track 5 session 4 - st dev con 2016 - life cycle management for web
TRANSCRIPT
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October 4, 2016
Santa Clara Convention Center
Mission City Ballroom
Lifecycle Management
and Security
Joe Pilozzi
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Recap
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The Modern World 3
Connected Devices are Being Attacked• Good Practices
• To truly understand the value of Assets
• Threats and Risk Analysis
• The role cryptography plays
• Tips to aid in the design of resilient
products
• Important Characteristics
• Confidentiality
• Availability
• Integrity
• Most attacks today are software based
Source: Engadget
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STM32 Security Features
• Security Features
• Unique Identifier
• Hardware Cryptographic Accelerators
• True Random Number Generator
• Memory Protection Unit
• Firewall
• Debug Port Access Control
• Tamper Detection
• Cryptographic Libraries
• Secure Boot
• Secure Firmware Upgrade
4
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STSAFE-A100 Product Summary 5
Authentication, wrap/unwrap
Signature verification
Secure channel with server (TLS)
Secure data storage, 6Kbytes (configurable as counter)
Features
Personalization
STSAFE-A100
Personalization service available
Certification CC EAL5+ HW (Jan. 16)
Crypto AES-128,256; ECC-256, 384 (Brainpool or NIST)
Package SO8N, DFN2*3
Communication I²C
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Securing Assets
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Securing Assets 7
Cryptographic keys required to:
Authenticate firmware update signature
Encrypt end-user / end-node data
Authenticate device to network / service
Authenticate service / network to device
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Securing Assets 8
Keys must be protected to some defined ‘level’
• Interface layerCloud Service
• Example AppsApplication Layers
• Drivers
• Libraries
Software Layers
• Embedded Code/ Firmware
Hardware
Tru
st
External (Flash) Memory
Secure partition
Internal Secure Memory
SRAM
Secure Hardware
Register Fuse
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Securing Assets 9
• Impacts cost
• Impacts supply chain decisions
• Impacts debug availability
• Impacts Failure Analysis
Factors affecting where / how to initialize keys
ConsumerProduct
Personalization
Product
Manufacture
Code
Keys / Certs
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Threats and Levels
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Security Process 11
Security functions:
- Technical requirements
- Security level
Per Sector / application perform:
Security requirements
Implementation
checked against
requirements
Architecture model
Policies and procedures
Risk assessment
Privacy Impact assessment
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Security Threat Levels 12
CasualViolation
Means
Resources
Skills
Motivation
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Safety Security
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Security Threat Levels 13
Low
Generic
Low
IntentionalCasual
Simple
Violation
Means
Resources
Skills
Motivation
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Safety Security
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Security Threat Levels 14
Sophisticated
Low Moderate
Generic
Low
IntentionalCasual
Simple
Specific
Moderate
Violation
Means
Resources
Skills
Motivation
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Safety Security
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Security Threat Levels 15
Low Moderate Extended
Generic
Low
IntentionalCasual
Simple
Specific
Moderate High
Violation
Means
Resources
Skills
Motivation
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Safety Security
Sophisticated
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Changing Threat Levels 16
ConsumerSoC ManufacturingSales /
Distribution
Manufacturing Phase
PackagePersonalizationProduct
Personalization
Certified Secure Facilities
In-field
Updates
Product
Manufacture
Code
Keys / Certs
Threat Level
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Basic Functional Compliance 17
• Device operates within a defined boundary
• Normal ‘electrical’ use of the device / service
• Misbehavior of the device is difficult to detect
Level 0
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ZERO
Basic Functional Compliance 18
• Examples:
• Physical removal of device from location (e.g. doorbell, remote sensor)
• Cost / Attackers’ level of sophistication
• Cost: none
• Sophistication: No specific skills or resources needed
Level 0
LOW
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Software and Device Attack Resistance 19
• Expected and unexpected input / commands are used in a way which
gains unauthorized access / use without breach of the device’s outer
case:
• Normal / abnormal ‘electrical’ use of the device / service
• And / Or device has been removed from end-use location, or stolen before end-use
deployment and subjected to indefinite command / environmental attack
• Can be mounted by a legitimate owner or system adversary and may yield secrets which
can compromise the system
Level 1
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Software and Device Attack Resistance 20
• Examples:
• Flood attacks, buffer attacks, triggering an error while using known software
upgrade commands
• BotNet, Bricking, for open MPU systems
• Cost / Attackers’ level of sophistication
• Cost: Low in terms of equipment
• Sophistication: Low – hackers with only software skills exploit poor security,
and errors in firmware to gain secrets / control
Level 1
LOW
LOW
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Invasive Device Attack Resistance
