towards a sociology of energy and globalization
TRANSCRIPT
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Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
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riginal research article
owards a sociology of energy and globalization: Interconnectedness,apital, and knowledge in the Brazilian solar photovoltaic industry
uiz Enrique Vieira de Souza a,∗, Alina Mikhailovna Gilmanova Cavalcante b
School of Electrical Engineering—Beijing Jiaotong University, Nr. 3 Shangyuancun, Haidian District, Beijing, ChinaInstitute of Philosophy and Human Sciences—University of Campinas, R. Cora Coralina 100, Cidade Universitária Zeferino Vaz, Campinas, CEP 13083-896,ão Paulo, Brazil
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:eceived 27 January 2016eceived in revised form 8 July 2016ccepted 16 July 2016
eywords:
a b s t r a c t
Brazil has enormous silicon reserves and solar irradiance levels, but the participation of solar energy in itselectricity mix was inexpressive until recently. However, the current policies of the Brazilian governmenthave been responsible for an increasing deployment of photovoltaic (PV) systems and thus provided morefavorable conditions for the emergence of a national PV industry. This article analyzes the development ofthe Brazilian PV sector in its “interconnectedness” with the global renewable energy market and therefore
hotovoltaic energyrazilhinaenewable energy industryociology of globalization
is presented as a contribution for the energy studies, as well as an empirical case for the “sociology ofglobalization”. The Chinese policies for photovoltaic energy are taken as parameter for the discussion ofthe Brazilian experience in order to highlight the growing importance of renewable energy investments inemerging economies and the decisive role played by the national States in pushing forward the renewableenergy industry as a strategic sector for their privileged insertion in the competitive global order.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
Mainly due to the contribution of sugar cane products (7.3%) andydropower (65.2%), the share of renewable sources accounts for4.6% of the Brazilian electricity mix, thus placing the country above
he international renewable energy (RE) average [1]. However, inhe field of solar energy the country performed poorly until 2013,hen the on-grid installed capacity for photovoltaic (PV) genera-Abbreviations: ANEEL, National Agency of Electric Energy; BNDES, Nationalank for Socioeconomic Development; CDB, China Development Bank; CNY, Chi-ese Yuan; CO2, carbon dioxide; EU, European Union; FCO, Midwest Developmentund; FDI, Foreign Direct Investments; FDNE, Northeast Development Fund; FIT,eed in tariff; FYP, Five-Year Plan; GW, gigawatt; GWh, gigawatt-hour; IEA, Interna-ional Energy Agency; kWh, kilowatt-hour; LCOE, levelized costs of electricity; MW,
egawatt; NDRC, National Development Reform Commission; PADIS, Program forhe Technological Development Support of the Semiconductor Industry; PRODEEM,rogram for Energy Development of States and Municipalities; ProGD, Developmentrogram for Distributed Power Generation; PROINFA, Incentive Program for Alter-ative Sources of Electricity; PV, photovoltaic; R&D, Research and Developmen; RE,enewable energy; SWH, solar water heater; WTO, World Trade Organization.∗ Corresponding author. Permanent address: Center for Environmental Studiesnd Research—University of Campinas, Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas AmbientaisNEPAM), Rua dos Flamboyants 155, Cidade Universitária Zeferino Vaz, Campinas,EP 13083-866, São Paulo, Brazil.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L.E.V. de Souza),[email protected] (A.M.G. Cavalcante).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.07.004214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
tion was restricted to only 5 MW. In Brazil, PV energy was usuallydeployed in remote areas without access to the transmission lines,but even if we consider the capacity of 30 MW registered in 2011for off-grid systems, the total participation of PV was still verymodest. The main reason for that was associated to the fact thatother renewable energy technologies presented lower costs thanPV. Therefore, PV was not listed in the PROINFA (Incentive Programfor Alternative Sources of Electricity, decree n. 5025, 2004), whichestablished minimum deployment targets and a complementarytariff for small scale hydropower stations, wind power and otherplants fueled by biomass in order to compensate the disadvantagesof such technologies in relation to the more competitive prices ofthe electricity generated by conventional power plants.
In spite of that, Brazil is currently undergoing a major turningpoint in its policies for solar energy. The government assigned thePV industry as a strategic sector and also established a set of mea-sures to promote more investments in this area. The institution ofthe net metering system enabled the independent generators tofeed the grid with their exceeding electricity, using it as a battery,and compensate with the same amount of electricity in the periodswhen solar irradiance is not enough to supply their consumption.Besides, the National Agency of Electric Energy (ANEEL) has pro-
moted several exclusive auctions for solar energy. As a result, theregistered number of small generators rose from 189 in June 2014to 1232 in October 2015, and the stakeholders in the PV industryestimate that 3.5 GW of solar energy might be deployed in the next
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our years [2]. Moreover, the government provided the auction win-ers with low interest rate loans on condition that they purchase
ocal assembled PV panels. This local content rule incentivized thestablishment of PV factories, although with uncompetitive pricesomparing with the imported Chinese PV panels.
