towards a new euro-atlantic security architecture

8/7/2019 Towards a new Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture

1/22

Towards a newEuro-Atlantic SecurityArchitecture

Report of the

Russian Experts

for the Valdai

Discussion Club

Conference

London, December 810, 2009


2/22

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 20092

T uts f t pt:

Si Karaganov,Chairman of the Presidium of the Council

on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP),

Dean of the School of the World Economy

and International Affairs at the State

UniversityHigher School of Economics.

Timfi Bordachev,Director of the Center for Comprehensive

European and International Studies

at the School of the World Economy

and International Affairs of the State

UniversityHigher School of Economics.

The authors express their gratitude to participants

in the discussions of the draft report: Anatoly

Adamishin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-

potentiary, SVOP member; Pavel Andreev, Head

of International Projects of the Russian News &

Information Agency RIA Novosti; Alexei Arbatov,

a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy

of Sciences, Director of the International Security

Center at the Institute of the World Economy and

International Relations, Russian Academy of Sci-

ences; Yevgeny Voronin, leading researcher at the

Euro-Atlantic Security Center of the Moscow State

Institute of International Relations; Vladimir

Voronkov, Director of the European Cooperation

Department of Russias Foreign Ministry; Ser-

gei Vykhukholev, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of RIA

Novosti; Dmitry Danilov, Head of the European

Security Department at the Institute of Europe,

Russian Academy of Sciences; Ivan Ivanov, Full

Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pro-

fessor/researcher at the State UniversityHigher

School of Economics; Sergei Kulik, Director for

International Development of the Institute of

Contemporary Development; Fyodor Lukyanov,

Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs

journal; Alexander Nikitin, Director of the Euro-

Atlantic Security Center of the Moscow State Insti -

tute of International Relations; Vladimir Ryzhkov,

Professor of the Department for International Eco-

nomic Organizations and European Integration at

the School of the World Economy and Interna-

tional Affairs, the State UniversityHigher School

of Economics; Alexander Savelyev, Head of the

Strategic Research Department of the Institute of

the World Economy and International Relations,

Russian Academy of Sciences; Ivan Soltanovsky,

Deputy Director of the European Cooperation

Department of Russias Foreign Ministry; Dmitry

Suslov, Deputy Director of Research Programs of

the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Igor

Yurgens, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of

Contemporary Development; and other colleagues

who took part in several rounds of discussions of

the ideas contained in the report.

This publication has benefited from materials of

the Russian Foreign Ministry, studies by the Insti-

tute of Contemporary Development, the Institute

of the World Economy and International Relations

of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute

of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the

Moscow State Institute of International Relations

of the Russian Foreign Ministry, from articles and

other publications by those who participated in

the reports discussion, and from statements by

Russian officials and experts.


3/22

4

12

15

15

15

16

18

18

21

CONTENTS

1. THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

ARCHITECTURE AND THE

CONTEMPORARY WORLD

2. THE STATE OF DEBATES

3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

3.1. Status quo

3.2. Status quo plus

3.3. Creation of a system

of special treaties forcollective actions

3.4. Russias acession to NATO

3.5. Preparation of a new

comprehensive European

Security Treaty

ANNEX


4/22

Towards a new Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 20094

1. The Euro-Atlantic SecurityArchitecture and thecontemporary world

1.1. The construction of international and collec-

tive security institutions in Europe has the longesthistory and has its origins in decisions of the 1815

Congress of Vienna which drew a line under the

Napoleonic Wars. At some stage, the desire to add a

comprehensive nature to newly established mecha-

nisms and formats became the most important ten-

dency in those efforts.

1.2. At present, the density of various institutions

for international interaction on security matters

in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole

is the highest in the world. The main regional

structures related, in one way or another, to collec-tive security include the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of

Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO) and many sub-regional struc-

tures. Two of the above organizations the OSCE

and NATO are institutions established to serve

the structure of international relations in the condi-

tions of the Cold War. Now they are looking for new

Members of NATO and OSCEMembers of OSCE

Members of NATO and OSCE

Ukraine

Georgia

Russian Federation

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

PolandBelarus

Sweden

Norway

United Kingdom

Ireland

Portugal Italy

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan

UzbekistanTajikistan

Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan

Armenia

Iceland

Finland

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Cyprus

Austria

Czech Republic

Hungary

4

1

2

3

9

10

5

116

127138

14

1615

17

1819

1. Netherlands2. Belgium

3. Luxembourg4. Switzerland

5. Liechtenstein6. Andorra

7. San Marino8. Holy See

9. Slovak Republic10. Slovenia

11. Croatia12. Bosnia

13. Serbia14. Montenegro15. Albania

16. Macedonia17. Estonia

18. Latvia19. Lithuania

20. Moldova

20


5/22

5Valdai diSCuSSiON CluB CONfERENCE


spheres of their activity in the new conditions, but

quite often by their very nature tend to repro-

duce the logic of confrontation.

1.3. o t pst 20 ys, multiltl

istitutis i eup sl sm

f t pblms fi t tit. For

example, the OSCE has imposed limitations on

military activities in Europe and made them more

transparent through exchanges of information

on armed forces, weapon systems and plans for

their deployment, the conclusion of the Open

Skies Treaty, etc. It has also built institutionalized

and other mechanisms for crisis alert and danger

reduction. The Council of Europe has made its

positive contribution, as well.

1.3.1. It is necessary to emphasize the role the Euro-pean Union plays in strengthening regional security.

Its efforts have largely strengthened peace and sta-

bility as they rest on the logic of overcoming state

nationalism and looking for solutions through com-

promise and democratic respect for the equality of

its member countries. Due to the European Unions

success, the larger part of the continent has bid fare-

well to endless conflicts and wars. In retrospect, one

can say that the Treaty of Rome, which established

the European Economic Community, served as a

peace treaty that put a final end to World War II for

the most of the continent. Europe no longer poses a

threat to the rest of mankind.

1.4. In general, the international political landscape

of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space is overloaded

with various multilateral institutions. Their func-

tional interchangeability has been growing, giv-

ing rise to elements of destructive competition

in peacekeeping efforts and counteraction to new

security threats. The gap between the global nature

of arising problems and the group approach to their

solution reduces the effectiveness of efforts by inter-

state associations and individual countries. At the

same time, none of the countries in the region fully

complies with the existing international political

principles of European security the so-called Hel-

sinki Decalogue, a code of pan-European politicalstandards of states conduct.

