to what extent did geographical factors....docx

To what extent did Geographical factors hinder Napoleon’s expansion and control of his empire during the 1812 Campaign in Russia? By Sophie Raymond

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To what extent did Geographical factors hinder Napoleon’s expansion and control of his empire during the 1812 Campaign in Russia?

“When the invasion was planned, Napoleon thought only of battling the Russian army; that he would

fight Russian weather, poor infrastructure, peasants, and his own hubris did not occur to the leader.”

(www.indiana.edu, 2012).

The expansion and control of Napoleon’s empire was stopped abruptly with the failure of the 1812

Campaign in Russia. The impacts were severe as he lost many hundreds of thousands of his soldiers

and his reputation was no longer that of a great leader. “He is no longer an idol, but has descended

to the rank of men, and as such he can be fought by men.” (Maria Feodorovna, 1896)

Prior to 1812

Napoleon had been successful in the artillery in his early life, having also been interested in

Mathematics and physical science, which should have made him more aware of what may have been

needed for the organisation of his troops for the Russian campaign.

He rose to power, successfully eliminating any Royalist opposition as he went. This meant that

Napoleon could become openly pro-republic and abolish his Consulate. Under the constant

influence of his advisor, Talleyrand, he took the role of ruler himself. He made himself Emperor and

wife Josephine his Empress. He then fired Royalists in positions of authority. Napoleon tried to show

off the power that he had gained by inviting the Pope along to his coronation, in which he was to

crown himself (www.sparknotes.com, 2012). This made the Pope look redundant and he made it

seem as though he thought he was more important than anyone, even the Pope. “Napoleon made a

symbolic gesture stating that he would be subservient to no one on earth, and that Rome would


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never command him.” For him to become the greatest Ruler of all time he would have to expand to

the East and Russia was having suitable disagreements with France over Poland, creating a new

target for the ambitious Emperor.

Napoleon awarded fancy titles to his loyal servicemen and people whom he expected would be

useful to maintain strong alliances with. He gained respect from this and men that he could trust. He

wanted to be the man that people would be in fear of and not "slapping me on the back [out of

friendship] whenever they saw me." (www.sparknotes.com, 2012). The dignity that Napoleon

received from this was from the hard work he put into ruling the French empire. Adding to the

nobility that Napoleon’s empire was now acquiring; his siblings became royalty of small countries

and regions across his Empire.

There were a lot of factors that lead to the fall of the Franco-Russian alliance and the beginning of

the Russian invasion. There was the problem with Russian Ports continuing to welcome English ships

for trade, despite there being an agreement between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I of Russia. The

Tsar “refused to implement the Continental System after 1806; neither had he made peace with

France after the Battle of Austerlitz.” (www.historyhome.co.uk, 2011).

Napoleon had gathered together a large number of troops for his time, which he believed would

make his Battle of Annihilation tactics very successful against a weaker enemy. The speed of

Napoleon’s Grande Armee meant they could spring surprise attacks on the enemy successfully

(Smith, Rupert. 2005). This operation showed that on such a large scale logistical planning was

needed, especially as the Grande Armee was underprepared, poorly supplied and inexperienced in

working on Russian terrain (Riehn, R. K. 1990).

Russian Weather


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The Battle of Eylau 8th February 1807, by

Adolphe Roehn. (www.war-art.com, 2012)

The first problem that Napoleon encountered in his conflict with the Russians was the weather. After

the invasion began on 24th June 1812 with the crossing of the Niemen River, a thunderstorm began.

“Wagons sank up to their hubs; horses dropped from exhaustion; men lost their boots. Stalled

wagons became obstacles that forced men around them and stopped supply wagons and artillery

columns. Then came the sun which would bake the deep ruts into canyons of concrete, where horses

would break their legs and wagons their wheels.” (Riehn, R. K. 1990). This shows that it was not only

the extreme winter of that year that caused serious problems, but as soon the war was launched

they faced issues with the weather in the summer.