Consequently, the purpose of this article is to analyze the emer-ence of the PV industry in Brazil and the importance of theeasures implemented by the government to boost the national
V market. Nevertheless, a comprehensive view on this process cannly be achieved if the Brazilian scenario is analytically situated inhe framework of the global energy markets. First of all, because theiscourse of climate changes to which the deployment of renew-ble energies is associated, constitutes an international narrative.econdly, the energy market is highly globalized, as the researchnd development of RE technologies and the manufacturing value-hain of energy equipment are geographically distributed in severalountries [3]. Finally, we argue in this article that national Stateseek to promote the internal development of the renewable energyndustry because they consider this sector fundamentally strategicor the good positioning of their respective economies in the global
arket.There is a tendency to take the existence of global energy
arkets as a given, a function of the power of transnational corpo-ations and the guidelines of national energy agencies. Nonetheless,
sociological inquiry needs to go beyond givens and attributes andxamine the making of these conditions, as well as the dynamicules according to which the involved actors design their strategies4]. Hence, our research is situated in the intersection of energytudies and the sociology of globalization: We will shed some lightn the global circuits for capital, knowledge, investment and trade
n the PV industry and thoroughly discuss the initiatives of therazilian government to insert the country in the transnational PVroduction chain.
Because China represents the gravitational center of the globalV manufacture, it will be taken as a reference for the analy-is of the Brazilian case. However, rather than merely comparinghese countries’ policies for the solar sector, we intend to high-ight the worldwide interconnectedness of production and marketshat constitutes the basis for the local development of the Brazil-an industry. In other words, the concept of “interconnectedness”ims to clarify those international links that function as causalmplications for determining the dynamic contexts in which theational States and energy enterprises define their plans. We willlso demonstrate that in a globalized economy the interconnectedeatures of the PV sector must be dialectic identified as both coop-ration and competition. Brazil is favored by the internationalesearch and development of solar panels, and its industry willnitially begin as an element of a transnational chain of the PV man-facture, but the telos underlying the governmental solar policiesas conceived according to the goal of progressively upgrading the
razilian participation in the global RE markets. On the theoreticalevel, this article investigates the emergence of the Brazilian PVndustry in order to shed some light on how nation States are pro-
oting the local renewable energy industry in the context of globalnterconnectedness and competitiveness.
. Theoretical framework and methodological approach
The evidence of globalizing dynamics in the energy sectoremands a corresponding theoretical view. It means that instead of
ollowing the mainstream approach in energy studies—according
o which the “nation State” is regarded as a closed unit and thenergy policies analyzed in the context of its limited territorialurisdiction—we intend to highlight the transboundary flows ofapital and know-how in the renewable energy sector in whicharch & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
the current Brazilian solar policies are embedded. In line with the“methodological cosmopolitanism” required by the object of thisresearch, the present article aims to contribute for the investiga-tions on renewable energy deployment in emerging economies andalso investigate the emergence of the Brazilian PV industry as anempirical case for the social studies of globalization [4].
The sociology of globalization has largely emphasized that animportant set of phenomena—climate changes, migrations, financemarket, identity—can no longer be understood in reference to theanalytical framework of the national States [4–7]. Local transfor-mations are due to more complex causal chains that cannot becircumscribed within national territories—and the more compactdimension of the global instances that followed the technologicalinnovations in the transport and communication infrastructureshas reconfigured the idea of national sovereignty in the sense thatchanges in the local contexts might be associated with processesthat are not completely under the legislation of national authorities.
The emergence of the PV industry in Brazil will be thus analyzedin consonance with the principles of “methodological cosmopoli-tanism”, such as developed by Ülrich Beck [7–9]. This theory isrelevant because it radically questions the division between the“inside” and the “outside” of social phenomena in relation totheir national borders. In the field of energy studies, it is espe-cially important because it offers an alternative reference for thewidespread research pattern that defines the problems of inves-tigation by focusing on the deployment of a certain technologyin a given country (e.g. the prospects of nuclear power in France,hydropower in China, wind power in Argentina). In short, one canhardly provide comprehensive studies on national energy policies,unless they are presented in connection to the dynamics of theglobal energy markets in which they are embedded [10]. That iswhy, rather than insulating the emerging Brazilian PV industryfrom the international arena, we will focus on the process by whichthe Brazilian government is developing measures to contribute forthe endogenization of the global dynamics in the national solarindustry.
Thus, we will consciously avoid treating the nation State as aclosed unit, as well as any sort of rigid conception of the “global”and the “local” as dualistic analytical categories. The theoreticaldivergences with the “methodological nationalism” do not imply,however, any underestimation of the actions taken by national gov-ernments to place their countries in a favorable position within thecompetitive world economy. Rather, we demonstrate that nationalStates played a decisive role in enabling the capabilities for globaloperation and coordination of the renewable energy market andwere also responsible for the policies that internalized the specificrules of the globalized PV market in national energy planning withthe purpose of strengthening the local manufacturers and theircompetitive insertion in the international arena.
In regard to our methodological approach, we based the argu-ments developed throughout this article both on primary andsecondary data. The secondary data were obtained in scientificarticles on the perspectives of PV energy in Brazil and China.The existing literature raised a number of questions, though,that demanded the gathering of original information. Hence,our primary data consist of five semi-structured interviews con-ducted along 2015: In China, we interviewed Shi Jingli, an energyresearcher from the Center for Renewable Energy Development andResearch Institute/National Development and Reform Commission.In Brazil, we interviewed the director Carlos Mattar and regulationspecialist Daniel Vieira from the distributed generation departmentat ANEEL, Professor Rafael Shayani from the University of Brasilia,
as well as two representatives of the PV manufacture company:Thatiane Roberto from Globo Brasil and Abdias Pontes from Mina-sol, both listed in the BNDES (National Bank for SocioeconomicDevelopment) catalogues of local manufactures. We also requested
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nterviews with representatives from BYD, S4 and Pure Energy, butince the requests were not replied, data about these enterprisesere collected from their respective websites.
