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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agenciesand their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 24 NOV 1966.Other requests shall be referred to Office ofthe Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC20310.

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AOAM-P (M) (24 Apr 6?)

CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

'>~1tJ>~UXJJf E 06 AyytA 1967^

SUBJECT:

TO:

Itional [Lessoas Learned,[Headquarters, >d Battalio^j 27th Infantry (The Wolfhounds) fOperation JWTLEBORO) CU-DT©

SEE DISTRIBIETION

Operatlqns__Aftfi£_Ac£laii TfeaSquartem^BattaTT

1. Forwarded as ihclosure Is Combat repor^0Deratigr^^TL£B0R0) conducTe^ByUSSSquarters12b Battalion ITtlTTnfaTitryTThl^SCfBBroDS). Information contained in this report should be evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR 01 within 90 days of receipt of covering letters.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material*

BY THE ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

a AM. d*u~.

KENNETH G. WICKHAM Major General, USA The Adjutant General

DISTRIBmiÖNT^^-^^^r/dArJ /9/Vr/P A^l^" Commanding General ~- ^ ^^TfOf^

US Army Combat Developments Command US Continental Army Command,^^"

Commandants Q^T0^. ptRm US Army Command and General Staff College US Army War College US Army Air Defense School US Army Artillery and Missile School US Army Armor School US Army Chemical Corps School US Army Engineer School US Army Military Police School US Army Infantry School US Army Intelligence School US Army Medical Field Service School

-D D C

MARS 1968x

EDTJIS D

1

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(Continued on page 2)

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US Army Ordnance School US Army Quartermaster School US Army Security Agency School US Army Transportation School US Army Signal School US Army Special Warfare School US Army Civil Affairs School

Copies furnished: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Research Anslysls Corporation (Library) Security Officer, Los Alamos Scientific Lshorstory Office of the Director or Defense Research & Engineering, ODD(SBAN), ODDDR&E Office, Chief of Staff, OB An* (UWSA)

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CONFIDENTIAL i

CONFIDENTIAL -

HKADOJARIEHS 2D B&TTALICH 27TH INPAITTKr

(IBB WOIfHOJNDS) IPO 96225

AVDCSBC-T

SUBJECT: Coobat aerations iifter Action Beporb (RCS II&CV 13-32)

TRW x Oomandlng • Offloer 2d Brigade, 25th Jtafantiy Division ÄPO 96225

Oonmandlng General 25th 3hf antiy Etvislon APO 96225

TO: Connander U.S. ULlitary Assistance Command, Vietnam ATTN: J3U3 AFO US Forces 962li3

FOROTRP

Böferenoe t

a. GPGRD UO-66 (Operation ATTLSBORO), Ifeadquarters, 2d Brigade,- 25th Ihfantiy DL-vlslon, Ik NOT 66.

b. OtORD 61-66 (Operation ATTLB3CR0), Headquarters, 2d Battalion »7th Infantry, 35 Mov 6J#

1, H&ME OR WEmiri AIP/OR TIPE OF OPEBATION.

a« Operation ATTIEBORO,

b» asardi and Destroy«

2, DATES OF QPERAIIOM, OUOXl Jtov 66 through 252liOO Nov 66,

3, LOCATIOM» BliH DUOIC TAT NINH Provinoe, reference map, Vlatiwn It25,000,-5xler0020, sheets 6232 HOS, 6231 IV IC, 6232 I S, 6232 J. NS, 6132 HMS.

lu OQMTRDL HEADyARfflRS» The control headquarters for the battalion doxlz« the oombat phase of the operation was the 396th light Infantry Brigade, 2d Batta31on 27th 3W6ntiy retumad to 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division control lllßOO Nov 66,

5, H5F0RTPO 3B3B8* ^^ H8niy ^ 3w ton«

6. TA« OBOAinZATIDH«

(b A, 2/27

Ob B, 2/27

Ob G, 2/27

Bn Ooitrol lb con Platoon HKC Elements Security Platoon Medical Platoon U«2 Mortar Platoon Scout Dog Platoon Ground Sarveillance Section

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

I CONFIDENTIAL

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7« aJPPCRTPO PORCBS»

«• Air aipportt The taetloal air support used by 2d Battalion 27th Jhfantxy «as planned and coordinated by higlier headquarters« No fzee stilte sons «as allocated the battalion and when taetloal air «as used It «aa on an iinsdlate basis«

b. Aviation Sapportt Only during the initial novenent to contact was aviation support used in it<8 taetloal role« B» majority of the tlite airuraft were used tor dally xesupply adssions originating in TAX UK*

filirdjhg the action, elements of numerous aviation ocnpanloe «ere * used« Ita eveiy instance these units perfannBd In an excellent manner« Raeupply nlssions were aooonplished with speed and efflolenpy« Medical evacuation of «ounded and dead during the action was sotisfaotoxfly aooon- plished« *

Ibe use of gunships was liAitod to tec factors: Pliet, the close- ness of enemy to friendly forces and secondly, the nature of the terrain« AU of Ihe fighting uas acöompUahed under a dense JUngle oanopy with no definable terrain features«

a, ArtiUezyi

(1) Oantposltlon t Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion 8th Artilleiy# 3id Battalion, 82nd ArtiUezy, and oiganic indirect support weapons of 2d Battalion, 27* Ihfantxy« The batteriea «ere so positioned to allow «■"•»■'*"■ coverage of the areas of operation at all tlAes«

(2) 3ho missions fixed «ere distributed between firs on suspected and known VC loections, rsconnalssanoe ty llro, harassing and Interdictory fixes, and mazking missions. Preparations were fired on landing «ones and suppresaive fires were used during extractions« Ihese suppxesdive fires wexe highly successful on all extractions due to the prior coordination that guaranteed safe air corridors and uninterrupted arblllexy fires«

(3) Iho survelllanoe of the forwazd observers «as augnented by forward air oontzt>llers and the ArüUexy Ilaleon Officer «ho «as obsexw ving from a oonmand and control aircraft«

8« ggMMh Soveral factors appear to have prompted the 9tli VC Division to soek

battle in the area west of DAU TMO, Ibe loss of npproxilately 1000 tons of xlce which wae captured by the 1^6th light Ihfantxy Brigade, and the itoending invasion of what was apparently an eneny base area cooplex vidrity XT 1|257 undoubtedly contzibuted to the enemys decision to fight, Tran all observations tho concentration of most of the 9th VC Division in an axea between DAU TIENG and TAT N1NH «as preplanned and not prlAarlly in response to US operations«

Based on a study of döonents captured on tho battlefield, V8 units appear to hove boon in contact, viclrlty XT 1|25U, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 273 ri VC Regincnt and tho &$ Ocnpooy which is the reoon company of the 9th VC Dlyialon« It is quite possible that eldmente of the 271st VC Bsginent wexe also deployed in tho some gonoxel area«

