to move the world by jeffrey d. sachs (an excerpt)

7282019 To Move the World by Jeffrey D Sachs (an excerpt)

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullto-move-the-world-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-an-excerpt 125



Chapter 983089

TH E QUEST FOR PEACE

983127 983144 983141 983150 983114 983151 983144 983150 983110 983115 983141 983150 983150 983141 983140 983161 came to offi ce in January 1961

the world lived in peril o a nuclear war between the two super-

powers Te Cold War conrontation between the United Statesand the Soviet Union would eventually consume trillions o dol-

lars and millions o lives in wars ought around the world At times

humanity seemed to be ldquogripped by orces we cannot controlrdquo a

pessimistic view that Kennedy noted and strenuously argued

against in his Peace Speech And yet the power o those disruptive

orces at times was indeed nearly overwhelming causing events

to spin beyond the control even o presidents Communist Partychairmen and the countries they led

Te Cold War was in every sense a stepchild o the two world

wars Tose wars created the structures o geopolitics military

might and perhaps most important o all the psychological

mindsets that determined the course o the Cold War John Ken-

nedyrsquos peace strategy would emerge rom his intimate under-

standing o the dynamics that had driven the two wars Te 1047297rst



4 To Move the World

war he knew as a voracious student o history especially the his-

tory as written by Winston Churchill Te second war he knew

1047297rsthand Te years between 1938 and 1945 were a deeply orma-

tive period o his adult liemdashas a student in prewar London while

his ather was US ambassador to the United Kingdom as a youngauthor grappling with the question o why England had ailed or

so long to conront Hitler as a patrol boat captain in the Paci1047297c

where his vessel P-109 was sunk by a Japanese destroyer and as

part o a grieving amily when his elder brother was lost in a dar-

ing bombing mission over Germany1

Te overwhelming question acing the world and acing

Kennedy during his presidency was how to prevent a third worldwar Te actors that had caused the two warsmdashgeopolitics arms

races blunders bluster miscalculations ears and opportunismmdash

continued to operate and to threaten a new con1047298agration Yet the

context was also undamentally new and more threatening Te

nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 to

conclude World War II had ushered in the nuclear age and had

made the stakes incalculably higher A thermonuclear bomb couldnow carry ar more explosive orce than all o the bombs o the

Second World War

Kennedyrsquos worldview on these issues was shaped above all by

the in1047298uence and model o Winston Churchill Englandrsquos great

author-politician-warrior-statesman whose masterly history o

the 1047297rst war Te World Crisis described a tragic era o war through

miscalculation

2

whose warnings about Hitler in the 1930s hadgone unheeded until almost too late whose leadership as prime

minister between 1940 and 1945 enabled the United Kingdom to

survive and eventually triumph over Hitler whose warnings in

1946 just afer World War II ended alerted the West to the ris-

ing threat o Soviet power and whose calls during the 1940s

and 1950s or a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union

did much to in1047298uence Kennedyrsquos peace strategy as president3



the quest for peace 5

Kennedyrsquos lielong ascination with learning rom and urge to

emulate Winston Churchill has been recounted by many biogra-

phers

Te greatest problem acing Kennedy (and indeed the world)

in drawing lessons rom the two world wars was that the les-sons were highly complex subtle and even seemingly contradic-

tory World War I seemed to be a lesson about sel-ul1047297lling

crises where the ear o war itsel led to an arms race while the

arms race in turn led to a world primed or war Tese lessons

seemed to call or restraint in the arms race and avoidance o

a sel-ul1047297lling rush to war and so even as Hitler rearmed Ger-

many in the 1930s in contravention o the reaty o Versaillesthat had ended World War I Britain avoided provocations that

could spiral out o control Most amously Prime Minister Neville

Chamberlain argued that it would be better to accede to Ger-

man demands on border adjustments with Czechoslovakia and

so ldquoappeasedrdquo Hitler in the name o peace at the Munich coner-

ence in 1938 a disastrous mistake that ueled Hitlerrsquos drive to

war4

I World War I seemed to argue against arms races and sel-

ul1047297lling prophecies o war the lead-up to World War II by con-

trast seemed to argue or meeting strength with strength and

avoiding the temptation o ldquoappeasementrdquo For Kennedy the de-

bate over appeasement was more than intellectual it was intensely

personal John Kennedy watched closely as his ather Joe strongly

deended appeasement indeed declaring that Chamberlain hadno choice when he acceded to Hitlerrsquos outrageous demands at the