. The scaling-up and reduction costs of photovoltaicanufacture in the north Atlantic-East Asia axis
In 2008, China reached the worldwide peak of solar panelsxport, and out of the 26,000 MW shipped, nothing less than 90%ere destined to Europe and North America [11]. On the demand
ide, the main explanation for the considerable increase in theurchase of solar equipment was the approval of supportive laws
or renewable technologies in European countries aiming at theccomplishment of their respective CO2 reduction targets. Ger-an, Spain and Italy were in the avant-garde of this process and,
ven though the specific regulations followed different strategies inach country, they consisted basically in providing financial incen-ives so that renewables could overcome their cost disadvantagesn relation to the conventional technologies.
In Germany, the Renewable Energy Law (2000) offered largeubsidies and government loans for RE producers, besides institut-ng the obligation for electric utilities to purchase all the electricityenerated by alternative sources. These measures were responsibleor increasing the German solar power generation from 64 kWh in000 to 28,060 GWh in 2012. The USA followed a different path andresented varied policies according to the legal framework of eachtate. The Investment Tax Credit (ITC), for instance, encouragednvestments in solar energy by reducing the tax liability for indi-iduals or businesses willing to acquire solar technologies. Alongith fiscal incentives, power purchase agreements and residential
olar leases also contributed for the United States to reach a PVumulative capacity of 7.2 GW in 2012 [12].
Therefore, the political interventions of some Northern coun-ries appear as the first causal element for the observed reduction inhe levelized costs of PV electricity (LCOE)—per-kilowatt hour costf building and operating a generating plant over an assumed finan-
ial life and duty cycle [13]. The “visible hand” of some developedations created incentives that pushed up the additional demandor solar energy and the prices of PV panels decreased substantiallyn the course of a few years (see Fig. 1). The growth in cumulative
c-Si module selling prices, 2000–2014.
installed capacity of solar PV from 1 GW in 2000 to 180 GW in 2014provoked the decline of the PV module cost due to the increase inthe volume of production. The second element in this causal chain isthe concentration of PV facilities in China. Indeed, the Chinese gov-ernment has stressed the relevance of its RE industry at least since1987, when it set up special interest-free loans for the promotionof solar energy [14].
More generally, the accession of China to the World Trade Organi-zation in 2001 has also contributed for increasing the Foreign DirectInvestments (FDI) in the energy field and facilitating the transfer-ence of some key renewable energy technologies along with thepurchase of production equipment [16]. Siemens Solar, Sayo, Sharp,SEC, among other international companies, promptly grasped thebusiness opportunity and started manufacturing solar panels inthe Chinese territory—and the volume of capital flows grew tosuch extent that, in 2009, China had attracted about one third ofthe global FDI in the PV industry. Meanwhile, a new generationof Chinese solar companies was grounded and their aggressiverecruitment strategies complemented the technological learningfrom the previous commercial exchange with foreign companies.According to Tour et al. [3], some highly skilled executives from theChinese diaspora built the pioneer PV firms and managed to fill theleading positions within their enterprises with other Chinese engi-neers and executives who, like themselves, had previously receivedforeign training.
These processes were in consonance with the governmentalmid- to long-term economic goal of gradually restructuring thecountry’s position in the international division of labour (NDRC,2012). China would be supposed to abandon its condition of “fac-tory of the world” to assume the historic opportunity of presentingitself as a major technology and innovation hub in East Asia. In otherwords, it would imply moving the emphasis of its industrial policiesfrom the pollution intensive manufacture of low value-added prod-ucts towards the scaling-up of high value-added renewable energyequipment and other low-carbon technologies [17]. Therefore, thecentral government identified the PV industry as a key element
in this strategy and included solar panels in the Catalog of Chi-nese High-Technology Products for Export (2006), commercializingthem at preferential rates.
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The easy access to finance is certainly one of the reasons whyhina became such an auspicious place for the development of theV industry. However, another decisive factor for the competitive-ess of the Chinese solar panels in international markets is the
nexpensive price of the electricity consumed by local industries.he PV value-chain is energy intensive, and electricity consump-ion is responsible for about 35% of the costs of polycrystallineilicon [18,19]. In this sense, the low prices enabled by the largeredominance of coal-fired thermal plants in the Chinese energyix provided a major contribution for the reduction costs of locally
roduced solar panels [20]. Of course the reduction of costs derivedrom the gains in scale and learning curve are in the core of the mar-et hegemony of Chinese-made solar panels, but such factors werectually enabled by the comparatively low prices of the electric-ty consumed by local industries. Thus, the environmental paradoxf the local PV industry is becoming competitive due to the pricedvantages of coal power. In other words, the advantages of PVeployment in terms of reducing greenhouse gases emissions areiminished when the solar panels are produced with electricity
rom highly pollutant coal plants, but competitiveness in the worldarket is measured by prices and not by life-cycle assessment cri-
eria.However, the decisions from Northern countries to interpose
ommercial barriers against Chinese solar panels were not basedn any life-cycle assessment consideration. Rather, it was an ini-iative to protect their respective national industries against theheaper prices of made-in-China solar cells. Indeed, the ChineseV sector succeeded in following the “go global” directive pre-ented in the 10th FYP. Suntech, Trina Solar, Solarfun, Yingli, JAolar and China Sunergy were listed either in the Nasdaq or in theew York Stock Exchange, enabling the attraction of international
apital, enhancing its international public image and highlightinghese enterprises’ international competitiveness. All these factorsogether helped Chinese companies to increase the volume of pro-uction, while some European or North American companies wereoing bankrupt. Some of those who managed to escape bankruptcyere merging with their Chinese competitors, like the example
f KSL Kutler (Germany), which was partially acquired by Suntechower in 2008 [21]. The statistics of International Energy AgencyIEA) [18] testifies this process showing that about one quarter ofhe 88,000 existing jobs in the German PV industry in 2012 hasince been lost—either because the companies were driven off thearket or because they moved to East Asia in order to catch up the
ompetitiveness trend.The competition with Chinese manufacturers had been severely
ggravated by the economic crisis of 2008. Fiscal concerns pushedermany and Spain to review the Feed in Tariff (FIT) mecha-isms, under which the system generators receive the fix amounthat added to the electricity price or generation cost. Many coun-ries reduced the FIT payments, while the British governmentnnounced that it would cut 50% of the subsidies given to the solarndustry [22]. In order to avoid the collapse of native PV manufac-urers, the European Commission approved in 2013 anti-dumpinguties on imports of solar panels of 47% on Chinese solar goods
n response to the complaints of dumping posed by the Germany-ased SolarWorld [23]. Something similar had taken place in theSA in the previous year, when the US Department of Commerce
mposed anti-dumping tax rates of 18.3%–249.9% on Chinese solarells, besides a final countervailing tax rate of 14.7%–15.9% [24].
