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y . U.S. ATO !IC ENERGY COM:!ISSION

} DIRECTORATE OF REGUL\ TORY OPERATIONS'

REGION I- -

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fic Inspection Report No: 50-289/74-25~

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Docket No: 50-289.'i Licensee: Metropolitan' Edison Company License No: DPR-501*.

Three lille Island Unit l'4 Priority:- , * . . _

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Category: B-2

Location: Middletown, Pennsylvania*

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iTypa of Licensee: PWR 871 We (B&W)'

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Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced'.

Dates of Inspect ~ ion: June 3 through June 6, 1974_

Dates of Previous Inspection:~ '

Reporting Inspector . > >-r ,d 6 /*#

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R. L.,Spessard,' Reactor I.nspector Date/T \' ? *. \(

Accompanying Ir.spectors: N.' '?'"", , .' '' ' / " -'l'''

D. M. Sternberg, Reactor Inspector Date'

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W. A. Ruhlman, Reactor Inspector Date

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Date.

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Other Accompanying Personnel: A. B. Davis, Senior Reactor Inspector (June 4&5,Date

1 144'5 197Reviewed By: de) W (, c/;.

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A. B. Davis, Senior Reactor Inspector D'a t e

q9101607y[Reactor Operations Branch

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SUFSIARY OF FINDIMCS

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Fnforcement Action4

Violations

1. Contrary to the requirements of the FSAR Section lA, OperatingQuality Assurance Plan Section VI, the Makeup and PurificationSystem and the Decay Heat Removal System were lined up withsuperseded operating procedures. (Details 13.e. (1) and (2))- , , .

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2.'' Contrary to the requirements of the FS AR Section lA, OperatingQuality Assurance Plan, Section VI, the Waste Gas DisposalSystem was lined up with a procedure-containing unauthorizedchanges. (Detail 13.e.(3))

Safety- . .

None Identified.

Licensee Action on Previously identified Enforcement Items

Not Inspected

Unusual Occurrences

A. Superseded valve checklists and startup checklists were used duringthe course of plant startup. (A0 74-7, lht Ed Telegram dated June

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6, 1974 to Director, DRO, RO:I). (Detail 13.e)

B. A socket weld leak was discovered on the discharge header of thereactor coolant system makeup pumps. (A0 74-6, lht Ed Telegram

dated June 4, 1974 to Director, DRO, RO:1). (Detail 5)

C. A pinhole sized leak was discovered in the "B" Makeup Pump recircu-lation flow orifice (A0 74-5, Fht Ed Telegram dated June 3,1974 to.

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Director, DRO, RO:I). (Detail 4)

D. The "C" tbkeup Pump sustained severe damage during operation.(Detail 6)

E. The Sodium Thiosulfate Tank was diluted with Sodium Hydroxide duringrecirculation of the Sodium Hydroxide Tank. (Detail 7)

F. A burned terminal was discovered on one of the control rod drivepower transformers. (Detail 12)

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Other Sinnificant Findings

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A. Current

1. Initial Criticalitya

The inspectors witnessed the initial criticality event whichwas accomplished in an orderly and controlled manner inaccordance with the procedure. Criticality was achieved at

10:36 pm on June 5,1974, and the actual critical conditionswere in close agreement with the predicted values. (Detail

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2. The Sodium Thiosulfata Tank is now operable. (Detail 7),

3. Repairs and testing of the control rod drive system have beencompleted. (Detail 8)

"14. Design changes to both Diesel Generators have been completedusing approved maintenance procedures. (Detail 9)

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5. The reactor . building sump and feeder drains were observed to beclean and free of debris. (Detail 10)

B. Status of Previousiv Reported Unresolved Items

1. The following items are resolved:

A procedure has been implemented which describes thea.-

actions to be taken to indicate the status of out of~

servicc/ calibration gauges, meters and instruments.

(Detail 11).

b. The discrepancies noted in the implementation of thesurveillance t - program have been corrected.(Detail 13.e)

The licensee's review and evaluation of the Dieselc.Generator circuitry design changes has been completed.(Detail 9)

C. New Unresolved Items1445 l99

None Identified

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Management Interview*

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j An exit interview was held onsite on June 6, 1974, at the conclusion of

i the inspection with the following attendecs:'

! Metropolitan Edison Company

Mr. J. G. Herbein, Station Superintendent| Mr. J. R. Floyd, Supervisor of Operations

! Mr. W. E. Potts, Supervisor of Quality Control

| Mr. J. J. Colitz, Station EngineerMr. J. P. O'Hanlon, Nuclear Engineer

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Mr. C. E. Hartman, Electrical Engineer| Mrr R. L. Summers, Junior Engineer}

General Public Utilities Service Corporation

j Mr. R. J. Toole, Assistant Test Superintendentj

1, The following summarizes items discussed.

