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Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the

Irreducibility of ExperienceWorlds Apart: The Market and the Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-1750 by Jean-Christophe Agnew; In the American Province: Studies in the History and Historiography ofIdeas by David A. Hollinger; Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacsto Habermas by Martin Jay; Munich and Theatrical Modernism: Politics, Playwriting andPerformance, 1890-1914 by Peter Jelavich; Modern European Intellectual Hi ...Review by: John E. ToewsThe American Historical Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 879-907Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association

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ReviewArticle

IntellectualHistory fter he LinguisticTurn: TheAutonomyof Meaning and the Irreducibilityf

Experience

JOHN E. TOEWS

IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 1981 that outlinedthe current rendsand futureprospectsof intellectual istory,WilliamJ.Bowsmacoupled a pessimisticssess-ment of the "obvious and probablyirreversible" rofessionaldecline of thespecialized "history fideas" with n optimistic rojection f the transformation

ofintellectual istory nto a pace-setting articipantn a more broadly onceived"history f meaning." Bowsma counseled intellectual istorians o resistdebilitat-ing defensive nxietiesregarding heirprofessional dentities nd the autonomyof theirfield nd torecognizethat he "remnant hieflyworth aving"from heirtraditional oncerns-the focus on theproduction, eproduction, nd transmis-sion ofmeanings nvarioushistorical eriodsand cultural ontexts-placed themat the center of the most interesting nd innovative work currentlybeingproduced, not onlybytheir ellowhistorians ut more generallynthehumanitiesand social sciences. The apparent declineof intellectual istory s an academic

subdisciplinemightbe construed s a signof itsmaturationnd assimilationntothe general currentof historicallyriented studiesof human culture:"We nolonger need intellectualhistory ecause we have all become intellectualhistori-ans."1

Bowsma premisedhis assessmentof intellectualhistory's ossible fate in the1980s on two general assumptions. First, he connected the decline of thetraditional history f ideas" to the historicaldisintegration f the belief thatconscious,rational houghtwas theuniversal, pecies-defining,nd thus"highest"

formof human activity,etermininghecriteria ftruth n matters f both factand value. By viewingthe worksproduced by intellectual lites claimingthisuniversalperspective s merely subgroupwithin he argercategory f culturalconstructionsfmeaning hatwere a functionf thehumanorganism sa whole,"intellectualhistorianswere finally oming to termswith theirown persistent

1William . Bowsma, Intellectualistoryn the1980s: FromHistoryf Ideas to HistoryfMeaning,"ournalf nterdisciplina7yistory,2 Autumn 981):279, 283,280.

879





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The booksunderreviewre in alphabeticalrder):

Jean-Christophegnew,WorldsApart:The Market nd theTheater nAnglo-

American hought, 550-1750 Cambridge, 986);David A. Hollinger,n the American rovince:Studies n theHistory ndHistoriographyf deas (Bloomington,nd., 1985);

Martin ay,Marxism nd Totality: he Adventuresf a Concept rom ukacsto HabermasBerkeley, alif., 984);

PeterJelavich, unich nd TheatricalModernism: olitics,PlaywritingndPerformance,890-1914 Cambridge, ass.,1985);

ModernEuropean ntellectual istory:Reappraisals nd NewPerspectives,Dominick aCapraand Steven . Kaplan, ds. Ithaca,N.Y., 1982);

DominickaCapra,Rethinkingntellectual istory: exts,Contexts, anguage(Ithaca,N.Y., 1983);

Dominick aCapra,History ndCriticismIthaca,N.Y., 1985);

AllanMegill, rophets f Extremity:ietzsche, eidegger, oucault, errida(Berkeley, alif., 985);

J.G.A.Pocock, irtue, ommercendHistory: ssays n Political houghtndHistory, hieflyn theEighteenth enturyCambridge,985);Mark oster, oucault,Marxism ndHistory:ModeofProduction ersusMode

of nformationCambridge, 984);PhilosophynHistory, ichard orty, .B. SchneewindndQuentin kinner,eds. Cambridge, 984);

The Return f GrandTheoryn the Human Sciences,Quentin kinner,d.(Cambridge,985).

practice fhistoricizingnd contextualizinghe ntellectnd itsproducts. econd,Bowsma assumed that the integration f intellectualhistorynto the history fmeaningwould not simply nvert he'hierarchies f the past, giving privilegedstatus obodilyneeds, psychological ravings, nd social interests,ather han toconscious ideas or rational argument,but would avoid reductionist roceduresaltogether. he newcategories f"meaning" nd "experience"would notreplicatethe old polaritiesof thoughtand reality, onsciousness and being, but wouldencouragean integrated onceptofhistorical eality s meaningful xperience nwhich "the creative nterpretationf experience also shapes experience" and"some sense of meaning s . . . both a condition nd a productof experience."2

This new agenda for ntellectual istory ad a numberof significantmplica-tions. t promisedan end to isolating pecialization nd theresulting isciplinaryand subdisciplinaryeuds and anxieties. ntellectualhistorians ould feel encour-aged by he ffirmationfthecentralityftheir oncerns nd therelevance ftheirprofessional killsforthe critical uestions animating urrent cholarship.Morespecifically, owsma envisioned an increasinglyelf-conscious earch for inter-

2 Bowsma,"IntellectualHistory n the 1980s,"283, 288.





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Intellectual istoryfterhe inguasticurn 881

pretive trategies o reconstruct heproduction nd transmission f meaningsatvarious cultural levels and in different ultural contexts.This search wouldencourage ess unilateral nd parasitic,more ntimate nd dialogical, elationships

with isterdisciplines uch as cultural nthropology, rthistory, nd philosophyand a more systematicse of inguisticmodels and procedures, ince the primarymedium of meaningwas obviously anguage. The culturalworld, the realmofmeaningful experience, he claimed, might be described as a "vast rhetoricalproduction."Entering nto the mainstreamof the history f meaning wouldinvolvethe intellectual istoriann a linguistic urn.3

The dozen recently ublished books under review n this ssay are too narrowand arbitrary sampling (skewed both toward modern European intellectualhistorynd the analysisof the artifactsf intellectual lites) to provide anythinglike n adequate test fBowsma's projections.t is strikingheextent o which heyvirtually ll assume, however,the validity f his general claim that intellectualhistorys an integralpart of the nterdisciplinarytudy f the history f meaningand that he pursuit fthis tudynvolves focusedconcernon the waysmeaningis constitutedn and through anguage. A new self-confidences clearly vident.The fearsofbeing conquered and colonizedbytheperspectives nd methodsofsocial historians, o prevalent mong intellectual istoriansust a fewyearsago,have diminished onsiderably,nd one can even findwarnings bout thedangers

of overconfidence nd intellectual mperialism.4 ut the interdisciplinaryndintradisciplinaryensionsand disputes have not been resolved or put aside.Although reconsideration nd perhapsrearrangementf conventional atego-ries and oppositionsis clearlyunder way,the first esult of this self-reflectiveactivityppears tobea displacement f conventional istinctionsnd disputes ntothe new termsof meaningand language. We mayall be historians f culturalmeaningas constitutedn language,but we still nvestigatemeaningat differentcultural levels involvingdifferent inds of textsrequiringdifferent inds oflinguistic nalysis.As MartinJay and others have correctlypointed out, thequestionof whether r not ntellectual istoryhould take linguisticurn nvolvesthepreliminaryuestionofwhich mong a varietyf inguisticheories f meaninga historianshould choose.5 The linguisticturns chosen often overlap withtraditional ivisionsbetween historians f sociocultural tructures, olitical de-ologies,and the artifacts f "high"culture, s well as betweenhistorians f thedifferent ationalcultures n which various theorieshave been formulated ndelaborated.

In spiteofthese ndications f continuing isagreementlongfamiliarines, ne

can also discern new frameworkfquestions, r a "problematic,"roundwhichthe discussionsamong intellectualhistorians re increasingly rganized. Mostseem ready to concede that anguage can no longerbe construedas simplymedium,relativelyrpotentiallyransparent,or herepresentationrexpression

3 Bowsma,"IntellectualHistory n the 1980s," 290.4 See, forexample,Hollinger, n theAmericanrovince, 88.5 MartinJay, Should IntellectualHistoryTake a Linguistic urn? Reflections n the Habermas-

Gadamer Debate," in LaCapra and Kaplan, Modern uropean ntellectualistory,7.





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882 John . Toews

of a reality utsideof itself nd are willing o entertain eriously ome formofsemiological heory n which anguage is conceivedof as a self-contained ystemof "signs"whose meanings re determined ytheir elations o each other,rather

thanbytheir elation o some"transcendental"rextralinguisticbjector subject.Disputes arise from a concern for the implicationsof a commitment o asemiological heory f meaning n its extremeform.Such a commitmentwouldseemto mply hat anguagenotonly hapes experiencedreality ut constitutest,thatdifferentanguages createdifferent, iscontinuous, nd incommensurableworlds, hatthecreationofmeaning s impersonal, perating behind thebacks"of language userswhose linguistic ctions can merelyexemplify he rules andprocedures of languages they nhabitbut do not control,that all specializedlanguage usages in a culture (scientific, oetic, philosophical,historical)aresimilarly etermined by and constitutive f theirputativeobjects.Withinthisperspective,historiography ould be reduced to a subsystem f linguistic ignsconstitutingts object, "the past," according to the rules pertainingin the"prisonhouseof language" inhabitedby the historian.As Keith Baker warns,structuralistheories flanguage seemtoextend"an offer fthe entireworld asa domainofmeaning, ut t thecostof ourhistoricalouls."6Although xpressionsofapocalyptic earofthe end ofhistorys we haveknown t or millenarianhopesfor a totallynew kind of history an occasionallybe discerned in the current

literature,he predominant endency s to adapt traditional istorical oncernsforextralinguisticrigins nd reference othesemiological hallenge,toreaffirmnnew ways that, n spiteof the relative utonomyof culturalmeanings,humansubjects tillmake and remake heworlds fmeaning nwhich hey resuspended,and to insistthatthese worldsare not creationsex nihilobut responsesto, andshapingsof,changingworldsofexperienceultimatelyrreducible o the inguisticforms n whichthey ppear. Insofar as it s a typeofhistory,ntellectual istorycannotbe completelydentifiedwith radical hermeneuticshat ssumesnothingexists eyondmeanings, ut tmust ddress the ssueofexplanation, fwhy ertain

meanings rise,persist,nd collapse atparticular imes nd inspecificocioculturalsituations.Althoughno easilydiscernible,ommonposition merges nthe worksunder review, hey an be seen as participatingn a commondiscourse n the sensethatthey ddress themselves o the promises nd the problemsof sustaining hedialectical unityof and differencebetween meaning and experience (as allhistoriansmust) n the wake of thelinguistic urn.