These protectionist interventions revealed a double contradic-ion. On the side of Northern countries, it highlighted that the realbstacles for the achievement of a new energy paradigm go far
eyond the argument that blames the higher prices of the electricityenerated by renewables. It suffices to say that Chinese PV prod-cts were 30% cheaper than US solar panels before the approvalf the anti-dumping tax rates, but strictly nationalist industryarch & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
policies succeeded in displacing the more cosmopolitan envi-ronmental concerns. On the Chinese side, they exacerbated the“overcapacity crisis” in the PV sector, which by its turn made it clearthat the renewable energy policies designed by the Chinese cen-tral authorities had been driven by the “growth imperative” ratherthan by the “green imperative” [25]. Before the commercial restric-tions in the overseas markets, China exported more than 90% of itssolar panels, while domestic PV deployment was not particularlyrelevant.
In face of this scenario, the next section discusses how theChinese government managed to prevent its national PV sectorfrom breaking down. We will show that new incentive policies fordomestic deployment were issued and, as a consequence of that,the installed capacity experienced an exponential growth in thecountry. We will also argue that, even though such policies wereresponsible for increasing the participation of solar energy in theChinese energy mix, they were not fully efficient in coping withthe “oversupply” in the PV sector. This pushed the solar industryonce again to foreign markets and, since the “overcapacity crisis”contributed for a further reduction in the prices of solar cells, Chinacould turn its production and commercialization strategies towardsSouthern countries, among which Brazil is also included.
4. Strategies for coping with “overcapacity”: domesticdeployment and diversification of the Chinese photovoltaicmarket
The restrictions imposed by Northern countries do not config-ure any peculiarity of the PV field; rather, they exemplified one ofthe patterns in the trade relations between North-Atlantic coun-tries and China. Neither the United States nor the European Unionremains among the ninety-seven nations who had granted China“Market Economy Status” until 2009. North-Atlantic countries are,actually, those responsible for a large part of the dozens of anti-dumping investigations and countervailing duties faced by Chinaevery year in the World Trade Organization [26]. According to theterms of its accession to the WTO, China will automatically be qual-ified as “Market Economy Status” in 2016. This assured promotionhelps us to understand the non-confrontational approach adoptedby Beijing towards the accusations of “unfair trade”.
However, it is important to have in mind that the PV industrygenerates employment and income in more than 300 out of 600 Chi-nese cities, accounting for 1.6 million employees in 2014 [27]. Totalproduction value for the manufacturing side of the sector exceeded200 billion Yuan (approx. US$31.5 billion) for the first three quar-ters of 2015 [28]. Therefore, the potential negative impacts in termsof job and social stability have led the central government to com-pensate the vertical drops in the total value of PV exports withmassive programs for domestic deployment [29]. Previously, only asmall fraction of the production output was destined for the gener-ation of electricity within the Chinese territory—usually in remoterural areas where the installation of solar panels was more cost-effective than the extension of the grid lines: “Brightness Program”(1996) and “Township Electrification Program” (2002) [30].
This scenario has drastically changed since 2008, when PVsolar capacity in China consisted of merely 140 MW. The cen-tral government issued a set of measures destined to relieve thePV industry from its setbacks in the international market. TheChina Development Bank (CDB) gave 250 billion CNY (ChineseYuan) of extension credit to the sector and opened a line of credit
of US$ 30 billion for Chinese solar cell and module manufac-turers [17]. Along with the subsidized loans, the State was alsoresponsible for the further acceleration of the demand throughambitious solar programs—“Golden Sun Program” and “Rooftop
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Fig. 2. Global Horizource: [39].
ubsidy Program”—and the implementation of a nationwide FIT forV electricity [24].
The incentives resulted in exponential growth of the PV installedapacity. The initial target set in the “12th FYP for Renewable Energyevelopment in China” was 5 GW, but in 2012 the national statisticsad already registered 8 GW of cumulative installation. Hence, theeployment goals for the period were rediscussed and increasedeveral times, until the government finally set up the purpose ofeaching 35 GW by the end of 2015. In interview with the authors,
professor from the Center for Renewable Energy Developmentnergy Research Institute (NDRC) informed that the target had beenchieved six months before the schedule and that policy-makersere considering doubling this number in 2017. In case such trade
s confirmed, China will rank not only as the main PV manufacturer,ut also as the hugest market for solar panels worldwide [31].