1.5. Stability in relations between most of the most

states of the region is due to their involvement in

sub-regional political, economic and military orga-

nizations NATO and the European Union which

ensure a very high level of trust and interdependence

between them. The geographical expansion of NATO

and the EU has now reached its limit, while it will

take the CSTO and the CIS a long time to achieve

One third of "big Europe"

Ukraine

Georgia

Russian Federation

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

PolandBelarus

Sweden

Norway

United Kingdom

Ireland

Portugal Italy

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan


Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan

Armenia

Iceland

Finland

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Cyprus

Austria

Czech Republic

Hungary

4

1

2

3

9

10

5

116

127138

14

1615

17

1819

1. Netherlands

2. Belgium3. Luxembourg

4. Switzerland

5. Liechtenstein

6. Andorra7. San Marino

8. Holy See

9. Slovak Republic

10. Slovenia11. Croatia

12. Bosnia

13. Serbia14. Montenegro

15. Albania

16. Macedonia

17. Estonia18. Latvia

19. Lithuania

20. Moldova

20


6/22


6 MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 20096

a comparable level of trust within themselves. So,

one-third of the population of Greater Europe lives

outside the prosperity and security area, which

only serves to consolidate the explosive split of the

Euro-Atlantic space.

1.6. The efforts made by Western countries after

1991 to keep former Socialist countries under

their political and economic influence by extending

NATO to them played a negative role in the erosion

of the European security system. NATOs eastward

expansion, which began in 1994-1995 and which

proceeded without Russias participation, has put

an end at least for the time being to opportuni-

ties for building a Europe without dividing lines.

Simultaneously, it has dealt a blow to Russias trust

towards the United States and its allies. russis

lit, which views itself as the victor in the strug-gle against totalitarian Communism, s

si its uty ft i t cl

W. Mwil, t Wst s b tyi t

tt it s ft uty, wi s li

p futi f w pttilly

u ftti. T situti is simpl:

t ol Wst will t it ty t fiis

ff russi t lu bl p

wit it tus fiis, f ll, t

ufiis cl W.

1.7. As a result, 20 years after the formal end of

the Cold War, the Euro-Atlantic space has failed to

overcome the legacy of the bipolar confrontation and

create a stable and efficient system for multilateral

interaction to counter traditional and new threats.

T cl W, wi ws l , s

p t b ufiis.

1.7.1. First, the existing institutions for international

and collective security in Europe have not solved

the main problem that is, the problem of war and

peace. Their inability manifested itself and resulted

in the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia in spring 1999

and in the conflict in the Caucasus in August 2008.

In both cases, the tragic events were caused by the

inability of the existing European security institu-

tions to prevent both internal and intra-state con-

flicts which escalated after the bipolar confrontationwas over.

1.7.2. Second, none of the institutional and legal

mechanisms existing in Europe ensure compliance

with the principle of indivisibility of security which

implies a commitment by all countries and inter-

state associations not to strengthen their own secu-

rity at the expense of others. Non-fulfillment of this

principle, which was codified in the 1999 Charter for

European Security, results in the loss of mutual trust

Countries that joined NATO since 1994

20

Ukraine

Georgia

Russian Federation

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

PolandBelarus

Sweden

Norway

United Kingdom

Ireland

Portugal Italy

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan


Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan

Armenia

Iceland

Finland

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Cyprus

Austria

Czech Republic

Hungary

4

1

2

3

9

10

5

116

127138

14

1615

17

1819

1. Netherlands

2. Belgium

3. Luxembourg

4. Switzerland

5. Liechtenstein

6. Andorra

7. San Marino

8. Holy See

9. Slovak Republic

10. Slovenia

11. Croatia

12. Bosnia

13. Serbia

14. Montenegro

15. Albania

16. Macedonia

17. Estonia

18. Latvia

19. Lithuania

20. Moldova


7/22



and in increased attention to military instruments

for ensuring national security.

1.7.3. The existing mechanisms and institutions for

multilateral interaction on security matters deny

Europe the ability to respond to new challenges and

threats and to be an adequate participant in inter-

national. There is no efficient institutional and legal

framework in Europe for cooperation of all states in

such matters as countering drug trafficking, terror-

ism and cybercrime, biosecurity, collective preven-

tion and reaction to emergencies and humanitarian

crises, environmental protection, and efforts to meet

environmental challenges, including global climate

change. The European Union and NATO prefer to

address these issues independently, which rules out

full-fledged participation of Russia and many other

countries in these efforts and which also paralyzesefforts of the OSCE.

Moreover, and this must be said straight out, the

possibility of NATOs expansion to Ukraine, which

Russias elite views as a vital threat to its security,

has created and maintains for as long as this possi-

bility exists a threat of a large-scale war in Europe,

which may escalate unpredictably.

1.8 The unfinished nature of the Cold War con-

stantly revives open or hidden suspicions and a

confrontational mentality and rhetoric in Russia and

many other European countries. The old geopolitical

thinking and the psychology of rivalry are clearly

raising their heads in Europe. Energy security

is a classic example of that. Non-Russian Europe

should thank God for the presence of energy-rich

Russia at its borders, while Russia should be thank-

ful for having such a wealthy customer. However,

natural, albeit hidden differences in the interests of

energy consumers and producers, which are easily

overcome in open bargaining, almost unconsciously

are given a political hue. Energy supply becomes

an issue of energy security and even acquires a

military tint (as follows from the discussion about an

Energy NATO). Another example, which is quite

phantasmagoric, is the farcical military-political

rivalry over 25 percent of the worlds undiscovered

(Sic) energy resources that allegedly are located inRussias economic zone in the Arctic. One can also

recall several EU attempts to prevent a final settle-

ment of the conflict in Transnistria only because

the settlement plan was proposed by Russia. Just

as the EU, Russia stood in the way of settlement in

Kosovo. Examples of this kind abound.

