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AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN DETERMINED TO CLOSE KABUL TOKANDAHAR CORRIDOR

Shaykh Nur ul-Haqq Mujahid bin Mohamed, the Taliban military commanderin the Maydan Shahr district of Wardak province, stated in a recent interviewthat Taliban forces are trying to block a major supply corridor south of Kabuland close it permanently. One of Afghanistans most important highwayspasses through Maydan Shahr, connecting Kabul with the Taliban stronghold ofKandahar. The interview appeared in the 44th issue ofal-Somood, the monthlymagazine of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (posted to jihadi websites on

July 22).

In the prologue to the interview, Shaykh Nur ul-Haqq is described as a high-standing graduate of a Peshawar theological school who joined the Talibanmovement in its early stages in the mid-1990s, eventually becoming head ofmilitary security in Nangarhar province. He has been in charge of military

operations in Maydan Shahr since 2002.

According to the Taliban commander, the Crusader forces in Maydan Wardakhave military positions in the provincial capital of Maydan Shahr as well asat various points along the Kabul-Kandahar highway. Battles between themujahideen and the Crusaders occur to control the corridor and the two sideswill swap control of it during the day, but at night the mujahideen will takecomplete control of it and all the roads leading to the district, stated the shaykh.

TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org

IN THIS ISSUE:

briefs....................................................................................................................................1

half-hearted security operations in punjab do little to restrain

taliban

b a j..............................................................................................................3

bombings in bangkok: a return to political violence for the red

shirts?

b d h f.......................................................................................................5

al-qaedas ambitions in pakistan: changing goals, changing

strategies

b p c..........................................................................................................6

Volume VIII, Issue 31u AUGUST 5, 2010

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Shaykh Nur ul-Haqq insists the growing number ofU.S. troops in Afghanistan is not as important as theirmorale, which he claims is in a state of decline, saying,This ailment cannot be evaded by increasing thenumber of troops.

Fighting in Maydan Wardak can be difcult, theTaliban commander admits. The huge capabilities ofthe enemy are posed against the limited resources oflocal ghters, and the districts close proximity to Kabulmakes it easy for the Coalition to move troops quicklyto Maydan Wardak in response to any Taliban attack.Despite this, the shaykh afrms that successful attackson military and supply convoys continue in the district.

Shaykh Nur ul-Haqq also described the various Talibanstrategies and tactics used throughout Afghanistan,

noting that what works in one province will notnecessarily work in another:

For example, in Kunar and Nuristan provinces,the most suitable military method is a militaryclash because those two provinces possess ageographic situation suitable for this militarystrategy. Meanwhile, in Helmand and thesouthwest of Afghanistan the preferred methodis to plant mines and use explosives because theterrain of those areas is desert terrain, whichdoes not afford the mujahideen secure places

to hide. As for Kabul, martyrdom operationsand surprise attacks are best because the openconcentration of large numbers of invaders theregives the mujahideen an opportunity to launchthose kinds of campaigns against their bases andbarracks.

For now, however, Shaykh Nur ul-Haqqs focus onclosing the highway through Maydan Wardak maybe disrupted by an outbreak of ghting between theTaliban and their former ally, the Hizb-i-Islam militia ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar (Weesa [Kabul], July 26). MullahZabiullah, a Maydan Wardak Taliban commander,was reportedly killed in separate ghting with Afghansecurity and intelligence forces on July 31 (BakhtarNews Agency, July 31).

LEADER OF YEMENS ADEN-ABYAN ISLAMICARMY REJECTS SOUTHERN SECESSION

In a recent interview with a pan-Arab daily, ShaykhKhalid Abd al-Nabi (a.k.a. Khalid Abdulrab al-Nabi al-Yazidi), the leader of Yemens Aden-Abyan Islamic Army

(AAIA), condemned the Southern secession movementas the work of Jews and Christians, while claiming hewas the victim of accusations by atheistic communistswho had inltrated the Sanaa government (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 9, 2009).