However, the increment in PV installations also presented someeficiencies and exacerbated the structural overcapacity of thehinese PV industry. In the past, the main problems were associ-ted to the lack of supervision on PV systems. As we mentionedbove, the government sought to use solar panels for provid-ng electricity to millions of people living in remote areas of thempoverished Western and Northwestern provinces, but it didot offer training programs to qualify the local workforce for andequate maintenance of those systems. More recently, the large-cale deployment of solar panels was not accompanied by anquivalent increase in the use of solar electricity, for in provinces
ike Xinjiang nearly half of the electricity output was curtailed ineptember 2015. The reason for the “idle capacity” of PV plants isssociated with the reluctance from grid companies to purchasen amount of solar electricity above the quotas determined byIrradiance in Brazil.
the authorities [31]. Besides, the provinces located in the west ofthe Gobi desert—Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, Xinjiang—concentrate animportant proportion of the country’s solar plants, but they are verydistant from the biggest cities and the insufficient grid coverage isa barrier for transmitting the large surplus of PV electricity to themain consumption centers [32].
In other words, the large-scale deployment of solar energy inChina was enabled by a set of measures taken by the central gov-ernment to compensate the adverse scenario in North-Atlanticmarkets after 2008 and create demand for the PV industry in face ofits overcapacity crisis. On the one hand, these subsidies constitutedthe turning point for domestic deployment and thus contributed forfurther reductions in the costs of solar panels. On the other hand,such policies followed an erratic pattern, inflating the “overcapacitycrisis”, instead of successfully managing it [17]. The crisis is partic-ularly acute in the downstream sectors of the PV value-chain invirtue of their comparatively lower technological and investmententrance requisites—and the consequences are seen as some enter-prises suspend the production entirely, while others operate witha capacity utilization of only 20–30% [33].
The further accelerated growth of the Chinese PV sector hasimplied that many producers registered very low or even negativebalances. According to the government’s strategy, the resolutionof the overcapacity crisis will necessarily push several manufac-turers into bankruptcy, but at the same time will qualify theremaining ones for a more competitive position in the international
market. On the global level, this strategy also implies the diversi-fication of Chinese exports towards Southern countries. Althoughthe Japanese share increased six-fold between 2011 and 2013, thusbecoming the main importer of Chinese solar goods, the declining
150 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
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rices have reoriented the international flows of PV equipment,ugmenting the portion of developing countries from 6% to 23% inhe same interval [34].
The destinies of Chinese solar panels are mostly concentratedn East and Southern Asia, but Africa and Latin America have alsoained importance. Taiwan, Vietnam and Indonesia developed localactories that have close interactions with Chinese producers andecame part of a regional value-chain. They manufacture solar com-onents that will be assembled in China and from there reexportedo dozens of countries. Due to the implementation of “feed-in tar-ffs”, South Africa imported US$ 456 million out of the US$ 531
illion PV cells and modules shipped to Africa in 2013, but otherountries like Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya were gained by the Chineseolar market as well [34].
Latin America still occupies a peripheral position in the inter-ational flows of solar investments. In the total balance of ChineseDI to the Brazilian electricity market, only one project is related tohe PV sector—US$ 50 million are announced to be invested by BYDo establish PV manufacture facilities. Chile is the forerunner of PVnergy in the region, while Mexico appears as a strategic partneror the potential role that this country can play as a pivotal basisor Chinese exports to the United States [2]. Due to zero tariffs forolar cells import established in Mexico, the Chinese manufactur-rs install their production and assembly of solar panels and thenxport the final product to Americas with zero tariffs [35]. Brazilgures only at the 27th position in relation to Chinese PV exports
o developing countries, but it may also be considered strategic tohe PV market due to its huge solar resources and silicon reserves.n the next section, we will focus on the emergence of the BrazilianV industry as a result of the policies implemented by the federalovernment to increase the share of solar electricity in its energyix and to position the country among the global players of the PV
ector.
. Brazilian policies on solar energy: catalyzing the internalemand as a primary step for “going global”
Similarly as in China, the first PV systems in Brazil were installeds part of the guidelines to provide access to electricity in remotereas. In 1994, the national government created the PRODEEM (Pro-ram for Energy Development of States and Municipalities), whichas intended to promote energy services for communities distant
rom the conventional grid, mainly in the North and Northeastegions [36]. The program “Light for All” (decree 4.873, 11.11.2003)
ight be seen as a development of PRODEEM, but its goals are morembitious in the sense that it aims at the complete universalization
nergy sources in the Brazilian energy mix.
of the access to electricity. Solar energy was included as part of theprogram both in its PV and solar water heater (SWH) variants andin different types of applications, such as lightening, water heatingand water bumping.
However, the cost-effectiveness ratio that provided the initialimpulse for the deployment of solar energy in the country was alsoresponsible for excluding PV technology from the PROINFA. Whilein the first case the installation of solar systems disobliged the gov-ernment from building transmission lines, in the second case theprice of PV electricity was considered disadvantageous in compari-son to small hydro power plants, biomass and wind energy. Hence,the lack of incentive policies has created a situation in which—inspite of Brazilian’s huge solar resources (see Fig. 2)—PV energybarely provides any contribution to the national energy mix [37,38].
