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TOWARDS AN EU POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT?

Charlotte Bretherton, Liverpool John Moores University

John Vogler, Keele University

The European Union’s frequently reiterated commitment to sustainable development and

to poverty eradication in the world’s poorest countries faces many challenges. How can

promotion of social and economic development be reconciled with the urgent need to

address issues of environmental degradation, resource depletion and climate change?

How can the differing needs and preferences of Member States and the European

Commission be accommodated to ensure the sustainability and coherence of EU external

development efforts? This paper uses the external dimensions of the Common Fisheries

Policy, with particular reference to fisheries agreements with developing countries, to

examine EU efforts to pursue its sustainability agenda. Particular attention is paid to the

Union’s policy coherence for development (PCD) strategy, which has the ambitious aim

of minimizing inconsistencies between policy sectors (horizontal coherence) and between

development priorities of Member States and the Union (vertical coherence). Since, in the

two decades since the concept was first used, sustainable development has become multi-

dimensional in character, embracing economic and social as well as environmental

aspects of development, its adoption as an overarching objective of the EU epitomises the

challenges facing the Union’s PCD strategy.

For a number of years our concern has been to assess the extent to which the EU can

effectively function as an international actor (Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 2000, 2006,

2009). Examination of the EU as a sustainable development actor requires that we move

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beyond assessment of the Union’s capacity to act, to consider how it acts. Specifically,

this paper is concerned with the extent to which the Union adheres to its Treaty

obligations on sustainability. These are enshrined in general terms in Article 3 of the

TEU and more specifically in Article 21(2.d) of the TFEU, which commits the Union to

‘foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing

countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’. Article 21(3) alludes to the need

for policy coherence in order to achieve these worthy aims. Given its fundamental nature,

we consider the development of the Union’s PCD strategy as a prelude to our discussion

of the particular challenges associated with sustainability in general and the Common

Fisheries Policy in particular.

Towards policy coherence in EU development policy?

The PCD concept originated in the context of the Development Assistance Committee

(DAC) in the early 1990s but rose to prominence a decade later following formulation of

the Millennium Development Goals. The MDG which provided both a clearer focus and

a more complex agenda for development policy than had previously been evident; and

the UN Millennium Declaration called upon all states to ensure policy coherence for

development.

The EU was a proactive participant in these international initiatives. In the context of its

strong commitment to the MDG, the Union subsequently paid considerable attention to

development of its PCD agenda, which aims to ensure that -

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The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in

all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing

countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen

policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and

mechanisms at all levels… (Council, 2006, p.6)

Attainment of PCD means, in addition to eliminating overlap and inconsistency between

Member State and Community efforts, ensuring that the aims of development policy are

not undermined by the impacts of policy in other areas, whether these are externally

oriented (for example foreign policy, trade or humanitarian assistance) or domestic

(agriculture and fisheries, amongst others) or cross-cutting issue areas such as gender

equality, environmental protection, climate change and sustainable development. PCD

thus poses considerable challenges to any political system. In the case of the EU, these

challenges are particularly daunting. Indeed, the fragmentation of EU development

efforts makes it necessary to consider, not only the ‘horizontal coherence’ across policy

sectors referred to above, but also ‘vertical coherence’ between Member State and Union

policies. Since vertical incoherence is a function of the fundamental, and unique,

character of the Union, we pay particular attention to this aspect.

Sources of vertical incoherence are not difficult to identify. Despite commitment to the

MDG, Member State policies continue to be formulated according to national priorities

and principles and, hence, to reflect traditional ties or particular interests. Thus, for

example, the top five recipients of Portuguese assistance - Angola, Cape Verde, Timor-

Leste, Mozambique and Săo Tome and Principe – are all previously Portuguese colonies.

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This pattern is evident elsewhere, with Spain prioritising Latin America and France

favouring Francophone Africa. The 2004 and 2007 (CEEC) Member States prioritise

South-East Europe, as does Greece. In consequence, several Member States continue to

prioritise middle income rather than least developed countries, thus failing to honour the

Union’s commitment to poverty eradication and the MDG (Schulz, 2007, p. 8). Given the

Commission’s responsibility for the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union also

disburses substantial amounts of assistance to East European neighbours and the

Mediterranean region.

Despite this continued focus upon historical ties and perceived interests, most Member

States and the Commission identify poverty reduction as the ‘overall objective’ of their

development policy; and many devote a considerable proportion of their assistance to

Africa (Commission/OECD, 2006).1 This, however, also brings problems. Failure to

coordinate the various development policies has very tangible, and negative, results - in

that there can be considerable duplication of effort, with several Member States and the

Commission all funding similar projects in a single country. Thus it has been reported

that in Tanzania, in 2006, more than 600 different health-related projects were in

operation while, in Kenya, ‘medicines are purchased simultaneously by 20 donors

through 13 different procurement bodies’ (Commission, 2007a, p.1). In such situations

staff in the (former) Commission Delegations have attempted to assist with coordination

on the ground, but this cannot remove the pressure on the administrations of very poor

countries obliged to interact with numerous donors each funding several projects.

Moreover, this duplication of effort also entails duplication of donor costs in terms of

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policy planning, implementation and evaluation – which has the effect of reducing the

volume of aid available to development partners. At the same time, duplication of effort

in particular countries and/or sectors can lead to marginalisation or neglect of others.

