export markets.

Overall, our analysis suggests that the liberal claim about the pacifying effects of

trade needs to be qualified. Trade can indeed have major effects on threat perception, but

the direction of these effects depends on whether the winners or the losers from trade

control policy choice. So long as beneficiaries of trade are at the helm of foreign policy,

29

relations between trading states may remain cordial. If those who are harmed by trade

come to power, there are no grounds for expecting this benefit.

While the evidence presented here points to some previously overlooked

complications in the effect of trade on foreign policy attitudes, it also raises at least two

questions that we cannot answer with the data we have used here. First, could trade

actually make security relations more conflictual if political leaders representing those

who are harmed by trade come to power? Second, while we know that the winners and

losers differ in their attitudes toward the trading partner, we do not know how either

group would view that state in the absence of trade. It seems likely that the winners

would be less positive, and the losers less negative toward the other state in this case, but

it is also possible that the divergence in threat perception between these groups results

primarily from the emergence of more positive or more negative attitudes by one group.

We have tested our theoretical argument using a one-year snapshot of the relationship

between two prominent trading states, the United States and China. Future research may

be able to answer these questions by incorporating additional trading partners or by

examining a single dyad over time.

Second, does trade influence threat perception in every case, or only when other

features of the relationship make the claim that the trading partner is a threat plausible?

Our data indicate that income gains and losses from trade have substantively large effects

on American attitudes toward China, but this is only one case. It is possible that other

considerations might prevent a state from being seen as a threat at all, regardless of the

income effects of trade. Chief among them, as noted earlier, are affinities based on shared

political culture and normative values (e.g. Russett 1993). Perhaps for this reason, there is

30

little serious discussion of a European threat in the United States, even though American

trade with the European Union also generates domestic winners and losers. Future

research that includes additional trading partners could reveal whether trade influences

threat perception in the absence of conditions that make it plausible to view another state

as a security threat.

31

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36

Table 1. Elite Survey Results about a Possible Chinese Security Threat

Is China a Threat?

Not a threat Important but not critical threat

Critical threat Don't know/Refused

1990 25% 59% 16% 0% 1994 6 47 46 1 1998 3 41 56 0 2002 6 47 47 0 Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Exact wording of question: "Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next ten years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all…. The rise of China as a world power."

"China is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals." "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree"1976 29.8 60.6 1980 15.4 69.6 1984 13.3 78.7 1988 16.1 74.8 1992 25.1 64.1 1996 45.8 44.7 Source: Foreign Policy Leadership Project Exact wording: [Prefatory wording concerning lessons from past experiences abroad varies from year to year.] Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement by checking only one box in each row…. China is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals.

Should the United States defend Taiwan against China? Foreign Policy Leadership

Project Chicago Council on Foreign

Relations 1975 10.9 1979 17.8 1983 15.3 1984 46.0 1988 49.0 1992 47.3 1996 56.1 1998 50.9 2002 51.6 Exact wording of FPLP question: Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning America's role in the world…. The U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent the military conquest of Taiwan. Exact wording of CCFR question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I would like to ask your opinion about some situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops … if China invaded Taiwan?

37

Table 2. Ordered Logit Model of Economic Interests and Threat Perception

Regional economic interests Home state sensitivity to Chinese Imports 24.34 (49.60) 9.10 (51.65) Home state export orientation to China 256.88 (183.44) 290.64 (188.08)

Education High school graduate -0.14 (0.21) -0.12 (0.21) Some college -0.04 (0.23) -0.02 (0.23) College graduate -0.27 (0.22) -0.21 (0.23) Graduate degree -0.34 (0.30) -0.29 (0.29) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (4 d.f.) = 4.00 χ2 (4 d.f.) = 2.80

Income Second-lowest quintile 0.04 (0.18) 0.05 (0.18) Middle quintile -0.23 (0.17) -0.21 (0.17) Second-highest quintile -0.13 (0.15) -0.12 (0.15) Highest quintile -0.51* (0.18) -0.49* (0.17) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (4 d.f.) = 12.49* χ2 (4 d.f.) = 12.31*

Ideology Slightly liberal 0.49 (0.45) 0.50 (0.45) Moderate, middle of the road 0.52 (0.41) 0.53 (0.40) Slightly conservative 0.54 (0.36) 0.53 (0.37) Conservative 0.99* (0.41) 0.99* (0.41) Extremely conservative 0.31 (0.50) 0.28 (0.51) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (5 d.f.) = 12.02* χ2 (5 d.f.) = 11.52*

Interest in media coverage of American foreign relations

Hardly interested -0.03 (0.38) -0.03 (0.37) Somewhat interested 0.55* (0.30) 0.57* (0.29) Very interested 0.90* (0.34) 0.89* (0.34) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (3 d.f.) = 24.40* χ2 (3 d.f.) = 23.32*

Female 0.20 (0.11) 0.22 (0.12) Age 0.08* (0.02) 0.07* (0.02) Age squared -0.0007* (0.0001) -0.0006* (0.0002) Favorable attitude toward globalization -0.30* (0.14) Cut point 1 0.96 (0.82) 0.78 (0.86) Cut point 2 4.06 (0.83) 3.88 (0.87) Observations 1,181 1,181 Brant test of parallel regression assumption: H0:

assumption is met χ2 (21 d.f.) = 17.21 χ2 (22 d.f.) = 17.05

The dependent variable is the response to the survey question concerning the seriousness of the Chinese threat to American vital interests. Responses were coded as follows: 1-"not an important threat at all," 2-" important but not critical threat," 3-"critical threat." Robust standard errors clustered on the state are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level in a two-tailed test.