The AAIA was established in the early 1990s by AbuHasan Zayn al-Abadin al-Mihdhar. When al-Mihdharwas executed in 1998 for his role in the deaths offour Australian and American tourists, al-Nabi tookover leadership of the group (al-Hayat, October 112005). A member of the Yafai tribe and a native ofthe al-Yazid district of Lahaj Governorate, al-Nabi leftsocialist-ruled South Yemen in the 1980s for religioustraining in Saudi Arabia. In 1994 he received militarytraining from the Taliban in Afghanistan but returnedto Yemen to participate in the civil war against the

South Yemen socialists. After this he became a seniormember of the AAIA. By 2003 al-Nabi was leading hisfollowers in clashes against government forces in theHutat Mountains of Abyan Governorate. According toal-Nabi, the atheistic communists of South Yemenhad merely been dispersed rather than defeated in thecivil war. Some remained in Yemen as members of theopposition, others became members of the oppositionoutside Yemen, and some donned the garb of the stateand joined the ruling [General Peoples] Congress PartyOutwardly, these people pretended to owe allegianceto the Congress Party but inwardly they owed their

allegiance to the socialist party, stated al-Nabi.

In 2005, al-Nabi turned himself in to authorities andreceived an ofcial pardon. He was released to hisfarm where authorities maintained he was leading apeaceful life despite numerous reports he was raisingand training an Islamist militia. Al-Nabi has repeatedlydenied having ties to the government, especially MajorGeneral Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the presidents brotherand commander of Yemens First Armored Brigade(Asharq al-Awsat, April 4, 2006; January 8).

The AAIA takes its name from an apocryphal prophecyby the Prophet Muhammad that predicts an army willarise from Aden-Abyan in the last days to ght forvictory in Gods name. Al-Nabi believes in this prophecythough he stops short of claiming to represent itsfulllment. According to him, The Prophet (p.b.u.h.preached about this army and about the fact that suchan army will emerge either now or in the future. Whenthis will happen exactly, only God knows. I believe thatthe global prophecies of our Prophet (p.b.u.h.) willinevitably take place. No one can stop them or interdict

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them [Regarding the AAIA] I cannot say denitivelywhether it actually exists and is effective or anythingelse.

Al-Nabi claims his difculties with the government areinated by those seeking revenge for their defeat in 1994.

For instance, the authorities may receive informationthat I am carrying arms in a certain location. Now thisis not a big deal. The majority of the Yemeni peoplecarry arms and even the women carry arms these days,he said. Al-Nabi also complains that the strength of theAAIA was consistently exaggerated in the past to thepoint where a band of some 20 followers was treated asthe equal of the national army. According to him, Themedia inated the issue because, as you know, moremedia coverage means more U.S. support and aid in thename of ghting terrorism.

Al-Nabi continues to defend al-Mihdhars murder offour Western tourists in 1998, saying, I believe hewas killed unjustly because, at the end of the day, eventhe killing of thousands and thousands of Christianunbelievers is not equal to one drop of blood of abeliever. He points to a fatwa by Shaykh Muqbil binHadi al-Wadi, who ruled in his book Al-Burkan Nasf

Jamiat al-Iman that the tourists had come in war andwere spies and corrupters on earth.

The AAIA leader holds a conspiratorial view of Yemens

political violence, claiming the Huthist rebel movementin north Yemen is a creation of the state supported bythe United States, though he does not explain how thiswould benet either party. He believes the southernsecession movement is likewise the work of Jews andChristians, saying it is certain that the United Statesand Britain are involved.

Though resolute in his advocacy of national unity, al-Nabi has elsewhere acknowledged there are numerousproblems facing the people of southern Yemen,including injustice, racism, usurping the money of thepeople, looting the land, oppression, barbarism, theuse of violence and force, a corrupt judiciary, corruptsecurity, and many other reasons. In fact, if we look atthe situation of the people in the southern regions, youmight excuse them for demanding secession (Asharqal-Awsat, January 8).

Half-Hearted Security Operations

in Punjab Do Little to Restrain

Taliban Attacks

By Arif Jamal

Nobody in the Punjab security establishment wasaware of how deep the Taliban had penetratedlocal society when the police and law

enforcement agencies started a half-hearted operationagainst the Punjabi Taliban in the last days of JuneThe operation came in response to simultaneous suicideattacks on two Ahmadi Muslim mosques in Lahore onMay 28 that killed 95 people (The News [Islamabad]May 29; see also Terrorism Monitor, June 12). Up tothis time, successive Punjab governments had looked at

Talibanization as an Afghan-Pashtun problem of littlerelevance to Punjab.

