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To: Environment and Planning Committee’s Inquiry ‘Potential benefits to Victoria in removing prohibitions enacted by the Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983’ Rosamund Krivanek

Terms of Reference – General: Potential benefits to Victoria in removing prohibitions enacted by the Nuclear

Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983

My submission assumes it is relevant to comment on the possible harms of the nominated course of

action as well as the potential benefits. The action being contemplated is ‘removing prohibitions

enacted by the Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983’ (the Act).

(Terms of Reference pursuant to Legislative Council motion on 14 August 2019)

Provisions that could be affected are:

section 5 of the Act, to enable ‘exploration, mining and quarrying of uranium and thorium in

Victoria’ (Term of Reference 1)

section 8, to enable ‘participat[ion] in the nuclear fuel cycle’ (Term of Reference 3) could

entail removing prohibitions on ‘constructing or operating—

a mill for the production of uranium or thorium ore concentrates,

a facility for conversion or enrichment of any nuclear material’,

a facility for the fabrication of fuels for use in nuclear reactors’, ‘a nuclear reactor

or a nuclear power reactor’,

a facility for reprocessing spent fuel,

a facility for the storage or disposal of any nuclear materials (including any

waste) resulting from any of the processes or facilities….’

It is unlikely that the prohibitions in section 9 are intended for removal since that would have the

effect of permitting possession, use, sale, transport, storage and disposal of nuclear material without

a management or use licence or an exemption under section 16 of the Radiation Act 2005.

The section 11 prohibition on government funding for exploring, mining or quarrying for uranium or

thorium should remain.

In 2015 the IAEA’s voice was joined to the OECD’s in advocating government intervention to

support the development and marketing of small modular reactors.

(Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2015 Edition, Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development/International Energy Agency, page 160 (pdf 162 of 215;

https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ElecCost2015.pdf Copyright © 2015,

30 September 2015 version)

However, in 2019 the IAEA stated:

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Next generation nuclear plants driven by fast reactors can reduce the spent

fuel discharged per unit of energy produced by factors of around 100 as well

as provide other inherent safety and security benefits. However, the

development and implementation of these technologies on a commercial

scale will require decades. (Emphasis added)

(Storing spent fuel until transport to reprocessing or disposal, IAEA Nuclear

Energy Series No. NF-T-3.3P (IAEA No NF-T-3.3P1846), International

Atomic Energy Agency, 2019, footnote 5, p 20, pdf 30 of 54,

https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/P1846_web.pdf,

accessed 26.2.2020)

Term of Reference 1: Investigate the potential for Victoria to contribute to global low carbon dioxide

energy production through enabling exploration and production of uranium and thorium;

Term of Reference 1 implies that exploration and production of uranium and thorium would be low-

carbon processes.

Exploration and production of uranium and thorium are unlikely to contribute to a low-carbon future

within Victoria or Australia .

The federal government proposes to establish a national radioactive waste management facility for

permanent disposal of low level waste (LLW) and short-term storage of intermediate level waste

(ILW). (https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/canavan/media-releases/national-

radioactive-waste-management-facility-napandee-site , accessed 27.2.2020). A central repository

would necessitate long journeys between origin and storage, treatment and disposal. For the

foreseeable future, the movement of materials over very long distances would be responsible for

increased carbon emissions from the largely carbon-based transport fleet. Some wastes require

treatment over hundreds of years before they can be placed in ‘disposal’. Retrieval, re-casing, re-

ponding, involve many processes and movements, all entailing the use of energy.