1938 Munich conerence as Hitler would have deeated the United

Kingdom in battle When war 1047297nally broke out the proponents o

appeasement were humiliated and Joe Kennedyrsquos vast political

ambitions were destroyed5 Te younger Kennedy would soon im-

plicitly come down on Churchillrsquos side writing in his 1047297rst book

Why England Slept that Britain had dangerously delayed rearm-



6 To Move the World

ing under the illusion that appeasing Hitler would keep it sae and

out o war6

As president Kennedy would battle with these powerul

and con1047298icting dynamics Should he restrain the arms race in

order to avoid a sel-eeding race to war with the Soviet UnionOr should he strengthen US arms in order to negotiate rom

strength Should he make concessions to the Soviet premier

Nikita Khrushchev to acknowledge Soviet interests Or should he

hold the line to avoid the appearance and reality o appeasement

Kennedy would remain a student o history and o Churchill

whom he most admired trying to apply the complex lessons o

the past to the urgent challenges o the present

Te Nuclear Arms Race

Te problems o distrust between the Soviet Union and the United

States were proound pervasive and persistent and that distrust

spurred the arms race Te two sides were o course rivals andcompetitors And each side lied to the other repeatedly and

persistently Tese were not grounds or easy trust Nor was the

historical context Just a ew years earlier Hitler had cheated re-

lentlessly thereby winning signi1047297cant concessions Chamberlainrsquos

appeasement o Hitler at Munich hung over the Cold War era

Donrsquot trust the other side Better to arm to the teeth

Even though there were enormous gains to be had by both theUnited States and the Soviet Union i they could agree on the

postwar order in Europe politicians on both sides ound it nearly

impossible to take any steps that required trust I they did they

opened themselves up to extraordinarily harsh attacks by hard-

liners on their own side who denied that the other side would

abide by any agreements A US politician who urged agreement

with the Soviet Union risked immediate subjection to the cries o




ldquoMunichrdquo and ldquoappeasementrdquo powerul political charges and ones

Kennedy was especially eager to avoid

Te two sides were trapped by two closely related problems the

prisonerrsquos dilemma and the security dilemma Te prisonerrsquos di-

lemma holds that in the absence o long-term trust or bindingagreements the logic o inter-state rivalry will push both sides to

arm Should the United States arm or disarm I the Soviet Union

arms the United States has no choice but to arm as well in order

to avoid being the weaker side I the Soviet Union disarms then

the United States gains military and political advantage by arming

while the Soviet Union is weak Tereore arming is a ldquodominantrdquo

strategy the best move no matter what the other side does Sincethe logic is the same or the other side both sides end up continu-

ally increasing their arms even though a binding agreement to

disarm would be mutually bene1047297cial7

Te security dilemma propounded by Robert Jervis a leading

political theorist is a corollary o the prisonerrsquos dilemma8 Te se-

curity dilemma holds that a defensive action by one side will ofen

be viewed by the other side as an offensive action Tus i theUnited States builds its nuclear arsenal to stave off a Soviet con-

ventional land invasion o Europe the Soviet Union will view the

US nuclear buildup as preparation or a nuclear 1047297rst strike against

the Soviet Union rather than as a deensive measure And i the

Soviet Union tries to catch up with the US nuclear arsenal that

will be viewed as an offensive action by the United States US

hardliners would argue that the Soviet Union is trying to neutral-ize the US nuclear deterrent so that the Soviet Union can launch

a conventional attack

As a result o the absence o trust and the harsh logic o both

the prisonerrsquos dilemma and the security dilemma both sides con-

tinued to amass nuclear weapons to the point o massive overkill

And as the arsenals continued to expand each side eared that the

other was actually building up or a surprise 1047297rst-strike attack



8 To Move the World

Te United States indeed contemplated launching a preventive

nuclear war worried that it would be unable to deend itsel in the

uture Jervis recalled the words o the German statesman Otto

von Bismarck who called a preventive war ldquocommitting suicide

rom ear o deathrdquo9

Te nuclear arms race accelerated as the United States and the

Soviet Union expanded their arsenals and as the United Kingdom

and France became nuclear powers (in 1952 and 1960 respec-

tively) with their own independent arsenals By 1960 the United

States had nuclear warheads positioned in several countries around

the world10 Te Soviet Union elt itsel very much surrounded in-

deed and increasingly unsure o whether these US nuclear weap-ons were really under US control

O course it wasnrsquot just the international situation that prompted

the arms buildup on each side It was also domestic politics Te

military-industrial complex gained power within each govern-

ment as time went on In the United States each branch o the

military demanded its own nuclear arsenal so that competition

among the US Army Air Force and Navy also drove up militarybudgets and the numbers o nuclear warheads and delivery sys-

tems Te same was true on the Soviet side where there was ar

less constraint than in the United States on the political power o

the military-industrial complex

o the Brink

When Kennedy assumed offi ce he took to heart Churchillrsquos belie

that political leaders must work actively to solve vexing interna-

tional problems He was intent on pursuing arms control but was

also a staunch Cold Warrior partly out o conviction and partly

out o political expediency in order to protect himsel rom power-

ul hardline anti-communists Kennedy believed that he could




untangle the dangerous con1047298icts with the Soviet Union And as

Churchill urged Kennedy would aim to solve these problemsrom a position o US military strength and without relinquish-

ing vital Western interests

Te tough and conciliatory sides o Kennedyrsquos negotiating strat-

egy were mutually reinorcing Churchill had long emphasized

the essential role o negotiating with onersquos adversary ldquoo jaw-jawrdquo

he said ldquois always better than to war-warrdquo11 Churchill had called

negotiation through strength his ldquodouble-barreled strategyrdquo andamously declared ldquoI do not hold that we should rearm in order to