IF THE GENERAL FIELD OF HISTORICAL STUDIES could be redefined s the investi-

gation of the contextually ituated productionand transmission f meaning,intradisciplinaryurf battlesbetween social and intellectualhistorianswouldappear to lose theirpoint.The disjunctionbetweenexternaleventand internalidea, between objective process or structure nd subjectiverepresentation rexpression,woulddissolve fa consensuscould be established hat heplowingof

6 Keith MichaelBaker,"On theProblem of the Ideological Originsofthe FrenchRevolution,"nLaCapra and Kaplan, Modern uropeanntellectualistory, 00.





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Intellectual istoryfter he inguistic urn 883

a field, he abuse of a child, r the storming f a fortress ereas much contextuallysituated,meaningful ocialactions s theconstruction f a philosophical rgument,the choice of a metaphor, he publication f a journal, or the performance f an

opera. However, a number of the most persuasively rgued contributions ocontemporary ebates on the futureof intellectual istory ndicate that, ven ifhistorians ould agree thattheywere all engaged in reconstructinghe history fmeaning, intradisciplinaryensions and conflictswould persist. The essays ofRoger Chartier nd Dominick LaCapra address this ssue critically nd directly,focusing n the hegemonialclaimsof "sociocultural istory" r the "social historyof ideas" within he history f meaning.7

What both Chartier nd LaCapra find bjectionable nthesociocultural istoryinspiredby the FrenchAnnales chool is the ways n whichthishistory bjectifiesmeaning nordertoopen up the sphereof culturalhistoryo themethodologicalprocedures and organizing ategoriesdeveloped in socioeconomic nalysis. uchobjectification,hey rgue, has takentwomajor forms. t ischaracterized, irst fall, by an overwhelming ocus on the reconstructionf impersonal,collective,"unconscious" tructures f perception, eeling, nd thought, n the nventory favailable toolsortermsthe exicon)and therulesand proceduresof their se (thesyntax) that togethermake up the collectivementalitef a period or culture.Particular ctsofmeaning-productionre reducedtoinstances f theunderlying

structures hat enable or restrict heir possibility. he connectionto MichelFoucault's concept of linguistic erformances s instancesof rules contained narchaeologically ecoverable archives" r "epistemes" r "discourses" s obvious,althoughFoucault eschewed the totalizing mbitions nd causal claims of manysocioculturalhistorians.The second way meaningshave been objectifiedn thesocial history f ideas is throughdefining ndividualmeaningsas self-identicalideas or "essences" thatcan be extracted rom heir extualcontexts nd treatedas commoditiesdistributed nd consumed in statistically easurable patterns.

AlthoughneitherChartiernorLaCapra denies the mportance freconstructinglinguistic odes or of analyzing he productionand distribution f meanings ascommodities, heyboth perceive the history fmeaning as a complex processoflinguistic reativitynd communicativectionthat s rreducible osocioeconomicmodels and demands the interpretivekills ntellectualhistorians nd literaryscholarshave developed in the critical eadingof the artifactsf "high"culture.

Chartierand LaCapra each propose a sweepingrevisionof the categoriesimposedon the historyfmeaningbysociocultural istorians. irst, hey uestionthe binary oppositionof elite and popular culture,especially n the form thatimplies hat hepopular is more basicand inclusive. uch a categorical ppositionconstitutes gross oversimplificationf the heterogeneousstrandsof cultural

meaning presentwithin nyhistorical ulture nd obscuresthecomplexity fthe

relations etween hem.The category feliteculturehidessignificantistinctions

7 The followingdiscussion draws on LaCapra's essays n bothRethinkingntellectual istoryndHistorynd Criticism. oger Chartier, "IntellectualHistoryor SocioculturalHistory?The FrenchTrajectories," n LaCapra and Kaplan,Modern uropean ntellectual istory.





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884 John . Toews

between he "high" ulture rticulated n thecomplex, elf-consciouslyonstructedartifactsof philosophers, theologians, artists,and other "intellectuals," he"official" ulture supported or propagated by state authoritiesor established

churches, nd the"dominant" r"hegemonial" ulture fsocialand political lites.Similarly, popular"culturemustbe conceptually ifferentiatednto"general"or"common" ulture, heculture fsocially ominated rpoliticallyxcludedgroupslikepeasants or wage-laborers,he"everyday" ultureofwork,play,family,ndgender relations n which all groups shared in specificways,the "political"or"public" culture in which citizens engage in debate on their common andconflicting oals as members fan organizedcommunity,nd the "mass"cultureofthe consumers nd producersof commodifiedmeanings.8As Chartier nsists,

although each cultural evel can be reconstructed s a world of meanings, heseheterogeneousworlds re not autonomous butappear "as compoundworlds hatbring together, n a virtually nextricablemixture, elements of verydiverseorigins."9 he multilayered omplexity fa culturecomposed.of suchheteroge-neous compounds undermines the assumptionof distinct cultural "objects"demanding differentmethodsof analysis.Both interpretivend reconstructivetechniques re needed for nonreductivenvestigationfthehistoryfmeaningsat all levels.Anonymously tructured odes enter ntothe mostindividualized,

self-conscious,nd linguisticallyefinedartifacts f "high" culture, ust as thereligiousbeliefsof a commonmiller hould not be reduced to a simple nstanceor determination f a reified, popular"mentalite.10

Second, deconstructingheoppositionofelite and popular entails a reconsid-eration of theoppositionsofcreation-receptionnd production-consumptionswell. Accordingto Chartier,receptionand consumptionshould be viewed ascreative, roductive ctions.The appropriation fimposedor distributedmean-ings,even in the mostauthoritarian nd closed homogeneous cultures, s notsimplya passive assimilationbut is characterizedby interpretive ctivity hatinvolves resistance and evasion as well as substractive, upplemental, andtransformativeevisions.Meanings are neversimplynscribed n theminds andbodiesofthose to whomthey redirected r on whomthey re "imposed"butarealwaysreinscribedn the act of reception." LaCapra develops thispoint into ageneraltheory, ften ormulatedntheterminologyfDerrida,aboutthereadingand interpretationftexts.Reading,viewing, rlistening re construed s critical,creative ctions nwhich hedynamic,multidimensionalspectsofthe productionofmeaning n theoriginal rtifact r text re constantlyuestioned, displaced as

repetitions n different ystems of meaning, supplemented, parodied, andreinscribednvariousotherways n a process that an neverattainthefinalityfdefinitive, ixed nterpretationut that nvolves continuousplay and prolifer-

8 LaCapra, istoryndCriticism,4-78.9Chartier,IntellectualistoryrSocioculturalistory,"4.10SeeLaCapra'sxtendedeviewfCarlo inzburg'she heesend heWormsnHistorynd riticism,

45-69.Chartier,IntellectualistoryrSocioculturalistory,"7-38.





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Intellectual istoryfterhe inguistic urn 885

ationof meanings.12While Chartier ees thedissolution f thedichotomy etweenproducer and consumeras a premise forerasingthe methodologicaldivisions

between ocioculturalnd intellectual istory,aCapra uses theconceptof creative

consumptionas a means of reinstating he "relative pecificity"f intellectualhistoryn both an intra- nd interdisciplinaryontext, s the formof historical

investigationhat s especially ttentiveothe sophisticatedrt of textualreading

and that takes as its privilegedobjectsthose "great"texts n which the active,

self-questioning,ritical, nd constructive spects of the process of meaning

productionare most clearlyevident. Intellectualhistorians re especiallycon-

cerned with those historical rtifactshatare "good for reading" or "good for

thinking,"whosemultilayered nd conflictingevelsofmeaningdemand critical

engagementand dialogue.'3The thirdmajorcategorical ppositionquestionedby Chartier nd LaCapra is

thatbetweenrepresentationnd reality.The conventionalproceduresof socio-

cultural history re perceivedas implying hatmeaningsare not produced as

actual,"material" ventswithin he denseinterrelationsfsystemsfsignsbutare

epiphenomenaland determinedbyan extralinguisticeality hroughrelations f

cause,reflection, epresentation,nalogy,or expression.The new,semiologically

orientedhistoryfmeanings,however, eginswith heassumption hatmeanings

do not simplymirroror representbut actuallyconstitute r create the realityexperiencedbyhumanbeings.The "experience"thatgenerates herevising nd

transforming rocedures of creativeconsumption s never "raw" but "always

already"constitutednmeaning.Two consequencesflow rom hispremise.First,

all forms of historicalevidence have not only a referential, documentary"

dimension nsofar s theyrefer o varioushistorical orms nd contents hat xist

as alreadyconstituted, given"meaningful xperiences,but theyalso exhibit a

"work-like" imension s actsofmeaning-productionn which hegivenforms nd

contents re set into new patternsof relationship n order to constitute newmeaningfulreality.This duality s present n parishregisters nd trial reports,

philosophicaltreatises nd musicalcompositions. n this case as well,however,

LaCapra goesbeyondChartiernclaiming hatdifferentinds ftexts mbody he

duality n different aysand thatthe relative pecificityf intellectualhistorys

tiedto ts nterestnunderstandinghose exts hat re eastdocumentarynd most

work-like. aCapra is concerned thatthe intricate nternaldynamicsbywhich

meaning s constitutedn greattextswillbe ignoredbyhistorians aught o "gut''

textsfor information bout an extratextual eality.Conventionalmethods ofparaphrase and synopsis, orexample, mply beliefthattexts re notevents n

thehistory flanguage in whichtheprocessofmeaning-constructionakesplace

butsimply ontainers f ideas or facts hatcan be extracted rom hem and then

12 LaCapra,Rethinkingntellectualistory,3-69.13 The allusions toClaudeUvi-Strauss'sommentn The avageMind hat ertainhingsanbe

"good to think"ust as othersmightbe good to eat.





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886 John . Toews

set into relationwithothersimilarlyminedideas or facts.14A second implication f thedeconstruction f the distinction etweenrepre-

sentation nd reality s the need to reconceptualize he issue of text nd context.