A. Preoperational Test Program (Detail 2)

B. Initial Startup Test Program (Detail 3)

C. Followup Action - A0 74-6 (Detail 5),

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D. Followup Action - A0 74-5 (Detail 4)

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E. Follovup Action - A0 74-4 (Detail 8)

F. Followup Action - A0 74-3 (Detail 9):

} G. Sodium Thiosulfate Tank Status (Detail 7)

H. Reactor Building Sump (Detail 10)

* I. Instrument Status Indication (Detail 11)

J. Inspectors' Witness of Initial Criticality and the observed

violations (Detail 13)1445 200

K. Loss of the "C" Makeup Pump (Detail 6)'

! L. Burned terminal on control rod drive power transformer (Detail 12)

In each area listed above, the licensee representatives acknculedged theinform. tion presented by the inspectors.

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4 DETAILS:

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li 1. Persons Contacted On Site|

Metropolitan Edison Company (Met Ed)

| Mr. T. H. Acker, Control Room Operator' Dr. T. S. Baer, Station Engineer

Mr. J. C. Banks, Control Room Operator.

Mr. M. L. Beers, Shift ForemanI - $2?? Mr. D. J. Boltz, Control Room Operator

9;' Mr. R. R. Booher, Auxiliary Operator,,

. Mr. T. L. Book, Control Room Operator:4 Mr. N. D. Brown, Control Room Operator

! Mr. K. P. Bryan, Control Room Operator.I Mr. E. E. Bulmer, Mechanical Engineer'

Mr. H. L. Carr, Jr. , Auxiliary Operators

- Mr. J. J. Colitz, Station Engineer. .m

Mr. W. W. Cotter, Mechanical Engineers,

Mr. T. L. Crouse, Control Room Operator_..

._ Mr. J. H. Deman, Radiation Chemistry Technician... Mr. J. R. Floyd, Supervisor of Operations - Unit 1

Mr. A. C. Fredlund, Control Room Operator*

Mr. B. C. Getty, Mechanical Engineer - Unit 2Mr. C. F. Gilbert, Supervisor of Operations - Unit 2.

| Mr. K. L. Harner, Radiation Chemistry Techniciani Mr. R. R. Harper, Instrumen't Foreman

Mr. C. E. Hartman, Electrical Engineer- - Mr. R. A. Heilman, Control Roca Operator

, .. Mr. J. G. Herbein, St.ation SuperintendentMr. J. F. Hilbish, Project Engineer - NuclearMr. G. R. Hitz, Control Room OperatorMr. R. S. Hutchison, Auxiliary OperatorMr. I. P. Hydrick, Shift Foreman

Mr. C. W. Keyser, Control Room 6peratorMr. B. A. Mehler, C]ntrol Room OperatorMr. R. P. }Eller, Test Coordinator

Mr. L. G. Noll. Control Room OperatorMr. J. P. O'Hanlon, Nuclear EngineerMr. W. E. Perks, Shift Foreman - Unit 2Mr. J. F. Peters, Administrator

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4 A 5 '.101Mr. E. L. Pilsitz, Control Room OperatorMr. R. H. Porter, Shift SupervisorMr. C. E. Randolf, Engineering AssistantMr. R. A. Rice, Security SpecialistMr. M. J. Ross, Shif t SupervisorMr. D. M. Shovlin, Supervisor of Mait:t*7anceMr. B. G. Smith, Shift Foreman

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. Mr. J. R. Smith, Shif t- SupervisorMr. R. L. Summers, Junior Engineertk. J. H. Thomas, Coordinator of Services '

7 Mr. R. P. Velez, Radiation Chemistry TechnicianMr. G.i C. Wallace, Shif t Supervisor}k. D. E. Weaver, Instrument Foreman '

Mr. H. L. Wilson, Instrument ForemanMr. W. H. Zewe, Shift Foreman-

8 Ceneral Public Utilities Service Corporation (CPUSC)

5[N1- Mr. J. J. Barton, Startup and Test| ..ac i Mr. W. H. Behrle, Shif t Test Directorg Mr. L. E. Eriggs, Startup Engineer: Mr. H. C. Eisnaugle, Project Administrator*

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! Mr. C. E. Gatto, Shif t Test Engineer! Mr. T. M. Hawkins, Shift Test Engineer*

Mr. G. P. Miller, Test Superintendent- :p=, Mr. M. A. Nelson, Technical Engineer

- Mr. S. G. Poje, Shift Test EngineerMr. I. D. Porter, Shif t Test Engineer..