Within a few days, law-enforcement agencies arrestedscores of Islamist radicals and recovered 28,000kilograms of explosives, anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, suicide vests, small arms andammunition (Asia Times Online, June 30). During theoperation, law enforcement agencies specically avoidedtargeting the Lashkar-e-Taiba (and the associated

Jamaat ud-Dawah) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad ledby Maulana Masood Azhar. Had they targeted these

groups as well, they would have faced bigger surprisesInstead of continuing the operation, the governmentmysteriously asked the law-enforcement agencies toslow it down. [1]

In the aftermath of the suicide attacks on the Ahmadimosques in Lahore, a war of words started betweenFederal Interior Minister Rehman Malik and the Punjabprovincial government. Malik supported a militaryoperation against the Punjabi Taliban, particularlythose entrenched in the south of Punjab, while the

Punjab government denied their existence, objected tothe use of the expression Punjabi Taliban and accusedthe Federal Minister of trying to destabilize the province(Dawn [Karachi], June 3).

As the Punjab government came under growing pressureby the federal government and the media to take actionagainst the terrorists, a slow moving operation waslaunched in Lahore in the second week of June. In thethird week, more than 2,000 police cracked down onsuspected terrorist hideouts in their search for some1,785 terrorists in Lahore (Tribune [Karachi] June 18).

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The reaction to the suicide attacks on the Ahmadimosques in Lahore seemed to have surprised the Talibanas well. For more than a month, they did not carry outany major terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. However,they came back with a vengeance on July 1 when theystruck Lahores Data Darbar, Punjabs largest and most

revered Su shrine.

Instead of accelerating the operation against the Taliban,the Punjab government slowed it down. In what was nomore than a cosmetic gesture, the Punjab governmentannounced it would ban 17 terrorist groups, most ofwhich were already banned by the federal Ministryof the Interior last year (Geo News, August 5, 2009).These included Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), Sipah SahabaPakistan (SSP), Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP),Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM),

Tehrik-e-Jafriya Pakistan (TJP), Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), Millat-e-Islamiya Pakistan(MIP), Khuddam ul-Islam (KuI), Islami Tehrik Pakistan(ITP), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), Jamiat-ul-Ansar (JuA),

Jamiat-ul-Furqan (JuFO), Khair-un-Naas InternationalTrust, Islamic Students Movement (ISM), BalochistanLiberation Army (BLA) and Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD).It also placed the Sunni Tehrik under observation. Nineof these groups belong to the Deobandi sect, threeare Shia-based and three belong to the Ahl al-Hadith(Sala) movement. The BLA is a Baloch nationalistorganization, while the ISM is a student organization.

Interestingly, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) didnot appear on the list (The News [Islamabad], June 5).

Although a leisurely search-and-arrest police operationcontinues in Punjab, police are not likely to get thearrested terrorists convicted in the courts of law, asthey are not receiving cooperation from the army andits intelligence agencies. In a secret report, the Punjabpolice accused the army of not sharing information onterrorists with them (The News, July 7). The reportclaimed that the army neither assisted nor showed

any interest in the trial of the accused in some veryhigh prole suicide attacks, including the February25, 2008 attack on the head of the Pakistani ArmyMedical Corps, Lieutenant General Mushtaq Beg, andthe February 4, 2008 attack on an army bus carryingstudents of the Army Medical Corps (Pakistan Times,February 26, 2008). The report, which describes therole of the army as deplorable, says that the army didnot share any information on the accused or the forensicevidence, although the accused remained in the custodyof the army for one year (The News, July 7). Nine men

charged with the attacks, including alleged ringleaderDr. Abdul Razzak, were acquitted in May for lack ofevidence (Dawn, May 13; BBC, May 13).

Explaining the sluggish pace of the operation, a policeofcial in Punjab cited the above mentioned report and

said that they had been given the list of terrorists bythe army and secret agencies, but these provided littleinformation. The army and the secret agencies have notshared any evidence on the terrorists either. Police canarrest them but cannot get them convicted in the absenceof the evidence, said the police ofcial. If they did notshare any information on such high prole attacks onthe army itself, how can we expect them to share anyinformation on the Punjabi Taliban? [2]

It seems that the Islamist radicals are now aiming at a

full blown Iraq-style terrorist campaign in the urbancenters of Punjab. Pakistani investigators found evidenceof the use of shaped charges an explosive chargedesigned to focus the explosives energy at the scene ofthe twin suicide attacks at the Su shrine in Lahore. AlQaeda has previously used these charges in improvisedexplosive devices. According to a senior Pakistancounter-terrorism ofcial, This is simply preparationfor urban guerrilla warfare in Pakistan, like al-Qaedapreviously launched in Iraq. (Asia Times Online, July21) The emerging situation shows that the importanceof a full military operation against the Punjabi Taliban

cannot be overstated.