First, he context nwhich textual rtifact r systematic attern f significationis to be understoodmust tself e conceived as a compoundworldofconstitutedmeanings, s a textrequiring nterpretation. oth text nd context re complexrelations f"signifying ractices."'5The connections etweenthem mustthusbeconstrued s "intertextual."he contextnever"explains"thetext n thesenseofproviding heessenceofits appearance or thecause of its effect r thereality fits representation. aCapra expends a greatdeal ofenergy n theexposure andsystematicritique f tendencies oward he reductive ontextualnterpretationftextual vents.His critical eviews fCarl Schorske's in de ievcleienna rStephenToulmin and AllanJanik'sWittgenstein'sienna, orexample, continually eturnto the two primaryways n which ntellectual istorymayfallprey,even in thepractice of its most distinguishedexemplars, to the sociocultural historian'sreading of texts s documentary epresentations f reality atherthan complextextualevents n a textualizedcontext.16 estrictive ocumentary eadingsthatparaphrase the complex workingsof a text n termsof essential contents areconnected to equally restrictive eadings of the context as a matrix for theproductionof thosecontents r as the source of the realitiesreflectedn them.

Reading LaCapra's critical ommentaries,ne beginstowonder f t spossibletoavoid thepitfalls fa referential r representational heory t allwithout easingto "do" historynd restrictingneselftothinkingbout it.Has thetheory fthelinguistic ensity nd complexity ftexts, ontexts, nd their pparently ircularrelationships utrunits possible utility s either a clarificationf, or guide for,historiographicalpractice?An instructive ommentaryon such questions isprovidedbytwo xceptionally alentedyounghistorical cholars,whohavewritteninterestingirst ooks devoted to historicalnalysis fthehighculture fdramaticwriting nd theatrical roduction n relationto other evelsof culturalmeaningand to shiftinghistoricalexperiences: Peter Jelavich'sMunich and TheatricalModernism:olitics, laywritingndPerformance,890-19141 andJean-ChristopheAgnew's WorldsApart:The Market nd the Theatre n Anglo-Americanhought,1550-1750.

Jelavich ends to eschew self-reflectiver programmatic heorizing nd can inmany ways be read within he framework f conventional ntellectualhistory,especiallyas practicedbyhis unconventionally rilliantmentor,Carl Schorske.The backboneofJelavich's tudy onsists fparaphrases and synoptic econstruc-

tionsofa numberoftexts na particular enre producedina particular ime ndplace. The homologies in content and formas well as the temporally ituatedpatterns fchange amongtheseartifactsf"high"culture re in turn nterpreted

14 LaCapra,Rethinkingntellectualistory,3-34;seealsoHans Kellner,Triangular nxieties: hePresent tate f European ntellectualistory,"nLaCapra nd Kaplan,ModernuropeanntellectualHistory,16-17.

15 LaCapra,Rethinkingntellectualistory,6-27.16 LaCapra,Rethinkingntellectualistory,4-117; LaCapra,HistoryndCriticism,1-86.





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and explained by placingthem na seriesofcontextual elationships. he "point"of theatricalmodernisms to be grasped through reconstruction f tshistoricalcontexts, oth contexts f meaningand contexts f experience.Modernism,he

suggests, was the productof a game played with diverseculturalpieces on apolitical,social, and commercialterrain that was constantly hifting."'7LikeSchorske,Jelavich ees the shiftsn the political errain, pecificallyhe externaldefeat and internalcollapse of liberal politics, s the ultimate ontextor as thecontextof last resortfor understanding hefate ofmodernist heater.His bookbeginswith description fthecrisis f Bavarian iberalismnthe atenineteenthcentury nd concludeswith description f its accelerating ollapse during andafterWorld War I.

Despite such indicationsof the persistenceof a traditionalhistoriographicalstandpoint,Jelavich'swork is clearly sensitiveto the kinds of concerns andperspectives oiced byLaCapra and Chartier.This awareness s evidentfirst f allin the choiceand definition f his"object"of nvestigation.Modernism s definedprimarily n termsof the emergence of a nonmimetic,nonrepresentationalconceptof anguageas a systemfsignswithinwhichworlds reconstructed atherthan reflected. This concept of language is seen as having critical anddeconstructiveswellas utopian and constructiveotentialitieso reformulatehefunction f art in society.This concept made possiblea criticaldismantling f

inherited ultural anguagesas "ideological"constructionsnd ustified he beliefthat the aesthetic reationof newpatterns f meaning,especially n thetheater,could also produce new worlds, onstruct ew modesof ndividual xistence, ndforgenew kinds of communities.

Second,Jelavich's wn reconstructionf thecultureof theatricalmodernismand its various culturalcontexts tends to treat these patternsof meaning asheterogeneousand compound worlds.The languages of theatricalmodernismexpropriate nd transformignifyinglementsfrom ubterranean, ppositionaltraditionsn official cademic neoclassicalculture,dominant Catholic religious

culture, raditional olk ulture, nd commercializedmassculture.The modernistculture thatemergesas theseelementsare put intoexperimentalrelationshipscreatingnewpatterns f meaning and a new self-consciousnessbout theways nwhich meaning-constructionccurs is in turn situated by the historian inrelationshipswith other compound and heterogeneous cultural worlds thattogether omposewhat wemight allthe culturaluniverseoffindesievcleunich.

But Jelavich is not content to summarize or paraphrase the process ofrneaning-constructionn a numberof texts ituatedwithin, nd interactingwith,

multiplecultural contexts,nor would he, I think,be willing o define his ownhistorys simply nothermoment n the tgame" fdeconstructingnd construct-ing meanings.He wants o knowwhy particularmodernist ersionofthegamebegan at a certain ime,why tsruleschangedwhentheydid, why ertainplayersplayed it. Answersfor these questionsentail some concept of the relationshipbetweenexperienceand meaning.Jelavich ttempts o address thisproblemat a

17 Jelavich,Munich nd Threatrical odernism,o.





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888 John . Toews

numberof levels, n termsof the external mpactof politicaleventsand socialchanges and in termsof the internalpressures of social interests,politicalambitions, nd psychological eeds,but theconceptualizationnd practice fthis

dimensionof his contextual nalysis seclectic, omewhatvague,and occasionallyreductive. What is missing is a clear sense of the complexityof mediatedconnections between experience and meaning that would parallel the newsophisticationf theanalysis fmeaning-constructionnd recognizetherelativeautonomy f thecultural phere. n thecaseof themodernistvant-garde,twouldseemespecially mportant oreconstruct heexperiential ontext fitsplayers nthe Bohemian worldsof disinherited ntellectuals nd the commercialculturalrelations hattransformedheir reated meanings ntomarketable ommodities.What kind of experience did aesthetic modernism make meaningful?This isobviously hecritical uestionforhistorians. elavichknowsthisbut is unable toformulate t in a clear fashion nd thusaddress iteffectively.

Agnew's WorldsApartprovides an interesting omplementand parallel toJelavich's tudy. Ranging over two centuriesof the history f meaning in theAnglo-Americanworld withsignificant oraysbeyond these temporal and lin-guistic oundaries, ll within heconfines f200 pages,Agnew's nvestigationacksthemonographic pecificitynd empirical ensity fJelavich's ook.Althoughheis intellectuallyubtle and often maginatively riginal n hisreinterpretationsf

familiar henomena, Agnewcan also be irritatinglyllusive nd has a tendency oengage in theorizingdigressions.His general themeconcernsthe relationshipbetweenthehuman experienceof the economicrealities f market xchangeandcommodityproductionon the one hand and the symbolic rtificialworld oftheatricalforms and performanceson the other. Agnew claims that, n pre-modern cultures like medieval England, the market and the theater weresegregated s "worlds part,"through laboraterulesand rituals, rom hestableidentitiesnd meaningsofordinary ocial ife.Bothwereplaces in which iminalexperiencesof fluidexchange,threshold rossing, nd transitionwere confinedand controlled.During the sixteenth entury,however,the marketgraduallyceased to be a place and became a "placeless process"pervading general socialrelationsntheculture hathad previously onfined t.This new pattern fsocialexperiencehad itscritical nd threatening spects: the dissolution'of raditionalnotions of self-identityn theexperienceof a protean,estateless,masterless elfalwayson the threshold fbecoming omething r someoneelse in theprocessofexchange, hebreakdown ftransparent eciprocity etween ocialactors hroughthe calculatedmisrepresentationf private ntentionsn the constantly enego-

tiatedrelations fsocial ife, nd the eveling ftraditionallyonstituted ocialandculturalhierarchies hrough hecommutation f all specific bligations nd valuesinto the liquid equivalenciesof commodity xchange.

Agnewcontendsthat EnglishRenaissance theater, n its forms s much as ormore than in thespecificmessagesof its contents,modeled, "materialized," ndexploredtheambivalences fthesenewmarket elationships, ivingnewmeaningto theancientfigure ftheatrum undi: Separated ikethemarket romtsoriginalritualand hierarchical egis, the Elizabethanand Jacobean theaterfurnished





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laboratory f representational ossibilities or society erplexed by the culturalconsequences of its own liquidity."'8The complex analyses and interpretationswithwhich Agnew pursues this themethroughthe seventeenth nd eighteenth

centuries annot easilybe summarized, ut theguidingthreadof hisargument sthat heculturalhistory f the theater smarkedby persistent ttempts o repress,deny, domesticate, nd control the protean implications f marketrelations srepresented on the stage. His analysis culminates in an interpretation feighteenth-centuryocial philosophy s a form of this domestication,n whichelementsof the theatricalmetaphorwere absorbed into social analysisfor thepurposes of segregating he market s an objective, conomicprocessfromthesphereofmoraland aesthetic alues,thuscontrollinghethreatening xperiences

of a generalized market culture."In manyways,Agnew's study an be read as an exciting xampleofthe practiceof the new, semiologically rientedhistory f meanings. Throughout his argu-ment,Agnew generally ollows deconstructivemodel ofreadingtexts s complexconstructionsf signs attempting o impose a fixed tructure fmeaningon thefluidityf marketexperiences,constantly ndermined n theirattempts y thesubversive power of marketculture itself. He also eschews the conventionaldistinctions etween sociocultural nd intellectualhistory nd applies the sameinterpretivemethods to documentsof popular culture as to the sophisticated

artifactsfhighculture.Agnew sclearlymoresubtle nd convincinghanjelavichin his effortso interpret he symbolicworld of cultural rtifactss struggles omake experiencemeaningful, uthe is less aware thanJelavich f theheteroge-neity and peculiarly compound nature of particular meaning-constructions.Agnew reads all of his texts,whether ermons,political reatises, r dramas,asaddressed to the same experiential ilemmas,with ittle oncern forthe varietiesof nherited atterns f meanings r the varieties f experience hat onstitute hecontexts fthese texts.Agnew simply ssumes that heprimary eality nderlyingsocial experience in modern society s the progressive ransformation f socialrelations hrough ommodity roduction nd exchange, producing a pervasive,problematic relationship between fluid and stable models of meaning-construction.'9 n theparlanceofthenewintellectual istory,ne could saythatAgnew is not attentiveenough to the specificitynd pluralityof historical"discourses," heheterogeneityfthequestions hese discourses ddress,and thevariety f theworldsofmeaningful xperiencethat are produced, reproduced,and transformedwithin hem.