9« HES3I0W«

Ihe ndseion of the battalion ehangod several tlAee during the reporting period« After tho action of U-5 Nov the battalion was reaction

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for« fbr tho X»t Infantiy UtdaXoiU lh«n th« btttillcn WM rsaotion for« of 25th Ibfantrx ntrloion* TSmUy eaabnl um zwortod to 2d Brlftdo, 2$th IhfkntrjrDlTLdLoa «bno tte btttoliOA otoaiod utLUmfy ham», mrnto oadMt •Mflnlto« nd acted as noellfla foroo fbr tho brl««do*

XQw gSBSB 2 9ESMffl8SS* M BtttaSloo, 27th Ihfantty pvtpans to:

a« Bt attaohad to hlghar hoadqaartaz» ooodaotlag oporatloaa In MtoeZcm C

b» Deftind fönrasd taaso cmpa»

o« Prwdda a waotlon foroa for alamonta oporating in War Zone C*

d« Oonduot noonnaisaanoe In foroo opairstione«

o. Ssoara fire eupport bosea for artlUaxT- unit a«

f. Oonduot aaaroh and destroy operations«

g« 2d Battalion, 27th Lrfantry 140 SOP tqppliea«

31« EIBOPTICW.

Oenaralt At IßaO'hrs, 3 Noveaibor, the 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy was infosnad tgr 2d Brigade, 25th bfantzy DLfision that the battalion «as under operational oonbrol of the 196th Brigade and to begin wmsnant to JUS TBSNÖ (XT li9l*7) as soon as possible (see Annex A^ Appendix 1)« At that tins, battalion headquarters and Conpatsr B «ere involved in an operation in tho •vidnity of DUC HUIQI "BN (XT 5707;. Co C Mas manning tho perinstor of Ist Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy at tho (U CHI base canp, Ob A was iJroadiatoly ordered to the airfield for helioapter transport to DAU TIENG. Tho 2d Brigade S3 specified that one rifle canpany and a battalion headquarters olsiaont were to be moved on 3 Nor, one more xifla company to bo moved at first light an If Nor end third rifle company to be moved on order«' At 1600 hrs 3 Nov an advance party consisting of the battalion ccroiander. tho S3 Air and Co A 00 waa flown to BAD TIENQ« Oo A closed DAU TIEND 031^30 Nov« The battalion flQ, 82, and ArtiUety liaison Officer arzived DAU TIBHG 032000 Nor after having closed the battalion (-} at OU CHI base oamp and'briefed them on the oarzent situation« Ihe battalion 00 reported to the OG, 196th Brigade and was given tho miasion of base camp reaction force end reserve for the 196th We elamenta that had booa.oownitted in tho vidnity of tho SA1D0N River« The battalion GP was located with the CP of 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry,

k November 29661

On tto mowing of It Nov, a reconnaissance of DAU TEND base camp was conducted to detentLne countor-ottaolc routes and blocking positions« By 1000 hrs, ^ho battalion received three CH-U7 loads of personnel and equipment oonaislting of one section (two tubes) of the i|#2 Mortar Platoon, a CP group with a 3A ton truck, Oo C moss and o radio Jeep« However, no amunltion rssupply or water can« wore zeoeived} the second xlflo corpeny hod not arrived; the SU and SL sections had Act arrived, and sufficient map coverage for the battalion was not available«

Oo 0 began arriving fTon CÜ CHI at HOC hrs by UH1D helicopter. At 1215 hrs the battalion waa ordered by the 196th Brlgado to secure a disabled helicopter at BEN GUI airstrip at (XT hh$W$), At 1230 hrs Co'A arrived at the dawned heliooptor and began zeooiving sporadic snLpor fixe, rifle grenades, and 6Ctan mortar fire« At 12lj6 hrs, with Oo A still at the downed helicopter, the 196th Brigade ordered tin battalion to alert Co 0 for possible coemittnent to an area of enemy contact at XT itl53 or to assist Oo A« Co 0 moved to the airstrip to awflt ooaaittmeRt and the battalion 00 and S3 returned from the

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BBN OJI Alwtrlp to tiio DüJ TEHQ Airstrip.

At li£0 hn tho GB, 156th Brigade tdefed tho 00^ 2d Battalion, 27th infantry at tho HUT TEMÖ Airatxlp« IP let Battalion, 27th Jofsntry was in heavy contact with an unlmoim «Uo VC force in tho Tidnity of XT ii35538c Vie battalion CO »as orderod to conduct an air aaaault at XT J*075>37 with Oo C and a Oomnand Group and link up with the left flank of IP let Battalion, 27th Ihfantiy aa soon as possible« The battalion GO zequested that Go A be extracted first and both Co C and A with battalion headquarters bo put in to assist IP 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry,' This roqaest was denied and the battalion CO briefod tho Co C conmander. At IhhO hn Co C departed for the 12 at XT J|07£37« Cb C landed and rseeived no hostile firs on the IZ. Sie * battalion GO joined Co C on the ground and the canpeny started moving fron XT kff&JP into the donee jungle to the northeast* At 1500 hn, under con- trol of tho battalion S3, Co A vas extracted fron tho downed hoUoppter loca- tion and xetuznod to BAU TJEIO, Co A vas alerted to stand by for possible * conmittaent. At this til» the CO, IP let Battalion, 27th Infantry reported 8 m and 23 WIA in tho vicinity of XT iOJ&S, he stated that most of the casualties wars fronrnaohinegun positions concealed in tho dense Jungle« Tho IF 1st Battalion, 27th Difantxy conaietod of'Haadquartors, Oo A, Co C 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy, Go C 3rd Battalion^ 21st üifantry. Go B and C 2nd Battalion, 1st'Ihfantiy. CO, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy contacted the ©, 2d Battalloh, 27th Ihfantzy «ho was flying in a cennand end control helicopter overhead« Both agreed that this would be the tine to have Gb A on the ground and ready for action« The S3, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry con- tacted the 196th Brigade and zequested movenont of Co A and a battalion GP tl^oup to* the area of operation. The request «as denied« 'At approodmatoly l^lf hn, the 00 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy contacted 00,'IP 1st Battalion, ü7th Ihfantzy by radio, thoy agreed that Co C 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy tfould attempt to roll up the flank of the VC position« Co C began'moving toward the sound of £Lring along tho front of tho TF 1st Battalion, 27th ftfohtzy« The terrain «as dense Jungle'and it took almost two end one half hoars for Co C to rocch tho VC position. 1h tho noantjütae. Go A had been oonnittod by tho 196th Brigade, and had landed vidtty XT 1|07<>37 at 1600 hrs« The 00 and 2(3, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantiy bad agreed by radio to put Co A on the LZ vicinity XT W537 and move them to tho oast to link up with IP let Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy fron the left rear in order to assist IP let Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy in the evacuation of tho many crsualties the IP «as receiving, ttils eHplcysient of Go A «as ohoaon by CO, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy bocaase Ob C waä woll into the dense Jungle in front ot IF 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy, and the possibility of lir-iing Co A and C before darkness was remote« At approodmately 1715 hrs flb G cotacted the VC force« The 00 of Cb C ves killed shortly after contact with tho VC. GPT CUrrier had can» forwaxd to locate the onony machinegun podtian; ho had organised an attack on the position and was killed assaulting a bunker« Lt McDougal assumed comaand and. at approBLnately 171(5 hrs an assault en the VC position was made a Bio assault was repulsed with ot least 7 man Idlled« It waa deteznined that the VC position consisted of a series or conooaled bunkers interaoKiacted by tarenoliao« Extending from the bunker apertures were fira lanes that were brxely visible in the Jungle« These lenos provided the machlaogunnger with a field of firs of 100 to 150 motors« The attackjr could not tell where tho fire lanes wars located, unless he was standing in them« Many lanes in tho bunker conplex were interlocking (see Annex A, Appendix 2)«

