torts state - nature of liability digest.pdf

7/29/2019 TORTS State - Nature of Liability DIGEST.pdf

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MERRITT v GOVERNMENT34 Phil 311TRENT; March 31, 1916

NATUREAppeal from decision of the CFI

FACTS- E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by theGeneral Hospital ambulance, which turnedsuddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenuewithout sounding any whistle or horn, incontravention of an ordinance and the MotorVehicle Act.- Plaintiff was so severely injured. His legshowed a contraction of an inch and a half and acurvature that made his leg very weak and

painful at the point of the fracture. Examination ofhis head revealed a notable readjustment of thefunctions of the brain and nerves. The patientapparently was slightly deaf, had a lightweakness in his eyes and in his mental condition.This latter weakness was always noticed whenthe plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor,especially when he attempted to use his moneyfor mathematical calculations.- Witnesses testified that plaintiffs physical and

mental condition before the accident wasexcellent. He was one of the best contractors ofwooden buildings. He could not now earn even ahalf of the income that he had secured for hiswork because he had lost 50 per cent of hisefficiency. He had to dissolve a partnership thathe had with an engineer and give up a contractfor the construction of a building.- Trial court held that the collision was due solelyon the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded

the plaintiff the sum of P14, 741.

- Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that E.Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in theCourt of First Instance of the city of Manilaagainst the Government of the Philippine Islandsin order to fix the responsibility for the collisionbetween his motorcycle and the ambulance ofthe General Hospital, and to determine the

amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, andthe Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands ishereby authorized and directed to appear at thetrial on the behalf of the Government of saidIslands, to defendant said Government at thesame.

ISSUESWON the government is liable for the damages

resulting from a tort committed by an agent oremployee of the government

HELDNORatio The State is only liable for the acts of itsagents, officers and employees when they act asspecial agents within the meaning of paragraph 5of article 1903.Reasoning

-In the United States the rule is that the state isnot liable for the torts committed by its officers oragents whom it employs, except when expresslymade so by legislative enactment. TheGovernment does not undertake to guarantee toany person the fidelity of the officers or agentswhom it employs, since that would involve it in allits operations in endless embarrassments,difficulties and losses, which would be subversiveof the public interest.

- As to the scope of legislative enactmentspermitting individuals to sue the state where the

cause of action arises out of either fort orcontract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:

By consenting to be sued a state simplywaives its immunity from suit. It does notthereby concede its liability to plaintiff, orcreate any cause of action in his favor, orextend its liability to any cause not previously

recognized. It merely gives a remedy toenforce a preexisting liability and submitsitself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject toits right to interpose any lawful defense.

- Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Codereads:

The state is liable in this sense when it actsthrough a special agent, but not when thedamage should have been caused by theofficial to whom properly it pertained to do the

act performed, in which case the provisionsof the preceding article shall be applicable.

- The obligation to indemnify for damages whicha third person causes to another by his fault ornegligence is based, as is evidenced by thesame Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that theperson obligated, by his own fault or negligence,takes part in the act or omission of the third partywho caused the damage. It follows therefrom thatthe state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is

not responsible for the damages suffered byprivate individuals in consequence of actsperformed by its employees in the discharge ofthe functions pertaining to their office, becauseneither fault nor even negligence can bepresumed on the part of the state in theorganization of branches of public service and inthe appointment of its agents; on the contrary, wemust presuppose all foresight humanly possibleon its part in order that each branch of service

serves the general weal an that of privatepersons interested in its operation. Between


