toshihiko izutsu • basic problems of ''abstract quiddity
DESCRIPTION
The concept of “quiddity” (máhíyah) plays an exceedingly important role in Islamic philosophy, not only in metaphysics but also in logic. For the Eisagoge (Ar. Isághuji), which constitutes the First Book of classical Aristotelian logic as it has been accepted by the Muslims, is in its essentials nothing other than an elaborate theory of “quiddity”. In the course of history, the concept of “quiddity” has raised in Islamic thought a number of interesting problems. The so-called i‘tibarat of “quiddity” is surely of the most important of those problems.TRANSCRIPT
BASIC PROBLEM3 OF "AF-STRACT QUIDDITY"
By
Toshihiko Izutsu
Professor a t M cGill University
Ins titu te o f Islamic Studies
I
T h e concept of “ q u id d ity ” (máhíyah) plays an exceedingly im p o rtan t
rőle in Islam ic philosophy, nő t only in metaphysics b ú t alsó in logic. Fór the
Eisagógé (Ar. Isághuji), w hich constitutes the First Book of classical A ristote-
lian logic as it has been accepted by th e Muslims, is in its essentials no th ing
o ther th an an e labora te theory of “ q u id d ity ”. In the course o f history, the
concept o f ^q u id d ity ” has raised in Islam ic thought a n u m b er of interesting
problems. T h e so -ca lled iUibárát of “ qu idd ity” is surely of the most im p o r
ta n t o f those problems.
T h e w ord i ‘tibárát fsg. iHibár) rneans ^ (various possible) ways o f look-
ing a t ” a th ing . T h e expression (<ictibárat of qu idd ity” , therefore, refers to
various possible ways in which “ qu idd ity” can be viewed a t the level of
conceptua l analysis. I t m ust be noted th a t the expression in no wise suggests
the existence o f various kinds of “ qu id d ity ” . All th a t it ndicates iS th a t every
“ q u id d ity ” can be rationally ap p roached from a n u m b er of different angles,
or can be conceived in a n u m b er o f different dimensions, and th a t a t each
of the dimensions “ q u id d ity ” discloses different ra tional characteristics.
T h ree iHibár&t have been consecrated by philosophic trad ition as being
the most fu n d am en ta l am o n g all the im aginable approaches:
(1) la bi-shart o r “ n o n - conditioned” .
(2) bi-shart Iá or ^negatively conditioned” .
(3) bi-shart shay’ or “ positively conditioned” .
O f these th ree the m ost controversial have always been the first an d
the second. T h e present p ap er will deal with somé o f the most basic problems
th a t have arisen a ro u n d the second, bi-shart Iá.
T he very concept o f “ quidd ity q u á negatively cond itioned” (máhiyah
bi-shart Iá) goes back directly to the metaphysics of Ib n Síná (Avicenna).
Bút it becam e a reál moot problem in Islamic philosophy w ith the descrip-
tion N a s i r a l - D in a l - T ű s íg a v e o f this concept in his celebrated Tajrid al-
‘Aqá’id. I n view of this fact, we shall do well to s ta rt by rep roducing the
short b ú t highly controversial passage o f this la tte r work, in which T űsi
enum erates w hat he considers the characteristic features of “ qu idd ity q u á
negatively conditioned” .1
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 4
II
(1) Wa - qad tűkhadh al - máhiyah,
(2 ) mahdhufan ‘an-há má *adá-há ,
(3) bi-hayth
(4) lau indámmá ilay - há shay\
(5) la-kána z á ’id.
(6) w a -lá takűn maqűlah ‘ alá,
dhálika al-majmű(.
(7 ) Wa - hiya al - máhiyah bi - shart Iá,
(8) w a -lá tájad illa f i al-adhhán
“ Q u id d ity ” m ay be viewed,
all elements o ther than itself being
rem oved therefrom ,
in such a way that,
if any elem ent were adjoined to it
(i.e. th e “ qu idd ity” ),
it (i.e. tha t elem ent) would b ú t be
something external (and su p erad d -
ed),
and it w ould nő t be pred ica ted of
th a t com bined whole.
“ Q u id d i ty '’ in such a state is “ n e
gatively conditioned ,,5
an d it does nőt exist except in the
mind-
5 T. IZLJTSU
Fór a correct unders tand ing of w h a t is s tated here about the categry
of “ q u á negatively conditioned ' it m ust be rem em bered th a t most of the lead-
ing M uslim philosophers recognize, over a n d a b o v e th e three Vtibárát, ano ther
iHibár or a stage which metaphysically precedes all of them , nam ely, a stage
a t w hich “ q u id d ity ” is viewed in its conceptual pu rity p rio r to its being
de te rm ined or conditioned by any th ing w hatsoever. This is the iHibár o f
“ qu idd ity q u á itselfv (máhíyah min hayth hiya).2
A t the stage of “ q u á itself” , “ qu idd ity“ is viewed in a state of totál
indeterm ination . N o de te rm ina tion , either positive or negative, is a t tached
to it. I t is nő t de term ined e v e n b y th e purely negative de term ina tion o f n o t-
b e in g - de term ined - by - anything. “ Q u id d ity ” is here being considered in
itself a n d by itself. T h e re is absolutely no reference to w hatever is nőt itself.
I t is in the capacity o f the hu m án m ind, however, to detach itself
f rom the state o f pure in tuition , recede a step, an d consider the in tu ited
thing, w hatever it m ay be, from a distance, observing it in an objective
way. “ Q u id d ity q u á itself”, w hen observed in such a m anner , discloses itself
to the m ind as som ething transcending, o r cut off from, all o ther things. No
longer is the “ qu id d ity ” then being in tu ited in its absolute purity ; fór “ o th e r”
things have already in tru d ed in tő the field of consciousness, except th a t the
“ q u id d ity ” is p ú t intő a negative relation w ith these “ o th e r” things. T h a t is
to say, the “ o th e r” things of which the m in d is conscious and which, so to
speak, su rro u n d the “ qu id d ity ” , a re in ten tionally expelled f iom the field of
consciousness an d kept back from the “ qu idd ity” . All this is a conscious
process, a t least theoretically if nő t practically. A nd the absolute pu rity or
transcendence o f the “ q u id d i ty ’’ becomes re - established on the g round p re -
p a red by this ra tiona l process. T h e “ qu id d ity ” is now in the state of “ n e g a
tively cond it ioned” .