ASIDE FROM THE REFORMULATION OF THE TEXT-CONTEXT PROBLEM, themost bviousconsequence of the linguistic urnin intellectualhistoryhas been a focus on"discourse" as an organizing ermforconceptualizing nd practicing hehistoryofmeaning. n a concluding omment n theessays nModern uropeanntellectualHistory: eappraisalsnd NewPerspectives,ditedby LaCapra and StevenKaplan,

18 Agnew,Worlds part, 4.19 This position appears to be based on a rather implistic, documentary" in LaCapra's sense)

readingof Marx; compare Agnew,Worlds part, 2.





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Hayden Whitenotes that discourse"has become one of the most ommonly sedterms n the exicon of the newgeneration f intellectual istorians.0 However,theessayson which his omment s based revealat leasttwo ignificantlyifferent

conceptsofwhat a discourse s and what ts cceptanceas an organizingprinciplemight mply.MarkPoster,presentingnd advocating Foucauldian perspective,insists hatredefining he objectof intellectual istory s discourse(s)impliesaradical,revolutionary reak with herationalist,ubjectivist,volutionaryssump-tions of the Western cultural tradition nd thus* lso withthe practicesof theconventional ntellectual istoryhathave served s itspreserver nd mouthpiece.Discoursesare identified s archaeologically ecoverable, bjectively escribable"systemsfstatements" elated ccording orules and proceduresthatrigorously

determinewhatcan be said and how itcan be said. They are static tructuresnthe sense that hangescan onlyoccuras internal ransformations ithin he rulesthatdefine hem, nd as discontinuousnd incommensurablenthe ense that heyconstitute elf-defining orlds whose relationship o other worldscan onlybeconstrued n terms of exclusion,resistance, r domination. ndividual perfor-mances or actions within discourse are thusalways nstances r manifestationsof ts rdering egularities. t the ametime, iscourses reperceived s intimatelytied to institutions nd social practices, s forming tructures f dominationorsystemsfpower.Discoursesmight husbe described s impersonal, nonymous,

"objective" ystems frulesthat, na verypractical nd active ense,construct heworld of objectsand subjects, he world of "experience."

Foucault'sconceptofdiscourse evolved n thestudyofdisciplinaryanguagesclosely onnectedtothe socialpractices fmedicine,psychiatry,riminology,ndsexology, nd it has been most nfluentialn stimulating istorical cholarship ntheseareas. Poster dvocatesthatFoucault'sdiscourses houldbecome theproperobjectof ntellectual istoryna broadersense,organizing hestudy fallpatternsof meaning-construction.uch advocacyseems caught in insurmountable on-tradictions. oster dmits hat,ntheprocessoftranslatingoucault'spositionntoterms hatwouldallow t to function s an interlocutorncurrent ebatesamongintellectualhistorians,he "examined the discipline of archeology not as adiscourse,but as a set of ideas, as the projectof an author,as the workof asubject."21 To engage seriouslyn a discoursewithFoucault therrdoreeems toassumea conceptofdiscourse thatunderminesPoster'sown, thatrecognizes henoveltynd autonomy f ndividualdiscursive erformances nd the possibility fdiscursive ransformationhrough ntersubjectiveommunication.

Although Keith Baker's contribution o the volume edited by Kaplan and

LaCapra pays ip service othetheories fFoucault, heconceptofdiscourseBakerdevelops for the investigation f competing ethical and political ideologiesarticulated in the general space of "public" culture diverges sharply fromFoucault's model. AlthoughBaker does see discourses as separately onstituted

20 HaydenWhite,Method nd IdeologynIntellectualistory: he Caseof HenryAdams," nLaCapra and Kaplan, Modern uropean ntellectual istory, 80.

21 MarkPoster, The FutureAccording o Foucault:The Archaeologyf Knowledge ndIntellectualHistory,"n LaCapra and Kaplan, Modern uropean ntellectual istory, 52.





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domains of meaning and social action in which the public world, its politicalhierarchies, egal structures,ocialcategories, nd relevant ctors re constructedaccordingto varying nternal logics" or sets of rules, organizingconcepts, nd

metaphors, hese discourses are not "insulated from nother n any strictway."They are dynamic ather han tatic nd undergo constant hange and elaborationthrough he activity f the ndividual gentswho performwithin hem.They areopen to the mpact f new experiences nd are capable of responding o the ctionsoccurringin other discourses.22This concept of heterogeneous, compound,interacting, pen discourses n a constant tate of dynamicchange both withinthemselves nd in their relationsto each otherbecause of the transformativeactivities f individual agentswho articulate hem seems to owe much less toFoucault than to the theory fdiscoursedeveloped over the past twenty-fiveearsinthe historiographyf earlymodernAnglo-American olitical heory, speciallyby Quentin Skinner,JohnDunn, andJ. G. A. Pocock,a theory hathas recentlybeen articulatedn tsmostdevelopedform nPocock'sVirtue, ommercendHistory.

As Pocock's ntroductoryssay, The Stateof theArt,"makesobvious, hetheoryof thehistory fpoliticaldiscourse has become increasingly omplexand flexibleas itspracticehas evolved and the numberof itspractitionersnow virtuallydiscursive ommunity hemselves)has expanded over theyears.As theobjectofhistorical nquiry,discourse is differentiatednto a relationshipbetween three

factors r dimensions.First, here s the "structural" imension developed in anextreme, ne-sided fashionbyFoucault)ofrelativelytableconventions, sages,idioms,rhetorics, r vocabularies hatPococknow refers o as "languages." Thisdesignation s a bitconfusing ince"languages"do notoverlapwith heordinarymeaningof vernacular anguages but are really sublanguages: conceptual andmetaphorical rameworks hat anbe translated rom ne vernacular o another.)Languages embody the rules that definea communicativeworld, determiningwhat counts as reality nd limiting he possible waysin whichrealitiescan beconnected.Many such languages may and usuallydo coexist the "republican"languageofcivicvirtue, heclassical iberalurisprudential anguageofrightsndcontracts,heutilitarianiberal anguageofinterest nd strategic djustments)nthe public space of political truggle nd discussionat any particularhistoricalmoment, nd any giventextmayparticipatena numberof anguagesand relatethem to each other implicitly r explicitlyn a varietyof ways, occasionallydeveloping "meta-languages" r secondary anguagesin order to do so. The firsttaskofthe historian fdiscourse s toidentifynd reconstruct uchlanguages,todemonstrate heir paradigmatic" orceor organizingpower nvarious texts nd

to construct heir mplicit ormsnto n explicit idealtype" rhypotheticalmodelthat an thenbecome an instrumentor dentifying particular anguageinothertexts nd contexts.

The second dimension in discourse is comprised of the specific inguisticperformances r "speech-acts" hat re not ust events n languagebut actionsonlanguage, expropriating he nherited, lreadyconstituted rameworkn order to

22 Baker, "Ideological Origins,"200-03.





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modifyor transformt. Such acts are acts of communicationdemanding andeliciting esponsesor "countermoves,"whichare themselves reative xpropria-tions and transformationsf language. It is thisprocessof constant nteraction

between peechand language,action nd structure,hat onstitutes "discourse."The conditions hatmake a discoursepossible re a pluralityf anguagesand theexistenceof speakerswho have access to these languages and are thus able toengage in creative inguistic erformances.Any singletextmay perform ctionsin many anguages at once, relate differentanguages to each other n a singleaction,or even move toward the creation of new linguistic ormsthroughthecreativeplayof the inventory f meaningsat itsdisposal.

Third, Pocock claims thatthe historicityf language in discourse cannot be

understood withoutsome concept of the relationshipbetween language and"experience."The past, as the inherited nventory f constitutedpatterns ofmeaning,weighs n the present fthe inguisticctor,precluding nydirect ausaldeterminationf speech by experience orreflectionfexperience n speech. Yetthe innovations and transformationshat individual speech acts performoninherited anguages must ultimately e situated n a history f experience andrelated o t na "diachronous, mbivalentnd problematic"manner.23n Pocock'shistoriographical ractice, conomic processes nd political ventsplayan impor-tantrolebut argely s experiencesthatdemand responserather han determine

whatthat responsewillbe.Knowledge of the experience to which discourse responds and which it

transformsnto meaningful experience is itselfonly accessible through themediationof texts:experience s not simplygivenbutalreadyworked over andmediatedby anguage and thus s muchan objectof nterpretations the texts nthehistoryfdiscourse.Pocock's mplicit utquiteobviouspolemical ntention orecover he republicandiscourseof civichumanism husalso entails revision fpreviousconceptions f thehistoryfexperience ntheeighteenth entury. hecentral significancePocock attributes o the creation of the institutions ndpracticesof public credit n the commercialrevolution t thebeginningof thatcenturyustifies nd reinforces hecontinuing elevance and importanceof thelanguage of civicvirtue.His attempts o displacethe ndividualistic aturalrightsand utilitarian heories of Locke and Bentham to the peripheryof politicaldiscourse s tiedto hisattempt odisplacethe kinds of experiencestheir heoriesmademeaningful,heexperiences fcommodity xchangeand production, o theperiphery f thehistory f experienceas well.

Experience also entersinto Pocock's history f discourse at another,more

general, evel. He admits hat he existence f discourse tself s a historical bjectpresupposesa specific indofexperientialbase,"that s,theexistence frelativelyautonomous agents, sharingand able to use a varietyof linguisticresourcesavailable in the public domain, and thus capable of issuing utterances andresponses hat renon-determined ndmutuallyntelligible. iscourse mplies hecommunicativeontext fan intersubjectiveommunityffree ndividuals.And

23 Pocock, Virtue, ommercendHistory,9.





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Intellectualistoryfter he inguistic urn 893

if themeaning-constructionsf historians re to be seen as takingthe formoflinguistic erformancesn a discourse, s Pocock seemsto assume theydo, theypresupposean intersubjectiveommunityf scholars.Pocock'stheories ften eem

liketheoretical eflectionsf familiar racticesbecause the worldthey ssume isalso the world in whichmanycontemporaryAnglo-Americanhistorians ive orthink hey ive.

