torts - quasi delict 2

7/27/2019 TORTS - Quasi Delict 2

1/34

G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, thejudgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employercannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice ofappeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of itssubsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of theaccused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of theemployer are carried in one single decision that has become finaland executory.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27,20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CVNo. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the RegionalTrial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal CaseNo. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to

dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal isorderedDISMISSED."4

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion forReconsideration.5

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman yMacadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of thecrime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,multiple physical injuries and damage to property and wassentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to paydamages as follows:

a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sumof P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the

sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his

unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a

month,P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of

Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00

as moral damages;

b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sumof P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum

ofP237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned

income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum,

and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral

damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]

c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sumof P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum

ofP22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum

of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of

income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and

the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;

d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sumof P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees

ofP170,000.00 for the orthopedic

surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an

additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to

cover future correction of deformity of her limbs,and moral damages in the amountof P1,000,000.00;


2/34

e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as

medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income,

andP25,000.00 as moral damages;

f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sumof P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for

loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as

medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages

and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as

moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;

h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sumof P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as

doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines

and P50,000.00 as moral damages;

i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for

medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines,P1,710.00

as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral

damages;

j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00

for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00

as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income

and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered

owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amountofP250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of

the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of thejeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual

damages;

"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of theinsolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities

of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accusedhad become final and executory.

"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 ofthe Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appealwhen appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, alsoadmittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice

of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmedthe denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf ofaccused.

"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed itsnotice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On

April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to[petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998,[petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Officeof the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners]brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused

from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that theOSGs authority to represent People is confined tocriminal cases on appeal. The motion was howeverdenied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2,1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instantmotion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the

institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus,once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in

Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive andenforceable.

The appellate court further held that to allow an employer todispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal caseagainst the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or


3/34

defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by theaccused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the

judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became finaland executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused wasthe employers subsidiary liability.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issues

Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participatedin the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the

judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

"B. Whether or not the doctrines ofAlvarez v. Court ofAppeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil(164 SCRA494) apply to the instant case."8

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunctto Item A.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal fromthe RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment ofconviction against the accused-employee has not attainedfinality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality,notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect,petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of theaccused-employee.

We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases

Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure states thus:

"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order,

unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."

Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal acriminal case, but the government may do so only if the accusedwould not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore,the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accusedshould have been given a more severe penalty.10 On the otherhand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment withrespect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right toappeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties shouldhave the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is

prejudicial to them.11

Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that theappellate court may, upon motion ormotu proprio, dismiss anappeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. Thesecond paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of theappellee ormotu proprio, dismiss the appeal if theappellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bailor flees to a foreign country during the pendency of theappeal."12

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose theirstanding in court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or


4/34

submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to havewaived their right to seek judicial relief.13

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused whojumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does so duringthe trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains theprinciple in this wise:

"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped afterhis arraignment and during the trial, but the trial inabsentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a

judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since henonetheless remained at large his appeal must bedismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of thisRule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. xx x"14

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless theyvoluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise

arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment againstthem.15 While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, asthey are deemed to have waived the appeal.16

Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explainedin Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of CriminalProcedure, which we quote:

"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of theaccused, be modified or set aside before it becomes finalor before appeal is perfected. Except where the deathpenalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after thelapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when thesentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,or when the accused has waived in writing his right toappeal, or has applied for probation."

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped andrefused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemedto have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgmentagainst him has become final and executory.17

Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil

liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:

"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporationsshall be civilly liable for crimes committed in theirestablishments, in all cases where a violation of municipalordinances or some general or special police regulationshall have been committed by them or their employees.

"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution ofgoods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from

guests lodging therein, or for payment of the valuethereof, provided that such guests shall have notified inadvance the innkeeper himself, or the person representinghim, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shallfurthermore have followed the directions which suchinnkeeper or his representative may have given them withrespect to the care and vigilance over such goods. Noliability shall attach in case of robbery with violenceagainst or intimidation of persons unless committed by theinnkeepers employees."

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers,according to Article 103 which reads:

"The subsidiary liability established in the next precedingarticle shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,and corporations engaged in any kind of industry forfelonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,


5/34

apprentices, or employees in the discharge of theirduties."

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now addressthe main issue raised by petitioner.