1.9. None of the existing collective security organiza-

tions in Europe can serve as a universal mechanism

for cooperation and conflict prevention. The absence

of legal obligations for the OSCE member states to

Ukraine

20

Ukraine

Georgia

Russian Federation

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

PolandBelarus

Sweden

Norway

United Kingdom

Ireland

Portugal Italy

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan


Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan

Armenia

Iceland

Finland

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Cyprus

Austria

Czech Republic

Hungary

4

1

2

3

9

10

5

116

127138

14

1615

17

1819

1. Netherlands

2. Belgium

3. Luxembourg

4. Switzerland

5. Liechtenstein

6. Andorra

7. San Marino

8. Holy See

9. Slovak Republic

10. Slovenia

11. Croatia

12. Bosnia

13. Serbia

14. Montenegro

15. Albania

16. Macedonia

17. Estonia

18. Latvia

19. Lithuania

20. Moldova


8/22



cooperate on crucial issues is the main reason for

the OSCEs inadequacy. NATOs emphasis on main-

taining peace and stability inside the Euro-Atlantic

community that is, on preserving the unity of the

West as well as its function as a defensive alliance

are becoming an obstacle to the extension of the

organizations capabilities, both geographically and

functionally. Yet the main problem of NATO is its

genetic code, which can be overcome, as practice

shows, either by transforming the organization into

a collective pan-European political-military union,

or by creating a genuine pan-European security

system.

1.10. As for the European Union or the CIS,

these organizations regardless of the difference

between their policies and weight in the world

are aimed, above all, at the development ofmultidimensional processes of integration within

themselves. The mechanisms they build, such as

the European Security and Defense Policy, are

primarily intended to unite member states and

enhance their individual capabilities, rather than

strengthen international security in general. Insti-

tutional constraints for the participation of Russia

and some other countries in NATO and EU efforts

to counter new security threats make these efforts

ineffective and unproductive and cause countries

to focus on bilateral cooperation, for example

between Russia and the U.S., between Russia and

individual EU countries, and between the U.S. and

Central Asian states.

1.11. The evolution of the strategic priorities of Rus-

sia and the United States poses a special challenge

to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic security archi-

tecture. While remaining major actors in the field

of hard security, these two states now increasingly

often set their eyes on other countries and regions.

1.11.1. The United States has long been shifting the

focus of its global strategy to Asia namely, China

and India while viewing Europe as an important,

yet secondary ally. Russia now also has a much wid-

er choice of opportunities and partners, compared

with the period 1991-2001. Moscow no longer views

the European vector of cooperation as an absolute

priority over the development of all-round ties and

interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.

1.11.2. Faced with the impossibility of its advanta-geous and equal accession to the Euro-Atlantic

space, Russia seems to be inclined to prioritize coop-

eration with China even if as a younger brother,

although a respected one. A partial geostrategic and,

especially, economic reorientation to the rising Asia

and Great China is necessary and beneficial for Rus-

sia. But its alienation from Europe the cradle of

Russian civilization and modernization threatens

Russias identity and may pose geostrategic risks in

the distant future.

1.12.T pst fiuti f ltis it eu-atlti i t stt f t

suity systm i it lks usly i

Nuclear powers and countries ocially developing

or suspected of developing nuclear weapons

Russian Federation

Iran

Israel

France

The United Kingdom

Pakistan

China North Korea

India

USA

USA

Nuclear Powers

Countries ocially developing

or suspected of developingnuclear weapons


9/22



utputi mist lbl l-

ls. The division of Greater Europe and the

continuing or even increasing geostrategic rivalry

in it hinders an effective response to new security

challenges, the main of which is the proliferation of

nuclear weapons, which began in the 1990s, and the

progressive destabilization of the Greater Middle

East.

1.12.1. The persistent threat of NATOs expansion

and the present bureaucratic and institutional dead-

lock in Russia-EU relations add to the estrange-

ment, which may be temporary but has a tendency

to strengthen. Even though the two parties have

achieved much in their rapprochement, they still

do not have clear objectives in mutual relations

and only vie with each other for the space that lies

between them, instead of jointly developing it.

1.12.2. The growing estrangement between Russia

and Europe is rooted not only in the values gap, now

growing again, but, most importantly, in their geo-

strategic rivalry which has now resumed as the Cold

War was not finished. If this estrangement keeps

growing and if the parties fail to unite on the basis

of their cultural proximity and the complementar-

ity of their economies, they will be doomed to play

the role of secondary or even tertiary players in the

world of the future. Europe will then become a large

Venice, a rich but decaying continent and a monu-

ment to its former greatness, while Russia will play

the role of an agrarian and raw-material appendage

of Great China and other developed economies. If

viewed from the position of realism, neither Russia

nor Europe reveal an ability for revival and trans-

formation into independent centers of power which

would counterbalance and supplement the two main

centers of the future world the United States and

China.

1.13. Current discussions about how to reform the

Euro-Atlantic security architecture take place in

basically new international conditions which differ

from the previous historical eras the period of the

balance of forces, the Cold War, and the transition

period of 1991-2008.

1.13.1. F t fist tim i tuis, eup

is t lbl t i t systm f it-

til ltis. The end of the systemic con-frontation between the West and the East, the

emergence of new countries on the global political

and economic arena, and the shift of the focus of

the world economy to the Asian and Pacific regions

push the European theater to the relative periphery

of international life. The Persian Gulf, the Middle

East and Central Asia are now the most troubled

region in the world, while East and South Asia is the

fastest-developing one.

1.13.2. Europe still plays a major role in the world

economy, but its ability to set trends in the develop-

ment of the global market has been steadily waning.

Militarily, most of the countries of Greater Europe,

Problem and dynamic zones

Russian Federation

Brasil

Problem zone

Dynamic zone

China

India

ASEANASEAN

1

2

3

1. Middle East

2. Central Asia

3. Korean Peninsula


10/22



except Russia, the United States and, partly, Britain

and France, are of no value. The EU will most likely

continue losing its international positions because

of its inability for sacrifice for the sake of effective

struggle over competitive positions in the world and

due to several structural reasons. The ratification of

the Lisbon Treaty will hardly slow down this process

significantly.

1.13.3. Second, the dynamism of the international

environment has markedly increased. New risks and

threats are becoming increasingly unpredictable,

and requirements have increased for the ability

of individual states and interstate associations to

promptly respond to emerging challenges. Under

these circumstances, the security system in Europe

remains static and largely oriented to the situation

of 20 to 60 years ago.

1.13.3.1. In these conditions, especially in light of

the redistribution of forces in the world in favor of

new centers of influence and the waning ability of

the West, which is increasingly challenged, to play

the role of leader, the United States and its allies in

Europe can no longer afford to conduct a dialogue

with Russia on European security matters from the

positions of superiority. Attempts to conduct it in

the old style are becoming increasingly counterpro-

ductive. However, the West cannot give it up com-

pletely. As a result, this dialogue is now in a kind of

gray political zone.