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these latter and the state, therefore, no relationsof a private nature governed by the civil law canarise except in a case where the state acts as a

judicial person capable of acquiring rights andcontracting obligations.- The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4,regulates the obligations which arise out of fault

or negligence; and whereas in the first articlethereof. No. 1902, where the general principle islaid down that where a person who by an act oromission causes damage to another through faultor negligence, shall be obliged to repair thedamage so done, reference is made to acts oromissions of the persons who directly orindirectly cause the damage, the followingarticles refers to this persons and imposes anidentical obligation upon those who maintain

fixed relations of authority and superiority overthe authors of the damage, because the lawpresumes that in consequence of such relationsthe evil caused by their own fault or negligence isimputable to them. This legal presumption givesway to proof, however, because, as held in thelast paragraph of article 1903, responsibility foracts of third persons ceases when the personsmentioned in said article prove that theyemployed all the diligence of a good father of a

family to avoid the damage, and among thesepersons, called upon to answer in a direct andnot a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition tothe mother or the father in a proper case,guardians and owners or directors of anestablishment or enterprise, the state, but notalways, except when it acts through the agencyof a special agent, doubtless because and only inthis case, the fault or negligence, which is theoriginal basis of this kind of objections, must be

presumed to lie with the state.

- Although in some cases the state might byvirtue of the general principle set forth in article1902 respond for all the damage that isoccasioned to private parties by orders orresolutions which by fault or negligence aremade by branches of the central administrationacting in the name and representation of the

state itself and as an external expression of itssovereignty in the exercise of its executivepowers, yet said article is not applicable in thecase of damages said to have been occasionedto the petitioners by an executive official, actingin the exercise of his powers, in proceedings toenforce the collections of certain property taxesowing by the owner of the property which theyhold in sublease.- The responsibility of the state is limited by

article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through aspecial agent (one who receives a definite andfixed order or commission, foreign to the exerciseof the duties of his office if he is a special official)so that in representation of the state and beingbound to act as an agent thereof, he executesthe trust confided to him. This concept does notapply to any executive agent who is an employeeof the acting administration and who on his ownresponsibility performs the functions which are

inherent in and naturally pertain to his office andwhich are regulated by law and the regulations.- The responsibility of the state is limited to that

which it contracts through a special agent, dulyempowered by a definite order or commission to

perform some act or charged with some definitepurpose which gives rise to the claim, and notwhere the claim is based on acts or omissionsimputable to a public official charged with someadministrative or technical office who can be held

to the proper responsibility in the manner laiddown by the law of civil responsibility.

- The chauffeur of the ambulance of the GeneralHospital was not such an agent within themeaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903On the computation of damagesThe two items which constitute a part of theP14,741 and which are drawn in question by theplaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for

permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, theamount allowed for the loss of wages during thetime the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuinghis occupation. We find nothing in the recordwhich would justify us in increasing the amount ofthe first. As to the second, the record shows, andthe trial court so found, that the plaintiff's servicesas a contractor were worth P1,000 per month.The court, however, limited the time to 2monthsand 21 days, which the plaintiff was actually

confined in the hospital. In this we think therewas error, because it was clearly established thatthe plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a periodof 6 months. The mere fact that he remained inthe hospital only 2 months and 21 days while theremainder of the 6 months was spent in hishome, would not prevent recovery for the wholetime. We, therefore, find that the amount ofdamages sustained by the plaintiff, without anyfault on his part, is P18,075.

Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed.Whether the Government intends to make itselflegally liable for the amount of damages aboveset forth, which the plaintiff has sustained byreason of the negligent acts of one of itsemployees, by legislative enactment and byappropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are notcalled upon to determine. This matter rests solelywith the Legislature and not with the courts.

ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL81 Phil 453


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FERIA; August 31, 1948

NATUREAppeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor

FACTS- Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into

which gasoline was being drained causing fire inthe warehouse of Emergency Control

Administration (ECA, a government agency).- The fire destroyed the building owned by thepetitioner, thereby giving rise to this claim fordamages against Panlilio for his negligence andthe officers of ECA for storing gasoline in saidwarehouse contrary to the provisions ofordinances of the City of Manila (ordinancerequires a license for storing flammable

substances, which ECA didnt have).- Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence thisappeal.