The following puts some timescales on low-level waste (LLW):

Classes of low level waste

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has LLW broken

into three different classes: A, B, and C. These classes are based on

the wastes' concentration, half-life, as well as what types

of radionuclides it contains.[2]

Class A consists of radionuclides with

the shortest half-life and lowest concentrations. This class makes up

95% of LLW and its radioactivity levels return to background levels

within 100 years.[2]

Classes B and C contain greater concentrations of

radionuclides with longer half-lives, fading to background levels in

less than 500 years. They must meet stricter disposal requirements

than Class A waste. Any LLW that exceeds the requirements for

class C waste is known as “Greater Than Class C”; this material

makes up less than 1 percent of all LLW and is the responsibility of

the United States Department of Energy under federal law.[2]

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(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low-

level_radioactive_waste_policy_of_the_United_States

downloaded 30.9.2019)

It is proposed that a central facility at the Napandee site in South Australia replace the 100 or so sites

said to store nuclear waste around Australia. The Minister’s media release states that 80 per cent of

the waste to be accommodated results from the use of nuclear medicine. This figure does not include

the voluminous deposits of tailings and spoil from uranium and thorium mining, which will remain

in situ, causing the affected sites and environs to be unusable effectively in perpetuity.

A Department of Environment technical memorandum of 1994 is informative regarding the

longevity of radioactivity in mining tailings:

(https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/7baf0bdd-a928-4d58-a0a7-

1e7e5647ca3c/files/tm48.pdf , downloaded 30.9.2019)

The federal government has yet to identify a site for the permanent disposal of ILW (intermediate

level waste), which has more complex and stringent requirements. Again, a central repository is

sought. Procurement of suitable central repositories, particularly for intermediate and higher level of

wastes, has eluded governments everywhere.

If and when an ILW storage and disposal facility is established, it would have some advantages over

the current multiplicity of sites where waste is held, managed and periodically treated at or near

ground level, close to non-nuclear facilities and unrelated land-uses.

A central facility would ‘potentially store intermediate-level waste on a temporary basis’.

(https://www.arpansa.gov.au/regulation-and-licensing/safety-security-transport/radioactive-waste-

disposal-and-storage/radioactive-waste, accessed 27.2.2020) At what intervals would the

intermediate level waste need to be retrieved from storage for treatment, recasement and return to

storage? Over what time frame would this occur? Would the storage facility incorporate the

necessary materials handling and processing capabilities or would the deteriorating containers be re-

transported around Australis for the purpose, then brought back to storage? Who is going to do this

in the year 2200, or 2400?

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The journeys and movements over very long time scales would demand energy which, in Australia

currently and for many decades to come, is likely to be supplied by carbon energy. Until transport is

decarbonised, these movements would cause greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere. This is

not consistent with the Victorian government’s commitment to a clean economy. Nor is the move to

open up more extensive mining of uranium and thorium-bearing ores. The mining process itself is

energy–intensive. Extraction, milling and trasnport will remain carbon-intensive for the foreseeable

future.

The nuclear waste site planned for Napandee would not deal with the large quantities of radioactive

waste from mining operations.

Australia has accumulated almost 5,000 cubic metres of radioactive waste

(around the volume of two Olympic size swimming pools). This does not

include uranium mining wastes, which are disposed of at mine sites.

(https://www.aph.gov.au/About Parliament/Parliamentary Departments/Parl

iamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/RadioactiveWaste)

The much larger quantities of radioactive mining waste left permanently at source will need to be

avoided in perpetuity. The storage, treatment and disposal task spoken of is therefore artificially

small.

If the policy of leaving bulk radioactive materials in situ continues, it would be deeply unfair to

present inhabitants, title holders and future generations to open up more sites to mining of

radioactive materials.

Equally important to address is the implied contrast between carbon emissions and nuclear waste in

terms of their environmental impacts. They have an outstanding characteristic in common: they are

serious pollutants. One harms the immediate air shed and the atmosphere as a whole. The other

poisons the air shed, water, unprotected humans, other life forms, soil, and the wider atmosphere in

the event of a major uncontrolled event.

An uncontrolled nuclear reaction in a nuclear reactor could result in

widespread contamination of air and water. (https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/nuclear/nuclear-power-and-the-

environment.php)

There will be no net gain to future generations if one pollutant (for which there are renewable

alternatives) is substituted by another that has more insidious impacts requiring control and

management on timescales far into the future.

Where conditions are highly uncertain and of long duration, the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) characterises the approach needed as ‘extending spent fuel storage one step at a time’.