1.13.4. International relations are now becoming

renationalized and even remilitarized, and the cri-

sis of global political and economic regulation is

deepening. Against this background, direct bilateral

interaction is growing between Russia, the United

States and key states of NATO and the EU in practi-

cal efforts to combat international terrorism and

piracy, in peacekeeping operations and in many oth-

er areas. This interaction objectively reduces the role

of European international institutions and organiza-

tions and weakens them still further. NATO-Russia

cooperation is doomed to be ineffective, at least until

the threat of the blocs further expansion to Russias

neighbors is eliminated.

1.14. It is necessary to clearly identify the problem:

Does the West want to continue its geopolitical

expansion, proliferating its institutions, above all

NATO, to countries bordering on Russia? Or is it

ready to put an end to this short-sighted policy?

It is tim t stp ypitil tlk but t

uiti f iti f zs f sp-

il itsts, us t up t xp-

si f s w zs i t mst ssi-

Big Europe and the countries

aspiring to join NATO

Ukraine

Georgia

Russian Federation

France

Spain

Germany

Denmark

PolandBelarus

Sweden

Norway

United Kingdom

Ireland

Portugal Italy

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan


Turkmenistan

Kyrgyzstan

Armenia

Iceland

Finland

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Cyprus

Austria

Czech Republic

Hungary

4

1

2

3

9

10

5

116

127138

14

1615

17

1819

1. Netherlands

2. Belgium

3. Luxembourg

4. Switzerland

5. Liechtenstein

6. Andorra

7. San Marino

8. Holy See

9. Slovak Republic

10. Slovenia

11. Croatia

12. Bosnia

13. Serbia

14. Montenegro

15. Albania

16. Macedonia

17. Estonia

18. Latvia

19. Lithuania

20. Moldova


11/22



ti, mility-plitil sp. Tis is wt

naTo is i. It wul b btt t i

su zs f spil itsts, t lst

i eup. But t must i up tis

xpsi i f f ti jit lpmt

u ily i t m f p-

ti. The talk about the desire of part of elites

in post-Soviet countries to join NATO to confirm

their European choice must give way to universal

responsibility for security in Europe. This does not

mean that Russia can and must impede the social

and economic consolidation of the entire Europe

around its most efficient center the EU.

1.15. Another challenge is the philosophy of nuclear

deterrence in relations between Russia and the

U.S., between Russia and the United Kingdom, and

between Russia and France, inherited from the timesof the bipolar confrontation. This philosophy can be

overcome by gradually reducing excessive nuclear

arsenals and means of their delivery, building a joint

Euro-Atlantic non-strategic missile defense system,

and conducting joint exercises between Russia and

Western countries.

1.16. Summi up, w lu tt t

stt f eu-atlti suity its i-

ttu is ustisfty i ll t xisti

pmts, xpt f t umb f isti-

tutis f multiltl itti. This state

of affairs can be remedied by resolutely moving

the bulk of the existing pan-European commit-

ments codified in documents such as the Charter

for a New Europe (1990), the Helsinki Document

(1992), the Charter for European Security (1999),

and the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) from

a political into a legal realm. We must build a new

collective security system that would unite the

whole of Europe; we must fulfill the legal comple-

tion of the Cold War and thus create prerequisites

for a new unification of Europe from Vancouver to

Vladivostok.

1.17. Naturally, this configuration would act in a

different world compared with the world of the firsthalf of the 1990s when the first theoretical possibil-

ity emerged for its creation. Russia will not give

up its policy of rapprochement with China and the

rising Asia, while the U.S. will continue its reorienta-

tion to the Pacific region and China. But such a con-

figuration would benefit all the three major actors in

the Euro-Atlantic architecture Russia, Europe and

North America and the rest of the world would

benefit as much.


12/22



2.1. The discussion of the need for a radical mod-

ernization and revision of the political, legal andinstitutional frameworks of the system of interna-

tional and collective security in Europe was initiat-

ed by Russia in early June 2008. The first Russian

proposals were formulated in President Medve-

devs speech in Berlin; later they were included in

the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia (July 2008)

and specified in the Russian Presidents speech-

es at the World Policy Forum in Evian, France

(October 8, 2008) and the Russia-EU summit in

Nice (November 2008). The Corfu Process, held

within the OSCE frameworks, is one more impor-

tant, although obviously insufficient, component

of the discussions of the Russian initiative and the

reform of the European security architecture.

2.2. The proposal for drafting a new comprehen-

sive Treaty on European (Collective) Security and

its signing by all countries of the Euro-Atlantic

space holds center stage in the Russian initiatives.

Russia insists that the treaty must be based on the

principle of indivisibility of security which implies

a legally binding commitment by all the participat-

ing countries not to strengthen their own security

at the expense of others. Another important aspect

of the proposed Treaty could be a requirement for

the consent of all the participating countries to

decisions made within the frameworks of exist-

ing and future military alliances, organizations

or coalitions that may affect the interests of other

parties to the Treaty. The Treaty could bind the

parties to hold consultations on such issues. Politi-

cally, the proposed Treaty is intended to put an end

to the unfinished Cold War and the geostrategic

rivalry in the Euro-Atlantic space and thus release

forces for effective cooperation in countering new

security challenges. For Russia, the conclusion

of such a treaty would substantially facilitate its

democratic modernization.

2.3. F t tim bi, t mjity f

Wst utis ffiilly pps t y

i f w llly bii tty. They only

express understanding of Russias position on its

exclusion from the decision-making mechanism

in NATO, especially in the context of the alliances

idea of its universal role in ensuring European

security.

2.4. The first detailed discussion of the Russian

initiative took place in December 2008 at a meet-

ing of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki.

Although statements by Russian officials contain

basic principles that Moscow wants to be included

in the text of the Treaty, Russias partners in the

West mostly complain that Moscows proposals

are not specific enough and say that Russia should

offer a ready draft of such a comprehensive treaty

for collective discussion within the OSCE frame-

works. Russia has well-grounded concerns that the

presentation of such a document would lead to its

all-out criticism and would result in the scrapping

of the dialogue on the reform of the Euro-Atlantic

security architecture in general. Naturally, the

Russian expert community has drafts of such a

treaty.

2.5. Simultaneously, Russias partners in the West

openly rule out discussing a replacement of the

OSCE and NATO by the new Treaty and its prob-

able institutional continuation. Most of the coun-

tries participating in the discussions propose con-

ducting them in the OSCE negotiating formats

and adapting the role and functions of this orga-

nization to the new realities as a practical result.

2. The State of Debates


13/22



Attempts are being made to convince Russia that a

greater role for the OSCE within the frameworks of

Moscows proposals can allegedly help draw sup-

port for them from Western countries. However,

Russia remembers well that its formal proposals

in the 1990s to transform the OSCE into the main

framework for Euro-Atlantic security were harshly

torpedoed.