From the sustainability standpoint, promoting the further diver-sification of the Brazilian energy supply through PV deploymentwould not only be convenient in face of the recent “carbonizationtrend” of the country’s power sector (see Fig. 3), but also due tothe seasonal complementary nature of solar and hydropower [40].The remaining potential for large-scale hydropower is located inthe Amazon basin, turning it into a politically controversial issuebecause of the ecological impacts of flooding parts of the rain forestand the social impacts resulting from the relocation of traditionalpopulations. Besides, one must consider that the current changein climate patterns has caused severe droughts in the Southeastregion, where a considerable portion of the operating hydropowerunits are located. This has affected the power supply and the energyshortages are being compensated with coal- and gas-fired plants[41]. Finally, the participation of RE in the Brazilian electricity mix isconsiderably higher than the international average, which impliesthat the production of solar panels in Brazil would result in loweremissions of greenhouse gases than in China. However, as we statebelow, a major problem for the Brazilian PV industry might be theexpensive costs of electricity and taxes, meaning that local solarpanels might be less competitive in the world-market in spite of itsmore environmentally beneficial life-cycle assessment.
The domestic solar PV industry in Brazil is still fairly undevel-oped, with actors missing along many stages of the value chain.Despite the ample availability of silicon, no solar cell manufactur-ers exist yet. There are some big companies like RIMA or Minasligasthat are leaders in the silicon metal market and have the technicalconditions to produce solar grade silicon. However, the commercial
production would be possible only with the reduction of electricityprices for the industrial sector (as it is an electricity intensive pro-cess) or subsidies in order to scale up the production to the export
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evel [43]. Otherwise, the solar cells produced in Brazil will not beble to compete with the Chinese ones.
Moreover, Brazil lacks to date an adequate industrial policy thatould promote a competitive PV manufacture and local produc-rs face a much higher tax burden than in other countries. Whilehe wind sector enjoys tax exemption for its components (towers,lades and some of the electrical components), PV raw materialsnd fabrication equipment face from 40% to 60% taxes, mostly dueo ICMS tax (value-added tax on sales and services). The Brazilianovernment had a tax incentive program PADIS (Program for theechnological Development Support of the Semiconductor Indus-ry) for the semiconductor industry that ended in May 2015. Therogram permitted the reduction of certain federal taxes in ordero encourage the production of microelectronic goods. Nonethe-ess, the PADIS could provide tax exemption for only 20% of inputsnd machinery of the solar industry, like PV panels and solar cells44].
In spite of that, the Brazilian government has recently estab-ished the objective of promoting a “turning point” in its policiesor the development of the PV sector. In 2014, ANEEL carried outhe first exclusive auction for solar energy with the sale of almost00 MW and guaranteed price for twenty years [45]. This approachas reinforced in November 2015 with a new exclusive auction inhich 1115 MW of PV generation were negotiated at the average
rice of BRL 297.75/MWh (US$ 78) [46]. Thus, the reservation of certain quota for solar energy was successful in overcoming theompetition between PV and other RE technologies, as well as inroviding the investors with signals that the government will playn important role in creating a massive demand for solar cells andodules. The perspective is that at least 3.5 GW of PV electricityill be deployed in Brazil until 2021 [47].
Another important similarity with the Chinese case is that therazilian government intends to use the public financial sectors a tool to boost the national PV industry. More specifically,he National Bank for Socioeconomic Development (BNDES) willoncede loans at preferential rates for the projects in which theocal content clauses—also known as nationalization factor—arebserved. Indeed, the strategy consists of a roadmap for revertinghe underdevelopment of the Brazilian PV industry so that national
anufacturers can progress to all stages of the PV production chainnd consolidate a relative autonomy in the sector [48].
According to the “Progressive Nationalization Plan”, the condi-ions for being benefited by the financial incentives given by theNDES in the period between 2014 and 2017 require that the mod-les should be assembled in Brazil and its frame must be sourcedithin the country. It is also expected that the electrical compo-
ents and the support of the system will be locally manufactured.rom 2018 to 2019, the junction box and the inverter must be addedo the previous list. From 2020 onwards, the national production ofolar cells is also a requisite for public financing, completing thushe evolution of the Brazilian industry to all stages of the PV produc-ion chain. In order to accelerate this process, those manufacturersho add locally the items not yet required by the schedule will
eceive a bonus, if they are sourced in Brazil [49].The Brazilian government expects a gradual increase of the local
ontent in the PV value chain during the next few years. Hence,he national features of the emergence of the PV industry in Brazilre noticeable both in regard to the importance of the State inter-entions in creating a set of new rules destined to promote thencrease of PV energy through the compensation of its currentigher levelized costs of electricity, as well as in the stimulus for therogressive upgrading of local manufacturers along the PV value
hain. However, another remarkable characteristic of this process ists “global interconnectedness”. Even though the reasons underly-ng the incentives given by the Brazilian government are associatedo the interest of promoting the national economy, the formationarch & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154 151
of the Brazilian PV sector is intrinsically global in the view of a) thetransnational flow of components to be assembled as a final “solargood”; b) the potential interest of foreign investors, since compa-nies from different countries are investigating the possibilities toestablish solar factories in Brazil and c) the domestic deploymentof PV energy as a necessary step for scaling up the production inorder to make the Brazilian industry an international player in thePV sector.
As a matter of fact, the Brazilian industry is represented only atthe extremes of the PV value chain. The fabrication of solar panelsis a quite verticalized process—and besides the above mentionedRIMAS and Minasligas, which supply a large volume of metallurgicalgrade silicon—the national production consists basically of modulemanufacturers (e.g. Tecnometal and Globo Brasil). That means thatthe local companies at the downstream level of the PV value chainare responsible for assembling the components—polycrystallinesilicon, ingot, wafers, solar cells—imported from other countries[40]. In its infancy, the Brazilian industry is situated in a periph-eral position of the existing international PV circuits of research,production and market. According to the government’s strategy,the acceleration of the national demand and the clauses of localcontent for public financing are going to support the spreading ofthe Brazilian industry towards all segments of PV production andcompensate its current underdevelopment.