Mr. J. J. Stromberg, Site AuditorMr. R. J. Toole, Assistant Test SuperintendentMr. J. E. Wright, Site QA ManagerMr. L. M. Zubey, Mechanical Engineer,

j' Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Services

Mr. J. H. Flint , Shift Data Analyst, ..

Mr. R. A. Govers, Engineera: Mr. E. R. Kane, Engineer

Mr. J. A. Middleton, EngineerMr. M. B. Owen, Engineer *

Mr. W. E. Schaid, Shift Data Analyst

NUS Comoany

Mr. J. D. Trotter, Consultant.

2. Preoperational Test Program

The inspector reviewed TWG bbeting minutes for the period iby 29 -June 4, 1974 (Meetings 110-115), completed test results (of ficialField Copy), and the approved Prerequisite List for Initial

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Criticality. Additionally, the licensce's written safety evalua-tions made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 for not completing certainpreoperational tests as described in the FSAR were reviewed on asampling basis (included TP 120/1, 2 and 3, TP 360/lA, TP 230/8, SP102.6 and F1104/6). The following information was obtained:

a. Prooperational Testing Status

Tests Completed and Accepted 88%

Tests Partially Completed and Accepted 8%

Tests Not Completed 4%.,

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The licensee evaluated the overall results of the preopera-_ s. . .tional test program and concluded that the program was suf-ficiently complete to support (relative to safety) initialcriticality. Tests not to be completed prior to initialcriticality were previously reported in Report 50-289/74-23,Detail 7.a. Additionally, the following tests were not

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j7 (1) TP 600/25, Hydrogen Addition Test

(2) TP 600/26, Degasification Test.

Tests (1) and (2)' above are to be deleted from the MTXon the baeis that the test objectives were accomplishedby Met Ed Operating Procedures.

.(3) TP 271/4, l'ain and Auxiliary System Functional Test

(4) TP 600/11, Emergency Feed System and OTSC Level ControlTest-

Tests (3-) and (4) above have been partially ccmpleted andaccepted by the licensec. The outstanding items relate

to the turbine driven cmcrgency feedwater pump which wasinoperable (needed new shaft). Testing to be completed

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prior to reaching 5% of full power (Tech Specs requirethis pump prior to reaching 5% of Full Power).

(5) TP 600/30, Hot Functional Test Checkpoints.

This test had been partially completed and ecepted by thelicensee. The outstanding item related to the Ibin SteamIsolation Valve Support System which did not have contacton every valve because design temperature had not beenreached. Testin6 to be completed prior to reaching 5% offull power.

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p The inspector has no further questions relative to the pre-,

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operational test program at this time.

, b. Test Results

The inspector verified that the test results for the proce-dures listed below had been accepced by the licensee unlessotherwise indicated. Included in the inspector's review (ona sampling basis) was the licensee's disposition of identi-

.I fied test exceptions and deficiencies and comparison of testdata with acceptance criteria. No deficiencies were identi-,

m fied.,.

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-:- (1) TP 151/1, Reactor Building Isolation Valve Leak Tests]

(2) TP 600/4, Makeup and Purification System Operational Test

The inspector observed that the letdown isolation valve_.

'' (MU-V3) had been successfully retested. This item is.,_

J. closed. (Report 50-289/74-08, Detail 6.a).

(3) F1104/15A, Auxiliary Building and' Fuel Handling Building"

Ventillation Functional Verification'

(4) TP 360/2, Area Radiation Monitors Calibration and

i Functional Test

$j (5) TP 310/3, E.S. Detection and Actuation Test

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I (6) TP 305/2, Reactor Protection System Response Time Test,

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(7) SP 320/4, ICS - Turbine Interface Test

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! (8) TP 301/2, N.I. Detector Cabling and Response Tests4

(9) TP 301/3D, N.I. Determination and Setting of DetectorVoltages

(10) SP-2, Filter Efficiency Tests

(11) TP 360/lB, Process Radiation Monitors Calibration andFunctional Tests - Atmospheric

(12) TP 360/1C, Procc as Radiation Monitors Calibration andFunctional Tests - Liquid

(13) TP 600/5, Nuclear Chemical Addition and Sampling SystemOperational Test

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- (14) TP 600/28, Controlling Procedure for Hot FunctionalTesting

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| (15) TP 600/13, Pressurizer Operation and Spray Flow Test.

Results cf this test had been partially accepted *.iith oneopen item relative to setting the pressurizer spray bypassvalve. This item was accomplished prior to approach toinitial criticality.