The problemraised by Pocock's work in relation to the general pursuitsofintellectual istorians oncernsthe extent o which tsassumptions nd methodsare applicable to different inds of inquiry ituated n differentommunicativecontexts.David Hollinger addressesthisquestion, t least mplicitly,n a numberof essays.Hollingerclaims thatthehistory f discourse s in factnot so much aprogramfor ntellectual istorianso follow s a description fwhatmanyof themwere practicing ong before the linguistic urn broughta new rigorof concep-tualization to their pursuits.24 ut the diversity f these pursuits mplies that"discourse"as an objectof studymightbe extendedbeyondPocock's somewhatrestrictedmodel of politicaldiscoursewithin communityfrelativelyqual andautonomous actors haring common nventoryf anguages.How broadly ouldone define the concept of a communicative ontext? Could one constructdiscourseon thebasisofthemoregeneralnotionofcommonquestions ddressedby linguisticperformers n different ulturesand different imes?Discourse

appearsto assumea communityf discursive ctors.How far ouldtheboundariesofsucha community e extended?Two recent ross-culturaltudies fthehistoryofspecific iscourses mong modernEuropean intellectualsmay provide nsightinto thepracticalrelevanceof suchquestions.

IT MAY BE MISLEADING TO CONSTRUE AllanMegill'sProphets fExtremity:ietzsche,Heidegger,oucault, errida s an exemplarof ntellectual istorys thehistory fdiscourse. Megill rarelyuses the term "discourse"to designatethe objectof his

analysis nd tends towardthe more conventional erminologyf "perspectives."He affirms is protagonists' ejection f theassumptionof evolutionary, ontin-uous history,r "historicism,"nd claims to be "committed" o "thestructuralistand poststructuralistotionof discontinuityn history."25 is interpretationsfthe textsof Nietzsche,Heidegger, Foucault,and Derrida are not conceived as

reconstructionsfutterances nd responses, r moves and countermoveswithina continuingargumentor conversation, ut as independentredescriptions fdifferent erspectives hatcan be read and understoodin isolationfrom oneanother.The "strangeaffinities"nd "tellingdifferences" hatMegill discernswithin hesetexts re notpresented s differentiationsf a commonvocabularyor language. He does not engage in the reconstruction f the enabling andrestrictiveules ofa linguistic ode forpurposesofcontextual nterpretation.n

fact,Megill generally lights nd oftenconsciously ismisses ontextual nalysis,hisaimbeingnot toexplaincertainperspectivess historicalctionswithinpecific

24 Hollinger, n theAmericanrovince, 31-34.25 Megill,ProphetsfExtremity,05.





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frameworks f both discourse and experience but simplyto "display" theseperspectives, laybare" their ssumptions, pointout" their ffinities ithother"more familiar hought," ccountfor heir hetorical orce, nd "tocriticizenthe

conventional ense."26Despitesuchdisclaimers,Megill's tudydoes conform othemodel ofa history

ofdiscourse n a numberofways.He admits hat hetemporal rganization fhisreconstructions onformsto a historicistmodel in whichNietzsche is seen aspositing perspective hat s adopted inmore unequivocalfashionby Heidegger,critically eveloped by Foucault, and finallydeconstructedby Derrida. In anumberofpassages,thisdevelopmentseven described s a four-stagedialectic."Asan identifiable evelopingperspective,moreover, hethought fthe"prophets

of extremity" merges froma shared "problematic"and manifests ommonpatternsthatcould be construedas constituting omething ike Pocock's "lan-guage." The problematics thebelief nthe existence f a crisis nWestern ulturecharacterizedbythe collapse of meaningful xperience, bythe perceptionthatnaturaland sociohistorical xistence s, or has become, "derelict" r meaningless,and the conviction hat ll attempts oclaim otherwise re illusory, elf-deceivingmystifications.he response to this risis akes the form f the developmentof a"language"of"aestheticism," hoseelements re expropriated rom heir riginal

contextsnRomantic nd Idealistthought nd recombinedna theory fmeaningwhich laims that rt,discourse, anguage,and mythmake and remake the worldthey laim to expressor represent.

Megilldoes attempt ointerpretheevolving xtremismfthe conceptof crisisand itsaestheticistorollarywithin contextualframework. his frameworksdefinedfirstfall as "crisis-oriented odernism nd post-modernism."27he fourfiguresof the studyare seen as setting he agenda as well as articulating heassumptions nd workingout the possibilities f a styleof thinking r formofdiscourseMegill believesdefines wholeepoch ofWesternhistory, rom he atenineteenth entury o the present.He claims hat his tyle f thought s intimatelyconnectedtoassumptions boutmeaning nd meaningful xperiencethat xtendfarbeyondthe confines f small groups of avant-garde ntellectuals nd artists.The language of the aestheticists as become "common coin,"articulating asituationthat faces a collective us" and presenting his "us" withoptions forresponse. It is thisculturalcontextof the individual prophets of extremity hatgives historicalpoint to theirclaims and motivates he need to engage theirdiscourses.Thus Megillcan interpret errida's deconstructionf the assumptions

of crisis nd theautonomy f anguageas opening "the possibilityfa beginning:one thatwould liberateus from he historicismnd aestheticism hat, n one wayoranother,have dominatedwestern hought incethebeginning f the nineteenthcentury."28

26 Megill, rophetsf xtremity,86.27 Megill, rophetsf xtremity,i.28 Megill, rophetsf xtremity,37.





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Megill makes an effort o mediate between the apparently contradictoryconcepts f his aimsand proceduresby nsistinghat hediscursive egularitiesndthecontexts e posits re hisown "fabrications,"reative onstructionsather han

historical econstructions.29he point of theseconstructionss to demystifyheclaims ofaestheticismo thatwe can perceivethe prophets s speakingto and atus ratherthan for us. The fabrications f historical econstructionre not to beperceived s purely rbitrary; hey rise from critical ngagementwith he textsthemselves,hey re acts of critical istancing hroughwhich he texts re allowedtospeak as the voicesof"others" o whichweare askedto respond.The languageofthe prophets s an "edifying iscourse" hat onstructs ew possibilitiesf ivingin the world, temporarily iftingus out of the given world of the everyday,expandingour horizons.But these discoursesremain placesto visit, ot places tolive. Megill rfnistsverand over again that heclaimby aestheticistshat he worldis a constructionf anguage simply annot cometo termswith ur experienceoftheworldas determinednot only by meaningsbut bynaturaland social needs.There is an intransigent, iven quality n experience, "reality" ncountered nthe ordinaryworldthat s obscured and ignored in the aesthetic heoryof theautonomy nd creativepowerofmeaning.One would have to be a "madman" ora "fool"to take the claims of theprophets iterally.30

This criticismfaestheticistiscoursefrom he standpoint fexperience nthe

"real" worldpointsto the majorproblem n Megill'swork.Althoughexperienceis a centralcategoryfordefininghis own critical tandpointvis-'a-visestheticistdiscourse, xperiencedoes not enter nto his historical nalysis f thatdiscourse.Even the notionof crisis s interpreteds a fabrication r constructionustifyinga certainmode of discourse; t s not related nany waytoa history fexperienceto whichdiscoursemust respond.Megillmakesno attempt o situate hehistoryof the aestheticist erspectivewithin hehistory f experience,even though- einsists hatthe aestheticist erspectivemplies denialof experience.Experienceentershisaccountonlyfrom heoutside, n a completely nhistoricized ashion.The consequencesof this nabilityo conceptualizethe role ofexperiencewithinthe historyof meaning is evident in his interpretations f the texts of theaestheticistss well. The aestheticisterspective, e concedes,has been extractedfrom extsnwhich t s often na problematic elation o otherforms fdiscourse.He has chosen to ignoretheseother anguages to "display"the structure f theaestheticist erspective.But it is precisely hose otherlanguages in Nietzsche,Heidegger, and Foucault that address the issue of the relationshipbetweenlanguage and experienceor languageand "reality." hus Megillhas dismissed r

erased experiencefrom oth hisanalysis f texts nd hisanalysis f their ontexts.The result s an ahistorical history" f meaningset in radical oppositionto adehistoricized xperience.

UnlikeProphets fExtremity,artinJay'sMarxism ndTotality:heAdventuresfa Conceptrom ukacstoHabermaswas self-consciouslyonceivedas a history f a

29 Megill,Prophets fExtremity,77.30 Megill,Prophets fExtremity,02, 343.





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discourse, the "Western Marxistdiscourseof totality," ven thoughitdoes notconsciously ollow he modelsofeitherFoucaultor Pocock.Jay'suse ofdiscourseas an organizing oncept scomplexand multilayered,s he is concernedwith he

ways n which one discourse totality) unctionedwithin nother Marxism),butis sometimes onfusing, ince the boundariesof both discourses re exceptionallyvague and porous. The discourseof totalityan be traced back as faras classicalGreece and is virtually ynonymouswith discussion of the metaphysicalortheological oundations fWestern ulture, utJay oesnot ttempto reconstructit na systematicr continuousfashion. nstead,he focuses n a numberoftextualeventswithin he discourseoftotalityhatWesternMarxistshad alreadyselectedas relevantto theirown projector that had exerted an obviousimpacton theirintellectual ormations.His aim is to showthat,by thetimeof theemergenceofWesternMarxism fterWorld War1,theconceptoftotality asalready mbeddedin a complex, nwardly ifferentiatediscourse,providing arious possibilitiesorcreative ppropriation.What wemight all the"compoundheterogeneity"f thediscourseof totalitys described n termsof three pairsof contrasting oncepts:"latitudinal/longitudinal"more commonly esignated nthe current iterature ssynchronic/diachronic but most simply stated as spatial/temporal),"descriptive/normative,"nd "expressive/decentered"replacingthemore tradi-tionalsubjective/objective).

The central role thatthe discourseof totality layswithinWestern Marxismdistinguishest frompreviousand competingMarxisms,Jaycontends,and therecognition fthis entralityllows the ntellectual erritoryfWesternMarxismto be charted n newways. First, t permitsJayto connect some of the familiarcharacteristicsf ndividual hinkersonventionallylassified s WesternMarxists:their sociocultural tatus as marginal ntellectuals ducated in elitist cademictraditions,solated from mass audience yet ommitted orevolutionary hange,their interest n methodologicaland philosophical issues and in the culturaldimensionofhistorical nalysis, heirhermetic tyle fwriting, heiropenness tonon-Marxist ntellectual raditions oncerned withthe issue of totality, nd thustheirtendency o proliferate djectivalor hyphenated Marxisms.Second, Jay'smethodallowshim to include within he ntellectual errain fWesternMarxismindividualspreviously xcluded because of theirhostility o one particularformoftotalitysubjectivistrneo-Hegelian) or because of theirnegative ssessment fthepossibilityr desirability f any form f historical otalization. f the traditionis conceivedofas a discourseemergingfrom shared focus on a problem ratherthanas a grouping of textswith imilar olutions, positivist"Marxists ike Louis

Althusser rGiovannidellaVolpe ornegativeMarxists ike Theodor Adorno canalso be included na meaningfulway.Finally,Jay'socus nthediscourse f totalityas an organizingframeworkmakes possiblea reconstruction f the history fWestern Marxism as a meaningful emporalnarrative.