ISSUEWON the government is liable for the damages

HELDNO- Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in thepreceding article is enforceable not onlyfor personal acts and omission but alsofor those persons for whom another isresponsible.

xx

The state is liable in this sense when it

acts through a special agent, but notwhen the damage should have been

caused by the official to whom it properlypertained to do the act performed, inwhich case the provisions of thepreceding article shall be applicable.

- In the case of Merritt v. Government, the courtheld the following:

The state is not responsiblefor the damage suffered by privateindividuals in consequence of actsperformed by its employees in thedischarge of the functions pertaining totheir office n relations of a privatenature governed by the civil law canarise except in a case where the stateacts as a juridical person capable ofacquiring rights and contracting

obligations.

xx

That the responsibility of thestate is limited by article 1903 to the casewherein it acts through a special agent(and a special agent, in the sense inwhich these words are employed, is onewho receives a definite and fixed order

by the commission, foreign to theexercise of duties of his office if he is aspecial official) so that in representationof the state and being bound to act as anagent thereof, he executes the trustconfided to him.

- There being no showing that whatevernegligence may be imputed to the ECA or itsofficers, was done by a special agent, becausethe officers of the ECA did not act as special

agents of the government within the abovedefined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of

the Civil Code in storing gasoline in thewarehouse of ECA, the government is notresponsible for damages caused through suchnegligence.- Although there is an act (Act No. 327)authorizing the filing of claims against thegovernment with the Insular Auditor, and appeal

by private persons or entities from the lattersdecision to the Supreme Court, it does not makeany and all claims against the governmentallowable, and the latter responsible for allclaims.

DISPOSITION Decision appealed from isaffirmed.

MENDOZA V. DE LEON

FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONALIRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION194 SCRA 486PARAS; February 27, 1991

NATUREResolution

FACTS

-

The National Irrigation Administration (NIA)maintains that it does not perform solely andprimarily proprietary functions, but is anagency of the government tasked withgovernmental functions, and is therefore notliable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia,who was not its special agent.

o NIA believes this bases this on: PD 552 amended some

provisions

of RA 3601 (the law which created theNIA)


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The case of Angat RiverIrrigation

System v. Angat River Workers Union- Angat Case: Although the majority opinion

declares that the Angat System, like the NIA,exercised a governmental function becausethe nature of its powers and functions does

not show that it was intended to bring to theGovernment any special corporate benefit orpecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinionheld that Angat River system is agovernment entity exercising proprietaryfunctions.

- The Angat dissenting opinion:- Alegre protested the announced termination

of his employment. He argued that althoughhis contract did stipulate that the same would

terminate on July 17, 1976, since hisservices were necessary and desirable in theusual business of his employer, and hisemployment had lasted for five years, he hadacquired the status of regular employee andcould not be removed except for valid cause.

- The employment contract of 1971 wasexecuted when the Labor Code of thePhilippines had not yet been promulgated,which came into effect some 3 years after

the perfection of the contract.

ISSUEWON the NIR is a government agency with a

juridical personality separate and distinct fromthe government, thereby opening it up to thepossibility that it may be held liable for thedamages caused by its driver, who was not itsspecial agent

HELD YES

Reasoning the functions of government havebeen classified into governmental or constituentand proprietary or ministrant. The former involvesthe exercise of sovereignty and considered ascompulsory; the latter connotes merely theexercise of proprietary functions and thusconsidered as optional.

The National Irrigation Administration was notcreated for purposes of local government. Whileit may be true that the NIA was essentially aservice agency of the government aimed atpromoting public interest and public welfare, suchfact does not make the NIA essentially andpurely a "government-function" corporation. NIAwas created for the purpose of "constructing,improving, rehabilitating, and administering all

national irrigation systems in the Philippines,including all communal and pump irrigationprojects." Certainly, the state and the communityas a whole are largely benefited by the servicesthe agency renders, but these functions are onlyincidental to the principal aim of the agency,which is the irrigation of lands.NIA is a government agency invested with acorporate personality separate and distinct fromthe government, thus is governed by the

Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No.3601 provides:Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporateis hereby created which shall be known as theNational Irrigation Administration. . . . which shallbe organized immediately after the approval ofthis Act. It shall have its principal seat ofbusiness in the City of Manila and shall haverepresentatives in all provinces, for the properconduct of its business. (Emphasis for

emphasis).

Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552provides that:(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiariesof the water from all irrigation systemsconstructed by or under its administration, suchfees or administration charges as may benecessary to cover the cost of operation,

maintenance and insurance, and to recover thecost of construction within a reasonable period oftime to the extent consistent with governmentpolicy; to recover funds or portions thereofexpended for the construction and/orrehabilitation of communal irrigation systemswhich funds shall accrue to a special fund forirrigation development under section 2 hereof;Unpaid irrigation fees or administration chargesshall be preferred liens first, upon the land

benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon,which liens shall have preference over all otherliens except for taxes on the land, and suchpreferred liens shall not be removed until all feesor administration charges are paid or the propertyis levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation

Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .The same section also provides that NIA maysue and be sued in court.It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has

corporate powers to be exercised by a Board ofDirectors. Section 2, subsection (f):(f) . . . and to transact such business, as aredirectly or indirectly necessary, incidental orconducive to the attainment of the above powersand objectives, including the power to establishand maintain subsidiaries, and in general, toexercise all the powers of a corporation under theCorporation Law, insofar as they are notinconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

DISPOSITION We conclude that the NationalIrrigation Administration is a government agency


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with a juridical personality separate and distinctfrom the government. It is not a mere agency ofthe government but a corporate body performingproprietary functions. Therefore, it may be heldliable for the damages caused by the negligentact of its driver who was not its special agent.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration

dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITHFINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No.55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1,1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA hasopened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it isliable for damages arising from tort committed byits employees, is still another thing.The state or a government agency performinggovernmental functions may be held liable for tort

committed by its employees only when it actsthrough a special agent.

CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA22 SCRA 267CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968

NATUREAppeal by certiorari from a decision of the Courtof Appeals.

FACTS- Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at thecorner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,Manila, waiting for a jeep. After waiting 5 mins,he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. As hestepped down from the curb to board the jeep,and took a few steps, he fell inside a manhole onP. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hitthe rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses

and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce hisleft eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing

his vision, several persons came to hisassistance and pulled him out of the manhole.One of them brought Teotico to the PhilippineGeneral Hospital, where his injuries were treated,after which he was taken home. In addition to thelacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teoticosuffered contusions on the left thigh, the left

upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apartfrom an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.These injuries and the allergic eruption causedby anti-tetanus injections administered to him inthe hospital, required further medical treatmentby a private practitioner.- Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint whichwas, subsequently, amended for damagesagainst the City of Manila, its mayor, cityengineer, city health officer, city treasurer and

chief of police.- Defense pointed out that because of thelucrative scrap iron business then prevailing,stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant;that the Office of the City Engineer has filedcomplaints in court resulting from theft of saidiron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts,the city government has changed the positionand layout of catchbasins in the City byconstructing them under the sidewalks with

concrete cement covers and openings on theside of the gutter; and that these changes hadbeen undertaken by the city from time to timewhenever funds were available.- CFI Manila sustained the theory of thedefendants and dismissed the amendedcomplaint, without costs.- This decision was affirmed by the Court ofAppeals, except insofar as the City of Manilais concerned, which was sentenced to pay

damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.

Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.

- The first issue raised by the Manila is whetherthe present case is governed by Section 4 of RA409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held fordamages or injuries to persons or propertyarising from the failure of the Mayor, theMunicipal Board, or any other city officer, to

enforce the provisions of this chapter, or anyother law or ordinance, or from negligence ofsaid Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officerswhile enforcing or attempting to enforce saidprovisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shallbe liable for damages for the death of, or injuriessuffered by, any person by reason of defective

conditions of road, streets, bridges, publicbuildings, and other public works under theircontrol or supervision.- Manila maintains that the former provisionshould prevail over the latter, because RA 409, isa special law, intended exclusively for the City ofManila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,applicable to the entire Philippines.