1047297ght I hold that we should rearm in order to parleyrdquo12 In 1938 it

had not been just a weakness o political will but also one o mili-

tary preparedness that had led Chamberlain to appease Hitler at

Munich

Kennedy would reer to Churchillrsquos double-barreled approach

in his campaign address in Seattle in September 1960

President Dwight D Eisenhower greets President-elect John F Kennedy (Decem-

ber 6 1960)



10 To Move the World

It is an unortunate act that we can secure peace only

by preparing or war Winston Churchill said in 1949

ldquoWe arm to parleyrdquo We can convince Mr Khrushchev

to bargain seriously at the conerence table i he respects

our strength13

Kennedy had no doubt either o the enormous potential gains

o cooperation with the Soviet Union or o the grave risks i the

United States cooperated (or instance through arms control)

while the Soviet Union reneged on its side o the deal Cheating

by the Soviet Union would threaten not only US security but

also Kennedyrsquos hold on power domestically Kennedy would re-peatedly urge cooperation but remain alert that any move toward

cooperation however modest could trigger political charges rom

the right that he was an appeaser

Te burdens on Kennedy were greater as a Democrat since Re-

publicans regularly assailed the Democratic Party or being ldquosof

on communismrdquo Kennedy thereore aimed to assure all sidesmdash

the US public Americarsquos allies and o course the Soviet Unionmdashthat he would vigorously resist Soviet aggression and deend

Western interests while he sought greater cooperation with the

Soviet Union He would aim at the core to pursue a tit-or-tat

strategy (a way to break out o the prisonerrsquos dilemma by recipro-

cating cooperation rom the other side) promising to join the

Soviet Union in arms control but also declaring repeatedly his

readiness to revert to an arms race i the Soviet Union did notkeep its promises Te tit-or-tat strategy o incremental coopera-

tion was mapped out a year afer Kennedy came to offi ce by one o

Americarsquos leading sociologists Amitai Etzioni whose remarkable

book Te Hard Way to Peace spelled out a psychological approach

to orging peace14 Etzioni believed that con1047297dence building was

crucial since in his view psychological rather than political or

military actors were the decisive drivers o the Cold War He pro-

pounded a notion o ldquopsychological gradualismrdquo to reduce ear




build trust and initiate a phased process o reciprocated conces-

sions Eventually suspicion and ear would be ldquoreduced to a level

where ruitul negotiations are possiblerdquo15 In many ways Kenne-

dyrsquos peace initiative in 1963 would pursue this approach

Kennedy 1047297rst signaled both aspects o his approach in hisinaugural address on January 20 196116 First came his robust ull-

throated commitment to the deense o liberty

Let every nation know whether it wishes us well or ill

that we shall pay any price bear any burden meet any

hardship support any riend oppose any oe in order

to assure the survival and the success o liberty

But equally stirring was his commitment to pursue the mutual

gains o cooperation

So let us begin anewmdashremembering on both sides that

civility is not a sign o weakness and sincerity is always

subject to proo Let us never negotiate out o ear Butlet us never ear to negotiate

Let both sides or the 1047297rst time ormulate serious

and precise proposals or the inspection and control o

armsmdashand bring the absolute power to destroy other

nations under the absolute control o all nations

Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders o science

instead o its terrors ogether let us explore the starsconquer the deserts eradicate disease tap the ocean

depths and encourage the arts and commerce

Kennedyrsquos emphasis on ldquoprecise proposalsrdquo was not incidental

Following Churchill once again Kennedy believed that miscalcu-

lation with the Soviet Union would best be avoided through clear

detailed and principled negotiating positions Yet here too the

ideal and the practical would collide Negotiations are 1047297lled with




eints bluffs and intermediate positions and these inevitably

raise the risk o miscalculation

Kennedy was sincere in his inaugural address when he said ldquoSo

let us begin anewrdquo As a senator and as a presidential candidate he

himsel had helped to spur the arms race by opportunisticallyhammering away at Dwight D Eisenhowerrsquos administration or

allowing a ldquomissile gaprdquo to emerge claiming in 1958 that there was

every indication ldquothat by 1960 the United States will have lost

its superiority in nuclear striking powerrdquo17 In act the true missile

gap contrary to Kennedyrsquos claim stood greatly in Americarsquos avor

While the de1047297nitive knowledge o the Soviet Unionrsquos very limited

ballistic missile capacity was a closely held secret o the Eisen-hower administration based on secret U-2 spy plane 1047298ights Sena-

tor Kennedy probably knew that he was exaggerating Soviet

capabilities As the presidential candidate running against hard-

line vice president Richard Nixon Kennedy was especially keen to

project a tough-minded oreign policy stance and avoid the charge

o being sof on communism typically levied against Democrats

No matter what Kennedy may have believed as a candidate helearned early in his presidency that there was no missile gap in the