Jay'snarrative eginswiththeparadigmatic rticulation f a Marxismrecon-ceived around the discourse of totalityn Georg Lukaics's History nd ClassConsciousness.ukaics'sposition s conceived as paradigmaticnot only because itpresented a compelling synthesis f Marxist and totalistdiscourse that later





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thinkers ould assimilatebutbecause this ynthesisontainedcritical nresolvedproblems-concerningthestatusofhumanity's elationship onaturewithin hesociohistorical rocessand the identity r even existenceof a collectivehuman

subject through which totality n a normativesense was to be historicallyconstituted-fromwhich significant iscourse could proceed. It "launched aproblematic."31he narrative nfolds s a historyfargumentation nwhichtheoriginatingparadigm is criticallyssimilated,reproduced,questioned,revised,elaborated,and increasingly deconstructed" o the point where discourse oftotalitytself s placed in question.The story oncludes,however,not withthecollapse of theproject ofWesternMarxismbutwithJay's ympathetic ortrayalof Habermas's "Prometheaneffort o reconstructMarxistholismon boldlynewgrounds"32 nd a discussionofhow thiseffortmightbe sustained n theface of

thepoststrucftiralisthallenge to all forms f discourseof totality.Jay's tory, ikeMegill's, s clearly tructured y tsconclusion.Habermas and

Derrida serveas guides to the histories hat ead up to them,but Habermas'sguidance isratherdifferenthanDerrida's.First, ay s muchmoresensitive hanMegill to the complex, conflicting elationsbetween different languages" orparadigms n any particular extualperformance nd to theways n whichthehistory fdiscourseproceeds notas a seriesofedifying ictionsreating heir wnrealitiesbut as an intersubjectiveialogue in which a common, shared realitystentativelyreatedthrough greement nd consensus.

Second,unlike

Megill,Jayplacestherelationship etween hehistoryfexperience and historyfmeaningnear the center of the historian'sconcerns. This focus is evident from hisattentivenessotexts hat ddress this ssue aswell s intheconstructionfhis owntext. n someways,Jay'swork s also characterized ya turn wayfrom hesocialhistory fideas, or at leastbyhesitancyoncerning hepossibilityfcarrying utitsprogram.Jay, ikeMegill,rejects he claim thatdiscoursecould be reduced toideology, otherepresentation fsocial,political, nd individual xperience, r tothe direct expression of needs, desires, or subjective intentions.Linguistic

paradigmsand discursive problematics" re seen as possessinga reality nd ahistory f theirown, as informing r shaping experience as much as beinginformed r shaped by it. YetJay does insist hatunderstanding hange in thehistory fmeaningrequires a contextual nalysis hat s more thanintertextual,thatconnectsmeaningsto experience,thatdoes not lose sightof the factthat"living ndividuals" nd notonlytexts re participantsnthehistoryfdiscourse.Such contextual nalysis s presentthroughoutMarxismnd Totality,ut itis notits entral ocus nd issomewhat cattershotncharacter. he failure rreluctancetoaddress therelationship etween xperienceand meaningmoresystematicallyis especially trikingn a worksympatheticor at least nothostile)to the variousMarxist nd Freudian-Marxist ositionsof itshistorical rotagonists.Marx andFreud (standing in here for more general sociohistorical nd psychologicalinterpretationsfmeaning) eem ncreasinglyohave becomenot somuchguides

31 Jay,Marxismnd Totality,27.32Jay, MarxismndTotality,61.





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for nvestigating ow life becomestext as theywereforan older generationof

intellectualhistorians)but complex textsto be deciphered with the help of

linguistic nd philosophicalguides.

WITHIN THE EXTENDED, LOOSELY ORGANIZED FAMILY of historiographical

subdisciplines,ntellectualhistory as gained occasional,grudgingrespectand,

morefrequently,otorietyor he ntensitynd promiscuityf ts nterdisciplinary

liaisons.This is especially ruefor those ntellectual istorianswho pursuewhat

H. StuartHughes describedalmostthirty ears go as theviaregiaofintellectual

history-reconstructionsf the meanings and interrelations f "great" texts,

which, partfrom heparticular ase of the history fhistoriography,endtobe

situated n the interpretiveraditions, isciplinary ocabularies, nd librariesof

otheracademic departments.33When intellectual istorians ecome particularly

promiscuous n their nterdisciplinaryelations, heymavbe open to chargesof

unprofessional ilettantism; hen theyforgeparticularlyntenserelationsnone

direction, heymay be accused of professionaldisloyalty, f not doing "real"

history. ensitive onewdevelopmentsn thedisciplines romwhichtheyborrow

their bjectsofresearch,ntellectual istoriansmayoftenfunction s advocatesof

theoretical erspectiveshat ppear alientotheirdisciplinaryolleagues.Because

of theiruncertainprofessional nd institutionaltatusand theirconcernwith

theoretical exts, ntellectual istorians ftentend to be more self-reflectivendinterestedn theoretical iscussion f thenature ndmethods f their nquiry han

mostotherhistorians; hey unctions "cuckoos nthehistorical est," n Leonard

Krieger'sapt phrase.34Such familiarmanifestationsf the dilemmasand opportunities f the intel-

lectualhistorian's rofessional ituation s a scholarwithout clearly efinedFach

are evident in the works under review.But the familiarhas taken on some

unfamiliarforms n the contextof the expansion of interest n the historical

constitutionfmeaningwithin he humanities nd socialsciences.The trendhas

been awayfrompsychologicalnd sociological heories hatprovidedmodelsforrelating xperienceto meaning n termsof representation,ause, or expression

and towardtheories hatrecognize anguage in all its density nd opacity s the

place where meaning is constituted nd thathave found theirfiore general

theoreticalrticulationn inguistics,hilosophy,nd literaryriticism. ut it s not

only the directionof intellectualhistory's nterdisciplinaryiaisons that has

changed. These relations lso appear to have takenon a new formthat s less

parasiticaland more reciprocal.The criticalquestion is not whethertheories,

models, or methodsdeveloped in one disciplinecan be effectivelypplied inanotherbut whether general shift n perspectivehas occurred regardingthe

production, eproduction,nd transmissionf culturalmeanings hatmpinges n

all of thedisciplines n the human studiesand providesthebasis for a genuine

33 H. StuartHughes,Consciousnessnd Society:heReorientationfEuropeanocialThought,890-1930(New York, 1958), 10.

34 Leonard Krieger, The Autonomy f ntellectualHistory,"Journalf he istoryf deas,34 (1973):499.





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interdisciplinaryialogue in which ntellectual istory illhavea distinctive oice.The shiftn the form f intellectual istory'snterdisciplinaryelations s evidentin threeareas: in the kinds of interdisciplinaryborrowing" xemplified n the

writings fLaCapra and Megill,Poster nd Jay, n thetype f "grand" theorymostinfluentialn the human studies,and in the internal ransformationsf neigh-boringdisciplines uch as philosophy nd literary riticism.

For almost decade, DominickLaCapra has been urging ntellectual istoriansto pay closer attention o developments n literary riticismnd philosophy norder to "acquire the conceptualmeans to come to termswithproblems n theirown field."35More specifically, e has persistently laimed that intellectualhistorians ould profit rom hestudy f Derrida in order to earn the art of closeand critical textual reading. From the Derridean perspective,historicaltexts

appear as scenles f struggle etweenopposing tendencies nd ultimately s actsoflinguistic omination nwhichone tendency shierarchically rivileged s thesourceofunity nd order. LaCapra believes thatthisperspectivehas significantimplications orthe practiceof intellectual istory. irst, treanimates he classictexts s vibrant nnercontests r dialogues that are only artificiallyr politicallyresolved.Second, it places the intellectual istorian n thepositionof a culturalcriticwhose interpretive eadings nvolve n immanent ritiqueof suchartificialand political esolutions s actsofdomination rself-deception. hird,thepractice

of deconstructive eading involves he reader in a dialogicrelationshipwith hetext.As an uncompleted ontest, he textbecomes a goad tothought, esistinghehistorian's wnattempts t "closure," ither hroughfull ppropriation r simpleprojection.Texts become presentas active"others,"not as objectsor mirrors.Fourth, n the dialogue with hehistorical ext, he nterpreterecomes awareofinterpretivectivitys a creative, ransformativeppropriation s wellas an act ofreceptionand recovery. ntellectualhistorybecomes an education in culturalself-awareness. inally, aCapra insists,s we have seen,a critical, econstructivereadingofhistorical exts eopens and "problematizes"herelationshipftext nd

context.The perspective n textualreadingthatLaCapra derives fromDerrida is not

simply transplantationf certain methods and models fromone disciplinetoanother. He findsin Derrida a general attitude toward the productionandreproduction f culturalmeanings, liberating, riticaltance hatdemystifiesndcontests he"conventional" rivilegingf"unity nd itsanalogues: order, purity,closure,undividedorigin, oherent tructure,and] determinatemeaning."36nthis ense, LaCapra's positionparallels hat fMegill,forwhomDerridafunctions

as the iberator rom he iteral laims faestheticism.n both ases,the ntellectualhistorian'sprofessional role is merged into the interdisciplinaryocation ofculturalcriticism, hose aim is to prevent ultural losureand keep theprocessofdialogue and criticismpen. But LaCapra perceives he ntellectual istorian'svocationofhistorical cholartobe a crucialelement nthe moregeneralvocation

