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UMR 5205 Towards A Resilient Service-Oriented Computing from Security and Business Perspectives Youakim Badr 1 , Frederique Biennier 1 , Wenbin Li 1 , Pascal Bou Nassar 3 , Soumya Banerjee 2 1 LIRIS Lab, INSA-Lyon, France 2 Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) 3 Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, India The 2 nd Franco American Workshop On CyberSecurity, University of Arizona, Tuscon, January 20-21, 2014

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Page 1: Towards A Resilient Service-Oriented Computing from ... · UMR 5205 Towards A Resilient Service-Oriented Computing from Security and Business Perspectives Youakim Badr 1, Frederique

UMR 5205

Towards A Resilient Service-Oriented Computing

from Security and Business Perspectives

Youakim Badr1, Frederique Biennier1, Wenbin Li1, Pascal Bou Nassar3, Soumya

Banerjee2

1 LIRIS Lab, INSA-Lyon, France2 Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF)3 Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, India

The 2nd Franco American Workshop On CyberSecurity, University of Arizona, Tuscon, January 20-21, 2014

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Outline

Context : SOA in opened, dynamic, and distributed environments

Challenges:

Business perspective: Building adaptable applications

Security perspective: Managing adaptable and end-2-end security

Contributions:

Resilient SOA

Business Requirements and Ad-hoc composition driven approach

Security risk-aware SOA and continuous security improvement

Conclusion and perspectives

2

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SOA in Opened and Dynamic environmentssecurity perspective

Security-aware SOA in dynamic environments ?

3

S1 S2

S3

S4

S5

RuntimeDesign time

Bu

sin

es

s P

roc

es

sIn

fra

str

uc

ture

Se

rvic

e P

rovid

ers

Info

rma

tio

n S

ecu

rity

(ESB)

Environment

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Web Service Security

Web service Security Standards

Application layer: SAML, ebXML, XACML, XML Firewall, …

Messaging layer : SOAP, WS-Security, XML-Signature, XML Encryption..

Transport layer: TLS/SSL, HTTP. FTP, SMTP, TCP/IP, …

XML specific attacks

oversize payload, coercive parsing, XML injection, WSDL scanning,

indirect flooding, SOAPAction spoofing, BPEL state deviation, middleware

hijacking, …

4

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Challenges Related to SOA Security-aware in DE

Existing SOA design methods

Reference Models: (OASIS) reference architecture, (Open Grp) SOA Ontology,

SOA Design Methods: SOMA, SOAD, CBM, SOAF, SODM, …

SOA security solutions

Limited to SW composition processes / technical implementations

Security risk management in Information Systems

OCTAVE, EBIOS, CORAS, SNA,…

5

Adaptable / end-to-end SOA security in dynamic environments ?

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SOA in Opened and Dynamic EnvironmentsBusiness perspective

6

S1 S2

S3

S4

S5

RuntimeDesign time

Bu

sin

ess P

rocess

S1 S2

S3

S4

S5

RuntimeDesign time

Environment

Business Requirements

Information Security

Internal changes

External changes

Adaptable SOA application and business processes

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The Web service composition process

2 phase-process

Web Service Composition is:

a multi-objective optimization problem

a NP-Hard Problem

Ad-hoc Web composition in Dynamic environments ?

7

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Related Work to Web service Composition DE

Composition Approaches

Manual : BPML, BPEL, …

Semi-automatic: Recommendation, workflows,..

Automatic: FSM, calculus, Planning, softcomputing, theorem proving,

Techniques : (syntactic vs semantic), (static vs dynamic), …

8

Adaptable Web service composition in dynamic environments ?