• Outer case is removed (or not present during assembly /
manufacturing) to access component pins to mount attacks which:-
• Manipulate its environment then observe it closely while it is operating in or out of its
intended ecosystem (network)
• Manipulate electrical topology of device components / schematic
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Level 2
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Invasive Device Attack Resistance
• Examples:
• JTAG pin on MCU exercised to readout memory (code, keys, personal data)
• Manipulate Crystal (clock) input, power or temperature to operate MCU outside of
intended range
• Side channel attacks: spy product to get secrets (power supply, electromagnetic
radiation)
• Cost / Attackers’ level of sophistication: Moderate
• Cost: Moderate - Requires possession of device, and tools to manipulate hardware
• Sophistication – Moderate - requires both electrical and software hacking skills
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Level 2
MED
MED
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Invasive IC Destructive Attack Resistance
• MCUs are removed from their packages to probe internal busses while
operating and/or reverse engineer the IC
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Level 3
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Invasive IC Destructive Attack Resistance
• Examples:
• Internal fault injection after de-capsulation (Force nodes by probing, Laser beam)
• Reverse engineering (code / data extraction)
• Circuit modification (fib,…)
• Cost / Attackers’ level of sophistication: ‘High’
• Equipment and expertise required is very high
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Level 3
HIGH
HIGH
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Lifecycles and Security
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Lifecycle 26
Development
Supply Chain/Distribution
Manufacturing
Installation / End-use
Commissioning/Re-commissioning
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Lifecycle 27
• “Simple Devices”: typically have limited functionality and are
managed/accessed via internet
• Secure boot and firmware update integrates conditional access coding to maximize
security
• Make use of MPUs, Firewalls, Read Protection, JTAG / test disable
• Battery-backed tamper prevention supported by STM32 should be used for devices with
available battery
• Integrate security co-processor (like STSAFE-A100) to handle crypto for secure boot and
conditional access
• Normal best practices to attain near 100% error handling
• Prevents disclosure of sensitive Intellectual Property and/or user’s personal data
• Similarly for security of keys; additional checks on crypto to be sure standard attacks are
mitigated
Development
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Lifecycle 28
• “Complex Devices”: Usually running a specialized operating system or
virtualized environment designed to run software / applications other
than OEM’s
• Java VMs running silo’ed applications
• Make use of separate execution areas to restrict access to data between unrelated processes
• In addition / with preceding: Secure Zone
• Where available, use of dedicated hardware security subsystem to protect authentication
mechanisms, execution of cryptographic services and prevent unauthorized access to key
material, and other assets like DRM
• Using tamper resistant device to personalize keys, and independently harden crypto again
simplifies the process
• Includes Gateway-like devices (aggregating / controlling data from simple devices)
• Needs to allow services to run within well-defined boundaries
Development
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Lifecycle 29
• Which supplier programs Firmware into devices?
• Key material for application access, Firmware update
• Hand-off keys (changed at device personalization)
• Public key crypto simplifies
• Flash readout in place sufficient for security model?
• Distributor programs?
• Stored/shipped devices at risk?
• Product must be protected from theft;
• compromised keys could be used for an attack
• Causing damage brand / end-user safety or privacy
Supply Chain
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Lifecycle 30
• OEM-owned manufacturing vs Contract (CM)
• OEM: Can initialize keys using HSM they develop / implement on controlled line
• Line can be secured (rejects/WIP controlled for security)
• Employees known and can be controlled to not be operating for other interests
• CM: Above possible but pre-initialized units required
• Lines probably not secured
• Security model requires control of finished goods
• Are there keys at rest in finished units which represent a significant threat?
• These can be at risk from identified adversaries
• Can unit be stolen, keys harvested and used to create a compromised/cloned unit
• Understand how this could be useful for adversaries’ purposes?
Manufacturing
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• Is theft (and / or re-attach) of device easily detected?
• Doorbell versus thermostat
• Units located in areas easily accessible by adversary, where modification may go unnoticed
• Is connection to a WiFi network constant or does the device re-initialize
to reduce power consumption?
• Separation of Keys for data security from protocol layer
• Prevents credentials leaked to allow simply connecting to same WiFi network
Lifecycle 31Installation / End-use
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• Disposed / returned device capable of unauthorized use?
• Consider how a user’s data is stored and how it should be removed from a device at
end-of-life.
• Not just a hacker perspective, but also a new (genuine) user – e.g. returned (and sold as
refurbished) goods
• Reliability/Quality requires access to Firmware?