The French found campaigning in Poland a substantial difficulty at the beginning of the march. The

barren land was very sparsely populated and hunting for food for the troops and horses was

increasingly difficult as the Russian winter was quickly approaching them. They were slowed down

by the unfamiliar territory and despite being pushed onwards by Napoleon the troops didn’t enter

Moscow, until 14th September. By then the winter had set in and October saw the start of the costly

retreat back to allied territory. “On the night of November 23, the temperature dropped and a

blizzard struck” (napoleon1812.wordpress.com). The weather was against them as there was a

mixture of snow, frost and rain which resulted in

a muddy mess of the countryside.

Previously at the Battle of Eylau in 1807

(pictured left), despite the weather, Napoleon’s

troops had managed to pull through after Prince

Murat (Napoleon’s brother in law) bought enough

time in the form of a charge of the cavalry so that the French reinforcements could arrive. This

shows there had been struggles in the past. Napoleon should have learnt from his past failures on

similar terrian. The climate and terrain of Poland was an important factor in reducing any chances of

expansion in 1812 because the longer the Russian campaign continued, the more likely they were to


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end up with similar wintery conditions to that of the Battle of Eylau. After this failure, Napoleon

retreated to his “winter quarters” (www.historyhome.co.uk, 2011), which was less easy in 1812

when they had ventured so much further east.

Napoleon was responsible for many deaths in 1812 between 24th June and 14th December; mainly

because of poor management skills and the misconception of the time it would have taken, as they

didn’t expect for the campaign to last longer than a month. After the Grande Armee had crossed the

Niemen River on the 24th and 25th of June, they left the poor weather behind and experienced an

extreme heat wave. This resulted in Napoleon’s main troops leaving behind the excess parts of their

uniform that they believed they wouldn’t need. They were suited up in dark blues, which absorbed

the intense heat and this resulted in the soldiers going without wearing underwear and other

garments that would be needed later in the cold Russian winter. “Most of the uniforms were cut

away and did not even cover the stomach.” (Zamoyski, A. 2004). This was a strain on the troops as it

would reduce their body temperatures meaning they had less energy available for pushing on with

the march. When they were in Moscow in September, many of his troops deserted the army in

search of warmer garments, trading all they had with the locals for long Russian coats. The French

used any items of clothing they could find to preserve their core temperatures, even slipping into

women’s dresses creating a tent as protection from the weather. This proves that they were not

expecting such a harsh climate in Russia, stopping Napoleon in his tracks and shattering his initial

hopes of “a defeated Russia [that] would cease to be a threat to Napoleon’s European empire.” (BBC

History Magazine, June 2012).

November 3rd was the last warm day. As temperatures dropped drastically, soldiers soon found

themselves retreating through 2 feet of snow. François Dumonceau stated that they were

“experiencing suffering the like of which we had never known.” (Zamoyski, A. 2004). The

hopelessness of Napoleon’s control of the troops in such weather was evident when

Württemberger, Faber du Faur, caught up with some men who had been a day’s march ahead of his


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3rd Corps. They had attempted to build shelter out of pine branches, but had “frozen stiff” in their

sleep. Colonel von Kerner found himself a barn for a sheltered night, but was shocked in the morning

when he stated, “Our men are there, sitting around campfires just as we left them last night, but

they are all dead and frozen.” (Zamoyski, A. 2004). Poor weather conditions therefore had a

significant impact on the slowed retreat from Russia, and was a factor for the termination of the

campaign overall.

Napoleon’s Supply Lines

As Napoleon had become well known for his quick victories in other countries, he was hoping to take

Russia in little more than a month. (BBC History Magazine, June 2012) This was one of his major

flaws as he didn’t take any supplies with his troops that would last them longer than this. This would

ultimately mean that the distance that the troops had travelled from France was over stretched,

which meant that it was not possible for Napoleon to expand and control his Empire successfully.