Sovietsrsquo advantage

Khrushchev would probably have understood the political

reasons or Kennedyrsquos missile-gap rhetoric and might even have

bene1047297ted in a way rom Kennedyrsquos exaggerated portrayal o Soviet

power Indeed when Kennedy chose in October 1961 to reveal

to the public the relative weakness o the Soviet nuclear orceKhrushchev was deeply aggrieved Still in the early days o the

new administration Khrushchev was intent on determining

whether Kennedy was in act a diehard Cold Warrior like Eisen-

howerrsquos in1047298uential Secretary o State John Foster Dulles or a po-

tentially cooperative counterpart in peaceul coexistence Early

steps by Kennedy could thereore help to chart the course toward

better relations

In addition to their public speeches and the interaction o their




diplomats the two leaders would soon learn much more about

each other in another way Beginning with Khrushchevrsquos letter o

congratulations to the newly elected Kennedy on November 9

1960 the two men engaged until Kennedyrsquos death in a back-

channel personal correspondence o more than a hundred lettersBoth pledged that the letters would be held con1047297dentially and

never leaked or propaganda purposes ldquoFor my partrdquo Kennedy

wrote ldquothe contents and even the existence o our letters will be

known only to the Secretary o State and a ew other o my closest

associates in the governmentrdquo18 Both leaders seem to have hon-

ored their pledges o con1047297dentiality Te result is a most extraor-

dinary exchange that together with other events offers criticalinsights into the thinking o both men the issues that worried

them and their strategies or peace

Kennedyrsquos Opening Provocations

Unortunately or the prospects o US-Soviet cooperation andcontrary to the approach o incremental cooperation Kennedy

came out swinging He did this in three provocative ways First

despite the act that the United States was ar ahead in nuclear

weapons Kennedy ordered a major military buildup o both nu-

clear and conventional arms Te total number o US nuclear

warheads would soar rom 20000 in 1960 to 29000 in 1963 at a

time when the Soviet Union had a small raction o that number(1600 in 1960 and 4200 in 1963)19 Conventional orces were also

greatly augmented as Kennedy adopted a new model o ldquo1047298exible

responserdquo He was highly critical o Eisenhowerrsquos nuclear policy

o ldquomassive retaliationrdquo to meet Soviet threats which purportedly

relied on US nuclear weapons to deter Soviet provocations

Kennedy wanted more non-nuclear options20

Second Kennedy approved a CIA plan or an invasion o Cuba

which would become the biggest blunder o his presidency Tird




he went ahead with a conrontational move that had been ap-

proved by his predecessor Dwight Eisenhower In 1958 Eisen-

hower had decided to strengthen the US nuclear arsenal by

posting intermediate-range nuclear missiles under US control in

Italy and urkey Te placements o these Jupiter missiles wereimplemented in June 1960 in Italy and October 1961 (the 1047297rst year

o the Kennedy administration) in urkey21 Te Soviet Union now

aced the threat not only o Americarsquos strategic bombers but also

o nearby missiles that could reach the Soviet Union in minutes

Tis was a new and terriying prospect that tipped the psycho-

logical and strategic balance toward the United States and consti-

tuted a major motivation or Khrushchevrsquos later attempt to putsimilar missiles into Cuba

Kennedy sought to negotiate peace through strength but these

early moves were more than a mere show o strength they were

a ratcheting up o the Cold War Here the contradictory lessons

o World War I and World War II were starkly revealed Kennedy

was prooundly concerned about a war starting through mis-

calculation as had World War I but was equally i not moreconcerned with being perceived as weak i he ailed to project mil-

itary strength and 1047297rmness Yet by taking steps to build US

military strength and increase the number o US military op-

tions he inadvertently exacerbated the risks o terrible miscalcu-

lation very much a case o Jervisrsquos security dilemma in operation

At the time that Kennedy assumed the presidency the CIA was

already in high gear to topple Cubarsquos new lef-wing governmentwhich had begun to con1047297scate US assets and sidle up to the

Soviet Union America had long backed Cubarsquos corrupt dictator

Fulgencio Batista who offered privileges and protection to Amer-

ican investors in the nearby island only ninety miles rom Florida

During the 1950s the young lawyer Fidel Castro led a guerrilla

insurgency against Batista 1047297nally succeeding in prompting the

dictator to 1047298ee on January 1 195922 No sooner had Castro con-

solidated his control over Cuba than Eisenhower and the CIA di-




rector Allen Dulles (the brother o Secretary o State John Foster

Dulles) began to plot a coup to bring him down Castro was not

yet a hardcore Soviet ally though a partial US trade embargo

initiated by the Eisenhower administration in 1960 was pushing

Cuba in that direction US actions in 1961 would soon lead Cubaully into the Soviet camp Te CIA brieed Kennedy early in his