2.6. Complaints are also expressed over Russias

concentration on hard security issues and its

ignoring the so-called Third Basket issues that

is, democracy and human rights. Moscow, in turn,

does not conceal that its proposals are aimed at

resolving the main European security problem

which, as the events of August 2008 showed, is the

problem of war and peace.

2.7. T ustimti by ffiil Ms-

w f t impt f t umiti

mpt f y w tty is bmi

ppt us. This underestimation

stems from the non-liberal political regime, now

taking shape in Russia, and the conclusion that the

slogan of proliferating democracy during color

revolutions and the war in Iraq concealed a desire

to broaden spheres of geopolitical dominance. Or,

as in the case with part of the elites in Central and

Eastern European countries it was a desire to

take revenge for defeats in the past centuries. At

the same time it is clear that it is in the long-term

interests of Russia to reverse the trend towards

curtailing democratic freedoms, which has obvi-

ously begun to deteriorate the efficiency of state

governance, impede economic modernization due

to the systemic proliferation of corruption, and

worsen the countrys positions in international

competition. We believe that Russian society is

interested in foreign assistance, even if it is a

legally valid political pressure, for improving the

human rights situation and restraining the arbi-

trariness of uncontrolled bureaucracy. Interaction

with the Strasbourg Court is telltale evidence of

that interest.

2.8. From Russias point of view, the present

OSCE even though it remains a convenient plat-

form for dialogue in terms of representation of the

parties concerned cannot be viewed as a frame-

work for a Euro-Atlantic security system because

of its inability to rid itself of the political ballast of

the last few years and to abandon its bloc approach

to decision-making. In this connection, Russia for

the time being views the increased attention to the

OSCE as attempts to torpedo the entire Moscow-

initiated dialogue.

2.9. The discussions indicate that the majority of

Western countries are not ready yet to recognize

the need to revamp the European security system

which suits them well, despite its obvious inef-

ficiency and even notwithstanding the fact that it

is becoming increasingly counterproductive. And

most importantly, they are not ready to abandon

their geopolitical expansion plans which have

already led to the war in Georgia and which are

undermining the positions of the whole of Europe

in the world.

2.10. At the same time, t y lf

tt pss si russi fist spk f

t f w Tty eup (cl-lti) Suity, t situti s mkly

imp tius ig. There is a

growing understanding of the inadequacy of the

existing system. A broad and substantive dialogue

is unfolding both within the Old West and between

Russia and Western countries. More and more

experts now come to understand, although few of

them acknowledge this in public, that the present

security system does not meet the interests of not

only Russia but, equally, the interests of the whole

of Europe, that this system predetermines a resur-

gence of instability and even military threat and

inevitably weakens the Old Worlds positions in

the world. NATO has frozen its enlargement. There

is a growing understanding of the inadmissibility

of its further expansion. It is sad that the price for

this understanding was paid by hundreds of Osse-

tians, Russians and Georgians who were killed in

the August 2008 conflict. But there is hope that

these victims will not be in vain.

2.11. Considering that any tangible results of a rad-

ical overhaul of the existing Euro-Atlantic security

system are unlikely to be achieved earlier than the

middle of next decade, the speed of the movement

towards the understanding of the need to modern-

ize the present security system is very satisfactory

and even impressive. (The possibility of achieving

earlier results seems unlikely due to the mutual

frustration and mistrust, amassed over the past

20 years, to the different-vectored movement of

the parties value paradigms, to the unrealistically

high assessment by Russia and, to an even greater

degree, by the EU of their capabilities in the new

world, and to the transitional nature of the U.S.

strategic objectives.)


14/22



3.0. As the result of analytical work and a series of

discussions of various drafts the authors came to aconclusion that the Euro-Atlantic security system

could develop along five scenarios. The authors

favored the fifth scenario development of a com-

prehensive on Euro-Atlantic security Treaty. The

principles of such a Treaty are laid out in paragraph

3.5 of this Report.

3.0.1. However, already when the text of the Report

was ready, the President Dmitry Medvedev put

forward an official text of a proposed Treaty. The

authors to their great pleasure note that their prin-

ciples where reflected in the officially proposed

document. Though, at this juncture, it has a nar-

rower scope. The authors decided not to change

the text of the 3.5 section, but rather to publish the

unofficial translation of the text of the proposed

Treaty as an Annex.

3.0.2. Naturally, the authors understand, that the

proposed text is the most interesting piece for dis-

cussion. However this debate is only starting. And

the actual treaty or could look differently eventu-

ally.

3.1. Sttus qu

3.1.1. Leaving things as they are will inevitably lead

to a hidden or open rivalry between various sub-

organizations of European security. In this event,

one might expect the unavoidable expansion of the

security void in Europe, and mutual weakening

of Euro-Atlantic partners. They will be unable to

resolve the Iranian or Afghan problems effectively

or in cooperation. The joint efforts in their solution

will be extremely limited or overly demonstrative.

They might only cooperate in a tiny range of issues,

where their interests fully coincide. The parties

participation in rebuffing real challenges of the 21stcentury will be far less effective. The unrecognized

zero sum game will continue. In case the West

resumes the attempts to expand the zone of its

military-political influence into the former USSR,

especially Ukraine, the risk of a conflict with unfore-

seeable consequences will increase.

3.2. Sttus qu plus

3.2.1. As a second option one might consider

the status quo plus program, brought forward

by some Western experts. This implies a slight

expansion of the authority of the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe, mostly

in the field of resolving frozen conflicts, the

modernization of the existing and the drawing

of new accords in arms limitation and reduction.

NATO and the European Union would be playing

an increasingly important role in ensuring secu-

rity. Russia would be making unilateral moves

to provide for its own security and pursuing the

policy towards preventing the strengthening of

Euro-Atlantic partners.

3.2.2. The OSCE has a number of advantages com-

pared with other European multilateral bodies.

These are: the comprehensive membership, the

consensual principle in decision-making, and the

complex approach that combines activities in the

three basic dimensions of the Helsinki Final Act.

But, as Western experts note, these principles also

act as serious limitations that occasionally paralyze

the OSCEs decision-making mechanism.

3.2.3. In case this scenario is realized, the OSCEs

role and functions are likely to continue to lose their

3. Possible Solutions


15/22



potency, even if this organization helps settle the

situation in the zones of simmering conflicts and

deploy NATO and EUs military and police forces

there. If this process is completed, all OSCE func-

tions will be reduced to the Third Basket, which will

inevitably mount tensions in Russia-West relations.