T h e “ q u id d ity ” in this new state o f pu r ity is a “ q u id d ity ” as an
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 6
abstrac t concept. S tructura lly it is said to be “negatively conditioned” because
here its conceptual pu rity is m ain ta ined by d in t o f a negative determ ination ,
nam ely, th a t of nőt - being - accom panied - by - any th ing - else.3 In the tradition-
al theory o f universalia in Islamic logic, “ q u idd ity" in such a State is know n
as “ ra tional universal” (kulit (aqli). I t m ay conveniently be exemplified by
the pure concept o f ‘an im al’ viewed as a self - subsistent ra tional entity pre-
cluding all o ther concepts th a t m ay possibly be associated with it. In the text
given above, Tusi refers to this aspect of the p rob lem by the clause(2): “ all
elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved therefrom ” . T h e sentence (6) States
th a t a “ qu idd ity” considered in this way is a “ qu idd ity q u á negatively c o n
ditioned” .
T he text mentions three m ore points as characteristic o f “ qu idd ity quá
negatively conditioned” .
F i r s t : -----as indicated by (3) - ( 4 ) “ qu idd ity” in such a state cannot
form an integrál whole w ith any o ther concepts. This is b ú t a d irect conse-
quence of ( l ) - ( 2 ) . Since the concept o f ‘an im al’, fór exam ple, is in this
dimension supposed to subsist independently of all o ther elements which, as
we have ju s t seen, are being consciously kept back from it, it is n a tu ra l tha t
the concept should absolutely refuse to be com bined with any o ther c o n c e p t-----
th a t of ‘ra tiona l’, fór e x am p le intő a conceptual unity . ‘A n im á l’ a n d
‘rational' here are two independen t concepts. Evén if we forcefully p ú t them
together, w hat is obtained will be no th ing m ore than a n external com bina -
tion of two self-contained elements refusing, ju s t like oil and w ater, to be
m ixed with each other. T h e com bination ‘an im a l’ - ‘ra t io n a l’ in this concep
tual dimension wáll aptly be com pared w ith a m án an d a stone p ú t side by
side in the external world. T hey can never be in tegra ted intő a whole. This
negative feature distinctively marks off the “ q u á negatively conditioned”
from the “ quá non - conditioned” , fór if ‘ra t iona l’ is ad jo ined to ‘a n im a l’ in
7 T. IZUTSU
the la t te r dimension, the two concepts get smoothly com bined intő a th ird
concept, i.e. th a t of ‘ra tiona l a n im a l’ which in fact is no th ing bú t the c o n
cept o f ‘m á n ’.
S e c o n d :-----as ind ica ted by ( 6 ) a “ q u id d i ty ” in the state of “ quá
negatively cond itioned” can never be predicated o f any th ing o ther th an its
own self (“ A nim al is an im a l” ), nő t even of itself as com bined with something
else. As we have observed in the foregoing, ‘an im al’ a n d ‘ra t io n a l’, fór
instance, a re in this dim ension preclusive o f each o ther, so th a t the c o m b i-
n a t io n of these two concepts rem ains an external com bination of two inde-
p e n d e n t elements: ‘a n im a l+ ra t io n a l’. T h e ‘a n im a l+ ra t io n a l’ is of course quite
a different concept from ‘a n im a l’, because it is ‘animal-i- X ’, representing
som ething m ore th a n m ere anim ality . ‘A n im ál’ ( “ q u á negatively conditioned”)
c an n o t possibly be p red ica ted of ‘an im al + X ’ because the former precisely
represents m ere anim ality . A nd by this negative feature, too, the “ q u á negatively
c o n d it io n ed ” proves radically different from the “ quá non - conditioned” , fór in
the la t te r dim ension ‘an im a l’ has a full r igh t to be pred ica ted o f the c o m
b ined whole (“ ‘A n im al+ ra tio n a l’ i s a n an im a l”, tha t is, “ M á n is an an im a l” ).
W e m ay add th a t in the text quo ted above, Tusi does nőt discuss the
re la ted p rob lem , w hether there is som ething th a t can be p redicated o f
“ qu idd ity q u á negatively conditioned . Briefly stated, the answer is yes.
Fór, a l though p r im a ry intelligibles canno t be pred icated of it, secondary
intelligibles c a n 4 . (“ A nim al is a genus” , “ M án is a species”, etc.).
T h i r d : -----as ind icated by the last sentence of the text, (8) “ q u id
d ity q u á negatively conditioned” does nő t exist except in the m ind. T h e re is no
disagreem ent am o n g M uslim philosophers th a t “ q u id d ity ” deprived of all its
accidents , i.e. a pure ly abs trac t concept, canno t exist in the external world.
T h e reál p rob lem is ra ther, w hether “ qu idd ity” in such a state does or can
exist in the m ind . A m ong the leading thinkers o f the la te r periods of Islam,
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 8
like Ju r ján i , Taftázáni, Q űshji, etc., we íind this pi'oblem being very seri-
ously discussed. Those who take the position th a t “ q u id d ity ” in its absolute
pu rity canno t exist even in the m ind a rgue th a t “ to exist írS the m in d ” is
itself an accident so tha t a “ qu idd ity existing in the m in d ” is by this very
qualification deprived of the conceptual purity which is a t issue in th e pre-
sent context. T h a t is to say, the “ q u á negatively conditioned” cannot exist
in the m ind w ithout bem g transform ed intő som ething else
Against this argum ent, those who adm it the m en tá i ex;stence ( ' “ q u á
negatively conditioned” point out th a t the negative thesis is based on a eon-
fusion between two different “ intentions” 5. W e must, they argue, clearly
distmguish between a State of affairs being viewed in its prim ary , de facto
m ode (nafs al-amr) o f being, i.e. as na tu ra lly given, before the light of anal-
ysis is shed upon it, and the State o f affairs being viewed analytically w hen
the secondary, reflexive in tention of consciousness is focused upon its s tructure.