Arif Jamal is an independent security and terrorismexpert and author of Shadow War The Untold Storyof Jihad in Kashmir.

Notes

1. Authors interview with a Punjab security ofcial,July 2010

2. Ibid

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Bombings in Bangkok: A Return

to Political Violence for the Red

Shirts?

By Derek Henry Flood

After barely two months of calm in the Thaicapital following a bloody end to the April-May protests, a pair of explosions in Bangkok

threaten to mark a new wave of political violence in theconfrontation between the Red Shirts (supporters ofthe United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship-UDD) and the Yellow Shirts (supporters of thePeoples Alliance for Democracy-PAD) (see TerrorismMonitor, May 28). The Red Shirts support the returnof exiled Prime Minister Thaski Shinawatra, who has

reportedly spent a good amount of time in the UnitedArab Emirates since his 2006 ouster in a bloodlessmilitary coup (AFP, November 16, 2008).

A by-election marked Thailands rst political test sinceMay 19, when the Royal Thai Army put a forcibleend to protests which left 89 dead and some 1,900wounded (Bangkok Post, June 19). Due to the deathof a parliamentarian in June, a by-election was held on

July 25 in Bangkoks suburban 6th district that pitted aleading UDD politician, Korkaew Pikulthong (currentlyjailed on terrorism charges), against PAD candidate

Panich Vikitsreth. The Thai electoral commissionallowed the Red Shirts Pikulthong to run from behindbars, in part to prove Thailands democratic bona des.No sooner were the votes beginning to be tallied foran apparent victory by Vikitsreths pro-army, pro-establishment Yellow Shirt faction than a terroristattack shook downtown Bangkok. The victory ofPanich Vikitsreth, an ally of Prime Minister AbhisitVejjajiva, may have been a relief to those craving areturn to stability, but may have further enraged radicalson the violent margins of the Red Shirt movement whobelieve they are acting in Shinawatras name, despite hispleas for calm and non-violence. After his candidatesdefeat, Shinawatra said to his passionate followers viahis Twitter account, People who love me and wishme well need to persevere against injustice and cruelty.Please dont solve the problem through violence becauseI dont like it and disagree with it (Pattaya Daily News,

July 26). [1]

The explosive device was an American-designed M-67fragmentation grenade rigged with an alarm clock todelay detonation until a preset time. The explosive

detonated during the evening rush hour at a bus stop oncongested Ratchadamri Street. The stop was located infront of the burned out hulk of a Big C department storein Bangkoks upscale Ratchaprasong shopping districtmuch of which was destroyed in the Red Shirt violencethis spring. The grenade, containing Composition B

explosive (a mixture of RDX and TNT), killed oneand injured 10, including a Burmese national. PoliceGeneral Panupong Singhara Na Ayutthaya stated thatthe electrical circuitry used in the attack indicated thatthe bomber was likely an explosives expert who waseither politically motivated or was intent on creatinga situation in the nation (Pattaya Daily News, July26). A Red Shirt spokesman, Prompong Nopparitstated that the Ratchadamri attack was carried out byproponents of PM Vejjajivas Yellow Shirt agenda. Ibelieve the bomb came from a group who support the

government and want emergency rule to be continued,Nopparit said (Bangkok Post, July 26).

The M-67 grenade is stocked by the Royal Thai ArmyIn early March, a robbery occurred at a barracks insouthern Thailands Phatthalung Province that resultedin the loss of 69 M-67s. The culprits, a group of armyprivates, slipped up and a portion of the arms cachewas later recovered. Though it is not publicly knownprecisely how many M-67s were recovered and howmany were returned, it is believed that some of thegrenade stock is still loose in the country (Khao So

[Bangkok], July 30). Several weeks after the southerndepot theft, an M-67 was hurled at the house of anotherformer prime minister, Banharn Silpa-archa, shortlybefore the April-May troubles erupted (Reuters, May14; The Nation [Bangkok], March 30).