The global interconnectedness of the Brazilian PV industry isalso remarkable in what concerns the building up of its infrastruc-ture. Inasmuch as Brazil represents a huge potential market for PVenergy, foreign companies from North-Atlantic and Asiatic coun-tries are currently evaluating different investment approaches thatwould enable them to take their profit shares in the Brazilian mar-ket. One possible path is taking part in solar auctions with projectsdeveloped in cooperation with Brazilian stakeholders. That is whathappened, for instance, when Canadian Solar won three solar PVprojects totaling 144 MW in the state of Minas Gerais in partner-ship with Brazilian PV developer Solatio [50]. Another modalityof “global investment” was exemplified by the Chinese industrialgroup BYD that recently announced the intention of expending US$50 million for setting up a manufacturing facility in Campinas [51].The German Solar-Cluster is pointing out to a similar direction, con-sidering the feasibility for the establishment of a PV manufacturingplant with annual capacity of 680 MW in the state of Paraná [52].Pure Energy—the filial of Italian holding aRegran, declared a veryambitious plan not only of building a factory to produce PV pan-els, but also to construct a pilot PV and concentrated solar powerplants [53]. Furthermore, one must also consider the links withforeign capital through the import of the equipment and the corre-sponding technology transfer for the manufacture of solar panels(interview with Abdias Pontes, representative of Minasol). AlthoughGlobo Brasil is a company founded exclusively with national capital,its machineries were imported from China and Switzerland, amongother countries [54].
Finally, it must be highlighted that in the very core of the incen-tives given by the Brazilian government lies the objective of pushingforward the competitiveness of the national PV industry so that itmight catch up with its international competitors and “go global”.The reason for that is the current rate of expansion of PV sys-tems worldwide. Solar panels have been deployed much faster thanexpected and the total global capacity overtook 180 GW in early2014. According to the IEA [18], PV energy might achieve 4600 GWof installed capacity and respond for 16% of the world consumptionof electricity by 2050. Although a latecomer in this field, Brazilianrecent energy policies aim at reproducing the successful experi-
ences of biomass and wind energy and turn the country into one ofthe international poles of the solar industry.In this sense, the Brazilian experience in the manufacture ofwind turbines presents a valuable example for the comprehension
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f the direction pursued by the solar policies. In August 2012, Brazilad already surpassed the milestone of 2 GW of wind generationith perspectives for the further development of 7 GW and 16 GW
y 2016 and 2020, respectively. The domestic escalation was a con-equence of the national incentives given by PROINFA and resultedn a large volume of exports of wind turbines. In 2013, more than
dozen local manufacturers were employing high qualified work-rs and supplying wind turbines for the domestic, as well as for thergentinian, North American and European markets [55]. However,
he Brazilian policies were focused on creating a market for windnergy, missing out on technology policies and the stimulation ofechnology learning that seems to repeat with PV technology [56].
Along with the exclusive solar auctions, the regulation of netetering systems seems to be a far-reaching measure announced
y the Brazilian government to enlarge the contribution of PVlectricity in the national energy mix and thus catalyze the localV industry. In the Brazilian case, net metering systems tendo be particularly effective for the distributed generation of PVower—small scale technologies to produce electricity close to thend users of power—because of the high electricity prices chargedn the residential and commercial sectors of urban centers. In012, residential tariffs averaged 0.17 D /(kWh), reaching as highs 0.27 D /(kWh) in Belo Horizonte, compared to 0.15 D /(kWh) inhe European Union [57].
In Brazil, residential tariffs vary according to the consumptionevel, and the more expensive tariffs are paid by the higher incomewellings in order to subsidize the energy supply to the lower
ncome dwellings [42]. Actually, 67% of the residential consumernits are not included in the social category benefited by subsidizedariffs, and the possibility of exchanging the exceeding PV electric-ty with the grid provided by the net metering systems has created acenario in which PV distributed generation already achieved parityrice with grid companies in some Brazilian big cities. Grid parityrice is a stage of development of the PV technology, at which it isompetitive with conventional electricity sources [58]. PV installa-ions will become even more advantageous in the following yearsue to the combination of a) rising of the average electricity con-umption in the residential and commercial sectors, b) building uposts of long distance transmission lines and c) higher participationf gas-fired plants tends to create further pressures in the electricityrice [41].
A further step into the creation of incentives for the large-scaleroduction of national solar panels was the recent announcementf the “Development Program for Distributed Power Generation”ProGD). The Ministry of Mines and Energy predicts an invest-
ents of BRL 100 billion (US$26 billions) for distributed generationrojects until 2030 [59,60]: due to the work that will be done byarious working groups in charge to resolve financial, regulationnd many other barriers for distributed generation. Solar energy isntended to be one of the main focuses of the program inasmuch asV systems occupies 90% of distributed power generation in Brazilnd could be easily installed on the rooftops of public buildingsuch as hospitals, schools and universities.
However, the current political and economic situation bringsncertainty for the PV market: The interest rates are increasing,he devaluation of Brazilian Real is continuing and many devel-pers who won the previous solar auction could not deliver theV plants at the winning price anymore. Only around 25% fromhe total amount of PV installed capacity contracted on the firstuction has been delivered, mostly due to speculation on the mar-et because some developers win the auction planning to sell therojects to the potential investors [59].