Certainíy, they go on to argue, a “ quiddity existing in the m in d ” is
nőt a “ qu idd ity” pure and simple w ithout any qualification. Bút in the first
o f the two dimensions tha t have ju s t been explained, “ existing in the m in d ”
is still a m a tte r o f the p rim ary m ode o f being, an d as such the h g h t of
consciousness is nőt shed upon it. As long as the m ind does nőt take cogni-
zance of it, “ existing in the m in d ” does nő t constitute a n accident o f the
“ qu idd ity” . A nd such is exactly the dimensjon in which th e “ q u á negatively
conditioned” is actualized. T h e being - in - the - m ind viewed as an accident
o* the “ qu idd ity” belongs to a different dimension, an d is therefore to be
completely ignored a t this stage of p r im ary intention. T h e being - in - the - m in d
disdoses itself as an accident of the “ qu idd ity” only a t the stage o f s eco n
dary in tention , w hen the consciousness hav ing in itself the pu re “ qu id d ity ”
a lready actualized, directs now its a tten tion to the very fact th a t it is beinj>
conscious o f the “ qu idd ity” in such a state.
9 T. IZUTSU
A similar, b ú t slightly different solution of the p ro b ltm has alsó been
proposed by somé o f the philosophers, th e gist of w hich is as follows.® T h e
functioning o f the m in d is by n a tú ré such th a t it can represent anything,
even its ow n non - existence. I t is, therefore, quite a simple m atte r fór the
m in d to represent “ qu idd ity” in the state of an absolute purity , deprived o f
all its accidents, be they external or m entái. So even i f “ quiddity q u á n eg a
tively conditioned” be qualified, a lready a t the p rim ary stage, by b e i n g - in -
t h e - m in d , the m ind is able to consider it as something nő t qualified by this
m en tá i accident.
T hose who take this position usually explain the s ituation by having
recourse to cases th a t a re m ore easily unders tandab le , like the concepts of
“ non - existent” a n d “ unknow n” . A “ non - existent” thing is existent in the
m in d as long as it is conceived as something, be it in a purely negative way.
Bu this k ind of existence does nő t p revent it from being the concept of
“ n o n - existent” . Similarly som ething “ u nknow n” is known as such the m om ent
the m in d takes cognizance of it. I t remains nevertheless the concept o f
“ un k n o w n ” in itself. J u s t in the same way, “ qu iddity q u á negatively condi -
tioned” is qualified by b e in g - in - th e - m in d insofar as the m ind is conscious
o f i t ; b ú t in itself it is “ q u id d ity ” s tand ing aloof from all qualifications, and
as such is opposed to “ qu idd ity q u á positively conditioned” .
So far the a b o v e -q u o te d text of Tusi would nőt seem to lead intő any
serious difficulties. Its a rg u m en t appears flawless. Such, however, is in
reality n ő t the case. F ó r m an y of the f ir s t- ra te thinkers claim to notice a
g la n n g contrad ic tion betw een the clauses (2) an d (4). H ence the thesis o f
“ two different m eanings” of the expression “ q u á negatively conditioned” (bi-
shart Iá). W a shall be concerned w ith this problem in the following section.
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 10
III
Before exam ining the na tú ré of the “ con trad ic tion” or “ confusion” which
Tűsí is said to ha ve m ade in pu tt ing the clauses (2) a n d (4) together in his
description o f “ quiddity q u á negatively conditioned’’, let us first give a brief
explanation o f the two different m eanm gs which these thinkers a t ta c h to the
expression bi-shart Iá.
(1) T h e first m eaning o f “ q u á negatively cond itioned” concerns essen-
tially an d exclusively the conceptual re lation between a “ qu id d ity ’’ an d its
accidents. H ere “ quiddity q u á negatively conditioned” m eans “ q u id d ity ” in
th e state of a totál seclusion from everything alien and external to itself-----
“ qu id d ity ” as viewed in its absolute conceptual pu r ity a p a r t from all “ o th e r”
elements, whether the la tter be its inseparable accidents (like being - an - o d d -
num ber in relation to the “ qu idd ity” of the n u m b er 3) or separable accidents
(like b e in g -w h ite in relation to the “ qu idd ity” of ‘m á n ’). I t will be quite
clear that this is precisely the m eaning in which we have in the foregoing
pages used an d understood the expression “ quidd ity q u á negatively c o n d i
tioned” . I t will be clear alsó tha t a “ q u id d ity ” understood in this way can n o t
exist in the external world, because it cannot b ú t be an abstract concept.
(2) T h e second m eaning of bi-shart Iá concerns a re lation th a t obtains
between the “ constituent parts” (a jzá \ sg. ju t?) of “ qu idd ity” . H ere we start
from a concrete situation in which we find a “ q u id d ity ” (e.g. ‘m á n ’) being
existent in the m ind as a conceptual composite (murakkab) constitu ted by
ano ther “ qu idd ity” ( ‘an im a l’) and a differentia (‘ra t io n a l5). W h a t we are
initially given is, on this supposition, a composite whole (‘m á n ’). O u r reason
exercises its discriminating ability upon this composite w hole an d analyzesit
in tő its com ponents: ‘an im al5 and ‘ra t io n a l5. T h en the reason considers the
concept of ‘an im al5 thus taken out of its original composition as an independent
11 T. IZUTSU
en ti ty s tand ing opposed to the o ther e lem ent: cr a t io n a l \ T h e concept of
‘an im a l’ viewed in this way exemplifies the second m e a n in g o f “qu idd ity q u á
negatively cond itioned” . T h e “ q u á negatively conditioned” is to be taken here
as a “ constituent p a r t” (juz?) o r “ m a t te r” (maddah) of a “ q u id d ity ” (‘anim al'1)
as the “ m a t ie r ” o f ‘m á n ’ in the present exam ple). ‘A n im ál’ here is “ negatively
cond itioned” in the sense tha t its conceptual independence is conditioned by
its difference or separation from ‘ra tio n a l’.