Napoleon wished to shatter the opponents that he faced in Russia. Logistical strategies had to be

thought up to support the new members of his army. “By June 1812, Napoleon had a field army of

611,000 men with 2000 guns and 250,000 horses.” After 6 months Napoleon’s army would be

destroyed and only 1 in 20 would return. His battle of annihilation was a tested strategy of the

Grande Armee that Napoleon hoped to use to defeat Russia’s army before even reaching the capital,

Moscow. This scheme had been used before in the battles of Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena-Auerstedt

in 1806. These had been revolutionary victories with blitzkrieg now a major part of Napoleonic

warfare. Napoleon wanted to use this offensive technique because he expected to stop any of the

counter attacks, which may have proved to be fatal to his ranks, however having used this before

may have been predictable to the Russians. This was shown in the Battle of Borodino, 7th September

1812, as whilst it was a French victory, it was not damaging enough for it to be worthwhile. “Russian

forces remained uncommitted which prevented Napoleon from engaging in the large-scale battle he


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sought.” (militaryhistory.about.com). This then meant that Napoleon’s line of supplies was stretched

further, following the retreating Russians.

The planning for the supplies for the Russian campaign was very limited. Napoleon was hoping to

not spend long on this campaign. For example, for the Battle of Danzig, 1807, he didn’t think he

would need supplies to last more than 50 days so Napoleon had concentrated rations to support

400,000 men along with fodder for 50,000 horses (www.militaryhistoryonline.com) proved that

Napoleon had made the same mistake before. In 1812 however, for most of the troops he hoped for

the war to be finished in just over 20 days, but to give compensation for any delays, he supplied

them with 30 days-worth of food. This would have been successful if his tactics of Annihilation had

worked, but instead Russians refused to participate in a large battle and took to scorching the land

to make foraging impossible. This resulted in Napoleon and his troops being dragged into the heart

of Russia, through forests, marshes and steppes, further weakening chances of supply lines from

successfully reaching them and making the campaign for expanding Napoleon’s empire seem an

unrealistic ambition. Supply lines couldn’t keep up with the required marches of the army and

troops at the back always suffered the worst deprivations (Riehn, R. K. 1990).

Napoleon said, “build with whatever materials are at hand.” (BrainyQuote, 2012) This was a flaw in

Napoleon’s plan. He left it to the chance of finding what he needed in his surroundings and was left

ill-equipped when it was needed most.

Napoleon’s anticipated time scale in 1812 was inaccurate, as Russia had very poor infrastructure in

the form of roads. This meant that there were 600,000 men (www.napoleon-series.org) using only a

few main roads that they could travel along, which slowed down the whole mission. There were 26

battalions making up this army and 8 of them were supplied with 600 small wagons each. The other

18 battalions were given 252 four-horse wagons which could transport 1.36 tonnes each

(www.bbc.co.uk). In total the number of horses needed for the wagons, cavalry and artillery was

250,000. For each of these animals it was necessary to supply them with 9kg of food a day. Napoleon


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planned for most of this to be found in Russia and as this was unsuccessful, horses died at a rate of

50 per kilometre (80 per mile). This was due to a poor diet of freshly cut green plants. This would

trap gas inside the animals and cause them to become so bloated that they would die.

The meat that was provided for the army’s rations was beef, which was brought in herds of cows. A

major issue with food was that the millions of pounds of rice, wheat and oats for both soldiers and

horses, which had to be transported in about 1500 wagons, needed another 50,000 horses to carry

these supplies. These horses contributed to the total that needed to be fed and eventually died from

malnutrition.

Logistically, Napoleon had overlooked the long term plans for transportation of supplies because of

the hope for a short campaign. As Napoleon had entered Russia in June 1812, the horses were

wearing summer shoes. The same route taken into Russia in the summer would have been

impassable on the return journey, as the Russian winter was so harsh. The tens of thousands of men

who all followed the same route compacted the snow into a “rock –hard and slippery surface.”

(Zamoyski, A. 2004).


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There was no ground below the horse’s feet that would be suitable for walking on without it being

dangerous. The image (right) shows how winter horseshoes are equipped with little spikes that allow

a horse to have some friction

between themselves and the snow

or ice

(napoleon1812.wordpress.com).