term about plans or a CIA-backed invasion o Cuba that would be

carried out by Cuban expatriates Te planning was ar advanced

as the CIA had prepared it in the 1047297nal year o the Eisenhower ad-

ministration

From the start Kennedy was deeply concerned not only about

the invasionrsquos chances o success but also about its implicationsor US-Soviet relations Tis would be among the 1047297rst major

moves in his new strategic game with Khrushchev and it would

be ar rom a cooperative one Kennedy eared speci1047297cally

that any action against Castro might prompt Soviet retaliation in

Berlin the hotspot o the Cold War Tis linkage was probably

exaggeratedmdashthe Soviets did not yet see Castro as vitalmdashbut it

played a role in Kennedyrsquos thinking Te planned invasion wasalso one o Kennedyrsquos 1047297rst oreign policy decisions He did not yet

have the con1047297dence to disregard the CIA and the military

Kennedy tried to have it both ways and ended up in a disas-

trous muddle He gave the green light to the CIA-based Cuban

invasion in April 1961 but he wanted ldquodeniabilityrdquo o US involve-

ment and so withheld key military backing such as air support

that was vital to any chance o military success Te hope o deni-ability was oolish the US role was obvious Kennedyrsquos prevarica-

tion guaranteed a complete ailure o the attack (a ailure that was

most likely in any event) ollowed by harsh international criticism

o the United States Te operation was too small or success but

too large or deniability Te expatriates who landed at the Bay o

Pigs were quickly killed or captured and the entire episode ended

ignominiously23

In the postmortem Kennedy met with Eisenhower to discuss




the botched operation and Eisenhower asked Kennedy why he

had denied air cover or the invasion Te historian Michael

Beschloss described the painul interchange

Kennedy said ldquoWell my advice was that we must try tokeep our hands rom showing in the affairrdquo Eisenhower

was aghast ldquoHow could you expect the world to believe

we had nothing to do with it Where did these people

get the ships to go rom Central America to Cuba

Where did they get the weapons I believe there is

only one thing to do when you go into this kind o thing

it must be a successrdquo24

By itsel the CIA operation was oolish naiumlve and incompe-

tently designed and managed Tis was par or the course or the

CIA which had bungled one operation afer another in many

parts o the world Te Bay o Pigs 1047297asco also con1047297rmed Kenne-

dyrsquos deep mistrust o the military which had begun with his expe-

rience in World War II Kennedy told reporter and riend BenBradlee ldquoTe 1047297rst advice Irsquom going to give my successor is to

watch the generals and to avoid eeling that just because they were

military men their opinions on military matters were worth a

damnrdquo25

It also contributed to a cascading set o errors Forced to appear

tough and decisive afer the very public ailure Kennedy quickly

called or increased military spending and harsher measures todestabilize the Castro regime26 Tese included a series o hare-

brained attempts to assassinate Castro part o the larger anti-

Castro strategy the CIA dubbed ldquoOperation Mongooserdquo27 As a

result both Castro and Khrushchev came to believe that Ken-

nedyrsquos next gambit would be a ull-1047298edged invasion o Cuba Tat

expectation contributed to the Cuban Missile Crisis the ollowing

year




Te Kennedy-Khrushchev private letters offer a remarkable in-

terchange regarding the Bay o Pigs Te letters beore the Bay o

Pigs are highly congenial the opening moves o con1047297dence build-

ing under the tit-or-tat strategy Khrushchev writes on Novem-

ber 9 1960 that he hopes Kennedyrsquos election will mean that ldquoourcountries would again ollow the line along which they were de-

veloping in Franklin Rooseveltrsquos timerdquo when the two countries

were allies28 He holds out the prospect o important agreements

ldquowe are ready or our part to continue efforts to solve such a press-

ing problem as disarmament to settle the German issue through

the earliest conclusion o a peace treaty and to reach agreement on

other questionsrdquo29 Kennedy responds that ldquoa just and lasting peacewill remain a undamental goal o this nation and a major task o

its Presidentrdquo30 Tey begin to arrange an early summit meeting

Yet the tone cracks in Khrushchevrsquos letter o April 18 two days

afer the Cuban invasion

Mr President I send you this message in an hour o

alarm raught with danger or the peace o the wholeworld Armed aggression has begun against Cuba It is a

secret to no one that the armed bands invading this

country were trained equipped and armed in the

United States o America31

ldquoI approach you Mr Presidentrdquo Khrushchev writes ldquowith an

urgent call to put an end to aggression against the Republic oCubardquo

Kennedyrsquos answer the same day is dreadully maladroit ldquoYou

are under a serious misapprehension in regard to the events in

Cubardquo he replies ldquoI have previously stated and I repeat now that

the United States intends no military intervention in Cubardquo32 Tis

patently alse denial brings a powerul rebuke rom Khrushchev

our days later




I have received your reply o April 18 You write that the

United States intends no military intervention in Cuba

But numerous acts known to the whole worldmdashand to

the Government o the United States o course better

than to any one elsemdashspeak differently Despite all as-surances to the contrary it has now been proved beyond

doubt that it was precisely the United States which pre-

pared the intervention 1047297nanced its arming and trans-

ported the gangs o mercenaries that invaded the

territory o Cuba33

Kennedyrsquos denial marked the second notable US presidentiallie to Khrushchev in less than a year Te previous summer the