35 LaCapra, Rethinkingntellectualistory,5.36 LaCapra, Rethinkingntellectualistory,8.





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900 John . Toews

as cultural ritic.Althoughphilosophers nd literaryriticsmay pay ip service othe need forcontextualhistorical nalysis, hey re untrained nd often nept nitspractice.Derrida mayhavecorrectlyproblematized"herelationship etween

text nd context, uthe has notprovidedguidelinesforthewaycontexts otherthan the general context f the Westernmetaphysical radition) an be read so asto illuminate heir ignificancentheproduction f "work-like" exts. ntellectualhistorians an providehistorical pecificityo theways nwhichdiscursive odesand social practices enter into the play of meaning-construction.ecause allmeaning s "context-bound"nd because this ncludes the meaningsthat criticsproduce in theirdeconstructive eadings,LaCapra clearly nvisions he intellec-tual historian's ole qua historian o be more thanancillarynthe nterdisciplinary

templeof culturalcriticism.37Although Jay and Poster acknowledge the general validityand historicalimportanceof the deconstructive ritiqueof previous attempts o constructunified determinatemeaningforexperience,the inspiration ach derivesfromHabermas and Foucault s tied moreclosely o theneed tocreate some newformofcultural onsensusand historical oherence nthe wake of the critical arnage.Jay finds in Habermas at least the possibility f rebuilding hope for anintersubjectivelyenerated, rational consensusthroughhistorical nalysisof itsexperiential conditions. Although Jaydoes not apply Habermas's theories as

models for his own historical nalysis,he does view them as opening up aperspective n ourpresent ondition hat ould revitalize hehistorian's raditionalinterestn forging bridgebetween memory nd hope. Poster,whoseFoucault,Marxism nd History:Mode ofProduction ersusMode of nformationignificantlymoderates his earlier extreme advocacyof Foucault's positions, ppears to bemovingtowarda similarstance. Foucault's theoryof discourse is described ascomplementaryoMarxism nthat tprovides comprehension fnewforms fsocial experience withinadvanced industrial ocieties n which "knowledge is

increasingly mplicated n modes of domination,"38 nd thus also as an aid formasteringthe future.Both Jay and Poster see the historian as an empiricalresearcher ensitiveothecomplexdialectic etweenmeaning nd experiencewhoplays n important ole nmodifying nd moderating he claimsofcontemporarytheoreticians.hus Poster laims hathistoricalnvestigationsf thediscursive ndexperiential ontexts fFoucault'sdisciplinary iscourseshave revealedtheneedto revise Foucault's claim that discourse constructs he objects and subjects tpurportsto represent.

A collection f introductoryssayson nine influentialontemporary hinkers,editedby Quentin Skinnerunder thepretentious nd somewhat nappropriatetitleof The Return f GrandTheoryntheHumanSciences, rovidesan interestingperspectiveon the kindsof interdisciplinaryelations evident n the works ofLaCapra, Megill,Jay, nd Poster. The volume includes useful and occasionally

37 LaCapra, Rethinkingntellectualistory, 7, 69, 344-46; LaCapra, Historynd Criticism,0, 42-43,106-07.

38 Poster,Foucault,MarxismndHistory,1.





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thought-provokingppraisals of the theoriesof Derrida, Foucault, Hans-GeorgGadamer, Habermas, John Rawls, Thomas Kuhn, Louis Althusser, ClaudeLevi-Strauss, nd Fernand Braudel. It would be difficulto fault he nclusionof

anyofthese figures mong an elitegroup of nfluential heoristsnthehumanitiesand social sciences ver the past twenty-fiveears, ut problems learly rise ntheattempt obring hemtogether s participantsnthe common project frestoring"grand theory" n cultural tudies.Skinner's ttempt o accomplish his ask nhisintroductoryssay s exceptionallymuddled and vague. Confusions riseprimarilyin two areas. First, kinnerdefinesgrand theory n an irritatinglyuzzymannerthat eems to nclude twodistinct ypes f theories: mbitious, ystematic,otalizingtheoriesofhuman nature and cultureon the one hand and theories hat mergedescriptive nd normative laims and thus dissolve the conventionaldistinctionbetween fact and value on the other. The firstdefinition eems singularlyinappropriate for many of the thinkers reated, speciallyfor the critics f alltotalizing heoretical laims uchas Foucault,Derrida, Gadamer, Kuhn, and evenHabermas. The second definition omes closer to designating commonelementof the individual theories but, at least in its iconoclasticforms,does not seemparticularly grand."The second area of confusion temsfromSkinner'sdevel-opmentalvision of grand theory's return."He posits an original positivistndempiricist tandpoint,grounded on a strict nalytical eparationof descriptive,

empirically alsifiable,nd thus"objective" heoryfromsubjective, thical, ndmetaphysical alue udgments,dominant mong Anglo-Americanocial scientistsduring the 1950s and undermined after 1960 "by successive waves ofhermeneuticists, tructuralists, ost-structuralists,ost-empiricists, econstruc-tionists nd other nvadinghordes."39Obscured in thismetaphor s the fact hattheoriginal ontext fthe nvading heorieswasdifferent rom hecontext f theinvadedtheorists.t is difficulto see whyGadameror Derrida should somehowbe seen as engaged in a granderformof theorizing han should Heidegger orSartre. More puzzling still is Skinner's suggestionthat the invasion of theContinental ritics f the positivist-empiricistonsensus cleared the ground fornew forms fsystematic,otalizing heory n Althusser, evi-Strauss, nd Braudel.This evolution s a "return" n an all-too-literalhronological ense.

Despite such confusions,TheReturn f Grand Theory oes provide suggestiveguidelinesforgraspingthe overall culturalpointof muchcontemporary heo-rizing, specially nthe workofDerrida, Gadamer, Foucault, nd Habermas,andespecially s itrelates othetheory nd practice f ntellectual istory. tthe mostobviouslevel,Skinner'sContinental nvadersand theirAnglo-American ympa-

thizershave constructed sweepingand apparentlydevastating ritiqueof thetraditional oundations f knowledgeclaims nboth the naturaland the humansciences. f wetake them eriously,we mustrecognize hatwe haveno access,evenpotentially,o an unmediated world ofobjective hings nd processesthatmightserve as the ground and limitof our claimsto knowledgeof natureor to any

3 Quentin Skinner, Introduction: he Return fGrandTheory," n hisTheReturnfGrandTheoryin theHuman Sciences, .





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902 John . Toews

transhistoricalr transcendentubjectivityhatmightgroundour interpretationofmeaning.Knowledge and meaningare not discoveries utconstructions. heworld and the subjectthatconfronts t are "alwaysalready" presentto us as

culturally onstructed. his perspectiveand one maycertainlyall it"grand"initssweepingreformulation f thewaywe live our selves and our worlds)has anumberof significantmplications. t is radicallyhistoricistn the sense that allknowledge nd meaning sperceived s time-boundnd culture-bound, ut t lsoundermines hetraditional istorians' uestforunity, ontinuity,nd purposebyrobbing hemofanystandpoint romwhich relationship etweenpast,present,and future ould be objectively econstructed. y conceiving f knowledgeas aform faction, screation, omination, rcommunicativengagement,moreover,thisperspectivemplicates ll forms fknowingnthesocial and political racticesofa specificociocultural ormation. inally,henewgrandtheory ends odissolvetheanalytical istinctionsetween, nd hierarchical rderingof, differentmodesof knowing nd thedisciplines onnected to them.

Within hegeneral situation rticulatedngrandtheory, ariousresponsesarepossible. One may, ike Gadamer, focus on the waysin whichshared culturalmeaningsembodiedindifferentraditionsan be revitalizedwithout allingntothemetaphysics fsubjectivedentification)hrough heexistentialncounterofdifferentulturalworlds rhorizons nd theproduction fa dialogicrelationship

Gadamerdescribes s the fusion nevercomplete)ofsuchhorizons.One may, ikeFoucault,emphasizethehegemonicaspects of all collective, rganizedworldsofmeaning and engage in a relentless, hough seeminglySisyphean,critiqueofdomination.One may, ikeHabermas,combine critique fhegemonicdiscoursesand their ustaining racticeswith utopianprojection fa possible phereoffreecommunicative nteraction nd democraticworld construction.Or finally, nemay, like Derrida, revel in what Nietzsche called thefrohlicheWissenschaftfdeconstructiveriticism,nveiling heproliferation fmeanings without nd inthe repetitive, onstantlydisplaced struggleto impose univocal meaning orculturalclosure. None of these responses can be theoretically r empiricallygrounded, ofcourse,without allingnto the llusions fa bankruptmetaphysics;they an onlybe justified n practice.

ALTHOUGH THINKERS LIKE Gadamer, Derrida, Foucault,and Habermas are notscholarsin specificdisciplines, heymightbe described in termsof a peculiarcombination f intellectual istorian nd cultural ritic.As scholars, hey ngage

inthehistoricalnalysis ftexts, iscourses, ndotherforms ftheproduction ndreproductionof meaning.As intellectuals, heirwork s aimed at the practicaltransformationf thepresent nd finds ts ustificationn thateffect. ne couldsay thatthey provide a self-reflectiveescription f the practice of intellectualhistoryas a way of life rather than a specialized academic discipline. Theambivalenceproducedbyrecognition fthegeneralculturalperspectivempliedinthe ntellectual istorian's outineworking ssumptions sone ofthepersistentthemes n theessaysofDavid Hollinger,recently ollected nd publishedunder





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the title n theAmerican rovince: tudies n theHistoryndHistoriographyf deas.Hollinger's field is American intellectualhistory, nd he largely ignores theContinental nvaders hatdominateSkinner's onception f grand theory, ut he

does address the issues raisedby the Skinnervolume,especially n his responsesto the writings f Thomas Kuhn and RichardRorty.He perceivesKuhn and Rortyas "historian'sphilosophers"who articulate nd defend "in a circle beyond thehistorical rofession basichistoricism ithwhichmosthistorians re generallyquite content."40 ut, whilehistoriansmay be quite content o assume a radicalhistoricist erspective n truth nd value in theirprofessionalwork, heymayfindthemselves ess contentwhen the historicist ejection fa transcendental roundis asserted s a general philosophy nd applied to their wn activitys truth ellersand reconstructors f meaning, as well as to theireverydaypracticeas culturalbeings in need of cosmicsupports for theirethicalcommitments.

In his essayon Kuhn, first ublishedovera decade ago, Hollinger seemed toshare Kuhn's assumptionthat "the invitation o forsake at last the fictionalabsolutes of natural theology"in favor of practically ffective, onsensuallyconstructed tandards nd traditions,he "transitionrom ranscendent bjectivitytosocially rounded objectivity,"id not mply ither orhistoriographyr for ifethat"terror nd caprice"would succeed rational nd empiricalgrounding n theproduction and reproductionof knowledgeand value. In fact,Kuhn's strong

affirmation f the value and effectivenessf the scientificnterprisepursuedunder the aegis of consensuallyconstructed ommunal standards seemed toprovide a model not so much for underminingobjective standards as forredescribing hem n ways hat ould protect s from nwarrantedkepticism. hehistoricizationfnatural cience mplied the principle hat communityanction"was "essential o knowledge" nd thuspointedtowardthe need fordisciplinarycommunities o set goals and standards n all fieldsof inquiry.41

In a discussion of Rorty's Philosophynd theMirrorof Nature, Hollinger

approaches the ssueofthe communal validation fknowledge nd value fromslightly ifferent ngle. He clearly sympathizeswithRorty'shistoricization fphilosophy,withhis critiqueof the "epistemological" rojectof ascertaining heconditions fobjectiveknowledge, nd withhisproposalthatphilosophers houldjoin thegeneralinterdisciplinaryrojectof historical ermeneutics,nterpretingvariousforms fknowledge s cultural onstructions,escribingheways nwhich

these various constructionsmighthang together, nd thusgathering hem nto"thegeneralconversation fmankind." If Rorty's eform f hisown discipline

wereto be actually arriedout," Hollingerclaims,the voice of

philosophywould

beginto sound rather ike the voice of intellectual istory."42ut Hollingeralsoexpressestwo reservations boutRorty's adicalhermeneutics. irst,Hollinger s

uneasy with the demotion of science to just another voice in the culturalconversation.Hollingerdoes not believe n the need topreserve omeplacewhere

40 Hollinger, n theAmericanrovince, 67.41 Hollinger, n theAmericanrovince, 24, 128-29.42 Hollinger, n theAmericanrovince, 69.