The inspector observed that the above tests had been cerducted* --

' ~ 7'. and accepted in accordance with the licensee's commitments to*tP - RO:1. (Met Ed letter dated April 19, 1974 to the Director,

| DRO, RO:I and Reports 50-289/74-17, Detail 5.b and 50-289/74-18,'

Details 2 and 3).

3. Initial Startuo Test Program

- : ,a. Procedures

The inspector reviewed the following procedures and verified- that previous RO:I comments had been included in accordance

with the licensee's commitments. (Report 50-289/74-18,Detail 7.b. Items (5), (9) and (10))

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(1) TP 800/5, Reactivity Coefficients at Power

(2) TP 800/32, Loss of Offsite Power Test'

' (3) TP 800/34, Generator Trip Test. .

b. Test Results..

(1) Detailed Review by RO:I.

The. inspector conducted a detailed review of the completed-

procedures (Official Field Copy) listed below. Thelicensee had accepted the results of these tests. Test

results met the acceptance criteria, and all test require-ments were satisfactorily performed.

(a) TP 200/11D, Reactor Coolant Pump Flow Test - Hot,,

With Core

The inspector observed that final balancing of thereactor coolant pumps had been completed and thatdata indicated frame and shaft vibrations met the

} accept.7nce criteria'. This item is closed. (Report; 50-2S9/.74-08, Detail 6.f)

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I (b) TP 200/12D, Reactor Coolant Flow Coastdcwn Test -Hot, With Core

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i (c) TP 330/5, CRD Trip TestI

! The inspector observed that TCN-2 to this procedurewas approved by the TWG on >by 29, 1974, in accor-dance with the requirements of Test InstructionNo. 9. This TCN, which permitted tripping the

| fastest and slowest rods at the same time by re-i- patching (Hot, No Flow Trip Test), was made to|- .??ic provide easier control of reactor coolant system.

; _. .;jf temperature by minimizing reactor coolant pumpj starts and steps. These tests and the Hot, Full

Flow Trip Tests were conducted following repairsr'

to the damaged CRD system equipment (A0 74-4).

(2) Verification by RO:I

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The inspector verified by review of the completed pro-- cedure (Official Field Copy) that the results of TP 302/ -

2C In-Core Detector Post - Installation Electrical Testhad been accepted by the licensee.

c. SP 710/2 - Controlling Procedure for Post Core Load PrecriticalTesting

The inspectors reviewed this procedure (Official Field Copy)'

which was being conducted and which was a prerequisite forbeginning the approach to initial criticality (TP 710/1).

__ The TWG reviewed the status of this procedure prior to sign-off of the Prerequisite List for Initial Criticality, and theinspectors' verified that the outstanding items frca this pro-cedure, as identified in the Prerequisite List, were completedprior to starting TP 710/1..

The results of heat loss test for the pressurizer were discussedwith licensee representatives who provided the following infor-mation: Modifications to the insulation showed no f mprovementsover previously observed conditions. The excessive heat losswas not considered an operating problem; however, for econcayreasons the matter was still being reviewed. Valve RC-V2 wasoperating satisfactorily; however, a larger motor crerator isto be installed. The inspector has no further questions onthis matter at this time. (Report 50-289/74-08, Detail 6.c).

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4. Followuo Action A0 74-5

During a previc- RO inspection (Report 50-289/74-23, Detail 2), theinspector veri: 2d that the licensee had established a program forinspecting bbkeup and Purification System Orifices. The licensee

reported by telephone on May 31, 1974, and by telegram on June 3,1974, that a pinhole sized leak had developed in the "B" Fbkeup

pump recirculation flow orifice. This pump was in service and thereactor coolant system was in a heat-up mode (utilizing ReactorCoolant Pump heat) at the time the leak was discovered. The "A"

- - Makeup Pump was put in service, the "B" Makeup Pump was secured,~ ~ ~EI1 bid the leaking orifice was isolated.

.WDuring this RO inspection the inspector reviewed the actions takenby the licensee relative to this occurrence. Included in the in-

spector's review were the following: written maintenance procedure

(WA 563) including the retest requirements (operational hydro per.,

USAS B31.1.0), weld history records, welder qualification records,~^".NDT examination records, X-rays of other orifices in the system,

~ visual inspection of the repairs with the system in operation, andthe licensee's plans relative to the other orifices in the system.,

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No deficiencies were identified. The following actions had been'

taken or were planned:

A replacement orifice (from Unit 2) was installed and the "B"a.

