To what extent did the purges weaken Russia by 1941? (24 mark)Christopher Cooper

The Great Purges were archetypal of Stalin’s attitude towards Russia in the 1930s.To consolidate his position, he removed many people from positions of potential power, and rid himself of political opponents. It can be suggested that, however, whilst making Stalin more powerful, it actually weakened the USSR as a whole.

Stalin’s purges of the people were the purges with the greatest effects. 20 million died overall, with an additional 16 million or so in Prison Camps, or Gulags, and imprisoned or in exile abroad. This would have removed a great many people from the potential workforce (although it was not uncommon to see prisoners in Gulags working on projects such as the trans-Siberian Canal), and also limited the number of able bodied people available to volunteer in the Red Army. The smaller workforce would have crippled Russian economic output, and limited the USSR’s military capabilities in the event of war – which Stalin knew was inevitable.

However, the purges of the people could also have strengthened Russia – most people arrested and disposed of were kulaks or other opponents of Stalin’s regime. They would have posed opposition, and potentially weakened, the central government of the USSR, had they not been removed. Stalin would have argued that these “counter-revolutionary” “undesirables” were creating divisions and hindering progress, which relied on a strong central government.

But others may suggest that Stalin himself was hindering progress by removing some of the country’s most progressive scientists, scholars and historians. These “intelligentsia”, the regime argued, would have lead opposition to the Communist regime, However, removing these people from society does create the problem of stopping progress, as these scientists, engineers and scholars would have had the ideas to fuel the industrialisation programme.

The army was also purged, and, since the Soviets joined the Second World War in 1941, this was an important issue. Generals who had been heroes of the Civil War period were purged – including Red Army founder Marshal Tukhachevsky. This would have affected the public’s view of the Soviet government, as they would have seen these men as heroes of the revolution, and expected them to be treated as such. However, in ridding himself of people like Tukhachevsky, Stalin also removed a potentially powerful political opponent, and demonstrated that no-one was above his rule.

The purges of the army also eventually strengthened it – it grew by 4 million in this time. And, as WG Krivitsky said, it removed the “rotten gangrene” from the “healthy flesh” of the army – it removed those hangers on who stood in the way of progress and Stalin’s ambitions for the USSR, and those who were unnecessary, and made the army over-bureaucratic and inefficient. The strive for efficiency is clear from the breakdown of those purged – 4 out of 5 Marshals, 90% of generals, 35,000 people above the rank of corporal, and few others. People above the rank of corporal stood in the way of Stalin’s total control of the Red Army.

Another major group to be purged was the Communist Party of the USSR itself. With party numbers reduced to roughly two and a half million by 1933, the party also now worked more efficiently and,

most members of the party were now supporters of Stalin. This led to fewer divisions in the party and a united government, with a unified approach to running the country. However, the purges scared most of the party (with the notable exception of Dmitri Molotov) into becoming, effectively, a group of “yes men”, who simply agreed with Stalin come what may. This made Russia more vulnerable to poor decisions by Stalin.

The purges would have made Russia stronger through a more streamlined and efficient Red Army, a streamlined Communist Party, a more efficient and less bureaucratic decision making process (with Stalin in absolute control) and greater National Unity. However, the people were now scared, and would have resented the government. It also, in the long run, damaged relations with the Western nations that the USSR relied on during the war for supplies and military assistance. As well as this, the sudden removal of 20,000,000 workers from the workforce would have the potential to cripple the Soviet economy. In addition, the army was temporarily weaker, and there was a new lack of scientists, engineers and other “intelligentsia” to drive forward the Soviet economy, and make it competitive internationally.