In this complex area of parallel policies, achievement of PCD would clearly require

effective leadership. Mechanisms that would support the development of leadership

capability are, however, absent. In the TEU joint responsibility for policy coherence is

accorded to the Council (representing the Member States) and the Commission, but

mechanisms for the necessary inter-institutional cooperation are not specified.

Failure to make formal provision for leadership reflects the reluctance of Member State

governments to accord influence over their national policies to others – in particular the

European Commission. Nevertheless, it has long been the ambition of the Commission to

take on this coordination role, with the aim both of increasing aid effectiveness and

enhancing the Union’s identity as donor. However, the heightened profile given to

development policy by the Union’s MDG commitments has not necessarily been

conducive to Commission leadership. Several Member States - notably the ‘Nordic Plus’

group of like-minded donors, comprising Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Ireland,

the Netherlands and the UK – have also shown a wish to exert leadership; and have been

openly critical of Commission efforts (Schulz, 2007, p.4; European Voice, 23 February –

1 March 2006). Nevertheless, the Commission, strongly supported by the many

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development NGOs located in Brussels, has been at the forefront of various initiatives to

promote PCD.

Proposals for the progressive untying of aid to least developed countries (Commission,

2002a) provide an early, and important, example of a Commission-led attempt to enhance

the coherence and effectiveness of EU development assistance. Tied aid is given on the

condition that the recipient will use it to purchase goods and/or services provided by the

donor. It thus severely restricts the options of recipients by preventing them from seeking

lower priced alternatives, hence reducing aid effectiveness. Indeed the Commission

estimates (2002a, p.3) that tying aid increases the cost of goods and services by between

15% and 30%. Following the Union’s commitment to the MDG there has been a

significant reduction in the proportion of tied aid provided by the Member States. In this

case the Commission’s pressure on Member States has been sustained, robust and, it is

argued, effective (Carbone, 2007).

During the first Barroso Commission (2004-2009) considerable efforts were made to

promote vertical coherence in EU development policy. Its most important initiative, The

European Consensus on Development (Council, 2006a) comprised a Joint Statement by

the Council, the representatives of the Member States, the European Parliament and the

Commission. This provides an unprecedented statement of commitment to ‘a common

vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member States and Community levels,

in development cooperation’ (ibid, pp. 1-2). Nevertheless, while politically important in

providing a high-level statement of common values and joint commitments – to poverty

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eradication, increasing the volume and quality of aid, sustainable development,

promotion of human rights, gender equality, ‘partnership’ with developing countries and

advancing the PCD agenda – the European Consensus fails to specify the coordination

mechanisms necessary to meet these commitments. The subsequent publication of a PCD

Rolling Work Programme (Council, 2006b), following an initiative from the

Commission, is an attempt to remedy this. It identifies priority areas and provides a

timetable for action, inviting each Presidency, on taking office, ‘to engage with the

Commission to identify which priorities need to be updated’ (ibid, p.2). However it is

noteworthy that these proposed measures received a mixed reaction from ‘wary capitals’

(European Voice, 2006, 23 February – 1 March, p.1).

Resistance from some Member States to an enhanced coordination role for the

Commission did not prevent that body from launching further initiatives. These include

an EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy (Commission,

2007a). The Code of Conduct is based upon principles that, if put into practice, would

comprehensively address the problems of vertical and horizontal incoherence. Central to

the proposals is donor (Member State and Union) specialisation, both by partner country

and by policy sector. Thus, to avoid excessive concentration of efforts in favoured

countries such as Tanzania and Vietnam, donors are expected to nominate priority

countries. This aims also facilitate measures to ensure that neglected or ‘orphan’

countries such as Burundi, Guinea and Yemen are included. In relation to policy sectors,

it is proposed that a ‘lead donor’ system be established that would involve concentration

of each EU donor’s activities upon the two policy sectors in which they have most

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expertise. This system would also ensure that at least one EU donor was involved in each

sector considered important for poverty reduction. Hence the Code of Conduct, if

properly implemented, has the potential to address problems both of duplication and of

neglect. These measures are far reaching and impinge significantly upon Member State

sensitivities. They also imply a proactive coordination role for the Commission.

According to a consortium of development NGOs, ‘division of labour has become a top

priority. The issue is judged sensitive and complex but essential’ (Aprodev, Cidse,

Caritas Europa, 2007, p.1). What, then, are the prospects for success?

Examination of the Code of Conduct reveals major problems. In relation to country

specialisation, for example, there is insufficient appreciation of the extent to which

Member States are committed to traditional development partners. Moreover, the

mechanisms by which donors will be induced to provide assistance to ‘orphan’ countries

are not specified. Thus, as in the case of other PCD-related initiatives, provision for

policy implementation are inadequate, with participation in this voluntary Code of

Conduct dependent upon Member State willingness, not only to align their policies more

closely with other EU donors, but also to accept the significant reorientation of policy

that specialisation would entail. As the Commission acknowledges, the necessary

changes would require ‘a clear political mandate from the top level’ (Commission,

2007b, p.8). It may be that, as Schulz (2007, p.1) has argued, the Code of Conduct

reflects ‘a naïve and un-strategic view of the division of labour, which does not take into

account donor self-interest’. Certainly the challenges are daunting. Nevertheless, the

Code of Conduct is the culmination of ideas ‘progressively elaborated since 2004 over

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seven presidencies with the participation of experts of the Member States’ (Commission,

2007b, p.4). It is voluntary and seen as a long-term process, for which precedents have

already been established, both in relation to Community programmes and (some)

Member State efforts, notably among the ‘Nordic Plus’ group (Commission 2007b, p.