This means that there would be no

success in hauling the wagons

uphill or even downhill as there

would be no brakes. This resulted in horses "fallen down underneath whatever it was they were

towing,” said Bernie Tidmarsh who is a leading farrier in Britain (David, S. 2012). “They wouldn't have

got any grip going downhill any more than they would have going up," he says. "The end result

would have been broken legs and mutilated limbs." Due to this there would have been a lack of

horses to pull wagons, which would have contributed to the deaths of much of the Grande Armee,

as his remaining men suffered a dangerous journey 2,400km home without any horse transport and

many needed supplies. Major-General Sir Robert Wilson, a British military observer, stated that

there were “naked masses of dead and dying men.” Along with “the mangled carcasses of 10,000

horses, which had in some cases, been cut for food before life had ceased.”

The French were beginning to starve and there were cases of cannibalism reported. “I am sure that if

I had not found any horseflesh myself, I would have turned cannibal.” (Bourgogne, F. 1812-1813).

This proves that, if even the higher ranks within the Grande Armee were finding it difficult to survive,

then there was certainly some poor planning on the part of Napoleon and his advisors. One evening

Sergeant Bourgogne recorded the burning alive of troops who had entered a barn to shelter from

the terrible winter. The building caught fire and as there were too many people within the barn, it

was impossible to escape from the flames. Some of the soldiers of Napoleon’s Grande Armée took

advantage of the cooked meat and ate their comrades so as to stay alive. The ranked staff could not

Winter

Horseshoes.


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judge their behaviour because they felt that under similar circumstances they may have done the

same (www.indiana.edu, 2012). It is not surprising that this became common practice because there

were men and horses dying of cold and starvation all around the troops and gave them the

opportunity for easily accessible meat.

Failure to compensate for longer excursions through Russia could have been one of Napoleons

major setbacks as during the Russian Campaign. Horseback warfare was a major aspect of warfare at

this time (BBC History Magazine, June 2012), which became a disaster once soldiers began to eat

their horses. This gave the French a disadvantage because “Russia

mobilised its formidable horse industry for war with exceptional

skill.” Some once-proud French officers (left) were made to resort

to riding Russian ponies to transport them to feel some superiority,

but was more humiliating. This just shows how much they had lost.

By just the 5th of December 1812 the army numbered less than 10,000 men who were capable of

any fighting. Napoleon was forced to flee to Poland.

Statistics

Figure 1 (Appendix 2) was drawn up by, Charles Joseph Minard. The images that he creates are

“mathematically proportioned images for dry and complicated columns of statistical data.”

(scimaps.org, 2012). 1mm shows 10,000 men. This type of data presentation is made to give you an

instant idea of how to compare the figures and shows a clear representation of the data whilst also

providing a map labelling cities and rivers. It shows the time scale against the data and how many

men were lost over the length of the campaign. Edward Tufte said the chart was “probably the best

statistical graph ever drawn” (cartographia.wordpress.com). The border between Poland and Russia

can be seen at the start of the graph and the line, which gradually decreases in size; showing the size

of the French army. The black band shows how napoleon’s troops retreated with a very insignificant


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Countess Walewska.

(www.napoleonicsociety.com, 2012)

number of men at the end. He started with 422,000 men and finished with about 10,000 making it

back to the Polish border. Only half of the survivors from Moscow survived the icy waters of the

Berezina River. The temperature and time scale are closely linked to the numbers of men who

returned. The one shocking statistic that stands out is the temperature on the Réaumur scale (which

was used a lot at this time) shows on 6th December 1812 it was -38°C.

Other Factors

However on the other hand, it was not geography that hindered Napoleon in his expansion and

control of his empire during 1804-1815. There were factors such as how Napoleon was a poor leader

and the strengths of the leadership in Russia. Another reason why this was a disaster could have

been a result of why they when into battle in the first place; to free Poland.