While the Thai capital was still on edge after the July 25attack, a second grenade exploded on July 30, when anunfortunate rubbish scavenger happened upon it hiddenin a trash pile (Mass Communications Organization ofThailand, July 30; Bangkok Post, July 30). The second

grenade had the pin removed prior to its placementwith the safety lever held in place by a rubber band. Itexploded when it was accidentally jostled by the manwho suffered cranial shrapnel wounds, as he pickedthrough rubbish bags across from the well-knownKing Power duty-free shopping center on BangkoksRangnam Road. It was very likely meant to explodeamidst a crowd later in the day to instill more fear afterSundays bombing. On July 31 three more grenades werediscovered in a drainage ditch outside the GovernmentHouse in Bangkok (Thai News Agency, July 31).

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No one has claimed responsibility for these incidents,nor has the Thai security apparatus yet afxed blame.Though the Thai military immediately stated that the

July 25 incident was not related to the by-election,many Bangkokians have their doubts (Bernama [KualaLumpur], July 26). The central government has been

gradually lifting the emergency rule orders, though thedecree still remains in effect in ten provinces, includingBangkok. PM Vejjajiva indicated that the normalrule of law will eventually be restored, with Bangkokbeing the last district to eventually return to normalcyupon the completion of the investigation into thespring uprising by the Centre for the Resolution of theEmergency Situation (Bangkok Post, July 30). For themoment, Thailands political narrative is in deadlock,with billionaire media mogul Thaksin Shinawatrapositioned as a hero to Thailands poor and sitting PM

Abhisit Vejjajiva positioned as part of the pro-royalistelite only interested in furthering his own gains at thecost of genuine democracy. The government suggests,without being entirely direct in its approach, that non-state actors backed by political power brokers are usingurban terrorism to make it appear weak. The oppositionclaims the elites in power, the Yellow Shirts, are actuallyusing the explosions to prolong the state of emergencyin Bangkok and consolidate rule, which the Red Shirtsbelieve to be unconstitutional. Thailands Deputy PrimeMinister, Suthep Thaugsuban, told the press, It isregrettable that the bomber wanted to incite further

unrest to show that the government cannot controlthe situation (AFP, July 30). Red Shirt spokesmanNopparit denounced the July 25 bombing, saying thatit gives the government a reason to extend the ongoingemergency decree (Pattaya Daily News, July 27).

Derek Henry Flood is an independent author andjournalist who blogs at the-war-diaries.com. Derek isthe editor of Jamestowns Militant Leadership Monitor

publication.

Note.

1. For the original Thai, see Thaksin ShinawatrasTwitter account, www.twitter.com/Thaksinlive

Al-Qaedas Ambitions in Pakistan:

Changing Goals, Changing

Strategies

By Zafar Imran

President Obamas Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy,by dening a goal of disrupting, dismantling,and defeating al-Qaeda, on the one hand gives

direction to this otherwise directionless war, and on theother emphasizes targeting al-Qaeda over all other anti-terrorism efforts (Associated Press of Pakistan, August2). Al-Qaeda, as innovative as it is, at least in terms ofinicting terror, has clearly taken advantage of Americasnarrow focus by assuming more of a supervisory role,delegating the active terrorism responsibilities to its

local franchises. Another important step al-Qaeda hastaken in response to Americas stepped up militaryapproach in Afghanistan is to focus more aggressivelyon the near enemy Pakistan in order to maintaina safe haven and save its high command (and ideology)from total extinction. These two fundamental changesin strategy have rattled global security strategists ingeneral and Pakistans security apparatus in particular.Not used to dealing with an enemy as unconventionalin nature as al-Qaeda, the rank and le of both thepolitical and military establishments in Pakistan hasbeen clearly outplayed by the terrorists. Moreover,Pakistans controversial strategic depth doctrine, whichnds India at the root of every destabilization attempt,not only results in providing cover to the terrorists butthe consequential anti-India sentiment also sends moreand more youth into the jihadists fold every day. Whatis more frightening than the terrorism itself is the erosionof Pakistans social fabric and the increasing numberof people, mostly from the countrys educated middleclass, who embrace extremist values.. [1]

Changing Battleelds

One of the biggest breakthroughs made by al-Qaedahas been shifting the center of gravity of terrorism fromPakistans lawless tribal region to the more settled urbanareas of Punjab and Sind provinces. Having penetratedinto Pakistani society through local terrorist outts, al-Qaedas goal in Pakistan is twofold:

Exacerbate the already existing fault lines whichdivide Pakistanis into different ethnic, politicaland religious factions, as well as encourage social

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divisions between the rich and poor by fuelingviolence between the two social classes.