10).

Clearly achievement of the level of policy coordination demanded by the PCD agenda

requires both effective leadership and appropriate instruments. Here, various tools to

assist with coordination and monitoring progress are already in place. These include

(since 2003) annual reporting by the Commission on Member States’ implementation of

their MDG commitments and the EU Donor Atlas, jointly published by the Commission

and the OECD, which is based on questionnaires completed by the Member States and

the Commission. This provides a clear indication of levels of commitment to

achievement of PCD. Thus, in 2006, nine Member States (and the Commission) claimed

that their coordination with other Member States was ‘strong’,2 while, understandably, all

of the 2004 accession countries (except Cyprus) stated that coordination was weak. Here

it is noteworthy that Italy and Greece also reported ‘weak’ coordination, while France,

Germany, Luxembourg and Spain failed to respond to the question on this topic

(Commission/OECD, 2006).

A further, important monitoring mechanism has been the Commission’s biennial report

on the progress of PCD. The first such report (Commission 2007c) concluded that PCD

mechanisms were poorly institutionalized and unsystematically applied, while the most

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recent report (Commission 2009), whilst reporting generally raised levels of awareness

and positive progress by some Member States and in some policy sectors, concludes that

a more focused approach is needed – ‘The EU should select some key development

challenges, analyse how it can contribute to achieving them through the broad array of its

policies and instruments, and ensure political mobilization around these challenges.’ It is

to the challenge of sustainable development that we now turn.

The concept of sustainable development

The complex and contested nature of sustainable development has led some authors to

question ‘whether sustainable development can be defined in relatively succinct terms’

(Atkinson, Dietz and Neymeyer 2007, p.2). Here, we briefly examine the evolvution of

its meaning, both generally and in EU discourse.

The concept of sustainable development originated from concerns about increasing

degradation of the natural environment – initially articulated in the context of the 1972

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment [UNCHE]); and about the ‘limits

to growth’ likely to be imposed by the impending exhaustion of key natural resources.

The quadrupling of prices by oil exporting countries in 1973 added urgency to this

debate.

Inevitably, from the outset, North/South divisions were evident - concerning the extent to

which environmental concerns should be prioritised over the economic needs of

developing countries. It was not until 1987, however, that these concerns were linked

through the concept of sustainable development - in Our Common Future, the report of

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the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). Here, in perhaps the

most widely used definition of the concept, sustainable development is considered to be

‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of

future generations to meet their own needs’. ‘Needs’ are held to be the essential

requirements of the world’s poor, and development ‘the progressive transformation of

economy and society’ (WCED 1987, p.43).

This definition, as Brenton (1994: 129) has argued, ‘provided a slogan behind which first

world politicians with green electorates to appease, and third world politicians with

economic deprivation to tackle, could unite.’ In consequence the concept has been open

to competing interpretations, not least between North and South. Following the 1992

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), it also

broadened in scope, emphasising the interdependence between economic and social

development and environmental protection as the essential components of sustainability.

The proceedings at UNCED saw contestation between developed and developing

countries over the potential cost to the South of meeting the environmental requirements

of the North (Vogler 2007, p. 436). Here, the notion of ‘common but differentiated

responsibilities’ provided scope for North/South differences to be accommodated. While

this formula had significance for construction of the international climate regime,3 it has

relevance, too, for the EU approach to sustainable development.

The Union’s commitment to sustainable development was first articulated It was in the

context of UNCED, leading to its inclusion in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty as an

overarching objective of the Union. Subsequently, the extended period of preparation for

the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) saw considerable

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development of the Union’s approach (Burchell & Lightfoot 2004; Vogler & Stephan

2007) and in 2002 the Commission produced proposals for ‘a global partnership for

sustainable development’. This highlighted the ‘important responsibilities’ of

industrialised countries in promoting sustainable development (Commission 2002b: 5).

EU priorities in relation to development policy were stated to be combating poverty, in

particular extreme poverty, supporting sustainable management of natural and

environmental resources and promoting good governance at all levels - a ‘necessary

prerequisite for sustainable development’ (ibid: 15).

Following a review process, a renewed strategy was published in 2006. This begins with

perhaps the most extended definition of sustainable development yet to be formulated -

It is about safeguarding the earth’s capacity to support life in all its

diversity and is based on the principles of democracy, gender equality,

solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, including

freedom and equal opportunities for all. It aims at the continuous

improvement of the quality of life and well-being on Earth for present and

future generations. To that end it promotes a dynamic economy with full

employment and a high level of education, health protection, social and

territorial cohesion and environmental protection in a peaceful and secure

world, respecting cultural diversity. (Council 2006b: 2)

Inevitably, the Union’s approach has been criticised – most particularly for its emphasis

on economic growth and relative neglect of environmental issues (Pallemaerts 2006;

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Hontelez 2006); and it is noteworthy that ‘environmental protection’ is among the last of

the many desirable outcomes included in the above definition. Since redistribution of

wealth and other resources is not contemplated, economic growth (even within the EU) is

seen as compatible with sustainable development; and in the poorest regions it is an

essential precondition. Nevertheless, combating climate change, protection of

biodiversity and of the natural environment more generally are regarded as essential

components of sustainability. The issue for the EU then becomes how to promote and

manage growth in ways that enhance quality of life and are sustainable.