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of CriminalProcedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed institutedin a criminal prosecution.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedureprovides:

"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for therecovery of civil liability arising from the offense chargedshall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unlessthe offended party waives the civil action, reserves the

right to institute it separately or institutes the civil actionprior to the criminal action.

"x x x x x x x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimecharged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; thatis, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves theright to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminalaction.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under

Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced byexecution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out tothe employee.19

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement ofreserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceedseparately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referredto in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shallremain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal

prosecution based on the same act. Here are some directconsequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on theCivil Code need not be reserved in the criminalprosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a

separate civil action arising from the crime charged doesnot extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannotrecover more than once for the same act or omission.24

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is thecivil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability exdelicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filedseparately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution

remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control ofthe prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order toprotect the remaining civil interest therein.25

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised PenalCode, which states that "[e]very person criminally liable for afelony is also civilly liable."26

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party tothe criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome

thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right topursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.

The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not adirect party to the criminal case, which was filed solely againstNapoleon M. Roman, its employee.

In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list ofcases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers.


6/34

Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in allth[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose anappeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in whichthe employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in suchcircumstances is not possible.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employersuniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to

the criminal cases instituted against their employees.28

Althoughin substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this factshould be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. Whilethey may assist their employees to the extent of supplying thelatters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot actindependently on their own behalf, but can only defend theaccused.

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against DoubleJeopardy

Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the

judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparentfrom its Appellants Brief29 filed with the CA and from itsPetition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial courtsfinding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver ofthe constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throwsthe whole case open to a review by the appellate court. Thelatter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justicedictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 Thisis the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal asentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have thepower to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lowercourt and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against theaccused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that

a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed bythe trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal wouldthus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgmentagainst him could become subject to modification without hisconsent.

We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why theaccused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It

is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violatinghis right against double jeopardy.

Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process

Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing theprevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew hisappeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of thecourt below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a longperiod of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal.Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court

in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:

"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot bewaived even by the accused himself, but the right ofappeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely forthe benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as hepleases. He may waive it either expressly or byimplication. When the accused flees after the case hasbeen submitted to the court for decision, he will bedeemed to have waived his right to appeal from the

judgment rendered against him. x x x."37

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of theauthority of the court and placed himself in a position tospeculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kepthimself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the

judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is intolerableand does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39


7/34

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapesand who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomesfinal and executory.40

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appealthe criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumpingbail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment inthe criminal case against him is now final.

Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner nowaccrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Courtin Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41Alvarez v.CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case,because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers inthese cases to take part in the criminal cases against theiremployees. By participating in the defense of its employee,herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings

laid down in these leading cases.

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases onsubsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenetthey have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding ofguilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers aresubsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of theiremployees in the event of the latters insolvency.44 Theprovisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability --

Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments inthe cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositiveportion of its decision, the trial court need not expresslypronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employeeand the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind

the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication,the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminalcase would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final

judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same token,to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of theiremployees without the latters consent would also result in

improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case isbinding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard tothe formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. Theliability of an employer cannot be separated from that of theemployee.49

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however,there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they areindeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the

former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crimewas committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties;and (4) that the execution against the latter has not beensatisfied due to insolvency.50

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separatecivil action. But the determination must be based on the evidencethat the offended party and the employer may fully and freelypresent. Such determination may be done in the same criminalaction in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, hasbeen pronounced;51and in a hearing set for that precise purpose,with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings forthe execution of the judgment.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense ofits accused-employee does not mean that its liability hastransformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither willits participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that


8/34

since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality,then the subsidiary liability of the employeripso facto attaches.

According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates thatwhile the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to beimposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanctionshould not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this caseinto two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is onlyone criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding ofguilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height ofabsurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who

jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependentupon the conviction of the former.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependenton the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since thecivil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by

reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability hasalso become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct inarguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingenton the imposition of the primary civil liability.