(IAEA Safety Standards Series No SSG-15, Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel at 2.1.1) The approach

needs to be more than the ‘wait-and-see or find-and-fix approach to SFM [spent fuel management]’

that it notes with disapproval. (IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NF-T-3.3P (IAEA No NF-T-

3.3P1846), p 21, pdf 31 of 54)

The ‘stepped’ approach is referred to again in the 2019 publication Storing spent fuel until transport

to reprocessing or disposal. (IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NF-T-3.3P (IAEA No NF-T-

3.3P1846):

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In theory, spent fuel storage facilities could be designed with materials,

inspection and maintenance capabilities to support operations for perhaps

several hundred years. However, when the associated costs are considered, it

may be preferable in some instances to design for a more modest lifetime and

purposely plan for significant refurbishment of facilities and equipment and

possible repackaging of spent fuel at that time.

(Page 11, pdf 21 of 54)

The same publication says:

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission considers 300 years of

storage to be appropriate for the characterization and prediction of ageing

effects and ageing management issues for extended storage and

transport [7]. (Emphasis added)

(https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/P1846_web.pdf,

accessed 26.2.2020)

It continues:

Continued generation and storage of spent fuel without full commitment

to a clearly defined end point is not a sustainable policy. … Storage for

longer and longer periods is not considered consistent with the

responsibility to protect people and the environment without imposing

undue burdens on future generations [2, 3].

(Ibid, [2.3])

Footnote 3 on page 10 of the same publication indicates how the need for continuing control and risk

management might be communicated to future generations:

The HLW inside the HABOG facility, the Netherlands, will gradually decay

until future generations and governments decide on the method of disposal of

the radioactive waste. This process of decay is symbolized by the orange

colour of the building, selected by its designer, Ewoud Verhoef, because it is

halfway between red and green. The exterior of the building will be

periodically repainted in successively lighter shades until it reaches white in

about 100 years, by which time the thermal output of the waste will have

reduced by one order of magnitude.

For the benefit of indigenous and other communities 100 or 300 years from now, for travellers of all

sorts and outback entrepreneurs, we need to consider how long a coat of paint lasts, how long a sign

remains standing and legible and whether it would be compelling or merely curious after 80 or more

years.

The IAEA places strong reliance on the inherent capabilities and robust longevity of existing

administrative and technical systems, despite the historical record of disruption and change.

[E]xtending spent fuel storage need not be viewed as passing an undue burden to future

generations if the means for assuring an acceptable end point are also passed along. This

would include the necessary financial resources, governance and regulatory infrastructure,

technical capabilities, and records and information, among other things [10]. (IAEA Nuclear

Energy Series No. NF-T-3.3P (IAEA No NF-T-3.3P1846), p 21, pdf 31 of 54)

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Where the above might fail, ‘the government’ is invoked:

If the licensee, for any reason, fails to satisfactorily maintain the licence, the

responsibility for enforcing requirements and ensuring safety will ultimately

fall on the government. …

It continues:

Society attends to matters considered important, so it is expected that spent

fuel will remain under institutional control for as long as it is considered to be

a hazard. Spent fuel will remain hazardous for many centuries, so the

question of institutional control becomes largely an issue of proper

application of the principles of ethics and sustainability — specifically of

ensuring that the burden is not to be passed to future generations.

The great exception to the previous statement is, apparently, the present generation. The

statement is precisely about the present generation passing on the burden to future

generations.

‘Institutional control’ is spoken of as readily achievable:

‘[It] is largely a matter of assuring the financial, human and technical

resources necessary for safe and effective storage and disposal or

reprocessing of the spent fuel and disposal of any associated waste.’

(Ibid, p 28, pdf 38 of 54)

THORIUM

USA EPA Fact sheet 175255 (accessed 23.2.2020)

https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/175255.pdf

Thorium is present at very low levels almost everywhere in the natural

environment, everyone is exposed to it in air, food, and water. Normally, very

little of the thorium in lakes, rivers, and oceans is absorbed by the fish or seafood

that a person eats. The amounts in the air are usually small and do not constitute

a health hazard.