Co C attempted to rstrleveits dead and wounded personnel. During this tite, firing was-going or* at the Co C position one: all along tho IP let Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy lines. The GO, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy threw a snake grenade and a smoto grenade was thrown in ths TF 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfentry lines. The GO, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy was infozned by the BflC that the Co C position was only 100 meters from TF 1st Battalion, 27th Ih- fantzy linos througi dense Jungle« At approodiatoly 1B00 hrs, the 00, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy took one squad and attenptod to gain contact with

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TP lat Battalion, 27th Difantry , he crossed a ilro lano and was taken under nachlnogun fire, ho assaulted the banker and was killed« IWo attempts to xotsleve hie body failed« Bio IP 1st Battalion, 27th Jhfantry made two etteopts duzlng the eioning to gain contact with Go G» Both attenpts failed and incurred manor casualties« At 2130 hrs the 33, 2d Battalion, 27th Difantiy contacted the 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantzy forward CP at BAP TB10 and re« quested clarification frcn 196th Brigade as to his status as acting 00, 2d Battalion, 27th infantiy« He was infonaed that the 2d Battalion, 27th DJ- fantiy was not attached to TF 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy, but was ftxpeotod to cooxdinato all actions with the 00, 17 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy« Ob 0 was told to fozn a tight perimeter for the night and informed that Oo A would be sent to gain contact with them on the mowing of $ Novomberi Ihere was.» intexnittoat grenade exchanges and firing throughout the night«

Go B, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy had arrived at DAU TIBKD on k Nor at 1700 hrs« His 2d Brigade of the Ist Ihfantxy Division arrived at MJ HZNQ and assumed operational control of Oo B for the purpose of the defense of DAU TiEN3«

During the night of l*-5 NOT, OO A, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantiy assisted in the evacuation of casualties of IF 1st Battalion, 27th Infantxyand established a perimeter defense around the 12 located at XT 1(10^37« Besupply had faocn aocarpliahed before dark« One 12 was usod for olonents of four battalions with no centroliied control« This resulted IA excessive con- fusion, loss of time; and loss of equipment by all units. At down of $ Nor the S3, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy ard the CO of Co A accomplished the coordlnatian for a passage of lines and reoonnaissanoe of the forward lines of TF 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy« A recommendation was made by the front line units as to the best route to use in getting to Oo 0. Oo A moved for* ward to attempt to link up with Go C After moving forward 30 meters they cmo under heavy machine gun fire« ühree men were killed and several wounded« ühe three KIA were lying near a VC bunker« At this time it was obvious that there was a VC bunter complex between Co A and Co C, Co A laid down a base of lire and attempted to manouver personnel ag-dnst the bunkers« When the 70 opened fire the maneuver personnel Unodiately assaulted the eneiqys bunkers» Ihree bunkers were ovorzun and one trench was crossed« Bio oonpaty cennandor was wounded, but refused evacuation« Oo A was rocoiving intense fire from fortified bunkers Just beyond the ones that had been overrun« Oo A sustained 7 KIH and several VIA fron the action«* Trying to roach sane of the KI4, others were wounded« 83» 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy instructed 00 A 00 to lay down a heavy base of fire and evacuate the wounded and equipnont and leave the dead for later evacuation in order to prevent further casualties« IF J*th Battalion, 31st Ihfantxy was moving toward Ob 0 from the northeast and was only IiOO motors away« IF i|th Battalion, 31st-Ihfantxy consisted of HQ, Companies A, B, C of ifth Battalion, 31st Ihfantxy, Co B 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy and Go A 2nd Battalion, 1st Ihfantxy«

S November 1566 >

Major flholton, the newly appointed CO of the 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy arrived with the'00 of the 2d Brigade, 2^th Ihfantxy'ULvision at the OP of Tf 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy at 093O hrs« Ühe S3, 2d Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy returned through frLendly lines and moved down the trail to the TF 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy CP« He briefed the now CO ,and it was agreed to evacuate the Go A wounded and those dead that could bo reached and to with- drew Oo A. Co A began evacuation of the woundod and dead under the cover of its own fire« /if tor the evacuation, CbA began its withdrawal under'the cover of fire provided by ZP 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy« By 1000 hrs,'Go A ecnpleted its withdrawal through IF 1st Battalion, 27th Ihfantxy linos« Ihn of the Co A dead could not be reached because of the intensity of enesy fire« Buxlng thy withdrawal Go A counted 22 enemy dead in the overreh enemy bunkers and trenches and 2 snipers who had been shot out of the trees«

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The 00, TP 1st Battalion, 27th Infantsry made radio contact with CO, TF Uth Battalion, Bist Infantiy and through the use of smoke spotted b/ a FAC above the position, the 00, TF 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry guided TF l|th Battalion, 31st Eifantry elemants tcward Co C. At 1010 hrs, elements of TF Uth Battalion, 31st Infantry readied a position within 200 meters'of Co C position« At 1003 hrs, 00, 196th Brigade ordered Co B, 2d Battalion, 27th üifantxy to the area of operation. From. C9$0 hrs until IJjOO hrs the VC made four probes of the lines of TF 1st Battalion, 27th Infantiy, each was «pulsed. From 0800 until 1020 hrs, the VC had been probing the Co C position with firs« Stxlet fire discipline was usod by Co C and evidently the VC force decided that the American unit had no ammunition left« At 1020 hrs a VC force bogan walking cautiously forward toward Co C, The ccopazy held its fixe until tho ene% was within 30 motors of their position, then opened fire and tho VC forca was quickly cut down«

At 1055 hrs, Co A, 2d Battalion, Ist Infantry-, a part of TF Uth Battalion, 31 st Infantry contacted Co C, Tho Co C pexltetor had 21 VC bodies around it. The perimeter was still unter fire and two bodies including that of the CO, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantiy could not be evacuated, TF Uth Battalion, 3 Ist Infantiy began'probing the VC portions and oam under heavy fire and received casualties* At approximately 1200 hrs, the GO, 196th Brigade ordered the withdrawal of all units to subject thu VC positions to heavy artilloiy bombardmont and oirstrlteas, Co B, 2d Battalion, 2 7th Infantry arrived at the GP of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantiy at 1200 hrs; Co B secured the IZ ?nd was alerted for possible canndttanent to the front. All during the after- T oon, firefights broke out at several locations along tho linos.

