towards an integrated supervisor: experiences from the netherlands aerdt houben head supervisory...
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Towards an integrated supervisor: experiences from The Netherlands
Aerdt Houben Head Supervisory Strategy department
De Nederlandsche Bank
Washington D.C., 6 June 2006
Outline
1. What determines the structure of financial supervision?• International trend towards integrated supervision• Advantages of integrated supervision• Alternative cross-sectoral models: one size does not fit all
2. Why did The Netherlands reform, and how?• Background • Steps towards the new framework• The Twin Peaks model: merger and reorganization
3. What have we accomplished so far?• Early experiences• First results
1. International trend towards integrated supervision
1987
Canada
2004
BelgiumThe NetherlandsAFM: CONDUCT DNB: PRUDENTIAL
1988
Denmark
1999
AustraliaIceland
2002
Austria GermanyEstonia
1985
Norway
1992
Sweden
2000
UKJapan Hungary
1971
Singapore
2003
Ireland Czech R.Slovakia
2006
1. Advantages of integrated supervision
Enhances the overall quality of supervision:
1. Promotes cross-sectoral consistency of supervision
2. Facilitates better monitoring of the financial system
3. Allows rapid policy responses
4. Reduces scope for regulatory overlap or white spots
5. Maximizes economies of scale and scope in supervision
6. Strengthens accountability
1. Alternative cross-sectoral models: one size does not fit all
Integrated with Central Bank?
yes
Prudential and Conduct-of-Business supervision integrated?
yes
no
no“One Peak”
Singapore, Ireland,Czech Republic,
Slovakia
“FSA”UK, Japan, Canada
Scandinavia,Belgium and more
“Three Peaks”Australia
Germany, Austria
“Twin Peaks”The Netherlands
Outline
1. What determines the structure of financial supervision?• International trend towards integrated supervision• Advantages of integrated supervision• Alternative cross-sectoral models: one size does not fit all
2. Why did The Netherlands reform, and how?• Background • Steps towards the new framework• The Twin Peaks model: merger and reorganization
3. What have we accomplished so far?• Early experiences• First results
2. Background
• Need for change: Increasing demands on supervisor’s effectiveness
and accountability
• Key consideration (1): Interwoven financial sector (products and
institutions)
• Key consideration (2): Concentrated financial sector
• Path dependence: Central Bank with
1. established reputation
2. extensive financial sector and supervisory expertise
3. autonomous administrative authority
2. Steps towards the new framework
• Removal of barriers to financial conglomerates (1990)
• Council of Financial Supervisors established (1999)
• New supervisory structure: establishment AFM (2002)
• Merger between DNB and PVK (2004)
STESTESecurities firms
PVKPVKInsurance companies
Pension fundsSTERFT
DNB
RFT
DNB
DNB
Credit institutions
Mutual funds
Cross sectorPer sectorCross sectorPer sector
Typical securities
Not typical securities
Conduct of businessPrudentialSystemic
Sectoral
2. Supervisory landscape before merger DNB-PVK and establishment AFM
Securities firms
Insurance companies
Pension funds
AFMDNB
Credit institutions
Mutual funds
Per sector
Cross sector
Per sector
Cross sector
Conduct of businessPrudentialSystemic
2. Supervisory landscape after merger DNB-PVK and establishment AFM
Functional
DNB (banks,investment firms)
Conduct supervision
Prudential supervision
Lender Of Last ResortSystemic Stability
DNB AFM
Prudential Supervision
2. The Twin Peaks model
Systemic Stability Lender Of Last Resort
Market Conduct SupervisionConduct-of-
Business SupervisionAfter
2004
PVK (insurers,pension funds)
Conduct supervision
Prudential supervision
STE/AFM (securitiesfirms,exchanges)
Conduct supervision
Prudential supervision
Before2004
2. Merger and internal reorganization required more than 2 years
phase 24 months
phase 35 months
phase 16 months
Strategy: behind the integration
Formulate strategy and logic behind integration
Identify synergy targets
Determine main new modes of operation
Develop criteria for the implementation process
Develop new main organisational model
Develop detailed structure of organisational model
Identify and implement quick wins
Develop broad implementation planning
Determine monitoring parameters and process for monitoring
Implement organizational structure and processes
Monitor synergies and cost savings
Develop plan of action for phase 4
Completion: full integration
Implement organizational structure and processes
Monitor synergies and use replacement policy
Resolve outstanding issues
phase 412 months
Dec 2002
June 2003
Oct 2003
April 2004
Planning: Integration process
Implementation: from day 1
Outline
1. What determines the structure of financial supervision?• International trend towards integrated supervision• Advantages of integrated supervision• Alternative cross-sectoral models: one size does not fit all
2. Why did The Netherlands reform, and how?• Background • Steps towards the new framework• The Twin Peaks model: merger and reorganization
3. What have we accomplished so far?• Early experiences• First results
3. Early experiences
• Increase in effectiveness and efficiency of supervision
• Better view of overarching financial stability risks
• Simultaneous integration/reorganization proved efficient
• Institute specific labour agreement proved practical
• Employees need time to adjust
3. First results
• IMF FSAP 2004
• Palmnet
• FIRM
• FTK
• Vision on Supervision 2006-2010
More risk-oriented and transparent supervisory framework
Wrap-up
Three propositions:
1. Supervisory structures are made-to-measure
2. Twin Peaks is optimal model for The Netherlands
3. Because of supervisory overlap, DNB and AFM need to cooperate closely
Towards an integrated supervisor: experiences from The Netherlands
René Geskes Head Conduct of Business Supervision
Authority for the Financial Markets
Washington D.C., 6 June 2006
Agenda
• Covenant DNB and AFM• Supervision in action: how does it work?• Regulation, policy and domestic and international
consultations• Coordination on top level• Overlap in supervision
Covenant DNB and AFM
• The new covenant between the AFM and the DNB was signed in 2004
• Agreement about • Licensing process • Investigations• Regulatory measures• Information exchange• Illegal financial institutions
• and how to avoid getting in each other’s way
Covenant DNB and AFM
• Functional division of supervisory responsibilities, distinguishing between general, market conduct and prudential aspects of business
• and how to avoid getting in each other’s way
General aspects of operations
Market conduct-specific aspects of operations
Prudential aspects of operations
Client administration, separation of assets, complaint handling, client relations and supplying information to (prospective) clients, Chinese walls, insider dealing, price rigging and conflict of interest and compliance
Organizational structure, strategy, reporting lines, proper management and internal (ICT) controls
Solvency risk management (credit-, market-, operational-, liquidity- and insurance risk), financial guarantees, capital and large exposure reporting and prudent management in outsourcing activities
Covenant DNB and AFM
credit institutions and insurers
securities institutions and collective investment schemes
DNB
DNB
AFM
AFM
General aspects of operations
Market conduct-specific aspects of operations
Prudential aspects of operations
Agenda
•Covenant DNB and AFM
•Supervision in action: how does it work?
•Regulation, policy and domestic and international consultations
•Coordination on top level
•Overlap in supervision
Opinion on:
• fit and properness of managers
• operational management (including AO/IC)
Supervision in action: licensing
DNB (prudential) Authorizes banks and insurance companies
Authorizes securities institutions and collective investment schemes
AFM (Market Conduct)
Sharing of information
Supervision in action: Investigations
• Planned investigations Sharing of planning and interim reports (each quarter)
Prior to investigation request for relevant information
Special wishes must be addressed!
If suspected failing falls in field of other regulator: information request!
• Unplanned investigations
• Reporting
Notification of other regulator
Joint reporting or sharing of results with due observance of statutory secrecy provisions
Supervision in action: Information exchangeBoth supervisors must, either by request or on their won initiative, exchange information on institutions under their supervision!
• Standard information
• Other information
All data which supervised entities are required to supply (standard legal obligations)
Examples: annual statements, management letters, auditor’s reports
Exchange without notification to supervised entity
Is specific. Notification of exchange of such information unless undesirable in the interest of an ongoing investigation or other circumstances
Supervision in action: Supervisory measures
• General measures
Can be taken autonomously by each supervisor after – if possible - consultation of the other supervisor
(unless impossible)• “Radical’ measures
Non-authorizing supervisor may initiate a radical measure by issuing a substantiated advice to the authorizing supervisor!!!
Power is confined to authorizing supervisor
First – if possible – consultation of the other supervisor
Authorizing supervisor assesses the advice against the principals of sound management – no fact finding!
• Covenant applies equally to actions against an institution that is unregistered yet requires authorization
Supervision in action: Illegal institutions
Agenda
• Covenant DNB and AFM• Supervision in action: how does it work?• Regulation, policy and domestic and international
consultations• Coordination on top level• Overlap in supervision
Regulation, policy and domestic and international consultations
• Co-ordination and mutual attuning promote the adequate arrangements of policies and regulations
• Jointly advise of the Minister of Finance• Inform each other concerning current issues addressed within
international co-operative bodies
Agenda
• Covenant DNB and AFM• Supervision in action: how does it work?• Regulation, policy and domestic and international
consultations• Coordination on top level• Overlap in supervision
Coordination on top level• Appointment of coordinators:
Supervision
Policy and regulation
Domestic and international consultation• Board level meetings 4 times a year• Standing committees/temporary working groups if necessary
Agenda
• Covenant DNB and AFM• Supervision in action: how does it work?• Lawmaking, policy and (inter)national coordination• Coordination on top level• Overlap in supervision
Overlap in supervisionSupervision Coordination Bureau
• Aim: limit the burden for supervised institutions
• Register and resolve complaints concerning overlap in operational supervision by the AFM and DNB
• Highlight problems where the pattern of complaints points to potential shortcomings in regulations, policy or implementation, that in turn call for longer-term solutions
• Decision and take measures. The institution concerned will be notified of the position of the supervisory authorities