CIA had pressed Eisenhower to permit another round o U-2 spy

1047298ights over the Soviet Union He reluctantly agreed When a U-2

plane was shot down the CIA and Eisenhower assumed that the

pilot Francis Gary Powers had been killed and the plane de-

stroyed in the crash Tey thereore publicly lied about the mis-

sion claiming that a US weather-research plane had lost its wayand crashed in Soviet airspace Khrushchev then revealed Eisen-

howerrsquos lie by producing not only the U-2 wreckage but the live

pilot as well US per1047297dy was exposed and Eisenhower was orced

to take responsibility Yet this was not a simple public relations

victory or Khrushchev It was a bitter setback or Khrushchevrsquos

concept o peaceul coexistence It also undercut his domestic

credibility as he had initially deended Eisenhower as not respon-sible or the U-2 1047298ight and the exposure o Eisenhowerrsquos lie

seemed to give credence to the Soviet hardliners who argued that

the United States could not be trusted Khrushchev soon enough

would demonstrate his capacity to lie about weighty matters as

well the Cold War was not a game played by saints Yet the back-

to-back prevarications by Eisenhower and Kennedy surely em-

Te U-2 1047298ights were seen even by the United States as serious provocations to theUSSR and violations o international law




boldened Khrushchev in his own uture dissembling regarding

nuclear testing and Cuba

In a ollow-up letter to Kennedy (May 16) Khrushchev ac-

knowledges that ldquoa certain open alling out has taken place in the

relations between our countriesrdquo34 Yet he set the ground or anupcoming June meeting with Kennedy in Vienna by emphasizing

the key point he sees the importance o a US-Soviet settlement

on Germany Te ate o postwar Germany had proved a constant

source o tension between the two superpowers since the dawn o

the Cold War and never more so than when Kennedy took offi ce

It is thereore crucial to revisit some o this history

At the July 1945 Potsdam conerence at the end o World War IIit was agreed that a council o the our major Allied powers (the

United States the United Kingdom France and the Soviet Union)

would administer postwar Germany but the ldquohowrdquo was lef un-

speci1047297ed35 In the short term the our powers accepted that Ger-

many would be divided into our occupation zones and that each

occupying power would manage its own zone until longer-term

arrangements or a uni1047297ed Germany could be agreed upon Tecapital city o Berlin though alling within the Soviet zone was

also divided among the our powers But the longer-term arrange-

ments or Germany were never agreed upon and relations be-

tween the West and the Soviet Union quickly deteriorated once

there was no common enemy o Hitler to unite them36 Te United

States France and the United Kingdom soon amalgamated their

occupation zones into a single entity which in 1949 became theFederal Republic o Germany (West Germany) Te Soviet zone

became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Te

ailure to agree on the ate o a uni1047297ed Germany sowed the seeds

or many o the Cold War con1047298icts that ollowed

Herein lay the basic dilemma Te Soviet Unionmdashwhich had

lost more than twenty million soldiers and civilians in World

War IImdasheared a German resurgence and thereby asserted harsh

control over the Soviet occupation zone o Germany Not only




that but Joseph Stalin the brutal leader o the Soviet Union since

the mid-1920s ruthlessly created satellite states in Eastern Europe

(in Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia Poland and elsewhere) under

single-party communist rule thereby establishing a controlling

corridor rom Russia all the way to the heart o Germany o theWestern powers these actions seemed to suggest a Soviet plan to

dominate all o Europe i not the world While US leaders had

initially avored deindustrializing Germany at the end o the war

to prevent it rom again becoming an economic and military

power37 they quickly changed their minds in the ace o the per-

ceived Soviet aggression Tey instead decided to reindustrialize

the western part o Germany as rapidly as possible as a bulwarkagainst the Soviet Union and to strengthen Western Europe gen-

erally38 Te Soviet Union viewed the hardening o US positions

as a violation o agreements intended to prevent a long-term re-

surgence o German power

Itrsquos not hard to see where this led As West Germany got stron-

ger Soviet anxieties rose As the Soviet Unionrsquos anxieties rose it

became more belligerent in response and the West then becameeven more determined to rebuild West Germany to resist Soviet

domination Tis explosive dynamic continued afer Kennedyrsquos

assumption o offi ce

Making things even more diffi cult or Kennedy was the act that

Eisenhower had proved neither very attentive nor interested in

the Soviet concerns vis-agrave-vis Germany Eisenhower stood strongly

in avor o Germanyrsquos economic and military recovery in part be-cause he wanted Western Europe to deend itsel so that US

troops could return home39 Eisenhower liked neither the cost o

stationing US troops in Europe nor the long-term political com-

mitment Eisenhower believed that US commitments should be

tapered down as soon as Europe could take up the burdens o its

own deense40 And i that even meant a Western Europe with nu-

clear weapons he was generally or it

In the 1047297nal years o the Eisenhower administration in response




to the European desire or nuclear weapons the United States and

NAOmdashthe military alliance o Western powers ormed in 1955mdash

began 1047298oating the idea o ldquonuclear sharingrdquo among the NAO

countries perhaps through a nuclear Multilateral Force (MLF)