At 1515 hrs, the CO, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry received orders to extract the battalion by helicopter to DAU TIENG, after the extraction of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry to TüY NINH«. Bach company received instructions fran the CO, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, Co A was ordered to assist in the handling of the Co C wounded and dead« Co B Was ordered to secure the FZ. Co C would be reorganised and accented for ahd the neu ecramahder (OFT STÖRET) placed in cannazxl imodiately upon its movement through the friendly lines,

Co C, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantiy and TF Uth Battalion, 31st Infantry readied TP let Battalion, 27th Infantry lines at 1530 hrs. They had carried out 6 dead and 19 wounded from Co C alone* Evacuation of tho dead and wounded bogen iBBiodiatoly, By 1800 hrs the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry was moved to a FZ and extracted to D<1T TIENG,

6 Novenber 19661

Bie VC bunker corqplex was subjected to artillery and airstrikes« At 1200 hrs 6 Nov, Co A, 2d Battalion, 23rd Infantiy moved into tho VC Position and retrieved all tho bodies and equipment of the 2d Battalion, 27th Eifantry, The VC hod withdrawn leaving many of their own as well as all tho US weapons« The 2d Battalion, 27th infantry was attached to tho 1st Infantiy Division on 6 Nov,

During the day tho canpaiy corananders and plr.toon loaders conducted a recomaissance of oounter-ottack and. blocking positions in the DAU TEllG base camp. Coordination was mode with the 3rd Battalion, 8th AfiVN Regiment for patrolling. Bio battalion was alerted for possiblo doploymant in a for- ward area of contact vicinity XT lj23578. Deployment was not made and the battalion continued to improve the defensive positions occupied. Maintenance

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of weapons and oquipnent was strt jsed by the oomfianders» During the hours of darkness passive seouxlty measures were taten« Anbush sites were established on likely enemy avenues of approach to the perliheter«

2 November l$6$t

The bcttnlion continued to occupy and Improve the defensive positions« During the morning 1Z replacements were reoeived for Can^anies A and C, rcspecti^ly. A liaison o.t.ricer from the battalion noyed to the CF of the 2d Brigade of the 1st Inf antjy Dt'vision. Patrolling coordination was made with the 3rd Bsttalion, 8th .ARVN Rogimont« Passive security measures in addition to anbush patrolling was initiated tc dene the VC access- to the peiiaeter, Tho VC had oanittand detoait«d 1 clayßöroon tho Co B peritoter« NO casualties were sustained and M-79 fire was dirocted at the suspected location of the enemy,

8 Movember 1^66;

At 0930 hrs a sweep of the battalion perimeter revealed the position from which the claymoro had been detonated the previous night« Ihe pro- tective wire had boon out in two places« At this location 1 complete VC claymore mine was found that had failed to detanct3« ÜMs mine was evacuated through intelligence channels to 25th Bifantxy QLvioLon headquarters at OJ CHI,

Sie battalion was notified by 2d Brigade, 1st Infantiy Division to be on a one hour alert for posatbla movement to asait t the 1st and 2d Battalions 28th Infantry, ühe battalion was not deployed« At 1600 hrs the CO, 25th Difantiy Division ordozod the CO, 2d Battalion, 27th infantiy to move to Z/L7 NINE base camp on 9 Nor« Detachmont from 2d'Brigade, 1st Infantiy Division and the xotuxn of control to 2d Brigade, 25th Infantiy Division was to be effective upon closure at the TAY NINH base camp,

9 November 29661

The battalion began movement to TAX NMI base oanp at 0900 hrs« AH elements had closed at 1600 hrs« Upon arrival at THY NUB the battalion wad plaeed under operational control of the 196th Brigade for base camp defense« Coordination was made and the battalion was quartered in the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantiy taLUats«

10 Novonber 1966:

A reoon was made of the IAY NIMH base emp by the conpany caimanders and platoon loaders, The location of bunkers and counter-attack positions were roconnoitorsd« OoozttLnation with the 196th light Dxfantiy Brigade and supporting artillciy was made« At 15Ö0 hrs the battalion was ordered by the GO. 25th Infantry Division to-make a reoon in force from XT 2972*97 to ZT 322U70 and return (see Annex A, Appendix 3)« Co B moved by truck from the base oonp to XT 297li97* itfter detrucking Oo B novod south of the road to XT 3222»70« At 1730 hrs, after making no contact, Co B was ordered to return north of the road to the entrucking point at XT 297U97« 00 B entrucked and returned to the TAX NINH base camp at 2Blfi hrs«

U November ffifo

Sie battalion contimod defense of the TAX KIWI base carp. At 0900 hre an order was reoeivod to displace the battalion in on adminstrative move to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantiy Division base omp located at XT 275685« Movement was to begin 120700« Preparation for the move began Uaediately«

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At 2230 hrs tlio TAX IIMI base camp was aubjeotod to a VC mortar at task consloting of Sl'and 82rnn nortars. Approodi^tcly 20 rounds fell In the 2d Battalion, lift Infantry area where this battalion uas quartered Co C, 2d Battalion, 27th Bifantay recoivod k light casualties who were ovacaatod to the base camp hospital« Counter-mortar fires were effected and damage to the battalion was light«

12 November 1$66:

Movement to the 2d Brigade forward base, vicinity XT 27$6S$ began at 0730 hrs (see Annex A, Appendix k)» Movement was ccmploted at 1600 hrs« Rooonnaissance of tlio battalion area was made, defensive positions were prepared, and night outposts were positioned« Ho contact was made during the reporting period«

13 November l?66i |

Hie-2d Battalion, 27th Infantry continued to man a portion of the 2d Brigade, 25th mfantry Division base camp« During the day 2 observation posts were established ty 00*8 A and C« Tho oompaftLos continued to fortify their defensive positions and clear fields of fire« Resupply aircraft moved needed supplies to a forward supply base established In the periLmeter«

During the night approximately 7 rounds of rifle grenade fire was received •on the Co C porlmotor, no casualties« Illumination missions Were* fired in an attenqpt to locate the position of the VC« H & I firos wore fired thlroüghout the night by tho battalion*s k,2 Platoon. Might ambushes were established by the Recon Platoon and a platoon of Co B, No contact was made but both patrols hoard movement and voices which were countered tilth mortar and artillery fires«

lU Novertber 1^661

ühe battalion continued to man a portion of the 2d Brigade forward base« Farther improvement of the defensive positions was made« The 00, 2d Battalion 27th Difantiy reoeived tho mission to move the battalion to fire support base #2 vicinity XT 2686 on 2$ Nov« Preparations began imnediatoly«