Makeup Pump returned to service.

b. X-rays were taken of the recirculation orifices for the "A" and

"C" Makeup Pumps and the letdown block orifice. X-rays indicated

severe hydraulic erosion had occurred to the orifice for the "A"Makeup pump; no evidence of erosion to the orifice for the "C"'

, Makeup pump, and slight erosion to the letdown block orifice.,

~Run times for the Makeup pumps (from electrical switchgear in-c.stalled instrumentation) were as follows: "A" - 1684 hours,

"B" - 1141 hours, and "C" - 120 hours.

d. As a result of Items b and c above, the "A" Fbkeup pump wasvalved out, the "C" tbkeup pump was running, and the "B" Make-up was lined up but not running. The "C" and "B" Makeup

pumps were selected for E.S. mode per Technical Specification3.3.1.1.b. However, during this R0 inspection the "C" Makeup

pump had to be removed from service (refer to Detail 6), and"A" and "B" }bkeup pumps were put in the E.S. mode with the"B" Makeup pump operating. Additionally, operating instruc-tions containing appropriate precautions relative to the "A"pump were issued.

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The UT inspection program which was being implemented per B&W'se.recommendations did not detect the leak (actually discovered;

'' by an operator) because the leak occurred in an area -(thru the*

wall at tie last orifice plate) not being examined. The areabedng examined was upstream of the orifice assembly ratherthan on ene downstream side which was the location of'thea

leak previously discovered at A50-1. The licensee intends to

! institute a weekly radiography examination of the recircula-tion orifices for the "A", "B", and "C" Makeup pumps and theletdown block orifice.

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- ~556 f. Orifices of a new design had been ordered, and two of these-E^F~ (for the Makeup pumps) were expected to arrive on site by

June 10, 1974. klans were to install these orifices on a'

priority basis on the "A" and "C" Makeup pumps.*

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5. Followup Action AO 74-6

The licensee reported on June 3,1974, during this RO Inspection1^

and by telegram on June 4, 1974, that a leak was discovered in asocket weld on the discharge header of the reactor coolant systemmakeup pumps. The leaking weld joint was located in a 1" 304stainless steel l'ine which supplies makeup water to the core floodtanks. The reactor coolant system was at 350cF and 1000 psig whenthe Icak was discovered. The secondary system was bottled up,the reactor coolant pumps and the operating makeup pump stopped,

I and the leaking weld isolated to make repairs that were completedj on June 4, 1974.

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The inspector reviewed the written maintenance procedure (WA 570)-

including the retest requirements (operational hydro per USAS3

B31.1.0) and Welder Qualification Records. The repair consisted ofgrinding out the defect, laying a fillet weld in the ground outarea until the area was filled up, and making a cover pass over theentire weld to provide additional strength. The inspector made avisual inspection of the weld following repairs and while thesystem was in operation. Additionally, the inspector had dis-cussions with GPUSC - QA representatives concerning this f ailure,the repairs and PT examination. The following information was

obtained: This was the first socket weld failure in a stainless,

steci joint. The weld records for the original weld were reviewed'

and no abnormalities were identified. The makeup and purificationsystem had been successfully hydroed to 4575 psig per USAS B31.1.0(1.5 times design pressure). The cause of the failure was unknown,

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but was surmised to be possibly insufficient weld metal. Following

repairs the PT cxamination revealed no indications, as determinedby a Level III inspector.

6. Loss of t'ne "C" lbkeuo Pump

At approximately 1:29 AM on June 5,1974, the "C" Makeup Pump whichwas operating, was manually stopped and the "B" Makeup Pump was

started. The plant was being maintained at 5320F + 20F with re-actor coolant pump heat. Control rod groups 1 thru 4 (Safety Rods)were fully withdrawn with the remaining control rods (groups 5 thru

....- .- M S-8) fully inserted, and reactor coolant system boron concentration"2E~was about 2070 ppm. Preparations were underway for the initial

critical approach with systems / components being aligned in accor-dance with an approved prerequisite checkoff list. The control

room operator received a " Low Lube Oil Pressure" alarm on the "C"Makeup Pump. The same pump was " punched up" on the computer con-sole and a high bearing temperature was indicated by the computer.The operator manually started the "B" Makeup Pump and secured the .~<:--

- "C" pump. Subsequent checkout of the computer memory indicatedthat the total clapsed time from oil pressure alarm to securing thepump was nineteen (19) seconds. Flow to the reactor coolant pump

seals was maintained at all times. In order to maintain the elec-.

trical separation criteria.and the.needs of the emergency makeupcapabilities, the "B" pump was later switched to the alternatepower supply and valves were aligned. The elapsed time frca oil

- pressure alarm until all electrical / valve ~ lineups were completedwas three (3) hours. The inspector accompanied the operator out-side the control room and followed most of the valve lineups and

electrical switching. In all cases, the operator appeared to-

follow all applicable safety regulations and approved valve lineup /+

electrical switching procedures. Severe damage occurred to the "C"pump, and the pump was being replaced with an identical pump fromUnit 2 when this L3 inspection ended. In the Unit 1 design there

are 3 Makeup Pumps; however, only 2 of these pumps are required tobe' operable in the E.S. mode powered from independent separatebusses to make the reactor critical. This condition was satisfied.