No Deprivation of Due Process

As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process,we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiarycivil liability incident to and dependent upon the employeescriminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipsofacto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee andupon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way thatacquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also hisemployers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a naturalright nor a part of due process.53 It is merely a proceduralremedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only

in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizingsuch exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements must be strictlycomplied with.55

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules onappeal as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can bediscarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot betolerated.57 In these times when court dockets are clogged with

numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by partieswith greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition ofthose cases.58

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired bythe winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file anappeal within the prescribed period, then the former has thecorrelative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of thecase.59

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it

participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannotbe said that the employer was deprived of due process. It mighthave lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day incourt.60 In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right toappeal.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decisionagainst the accused. It should be clear that only after proof of hisinsolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. Ithas been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in somekind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guiltyof the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense inthe discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from theadmissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on itsregular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned bypetitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, NapoleonRoman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x


9/34

x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already afinding of guilt against the accused while he was in the dischargeof his duties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailedResolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED


10/34

G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT yALMERA, accused,FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.

YAP, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Courtof Manila, Branch XX, rendered on February 17, 1986, convictingthe accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robberywith Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Thevictim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old workingstudent who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He wasallegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worthP300.00 more or less.1

Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial andconvicted. The other accused, Rogelio Ligon, was neverapprehended and is still at large.

The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 atabout 6:10 p.m. The accused, Fernando Gabat, was riding in a1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat,and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi wascoming from Espana Street going towards the direction ofQuiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in thefront seat by the window on the right side of the Kombi. At theintersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street beforeturning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, theKombi had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting forthe traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarettevendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy somecigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handedGabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction wasoccurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi

driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to whatprecisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucialmoment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflictingversions by the prosecution and the defense. It is notcontroverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speedtowards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi butapparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosaleswas rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General

Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries andwas confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.

Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident wasa taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He was behind theKombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on thesame lane in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to theright").2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down onthe pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued itas it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to makethe driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal

monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons init. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them"nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men in the jeep joined thechase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard,Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic lightturned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeeppulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turnedout to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and PeterIgnacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon,and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. Itwas found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, acertain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rearseat.4 The three were all brought by the police officers to theWestern Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan.The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along withthem. The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo Primiciaswere taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. FernanPayuan.5 Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, datedOctober 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were


11/34

released early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon wasdetained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for furtherinvestigation.

Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in courtagainst Rogelio Ligon dated December 6, 1983 charging himwith Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.7 Six months later,however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed

another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabatfor Robbery with Homicide.8 He filed the latter information on thebasis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo9 and a

joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarettevendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23,1983.10 These affidavits were already prepared and merelysworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.

On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. OrlandoV. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of

death of Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bi lateral,secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."11

The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony ofthe taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, that Gabat grabbed thebox of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's handfrom the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling downand hitting the pavement. In its decision, the trial courtsummarized the testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00o'clock in the evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was thendriving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far EasternUniversity, and at the intersection of Lerma and QuezonBoulevard, the traffic light changed from green to red. Thevehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was rightbehind a Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light tochange to green, Castillo Idly watched the Volkswagen Kombiand saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal toa cigarette vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approachedthe right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was handing the

cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green.When the Kombi moved forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed thecigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ranbeside the Kombi and was able to hold on to the windowsill ofthe right front door with his right hand. While Rosales wasclinging to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground, theKombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass.Castillo, who was closely following the Kombi, then saw Gabat

forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and thelatter fell face down on Quezon Boulevard near the Rectounderpass.12

The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarizedby the court as follows: On the date and time in question,Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board theVolkswagen Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had tostop at the intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevardwhen the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted tobuy cigarettes, called a cigarette vendor who approached the

right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of cigarettes andhanded to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order tochange the P5.00 big, Rosales placed his cigarette boxcontaining assorted cigarettes on the windowsill of the front doorof the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window frame.Suddenly, the traffic light changed from red to green and RogelioLigon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the transactionbetween Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle spedonward, the cigarette box which was squeezed between the rightarm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi.Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsillof the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw thecigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he toldLigon to veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off at thesidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it couldnot be done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, whilethe vehicle slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the rightin an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip onthe window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard.


12/34

Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied thatthey should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to theparents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the sceneof the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding alongDewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of PrudencioCastillo and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon werebrought to police headquarters, but neither of them executed anywritten statement.13

The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version,stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly took orgrabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise,there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi andhang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo'stestimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right handof Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the lattercould not have fallen down, having already been able to balancehimself on the stepboard.

On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible thetestimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarettebox on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand,while he was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledgethat cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not letgo of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box ofcigarettes in order to change a peso bin given by a customer.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded greatrespect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless it is shows thatthe findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failedto consider certain material facts and circumstances in itsevaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar, a careful review ofthe record shows that certain material facts and circumstanceshad been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken intoaccount, would alter the result of the case in that they wouldintroduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle theaccused to acquittal.