Exposure to higher levels of thorium may occur if a person lives near an

industrial facility that mines, mills, or manufactures products with thorium.

Thorium-232 on the ground is of a health risk because of the rapid build-up of

radium-228 and its associated gamma radiation. Thorium-232 is typically

present with its decay product radium-224, which will produce radon-220 gas,

also known as thoron, and its decay products that result in lung exposure.

Thorium-230 is part of the uranium-238 decay series. Thorium-230 is typically

present with its decay product radium- 226, and it is therefore a health risk from

gamma radiation from radium-226 decay products, lung exposure from radon-

222 gas and its decay products, and inhalation and ingestion exposure.

How does thorium get into the body?

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Thorium can enter the body when it is inhaled or swallowed. In addition, radium

can come from thorium deposited in the body. Thorium enters the body mainly

through inhalation of contaminated dust. If a person inhales thorium into the

lungs, some may remain there for long periods of time. In most cases, the small

amount of thorium left in the lungs will leave the body in the feces and urine

within days.

If thorium is swallowed in water or with food, most of it will promptly leave the

body in the feces. The small amount of thorium left in the body will enter the

bloodstream and be deposited in the bones, where it may remain for many years.

(USA EPA Fact sheet 175255, accessed 23.2.2020

https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/175255.pdf)

Thorium-based nuclear power generation is fueled primarily by the nuclear fission of

the isotope uranium-233 produced from the fertile element thorium.

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium-based nuclear power , accessed 25.2.2020)

Proponents … cite the lack of easy weaponization potential as an advantage of thorium

due to how difficult it is to weaponize the specific uranium-233/232 and plutonium-

238 isotopes produced by thorium reactors, while critics say that development of breeder

reactors in general (including thorium reactors, which are breeders by nature) increases

proliferation concerns. As of 2020, there are no operational thorium reactors in the world

(Ibid)

See also https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/substances/thorium

(accessed 20/2/2020): thorium can cause liver, lung, pancreas and bone cancers.

Some disadvantages of thorium nuclear power are said to be:

Breeding in a thermal neutron spectrum is slow and requires

extensive reprocessing. The feasibility of reprocessing is still open.[28]

Significant and expensive testing, analysis and licensing work is first

required, requiring business and government support.[16]

In a 2012

report on the use of thorium fuel with existing water-cooled reactors,

the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists suggested that it would "require

too great an investment and provide no clear payoff", and that "from

the utilities’ point of view, the only legitimate driver capable of

motivating pursuit of thorium is economics".[29]

There is a higher cost of fuel fabrication and reprocessing than in

plants using traditional solid fuel rods.[16][27]

Thorium, when being irradiated for use in reactors, makes uranium-

232, which emits gamma rays. This irradiation process may be altered

slightly by removing protactinium-233. The irradiation would then

make uranium-233 in lieu of uranium-232 for use in nuclear

weapons—making thorium into a dual purpose fuel.[30]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium-based nuclear power)

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Term of Reference 2: Identify economic, environmental and social benefits for Victoria, including those

related to medicine, scientific research, exploration and mining

There is no implied claim in this term of reference that only uranium and thorium mining

employment could provide economic and social benefits. Nuclear medicine and scientific research

are established activities that do not rely on a hugely expanded nuclear industry.

I address environmental criteria under Terms of Reference 1 and 4.

Term of Reference 3: Identify opportunities for Victoria to participate in the nuclear fuel cycle

The nuclear fuel cycle has high externalities throughout its cycle - from materials extraction and

delivery, through processing and application stages to the interminable waste treatment, management

and disposal problems. It could not be described as an economic boon or a social good.

The recently announced storage and LLW (low level waste) disposal site to be developed at

Napandee is expected to employ 45 people.

(https://www.industry.gov.au/news-media/national-radioactive-waste-management-facility-

news/napandee-identified-to-host-the-national-radioactive-waste-management-facility)

Term of Reference 4: Identify any barriers to participation, including limitations caused by federal or

local laws and regulations.