In case the national energy policies succeed in turning the coun-ry into an international center for the manufacture of solar panels,razil will have followed the inverse path that characterized thelobal emergence of the Chinese PV industry in what regards their
arch & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
respective synergies between domestic and global markets. Whilethe Chinese PV sector emerged as a result of the demand fromNorth Atlantic countries and only in a second moment turned itsproduction flows towards internal deployment, the Brazilian expe-rience is based on a set of measures to explore the huge domesticpotential for solar generation as a platform for the developmentof the national industry as one of the international poles for theproduction of solar goods.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to investigate the emergenceof the PV industry in Brazil within the theoretical frameworkof “methodological cosmopolitanism” [9]. For a comprehensiveunderstanding of the phenomenon analyzed, an approach thatencompasses the global dynamics of the renewable energy mar-ket has proven to be more enlightening than a narrow insulationof the national energy policies and their effects on the local solarmanufactures. Hence, we focused on the globally interconnectedaspects of the rising Brazilian PV sector and the transboundarycausalities that impelled the State to create incentive mechanismsfor the development of this strategic industry.
We demonstrated that the interventions of national States werethe leading factor in the creation of an international PV mar-ket. In Europe, the German and Spanish governments approved“feed-in tariffs” for PV electricity and this mechanism contributedfor an exponential increase in the demand for solar panels. InChina, the central authorities designated the renewable energyindustry as one of the priority economic sectors, which causedthe accelerated growth of the PV companies under the influenceof preferential loans, on the one hand, and the massive demandfrom North Atlantic countries, on the other hand. Furthermore, theState institutions assumed the task of safeguarding the interests oftheir respective national solar industries. Northern governmentsimposed protectionist measures against the more competitiveChinese companies, while China reacted to the vertical drop ininternational sales with large scale programs for domestic deploy-ment of PV energy.
This process resulted in substantial reduction costs of solargoods, allowing Southern countries to participate in the PV mar-ket in spite of their tighter financial constraints. In this context,the Brazilian government also reoriented its conservative approachtowards solar energy, announcing exclusive auctions for PV gen-eration that mitigated the concurrence between solar and otherRE technologies. In view of the constantly increasing electricityprices, the government also established a net metering systemin order to anticipate grid parity—turning PV installations into acost-effective possibility for distributed generation, which mightexplore the huge potentials of the Brazilian market and thus boostthe production of local solar industries [61]. In line with this pur-pose, the amount of BRL 100 billion that is expected to be investeddue to the results of ProGD program is another favorable indicationfor the massive deployment of solar distributed systems in Brazil.
The Brazilian PV sector emerges in a global context in whichAsia is the gravitational center of the PV industry. However, thecurrent situation has also opened development opportunities forother emerging economies. South-South trade is the most dynamicsegment of the international trading system and environmentalgoods—products to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correctenvironmental damages—became an important component of this
growth [34]. This is also valid for the case of the PV market, forthe Chinese hegemony in this field is not entirely contradictorywith a geographic dispersal of solar manufactures. Actually, the PVindustry is still in its consolidation phase and there is a window of
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pportunities for the rise of new poles of manufacture along withhe simultaneous integration of global RE markets.
Nevertheless, the access of new global players to the PV fieldoes not constitute a spontaneous process. Such industry demandsigh capital investments as well as Research and DevelopmentR&D) efforts for technological innovation. For this reason, the reg-lations and public policies developed by State institutions areecisive factors for the assurance of a certain level of initial demandhat might ignite the investments on RE manufacture. Indeed, aetailed analysis clearly shows that the countries with outstand-
ng performance in the international RE market are precisely thosen which the interventions of the State favored the technologicalpgrading and the development of the local value chain. In the cur-ent moment, Brazilian expenditures on R&D in the PV field cannote compared to the level of the German and Japanese investments,hich might affect the Brazilian competitiveness.
The consolidation of the Brazilian PV industry is still an ongo-ng and unsettled process. We argued that the high solar irradianceevels, the vast reserves of silicon and the enormous potential ofhe internal market set up a positive constellation for the advance-
ent of local solar enterprises. However, uncertainty on politicalnd economic background, the expensive prices of industrial elec-ricity and the impact of the high interest rates on the costs of capitalgure as the Achilles’ heel of the Brazilian PV production in its initialhase [62]. Since the PV manufacture is an energy intensive pro-ess, Brazil is unlikely to become a really competitive global player,nless its energy prices are reduced. The clauses of local content are
ntended as corrective measures for coping with such barriers andlacing the national sector in advantageous circumstances for theperation in the internal market. Nonetheless, fiscal obstacles andhe relatively higher costs of production might indeed restrain theevelopment of the local solar industry to the downstream sectorsf the PV value chain. Especially in case insufficient resources and
ncentives programs are destined to R&D, Brazil tends to continuen a subordinate and dependent position in the global PV circuits,
ostly restricted to the assembly of components and thus limit-ng its potential in terms of innovation, commercial balance andreation of local qualified jobs.
cknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the support of Jiang JiuchunDean of the School of Electrical Engineering, Beijing Jiaotongniversity—China), Leila da Costa Ferreira (Full Professor at Uni-ersity of Campinas—Brazil) and Valeriano Mendes Ferreira CostaAssistant Professor at University of Campinas—Brazil). We are alsohankful to the energy researchers and stakeholders of the PVndustry who provided us with valuable information. The São Paulotate Research Foundation (FAPESP) and the National Council for Sci-ntific and Technological Development (CNPq) contributed for theccomplishment of this research.
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