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Research Problem

How to continuously adapt SOA-based applications or business processes

to changes, occurring within/outside the Web service composition process

and satisfying business and security constraints in dynamic environments

9

Contribution : Resilient SOA: Model driven evolutionary approach

- From business perspective:

- Ad-hoc Web service composition approach with/out composition plans

- Rule-driven and heuristic based composition process

- Satisfying multiple constraints

- From security perspective:

- Security risk driven SOA design method

- A Continuous Security Improvement Process (runtime to design time)

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Resilient Models

Resilient models are based on (DDDAS) – Info-Symbiotic Systems

Unify computing and measurements

10

S1

S2

S3

D1

D2

D3

1

2

34

5

66

7

Time

Mo

de

l e

vo

lutio

n

Sn⊗ En ⊩ Dn

Sn ⊗ f(Dn) ⊗ En ⊵Sn+1

Sn Dn

+

-En

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Generalized Resilient SOA

11

Business Requirements Model

Ad-hoc Composition Approach

En

do

ge

no

us

Ch

an

ge

s

Ex

og

en

ou

s C

han

ge

s

Tolerance Model

Security Model

QoS Model

Running processes

Infrastructure

Business Logic

Security Model

Contextual Information

De

sig

n t

ime

run

tim

e

aff

ect

gen

era

te

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Resilient SOA from a Business Perspective

12

Business Requirements Models

Ad-hoc Composition Approach

Endogenous Changes Exogenous Changes

New Business needsFault Tolerance Model

Business-centric Req. Model

Capability-focused Req. Model

Rule-driven Req. Model

- Structure rules

- Dependency rules

- Constrain rules

- …

Adhoc Web service Composition

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Resilient SOA from a Business PerspectiveBusiness-focused Requirements Model (BM)

BM={objectives / objective = <Actions, Non-functional Req., Contextual Information>}

Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR)

Business Vocabulary: noun concepts, fact types, instances, …

Business Rules: modal operators, quantifiers, qualifiers, conditions, …

Example

13

Objective obj1: Manage train crisis

Actions

a1: Fire must be extinguished.a2: Victims must be assisted. a3: Railways must be repaired. a4: Electricity must be recovered.

Non-functional Requirements

nf1: It is obligatory that at least 10 firemen extinguish fire.nf2: It is necessary that total response time is less than 4 hours.nf4: It is obligatory that the electricity is recovered after the fire is extinguished.

ContextualInformation

ctt1: Crisis place is Pairs.ctt2: Crisis date is 2013/03/01.

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CM = {objective, profiles, inter-capability relations} => WS

objective= { verb-noun}

profiles = <capability names, attributes>

inter-capability relations[static | dynamic] = [Cooperation | Support | Competition]

Alternatives: IOEP, frames, …

Example

14

ID Goal Profile

Inter-capability relations names attributes

cap2.2 <manage, crisis> <evacuate, population> (Place, Marseille)

cap3 {<manage, crisis>,

< rescue, people>} <transport, victim> {MaxBusNumber, 10) {cap3, cap4, Support}

cap4 {<manage, crisis>,

<rescue, people>} <assist, victim> (MaxAssistNumber, 300) {cap3, cap4, Support}

cap5.1 <manage, crisis> <extinguish, fire> (AvailableFiremen, 40) {cap5.1, cap5.2, Cooperation}

{cap5.1, cap7, Support}

Resilient SOA from a Business PerspectiveCapability-Focused Requirements Model (CM)

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Structure rules Sequence (⧁), parallel(⦷), selection (⦸), ...

Ex: AssistVictim⧁TransportVictim

Local constraint rules AssistVictim.response_time < 15 min

Global constraint rules crisis_process.response_time < 2 hrs

Dependency rules Optimal composed (⊞), excluded (⨂), substituted (⦿),

Ex: BuyTicket⊞ BookHotel

Contextual rules

Mediation rules

15

Resilient SOA from a Business PerspectiveRule-driven Requirements Model (RM)

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..

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Resilient SOA from a Business PerspectiveMatching and Discovering algorithms

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Resilient SOA from a Business PerspectiveAd-hoc Web Service Composition Algorithm

Input: rules

Output: an optimal

17

Start

Input: UR, Wa, and Wt

Composition

Rule Base

guide

enrich

1.Service Planting

4.Service Evaluating 3.Service Harvesting

2.Service Growing

Satisfied with

result?

Output coptimal

enrichY

N

1- Service Planting

- Initialize composition rule set

- Filter discovered atomic services

2- Service Growing

Construct potential composite service

Construct entire composite service

Composite service elimination

3- Service Harvesting

QoS Normalization and Utility Calculation

Composite service clustering and rule enrichment

4- Service Evaluation

Stop condition

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Resilient SOA from a Security Perspective

18

Business Requirement

Web Service Composition

Endogenous Changes

Exogenous Changes

Context ModelContext Model

Service Model

Risk Model

Annotation Model

gen

era

te

feed

ba

ck

Security Policy

.