I t is im p o rta n t to rem ark fór a r igh t understand ing of w hat we are
going to say ab o u t the “ confusion” Tusi m ay have m ad e between the two
m eanings o f bi-shart Iá, tha t a “ qu idd ity” understood in the second sense
is considered by all those who m ake this distinction to exist in the external
world. I t m ust be ad d m itted , they say, th a t primarily a “ qu idd ity” in such a
s tate exists only in the m ind , fór it is originally a p roduct of a ra tional
analysis by w hich the m ind establishes it as an independen t entity in sepa
ra t io n from its com pan ion from which it is in reality nőt separated. However,
insofar as it exists in its original form in the external world in com bination
w ith its differentia a n d o ther accidents, it does exist secondarily a n d per
accidens, in the ex ternal world.
W ith this p re lim inary explanation in m ind, let us now tu rn to the
a rg u m en t o f those who see a “ confusion” in w hat Tűsi says abou t the struc-
tu re o f “ qu idd ity q u á negatively conditioned” .
T h e m a in po in t o f their criticism is as follows. T ű s i’s description of
“ qu id d ity q u á negatively conditioned” lacks consistency in th a t it can be
taken nefiher in the first sense th ro u g h o u t n o r in the second sense. T h e
criticism is based on the observation o f the two following facts.
(a) T h e expression: “ all elements o ther th an itself being rem oved
th e re fro m ” clearly shows th a t w h a t Tűsí has in m in d is “ q u á negatively
co n d it io n ed ” in the first sense. Bút the clause which follows it, nam ely : “ if
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 12
any elem ent were adjoined to i t” stands flagrantly in conflict with this
understanding . Fór “ q u á negatively conditioned” in the first sense is sup -
posed to be absolutely de tached from all “ o th e r” elements, so tha t if any
elem ent were to be adjoined to i t ---------even by m ere su p p o sit io n --- the
“ q u id d ity ” would cease to b e i n the p u r ity of “ q u á negatively conditioned
in the first sense.
(b) Nor, however, is it possible fór us to take T ű s í’s description con -
sistently in the second sense, because the sentence i 8) explicitly states th a t
the “ qu idd ity" in question “ does nő t exist except in the m in d ” . W e have
already seen above tha t “ quá negatively cond itioned” does exist in the exter
nal world, albeit secondarily.
According to Ju r ján í , the clause (2) fits only the first sense, while the
clause (4) is proper only to the second sense. Thus he sees in T ű s í’s descrip
tion an obvious an d undeniable confusion betw een the two meanings.
I t is interesting to rem ark in this respect th a t because o f this “ c o n fu
sion' no less an au thority th an Taftázán i goes to the extreme of denying the
authenticity of the T a jr id a l- ‘Aqá'id itself. C om paring the ab o v e-c ited passage
w ith w hat Tűsi says in his Com m entary on the A vicennian Ishárát, T a ftázán i
reaches the astonishing conclusion that this work is p robab ly nő t a reál work
o f this g reat Master. Says he: “ (T h e confusion be ween the two meanings)
testifies tha t this is nőt one of his reál works” . “ In this (confusion) we have
a n indubitab le evidence in support of the negative opin ion th a t has been
expressed about the Tajrid a l - ‘Aqá'id, nam ely th a t it is nő t an au then tic
work of Tűsi, despite the fact tha t the book is too good and precious to be
ascribed to anyone else” .8
O f all those who see a “ confusion” in T ű s i’s description, Q űshji ( ‘A lá5
a l - D in A h m ad a l-Q ű sh ji , d. 1474) deserves special mention. H e was
am ong the first thinkers to recognize the distinction between the two technical
13 T. IZUTSU
m eanings w ith which we are concerned in this section, a n d to em phasize the
im portance o f m a in ta in ing this distinction rigorously an d in the most sys-
tem atic way, nőt restricting the distinction to “ quá negatively conditioned”
alone b ú t ex tending it to “ q u á positively conditioned” a n d “ q u á n o n -c o n d i
t io n e d ” as well. A n d on the basis o f this w idened vicw, Q űshji criticised
I asi’s exposition, a l though he did nő t go to the extent o f denying the au then-
ticity o f the Tajrid al-'AqüHd. In view o f the historical im portance o f his
theory, we shall give here an outline of the m ain ideas which he expresses
on the par t icu la r p rob lem a t issue in his famous Gom m entary9 on this very
work o f Tűsi.
I t is im p o r ta n t to note tha t, since, as we have ju s t seen, Q űshji does
n ő t restrict the d istinction betw een the “ two m eanings" to bi-shart Iá, b ú t
extends it systematically to Iá bi-shart a n d bi-shart shay\ the problem is no
longer how one should u n ders tand the expression “ q u á negatively c o n d i
tio n ed ”. Q űsh ji r a th e r proposes to establish now two different systems of
i ‘tibárát of “ q u id d ity ” , two systems o f technical terininology which are parallel
to each o ther in th a t both consist o f three terms exactly the same, b ú t which
are different from one anofher in iha t they are based each on a different
m terp re ta tion of the terms.
T h e basic “ m ean ing” in terms o f w hich one o f the two systems is
constitu ted is the same as w hat we have already elucidated a t the outset of
the present section as the first m eaning o f “ q u á negatively conditioned” . T h e
iHibárát o f “ q u id d ity ” , u n d e r this in terp re ta tion , tu rn out to be a systematic
p resenta tion of the three m ajo r ways in which reason can consider “ q u id d i ty ”
m term s of the degrees a n d modes of determ ination .
T h e second system of the iHibárát of “ q u id d ity ” is a classification o f
th e m u tu a l relations th a t a re conceivable between the inner (or essential)
constituents o f “ qu idd ity" , which are capab le o f being p red ica ted o f the latter.
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 14
Thus, to repeat, we have two systems o f iHibárát o f “ qu id d ity ” , each
consisting o f the same terms:
(1) Iá bi-shart “ q u á n o n -c o n d i t io n e d ” ,
(2) bi-shart Iá “ q u á negatively cond itioned”,
(3) bi-shart shay “ q u á positively conditioned” .