During tho night the VC again harassed the battalion perlnter this tine directing their firös to tho Co B perimeter. The enemy fire was countered with indirect fires« No casualties were sustained from the 6 rounds of ziflö grenade fire« Co*s A and C established ambushes but no contact was made«

15 November 1966:

Bie battalion moved to fire support base #2 vicinity XT 2686 (see. Annex A, Appendix 5A)« Tho advance party departed tho base cosp at 1030 hrs and the main body departed at 1200 hrs« Danodiately upon reaching the new base camp a thorough search of tho battalion perimeter was conducted. Upon completion of the sweep the tuilding of defensive positions began. The Ü.2 Mortar Platoon and rosttppllos began novomont to tlio forward posit ion at 1330 hrs« Upon closing, the fixing positions wore established and registration completed« A forward'supply base was established and tho supplies roovöd to the now location«

During the night tlio companies established IP/0P!s. No sightines or hearings were made«

16 November lf66t

2d Battalion, 27th Infantry continued to fortify the defensive positions established 2$ Nov« Ocmmond enQhasis was placed on overhead cover and fields

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of fire« Each company hnd teams to eat and nark routes for zeaappty- and evacuation If needed during the night« Bie indirect fire weapons continued to add ccncontrations to the fire support plan whiia conducting training«

Daring the night Co1 s B and C established LP/OP»s in their respectivo sectors« No sightings or healings Here made.

17 Noverabcr ^66?

At C800 hrs Gb 3 began a sweep of the area adjacont to the battalion periö©v.or. No contact or cnon^r activity was observed and the company zetuxtxid at. 1130 hrs. Upon the return of Co B. Co A departed for their nweep. No contact was made and Co A returned to friendly front linos at 1330 hrs« Co C departed for a sweep at II4OO hrs« No contact was made and return to friendly front lines uao completed at 1620 hrs«

At 1I>2JJ hrs the Rooon Platoon departed friendly front linos. No contat was made and the Rocon Platoon returned at L'^ hrs« During the sweeps the cacsiandors integrated training -;ith the combat mission end practiced jungle tactics oriented to the terrain (see Annex A, Appendix 6),

Ambush points were established ty Ccmponics Ay B, and (V No contact was made and all ambush points had returned to friendly front lines at 06U8 hrs«

18 Norombor 1^66:

On 18 Nov the battalion had the mission of securing the brigade perimeter, cutposting the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantiy perimeter prior to its move on a conbat assault (see Annex A, Appendix-5B). Secuilty positions were esta- blished by Co A at XT 270856, XT 27li8?8, and XT 275861; Security Platoon XT 276858j and the Itecon Platoon at XT 272866, Co B was on 1-hour notice for reinforcing cloncnts of the 2d Brigade, The mo-vo of the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry was completed at 222$ hrs,

Co C (-) conducted a sweep at 1127 hrs (see Annex A, Appendix 7), No contact was made and the oompany (-) returned to friondly front lines at 1220 hrs.

Mortar crew and FO training was conducted duriiif the day, supervised by the artillery liaison officer and the battalion U,2 Platoon Leader«

15 November 1^66:

Co'A conducted a sweep of the area adjacent tl.oir perimeter commencing at 1015 hrs (see Annex A, Appendix 8), The Co A compandor used the sweep as a training vehicle for training the replacements in Jungle tactics and formations« The sweep as conplated at UjlO hrs, no contact was made«

Ambush points wore established on the poxlmeter by Go B and the Security Platoon, no contact «as made«

20 November 1^661

Co C conducted a sweep beginning at 0900 hrs (see Annex A, Appendix 9)« During the sweep Co C destroyed 1 VC structure, 1 lean-to and a tunnel vicinity XT 275875« 1 Pfonoh typo radio trznanittor beyond repair was found vioinlty XT 271(879 and evacuatod through intelligenoo channels« übe sweep was con^letod at 1235 hrs«

Ambush points v.'src established by Co A at XT 260661 and the Security Platoon at XT 267868, no contact was made«

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21 MoveiBber 1566 t

The sMeeps scheduled «ere cancelled (see Annex A, Appendix 10), The batta 11 on outposted the lat Battalion, 27th Infantzy lines while they con- ducted an operation» Hie outpcet Mare establi^ied and in position at 1030 hrs« At 1023 hrs a report «as received of small oms being fired at an aircraft from XT 276865« The 3rd platoon of Co C wan dispatched to check the area« Hie sweep revealed negative results and returoed to base canp at 1350 hrs.

Three airstrLlaos'viere conducted under the control of 2d Brigade vicinity- coordinates XT 276871, XT 257865, and XT 257851. Blenonts manning the pexl- seter nazfcod with snoka and the-airstrilces were oon^lotod*

During the night the VC mortared the periaeter« At 0200 hij, the first rounds began hitting in the porlmoter» A conploto report rcveolod 31 rounds had hit within the battalioft perimeter. One person was slightly injured but did not required evacuation« At the ruport of incaiing rounds the 8lmm snd U«2 mortars began firing on suspoctod VC locations* Tho small scale attack lasted only 5 minutos and no othor incidents occurred during the night»

22 Movember 1^66:

The plan for tho day was to conduct a conbat assault vicinity XT 378859 to obtain an engineer anolysi s of a bridge sit (soo Annex A, Appendix 11). Co A would combat assault into 12 2 and secure position ALPHA« On order Co A would move to tho bridge sito with an engLnoer representative and conduct tho analysis. Co B would combat assault into IZ 1 and secure position BRAVO« Co C would combat assault and secure position CHARLIE and cover tho flank of Co A as it approached tho bridge site. Tho mission of the Recon Platoon was to secure the CP group after landing on LZ 1«

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry outposted the battolion perimeter during the operation« The Security Platoon manned tho Recon Platoon position.

At C61i5 hrs, tho combat assault began with Co B nnldng the initial assault« The 12*s wore cold and ConpanLes A and C and tho Recon Platoon followed. All lifts wore on the ground at 0925 hrs« Whilo securing and searching position CHARLIE Co C located and destroyed 900 pounds of rice vicinity XT 379856 (see Avmx A, Appendix 11). The Recon Platoon located freshly dug holes, fighting positions, and footprints. The holes had possibly been dug for AT nines but none were located« After conqploting the mission the olemonts prepared for extraction« Closein artillery fires were placed around the PZ and two airstrikes wore conducted in conjunction with the extraction« The oxdar of departure was tho some as that of entry and on the last lift of Co B autcmatic weapons fire was received from XT 379861« Upon return Co A (-) conducted a short swoop to XT 25886U« No contact was made and Go A (-) returned to base camp rt 1705 hrs«

Ambush sites were established by the Security Platoon and Go B« No contact was made and tho patrols returned at 0705 hrs«

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23 November 1966;

The batalion again outposted the 1st Battalion, 27th Bifantiy lines while they were conducting an operation away from base camp, Tho companies occupied tho ferner position that were used in the previous outposting mission. The Recon Platoon conducted a swep beginning at U|07 hrs (see Annex A, üppondix 12). The Hccon Platoon made a reconnaissance by fire and employed Jungle tactics through the dense foliage. At 151(0 hrs two banbs that had failsd to detonate were located XT 257868« Tho bcabs were later

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doatrcyod by an BOD toan» Bio Rooon Platoon wtuxnod at 16U0 hw.