Despite the difficulties associated with sustainable development as an imprecise and

contested concept, it has the effect of drawing attention to, and linking, a number of

significant issues for development policy. These include –

that approaches to development must take account of intergenerational equity

that intra-generational equity issues between North and South can be addressed

through adoption of common but differentiated responsibilities

that sustainable development incorporates social, environmental and governance

issues as well as economic factors.

The comprehensive nature of the sustainability agenda is reflected in a ‘midpoint’ review

of the MDG prepared for the European Commission, where has been concluded that the

MDG should be considered ‘as part of an overall sustainable development strategy rather

than a set of independent targets (Bourguignon 2008, p.5). The implications of the

sustainability agenda for development policy are profound. It cuts across all aspects of

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policy and represents, in consequence, the quintessential challenge to policy coherence.

We now turn to the Union’s role and record in promoting sustainability.

Promoting sustainable development?

Internationally, the EU has been a major promoter of the concept of sustainable

development. It has played a prominent role in the Commission on Sustainable

Development and is considered to have been instrumental in promoting reforms that aim

to make this body more effective (Vogler & Stephan 2007:, p.13). At the WSSD, too, the

EU was among the strongest promoters of the sustainability agenda, succeeding in

pushing through a number of initiatives (Lightfoot & Burchell 2004).4

From the EU perspective, there has been a clear ambition to assert influence in this area -

The European Union is well placed to assume a leading role in the pursuit

of global sustainable development. It is the world’s largest donor of

development aid, the world’s biggest trading partner, and a major source

of direct private investments. It has developed and promoted a great

number of clean technologies. (Commission 2002c: 6)

The Union’s rhetorical commitment to sustainable development is not in question. Our

concern is with the extent to which EU actions are directed towards the Treaty

commitment to ‘foster the sustainable economic and social development of the

developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them’ (TEC

Article 177). In particular we are concerned with the extent to which there is coherence

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between the external impacts of EU internal policies and the promotion of sustainable

development.

Here the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) upon trade in agricultural

products has particular significance - together with that of the Common Fisheries Policy

(CFP), which is discussed later. The CAP, in obliging the Union to dispose of surplus

agricultural products on world markets through use of subsidies, has had long-term

adverse effects on agricultural production and food security in developing countries.5

Clearly, the negative external impacts of internal policies are difficult to reconcile with

rhetorical commitments to sustainability. Nevertheless, the Union has undoubtedly

responded to such criticism - indeed its PCD strategy represents an important part of that

response.

A further policy sector having significance for sustainable development is environmental

protection. As one of the largest polluters and resource exploiters on earth, the EU

inevitably casts a long ecological shadow. Approximately 40% of the resources

consumed within the Union are sourced beyond its borders, ‘indicating continuous

pressure on the global environment’ (Bringezu & Schütz 2001, p. 12). In the case of the

CFP, more than 50% of fish consumed within the EU has, since 1987, been sourced from

outside European waters (Commission 2001b: 9). In relation to climate change,

undoubtedly the most important challenge to sustainable development, the Union, with an

economy second in scale only to that of the USA, is also the second highest (per capita)

emitter of carbon dioxide. In this important aspect of sustainable development the Union

can justifiably claim to have played a proactive external role, emerging during the

ratification process of the Kyoto Protocol as a major player. Indeed at that time the Union

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was considered to have become ‘the only game in town’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin

2001, p.13). At the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, however, it

became clear that the influence of the Union had declined to the extent that it was

unsuccessful in achieving several of its more ambitious aims (European Voice 7-13

January 2010). This failure of EU leadership has considerable implications for its ability

to promote sustainable development externally.

Within the European Union, effective policy coordination across all the areas subsumed

by the concept of sustainable development provides significant challenges. A plethora of

mechanisms, which can be divided into high-level coordination strategies and

mechanisms at the level of day-to-day policy making, has been developed to address

them (Adelle, Hertin & Jordan 2006, p. 69).

Strategic initiatives in relation to sustainable development include the Cardiff Process,

launched at the 1998 Cardiff European Council, which invited ‘all relevant formations of

the Council to establish their own strategies for giving effect to environmental integration

and sustainable development within their respective policy areas’ (Presidency

Conclusions 1998: 32). However, this has tended to be viewed by participants as ‘a pro

forma exercise’ (Pallemaerts 2006, p. 27).

Mechanisms to promote policy coordination at the operational level include the Impact

Assessment regime developed by the Commission, which aims to provide ‘a more

coherent implementation of the European Strategy for Sustainable Development’

(Commission 2002d, p. 2). Since 2003 all major policy initiatives have been required to

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undergo an evaluation process to assess ‘the likely positive and negative impacts of

proposed policy actions….and identify trade-offs in achieving competing objectives

(ibid). While there is a requirement that the external dimensions of sustainable

development are included in Impact Assessments, this aspect has been relatively

neglected. Thus analysis by Adelle, Hertin & Jordan (2006) of the 41 Impact

Assessments conducted in 2003 and 2004 found the degree of consideration given to the

external dimension to be ‘extremely low’. Moreover, despite a requirement that all

relevant stakeholders must be involved in the process of preparing Impact Assessments,

there was a lack of consultation with developing country representatives, development

NGOs ‘and in some cases even DG Development’ (ibid: 68).

It would appear that, despite these many efforts, coordination of policies to promote

sustainable development and achievement of PCD remain elusive. We turn now to an

examination of these issues in relation to the Union’s fisheries agreements with

developing countries.