While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterestedwitness with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other thanto see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not taintedwith bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his observationof the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicabwhich Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to theKombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo atthe trial.14 Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the

rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upperportion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear endof the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo toobserve clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front endwhere Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which mustbe taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony asto what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarettevendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. Asthe taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a distanceof about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partiallyobstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he

saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pryloose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thussubject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering that thisoccurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and bothvehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.

We find it significant that in his statement given to the police thatvery evening,15 Castillo did not mention that he saw Gabatforcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of theKombi, although the police report prepared by the investigatingofficer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same date, stated thatwhen the traffic signal changed to green and the driver steppedon the gas, the cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales)was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly the formerclung to the door and was dragged at a distance while at thesame time the latter punched the vendor's arm until the same(sic) fell to the pavement," thus showing that during the policeinvestigation Castillo must have given a statement to the policewhich indicated that Gabat did something to cause Rosales to


13/34

fall from the Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavitprepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to byCastillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on January 17, 1984 thatthis vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit wasmade the basis for filing another information charging both Gabatand the driver with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced

with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused Fernando Gabathas been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, thequantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of soserious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met inthis case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonabledoubt.

However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminallyliable is also free from civil liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of theaccused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyondreasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required

in a civil action for damages.17 The judgment of acquittalextinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includesa declaration that the facts from which the civil liability mightarise did not exist.18

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code,which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the groundthat his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt doesnot necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act oromission, has been explained by the Code Commission asfollows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminalcase also releases him from civil liability is one of the mostserious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has givenrise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in themind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. Thereasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil

responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, whenthe latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leadsto unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Suchreasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcationbetween criminal liability and civil responsibility, and todetermine the logical result of the distinction. The two

liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. Oneaffects the social order and the other, private rights. Oneis for the punishment or correction of the offender whilethe other is for reparation of damages suffered by theaggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so differentfrom each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise uponthe civil action arising from a crime; but the public actionfor the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby beextinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes ofthe imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense

should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for thepurpose of indemnifying the complaining party, whyshould the offense also be proved beyond reasonabledoubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private rightto be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is theright of the aggrieved person any less private because thewrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends theadoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct aserious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustiblesource of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the partof the innumerable persons injured or wronged. 19

In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidenceexists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liabilityof Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of thetestimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at thetrial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we


14/34

find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat byhis act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage toRosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat'swilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middleof a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain ofevents which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault andnegligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from movingforward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help

Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle,and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally,Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead ofstopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven factstaken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable underthe Civil Code20 for the damage done to Rosales.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellantGabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. However, he ishereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there beingfault or negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose

Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter'sdeath, P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, andP4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged loss of incomeamounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficientevidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.


15/34

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAELGONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals'decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of convictionand acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion onthe ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal

ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount ofP9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA,FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA,YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC,ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEOGARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDOCELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHNDOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDODOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION,committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of JosePanganiban, province of Camarines Norte,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above- named accused, RoyPadilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, YollyRico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, RobertoRosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr.,Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, JohnDoe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, byconfederating and mutually helping one another,and acting without any authority of law, did then

and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, bymeans of threats, force and violence preventAntonio Vergara and his family to close their stalllocated at the Public Market, Building No. 3, JosePanganiban, Camarines Norte, and bysubsequently forcibly opening the door of said stalland thereafter brutally demolishing and destroyingsaid stall and the furnitures therein by axes andother massive instruments, and carrying away thegoods, wares and merchandise, to the damage andprejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family

in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual orcompensatory and moral damages, and further thesum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused tookadvantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the restof the accused being policemen, except RicardoCelestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,Camarines Norte, and that it was committed withevident premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth JudicialDistrict rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of whichstates that:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accusedRoy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and JoseParley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of


16/34

grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer animprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fineof P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages inthe amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount ofP30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,

jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided forby law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon',David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, GodofredoVillania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, RicardoCelestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby orderedacquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for theircriminal participation in the crime charged.