Each of these three terms carries a different m ean ing accord ing to
w hether it is understood in reference to the one or the o ther system. Let us,
fór the sake of convenience, designate the two systems as S y s tem -A an d
System -B respectively. Since abou t S ys tem -A w h a t we already know is
sufficient fór our present purposes, we shall p ú t System -B in the foreground
and consider in particu la r bi-shart Iá an d bi-shart shay3 w hich are o f special
relevance to the p rob lem we are concerned with.
Let us first take up bi-shart shay’ “ quá positively conditioned”, or m ore
literally “ q u á conditioned by som ething” . I t is to be rem arked im m ediately
th a t in System -B the w ord shay’ does nőt m ean “ an y th in g ” ; th a t the r e fe r
ence is ra th e r to a certain definite thing. A n accident like ‘laugh ing ’ (dáhik)
or Ccapable of writing’ (kátib), fór instance, function in S y s tem -A as shay*,
i.e. a conditioning factor of the “ q u id d ity ” (of ‘an im al’, fór instance). Fór
in fact in System -A anyth ing can function as a conditioning factor o f “ q u id
dity” . T h e ‘an im a l’ as conditioned by being - c a p a b le -o f -w r i t in g is ‘m á n ’,
an d it provides an example o f “ quiddity q u á positively conditioned” . In Sys
tem -B , on the contrary, only those concepts w hich are found in the in terior
of a “ qu iddity” an d which essentially constitute it from inside are allowecl
to function as the conditioning factors of the “ qu idd ity” . O therwise expressed,
it is only the diíferentia th a t can be considered the shay’ of the “ qu idd ity” .
‘A nim ál’, fór example, is in itself an indeterm inate “ qu idd ity” . I t does
nőt acquire detcrm ination an d ac tuah ty unless a diíferentia (e.g. ‘ra t io n a l’)
15 T. IZUTSU
be added to it. W h en ‘an im al’ is conceived as being in a s tate in which one
o f its differentiae has a lready actualized it, the “ q u id d ity ” o f ‘a n im a l’ is
said to be in the s tate of “ q u á positively conditioned.” in terms of S ystem -
B. T h u s a “ qu idd ity q u á positively cond itioned” in terms of System -B is a
predicable , “ species”.
B i-shart Iá o r “ q u á negatively conditioned" is alsó given two different
in te rp re ta t ions in terms o f the two systems. In S y s tem -A , bi-shart Iá reT rs
to the s tate in w hich “ qu idd ity” is kept deliberately detached from all e le
m ents o ther th an itself, while in System -B ‘‘qu idd ity q u á negatively c o n d i
tioned" is “ q u id d i ty ” viewed as a constituent elem ent of a composite concep-
tual whole in which it is com bined with ano ther constituent element. H ere
we have a “ q u id d ity ” (let us call it X) seen as jo ined to ano ther element
(let us call it Y) so th a t as the result of this com bination a th ird conceptual
en tity (let us call it Z) is actualized. X and Y are the constituent elements
o f Z ; th a t is to say, each of X and Y is a “ p a r t” f ju z ’) o f Z. Thus, to
restate the m a t te r in m ore concrete terms, ‘an im a l’ (X) is com bined with
‘ra t io n a l5 (Y) to form a th ird concept: ‘m á n ’ (Z). ‘M á n ’ in this context is
viewed as a conceptual composite m ade of ‘an im a l’ an d ‘ra t io n a l’. ‘A nim ál’
is a “ p a r t ” of ‘m á n ’. A n d under such an in terpre ta tion , ‘an im al’ m aintains
its own conceptual independence so tha t w hatever is jo ined to it is regarded
as som ething external to it. I t is in this sense th a t the “ qu iddity ’ of ‘an im al’
is said to be in the state o f “ q u á negatively conditioned in System -B . Since
it is only a “ p a r t ”, or a constituent element, of ‘m á n ’, it canno t be p r e d i
cated o f ‘m á n ’. In o ther words, we canno t say in this par t icu la r dim ension:
“ M á n is an an im al ', fór ‘an im a l’ here does n ő t include in itself the other
constituent of ‘m á n ’, nam ely ‘ra tio n a l’. ‘A n im ál’ in this situation is said to
be the “ m a tte r" (máddah) of ‘m á n ’.
I t m ust be noticed th a t in System -B , “ qu idd ity" , w hether it be “ q u á
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 16
positively conditoned” or “ quá negatively conditioned”, is viewed as being
jo ined with something else. Evén in the state o f “ q u á negatively conditioned” ,
it is nő t the case tha t “ qu idd ity” stands com pletely detached from all e le
ments o ther th an itself, as it does in System -A . T h e only difference betw een
“ quá positively conditioned” and “ q u á negatively cond itioned” in System -B
lies in the following fact. In the former, the added elem ent (Y) is viewed as
having completely pene tra ted intő the inner tex ture o f the “ q u id d ity ” (X)
in such a way th a t X is actualized as Z pu re an d simple, leaving outw ardly
no trace of X and Y. Thus, to use again our fam iliar exam ple, w h a t we
actually have here is the pure concept of ‘m á n ’, while its constituent e l e
ments, ‘an im al’ an d ‘ra tiona l’, having been, as it were, dissolved in tő ‘m á n ’,
lie totally h idden u nder this composite whole. In the state of “ q u á negatively
conditioned”, on the contrary, the ad ded elem ent is viewed as rem ain ing
external to the “ qu idd ity” so th a t the two constituents, although they a c t u
ally are united intő a single composite, m ain ta in each its ow n conceptual
independence. In the very s tructure o f ‘m á n ’, fór exam ple, ‘a n im a l’ is intui-
ted in itself as an independently subsisting entity.
I t is on the basis of such an in terpre ta tion of the two systems th a t
Qushji claims to find a confusion between the tw o m eanings of “ q u á n e g a
tively conditioned” as described by Tűsi.