In the event these conflicts flare up as happened

with South Ossetia the efforts to settle them will

surely lead to a confrontation between Russia and

Western organizations.

3.2.4. The removal of the hard security issues

from the OSCE agenda might result in their uni-

lateral regulation, with a lesser degree of Russia-

NATO involvement. There is a possibility that the

Collective Security Treaty Organization and NATO

act as regulators. The latter option might lead to

an increasing division of Europe and the revival ofbipolar confrontation, in its truncated version. One

must forget about effective cooperation between

European states in the solution of the most acute

global problems. This will affect, in a most nega-

tive way, the capability of both Russia and Western

states to resolve such problems as the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction and stabilization of

the Greater Middle East.

3.3. cti f systm fspil ttis f llti

tis3.3.1. The third possible scenario for the devel-

opment of the security architecture in the Euro-

Atlantic space is to divert the collective efforts of

countries and international organizations from the

possibly difficult attempts to work out a universal

political-legal format of a new European Secu-

rity Treaty. T eup xpt mmuity

ffs mpmis: eu-atlti utis

iztis ul w pk f

itstt mts mi pt f

ti s i sui til suity

ti m ffti tls t mbtxtl tts t eup.

3.3.2. This approach might draw a line between

traditional and new threats to security in Europe.

Whereas in the sphere of traditional threats, the

parties are expected to renounce unilateral and

uncoordinated moves in the military-political

sphere, the issues of new challenges and threats

mean creating mechanisms for European countries

collective moves to rebuff the most important global

challenges.

3.3.3. An umbrella treaty on creating a single

(collective) security space from Vancouver to Vlad-

ivostok which would formally put an end to the

Cold War in Europe would act as the political

superstructure of such a system of accords. The

signing of the document containing provisions

on indivisibility and mutual security guarantees

and the universal commitment to observe human

rights, maintain the supremacy of law, territorial

integrity and inviolability of borders, settle dis-

putes peacefully, would help close the chapter on

the split of the continent in the 20th century.

3.3.4. One might suggest the following key multilat-

eral sectoral documents:

3.3.4.1. An agreement on the OSCE, to confirm the

key role of this institution as a framework inter-state organization and the symbol of a re-united

Europe, and ensure equitable representation of all

Euro-Atlantic states without exception, in discuss-

ing the most important challenges and problems

facing them. The OSCE must become a regional

organization of united nations, although it would

be based on more democratic principles than those

of the UN.

3.3.4.2. An agreement on indivisibility and mutual

security guarantees, to ensure the predictability

of actions by states and unions in the sphere of

national security. It should envision the setting up

of an international institution, with the sole func-

tion of monitoring and settling the problems of

potential threats of actions by each of the signato-

ries with respect to each other. The main element

of such an agreement would be the signatories

commitment to resolve their security problems

through this organization, using the mechanisms

envisioned by the agreement, as well as through the

UN Security Council.

3.3.4.3. An agreement on energy security, to spell

out the general understanding of the trends and

priorities for European states in this field and lay

groundwork for integration between the energy

sectors of Russia and Europe. A single inter-

connected system of pipelines ensuring uninter-

rupted supplies even in case of terrorist attacks

would facilitate such integration. The main ele-

ment of this agreement should be a legal basis for

the leading energy companies to exchange assets

and set up a common regulator for all the signa-

tory states, possibly along the lines of a modified

Energy Charter.


16/22



3.3.5. The list of new agreements could include:

an agreement on security guarantees and territo-

rial integrity of neutral and non-bloc states,

an agreement on fighting terrorism and cross-

border crime,

an agreement on combating drug-trafficking,

an agreement on combating piracy,

an agreement on combating cyber terrorism and

cyber crime,

an agreement on counteracting the threats to

human life and human environment (biosecurity),

an agreement on the prevention of militarization

of outer space,

an agreement on collective struggle against natu-

ral and man-made disasters,

an agreement on cooperation in issues of climate

change,

an agreement on joint peacekeeping operations, an agreement on joint development of the Arctic

region.

The common features of all these documents should

be their legal binding force, the availability of clear

interaction procedures, specialized agencies and

mechanisms of control, and in some cases the

parties financial obligations.

3.3.5.1. T amt Pli t

Tspy cfi-Buili M-

sus, isi by t Tty c-

til am Fs i eup pps t bs imptt. at t sm tim, it wul b

xtmly ixpit t pl m-

iz tis tty. It became obsolete even before it

was signed, and carries and generates the Cold War

mentality. New talks over this treaty are fraught

with the re-militarization of the European politics

and reanimation of old fears and suspicions. Lastly,

the very concept of a balance (parity) of armed forc-

es and armaments in Europe has been and remains

a challenge to the common sense.

3.3.6. This package of agreements must be comple-

mented with a new Russia-EU framework agree-

ment and a series of sectoral accords. These accords

should envision, above all, creation a single human

space in Europe with visa-free travel; a single ener-

gy space with cross ownership of mining, transpor-

tation, processing and distribution companies; and

a single legal space (through a modernized Energy

Charter in the form of a treaty, if possible).

3.3.7. The interested countries and international

associations might find it easier to reach accords in

each of these fields and monitor the implementation

of the commitments each of them takes if they create

appropriate institutions and agencies. The Euro-

Atlantic countries may consider other pressing fields

that require mechanisms of collective actions.

3.3.8. A network of interstate agreements in which

individual countries, associations or unions might

participate, will provide not only for removing the

main threats and challenges inside Europe that

stem from the incompleteness of the Cold War but

also give the European countries a more flexible and

faster system of response to the challenges of the

increasingly complex global environment. It will

enable each participant to have complete support

from other Euro-Atlantic states in the protection of

its national interests.

3.3.9. The pros of this plan are the relative ease toreach an agreement in a given sector, a potential to

flesh out cooperation in European security with real

achievements, and an improvement of the general

political atmosphere, much poisoned in the recent

years.

3.3.10. But if these agreements are not pan-Europe-

an, and only concern blocs of states, any member-

state in these blocs (CSTO or NATO) might block

progress and aggravate the general situation. This

option looks preferable or possible only if they bring

together all European states. NATO and the CSTO

(to a lesser extent) might regard these agreements

as a threat to their integrity.