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Table 3. Logit Model of Support for Policies toward China

Limit Chinese Power

Defend Taiwan

Defend Taiwan

Regional economic interests Home state sensitivity to Chinese

Imports 89.47 (47.39) -30.67 (71.18) -16.27 (68.79)

Home state export orientation to China

10.19 (203.18) 185.71 (201.67) 178.62 (203.06)

Education High school graduate -0.61* (0.18) 0.08 (0.25) 0.13 (0.26) Some college -0.88* (0.20) 0.37 (0.23) 0.38 (0.23) College graduate -1.28* (0.21) 0.45 (0.26) 0.37 (0.26) Graduate degree -0.94* (0.29) 0.52 (0.30) 0.45 (0.29) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (4 d.f.) =

43.58* χ2 (4 d.f.) =

10.00* χ2 (4 d.f.) = 6.07

Income Second-lowest quintile -0.05 (0.16) -0.08 (0.19) -0.11 (0.20) Middle quintile -0.39 (0.23) 0.04 (0.22) 0.04 (0.22) Second-highest quintile -0.26 (0.21) -0.42 (0.23) -0.45 (0.24) Highest quintile -0.60* (0.20) -0.50* (0.15) -0.52* (0.16) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (4 d.f.) =

10.64* χ2 (4 d.f.) =

17.58* χ2 (4 d.f.) =

15.48* Ideology

Slightly liberal 0.13 (0.40) 0.18 (0.30) 0.14 (0.30) Moderate, middle of the road 0.33 (0.41) 0.48 (0.26) 0.50 (0.28) Slightly conservative 0.22 (0.43) 0.21 (0.29) 0.18 (0.30) Conservative 1.12* (0.40) 0.91* (0.31) 0.89* (0.34) Extremely conservative 1.48* (0.57) 1.24* (0.37) 1.28* (0.40) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (5 d.f.) =

52.58* χ2 (5 d.f.) =

20.27* χ2 (5 d.f.) =

19.56* Interest in media coverage of

American foreign relations

Hardly interested 0.23 (0.47) 0.39 (0.42) 0.29 (0.44) Somewhat interested 0.11 (0.33) 0.66 (0.39) 0.49 (0.41) Very interested 0.22 (0.35) 0.91* (0.39) 0.72 (0.42) Wald test of joint significance χ2 (3 d.f.) = 0.91 χ2 (3 d.f.) = 8.53* χ2 (3 d.f.) = 5.13

Female -0.15 (0.17) -0.23* (0.11) -0.26* (0.12) Age 0.03 (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) Age squared -0.0004 (0.0002) -0.0004 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) Isolationism -0.75* (0.18) Constant -1.29 (0.75) -2.91* (0.69) -2.14* (0.68) Observations 1,194 1,194 1,166 The dependent variables are the responses to survey questions concerning support for efforts to limit the growth of Chinese power, and to deploy American troops to defend Taiwan. See the text for exact wording. Responses were coded "1" if the respondent supported these policies and "0" otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered on the state are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level in a two-tailed test.

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Table 4. Roll-Call Voting on the East Asia Security Act of 2005

Homogenous District

Heterogeneous District

Democrats Republicans

Democrat -0.19 (0.57)

-0.77 (0.78)

1.48 (0.93)

Ideology (DW-NOMINATE, first dimension)

0.51 (0.59)

0.68 (0.82)

1.91* (0.97)

0.38 (0.64)

District sensitivity to Chinese Imports

5.33 (85.79)

162.13 (137.97)

-129.82 (126.43)

-180.97 (141.30)

147.57 (116.80)

District export orientation to China

-335.31 (320.43)

-1167.16* (550.54)

85.31 (431.43)

431.67 (503.26)

-945.95* (485.14)

Percentage of district residents (aged 25+) with some college education

-0.03* (0.01)

-0.03* (0.02)

-0.03* (0.02)

-0.04* (0.01)

-0.02 (0.02)

Constant 2.03* (0.99)

3.87* (1.53)

1.11 (1.41)

Observations 418 224 194 418 Note: Models estimated using logistic regression. Measure is Hyde (R-IL) motion to suspend rules and pass East Asia Security Act of 2005, defeated 215-203, on July 14, 2005. The measure received majority support, but failed because two-thirds majority was required. Coefficients in the last two columns were estimated in a single model using interaction terms. Conditional coefficients for the effects of the district characteristics on members of each party are reported here. For purposes of this analysis, Bernard Sanders (I-VT) was treated as a Democrat.

40

Figure 1.American Trade with China, 1970-2007

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Perc

enta

ge o

f GD

P

ExportsImports

41

Figure 2. Predicted Assessments of the Chinese Threat by Hypothetical Respondents

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

Median value inall categories

Highest incomeand education

categories

Lowest incomeand education

categories

"Very interested"in media coverageof foreign affairs

"Conservative"

Pred

icte

d Pr

obab

ility

of R

espo

nse

Not an important threatImportant but not critical threatCritical threat

42