I h e expression (2) “ all elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved
thereform ”, he argues, means mujarradah, i.e. completely stripped o f all addi-
tional factors, and therefore it applies only to System -A . Fór, as we have
ju s t seen, in System -B, the “ q u id d ity ” is nő t in tu ited in its absolute i n d e
pendence; it is viewed in com bination with another element, except th a t the
two factors are regarded as m u tually exclusive of each other.
This would im m ediate ly imply th a t the clause (4): “ if any elem ent
were adjoined to i t” cannot apply except to System -B . T h e particu le lau ‘i f ’
17 T. IZUTSU
indicates th a t the m en tá i act o f ad jo in ing an o th e r e lem ent to the “ q u id d ity ”
is a m ere supposition. Bút even a supposed ad jo in ing o f ano th e r e lem ent
transposes the “ qu id d ity ” from S ystem -A to System -B .
Q űshji concedes th a t it is nő t impossible to unders tand the expression:
“ All elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved th e re fro m ” as a reference to
th e s truc tu re o f “ q u á negatively conditioned” in S y s tem -B } nam ely to u n d e r
s tand it in the sense of th e “ qu idd ity" nőt in terna lly m ixed with any o ther
e lem ent even if in ac tuality it m ay be found in com bination with o ther e le
ments. In th a t case, the clause (4) would be no th ing m ore th a n an additional
explication of w h a t is expressed by (2). In support of this in terpreta tion one
could ad d u ce the words o f Ib n Siná him self which a re found in the M éta -
physics c~ his .STiz/ű’ an d which read : “ ‘Quiddity* m ay be taken q u á c o n d i
tioned by no th in g (i.e. “ q u á negatively cond itioned” ). T h a t is the case when
its concep t is represented strictly in such a way th a t it should be represented
alone, th a t w hatever is jo in e d to i t should be considered something external
to it, an d th a t the original concept should nőt be pred icab le o f the c o m p o
site concep t (thus p roduced as the result o f this com bina tion )” .
Bút then , Q űshji continues to argue, the description of Tűsi thus
in te rp re ted would come intő conflict with the sentence (8): “ an d it does nőt
exist except in the m in d ” . Fór “ q u á negatively conditioned” in system -B
can very well exist in the external world as well as in the m ind , whereas
w hatever is com pletely s tr ipped o f all add itional factors can n o t in the n a tú ré
o r the case exist in the ex ternal world.
IV
T o w a rd the end of the 1 5 th cen tury there arose an in teresting philo-
sophical despu te betw een Ja lá l al - D in al - D aw w áni ( 1 4 2 7 - 15 0 1 ) a n d
G h iyá th a l - D in a l -D a sh ta k i (d. 1 5 4 2 ) . D aw w án i an d D ashtakí were two
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 18
outstand ing philosophers of the age, who were sharp ly opposed to each o ther
on a n um ber o f m ajor problems. T h e “ two m eanings” of “ q u á negatively
conditioned” happens to be one o f those problems on which they desagreed
in a rad ical m anner*0.
D ashtaki denies the very existence o f tw o different systems of technical
terminology. Each one o f the three m ajor i ‘tibárát: Iá bi-shart, bi-shart Iá and
bi-shart shay', m ain ta ins one an d the sam e basic technical m ean ing w hether
it be applied to the relations between “ qu idd ity” a n d its accidents (S ys tem -
A) or to the relations holding between the constituent elements of “ qu idd ity”
(System -B).
D ashtaki adm its th a t w hat Tusi refers to by the expression: “ all o ther
elements other than itself being removed therefrom ” is certainly “ qu id d ity ”
viewed by itself, in isolation from all external elements. Bút this does nőt
m ean th a t Tűsi is considering here “ qu idd ity” , as it were, in a completely
void space, p u tt in g it in a state of totál conceptual isolation in which it
appears w ithout any accom panying acc id en t fór, D ash tak i says, observ-
ing “ quidd ity” in such a state serves absolutely no purpose in the present
context. W h a t is in queston is ra th e r “ qu idd ity” observed in such a state
th a t it will rem ain conceptually independent, refusing to be umfied w ith
any accident th a t may come to be a ttached to it, i.e. “ qu idd ity” th a t will
continue to keep its self-identity even when in actuality it is accom panied
by o ther elements. ̂ This an d no th ing else, D ash tak i says, is w hat is m ean t
by the “ abstrac tion” ( tajrid, i.e. rendering abstract or naked, m ’jjarradah) of
“ qu idd ity” from all accom panying factors ( lawáhiq, sg. láhiq).
I t goes w ithout saying, Dashtaki adds, th a t “ q u id d ity ” seen in such a
state does nőt exist in the external world. Fór in the external v 'orld “ q u id
d ity” is completely unified with w hatever accompanies it, be the accom pa -
nying factor essential or accidental. A n “accom panying factor” is a predicate ,
19 T. IZUTSU
an d every p red icate is na tu ra lly unified a n d identified with the subject in
the external world.
A ccording to D ashtaki, no o ther in te rp re ta tion accords w ith the words
o f I o n Siná, (w hich we quoted earlier tow ard the end o f the last section).
D aw w áni, however, takes exception to this view. H e says: D ash tak i’s
thesis is no th ing other th a n a dow nrigh t denial o f the external existence oí
■'matter” . F ór “ q u id d ity ” which is actually accom panied by an o th e r faclor
b ú t w hich rem ains v ithou t being unified with it, can n o t b ú t be “ m a tte r” ;
an d D ashtaki declares th a t “ qu idd ity” in such a state does nőt exist except in
the m ind. Bút saying so, D aw w áni continues to a rgue , comes intő direct
conflict w ith w h a t Ib n Siná taugh t, who clearly recognized the existence o f
“ m a t te r ” . Besides it comes intő conflict w ith reality as well.
T h e upshot o f this a rg u m en t is tha t we have to adm it th a t there
a re two systems of technical terminology in terms of w hich the phrase “ q u á
negatively coxditioned” m ust be undestood in two different meanings.