3.3.11. From Russias point of view, the success of

this process will depend on the signing of a basic

agreement on indivisibility and mutual security

guarantees that would rule out the threat of NATOs

further enlargement and the threat to Russias vital

interests. It would be very difficult for Moscow to

sign sectoral agreements until it has received guar-

antees that this threat will not re-emerge.

3.4. Russias acession to NATO

3.4.1. The fourth scenario is Russias ascension

to NATO under the old French scenario (without

joining the blocs military organization). It is only

after Russias gains membership that the bloc could

enlarge by inviting other former Soviet republics.

3.4.2. This option looks quite attractive. Contrary to

the widespread belief, Article 5 of the North Atlantic


17/22



Treaty does not envision any automatic security

guarantees. The military-technical obstacles to NATO

membership are grossly exaggerated. Membership in

the alliance does not rule out participation in other

military-political associations. For example, Russia

and China could set up a security union, if neces-

sary, or t Si cpti oizti

ul bst its suity lmts.

3.4.3. The advantages of this option are obvious.

The confrontation and the Cold War in Europe will

come to an end. NATO will become an effective

and persuasive tool to maintain peace in the world

(in cooperation with other great powers, above all

China and India). Russia will become more power-

ful within the community of developed countries

with similar cultures, with the increase of external

impulses for further modernization.

3.4.4. Such a scenario was quite possible in 1991-

1994, before NATO began to enlarge. At present, it

looks the least likely, but cannot be ruled out entire-

ly. The world is developing unpredictably fast and

requires radical changes in policies. Such changes

do occur sometimes, for example, when Barack

Obama announced changes in the U.S. strategy. If

Obamas policies holds, thrives and adheres to the

announced objectives, this scenario will not appear

all that impossible. Therefore, it must be taken into

account.

3.4.5. A special case within the fourth scenario is

a military-political union between Russia and the

U.S., proposed by some Russian scientists and pub-

lic figures. But it has not been worked through in

detail, and seems fantastic at this point. Still, it can-

not be ruled out in the contemporary world.

3.5. Ppti f wmpsi eup

Suity Tty.

3.5.1. a w mpsi eup (cll-

ti) Suity Tty wul b t bst pti.

It mit ilu ll stts t ky it-

til iztis (t eU, naTo, t cIS,

t cSTo), pti i t eu-atlti

sp, ltu it mit b p f ll t

itst stts. The countries which are not

members of the EU, NATO, the CIS or the CSTO

may participate in the treaty as nation states. The

signing of the treaty only by the interested countries

appears to be the best option, while organizations

might sign after all their members have reached an

accord.

3.5.1.1. The most attractive aspect of this solution is

the possibility to make the parties commitments in

the field of collective security legally binding.3.5.2.

The objective of the treaty is to strengthen peace

and increase stability and predictability of actions

by certain states and interstate associations on the

basis of the parties international legal commit-

ments. The treatys contents might include:

3.5.2.1. The key principles of relations between the

states, which should be based on meeting the exist-

ing international commitments under the UN Char-

ter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter for European

Security and other documents, and their uniforminterpretation and observance.

3.5.2.2. These key principles are: the sovereign

equality of all states, the respect for their territorial

integrity, political independence and inviolability of

borders, and the possibility to change borders only

in line with international law, peacefully and under

accord.

3.5.2.3. Certain provisions of the treaty should con-

firm the commitments taken by the OSCE members

(in the Charter for European Security) and the Rus-

sia-NATO Council not to ensure ones own security

at the expense of the security of others, support the

integrity of the common security space, and respect

the right of any state to sovereignty. The interna-

tional organizations must confirm that they have no

exclusive rights to maintain peace and stability in

the Euro-Atlantic space.

3.5.2.4. Another commitment is not to view each

other as opponents, refrain from participation in

military alliances, coalitions or organizations whose

activity is aimed against one or several signatories

to the treaty, or if the objectives of these associa-

tions contradict it. Under the treaty, the signatories

pledge not to inflict damage to the security of other

states, and adhere to the principle of equal and uni-

form security. In working out their national policy,

they should take into account all the aspects of

ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic region, and

must not ensure their own security at the expense of

the security of other signatories to the treaty.

3.5.2.5. The treaty must confirm that no signatory

or a group of countries have priority in the respon-


18/22



sibility to keep peace and stability in the Euro-

Atlantic space, or the right to consider any part of

the region as a sphere of their influence; it must

confirm the supremacy of the UN Charter and the

UN Security Council in maintaining international

peace and security; and its exclusive right to sanc-

tion the use of force.

3.5.2.6. The treaty should uphold:

the universal principles in settling conflicts, the

unequivocal inadmissibility of solutions by force

and the clear rules to be applied to all crises, in

accordance with the UN Charter;

the basic principles to develop arms control

regimes and confidence-building measures on

the basis of reasonable sufficiency in military

construction, including a clear definition of the

notion considerable combat forces, as well asmeasures to enhance transparency with respect to

military forces and military activities;

3.5.2.7. The treaty should contain concrete prin-

ciples and mechanisms of interaction between

the states and organizations in confronting new

challenges and threats, such as the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction, international

terrorism, drug-trafficking and other kinds of

cross-border crime.

3.5.2.8. Under the treaty, the participant states

take the commitments to observe democratic

rights and civil liberties, and establish the legal

mechanisms to lift the restrictions on the move-

ment of citizens within the space where the

treaty is effective. Of course, this set of provisions

should occupy a prominent place in the docu-

ment. But the Second, or Economic Basket if

we use Helsinki Act notions should not play a

key role in the treaty. Considering the present

stage of Russias development and involvement

in the global economy, these relations should

be confined to the World Trade Organization or

Russia-EU interaction.

3.5.3. It is necessary to consider including in the

treaty of elements inherent in collective defense

organizations (the protection of one members by

the force of all other signatories), as well as broad

economic problems, such as cooperation in energy

security. Under the treaty, any armed attack on one

or several signatories to the treaty should be viewed

as an attack on all; and the document must envision

clear mechanisms of urgent consultations over the

issue.

3.5.4. The treaty might set up a new monitoring

organization: a collective security organization with

a permanent Secretariat. In theory, the OSCE might

evolve into a new organization, but this develop-

ment appears unlikely.

3.5.5. Despite the fact that this option is obviously

preferable, it requires very long and difficult efforts

to bring together numerous and often contradic-

tory interests, create a whole complex of solutionsfor the elements of the agreement, crucial for each

participant. This process might take a long time,

during which the security situation in Europe might

steadily deteriorate.