Refashion the socio-political identity ofPakistanis in the spirit of al-Qaedas interpretationof Islam a system that promises harsh Sharia-

compliant justice and freedom from godlessdemocratic systems of governance that breedcorruption and moral decadence in society. [2]

These seemingly ambitious goals, which may have lookedimpossible only two years ago, are very much a realitytoday. According to recent opinion surveys, discontentamong Pakistanis has risen to an alarming 84%, morethan 60% of its youth are cynical about democracyand one third strongly supports the implementation ofSharia law. [3] In this environment, al-Qaeda surely

sees a window of opportunity in Pakistan. Moreover,the governments inability to provide even the basicamenities of life to the masses, let alone to curb terrorism,is only expediting the disaster and has the potential tojeopardize the security of the whole region.

Al-Qaedas longing to convert Pakistan into a Shariastate is not new. In his attempt to discredit Pakistanspolitical structure, Osama bin Ladens deputy, Dr.Ayman-al-Zawahiri, has penned a series of statementsand articles, including a 130 page monograph entitledThe Morning and the Lamp: A Treatise Regarding the

Claim that the Pakistani Constitution Is Islamic (seeTerrorism Monitor, March 19). In this monograph,Zawahiri carried out an in depth analysis of Pakistansconstitution, arguing that all the institutions of state inPakistan are in conict with Islam and that it is virtuallyimpossible to promulgate Sharia in a Western-styledemocratic system.

The Campaign Against the Pakistani State

Despite al-Qaedas vociferous attacks on the state ofPakistan since 2001, it was not until about two yearsago that the movement started taking concrete stepstowards realizing its dream of tearing down the Pakistanistate. The late Abu Mustafa al-Yazid, al-Qaedas chiefof operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan before beingkilled in a South Waziristan drone attack in May,established the organizations Pakistan bureau byforging alliances with local organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI),and Ilyas Kashmiris 313 Brigade, to name the mostprominent. This change in policy allowed Pakistanis forthe rst time to rise in the ranks of al-Qaeda - previously

an Arab (mainly Egyptian) dominated organization. Inorder to please its local partners, al-Qaeda also startedtaking responsibility for activities in which it had notshown much interest before, such as terrorist attacks onIndia by Pakistani groups, as well as providing supportfor the military struggle in Kashmir. [4] Since then, the

partnership between the two has only strengthened, andterrorist activities have intensied in Pakistan. Neverarticulated in such depth before, al-Qaedas long termvision of Pakistan was elaborated by its chief mediaspokesperson for Pakistan, Ustadh Ahmad Farooq another Pakistani in a recent interview with al-Qaedasmedia wing:

We are trying to create and to liberate a Pakistanthat will be a pure Sharia governed state andthat will be a safe center for all Muslims from

any place in the world, irrespective of theircolor, race or geographical origin. We are doingjihad for a Pakistan that will be a center of themujahideen and of Muslims who would be ableto come to Pakistan without any restrictions (AsSahab Media Productions, July 12).

An Expanding List of Targets

Recent Lahore attacks on Ahmadi mosques (May 28)and the Data Darbar Su shrine (July 1) indicate thebroadening of the terrorists agenda, which previously

had a narrow focus on military and intelligence ofcialsIntent on forcibly changing the fabric of Pakistani societyal-Qaedas Pakistan bureau seems to have expandedthe list of its targets by including centers of powerthat have the potential to affect its agenda by shapingthe public discourse against stricter interpretations ofIslam. Notable scholars of the majority Barelvi sectlike Maulana Sarfaraz Ahmed Naeemi (assassinatedby the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] on June 122009), as well as educated members of the Shia andAhmadi minorities, seem to match the prole and aretaking the brunt of the emboldened Salast campaign(Dawn [Karachi], June 13, 2009). At least 4,000 Shiahave been gunned down in targeted killings throughoutthe country in the last two years (Dawn, June 24). InPunjab alone, since 2006 1,312 security personnel andcivilians have been killed in 174 terrorist attacks (guresfrom South Asian Terrorism Portal). Unlike the PashtunTaliban, which recruits mostly from local tribes, thePunjabi Taliban represent a wide cross-section ofPakistans rural and urban middle class and are thereforedifcult to nd among the common people. Moreoverthese loose outts, which previously used to operate

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independent of each other, have emerged under thesupervision of al-Qaeda as a network of networks,with each constituent terrorist organization specializingin a particular city/region or terrorist activity.