Oozing the afternoon the alort to more to 0Ü CH the following noznlng «u »oeived« Materials hot needed vnto ovacuatod ana carried to T&T HINH during the lato afternoon«

Artbueh sitoa wer» eetablished )y Oo A and the SBfiurity Platoon» No contact «as modo and tho patrola ratazned at 0716 hrs»

2U Htoveiriber 3^66 >

Ihe plan for tho day woe to rwvo all oqulpnont end personnel to CD GHZ« All supplies «ere loaded on halicopters and carried to TAY NINH for link u? * with a convoy. Persona not needed «ere sent to TAT IIIKH to facilitate the unloading and loading of the eqalpncnt, AU itens not returned were destroyed end the ana policed at (900 hw« Positions «era established and the companlos sere given their oxtior of movemont, .The move bo gar. ct 12J|5 hrs* Artllloxy fires «ore directed to tho oxve south of tho FZ and aLrstxHaes «ero usod ih the aroa to the north« Hie aircraft nado tho extraction from oast to vest« The first elomonts oztraotod «hexe oarxled to tho baso omg of 1st Battalion, 5th Infttntzy (Moahanliod)« After the tactical Sxtrcetion «as ecB^loto tho battalion «äs shut tied to CD CHI in helicopters. All olomente had closod at 1800 hrs»

12« REaJLTS,

a* PTiondlyi 71) personnel «ere casualties (27 KIA and U? WIA (seo Annex B)#

b# Snesyt

(1) Poraonnoli

i£ 7C XU (BC)

(2) Items destroyed:

900 pounds of rice il VC structures 1 lowHto 1 tunnel 1 roneh radio beyond repair

13, jflfflSmfiS MATTERS«

a« Supply:

CLASS It Monnol doily rasupply was conducted in tha battalion aroa of the DtLvlaion boso oaii|>« All moss halls «oro closod down with the exception of Oo C which fed all stay back personnol in the battalion« When the battalion closod into the airstrip at ÜAU TEUD Oo A»s noss hall, supple- mented by cooks from all othor messee« was sent foxwerd to the airstrip and subsequently fed two hot meals dally ( supraar, breakfast). At MU HEN}, dass I support camo both from 00 CHI and the 8th Support Battalion located St DAH TIENQ« Initially the items forwarded from OJ CHI «era ice, water, canned goods and some perishables« Aöocuntability for A rations or 0 rations or was not roauirod of thi^ battalion« Ih the lr.il!er-dayB at D'.ü THÜD all GL&cr I oupnort gene froa the 8th Support 'Dr:ttr.lio:i«

When the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantxy moved to I/II HINH baso caii|>, the battalion was attached to the 196th Light Ihfantzy Brigade and all doss I

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«pport Oase fix» the 2d Battalion, Ist Ihfantiy • Ratlona mro preparod In the Oo A aftd Oo B, 2d Battalion, let Bifantzy neeo halle by wee personnel of this battalion, (2d Battalion, 27th Infantry^ Biroe hot meals «ere sextrsd dolly ot this location»

When tho battalion moved fonmxd into firs support base #1, no moss hall aocompanlod the battalion« Itenrporary field moss facilities were esta- blished in the 2d Battalion, 1st Jhfantxy area and the supper moal was pre- pared and forwarded dolly to the battalion» la flro support base #1 tho meal was fed In ono control location for all units« Mess equlpront was extracted tho following noming« Water was forwarded daily to the firs support base from tho TAT NDIH base amp. Ice was unavailable), Supplo- . msntary packsts wer« available and wore sent forward on a daily basis«

The last forward move was to fire support bos« $2« 3he mo as facilitioa remoinod in TAX NINH staffod by peroonnol frota all units of the battalion* < A change was initiatod and the dinner moal wos'forwarded dolly« QLnnor

was sorvod in each of tho oenpanios raspeotivo' GP areas sLmultaneously to insure greatör security^ offieioncy of serving, and to poxmlt extraotion of mess eqoipBBnt prior to daxtaiess« It had boon loomed from tho initial tiro support base that tho feeding of tho sapper moal interfered with opera- tional roquirements at dusk« Ice, water, and supplomotaay packets were avail- able and were resup^liod on a daily basis« At all timos a ono days Oration was on hand for omorconoy uso« On the final day of the operation, 2h November the Bmnksgiving Foast was sorvod to everyone upon their return to 00 CHI«

CLASS II - 171 During the initial phases of the action mach equipment trsnsferrbd hands due to operational necessity« Consequently, upon the oor^üetion uf tho operation a long list of missLnc equipment has turned up« Many rifles and other items of equipment remained with the friendly casualties and were returned to 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry S-k through normal supply channels« In that initially many porsonnol were treated at Till NBH, during tho latter days of ATIUSBCRO thorough ehe des revealed that weapons belonging to this unit were in the supply- channels of the Ist Battalion, 27th Infantry, as well as tho 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry«

These weapons and items of equipment have been rotzlevod and items in oar supply channel^ not belonging to this battalion, have boon returned to owning units if looatod« All units from this battalion have at this tlAe sabnLttud the proper paperwork on tfoir raspeotivo combat losses incurred during this operation«

Items of dass II - IV supplied throughout tho operation Included tho following (

1* Sandbags 60,000 2« 8» fenoo posts 1*00 (limited uso only) 3« Chain saws $ iu Fatigues 150 pairs 5« Socks 1360 pairs 6« Underwear 750 sets 7« Boots 25 pairs 8« Mosquito repollant 2000 bottlos 9« Foot powder 1000 cons

10« Water purlfioatioti tablets 2000 bottles 11« Mr mattxvssos IßO 12« Poncho ll;0 13« Flashlights 105 iL PRC-25 battorLos 2h oases 15« aiovels 75 16, Maxtor balloons 12

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17c Id.

20» 21. 22.

Macho tes Concertina Pack boards Mine dotoctor Flamethrowers Leather gloves

100 81* rolls 70 (on call TM) 1 (on call HI) 3 (on call TK) 50 pair

At the TAT NDIII supply base two A-22 Ba^s were secured and prepared for emergency rosupply. They were packed with water and the "ifiLght ßt" and were- imnodiatoly available for sung load by UIID helicopter« Bils pre-packaged load had the capability of being dropped frcn the air at tree top or higher level into incocessable Junglo terrain»

CIASS nil (Total consumption)

1, Mogas 2« Diesel 3. 01130;?