Numerous federal laws, treaty obligations and codes are relevant to Term of Reference 4. They set

out detailed and exacting conditions of participation that would amount to barriers to participation if

the conditions could not be met in the strictest terms.

I list a few examples of the relevant Australian laws, codes and international instruments; there are

many more.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) and its annexures

including:

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with its annexures including:

Schedule 3—Agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency

for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons;

Schedule 4—Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

Examples of related national codes are:

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

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Code for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (Radiation Protection Series C-2

(Rev. 1) March 2019, ARPANSA(Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety

Agency)

The proposed central storage, treatment and disposal facility(s), while having some obvious

economies and advantages in terms of quality control and oversight, would also create exposure over

long distances, possibly with a multitude of sub-contracted operators, in related transport of nuclear

materials. It would also expose other road users and roadside communities to risks.

Proliferation – extraction, enrichment, application and waste management including spent fuels –

also augments the Non-proliferation task with regard to nuclear weapons. Australia is currently party

to discussions towards a Fissile Materia Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Fissile material (highly enriched uranium, plutonium and potentially other

materials) is the central component to the composition of nuclear weapons.

An FMCT, a central element to the "progressive" approach to nuclear

disarmament, would be a quantitative disarmament measure by reducing the

amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons.

(https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-

disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-issues/Pages/australias-policy.aspx) In its National Statement to the Nuclear Summit In Washington (2016), Australia said:

[T]errorists will seek to exploit the weakest link, misuse technology and take

advantage of any lack of international cooperation in their quest to cause

catastrophic damage and loss of life. This is why Australia fully supports

high standards of nuclear security to prevent the theft of nuclear materials or

sabotage of nuclear facilities.

Australia’s commitment to nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation

is longstanding. Even prior to the first nuclear security summit in 2010,

Australia had ratified the 2005 Amendment of the Convention on the

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, was already using low enriched

uranium technology to fuel its research reactor and produce medical isotopes,

was engaging strongly with the IAEA and regionally on promoting high

standards of nuclear security, and was a regular contributor to the IAEA’s

nuclear security fund since its inception in 2002.

Since the first Washington summit, Australia has ratified the International

Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, hosted an

IAEA Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) peer-review mission

and has invited the IAEA to conduct a follow-up mission in 2017. Australia

also has repatriated highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States.

(http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/national-statement-

australia)

Nevertheless, fully effective materials control is difficult to achieve. The result of an

IAEA inspection included the following:

During the reporting period the IAEA conducted inspections in accordance with

standard arrangements under Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and

the Additional Protocol. Inspections were conducted at ANSTO’s Lucas Heights site,

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Monash University, and CSIRO’s site at Clayton, Victoria. The IAEA conducted its

annual, scheduled physical inventory verification inspection at ANSTO in May, and a

short notice random inspection in September. Details on all inspections are provided

in Table 10, and the IAEA’s findings from these inspections (where available at the

time of publishing this Annual Report) are listed in Appendix D.

ASNO officers facilitated access for the IAEA inspectors in accordance

with conditions under respective permits issued under the Safeguards Act

and accompanied the inspectors during all of their activities. The IAEA’s

91(b) statement of conclusions (See Appendix B) for material balance

area AS-C for the period 1 June 2016 to 5 April 2017 included: “The

IAEA also concluded to the extent possible that declared nuclear material

has been accounted for although it is noted that verification of much of

the enriched uranium inventory is pending the implementation of a

suitable method.”

The related Table 11 follows:

Table 11 Inventory Differences Recorded during 2017–18

MATERIAL BALANCE AREA

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BOOK AND PHYSICAL INVENTORY*

COMMENT

ANSTO research laboratories (MBA AS-C)

0.00 (0.01) g enriched 235U Corrections of rounding errors in batch weights.