7. Sodium Thiosulfate Tank Ooerational Status

During a previous RO inspection (Report 50-289/74-23, Detail 3),this matter was reviewed. During this RO inspc ction, the inspectorobserved that the installatten of the tank insulation was essentially

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complete. The inspector also determined that installation and test-ing of the heat tracing (lower section) had been completed. The

upper section of the heat tracing has been installed; however, cir-cuitry design changes are to be made to this section to permit itsactuation as determined by tank temperature. According to licensee

representatives, the lower section is sufficient to maintain a tanktemperature of >75 F, and the upper section would be actuated on, asrequired during severe cold weather conditiens.

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.,_ At the time of this inspection the tank contents were out of specsPrf as a result of dilution by Sodium Hydroxide. This occurred as a'

biEiresult of leakage thru a normally closed valve (BS-VS1) during re-circulation of the Sodium Hydroxide Tank. This condition was identi-fied as a result of sampling both tanks. As an interim measure,

operating procedures have been revised to require removal of thespool piece (between the normally closed valve and associated tank)in the supply lino to the tank not being circulated. The licensee

-- is evaluating a sy stem modification, that consists of installing''-

a second isolation valve in the supply line to each tank, to correctthis apparent desige deficiency. The licensee plans to drain the

tank, and add a new batch of Sodium Ti.losulfate to bring the tankcontents back into specs; a licenser representative stated thatRO:I would be notified when this m olution was completed.

RO:I was notified by the licensee by telephone on June 14, 1974,that the contents of the Sodium Thiosulf ate Tank met the require-ments of Technical Specification 3. 3.1. 3 (e. g. , 35,800 pounds ofsodium thiosulf ate at 29.5 weight percent solution with 1.5 weightpercent boric acid - sodium hydroxide buffer at a pH of 9.2). The

-- licensee was informed that R0:I had no further questions on theoperability of this tank and that R0:I would reconmend to DL thatLicense Condition 2.c. (1) be cleared.

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8. Followup Action - A0 74-04

The licensee's ten day letter for this occurrence had not been re-ceived at the time of this inspection; however, the correctiveaction to restore the Control Rod Drive System to operationalstatus following the fire in a CRD cabiaet was reviewed. Thisconsisted of a review of selected maintenance procedures used to!

repair the damage and a review of rod scram time test dat- obtainedafter the repairs. R0:1 has no f ttrther questions in this area at

this time.

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I 9. Followup Action - A0 74-03'

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i The licensee stated in a letter dated May 30, 1974, that tha

followup action to correct the condition of the 13 Emergency Diesel'

Generat' r failure to run was to generate an approved procedure toorepair, test and restore to service and brief personnel inv'olved inthe need to use procedures. The inspector reviewed the approved

' procedure used to restore the 1B Diesel and also the procedure usedto modify the 1A Diesel Generator. The inspector also discussedwith a licensee representative the briefing of the maintenance

;3;gpersonnel and verified such training was conducted. RO:I has no'

this-time.(9g: further questions in this area at'

The design change evaluation (GPU Startup Problem Report 975 com-,

pleted on June 3, 1974) was reviewed by the inspector. This report-

reevaluated the design adequacy of the circuit changes based onquescions raised during a previous RO inspection. The inspectorhas no further questions on this matter, and the item is resolved.

~ (Report 50-289/74-18, Detail 13.m)

10. Reactor Building Sumo_

The inspector physically inspected the Reactor Building sump andseveral feeder drains. These appeared to be clean and free ofdebris. This item.is closed. (Report 50-289/74-18, Detail 12)

11. Instrument Status Indication'

A deficiency in the licensee's program used to indicate the opera--

1<:. bility and/or calibration status of meters, gauges and instrunents~

was identified in Report 50-289/74-21, Detail 3. The licensee haswritten and implemented a procedure and tagging system whereby outof calibration meters, gauges and instruments are identified and

marked. The inspector revieced two (2) different instrucents whichhad been marked in accordance with this procedure. Temporary tagsare being used, but permanent black and white stickers have beenordered according to a licensee representative. RO:I has no furtherquestions in this area at this time.