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Courtof Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of gravecoercion was not supported by the evidence. According to thepetitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance

of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stallbecause the municipality had enacted municipal ordinancespursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. Thepetitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that thedemolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the verydirective of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall ownersseventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. Thepetitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of fivemonths and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law.They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each,P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00

moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costsof the suit.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court ofAppeals states:

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgmentappealed from in the sense that the appellants are

acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but theyare ordered to pay jointly and severally tocomplainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actualdamages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending thatthe acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liabilityresults in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals

denied the motion holding that:

xxx xxx xxx

... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonabledoubt whether the crime of coercion wascommitted, not on facts that no unlawful act wascommitted; as their taking the law into their hands,destructing (sic) complainants' properties isunlawful, and, as evidence on record establishedthat complainants suffered actual damages, the

imposition of actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action,contending that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AGRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSEDITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPONPETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TOCOMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTINGPETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROMWHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDINGIN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26,


17/34

1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTALWAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOTON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WASCOMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUALDAMAGES IS CORRECT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ALEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAINJUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS

APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERSCOMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT ISTAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS'PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAINDECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE

ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DIDNOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND

THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHERCRIME.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,

APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR,JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAYCOMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED

ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not therespondent court committed a reversible error in requiring thepetitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants afteracquitting them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which isincluded in the criminal action is that arising from and as a

consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant wasacquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from thecriminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal chargecould be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effectthat the liability of the defendant for the return of the amountreceived by him may not be enforced in the criminal case butmust be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of thesaid amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the

doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable RodolfoBaltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623;People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us,the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not committhe acts stated in the charge against them. There is no disputeover the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition withaxes and other instruments, and the carting away of themerchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these actswere denominated coercion when they properly constituted someother offense such as threat or malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoingprovision, the violence must be employed againstthe person, not against property as what happenedin the case at bar. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The next problem is: May the accused be convictedof an offense other than coercion?

From all appearances, they should have beenprosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief.But the law does not allow us to render judgment ofconviction for either of these offenses for thereason that they were not indicted for, theseoffenses. The information under which they were


18/34

prosecuted does not allege the elements of eitherthreats or malicious mischief. Although theinformation mentions that the act was by means ofthreats', it does not allege the particular threatmade. An accused person is entitled to be informedof the nature of the acts imputed to him before hecan be made to enter into trial upon a validinformation.

We rule that the crime of grave coercion has notbeen proved in accordance with law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal theynevertheless are liable for the actual damagessuffered by the complainants by reason of thedemolition of the stall and loss of some of theirproperties. The extinction of the penal action doesnot carry with it that of the civil, unless theextinction proceeds from a declaration in a final

judgment that the fact from which the civil mightarise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev.Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311,People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case,the fact from which the civil might arise, namely,the demolition of the stall and loss of the propertiescontained therein; exists, and this is not denied bythe accused. And since there is no showing that thecomplainants have reserved or waived their right toinstitute a separate civil action, the civil aspecttherein is deemed instituted with the criminal

action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states thefundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted,the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from theoffense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied

institution when the offended party expressly waives the civilaction or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v.

Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in thecriminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto foundedon Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the

civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of theaccused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through JusticeJorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid downthe rule that the same punishable act or omission can create twokinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where providedby law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from theact as a crime and the liability arising from the same act asa quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability maybe enforced against the accused, However, the offended party

cannot recover damages under both types of liability. Forinstance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due toreckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under thepreceding article is entirely separate and distinctfrom the civil liability arising from negligence underthe Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recoverdamages twice for the same act or omission of thedefendant.

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding sectionthe following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx


19/34

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carrywith it extinction of the civil, unless the extinctionproceeds from a declaration in a final judgment thatthe fact from which the civil might arise did notexist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civilaction may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the

manner provided by law against the person whomay be liable for restitution of the thing andreparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accusedfor damages only when it includes a declaration that the factsfrom which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civilliability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal isbased on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) asonly preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; wherethe court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not

criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil.558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies ofestafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certainrelatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332,Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arisefrom or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accusedwas acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p.623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is

acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not beenproved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action fordamages for the same act or omission may beinstituted. Such action requires only apreponderance of evidence. Upon motion of thedefendant, the court may require the plaintiff to filea bond to answer for damages in case thecomplaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal isbased upon reasonable doubt, the court shall sodeclare. In the absence of any declaration to thateffect, it may be inferred from the text of thedecision whether or not the acquittal is due to thatground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the

criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of acivil case based on the same acts which led to the criminalprosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that hespent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz

Agricultural and Fishery School and for hispersonal benefit is not a declaration that the factupon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based doesnot exist. The civil action barred by such adeclaration is the civil liability arising from the

offense charged, which is the one impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, RuleIII, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would notbar a civil action filed against an accused who hadbeen acquitted in the criminal case if the criminalaction is predicated on factual or legalconsiderations other than the commission of theoffense charged. A person may be acquitted ofmalversation where, as in the case at bar, he couldshow that he did not misappropriate the publicfunds in his possession, but he could be rendered

liable to restore said funds or at least to make aproper accounting thereof if he shall spend thesame for purposes which are not authorized norintended, and in a manner not permitted byapplicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello,120 SCRA 203)


20/34

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civilaction to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved inthe civil case have already been established in the criminalproceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process hasbeen accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of thecriminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocencecalled for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecutingattorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all

witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a morestudied consideration by the judge of the entire records and ofapplicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civilaction simply because the accused was acquitted would meanneedless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplicationof litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and moneyon the part of all concerned.

The trial court found the following facts clearly established by theevidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then ChiefGaldones, complying with the instructionscontained in said Memorandum No. 32 of theMayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara hadnot vacated the premises in question, with the aidof his policemen, forced upon the store or stall andordered the removal of the goods inside the storeof Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of thegoods taken out, piled them outside in front of the

store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after allthe goods were taken out from the store, orderedthe demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara.Since then up to the trial of this case, thewhereabouts of the goods taken out from the storenor the materials of the demolished stall have notbeen made known.

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the saidVergaras had not up to that time complied with theorder to vacate, the co-accused Chief of PoliceGaldones and some members of his police force,went to the market and, using ax, crowbars andhammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who

were not present or around, and after having firstinventoried the goods and merchandise foundtherein, they had them brought to the municipalbuilding for safekeeping. Inspite of notice servedupon the Vergaras to take possession of the goodsand merchandise thus taken away, the latterrefused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as theyevaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture andequipment

judgment destroyed300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken8,000.00

P9,600.00

It is not disputed that the accused demolished thegrocery stall of the complainants Vergaras andcarted away its contents. The defense that they didso in order to abate what they considered anuisance per se is untenable, This finds no supportin law and in fact. The couple has been payingrentals for the premises to the government which


21/34

allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore,farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance perse which could be summarily abated.

The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that theycaused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and hadits contents carted away. They state:

On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas onVergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passagewaysof Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still inthe premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police andmembers of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished thestore of the Vergaras, made an inventory of thegoods found in said store, and brought these goodsto the municipal building under the custody of theMunicipal Treasurer, ...

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of theCivil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminalprosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not beenproved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages forthe same act or omission may be instituted." According to somescholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separatecivil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law evenin the interests of economy and simplicity and following thedictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient tosustain the civil action but inadequate to justify aconviction in the criminal action, may it render

judgment acquitting the accused on reasonabledoubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? Anaffirmative answer to this question would beconsistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct

and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with thereinstituting of the same civil action, or one basedon quasi-delict or other independent civil action,and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save theinjured party unnecessary expenses in theprosecution of the civil action or enable him to takeadvantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c)otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of

permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil actionwhether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or otherindependent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in themanner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Codeshould be amended because it clearly andexpressly provides that the civil action based on thesame act or omission may only be instituted in aseparate action, and therefore, may not inferentiallybe resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss

the civil action upon acquittal of the accused anddisallow the reinstitution of any other civil action,would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal onreasonable doubt without any significance, andwould violate the doctrine that the two actions aredistinct and separate.