Other locations (MBA AS-E) –0.49 kg depleted uranium –0.02 (–0.02) g enriched 235U –0.03 (–0.03) g enriched 233U 0.38 kg natural uranium 0.17 kg thorium

Primarily due to re-measurements of batches.

Other locations (MBA ASE1) 5.71 kg depleted uranium 0.05 (0.00)g enriched 235U 0.08 kg natural uranium <0.01 kg thorium

Primarily due to re-measurements of batches (including one batch of legacy depleted uranium counter weights from aircraft).

CSIRO (MBA AS-I) –2.02 kg depleted uranium –0.03 kg natural uranium –0.26 kg thorium

Re-measurement of batches as part of efforts by CSIRO to more accurately characterise its inventory.

(https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/corporate/annual-reports/asno-annual-report-

2017-18/html/section-2/australias-uranium-production-and-exports.html#waste-

disposal p 48, pdf 56 of 136) These discrepancies occurred in the context of a limited number of facilities for

medical and scientific purposes in the hands of people trained and practised in high-

precision work and ethical standards.

Widening extraction and processing activities and adding nuclear power generation

would greatly increase the size and complexity of the task of managing radioactive

materials.

ANSO’s Annual Report of 2001-2002 also reported discrepancies: pages 27-28

(https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22pub

lications%2Ftabledpapers%2F15777%22;src1=sm1)

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A major focus of IAEA inspection activity is the identification and

evaluation of ‘material unaccounted for’ (MUF), that is, the difference

between the records maintained by the operator (the ‘ending book

inventory’) and the physical inventory verified by the IAEA. Since MUF

is the difference between two measured quantities, it may be equal to

zero, or it may be either a positive or negative value. If MUF is positive

it does not necessarily indicate that material has been lost, nor does a

negative figure mean that material has somehow been created. In many

cases MUF can be attributed to unavoidable measurement differences,

but where the size of the MUF is outside the range expected from

measurement difference further investigation is required.

In 2000-01 there was MUF in three material categories in MBA AS-C

(R&D Laboratories). For enriched uranium, the Physical Inventory was

greater than the Book Inventory by 2.36 grams of uranium element and

0.06 grams ofU-235 isotope—this was within the expected measurement

difference. For natural uranium, the Physical Inventory was less than the

Book Inventory by 0.34 kilogram—this MUF related to a small

container of natural uranium powder which was mislaid. While

investigation showed some ways in which this material may have been

used, it was not possible to identify from the operator’s records where

the material was or where it had been used. For depleted uranium, the

Physical Inventory was less than the Book Inventory by 0.12 kilogram—

this difference was under investigation at the time of writing. ANSI O

has undertaken to strengthen its accountancy and control system to

prevent a recurrence.

The IAEA reports all conclusions drawn from its routine safeguards

inspections in Australia, including comments on any MUF, in the

statements provided pursuant to Article 91(b) of Australia’s NPT

safeguards agreement (see Annex E for details).

The above types of materials discrepancies (in 2017-2018 and 2001-2002) may well be

occurring more regularly. They are illustrative of the difficulty of accounting fully for

the hazardous materials even under relatively simple and confined conditions.

In light of the announcement of a central waste site at Napandee, it is worth considering the Code

recommended for adoption by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

(ARPANSA) concerning site selection for disposal of solid radioactive waste. Conditions at sites

evaluated, including Napandee, were said to be suitable ‘with mitigation’.

Radiological protection criteria

3.1.28 Site selection criteria related to radiological protection that must be

considered are listed below. A potential site is not required to comply with all

of these criteria. However, there must be compensating factors in the design

of the facility to overcome any deficiency in the physical characteristics of

the site unless such compensating factors are deemed unreasonable, in which

case another site should be identified.