ISSUES

WON City of Manila should be held liable for thedamages suffered by Teotica.

HELDYES.Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising fromnegligence, in general, regardless of the objectthereof, whereas Article 2189, CC governsliability due to "defective streets," in particular.Since the present action is based upon the

alleged defective condition of a road, said Article2189 is decisive thereon.


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Reasoning The assertion to the effect that saidAvenue is a national highway was made, for thefirsttime, in its motion for reconsideration of thedecision of the Court of Appeals. At any rate,under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is notnecessary for the liability therein established toattach that the defective roads or streets belong

to the province, city or municipality from whichresponsibility is exacted. What said articlerequires is that the province, city or municipalityhave either "control or supervision" over saidstreet or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,therefore, a national highway, this circumstancewould not necessarily detract from its "control orsupervision" by the City of Manila, underRepublic Act 409.Then, again, the determination of whether or not

P. Burgos Avenue is under the control orsupervision of the City of Manila and whether thelatter is guilty of negligence, in connection withthe maintenance of said road, which weredecided by the Court of Appeals in theaffirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of saidCourt thereon are not subject to our review.Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decisionappealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed,with costs against the City of Manila.

Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

ARANETA v JOYA57 SCRA 59CASTRO J.: May 24, 1974

FACTS:-An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING

Company was sent to the States to pursuestudies in television. When asked about the

expenses of the trip, respondent answered thatthese were not shouldered by the company andinstead by other parties-while abroad, he continued to receive hissalaries in the form of vouchers ordered andsigned by respondent Joya. The petitioner signedthree of these checks. The others were signed by

either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta(company treasurer) who put up part of the billconnected with Taylor's trip and also handed himletters for delivery in the United States. The Ace

Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, onaccount of Taylor's travel and studies-the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with thecourt of first instance of Manila against therespondent for recovery of the total sumdisbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was

made without its knowledge, authority orratification. The respondent, in his answer,denied the charge and claimed that the trip wasnonetheless ratified by the company's board ofdirectors, and that in any event under the by-lawshe had the discretion, as general manager, toauthorize the trip which was for the company'sbenefit-Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against thetwo Aranetas proving that they were involved in

sending Taylor abroad-trial court rendered judgment ordering therespondent to pay the Ace Advertising "the sumof P5,043.20 with interest at the legal rate from

August 23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd partycomplaint dismissed-CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd partycomplaint was reversed stating that Taylor's triphad been neither authorized nor ratified by thecompany

-CA noted that based on the facts, bothpetitioners knew and through their acts showed

that they approved of the trip. were also privyto the unauthorized disbursement of thecorporate moneys jointly with the appellant; whathad happened was in truth and in fact a ventureby them given their stamp of approval; and as itwas an unauthorized act of expenditure ofcorporate funds, and it was these three without

whose acts the same could not have happened,the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict bythem committed upon the corporation, for whichsolidary liability should have been imposed uponall in the first place

ISSUE:WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

HELD: Yes

- The petitioner's assertion that he signed thequestioned payroll checks in good faith has notbeen substantiated, he in particular not havingtestified or offered testimony to prove such claim.Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, thepetitioner remained passive, throughout theperiod of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning theunauthorized disbursements of corporate fundsfor the latter. This plus the fact that he even

approved thrice payroll checks for the payment ofTaylor's salary, demonstrate quite distinctly thatthe petitioner neglected to perform his dutiesproperly, to the damage of the firm of which hewas an officer.

-The fact that he was occupying a contractualposition at the Ace Advertising is of no moment.The existence of a contract between the parties,as has been repeatedly held by this Court,

constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by


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