An example of this coordination is found in the

recent wave of terrorism in Punjab. According tointelligence reports, the LeJ, with its strong intelligencenetwork throughout Punjab, carried out the task ofidentifying the targets and conducting surveillance ofspecic installations (Daily Times [Lahore], July 12).Responsibility for providing logistical support, i.e.suicide vests, explosives and safe havens, was delegatedto HuJI, while the TTP provided suicide bombers. Sucha sophisticated and coordinated campaign of violenceagainst the Pakistani people is a clear indication that theterrorists agenda is to forcibly change the outlook of

Pakistani society and is not merely focused on isolatedattacks against Pakistans security apparatus, as arguedby many.

Conclusion

The response from the government of Pakistan to thismost dangerous of threats is puzzling, to say the least.The nations political leadership, which wholeheartedlysupported the military operations in the tribal areas, ismore than divided on chalking out a similar strategyagainst an al-Qaeda-Punjabi Taliban nexus. Huge gains

achieved against the terrorists in initially successfulmilitary operations in Swat, Buner, Bajaur, and SouthWaziristan have been squandered by self-servingpoliticians who impede the capture of terrorists hidingin their constituencies in Punjab. The expanding numberof self-proclaimed analysts who thrive on made-upconspiracy theories mislead the people by fueling anti-American sentiment. The confusion that is created in theresulting mayhem is doing little to pacify the concerns ofthe Pakistani public who, having lost faith in politiciansand democracy, are beginning to look towards thepromised Sharia state to at least bring order to their

lives.

Pakistan has a troubled history of ethnic feuds, sectarianbloodshed and linguistic politics. There are layers uponlayers of confused identities which have kept 170 millionindividuals from becoming one nation. Exploiting thesesocial fractures to its benet is the heart of al-Qaedaswell-planned strategy to break into Pakistani societyand to use it as a base for terrorist operations in therest of the world. Indifferent to the looming dangerof potential state failure at the hands of terrorism, the

Pakistani leadership seems to underestimate the level ofthis threat, while terrorists chip away at its legitimacyone attack at a time.

Zafar Imran is an independent analyst, and researcheson state building in fragile and failed states, with a

special focus on Pakistan and Afghanistan. His currentresearch focuses on fragmentation in Pakistani societyas a source of rising radicalism, and its implications onregional security.

Notes

1. According to the Pew Global Attitudes surveyPakistani Public Opinion (August 2009), a growingpercentage of Pakistanis favor strict implementation ofSharia and harsh punishments. The survey suggestedthat 83% support stoning people who commit adultery

80% favor punishments like ogging and amputationof hands for crimes like theft and robbery and 78%support the death penalty for people who leave theMuslim religion.

2. Al-Qaedas vision for Pakistan, although not presentedby its leadership in a coherent strategic documentcan be cobbled together by reviewing statements andessays produced by its leaders over the last 10 years.See especially The Morning and the Lamp A critiqueof the Constitution of Pakistan, by Dr. Ayman alZawahiri; see also Why Jihad in Pakistan a recent

statement by al-Qaedas spokesperson for PakistanUstadh Ahmad Farooq, laying out al-Qaedas vision ofa Sharia state in Pakistan; and Zawahiris message Tothe Pakistan Army and the People of Pakistan, August10, 2008.

3. 22 Nations Pew Global Attitudes Survey, June 172010, http://pewglobal.org/les/pdf/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010-Pakistan-Report.pdf);British Council Survey of Pakistani youth, November2009, (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/20pakistan-younger-generation-democracy-report).

4. In a posthumously released audio message, MustafaAbu al-Yazid accepted responsibility for the attack onthe German Bakery in Puneh India, which killed 20people on February 13 2010, and praised Ilyas Kashmiria Pakistani jihadist, by saying, The person who carriedout this operation was a heroic soldier from the Soldiersof the Sacrice Brigade, which is one of the brigades ofQaedat al-Jihad [al-Qaedas formal name] in Kashmirunder the command of Commander Illyas Kashmirimay Allah preserve him (The Hindu, July 10).

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