Napoleon’s battle for Poland

Overall the Russian Campaign was the major turning point for Napoleon’s campaign because it was

the start of his downfall.

Napoleon was welcomed by many patriotic Polish supporters of the idea of a self-governed country.

He attempted to increase his backing of his campaign “by hinting that he was about to reconstruct

their country which had disappeared in the Partitions of 1772, 1793

and 1795.” After Napoleon’s affair with Polish Countess Walewska

(pictured), she had asked him to liberate Poland and return the

country to her people.

It is believed that she made an influence on the policies of the French

invasion. As the Russian army was still in Poland, Napoleon needed to

push them out and he was keen to dispose of the only great power


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that stood between him and complete control of the continent. (www.historyhome.co.uk, 2011).

Napoleon‘s mistakes

It is debatable as to how naive Napoleon was because of his misconception of the idea that he could

take Russia in a month. It can be argued that he was “one of the greatest military minds that has

ever existed,” which was the view of historian David G. Chandler. (Kafker, F. A. 1991) He was a great

military commander and his rise to power as the Emperor of France and many places in Europe,

which he had invaded, has been greatly praised. However, it can be argued that he made great

mistakes within the 1812 Campaign.

Napoleon had misconceptions of the Russians. He recalled his Ambassador to St. Petersburg,

Armand Caulaincourt, in May 1811. Napoleon described Russian Nobility as “dissolute, decrepit, self-

seeking, undisciplined, incapable of self-sacrifice” and anticipated that it would be an easy defeat.

After the Battle of Friedland, June 14th 1807, he believed that Russia would be as easy to crush as it

was then. Caulaincourt strongly tried to discourage Napoleon as, “threatened with an attack for over

a year, the Russians have made preparations and strengthened their forces… they have made

preparations for defence and resistance to the utmost.” (www.napoleon-series.org).

Napoleon planned the logistics of the Campaign so that, on top of the unbearable heat of the

summer, each soldier would be carrying his own individual uniform, weapons and bedding, meaning

they carried an average of almost 30kg. The Imperial Guard carried an extra 2.5kg of dress uniform,

which was unnecessary (www.militaryhistoryonline.com). This was bad management as some of

these things could have been transported on the back of carts to save the men vital energy and

allow them to endure a faster pace advancing into Russia. There were shortages of various items of

equipment across the national armies that Napoleon controlled; for example, tents were no longer

able to be issued to the troops. Napoleon insisted “Tents are unfavourable to health... A few planks


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and a morsel of straw shelter him from the wind." (Bonaparte, N. 1831). This was one of the worst

decisions made by Napoleon himself. The lack of cover for the soldiers was one of the most

important failures that killed the majority of Napoleon’s troops and hindered any progress of

conquering Russia and expanding the French empire eastwards.

Russian General’s successes

The most important aim of the Russian Tsar and his advisors was to protect their army as they were

initially greatly outnumbered. Napoleon’s hopes for a quick victory were soon shattered as the

Russians led his troops deeper into Russia across Lithuania and Belarus. “Alexander’s combined

military/diplomatic strategy was more realistic and more subtle than Napoleon’s reliance on

blitzkrieg.” (BBC History Magazine, June 2012). They burnt the land as they retreated to reduce the

chances of Napoleon finding any new supplies, known as the “scorched earth” strategy, whilst

stretching the original supply line. This was clever, as the Russians were originally outnumbered 2:1.

By the time Napoleon’s troops had arrived in Smolensk the number of his troops reduced drastically

and were now only outnumbering the Russians by 3:2. Although Napoleon missed his chance to

defeat the Russians due to his own mistakes, there were other factors such as the shrewdness of the

Russians along with “the Russian troops’ fierce and skilful resistance.” (BBC History Magazine, June

2012).

Napoleon thought that he could wipe out the Russian army without going too far into the country,

however this was where he was wrong as the Russians had the terrain on their side. They had

extensive knowledge of the land and were able to retreat enough to lead the French army right into

the heart of Russia. “Persistent hunger and desertion and growing distances from essential supply

lines meant that by September Napoleon’s army would be halved by the conditions alone.”