Sustainable development and the Union’s external fisheries agreements

The European Union had, by the 1980s, established itself as a very significant actor in the

politics of world fisheries. Its activities, however, were increasingly seen to contradict its

declared support for the norms of sustainable development. Expectations arose that the

EU should create a fisheries policy that had relevance for all aspects of sustainable

development – economic, social and environmental. The threat to the marine

environment posed by over-exploitation of fish and other marine resources is well

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known, but it is worth noting that, in global terms, by 2000 approximately 25% of world

fish stocks were overexploited and depleted and a further 50% fully exploited (FAO

2004). Fish are of great importance to food security, particularly in the poorest

developing countries, providing more than 2.6 billion people with at least 20% of their

average per capita annual protein intake in 2002.

In many of the developing countries which have fisheries agreements with the EU, the

artisanal fishing sector is crucially important to food security (European Centre for

Development Policy Management [ECDPM] 2005, p. 10). The Commission has

acknowledged that the external dimension of the CFP is ‘partly responsible for over-

exploitation of the fishing grounds of some third countries’ (Commission 2001b, p. 18).

Over-fishing endangers not only the marine environment but the health, livelihood and

social cohesion of coastal communities. Insofar as fishing is carried out by non-local or

national fleets, it also constrains economic development more broadly, in that fish and

fisheries products are among the few areas where the export activities of developing

countries have increased, their value, exceeding 1.74 billion euros in 2003 (ECDPM

2005, p. 9). Prioritised by the Union as a consequence of the colonial legacy, and

involving many of the world’s poorest countries, the EU’s fisheries agreements with

(particularly) African countries are of great significance. It is in this context that the CFP

came to represent a serious a serious problem for the Union’s aspirations to leadership in

sustainable development policy – and, on consequence, a particular challenge to its PCD

agenda.

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The Union had always provided one of the largest world markets for fish products and

some of the Member States, particularly Britain and France, possessed substantial deep-

water fishing fleets. These were augmented by the accession of Spain and Portugal.

Although the possibility of a common fisheries policy formed part of the agricultural

provisions of the Rome Treaty, the real impetus for the CFP was provided by dramatic

changes in the external environment. In 1976, the Member States, in common with many

other coastal states, agreed to create Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZ) that extended

their control of marine resources from 12 to 200 nautical miles.6 This necessitated market

integration at the EU level and also measures to secure access by European deep water

fleets to their traditional fishing grounds, from which they were excluded by the newly

created EEZ. The CFP, which came into effect in 1983, provided for common

management of fisheries in EU waters and external representation of EU fishing interests

by the Commission. Thus, negotiation of fisheries agreements with third parties became a

matter for the Union but it remained the sole responsibility of member states to carry out

the necessary control and surveillance of their fishing vessels. This division of

responsibility has profound implications both for the PCD strategy and for the Union’s

sustainable development efforts, as we shall see.

Even before establishment of the CFP, the Commission had begun to negotiate fisheries

access agreements with third countries, one of the first being concluded with Senegal in

1979. The established practice has been to sign an initial agreement and then to

supplement it with short term protocols -16 have been negotiated with Senegal, the last

terminating in mid 2006. Subsequently, two main types of agreement were developed;

reciprocal and compensatory. The first involves an exchange of fishing opportunities with

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countries such as Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Compensatory agreements were

much more numerous and raise key issues of development and sustainability. They

depended upon payment of financial compensation by the EU (and in part by private

European ship owners) in return for access to the third country’s fishing grounds.7 By the

late 1990s there were a number of such agreements (the so-called Southern Agreements)

around the African coast, in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. EU deep water fleets thus

gained access to a variety of valuable stocks - pelagic fish including tuna, sardines and

mackerel as well as demersal species, such as octopi and shrimps. In the late 1990s the

EU catch under the Southern Agreements totaled 240,000 tonnes per annum from an

annual total of 590,000 under all the external fisheries agreements (IFREMER 1999,

p.10).

The compensatory agreements are of two types. First, the tuna agreements, restricted to

this high value species. Tuna are highly migratory ocean going fish that are caught either

by ‘seine’ nets, surface long-lines or pole and line. The use of purse seines by the EU

fleet is particularly controversial because of the by-catch that is associated with this

fishing method. There can also be major problems in establishing exactly where tuna

have been caught, given their propensity to swim cross the borders of EEZs. The EU

currently has tuna agreements with Cape Verde, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mauritius, São

Tomé and Principé, the Seychelles and the Solomon Islands. Because of the nature of

tuna fishing there is usually no direct competition with local fishermen and conflicts of

interest between the EU and local industry revolve around processing and canning for

export.

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With the other type of ‘mixed agreement’ there is scope for direct clashes of interest

between the EU and local fishing communities. Mixed agreements often include tuna

alongside a range of other stocks, cephalopods, crustaceans and pelagic fish, where EU

activity (including bycatch) can directly impact upon the livelihood of local ‘artisanal’

fishermen. Shrimp fisheries provide a case in point. Mixed agreements extend down the

West African coast - Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Côte

d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Angola have fisheries agreements, although in

some cases no protocol is currently in force. There is also a mixed agreement with

Mozambique. In the non-tuna fisheries sectors Morocco has been the EU’s most

important fishing ground, followed by Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Angola.8

While the direct economic benefits to the Union were highly concentrated in particular

fishing communities in Spain, Portugal and to a lesser extent France, the importance of

the compensatory payments was of an altogether different order for the recipients. For

São Tomé, EU fishery payments represented 13% of total budget revenue, for

Mauritania, 15% and for Guinea Bissau a massive 30% (IFREMER 1999, p.19). In

return for these payments the EU’s deep water fleets gained access to the marine

resources of some of the world’s poorest countries.9 Understandably there has been

considerable criticism of these agreements, which demonstrate ‘outright policy

incoherence’ (UNDP, 2005, p. 145). In the case of Senegal -

After 15 years of ‘cooperation’ with the European Union, Senegal’s

fishing sector is in deep crisis. Stocks have been severely depleted,

disrupting the artisan sector, pushing up fish prices in local markets and

jeopardizing supplies to canning factories producing for export (ibid).