12. Burned Terminal on Control Rod Drive Power Transformer

on June 3, 1974, the licensee reported an observed imbalance iathe phase currents of the CRD system. The problem was tracedto a burned terminal on the primary of one of two main transfor-mers for the system.

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The inspector observed the work in progress and observed that a pro-cedure was being used and Q.C. coverage existed. The licensee'srepresentative stated all similar terminals were checked and foundto be tight. Additionally, he stated no safety issue was involvedin this occurrence. The inspector observed the return to serviceof this equipment prior to initial criticality and has no furtnerquestions on this matter.

13. Inspectors' Witness of Initial Criticality

Certain activities, procedures, and documents of the licensee were- EjyLireviewedbytheinspectorstoverifycompletenessofrequirements

u.qrfor initial cciticality. The following is a list of specific topicsreviewed and the inspector's comments relating to. these items:

a. Criticality Procedure: Official copy was current and had allrevisions incorporated.

. .b. Primary Chemistry: Most recent samples indicated chemistry ,

within Technical Specification limits..

c. Gaseous and Liquid Effluents Monitoring: The installed effluentmonitoring system was observed to be operating and within thecurrent calibration cycle.

d. Chemical Factor Analysis: The inspector witnessed a Met EdRadiation Chemistry Technician perform the determination ofthe primary coolant boron concentration. This activity was

accomplished using the correct procedure. A one time sample,

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specially diluted by the Unit 2 Station Engineer was passed~I- to the Radiation Chemistry Technician as a normal sample.

It was correctly analyzed and its off-nominal concentration. correctly identified. .

e. Procedure Prerequisites: A sample of Surveillance Test Pro-cedures and system Operating Procedures, which were requiredto be completed by the Initial Criticality Procedure (TP 710/1), were reviewed. No deficiencies in the results of theSurveillance Tests were noted.* The following deficiencieswere observed during the review of the operating procedures:

* Deficiencies in the licensee's Surveillanca Test Program were pre-viously identified in Report 50-289/74-23, Detail 21. The licenseehad conducted a comprehensive review 3 and the inspectors noted theidentified deficiencies had been corrected. RO:1 het no furtherquestions in this area at this time.

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- (1) The Makeup and Purification System was being lined duringpreparations for initial criticality in accordance withOP 1104-2. The Control Room Working Copy used to acccm-plish this activity was observed to be Revision 1 datedFebruary 1, 1974. The Control Room File Copy was ob-served to be Ravision 2 dated April '- 1974. Subsequent

review of the Procedure Index indicated that Revision 3to this procedure had been distributed on Fby 24, 1974.

(2) The Decay Heat Removal System was lined up during pre-parations for initial criticality in accordance with OPr,m_.

~{'(.} ~ 1104-4. The valves in this system wers positioned perEnclosure 1 to OP 1104-4 Revision 0 on May 30,1974. It~ " -

was observed that the Control Room Working and Filecopies of this procedure, including Enclosure 1 wereRevision 2 approved April 27, 1974 and placed in theControl Room files on May 16, 1974.

The above are in violation of the FSAR 'Section lA, Opera-~ ~ " ~ -

- ting Quality Assurance Plan, Section VI, Document Control,which states in part: ". . .The Generation Division docu-ment control procedure further requires that each >bnager

--- and Station Superintendent provide in their proceduresmeasurec: ... to ensure that approved changes be pronptlytransmitted for incorporation into documents; and toensure that obsolete or superseded documents are elimin-ated from the system and not used..."

(3) The Waste Gas Disposal System was lined up during pre->

- parations for initial criticality in accordance withOP 1140-27. It was observed that the Control Room Werk-~

ing Copy which had been used to accomplish this setuphad pen and ink changes to certain valve, level indicatorand electrical panel designators on pages 5 and 6. There*

was no indication that.these changes were approved by any-one. It was also noted that these changes did not appearin the Control Room File Copy of OP 1104-27. This copywas also observed to be missing pages 22, 23, 24, 25, 26and 29.

The above is in violation of the FSAR Section lA, Opera-ting Quality Assurance Plan, Section VI, Document Control,which states in part: "The Superintendent of the TMIStation Unit 1 will ensure that no changes are made to

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site instructions, procedures, and drawings unless suchchanges are approved by the appropriate approving organi-zation ..."