3.5.6. To avoid this, in case of a decision is made to

move towards such a treaty, one might adopt a dec-

laration (agreement) stating such readiness and the

basic principles of the treaty. The agreement should

contain the commitments to refrain from actions

for the period of drawing the treaty which might

be interpreted as detrimental to the signatories

to the future treaty, in particular the enlargement

of the existing military-political alliances. In these

conditions, the very process of drawing the treaty,

despite all the difficulties, could become a powerful

tool to build up confidence and cooperation, and

strengthen the parties international positions and

international peace.

3.5.7. The new treaty should not rule out the

participation of member-states in other security

agreements, or create obstacles to it, such as the

U.S.-Japanese security alliance or the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, as the latter acquires

the functions related to the sphere of hard security.

On the contrary, the new treaty should become the

most important unifying framework of interna-

tional security.


19/22



Annex

European Security Treaty(Unofcial translation)

Draft

The Parties to this Treaty,

Desiring to promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in conformity with

international law,

Guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with

the Charter of the United Nations (1970), Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Coop-

eration in Europe (1975), as well as provisions of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of

International Disputes (1982) and Charter for European Security (1999),

Reminding that the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-

pendence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the goals and principles of the Charter

of the United Nations is inadmissible in their mutual relations, as well as international relations in

general,

Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary respon-

sibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to join efforts in order to respond effectively to present-day security challenges

and threats in the globalized and interdependent world,

Intending to build effective cooperation mechanisms that could be promptly activated with a view to

solving issues or differences that might arise, addressing concerns and adequately responding to chal-

lenges and threats in the security sphere,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of

indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty

individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organiza-

tion, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all

other Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to these prin-

ciples and to strengthen security of each other.

Article 2

1. A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting

significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.

2. A Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek

to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or organizations observe principles set forth in the Charter

of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations


20/22



and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Final

Act, Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, as well as in Article1 of this Treaty, and that decisions taken in the framework

of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties

to the Treaty.

3. A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the territory of any

other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or

Parties to the Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties

to the Treaty.

Article 3

1. A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or the Depositary,

any other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational

measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its

security.

2. Parties shall inform the Depositary of any requests under para.1 of this Article and of responses to

them. The Depositary shall bring that information to the attention of the other Parties.

3. Nothing in this Article prevents the Parties from undertaking any other actions to ensure transpar-ency and mutual trust in their relations.

Article 4

The following mechanism shall be established to address issues related to the substance of this Treaty,

and to settle differences or disputes that might arise between the Parties in connection with its inter-

pretation or application:

a) Consultations among the Parties;

b) Conference of the Parties;

c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties.

Article 5

1. Should a Party to the Treaty determine that there exists a violation or a threat of violation of the

Treaty by any other Party or Parties, or should it wish to raise with any other Party or Parties any issue

relating to the substance of the Treaty and requiring, in its opinion, to be considered jointly, it may

request consultations on the issue with the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested

in such consultations. Information regarding such a request shall be brought by the Requesting Party

to the attention of the Depositary which shall inform accordingly all other Parties.

2. Such consultations shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than (...)days from the date of

receipt of the request by the relevant Party unless a later date is indicated in the request.

3. Any Party not invited to take part in the consultations shall be entitled to participate on its own

initiative.

Article 6

1. Any participant to consultations held under Article5 of this Treaty shall be entitled, after having held

the consultations, to propose the Depositary to convene the Conference of the Parties to consider the

issue that was the subject of the consultations.

2. The Depositary shall convene the Conference of the Parties, provided that the relevant proposal is

supported by not less than (two) Parties to the Treaty, within (...) days from the date of receipt of the

relevant request.

3. The Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least two thirds of the Parties to the

Treaty. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus and shall be binding.

4. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

1. In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack against a Party to the Treaty, immediate actions

shall be undertaken in accordance with Article8(1) of the Treaty.


21/22



2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article8 of the Treaty, every Party shall be entitled to consider

an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-

defense under Article51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked

Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Information on

measures taken by Parties to the Treaty in exercise of their right of self-defense shall be immediately

reported to the UN Security Council.

Article 8

1. In cases provided for by Article7 of this Treaty, the Party which has been attacked or threatened with

an armed attack shall bring that to the attention of the Depositary which shall immediately convene an

Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to decide on necessary collective measures.

2. If the Party which became subject to an armed attack is not able to bring that to the attention of the

Depositary, any other Party shall be entitled to request the Depositary to convene an Extraordinary

Conference of the Parties, in which case the procedure provided for in Para.1 of this Article shall be

applied.

3. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties may decide to invite third states, international organi-

zations or other concerned parties to take part in it.4. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths

of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be taken by

unanimous vote and shall be binding. If an armed attack is carried out by, or a threat of such attack

originates from a Party to the Treaty, the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number

of votes of the Parties in adopting a decision.

The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 9

1. This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the

UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations

of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in

the area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty are not incompatible with

the Treaty.

3. The Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty.

4. This Treaty shall not affect the right of any Party to neutrality.

Article 10

This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from

Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union,

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, North

Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States in from to .

Article 11

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States and to approval or adoption by the

signatory international organizations. The relevant notifications shall be deposited with the govern-

ment of ... which shall be the Depositary.

2. In its notification of the adoption or approval of this Treaty, an international organization shall

outline its sphere of competence regarding issues covered by the Treaty.

It shall immediately inform the Depositary of any relevant changes in its sphere of competence.

3. States mentioned in Article10 of this Treaty which did not sign the Treaty during the period indicated

in that Article may accede to this Treaty by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 12

This Treaty shall enter into force ten days after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification with the

Depositary in accordance with Article11 of the Treaty.


22/22



For each State or international organization which ratifies, adopts or approves this Treaty or accedes

to it after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification of ratification, adoption, approval or accession

with the Depositary, the Treaty shall enter into force on the tenth day after the deposit by such State

or organization of the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 13

Any State or international organization may accede to this Treaty after its entry into force, subject to

the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

For an acceding State or international organization, this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after

the deposit of the instrument of accession with the Depositary, provided that during the said period

no Party notifies the Depositary in writing of its objections against such accession.

Article 14

Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty should it determine that extraordinary

circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have endangered its supreme interests. The

Party intending to withdraw from the Treaty shall notify the Depositary of such intention at least (...)

days in advance of the planned withdrawal. The notification shall include a statement of extraordinary

circumstances endangering, in the opinion of that Party, its supreme interests.

towards a new euro-atlantic security architecture

Documents