Security Objective

Business Domain

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Contribution: Security aware SOA Design

The Security Risk-driven SOA Design Method addresses

information security in the SOA from a risk management

perspective (...) at design time and runtime

LifecycleThe Preparatory Stage

The Design Stage

The Execution Stage

Outcome:key models, tools and deliverables in each step to progressively identify

business goals, essential assets, and services

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.

Service Model Security Policy Model Risk Model

Security

Objective

Contract

depends

Risk

Essential

Asset

Threat

Treatment

Vulnerabilityexploits

Attack

creates

Contextdepends

createsmitigates

impacts

Attacker

conducts

Person

Misuse creates

Security

Policy

Constraintsapply to

Scenarioresults

Incident results

Organizational

Risk

Technological

Riskaccomplishes

Service

Business

Object

Business

Process

Manual ActivityBusiness Service

exchanges

realized by

Message

Business

Asset

encapsulates

Operation

Infrastructure

Asset

offers

hosted on

Provider

ClientInterface

depends

Acceptance

Avoidance

Transfer

Mitigation

Security

Measure

Security

Service

Security

Mecanism

Security

Protocol

Security

Pattern

ensures

corresponds to

Security

Assertions

specifies

defines

Threat Patterns

specifies

leads to

define

identifies

expose

providesconsumes

weaken

Software Hardware

Role Actor Business Policy

ensures

20

Resilient SOA from a Security PerspectiveService Model, Security Model and Risk Model

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Context Model

Essential Assets for the SOA design context

Business Assets

business processes, documents, partners, actors, roles, …

Service Assets

atomic & composite services, operations, messages, …

Infrastructure Assets

hardware, software, network protocols, …

Building the Dependency Graph

Bayesian Networks learned from surveys

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The SOA Design Method Lifecycle

1- Service Model• The Service Identification and

Specification Phase

2- Risk Model, Context Model• The Risk Management Phase

3- Annotation Model• The Annotation Phase

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The Service Identification and Specification Phase

1: Business Domain Identification

2A: Business Process Modeling

2B: Business Document Modeling

3: Security Objectives Identification

4: Service Identification

5: Service Specification

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The Risk Management Phase

6: Context Establishment

7A: Security Requirements

7B: Risk Identification

8: Risk Assessment

9: Risk Treatment

24

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Example: Risk Levels

.

25

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Adaptive/Continuous Security Improvement Process Model-to-Model Transformation

1) From Risk Model to Service Model

- Risk management phase to service specification phase

- Example: Risk high => choose a risk treatment strategy

- Implementation: Security Decision-Making process

2) From Context Model to Risk Model

- Runtime to risk management phase

- Example: Context changes => establish the context

- Implementation: Service Monitoring process

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A Decision-making process for Security Risk Treatments

Fuzzy Inference SystemDependency

Graph

- Avoidance

- Reduction

- Sharing

- Retention

Treatment

Strategies

Uncertainty

Unreliable data

Ambiguity

SOA

Ecosystem

Security

Threats

Problem: Deciding on the best risk treatment strategy to deal with threats often relies

on rules of thumb and often incorporates security analyst’s intuition and judgment.

Imprecision

Randomness

Risk Treatment Decision Process:

[Threats] cause [Risks] handled by [Security Objectives] resulting in [Security Treatment]

Fuzzy Logic:

- Simulating analogy and approximation

- Handling imprecision measures conveyed by the natural language

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A Service Monitoring System for Vulnerability Detection

Problem: Revealing security profiles disclose service weaknesses to potential threats

by providing critical information about essential assets

Security Annotations: obfuscate security information and enrich service descriptions

with a global security level

Annotation value: For a service s that depends on n assets, x1, .., xn

Supervision ⊆(∀ hasPertinentEssentialAsset.Message)∧(∀ hasPertinentEssentialAsset.BusinessObject)∧(∀ hasPertinentEssentialAsset.HostingServer)∧(∀hasPertinentEssentialAsset.OperatingSystem)

Examples: Confidentiality, Availability, Supervision, …

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Questions ?