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The legal basis of the EU’s compensatory agreements is that a harvestable surplus of fish

must exist within the EEZs of partner countries. Article 62 of the 1982 Law of the Sea

Convention states:

The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the

exclusive zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the

entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements…give

other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.

This is access, not ownership, and access to what remains a common property resource,

which now has to be shared between traditional users and incoming highly efficient and

heavily capitalised boats. A major problem is that, for the most part, the ‘surplus of the

allowable catch’ is difficult to establish. This would require an understanding of the

maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for specific stocks in particular locations, and in

many cases reliable scientific data does not exist. Such knowledge is vital for the

sustainable management of stocks - involving the amount of fishing ‘effort’ in terms of

boats permitted to fish and the setting of a total allowable catch (TAC), plus other

regulation on biological rest periods and net sizes.

Further questions surround the wider ecological damage caused by modern intensive

fishing methods such as bottom trawling. One justification for enclosing 90% of the

world’s fisheries in EEZs was to avoid the ‘tragedies of the commons’ associated with

open access fisheries. However, this requires effective policing to combat what is termed

IUU, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. Unfortunately, such practices appear to

be rife in the fishing grounds off the African coast, involving as many as 50% of active

23

vessels, and the developing countries concerned simply lack the resources, and

sometimes the will, to monitor, police and sustain their fisheries.10 After all, even with all

the advantages enjoyed by some of the richest nations on earth, the CFP has hardly been

a resounding success in this regard!11

A bleak, but not entirely unfair, conclusion would be that, having destroyed much of their

own fisheries through short term unsustainable practices and the subsidisation of

excessive fishing effort, the Europeans proceeded to make agreements allowing them to

repeat this performance in the fishing grounds off the African coast. Before 2002, the

EU’ Southern Agreements were aptly characterised as ‘pay, fish and leave’ (Directorate-

General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (undated).

With regard to compensatory payments, it has been ‘difficult to trace to what use’ money

paid into national budgets was put, although some of it may have been dedicated to

development of fisheries (IFREMER 1999:19). However, compensation payments did

not generally reach those most likely to be directly affected by the activities of the EU

fleet, the small scale ‘artisanal’ fishing communities. Here was a real challenge to PCD

and to sustainable development, for such local communities rarely enjoyed access to

official aid programmes and found themselves in competition with large, technically

well-equipped and highly subsidised European boats. In Senegal, for example, there are

60,000 artisan fishermen who traditionally catch more than 70% of the fish consumed

locally, but as fish stocks diminished they were forced to travel further and further to

make their catches. This was one reason why the Senegalese government broke off

24

negotiations with the Commission for a new protocol in 2002, citing EU demands for an

annual increase in catch quota from 10 to 16,000 tonnes and an increase in vessels

permitted to fish from 148 to 207. Although the EU catch was less than that of local

fishermen it was implicated in a decline in stocks, and EU fishing and processing was

also seen by the Senegalese government as a barrier to the development of local industry,

fish having now surpassed groundnuts as the primary Senegalese export (Africa

Recovery, 2002). There continues to a complex of trade and employment-related issues

associated with the fisheries agreements. EU boats can employ local crew and use local

port and processing facilities – although by reason of geography this is more likely in the

Indian Ocean than in the east central Atlantic where Spanish boats can be based in the

Canary Islands.

The negative outcomes of the CFP, both in its external dimensions and internally

attracted much criticism, and to pressure for reform. Indeed, such has been the

opprobrium attracted by the CFP in international fora, the Commission concluded that ‘If

the current external fisheries policy is not adapted to changing circumstances and to new

challenges, the status of the Community as a major and responsible international player

will be undermined’ (Commission 2001c, p.19). Following a process of consultation a

reform of the CFP was introduced in 2002. As a consequence, the Union’s access

agreements with third countries were replaced by Fisheries Partnership Agreements

(FPA) that provide a legally binding framework through which ‘policy dialogue’ about

sensitive sustainability issues can be promoted (Commission 2002d, p. 6). To reinforce

this ‘dialogue’ (our interviews with representatives of ACP countries suggest that

‘monologue’ tends to be a more appropriate description), EU financial contributions are

25

divided between payment for access and support for fisheries management activities in

recipient countries. The Agreements were intended to demonstrate the Union’s

commitment both to sustainable and responsible fisheries policy and to poverty reduction

in developing countries. Hence, it was emphasised, PCD principles would be ‘strictly

respected’ (ibid).

Subsequently, while it is acknowledged that ‘small improvements towards sustainability’

have been achieved (Eshelby 2007, p. 27), there has been a tendency to extend rather than

renew existing agreements, at least on a temporary basis. This has been the case in

relation to Guinea Bissau and Senegal, whose agreements (considered unsustainable by

environmentalists) expired in 2006. In those countries, as a consequence of overfishing,

artisanal fishing communities have been forced to seek alternative sources of income. In

Senegal ‘migration has grown profitable’, with many fishermen engaged in transporting

illegal migrants to Spain. According to one fisherman from the Saloum Delta, ‘In the

bigger fishing boats we can fit 60 people lying down and carry them across to Europe. It

is a better way to make money than fishing’ (quoted in Eshelby 2007, p. 28). This

boomerang effect, which is also highlighted by the International Organisation for

Migration (2007), is a particularly unhappy consequence of policy incoherence.