Te United States saw the MLF as a way to share nuclear weaponswith allies and give Europe its own deterrent without having to

give any one nation ull control and the power to launch a nuclear

weapon unilaterally41 Tis prospect particularly o West German

nuclear access was a crucial actor in the dramatic heating up o

US-Soviet tensions in the lead-up to Kennedyrsquos presidency Tis

point is made orceully by the historian Marc rachtenberg in A

Constructed Peace (1999) one o the most incisive and importanthistorical analyses o this phase o the Cold War

Kennedy did not yet have a strategy or Germany and indeed

was pressed hard by the West German leader Konrad Adenauer

not to have one From Adenauerrsquos point o view any thaw in rela-

tions between the United States and the Soviet Union would likely

come at West Germanyrsquos expense But Kennedy would listen to

and learn rom Khrushchevrsquos repeated and heated concerns overGermany especially concerning Germanyrsquos acquisition o nuclear

weapons Kennedy would eventually break with Adenauer on that

question thereby paving the way to closer cooperation with the

Soviet Union But that breakthrough was still two years in the u-

ture and dire risks were strewn on the path to success

Berlin Redux

Following the Bay o Pigs debacle it was now Khrushchevrsquos turn

to misstep badly With Kennedy on his back oot Khrushchev be-

lieved that he was now in a position to pressure Kennedy into an

agreement on Germany which was Khrushchevrsquos primary oreign

policy concern Kennedyrsquos primary interest was in discussing a

nuclear test ban treaty which he elt was essential to slowing the




arms race and nuclear prolieration one o Kennedyrsquos mostpressing concerns Te idea o a test ban treaty had been dis-

cussed or several years but the two sides were never able to get

past their disagreements on how such an agreement would be

enorced

At the Vienna Summit o June 1961 Khrushchev ensured that

Germany and Berlin rather than a test ban treaty dominated

the discussion Khrushchev told Kennedy that the Soviet Unionwould recognize the German Democratic Republic (East Ger-

many) and end Western access rights to West Berlin by the end o

1961 America and its allies viewed access to West Berlin as a vital

interest o the Western alliance and so Khrushchevrsquos threat was an

enormous provocation I war came rom this it would come said

Khrushchev He said that Berlin was a ldquorunning sorerdquo and that

disarmament was ldquoimpossible as long as the Berlin problem ex-

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev with President Kennedy at the start o the

Vienna Summit (June 3 1961)




istedrdquo42 Kennedy responded ldquoTen Mr Chairman there will be a

war It will be a cold long winterrdquo43

In act the diffi cult interchange brought the two leaders a little

closer to a solution though they certainly could not see it at the

time Tere were actually three German issues on the table allintricately intertwined Te 1047297rst was the Soviet desire or a peace

treaty with Germany that would somehow protect the Soviet

Union rom uture German aggression Te second was West Ber-

lin which Khrushchev considered to be ldquothis thorn this ulcerrdquo

within East Germany44 Khrushchev viewed West Berlin as a stag-

ing post or Western spying and aggression against the Soviet

Union ldquoa NAO beachhead and military base against us insidethe GDRrdquo45 He wanted the Western troops out Te third issue

involved the question o German rearmament and especially

German access to US nuclear weapons Te implicit progress

made in Vienna was a start in teasing apart these three issues

Kennedy would hold his ground on West Berlin but would also

recognize Khrushchevrsquos valid concerns about German rearma-

ment Kennedy made clear to Khrushchev in Vienna that he op-posed ldquoa buildup in West Germany that would constitute a threat

to the Soviet Unionrdquo46

History has judged that Kennedy ldquolostrdquo the Vienna Summit be-

cause he was browbeaten by Khrushchev particularly when the

two quarreled over ideology Indeed Kennedy himsel described

the Vienna experience as brutal telling a New York imes reporter

that it was the ldquoworst thing in my lie He savaged merdquo

47

Yet Ken-nedy in act had held 1047297rm and clear the West would not buckle

under threats on West Berlin More important and despite all

appearances Kennedy and Khrushchev were now on a path to

resolve the larger German issues a path they would pursue suc-

cessully in 1963

But the next act on Berlin would be a public relations disaster

or the Soviet Union As tensions over Berlin mounted more and




more East Berliners voted with their eet by crossing the line to

West Berlin and rom there to the West generally During the 1047297rst

six months o 1961 over 100000 people lef East Germany with

50000 1047298eeing in June and July alone48 Te ongoing exodus o

East Berliners was a huge economic loss to a 1047298oundering econ-omy but an even starker daily embarrassment in the rontline