ItiPOO gallons 5,600 gallons

135 gallons

CIASS V; During tho initial phase of tho operation when the battalion was in contact udth enemy units, class V vias rosupplied from OJ CHI to DAU TIENGr /drstrip. largo stocks were fortraidod and kept on hand at VJOJ TIENQ to fncilitiato farther zesup^ly of tho forward lino units. Standard night kits wore flown in initially to be followed by the larger bulk quanti- ties of amunition. Units at D/U TIENQ wore nutually supporting in areas where special ammunition was requested«

When the battalion moved to TA7 NINII most of tho amntunition was sent with the battalion, certain types and quantities wore left at the airstrip for th incoming units. Frctt this time on all ammunition requirements were obtained from the ASP of tho 196th light Infantry Brigade. All annunLtion requested by tho battalion Uhilfi located in the two forward fire support bases was drown fron TA7 1IIIJH and fozwarüed to tho battalion while located in the forward fire support bases. Ammunition stocks were out to a mlnioum essential level in order to frcilitate movement of the base and at the same time back up any emoripncy anmunition needs« Critical items and their respective basic loads maintained are indicated t Summ HE 1J50-500 rounds, I'.2rin HE 250-300 rounds.

b, Maintonanoo: The heavily orqjhasizod maintenance carried on during times when there was c miniium of voldolo use payed enonaous dividends daring Operation ATTIßBORO, Almost doily there wns a roquiremont for vehicles to be used in convoys moving supplies to tho TAX UlEI base oaBg), The good condition. 0f tie tciilclcs provonted delays in tho convoys because vehicle breakdowns were almost nan-oxlstent. The maintenance shop steadily iiprovod the condition OJ. tho vehicles«

c# Treatment of Casualtlos; Evacuation and Eospitalisatlon • The bottrllon old sfatian moved forward on th? second day of the operation, freatnont of the casualties at all forward locutions was done in an outstanding manner« Evacuation during h-$ Nov was very slow duo to the intensity of weapon fire and the terrain« Eventually tho casualties wore evacuated to 7th Surgical hospital at OJ CHI, the 93rd evacuation hospital at BIEN HQ/l and the 3rd Field hospital at SAIGON« Accounting for tlio wounded was diffi- cult due to namorous locations and time lapse during the evacuation«

d« Transportation: The battalion 2^5 ton tiucks wore used daily to support tho enure operation« During the first few days their main function was to tronnport tho resupply items of water,. rations, and annunltlon fron the battr.lion .avoa to the division resupply pad -or the exalting trans- portation, Tho only vehicles sent forward to DAU TBIO were HQ 6 and HQ 311«

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HQ 3k was utilised to haul supplies «ad HQ 6 was used for radio eonamaications wLtb the AN-4IBC J|6 radio» ill vehicl» transfer was by GH-Jtf fphinodk}

When the battalion «bs moved to HI NIMH many more vehicles oonvt^d to the SAX NINH base oajn^ these ineladad the Support Platoon vehicles, ■ortar platoon TMiicles« xeoon platoon vohLe lee, and several other %/k ton ooBBiand vehiolss«

Daily oontnys «ero then initiated between GIT GHZ and Sir NINE to r* supply necessaqr anppllea and equipnant to the S-l| reprsaontatlves in ZA7 NIT!, Sie final oonray was en 2k Ifotehieb extmtted all supplies, aquipnsnt and personnel of the 2d Battalion, 27th Difantry fron TAT imm to the CD CHI base

Itssttpply: & the initial stages of the operation all resupply came ftron Ctr CHI via CH-i*7 (Chinook^ All »supply was initially limited to Close 7 and other elasaes of supplies were only forwarded after all units had ful- fLUod their daily Class 7 requinments* ApprädLnatcly 3-5 sorties were sohedoled and utilised by this battalion daily« Iho use of UHLD aircraft was liMted and need only to a niaLmuB extent«

Uhon the battalion was noved to the two fire support bases all re- supply was by USLD oiroraft« fifteen to twenty sortios of water, rations, and anmnttion wore f loan dally in support of this battalion« OM nave of the battalion fron tho first fire support base to the final base utilised $9 supply and mortar sortlos« Iho final extraction to TXT fön üggynd soae 2$ sorties» Due to tho extensive distance fr« CU CHI at no tiif» waa tho "Buck Bogers Von" utilised« Diroughout ihe operation throe supply points were utilised« Tho first «as that In 07 CHI, tfr» second in TAX NIMH, and tho third uf $ personnel was located Hith the battalion f orrrard GP« Coanmieations between the three points was limited to land line, which was separate but effbetive«

e« Gbnuniaationst

(1) Dio pxloaiy noana of comninloation uas the AN PttC-25 with a Jungle ontoima«. NUmorous tines tranamission and xoooptlan wit difficult due to the dense foliajjo. In static situations tho A!I PRC-25 was coupled with the RC-292 antenna to overcome the problems«

(2) A new radio AN/JRC-106 was installed on a battalion vehicle and moved to MJ TIEMö ALrstzlp in the initial stagoo of tho operation« She only problem was the ase of qualified operators« Sie oonsitivlty of tho aet requires a person to continually operate it to got maxUmm efficiency, Sie elapse of timo botMMn operations necessitating tho use of AJt/OKG-lOS allows the operator to bocona stale unless a small period of each day is spent operating the set«

(9) Land linos wore used in static aituctiona and sons what relieved tho probloa of continuous radio uee« Hi situations nher» aircraft are ccadng into and leaving the area the land lino provides a more audible means of caeunnnlcation with ground elements. The como platoon moved forword in tho second day of the operation oarryLni with it a SB-22 that «as in con- Umous operation throughout the operation«

lib JBSCIAL BaOHMENT AND gCHNiqnES«

On swaoP8 tht ootapanies onploycd Jungle tactics as refresher training« The terrain «baro the battalion bed provioual; opoj-»t4d uti not condudvo to juxigle taotlca and therefor« the companios nodded « Mfzosher course consisting of fozuiatlona and metJiods of novenant«

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Using VC tactics. Go A built defensive positions that were highly sophisccted and exbrowoly well eanouflaged. Firo lands that were interlocking Moro cat for appraxutatoly 75 meters from all bunkers« Siis provided oxoollonfc fields of flro and allowod maxiaim observation through the dense Jungle.

übe battalion in this action was pitted against a well ainwd, dotor^ ndned e neuer occupying excellent defensive positions« Bio tiro r.iost outstanding factors that dominated tho events of this fight wore the oneny's decision to held his position and fight et cloeo quarters for a susteinsd period, and the extraordinary degree of valor and courage shown by membora of Companies A and C of this battalion*

It will probably never be known why the cneny deddod to stand and fight in this instance instead of his usual tactic of broaldng contact quickly and »fading* into the jungle« However, it ray be assunod that because contact with US olensnts «as made at so many different locations that the VC erroneously assumed that they wore surrounded« It is interesting to note that documents found on the bodies of tho VC at the scene of the battle k»$ Nor indicated that elemonts from two rsgimsnta of the 9th QLvision and the 9th Division Bscomoissanco Codpany wore involved in the fight.