The FPA negotiated with the government of Guinea Bissau in 2007 provides some

evidence of the characteristics of the new agreements. While licences for tuna vessels are

reduced from 70 to 37, opportunities in other areas are broadly maintained. The EU’s

annual financial contribution is maintained at around €7 million, 35% being targeted to

26

fisheries projects with an additional annual €500,000 payment earmarked to improving

sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) conditions in the fishery and to strengthening

monitoring, control and surveillance (Agritrade Fisheries 2007). This reflects a pattern

observable in recent protocols, where targeted actions ‘to promote conservation of

resources and sustainable development’ represent a defined percentage of the

compensatory payments. This ranges from 100% in the Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique

protocols through 60% for Gabon and Comoros, 37% for Morocco and 13% for

Mauritania (Commission, 2007d). These actions are highly specific to the fisheries sector

and concentrate on port infrastructure development, strengthening surveillance and

control, quality control of fish products, scientific research and training, plus support for

participation in international fisheries meetings. Only rarely is there any reference to

support for small scale fisheries.12 The focus is institutional, scientific and regulatory and

one may contrast the amount spent upon collecting biological data on stocks with the

dearth of information on the socio-economic impacts of fisheries policy -

Whilst biological data on ACP fish resources are often scarce, economic,

social and environmental data on ACP marine ecosystems are generally

non-existent. This leads to an underestimation of, for example, the social

and economic importance of small-scale fishing communities, or the

fragility of some ACP coastal ecosystems (Agritrade fisheries, 2007).

The principal source of this policy incoherence is the fundamental contradiction between

the needs and demands of the EU-based fishing industry and its customers, and the

sustainable development objectives of the Union. Thus, the first aim of the post-2002

Partnership Agreements is to protect the activities of EU deep water fleets ‘because of

27

their special nature and their connection to regions which are highly dependant on

fisheries’; and the second to ‘establish sustainable fisheries outside Community waters’

(Council 2004, p.3).

The Commission acknowledges that, despite the 2002 reforms, the CFP continues to be

both incoherent and unsustainable. This is plainly stated in the 2009 Green Paper on

(further) reform of the CFP –

The main objective for activities under the external dimension of the

Common Fisheries Policy should be to extend the principles of

sustainable and responsible fisheries internationally. Other objectives that

currently guide the external dimension of the CFP, such as maintaining

the presence of an EU fleet internationally and ensuring that this fleet

supply the EU market, may be less relevant today (Commission 2009b,

p.22).

In an explicit reference to PCD issues, the Green Paper reports that, while the post-2002

FPAs have supported the development of the industry, this has not been ‘in a way to have

a significant impact on the fight against poverty and the achievement of the Millennium

Development Goals. The external fisheries policies should better take into account the

food security strategies of the third countries’ (ibid, p.23). Despite this the Green Paper –

which is under consultation until Autumn 2010 – contains few concrete proposals for

achievement of PCD.

Clearly, the external dimension of the CFP suffers from deficiencies in both horizontal

and thematic coherence. In relation to vertical coherence, significant differences are

28

evident between the priorities of Member States. Germany is said to be most supportive

of developmental and environmental interests, while Spain is the strongest supporter of

EU producer and consumer interests (OECD 2004, p. 50). Such differences have

contributed to difficulties in agreeing and implementing reform and in concluding FPAs

with third countries.

The challenges facing thematic horizontal are considerable. Since many of these are

implicit in the discussion above, the focus here is upon a range of trade issues that impact

upon sustainable development. The EU is the world’s most important market for fishery

products and is the destination for approximately 75% of ACP fishery exports (ECDPM

2005, p. 9). Since export earnings are greater for processed or canned fish products, ACP

efforts to increase the proportion of such exports (currently approximately 40%) would

be expected. A number of factors combine to inhibit this, however. The first of these is

lack of basic infrastructure in ACP countries. Here it is noteworthy that financial

payments for fisheries access made by DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs have far

exceeded the value of development assistance to the fishing sector provided by DG

Development (ibid: p.8). Moreover, access payments, 65% of which are funded by the

EU and the remainder by vessel owners, represent a substantial subsidy to the EU-based

fishing industry.

Other impediments relate directly to market access. First, despite the beneficial access

currently accorded to ACP products, the Union’s rules of origin requirements stipulate

that fishery products must be obtained using ACP or EU vessels. In circumstances where

the necessary vessels are not available in ACP countries (this applies in particular to the

lucrative tuna fisheries), ACP processors are obliged to purchase fish from expensive EU

29

suppliers rather than more competitive sources. Second, various technical barriers impede

ACP market access, in particular SPS requirements. Without adequate financial

assistance, the cost of meeting EU hygiene and food safety regulations is too high for

many ACP governments. In consequence they have ‘no choice but to enter into fisheries

agreements’ (ECDPM 2005, p. 15). It is important to note that these market access

restrictions are not related to sustainability of fish stocks but to the ability to benefit

financially from their exploitation. In the high value-added sectors of the fishing industry,

ACP and EU producers are in direct competition.