competition between socialism and capitalism It was one o the

main reasons why Khrushchev sought a long-term solution to

Berlin

As the 1047298ow o East Berliners accelerated so did the geopolitical

pressures Finally the East German government with the support

o its Soviet backers moved to stanch the human 1047298ood Berlinwoke up on the morning o August 13 to a barbed wire divide

soon to be a concrete and heavily armed wall patrolled by around

7000 soldiers and stretching 96 miles in Berlin and along the bor-

der between East and West Germany49

Kennedy wisely did not challenge the Berlin Wall except in a

perunctory manner recognizing that any challenge or protest

would prove empty Te West would certainly not go to war overSoviet actions on the Soviet side o the wall Indeed Kennedy im-

mediately and correctly surmised that the wall might actually

prove to be stabilizing in its perverse way by removing the embar-

rassing and costly provocation o mass outmigration rom East

Berlin As he suspected the end o the 1047298ow o migrants rom

East Berlin rather quickly eased the Berlin crisis

In act the overall Berlin situation seemed to Kennedy to be adangerous snare that was certainly not worth the risks o global

war Afer the Vienna Summit Kennedy had commented to his

close aide Kenneth OrsquoDonnell

Wersquore stuck in a ridiculous situation God knows Irsquom

not an isolationist but it seems particularly stupid to

risk killing a million Americans over an argument about

access rights on an Autobahn or because the Ger-




mans want Germany reuni1047297ed I Irsquom going to threaten

Russia with a nuclear war it will have to be or much

bigger and more important reasons than that Beore I

back Khrushchev against the wall and put him to a 1047297nal

test the reedom o all Western Europe will have to be atstake50

Kennedy would continue successully to deend West Berlin

but he would also recognize the need to move to a sounder long-

term position with the Soviet Union vis-agrave-vis Germany Tat in-

sight was crucial to Kennedyrsquos eventual success in 1963 and to the

calming o the East-West conrontation thereafer It was a basicstrategic insight that Eisenhower never recognized or acted upon



Excerpted from To Move the World by Jeffrey D Sachs Copyright copy 2013 by Jeffrey D Sachs Excerpted

by permission of Random House a division of Random House Inc All rights reserved No part of this

excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher

Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers

Learn more about the book

Meet Jeffrey D Sachs at a book signing



Chapter 983089

TH E QUEST FOR PEACE

983127 983144 983141 983150 983114 983151 983144 983150 983110 983115 983141 983150 983150 983141 983140 983161 came to offi ce in January 1961

the world lived in peril o a nuclear war between the two super-

powers Te Cold War conrontation between the United Statesand the Soviet Union would eventually consume trillions o dol-

lars and millions o lives in wars ought around the world At times

humanity seemed to be ldquogripped by orces we cannot controlrdquo a

pessimistic view that Kennedy noted and strenuously argued

against in his Peace Speech And yet the power o those disruptive

orces at times was indeed nearly overwhelming causing events

to spin beyond the control even o presidents Communist Partychairmen and the countries they led

Te Cold War was in every sense a stepchild o the two world

wars Tose wars created the structures o geopolitics military

might and perhaps most important o all the psychological

mindsets that determined the course o the Cold War John Ken-

nedyrsquos peace strategy would emerge rom his intimate under-

standing o the dynamics that had driven the two wars Te 1047297rst



4 To Move the World


















Second World War





miscalculation

2













phers














war4
















6 To Move the World


out o war6




























































8 To Move the World






















o the Brink





















Munich




ber 6 1960)








our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers





4 To Move the World


















Second World War





miscalculation

2













phers














war4
















6 To Move the World


out o war6




























































8 To Move the World






















o the Brink





















Munich




ber 6 1960)








our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers








phers














war4
















6 To Move the World


out o war6




























































8 To Move the World






















o the Brink





















Munich




ber 6 1960)








our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers





6 To Move the World


out o war6




























































8 To Move the World






















o the Brink





















Munich




ber 6 1960)








our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers





































8 To Move the World






















o the Brink





















Munich




ber 6 1960)








our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers

















Munich




ber 6 1960)








our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers










our strength13








































gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers

















gains o cooperation















































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers


































better relations












































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers













































































ministration




















ignominiously23























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers
























damnrdquo25









year






























our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers
































our days later












territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers














territory o Cuba33














































































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers





























































































Berlin Redux













enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers









enorced






































47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers





























47





cessully in 1963













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers













Berlin








































Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers





















Read more

TO MOVE THE WORLD

Order your copy now

Amazon

Barnes amp Noble

IndieBound

Kindle

Nook

iBookstore

Kobo

Google

Other Retailers



to move the world by jeffrey d. sachs (an excerpt)

Documents