In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seemsevident that there is much sophistry and nopragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent toaward in the same proceedings damages against

the accused after acquitting him on reasonabledoubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinctand separate character of the two actions, thenature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, thevexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation orinstitution of a separate civil action, and that theinjured party is entitled to damages not becausethe act or omission is punishable but because he


22/34

was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco,Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order toallow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittalbased on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly andexpressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the

defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on theground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonabledoubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is notprecluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can beavailed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil casemay be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing isthe only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in therendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding

damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side byside. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminalliability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unlessthere is clear showing that the act from which civil liability mightarise did not exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code atrivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled forburden before one who has already been the victim of acondemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justicewhich he seeks.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code inarriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possiblyhave intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party torecover just compensation by making a separate civil actionmandatory and exclusive:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in acriminal case also releases him from civil liability isone of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legalsystem. It has given rise to numberless instancesof miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal wasdue to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the courtas to the guilt of the accused. The reasoningfollowed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility

is derived from the the criminal offense, when thelatter is not proved, civil liability cannot bedemanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinkingleads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line ofdemarcation between criminal liability and civilresponsibility, and to determine the logical result ofthe distinction. The two liabilities are separate anddistinct from each other. One affects the social

order and the other, private rights. One is for thepunishment or correction of the offender while theother is for reparation of damages suffered by theaggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for thepurposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon theaccused, the offense should be proved beyondreasonable doubt. But for the purpose ofindemnifying the complaining party, why should theoffense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt?Is not the invasion or violation of every private rightto be proved only by preponderance of evidence?

Is the right of the aggrieved person any less privatebecause the wrongful act is also punishable by thecriminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional factshave to be established or more evidence must be adduced orwhere the criminal case has been fully terminated and aseparate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more


23/34

expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where thecriminal action was decided for further hearings on the civilaspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, chooseto file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to thecomplainants in this case to require at this time a separate civilaction to be filed.

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court ofAppeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment ofacquittal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of therespondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack ofmerit.

SO ORDERED.


24/34

G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are notguarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. Theyare not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences.Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment .. . 1

The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medicalmalpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the type of claimwhich a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong

committed by a medical professional which has caused bodilyharm. 2 In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most oftenbrought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of theCivil Code, 3 and in some instances, as a criminal case under

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code 4with which the civilaction for damages is impliedly instituted. It is via the latter typeof action that the heirs of the deceased sought redress for thepetitioner's alleged imprudence and negligence in treating thedeceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner and one Dr.Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during theoperation of the deceased were charged with "reckless

imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in aninformation which reads:

That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of SanPablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accusedabove named, being then the attendinganaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did

then and there, in a negligence (sic), careless,imprudent, and incompetent manner, and failing tosupply or store sufficient provisions and facilitiesnecessary to meet any and all exigencies apt toarise before, during and/or after a surgicaloperation causing by such negligence,carelessness, imprudence, and incompetence, andcausing by such failure, including the lack of

preparation and foresight needed to avert atragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali onthe day following said surgical operation.5

Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleadednot guilty to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994, theMunicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo Cityrendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereunderquoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dra.

Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged forinsufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra.Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for thedeath of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, andtherefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised PenalCode, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer thepenalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment ofarresto mayor with costs. 6

The petitioner appealed her conviction to the RegionalTrial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision of the

MTCC 7 prompting the petitioner to file a petition forreview with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hencethis petition for review on certiorariassailing the decisionpromulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 1995affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that sheis further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia UmaliP50,000.00 as indemnity for her death. 8


25/34

In substance, the petition brought before this Court raisesthe issue of whether or not petitioner's conviction of thecrime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supportedby the evidence on record.

First the antecedent facts.

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali DeOcampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinicand General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City,Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in theafternoon of the same day. 9 Prior toMarch 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who founda "myoma" 10 in her uterus, and scheduled her for ahysterectomy operation on March 23,1991. 11 Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on theevening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated onthe next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 12 According to

Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windowand the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendantfor a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. 13 Because of theuntidy state of the cl inic, Rowena tried to persuade her mothernot to proceed with the operation. 14 The following day, beforeher mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena askedthe petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitionercalled Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydiathen informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she mustbe operated on as scheduled. 15

Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sisterand two aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydiaunderwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo wentout of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagametampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About onehour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to askthem to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from theSt. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the

attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of a few hours,the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. Theoperating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take theirsnacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of theoperating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowenaand the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner'sorder as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood

bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which waslater transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, whowas attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparentlythe oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband togetherwith the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo DistrictHospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply ofoxygen as soon as it arrived. 16 But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M.she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50.Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the SanPablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respiratorand further examined. 17 The transfer to the San Pablo District

Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of theother relatives present who found out about the intended transferonly when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San PabloDistrict Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded atricycle and followed the ambulance. 18

Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she waswheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillore-operated on her because there was blood oozing from theabdominal incision. 19 The attending physicians summoned Dr.Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology

Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, whenDr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possiblydead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles theninformed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing hecould do to help save the patient. 20 While the petitioner wasclosing the abdominal wall, the patient died. 21Thus, on March24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali waspronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the


26/34

immediate cause of death and "Disseminated IntravascularCoagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. 22

In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the followingcircumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that she wasindeed negligent in the performance of the operation:

. . . , the clinic was untidy, there was lack of

provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for anycontingency that might happen during theoperation. The manner and the fact that the patientwas brought to the San Pablo District Hospital forreoperation indicates that there was somethingwrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conductedthe operation. There was no showing that beforethe operation, accused Dra. Cruz had conducted acardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of theblood of the patient. It was (sic) said in medicalparlance that the "the abdomen of the person is a

temple of surprises" because you do not know thewhole thing the moment it was open (sic) andsurgeon must be prepared for any eventualitythereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a publicdocument was not presented because it is onlythere that we could determine the condition of thepatient before the surgery. The court also noticed inExh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished topostpone the operation but the patient wasprevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with thesurgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died

because of the negligence and carelessness of thesurgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of loss ofblood during the operation of the deceased forevident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, thereason why the patient was brought for operation atthe San Pablo City District Hospital. As such, thesurgeon should answer for such negligence. Withrespect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist,

there is no evidence to indicate that she should beheld jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually didthe operation. 23

The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCCand upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency, negligenceand lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) inhandling the subject patient before and after the

operation."

24

And likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction,the Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:

. . . While we may grant that the untidiness andfilthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicatenegligence, it nevertheless shows the absence ofdue care and supervision over her subordinateemployees. Did this unsanitary condition permeatethe operating room? Were the surgical instrumentsproperly sterilized? Could the conditions in the ORhave contributed to the infection of the patient?

Only the petitioner could answer these, but sheopted not to testify. This could only give rise to thepresumption that she has nothing good to testify onher defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverifiedstatement of the prosecution witness" remainsunchallenged and unrebutted.

Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's versionindicating the following facts: that the accusedasked the patient's relatives to buy Tagametcapsules while the operation was already in

progress; that after an hour, they were also askedto buy type "A" blood for the patient; that after thesurgery, they were again asked to procure moretype "A" blood, but such was not anymore availablefrom the source; that the oxygen given to thepatient was empty; and that the son-in-law of thepatient, together with a driver of the petitioner, hadto rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital to get


27/34

the much-needed oxygen. All these conclusivelyshow that the petitioner had not prepared for anyunforeseen circumstances before going into thefirst surgery, which was not emergency in nature,but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had noready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly typedand cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygensupply.

Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keepnagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by aninternist, which are standard requirements before apatient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitionerdetermine as part of the pre-operative evaluation,the bleeding parameters of the patient, such asbleeding time and clotting time? There is noshowing that these were done. The petitioner justappears to have been in a hurry to perform the

operation, even as the family wanted apostponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously, she didnot prepare the patient; neither did she get thefamily's consent to the operation. Moreover, she didnot prepare a medical chart with instructions for thepatient's care. If she did all these, proof thereofshould have been offered. But there is none.Indeed, these are overwhelming evidence ofrecklessness and imprudence. 25

This Court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing

circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of convictionagainst the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudenceresulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are:(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doingor the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be withoutmalice; (4) that material damage results from the recklessimprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precautionon the part of the offender, taking into consideration his

employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physicalcondition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time andplace.

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lackof precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determinedaccording to the standard of care observed by other members ofthe profession in good standing under similar circumstances

bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the timeof treatment or the present state of medical science. 26 In therecent case ofLeonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, etal., 27this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effectrepresents that, having the needed training and skill possessedby physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he willemploy such training, care and skill in the treatment of hispatients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level ofcare that any other reasonably competent doctor would use totreat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in thisaspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential

to establish not only the standard of care of the profession butalso that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care fallsbelow such standard. 28 Further, inasmuch as the causes of theinjuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only inthe light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized thatexpert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusionas to causation. 29

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case isthe absence of any expert testimony on the matter of thestandard of care employed by other physicians of good standing

in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expertwitnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. NietoSalvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) onlytestified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture toilluminate the court on the matter of the standard of care thatpetitioner should have exercised.


28/34

All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities ofthe clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood,oxygen,

torts - quasi delict 2

Documents