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904 John . Toews

universalstandards still apply, but he does believe that the kind of effectiveknowledgepromoted by the disciplinaryommunity f naturalscientistshouldnot be slighted.Althoughhe would rather ee intellectual istory efined s part

of an interdisciplinarycommons"-"an intellectualxpanse occupiedperiodicallybyscholarsoperating ut ofmanynetworksnd possessedofa variety f skills"-thanas a professional ubdiscipline r "estate," he occupantsof thiscommonscould stillform communityble togiveshape to inquiry n the basisofcertainshared commitments. e proposesthree such commitments hathe believes arealready implicitlyshared: first,the insistence that thinking is neither atranshistoricalssencenor an epiphenomenonreducible to something lse but areal historical ctivity ith vents nd structuresrganized ndiscoursesthat rerelated ncomplex ways o otherforms fsocial action; second,the claim that hehistoricalactivity f articulating rguments in discourses by those who areproducers and reproducersof meaning byvocationor profession-the intellec-tuals-is historically ignificant;nd third, heoperating assumptionthat socialaction akesplacewithinnabling nd limitinginguistictructureshat, t the evelofpublic discourse, mplicate ll inhabitants f an organized political ommunitybut are also connected in intimatewaysto the discoursesof intellectuals. uchcommitments, e claims,are sufficiento framethe activityf a community finquiry,delimitingproblems, directingresearch,and establishing riteria of

judgment. Only from a base in such a community f discourse and action canintellectualhistorians enter into the interdisciplinary nd ultimatelypublicdiscourseof culturalcriticismwith distinctive oice.43

Hollinger'sconcern for therelationship etween the discourse of intellectualsand thepublicdiscourse hat nformshe collective ctivityfpolitically rganizedcommunities s the basis for his second reservation bout Rorty'sstance-itspolitical mplications. he notion of generalculturalcritique s not an adequatebasis for public discourse. Because community, iscourse,and effective ocialaction are intimately elated, he question raisedby Hollinger s actuallywhetherconsensual communities ble toengage in publicdiscourse and direct ction canexistor whether onsensuson thevalidityfknowledge nd substanceofvalue isalways mposed,hegemonic, r repressive.Hollinger certainly grees withRortythat it is no longer historically ossible or desirable to establish onsensus byappealingtosomemetaphysical oundation; onsensusmust risefromwithin hecommunicative nteraction f discourse tself.Rorty,much like Derrida,suggeststhattheonly consensuspossible n a post-metaphysicalulture s agreement hatthecontest f interpretations,heplayofmeanings,mustnotbe closed, thatthe

conversation f humankind must be keptopen. Hollinger, however,notes thecriticalmportanceof at least some element of substantial onsensus ifeffectiveaction,whether nscholarly esearch r inpublicpolicy,s to be possible.Both turnto the tradition of American Pragmatismto ground their perspectives. ButHollinger smoreconcernedthanRorty bout theways nwhichPragmatistriticalstances toward the epistemologicalprojectof grounding truth nd value in a

43 Hollinger, n theAmericanrovince, 77-81.





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transcendentphere weretied topositive ttemptsocreate a "culture finquiry"modeled not on the metaphysics ut on the social organizationand effectivepractice of naturalscience,and in theways n which a professionally onfined

discoursemerged intoa more generaldiscourseamong intellectualsnd finallyaffected he form nd contentof publicdiscourse.44

The issues at stake n thedisagreements etweenHollingerand Rorty houldnot be construed simplyas differences n the professionalperspectivesof ahistorianand a philosopher. Philosophyn History, volume of essays bothexemplifying nd advocating the "historicization" f philosophy,edited bySkinner,Rorty, nd J, B. Schneewind,revealstheextent o which n expandinggroup ofAnglo-American hilosophershavebecome nvolved nsimilardebates.The striking hing about Philosophyn History s that, despite the inevitabledifferences n perspective ne should expect in a wide-ranging ook of sixteenarticlesby different ands,theneed for a historicizationfphilosophy nd thusfora moreintimate elationship etweenphilosophy nd other ocial or culturalstudies-and especially intellectualhistory-is assumed rather than debated.There is a consensus,at least among this selectgroup of philosophers, hat thediscipline fphilosophy s recently racticed n theAnglo-American ontexthasbeen muchtoo narrow n scope and outrageously retentious nd anachronisticin itsclaims. It has focused on obscure linguistic nd logical issues tied to the

epistemologicalproject of articulating he conditions of certain knowledge,definedthese ssues as the eternal uestionsofphilosophy,nd reconstructed hehistoryof philosophy as successiveattemptsto answer these questions. Thehistoricalperspective s put intooperationto reveal the historicallyontingentnatureofthisdefinitionfphilosophy nd philosophical roblems, oopen up thediscipline o a range ofnewquestions relating o the nterpretationfmeaning,ethics, nd politics) s wellas tomethodsfor pproaching nd writing boutsuchquestions.At issue is not simply he revision nd enrichment f the history fphilosophy hrough heexpansion of ts anon ofrelevant hinkersnd questions,but the reformulation f the nature of philosophyas a culturalactivity. heconventional nalytic istinctionetween hevalidity nd thehistorical enesisoftruth laims is rejected.This does notmean, however, hat all of the historicistrevisionistsrewilling o go as far s Rortyntransforminghilosophy nto modeofcultural ritique. n fact, hemajority fthecontributorseem, ikeHollinger,toassumethat hecollapseofbelief nthemetaphysical oundations fknowledgeand value,and thus oftheepistemologicalmodel fordoingphilosophy, eed notimplythe impossibilityf reconstructing nowledge and value on historicist

foundations.The case for themoderatehistoricistosition s presentedmostclearly n thelead articlebyCharlesTaylor,whichdirectlyhallenges Rorty's ssumption hatthecollapseoftheepistemologicalmodel ofphilosophy mplies cceptanceoftherelativitynd incommensurabilityf all constructionsf meaning.Againstsuch

44 Hollinger, n theAmerican rovince, -43. See also Richard Rorty,Consequencesf Pragmatism(Minneapolis,Minn., 1982), especiallyxiii-xlvii.





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"non-realism," aylor argues that hemeanings onstructed yphilosophersmustbe udged interms ftheirrelationshipothehistorical eality f socialpractices.The epistemologicalmodel,he contends,was an abstract, niversalizing,nd thus

self-justifyingescription fa form f social action mplicitlymbedded ina widerange of technological, thical,and political practices.Criticism f thismodeloriginated in the encounter with the practicesit justifiedand the growingrecognitionand self-assertionf alternativeforms of social practicethat theepistemologicalmodel could not assimilateor make intelligible. hilosophicalactivitys the historical riticism f culturalassumptionsbringsto articulationkinds of experience that have been repressed or ignored in the conventionalculture. t refutes he previousmodel by demonstratingts nability o provideexperiencewith ntelligibility.kepticism nd "undecidability"ould onlyarisefrom a critique of a cultural framework laiming exclusivityf the criticwerewithout communal ties, without a historically ituated life in specificsocialpractices. But criticism f the epistemologicalmodel is also a criticism f thepossibility f such a historically isengaged, culturally homeless"stance. Therecognition hatphilosophy s "inherently istorical" s also a "manifestation f amore general truth bout human lifeand society."Taylor thus argues that t ispossibleto attainrational onsensusor at least maintain rationaldiscourse boutthe relative alidity f alternative atterns f culturalmeaning.This possibilityn

turn is based on the intimateconnectionbetween meaning and experience,between discourse and communalpractices.45

TAYLOR'S CRITIQUE OF RORTY BRINGS US BACK to the major issues raisedby thelinguistic urn n intellectual istory. here can be no question thatthis urn hasenormously nrichedour historical nderstanding f thecomplex ways n whichmeaning is constituted, ransmitted, nd transformed n the heterogeneous,compound, interrelatedworldsofmeaningwe call culture.The tidesofpsycho-

logical nd sociological eductionism eem to have been dammed and turnedback.The history fmeaninghas successfullysserted the reality nd autonomyof itsobject.At the ame time,however, new form f reductionism as become evident,the reduction of experience to the meanings that shape it. Along with thispossibility, new form of intellectual hubris has emerged, the hubris ofwordmakerswho claim to be makers of reality.Modern European intellectualhistorians seem especially sensitiveto these trends and the pretensions andanxietiestheyencourage. If thebooks under review re any indication, urrentwork mong intellectual istorians f theyounger post-1968) generation eveals

a pressingneed to rethink herelationship etween xperience nd meaningwiththe same criticalntensitynd sophisticationhathas been devoted to exploringtheways n whichmeaning s constitutedn language. Such reconsiderationwillalso entailgreater ttentivenesso thecontinuitieshatjoin hework f theyoungergeneration, nboth methodsand problems, o theso-calledconventionalhistory

45 CharlesTaylor, "Philosophy nd ItsHistory,"n Rorty, hilosophynHistory,7-30. An essay byAlasdair Maclntyre n the same volume makes a similar rgument.





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of older generations.Renewed focus on the experientialcomponent in thedynamic,mutuallymplicatedpolarities fmeaningful xperience snotsimplymatter of

reclaiming a balance lost in recent oscillationsbetween opposingreductionisms.t isessential orourself-understanding,nd thus lso forfulfillingthe historian's ask of connectingmemory withhope, thatwe recognize andexamine therecent urn wayfrom xperience s a specific esponse toparticularevents and developments n the history f experience,a response, to be sure,burdened, limited, nd shaped by the alreadyconstituted,nheritedworld ofmeanings n which, nd fromwhich, twas constructed.

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