The criteria for the site are that:

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a) the site is located in an area of low rainfall, free from flooding, with good

surface drainage features, and generally stable geomorphology

b) the water table in the area is at a sufficient depth above or below the planned

disposal structures to ensure that groundwater is unlikely to impact on the

waste, and the hydrogeological setting is such that large fluctuations in the

water table are unlikely

c) the geological structure and hydrogeological conditions permit modelling of

groundwater gradients and movement, and enable prediction of radionuclide

migration times and patterns

d) the site is located away from any known or anticipated seismic, tectonic or

volcanic activity of a severity which could compromise the stability of the

disposal structures and the integrity of the waste

e) the site is located in an area of low population density where the projected

population growth or the prospects for future development are also very low

f) the absence of groundwater suitable for human consumption, pastoral or

agricultural use which may be affected by the presence of a facility

g) there are suitable geochemical and geotechnical properties of the site to

retard migration of radionuclides and to facilitate repository operations.

Other criteria

3.1.29 Other non-radiological site selection criteria must also be considered. A

potential site is not required to comply with all of these criteria. However,

supporting, well-founded arguments must be provided in association with the

safety case to address any criteria that are not fully met.

The criteria are:

a) the immediate vicinity of the facility has no known significant natural

resources, including potentially valuable mineral deposits, and which has

little or no potential for agriculture or outdoor recreational use

b) there is reasonable access for the transport of materials and equipment during

construction and operation, and for the transport of waste into the site

c) the immediate vicinity of the facility has no special environmental

attraction or appeal, no notable ecological significance, and is not the

known habitat of rare fauna or flora

d) the immediate vicinity of the facility has no special cultural or historical

significance

e) there are no land ownership rights or controls that compromise

retention of long-term control over the facility.

(Code for Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste, Radiation Protection Series C-

3, RHC Draft – December 2017, Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear

Safety Agency (ARPANSA), prepared jointly with the Radiation Health

Committee. (pp 22-23 or 69)

https://www.arpansa.gov.au/regulation-and-licensing/regulatory-

publications/radiation-protection-series, accessed 29.9.2019)

All the criteria are important and, in fulfilling them, it is to be hoped there would be minimal reliance

on ‘mitigation’.

The last three factors (3.1.29 c – e) should be considered carefully. There is a risk that, in selecting

‘empty and remote’ sites, the discredited notion of terra nullius will be given an insidious boost. Parties

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with no cultural investment might unreflectingly dismiss the significance of undisturbed areas – and

consider them ideal for exploitation. Avoidance of such mistakes requires principled oversight and

cooperation with legitimate parties. Further, it would be unusual to find a site of ‘no notable ecological

significance’ unless it had been destroyed prior.

The environment is protected as a matter of national environmental significance pursuant to section 21 of

the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, in relation to nuclear actions. The

section 140A prohibition on approvals for construction or operation of any nuclear fuel fabrication plant,

nuclear power plant, enrichment plant or reprocessing plant should remain.

It is also relevant to consider State laws that are not readily compatible with the suggested legislative

changes forming the grounds of the present inquiry.

The Renewable Energy (Jobs and Investment) Amendment Act 2019 has as its Objects

(a) to increase the proportion of Victoria's electricity generated by means of

large-scale facilities that utilise renewable energy sources or convert renewable

energy sources into electricity; and

(b) to contribute to achieving the renewable energy targets; and

(c) to support the development of projects and initiatives to encourage investment,

employment and technology development in Victoria in relation to renewable

electricity generation; and

(d) to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in Victoria and to

achieve associated environmental and social benefits; and

(e) to promote the transition of Victoria to a clean energy economy; and

(f) to contribute to the security of electricity supply in Victoria.

Uranium and thorium are fossil fuels, not renewable energy sources. Fission in breeder reactors does

not make them renewable in the intended sense. Permitting the establishment of a nuclear energy

industry would reduce the market share of renewable energy technologies, contrary to the above

objects . The renewable energy target of 50 per cent for 2030 under the Renewable Energy (Jobs and

Investment Amendment Act 2019 would not be compromised, since ‘development and

implementation of these technologies on a commercial scale will require decades’. (IAEA 2019,

above) However, the intrinsic disbenefits argue against any reliance on a radioactive fuel cycle or its

introduction into the Victorian energy landscape.

LC EPC Inquiry into Nuclear Prohibition submission 65

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