• Returned devices need to be debugged somehow
Lifecycle 32Commissioning/Re-commissioning
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Examples
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Streetlight Example 34
• Device security assets (keys) must be
protected when / if:
• Keys are in NVM (no battery backed-RAM which
can be zeroed on tamper)
• Distributor initializes FW and keys
• Contract manufacturer is used to make product
• Limited function device without OS (only runs
updated FW images, and no software)
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Option 1 35
Standard Microcontroller (STM32)
Sensors
STM32
General
Purpose MCU
Communication
General Purpose
MCU
Communication
Device
SecurityApplication
Sensor
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Option 1
• Keys Stored and used in a Standard Microcontroller
• Microcontroller configuration requirements
• Secure boot / Secure Firmware Update and crypto (conditional access) code protected
using Memory Protection Unit / Firewall / PCROP (STM32 standard features)
• Keys stored in read protected Flash, and JTAG disabled…
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Option 1: Threats to Manage 37
• Development: HSM, or production key initialization system must be
developed, tested and deployed into supply chain
• Test keys used for development of personalization infrastructure for planned value-chain
• Root crypto should be tested / validated according to security target required
• Supply Chain: Distributor must use HSM (Hardware Security Module)
to initialize keys
• Distributor’s programming facility should be audited
• Require additional security controls on authorized ship locations, and destruction of
rejects to programming process
• Not possible to fully control
Impact on Lifecycle
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Option 1: Threats to Manage 38
• Manufacturing and finished device distribution
• Uninstalled microcontroller and opened devices (WIP) should be managed to maximize
security; ready to attack, and manipulate power supply and other factors
• Installation and end use
• Setup of connection to Wi-Fi should be separated from conditional access point
• Requires check / binding upon separation to prevent devices from being misused
• Message device has been removed
• System monitors IP location data to prevent operation after being moved without check
• Revocation of potential clones necessary?
Impact on Lifecycle
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Option 1: Threats to Manage 39
• Decommissioning / Recommissioning
• Personal data erased, access keys e.g. for associated cloud services
• Process to re-assign device after return then sell / assign to new owner without leaving
access to old owner’s location enabled (similar to preceding)
• Can absence from network with ability to hack keys out through destructive means a
threat to users / brand?
Impact on Lifecycle
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Option 1: Max Security Achievable 40
Low Moderate Extended
Generic
Low
IntentionalCasual
Simple
Specific
Moderate High
Violation
Means
Resources
Skills
Motivation
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Safety Security
Sophisticated
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Option 2 41
IoT Platform Fortified with STSAFE-A
Sensors
STM32
General
Purpose MCU
Communication
General Purpose
MCU
Communication
Device
SecurityApplication
Sensor
Security
STSAFE-A
Secure Element
Secure
ElementSensor
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Option 2 42
• Crypto keys programmed by ST in STSAFE-A100
• Validated to be tamper resistant to Common Criteria EAL5+
• Microcontroller configuration requirements
• Secure boot/Secure FW update and crypto (conditional access) code protected using
Memory Protection Unit / Firewall / PCROP (STM32 standard features): as binding to
secure micro
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Option 2: Threats to Manage 43
• Development:
• Crypto basis of security requires minimal crypto validation (can concentrate on
application rather than security)
• Supply Chain: ST initializes keys on their secure line, which are highly
resistant to threats thereafter
• Supply of ICs only shipped to valid / authorized distributors
• Manufacturing and finished device distribution
• Cryptographic binding of application processor (STM32) with Secure Element
Impact on Lifecycle
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• Installation and end use
• Application / access should be separated from conditional access and no access to keys
in Secure Element (more secure)
• Setup of connection to WiFi should be separated from conditional access point
• Requires check / binding upon separation to prevent devices from being misused
• Message device has been removed
• System monitors IP location data to prevent operation after being moved without check
• Revocation of potential clones necessary?
Option 2: Threats to ManageImpact on Lifecycle
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• Decommissioning / Recommissioning
• Process to re-assign device after return then sell / assign to new owner without leaving
access to old owner’s location enabled (similar to preceding)
• Can absence from network with ability to hack keys out through destructive means a
threat to users / brand?
Option 2: Threats to ManageImpact on Lifecycle
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Option 2: Max Security Achievable 46
Low Moderate Extended
Generic
Low
IntentionalCasual
Simple
Specific
Moderate High
Violation
Means
Resources
Skills
Motivation
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Safety Security
Sophisticated
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Conclusions and Recommendations
47
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Conclusions / Recommendations 48
• Security is based on threats which change during component sourcing
and manufacturing
• Tamper prevention implementable on finished product to achieve Level 2 security not active
until assembly is completed
• Keys can be securely initialized in a secure micro by the IC manufacturer (or distributor) without
worry thereafter
• Keys can be securely initialized on a trusted / secured line during manufacturing using an HSM
• Level 1 security for a finished product can be compromised by insecure key initialization at
manufacturing, or supply chain leaking an undiversified key or not using PKC
• Using STSAFE-A100 to securely initialize and protect keys simplifies and adds security
Work with ST, your experienced partner
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Demos
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ST Solutions for Security in IoT 50
Smart City Solution
for IoT Node
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Thank You