Against this criticism D ashtaki argues in the following way. H e begins
by agreeing tha t “ qu idd ity q u á negatively conditioned" as he himself under-
stands it is a constituent “ p a r t” i.e. “ m a t t e r " of a “ qu id d ity ” which,
accom panied by accidents, actually exists. B ut} he says; a “ constituent p a r t”
is nő t necessarily a constituent p a r t in the ex ternal world. Fór it can very
well be a “ p a r t ” w hich is ob ta inab le only th rough ra tiona l analysis. R a ther ,
it is in the present context a ra tional “ p a r t” , because w hat are regarded as
“ accidents” (or “ accom panying factors” ) in the present context are all “ pre-
dicates” , an d “predicates” are nő t constituent “ parts” o f “ qu idd ity” in the
ex ternal world. So the denial o f the external existence o f “ m a t te r ” in this
sense goes ne ither against the teaching o f Ibn Siná nor against the objective
s truc tu re of r e a l i ty .^
T his answer, however, does nő t a t all satisfy Daw w áni. Besides, D aw w áni
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 20
radically differs from D ashtaki in the u n ders tand ing o f “ q u á negatively con
ditioned” . A nd his in te rp re ta tion o f T ű s i’s text is accordingly very different
from D ash tak i’s.
In his view, the “ abstraction of q u id d i ty ” , i.e. looking a i ^ q u id d ity ”
in the state o f isolation from o ther elements, is a relatíve m atte r . T h a t is to
say, “ qu idd ity” in such a state changes its n a tú ré a n d s truc ture in accordance
with the “ o ther elements” w hich are excluded from it. D aw w án í points ou t
two casses as directly relevant to our problem.
(a ) T h e first is the case in w hich “ q u id d ity ” is viewed as being in
totál isolation from all o ther elements w ithout exception. “ Q u id d ity ” in such
a state, being a sheer conceptual abstraction, canno t na tu ra lly exist in the
external world. Fór in o rder to exist externally, “ qu id d ity ” m ust necessarily
be determ ined in one way or another. Bút being - de te rm ined is itself an
alien factor added from outside to “ q u id d ity ” in this dimension.
(b ) T h e second is the case in which “ qu id d ity ” is considered as being
preclusive of somé definite elem ent or elements, nő t o f all. Fór exam ple, the
‘body’ viewed in isolation from the ‘sóul’, the ‘body’ from whose inner s truc
ture the ‘sóul’ is considered to be excluded, is in the s tate o f “ q u á n e g a
tively conditioned” only with regard to the ‘sóul’. W ith regard to the rest of
the elements th a t could accom pany the ‘body’, it rem ains indeterm inate ,
th a t is, “ q u á n o n -co n d it io n ed ” . In such a case, it is qu ite possible fór the
‘body* to becom e actualized in the external world in v ir tue of somé of these
elements o ther th an the ‘sóul’.
D aw w áni is convinced th a t the distinction betw een these tw o c a se sc a n
account fór the seem ingcon trad ic tion w hich is observable betw een Tűsi and
Ib n Siná concerning the external existcnce of “ q u á negatively conditioned” .
T h a t whose external exstence is denied by Tűsi is “ q u á negatively conditioned”
in the sense ( d ) , while Ibn Siná affirms its existence because he understands
21 T. IZUTSU
“ q u á negatively conditioned” in th e sense (b ) . ‘A n im á l’ does exist in the
external world when it is considered in the state o f “ q u á negatively c o n d i
t io n ed ” with reg ard to ‘ra tiona l’ alone, a lthough it canno t have external
existence w hen it is considered in isolation from all elements o ther than
itself. T hus , D aw w án i concludes, there is no reál contradiction betw een the
two Masters.
V
Láhiji h im self13 has a n original solution o f his ow n to offer fór the
p roblem concerning the notorious “ confusion” which m any a leading thinker
have seen in T ű s i’s descn'ption of “ q u á negatively conditioned” .
H e starts w ith “ quiddity q u á itself” (min hayth hiya hiya). “ Q u idd ity
q u á itself” is absolutely noth ing other than itself. T h a t is to say, all the
elem ents th a t could possibly accom pany it, w hether negative or positive, are
all p recluded from “ q u id d ity ” a t this stage. T hus we find T űsí’s words: “ all
elements o ther th a n itself being rem oved there fo rm ” literally actualized in
“ qu idd ity q u á itself” . I t is im p o rta n t to rem ark , however, tha t a t this highest
stage o f abstraclion , the expression “ all elements o ther th a n itself being
rem oved thereform ” refers only to the de facto s tructure o f “ qu idd ity q u á
itself” before the m in d starts to work upon it. O therwise expressed, there is
as yet no represen ta tion or notion o f the “exclusim o f other e lem ents” from
“ q u id d ity ”. T h e very act o f conceiving its - b e in g -d e ta c h e d - f ro m -a l l -o th e r -
elements belongs to the secondary level o f ra tional elaboration. A t th e p r im ary
level o f conception w hich is p r io r to all ra tional e laboration , “ qu idd ity” is
s im ply in tu iied in itself, there being on our p a r t no awareness even of its
being isolated from o ther elements.
N ow according to Láhiji, the expression “ all elem ents o ther th an
itself be ing rem oved therefrom ” m ust be understood exactly in this sense. I t
ABSTRACT QUIDDITY 22
is in tended to be a descerption o f the state in w hich we find “ qu idd ity quá
itself” before our m ind proceeds to analyze its structure.
Thus, in the view o f Láhíji, the first sentence in the a b o v e -c i ted
passage from Tűsi’s Tajrid m ust be given an ar ticu la tion entirely different
from the usual one. T h e usual a r t ic u la t io n in accordance w ith w hich we
translated the passage earlie r 1̂ — connects the words “ all elements o ther
th an .. .” with the verb qad tűkhadh (“ m ay be view ed” ), so th a t the sentence
reads: Wa qad tűkhadh/al- máhiyah/mahdhűfan ían-há mű ‘adá-há. T h e a r t ic u la
tion which Láhiji proposes takes the words “ all elements o ther th a n . . .” as a n
adjectival phrase qualifying al-máhiyah, so th a t th e read ing will be: Wa qad
tukhadh/al-máhiyah mahdhufan ian-há má ‘adá-há/bi hayth lau indámmá..., which
will m ean : “ Q u idd ity in the state in which all elements o ther th a n itself are
rem oved therefrom (i.e. in the state o f “ q u á itself”) m ay be viewed in such
a way that if any elem ent...” . U n d e r this in terpre ta tion , T űsi is here referring
to the above - m entioned process of ra tional e labo ia tion in virtue o f which
“ qu iddity quá itself” comes to be viewed in such a s tate th a t w hatever is
associated with it must be regarded as an alien elem ent ad ded to it from
outside. T h e s tructure of “ qu idd ity” which is disclosed to the m in d through
such a ra tional process is no other than “ q u á negatively cond itioned” .