(www.inyourpocket.com).


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On 9th August Tsar Alexander appointed Prince Mikhail Ilarionovich Kutuzov as commander-in-chief

of the whole Russian army (Zamoyski, A. 2004). Kutuzov was an obstacle to Napoleon’s expansion of

his empire because he developed the tactic of retreating to wear out the Grande Armee, whilst only

participating in minor battles. This continued until the Battle of Borodino.

The Battle of Borodino, 7th September 1812, was not a significant defeat for Russia. The Russians

were ahead of the French so Kutuzov was able to find the best position for strong defence close to

the Kolocha and Moskwa Rivers (militaryhistory.about.com). The advantage this had to the Russians

was to slow down the starving and diseased French. The French had 130,000 men initially who were

able to fight and between 30,000-35,000 were killed, wounded or captured. Russia started out with

120,000 men and lost just over 40,000 (militaryhistory.about.com). These figures show there were

similar outcomes for each side, and afterwards the Russians continued their method of retreat

unfazed.

The Military Governor of Moscow, Count Fyodor Vasilyevich Rostopchin, realised that Moscow was

not safe from French occupation. He organised a largely successful evacuation of civilians. It is also

believed that he started the fires in September when Napoleon arrived, burning three quarters of

the city. It was these fires that led Napoleon to vacate Moscow, as the “supplies that could have

sustained the French army through the winter” were destroyed (britannica.com). This was a great

success for Russia, because Napoleon had believed when he entered Russia the Tsar would have

been forced to sign a peace treaty and become a satellite to France.

When Napoleon left, he attempted to move southwest but was obstructed by Kutuzov at the Battle

of Maloyaroslavets on October 19th. This meant that instead of crossing fertile new lands that may

have resulted in survival for the French, they were pushed back along the same route they had

covered on the inward journey. Kutuzov ultimately ended the war without another unnecessary

battle, harrying the French all the way to Poland, almost wiping them out at the Berezina River.


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French Medical problems

In the Napoleonic era battlefield medicine and disease treatment was seen as a deviation from the

original intentions of war (canadahistory.com). There were other factors that Napoleon considered

more important than rescuing men who had little chance of survival. His focus was on the healthy

men who were capable of fighting and assisting their endurance of the war.

The survivors of Borodino were the ones who suffered the most, many of them were already

wounded and there were more hardships to come. They would be the first to die. The medical

services were out of date and the wounded were left for days on the field. This was worsened by

there being little knowledge of hygiene or antibiotics at the time (www.militaryhistoryonline.com).

This would be true of all campaigns in the early 1800s, and it played a part in the destruction of the

French Grande Armee.

The most common treatment for battle wounds was amputation, which was dangerous because of

significant blood loss. Small wounds from a musket-ball could be fatal, even if it had not hit a vital

organ, the entry into the body would carry dirt, cloth from the uniform and even small splinters of

bone if it was hit. This would have added to the bacteria and would also have a chance of just

resulting in patients bleeding to death (www.napoleonguide.com). Statistics show that only one

third of all amputees survived after the battles due to loss of blood, disease and infections

(www.napoleonguide.com). This would have reduced the chances of such a successful expansion

during the 1812 campaign as many skilled soldiers and officers were killed.

A young commissary, Alexandre Bellot de Kergorre, stated “the hospitals... contained three thousand

patients lying in two stone built houses.” In such a confined space there would be a very fast

transfer rate of spreading diseases from patient to patient. It would have been easier to tend to

patients who were well fed and watered, however added to their wounds they were dying of hunger

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/

http://www.napoleonguide.com/


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and thirst. He said “a shocking thing was the impossibility of removing the dead from among the

living... Not only was the hospital full of corpses, but so were the streets and a number of houses.”

There was a lack of stretchers, which meant that it was hard to transport the dead away, especially

as there were so many alive and badly injured patients that needed the time of the doctors more.