Thank you

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The Decision-making System for Security Risk Treatments:Fuzzy Production Rules

R1 IF [Essential Assets] AND [Vulnerability] AND [Incident] THEN [Threat]

R2 IF [Threat] AND [Rate of Occurrence] AND [Severity of Impact] THEN [Risk]

R3 IF [Risk] AND [Security Objective] THEN [Securiy Measure]

R4 IF [Security Measure] THEN [Risk Treatment]

.

Examples of rules in stage Ri, R2, R3 and R4:R11 IF Essential Assets is Service AND Vulnerability is High AND Incident is Intentional THEN Threat is

Malicious

R21 IF Threat is Malicious AND Rate of Occurrence is Possible AND Severity of Impact is Loss THEN Risk is

High

R31 IF Risk is AND Security Objective is Confidentiality THEN Security Measure is Encryption

R41 IF Security Measure is Encryption THEN Risk Treatment is Reduction

.

.

.

3- Fuzzy rules

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The Decision-making System for Security Risk Treatments:Evaluation and Inference

4 - Fuzzy evaluation method to propagate multi-stage analysis

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A Service Monitoring System for Vulnerability Detection

Public Vulnerability Databases

- National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

- Open Source Vulnerability DataBase (OSVDB)

- United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)

The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)

cpe:/{part}:{vendor}:{product}:{version}:{update}:{edition}:{language}

Vulnerability Management Service

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The Decision-making System for Security Risk TreatmentsFuzzy Variables and Memberships

T(Essential Assets) = {Service, Operation, Message, Business Process}

T(Vulnerability) = {Low, Medium, High}

T(Incident) = {Random, Regular, Intentional}

T(Threat) = {Malicious, Accidental, Failure, Natural}

T(Security Objective) = {Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Accountability, Assurance}

T(Security Measure)={Encryption, Authentication, SecureTransmission}

T(Rate of Occurrence) = {Certain, Possible, Probable, Rare}

T(Severity of Impact) = {Insignificant, Major Impact, Loss}

T(Risk) = { Low, Medium, High}

T(Risk Treatment) = {Reduction, Sharing, Avoidance, Retention}

.

Vulnerability

Low Medium High

0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d ≤ 1

2- Membership Functions

1- Fuzzy Linguistic Variables

b

a

c

d

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Backup slides

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Contribution

End-To-End security

1.SOA is an ecosystem of services

2.Managing security as potential risks

Contributions

1.Security reference model

2.Dependency model

3.Fuzzy Inference System for Security

Policy

Secured SOA Design Method =>

Design time

Service Identification and specification

Risk Management

Run time

Monitoring

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The Service Conceptual Model

Contract

Essential

Asset

Service

Business

Object

Business

Process

Manual ActivityBusiness Service

exchanges

realized by

Message

Business

Asset

encapsulates

Operation

Infrastructure

Asset

offers

hosted on

Provider

ClientInterface

Security

Assertions

specifies

expose

provides

consumes

Software

Hardware

Role Actor

Business Policy

37

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The Security Policy Conceptual Model

Security

Objective

depends

Treatment

Context

Security

Policy

Constraints

accomplishes

Acceptance

Avoidance

Transfer

Mitigation

Security

Measure

Security

Service

Security

Mecanism

Security

Protocol

Security

Pattern

ensures

corresponds to

defines

ensures

38

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The Risk Conceptual Model

Risk

Essential

Asset

Threat Vulnerabilityexploits

Attack

creates

depends

createsmitigates

impacts

Attacker

conducts

Person

Misuse creates

Scenarioresults

Incident results

Organizational

Risk

Technological

Risk

Threat Patterns

leads to

identifies

weaken

39

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SOA applications in Dynamic environments

.

40

S1 S2

S3

S4

S5

RuntimeDesign time

Environment

Business Requirements

Information Security

Internal changes

External changes

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Motivating Example: SOA and information security in opened and dynamic environments

Se

rvic

e

Pro

vid

ers

Busin

ess

Pro

ce

ss

Infr

astr

uctu

re

(ESB)

Security

Risk

uncertainty

o - Information security : Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Accountability,

Assurance, Non-repudiation, … h

41