All this would seem to indicate th a t Láhíji does nő t recognize the
validity o f the conception peculair to S ystem -A in the understanding of
bi-shart Iá or “ q u á negatively conditioned” . F ó r bi-shart Iá as understood in
terms of S ys tem -A would, n his view, simply be “ quiddity q u á itself” . His
t re a tm e n t of the m atte r sliows a t the sam e tim e how he understands System-
B in relation to “ q u á negatively conditioned”. T h e la tter, according to his
understand ing , refers to the state in which the negative situation o f “ o ther
elements” vis - á - vis “ qu idd ity” has come intő a clear focus o f our conscious
ness after having been completely h idden an d invisible a t the stage of “ q u á
itself” .
23 T. IZUTSU
Láhiji points out th a t the source o f confusion fór the critics o f Tusi
hes in the fact th a t Tűsi uses the w ord mahdhufan íkbeing rem oved” in a way
w hich is really confusing. Bút in t ru th the “ rem oving” here does nő t m ean the
ra tiona l process oí rem oving all o ther elements from “ q u id d ity ” . I t means
exactly the same situation which Ibn Siná pointed to by the use o f a fa r less
confusing phrase : b i-dh áti-h á “ in itself” , i.e. “ qu idd ity q u á itself” .
Thus, Láhiji concludes, there is no contradiction between Tűsí and
Ib n Siná. N or is there any confusion ín the conception of Tűsi himself between
the so -ca l led two m eanings o f “ quá negatively conditioned” .
VI
W e have exam ined in the foregoing somé o f the representative views
on the n a tú ré a n d s tructure of “ quiddity q u á negatively conditioned” . In
spite o f a n exceeding im portance th a t has been a ttached to i t or, we
m igh t say, precisely because o f i t the problem does nő t seem to have
reached any final solution. H ow ever this m ay be, the distinction betw een the
two m eanings o f “ q u á negatively conditioned”, together with the m ore
generál d istinction between the two systems o f the i‘tibárát o f “ qu idd ity”,
have exercised an indelible influence on the developm ent o f Islamic ph ilo -
sophy in all its branches including the sem antic theory o f jurisprudence. Bút
to go fu rther in tő details a b o u t these m atters will take us too far beyond the
scope o f th e p resent paper.
Footnotes
1) Tajrid a U ‘tiqád (or Tajridal-‘Aqá’id) in Kashf al-Mur&d by al-H illi, Q um , undated, p. 60.
2) Aceording to the m ajority of the later philosophers, this stage is nő t to be established
as that of "qu idd ity quá itself ” , bút rather as a special klnd of "q u id d ity quá
non-conditioned” technically known as máhiyah Iá b ishart maqsamí. T he la tter is
"q u á non-conditioned” which stands side by side with, and opposed to, "q u á
negatively eondltioned” and " q u á positively conditioned” . Since. however, this
is nőt a point having a direct bearing upnn the problem we are concerned w ith
in this paper, I shall treat the i'tibár now a t issue as "q u id d ity quá qu idd ity” .
3) See Taftázáni: Shark al-Maqdsid', Istanbul, 1305 A .H ., p . 98.
4) Háshim al-H usayni, fór example, categorically States: "q u id d ity ” in this dimension
cannot be predieatcd of anything else, nor can anything else be predicated of it
(Tawdíh al-Murád, T ehran, 1381 A .H ,, p. 131). Bút this is evidcntly a mistake
(See al-K ázim i a l-K hurásan i’s rem ark on this point in his Taqrírát Muhammad
Husayn al-N á’int, vol. 1, T ehran, 1368 A .H ., p. 359. Alsó a l-K h ű ’i: Ajwad al-
Taqrirát f i al-Usúl, vol. 1, Qum , undated, p. 522.
5) See Ju rján i: Sharh al-M awáqif I I I , Cairo, 1907, pp. 26-28.
6) £A bd al-R azzáq al-L áh iji: Shawáriq al-llh&m, vol. 1, T ehran , 1860, p. 150.
7) Ibid., p. I 48.
8) Op. cit. pp . 101-102.
9) Sharh Tajrid al-Túsi, L ith ., T ehran , 1247 A .H ., pp. 84-85.
10) Dawwáni wrote an encyclopaedic survey of Islamic philosophy entitied Unmúdhaj al-
‘Ulúm ("A General Survey of All Sciences” ) against which D ashtaki wrote a book
of refutation called Hadd ‘alá Unmúdhaj a l-U lúm al-JTláliyah ("R cfu tation of Ja láh
al-D in’s General Survey of All Sciences” ). T he following exposition is based on
Láhíji (op. cit.) p . 149.
11) Thus understood, however, bishart Iá will simply be " m a tte r” (máddah) as wre have
defincd above. And this is w hat Dawwáni is going to point out.
25 T. IZUTSU
12) This argum ent is certainly weak because it is based on a confusion between " m atte r”
and “ genus” . In Avicennian metaphysics " m a tte r” is an external constituent, the
corresponding rational constituent being "g en u s” .
13) ‘A bd a l-R azzáq a l-L áh iji (d. 1640), disciple and son-in -law of M óllá Sadrá, the
au thor of the above-m entioned Shawáriq al—Ilhám which he wrote in the form of
a com m entary upon T űsi’s Tajrtd al—I ‘tiqád (or Tajrtdal - ‘Aqá’id) bút whieh is far
m ore than a com m entary. T he book itself remains to be studied.
14) A t the outset of Section I I .