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! These items were brought to the attention of the Plant Superinten-'

dent who directed a review of the revisions of the procedures usedto align all safety related systems during preparations for initialcriticality. As a result of this review the licensee stated all

j valves affected by differences in the current and superseded check-lists were correctly positioned prior to beginning the approach to,

._,;,, initial criticality. The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC),

!'0, , s evaluated this occurrence as an abnormal occurrence, and it was.

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reported as A0 74-7.. .

i f. Required Plant Systems in Service: The systems required bythe prerequisite lists were reviewed on a sampling basis andwere found to bc operational or noted exceptions had been3

reviewed and determined to have no impact on criticality., _ , ,

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g. Calibration Checks of Instrumentation: A sample of safetyrelated system surveillance tests were reviewed and found

_.to be current and complete.

h. Source Checks c f the Source Range Instrumentation: Theresponse of the S.R. Channels to the installed neutronsources was observed.

i. Signal to Noise Checks: The licensee took an exception to- '--

the requirement in TP 710/1 to verify the source range signalto noise ratio greater than 2. This exception was based ona preoperational test accomplished prior to fuel loading.

j. Minimum Count Rate on Each Channel: The inspector observedan indicated count rate in excess of the minimum required(>2 ' CPS) at the tite Control Rod withdrawal ccamenced.

k. Reactor Trip Settings Lowered: The inspector reviewed themost current surveillance test of Channel C of the PowerRange Instrumentation and observed that the trip settingwas lowered in accordance with the Test Change Notice tothe Power Range Surveillance Test.

1. Increased Channel Sensitivity of Instrumentation: Theinspector reviewed the most current Surveillance Test ofChannel C Power Range Instrumentation and observed thatthe gain had been increased in accordance with the TestCha'nge Notice to the Power Range Surveillance Test.

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Special Instrumentation In Service: The inspector observedf m.

the counter-scalers and stop watches required by the pro-} cedure appeared operabic.j

n. Data Properly Recorded: The inspector observed that datarequired by the procedure being entered into the data:

isheets,

Data Properly Presented for Analysis: The inspector observedo.boron concentration data and count rate data being presentedto the data takers and analysts for evaluation.

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- . z _.<p. Analysis Performed: The inspector observed the generation

of the 1/M plots and verified several points independently.Additionally, the dilution rate was checked using stopwatch and the installed flow meter.

q. Adequate Staff: The inspector reviewed a Test Manning memoprepared by the Plant Superintendent and found it met the'~" .

- ' requiremants of the Technical Specifications for this test.

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r. SRO's and R0 at the Required Location: The inspector observed- the number of licensed operators required by the Test Manning

Memo were on watch during the procedure.

s. Maximum Crew Working Time: A representative of the licenseeinformed the inspector that the maximum shif t being workedj by the personnel directly involved with the initial criticality

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was twelve (12) hours.i

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I t. Shift Turnover Performed in an Orderly Manner: The inspector

attended several crew turnovers and test briefings. Thesewere conducted in an orderly mann;r.

Orderly and Systematic Use of Procedure: The insp.: tor wit-*

u.nessed the initial criticality evolution and observed thatthe evolution was conducted in accordance with the procedurein an orderly manner.

The following is a brief summary of the sequence of events observedduring the actual evolution. All times listed were on June 5, 1974.

The procedure commended at 2:30 pm. Plant conditions were as

follows. Temperature 532 120F, primary pressure 2155 1 25psi, Control Rod Assemblics (CRA) Croups 1-4 fully withdrawn,

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4 Reactor Coolant Pumps running, primary Boron Concentrationwas 2070 ppm. At this time Groups 5, 6, 8 were fully with-drawn and Group 7 pulled to 75%. Rod withdrawal was com-pleted at 3:35 pm and boron dilution of the primary commencedat 4:56 pm at a rate of 50 1 10 GPM. Dilution was secured at10:27 pm, and the letdown flow was increased to about 140 GPM.The reactor was declared critical at 10:36 pm with a boronconcentration of 1623 ppm compared to the acceptance "alueof 1626 150 ppm. The power level was stabilized with rodmotion and necessary data was collected.

_Eh.fy. Procedural Signoff Completed: The inspector observed the sign-[off of the prerequisites for the procedure and the appropriater

checklists.

w. Data Analysis Performed in a Timely Manner: The maintenanceof the 1/M Plots and estimated critical condition updates wereobserved to be performed in accordance with the procedure whichprovided adequate time to ensure control of the evolution.'- -

' x. Criticality Achieved Near Predicted Value: The licensee's data-

indicated the critical concentration of boron was 1623 ppm com--- - pared to a prediction of 1626 150 ppm, with all other specified

reactivity sources as required by the procedure.

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