Kergorre witnessed these tragic scenes and on his own “took away 128 [dead bodies], which had

been serving as pillows to the sick and were several days old." (www.militaryhistoryonline.com). If

less French troops had died during the 1812 campaign then Napoleon would have had a greater

chance of putting pressure on Russia’s weaker army to sign a peace treaty.

Conclusion

In total it is 2770km from Paris to Moscow and could take over 600 hours of marching to get there.

That would not take into account the time for the battles and rest. With the campaign lasting over 6

months the troops would have been exhausted. It would have taken a lot longer for Napoleon to get

to Moscow than this because the Russians had made it more difficult, blowing up bridges and

burning the land, making Napoleon’s troops build pontoon bridges and take detours in search of

food. The pace at which Napoleon pushed the army on was too fast for the supplies to keep up and

many of his men starved as a result. Looking at all of the evidence it can be said that geographical

factors were a very significant hindrance for Napoleon in his expansion and control of his empire

during the 1812 campaign in Russia. There are vital points that support this argument such as the

temperatures dropping to -38°C on 6th December, meaning men who sat down to rest would freeze

in their sleep. This therefore supports the idea that geography impacted significantly on Napoleons

expansion into Russia. The supply lines were a failure of Napoleon’s management, however it was

due to the weather and the horse’s shoes that made an expedition of that scale completely

impossible. The fact that these supply lines could only carry a certain amount of food meant that

there was a food shortage with many men turning to cannibalism as the only way to survive. With

the weather and lack of healthy troops preventing them from completing the campaign, it can be

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/


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seen that geographic factors were very influential towards the control of Napoleon’s expansion into

Russia.

However, the other factors were also important such as Napoleon’s management skills leading to

the control of his empire being weakened after the failure of the Russian Campaign. The Russian

Generals, such as Prince Kutuzov, had the upper hand because they had extensive knowledge of the

terrain and used tactics such as retreating and scorching and burning the land, which was not what

Napoleon was expecting. He had underestimated the Russians despite warnings from his own

Ambassador for St. Petersburg, and also thought they would not need tents, leaving no shelter for

the troops. His attitude to the dying soldiers was that he should divert resources to the healthy men.

This would have been a very large factor in the failure of the campaign.

Overall it would still seem that the timing of the campaign was the worst part of the whole operation

because it meant that the troops remained in Russia through the deadly winter. This leads me to the

conclusion that, while it is to a great extent geographical factors (weather and terrain) that hindered

Napoleon’s expansion and control of his empire into Russia during the 1812 Campaign, Napoleon

himself was also to blame because he worsened the impacts, with his determination to reach

Moscow. In hindsight, if he had turned back to France after the Battle of Borodino, he could have left

with the dignity of winning the war. The Russians would have looked weak as they had retreated and

he would have gained control over his empire for a lot longer. The French could have attempted to

rebuild their army in time to overwhelm British forces at the Battle of Waterloo.

Russia had been Napoleon’s downfall.

Word count: 5277

Appendix 1


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Napoleon’s early life:

Right from the age of eight in 1777, Napoleon took a scholarship at the military college of Brienne in

France, funded by his father Charles. In 1784 he joined the ‘Ecole Militaire’, which was the French

military academy, in which his main focus of study was in advanced tactics and strategies.

(SparkNotes, 2012) Many historians would agree that this was the key factor that led to Napoleon’s

future ambitions of becoming a great leader. A lot of the time he taught himself by reading books on

history and geography whilst in Valence. He stated "There are in Europe many good generals, but

they see too many things at once." (www.napolun.com, 2012). This shows that he had studied the

tactics of many other generals; he had seen that their drawbacks and learnt from their mistakes.

Appendix 2

Charles Joseph Minard, French Civil Engineer. He was interested in physics and streams and enjoyed

depicting data in graphic tables and figurative mapping. (Image on next page)


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Cited References

BBC News (2012) All for the want of a winter horseshoe. [online] Available at:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16929522 [Accessed: 20 Oct 2012].


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