Conclusion

Sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals are, as we have seen,

intimately connected; and progress towards policy coherence is essential for their

realization. The ‘overarching objective’ of sustainability would challenge the policy

coherence mechanisms of any political system, and the complex and fragmented nature

of the EU system generates unique coordination problems. Nevertheless the most

fundamental element of sustainable development, poverty reduction in the world’s

poorest countries, is compromised by lack of coherence between development

commitments and policies such as the CFP. Developing country exports comprise a very

small proportion of EU trade, of which fisheries products are only a part. The

impediments to market access experienced by the ACP fisheries sector are incompatible

with notions of equity between North and South, just as overexploitation of ACP marine

resources by EU fleets is incompatible with notions of inter-generational equity and

30

environmental sustainability. While the new generation of Partnership Agreements

prioritises sustainability of fish stocks, broader environmental and development issues

continue to be marginalised. Ultimately, the CFP case demonstrates that EU economic

interests take precedence over commitment to promote sustainable development in

general and poverty eradication in particular.

These policy coherence problems are readily acknowledged within the EU, and various

attempts have been made to address them with, as yet, little success - as we have seen.

There has been some optimism within the NGO community that the provisions of the

Lisbon Reform Treaty will prove conducive to greater policy coherence (Bond 2008;

Eurostep 2009). This hinges upon the language of the Treaty, with its strengthened

commitment to PCD, and upon the structural innovations that give the potential for a

coordinating role across all external policy for the High Representative and the External

Action Service. The strengthened involvement of the European Parliament, particularly in

relation to the CFP, may also prove to be a positive development. In anticipation of this,

the EP has already passed resolutions strongly supporting the principles of PCD,

specifically in relation to fisheries policy (European Parliament 2008).

Clearly it is too early to assess the extent to which optimism is well founded, but the early

period since entry into force of the Reform Treaty has been characterized by uncertainty

and division, not least over responsibility for development policy. The setbacks for the

Union’s climate change negotiators at Copenhagen in December 2009 have also

31

contributed to the prevailing climate of uncertainly over external policy in general, and

sustainable development in particular. A final setback has been a report by the OECD

(April 2010) that there was a reduction of development assistance by eleven Member

States in 2009, with the result that the EU is failing to reach its own development

assistance targets. This reflects the impact of the financial crisis upon Member State

budgets and provides a stark indication of the additional challenges facing PCD and the

Union’s sustainable development objectives.

The Union has chosen to emphasise its commitment to sustainable development.

However, this presented an easy target to critics of its external policy. Fisheries policy

presents a particularly pointed example. By its very nature, sustainable development

requires horizontal policy coherence. The peculiarities of the EU require vertical

coherence as well. Carbone (2008, p. 323) regards this as ‘Mission Impossible’. Whether

the Lisbon Treaty can modify this conclusion remains to be seen.

1 Of the fifteen pre-2004 Member States, all except Greece and Spain devote a considerable proportion of assistance to Africa. The highest proportion is provided by Belgium at 81% (Commission/OECD, 2006). 2 These were Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (Commission/OECD, 2006).

3 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change requires that reductions in greenhouse gas emission be made only by developed countries in the first commitments period. 4 These include EU initiatives on ‘Water for Life’, ‘Energy for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development’ and ‘Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade’. 5 Among the most notorious examples are exports of beef and tomato concentrate to West Africa, of dairy products to Tanzania, Brazil and Jamaica and of canned fruit to South Africa (OECD 2004). 6 EEZ were created in the context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They do not apply in the narrow waters of the Mediterranean. 7 The current ratio of payments between EU and vessel owners is 65:35. The only compensatory fishing agreement with a northern country involves Greenland.

32

8 Under the Southern agreements, with more than 87% of the total catch, Spain eclipses all other Member States in terms of volume (not including tuna catches). Morocco was the major source of the catch, accounting for over 74%. It far outstripped Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Angola (these four together accounting for more than 25% of the total). The other fisheries agreements are therefore of limited significance (IFREMER 1999:10).

9 Their 2006 HDI rankings (UNDP 2006) were as follows: Guinea Bissau 173rd , Mozambique 168th, Côte d’Ivoire 164th, Angola 161st, Senegal 156th, Guinea 160th, Gambia 155th, Mauritania 153rd, Madagascar 143rd, Comoros 132nd, São Tomé & Principe 127th, Morocco 123rd and Cape Verde 106th (the lowest ranked state in the international system is Niger at 177th place). 10 Greenpeace conducted surveys off the Guinean coast in 2001 and 2006 and found that the situation had hardly changed, with half of the 92 vessels sighted in 2006 suspected of IUU (Agritrade Fisheries 2007). 11 Effective monitoring of fishing activity is at the heart of CFP reform. Satellite-based vessel monitoring systems have been mandatory in EU vessels over 24 metres in length since 2000 and there are plans to extend its use to the monitoring of EU fisheries agreements. 12 For example the 2004-2008 Guinea Protocol has a targeted financial contribution of €1,400,000 distributed as follows:

1. financing of scientific and technical programmes to improve information on fishery and biological resources of the Republic of Guinea’s fishing zone:250,000 euros;

2. support for fisheries surveillance and management of fishing effort: 400,000 euros; 3. support for small scale fishing: 175,000 euros; 4. institutional support for the Ministerial bodies responsible for fisheries:250,000 euros; 5. funding for training in different scientific, technical and economic disciplines related to fisheries:

15,000 euros; 6. contribution to and participation by the Republic of Guinea in international fisheries

organizations:175,000 euros. (Commission 2007c).

1

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