It would be bonoflotal to examine the detrLmental factors of the action in order to seek iiqprovononts and solutions, ühey wore ac follows:

a. 3he inability to reeonnolter the VC positions without becaming engaged*

b. Hie limited usd of air and artiUezy firo power duo to tho closeness of the combatants.

C operation.

The plocomoal oaanLttnent of the battalion into the ana of

d. The inability to reinforce Co C quickly because of the dense jungle,

e. Sie lack of intolllgeaoe available to tho battalion bofoxo and during the action,

Oils battalion has adopted the technique of employing eeoute in advance of cur units in dense jungle terrain« It is hoped that this technique «111 provide early wamifig to tho main body and a degree of rooomdesanoe without decisive engagement. If thle Is successful the cotunandor een withdraw and safely use artillery and air support on strong eneny* positions before ad- vancing again*

Tho problem of sustaining additional tasualtleä While attempting to retrtova wounded was previlena during this action. Thoro is no good solution to this problem and la all cases It will be a uatoer of command judgement fay tlm leader on the ground. It is aasy to say that ia should not happen, but the slftple fact is that it does occur, end our leodors should bo fully aware of the conseqaenoos of their dodslona.

26. RECCMHEHDATIOIS,

a. When intelligence is scanty but whon it la known that a hardcore VC unit is located In dense jungle terrain, employ « battalion as a battalion, not by piocemoal canmittaaat of individual ooapanlos.

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CONFIDENTIAL b. When a ccj^any or platoon is used alona in this terrain It mast

be in proodLndty to a suitable landing Bono for rapid roinforoenmt«

o» Units should not attempt to link up with tho flank of another elomenb in tho dense junglet Bioy should approach thö unit from tho rear and after link-up move laterally to the desirod flank«

FGR THE CCHM/JfflER:

AKinfts iiEirai CPT, Bifantxy Adjutant

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Annex A, Appendix 10 21 Noverober 3966 teferenoet Map, Vietnam« Ii2£,000

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CONFIDENTIAL Annex A, AppandJbc U 22 November 1966 Referanoe: Map, Vietnam, li25,000

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CONFIDENTIAL

Annex A, Atpandix 32 23 November 1^66 Beferenoei Kap, Vietnam, 1|2$,000

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IzuMK B to Ooribat Opomtlons After AetLon Iteport (deration ATTUSBORO)

Uit of Haaadad Jn Action

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Ndma OcBpany

2;

5. 6. 7; 8; 9." 10; li; 22; 33; lit. 35;

IT; 18;

20; 21; 22; 23; 2U; 2$; ?6; 22; 28; 29; 30; 31. 32, 33. 3h. 36. 36; 37; 38; 39;

la; 112; 43. lib: tt; 1J6;

Itold, Ronald E HHC linder, Roydon F HHC Hippe, Dae Lotnbert G Holloman, Bioraas Jr

A A

Heuser, Janes E A Wödo, Robert C A JLnenes, Domingo A June, Jams L A Stevens, Riqhanl A A Bogers, Jamas T A Price j David B A Lope«, Ens at R A Oox, John X A DLlllplnne, Robert A Martc,'Robert A I^mch, John H A QooKorn. Mrx F A Dugloehi AXtön G A JStiullfe Asse £ A Honhson, James E A Wbigand; Bonalä T A Anthony, Ibrranoo 1 A Pcüey, Robert F A Onwee, Harold K Jr A Vfebb,Carlton C Bveon,'Edwin T C Sdlois; Janes D C Rivers, Qeary c Gönners, Ihonns J c Ifohe, Richard A c vaiUams, Jbmos t c Howard, David J c Broirn, Charlie L Jr c Harrell> ULUlama D c Johnsonj William T Vaxgas Bodriguos, Enor Mardf old, larty D

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Williamaon, Jama D c Koefahfl/Donald 0 c Hobson, -Roy H c Fens, Alphonse G Shelser, O^rl D c Brlandsen, Allan W V Mtirchlson, Ray Q p Rcuitt, RejrW c Mantogaaeiy, Donald A G Vlgel, Gene D 0

Xn» of Wound

OSf (L) knee OS/ abdenon GSf (R) foot Ftf (R) ear 63f chost Bonder bums face & eye lide Contusion bade FIf hip & logs FV thumb & middle finger (L) hand, nedc FW (K) loifor leg FW lewor bode QS7 (B) log* FW (L) side (R) arm Injured knee (R) oaf b^ek GSW (t) ki»o Oaf (L) buttocks OStf bock FW chest & back OS/ (L) thi^i FW buttock (L) arm 09/ chost FW (L) side FW (R) elbow DUgnosis FW(L) check FW ribs FW (L) log 0S7 T t T (L) shoulder M5/W (R) upper azm FW (L) sliqulder FW (L) lower leg Contusion (R) knee Oaf ohest (R) am FW (L) leg GS:; (R) cheek oaf (L) aim Oa/ ankle FW (B) forearm, fingers (R) hand FW chest Lac forehead FW lower (R) abderaen FW back M«L (R) shoulder FW (L) foot FW buttock oar (L) arm

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CONFIDENTIAL

Annox B to Coibat Opontlons After Action Report (Operation ATTLEBORO)

Ust Of Killed In Action

Nane Company Type of Wound 1« Althoff, Rodnoy HHC Pant: Wounds head 2, Burott, William C HRC QSW hoed, chost & sturaach 3» Caniff, Jbhn R no QSW hood U« Bond, Hany D HHC W ant: chest i, MiUens, Troderide HHC GS/ chest 6. Slangier, Richard A HHC QSW chost 7» Donmn, lAlliara L A Milt GSW 8. Elswiclc, Lax A Hilt 09fJ 9« Bitten, Earl D A GS/ boeör 16. Blewett, Roy R A GSW head U« Stell, George a A GSW hoed 12* Russell, lynn J A' FW nods 13, Torres, fbmando L Jr A GSW pontk» head lJU Taylor, Robert B A GS1 nont: chost 15* Winters, Qeno T A GST neck 16» Thanes, Aaron L A 03/ chest 17« Itorraalt, Alan J A Dsprossed skull IB. Walker, Artie 0 A SOW chest ISi- Vest, Robert L A GSW -Jhest 20. Adams, Robert L Jr C GSW head 21» Barker, Howard C c Oeprossed skull, burns entdLre body 22* Besson, Lawrence E C Pont: wounds stomach 23« Oorrier, Gerald F C IW posiwrlor skull 2lu Pontnnos-Veiea Jos« C Wounds oack 2$* PBWB-Cru«, laiis A c Pent: rounds stonv-ch, (L) shoulder 26, Toung, Boibby c Pent: -;ound neck 27. Wright, James L c JSW haad

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