title iv.crimes against public interest

7/29/2019 Title IV.crimes Against Public Interest

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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC

INTEREST

COUNTERFEITING

People vs. Kong Leon

FACTS: Kong Leon, a goldsmith, was sellingillegally fabricated USdollar coins which are already

withdrawn from circulation.Several unfinished coins

were found by the police in hisshop and pockets.

HELD: When RPC was enacted, the Spanish text

was theone approved. Thus, it controls the

interpretation of provisions. Therefore, under

Spanish Penal Code,fabrication of coin withdrawn

from circulation is punishablebecause of (1) the

harm it caused to the public when itgoes into

circulation again, (2) the danger of acounterfeiter

staying within the country (he maycounterfeit coins

in actual circulation and (3) collectorswill bedefrauded.

MUTILATION OF COINS

FORGERY

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:Accused of counterfeiting Philippine

treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta

and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the

Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal

possession of said forged treasury notes and

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging

from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of

prision mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as

well as a proportionate part of the costs. On

appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said

indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10

years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. The

case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by

Sergio del Rosario.

It appears that, after showing to complainant

Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills

Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill

Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the

same were counterfeit paper money manufactured

by them, although in fact they were genuine

treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of

the digits of each of which had been altered and

changed, the aforementioned defendants had

succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said

complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23

1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the

manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of

the Philippines. Appellant maintains that, being

genuine treasury notes of our government, thepossession thereof cannot be illegal.

It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of

Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been

erased and changed so as to read 0 and that

similar erasures and changes had been made in

the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of

Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No.D-716326 of

Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No.

D-716329 of Exhibit H.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is liable fo

counterfeiting treasury notes.

HELD: YES.Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised

Penal Code read:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false

treasury or bank notes and other instruments of

credit. - Unless the act be one of those coming

under the provisions of any of the preceding

articles, any person who shall knowingly use or

have in his possession, with intent to use any of

the false or falsified instruments referred to in this

section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in

degree than that prescribed in said

articles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtual law library

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. - The

forgery referred to in this section may be

committed by any of the following

means;chanrobles virtual law library

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any

instrument payable to bearer or to orde

mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and

genuine

document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtual law library

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting o

altering by any means the figures, letters, words or

signs contained therein.

It is clear from these provisions that the possession

of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of

"the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in


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which had been erased and or altered, with

knowledge of such notes, as they were used by

petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the

manner adverted to above, is punishable under

said Article 168, in relation to Article 166,

subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs.

Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).

PEOPLE vs GALANO

FALSIFICATION

G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA

ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY

VICKERS, J.:

The Supreme Court designated Justice Norberto

Romualdez as chairman of the examination

committee for admission to the bar in the year1926. The accused Estela Romualdez,private

secretary of Justice Romualdez since 1921, was

designated as corrector in Political Law.

In the list of successful candidates there appeared

the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a

general average of 75%. However, a later revision

of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that

the grades of 73 in Civil Law, and 64 in Remedial

Law had been written on the first page of said

compositions after striking out the grades of 63 in

Civil Law, and 58 in Remedial Law. The

investigation of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of

Manila led to the filing of the information in this

case.

The accused Estela Romualdez, according to her

own admission, made the alterations of the grades

originally given by the correctors to compositions.

But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own

behalf, was not able to explain how and under

what circumstances she made those alterations.

The accused Luis Mabunay obtained the general

average of 72.8%, according to the computation

appearing on the roll originally written in the list

Exhibit C-1; that after the Supreme Court denied

the recommendation of the examination

committee that all grades from and between 70%

and 75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name,

nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful

candidates which was published on March 5, 1927

(Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the

increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1)

and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made

by his coaccused by erasing and altering the

grades theretofore given by the correctors.

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort

to contradict the evidence for the prosecution with

reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600

from his savings account on the second day o

March, 1927, or three days before the publication

of the result of the examinations which, when

correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400

made by the accused Estela Romualdez in he

current account on the seventh day of said March,

1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of themotive of said accused for increasing the grades of

Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach

the lowest passing general average.

ISSUE: Whether Estela Romualdez and Luis

Mabunay were guilty of falsification of public o

official documents

HELD: Yes. The examination of candidates fo

admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot

therefore be maintained with any show of reason

that the papers submitted by the candidates in the

course of the examination were not public andofficial documents, or that the alteration, under the

circumstances alleged in the information, of the

grades given to such papers by the "correctors"

was not a crime. The phrase "falsification of a

document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of

the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the

words. It has a technical meaning, and according to

article 300 may be committed in the following

eight ways:

1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting

signature, or rubric.

2. By causing it to appear that persons have

participated in any act or proceeding when they

did not in fact so participate.

3. By attributing to persons who have participated

in an act or proceeding statements other than

those in fact made by them.

4. By making untruthful statements in a narration

of facts.

5. By altering true dates.

6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a

genuine document which changes its meaning.

7. By issuing in authenticated form a document

purporting to be a copy of an original document

when no such original exists, or by including in

such a copy a statement contrary to, or different

from, that of the genuine original.

8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative

to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry o

official book.


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The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs

2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades

in such a way as to make it appear that the

"correctors" had participated therein, because she

blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and

wrote new and increased grades opposite their

initials, without indicating by her own initials that

she had made the alterations. She in that way

attributed to the "correctors" statements other

than those in fact made by them. Her onlyexplanation of why she altered the grades in that

way was that it pleased her to do so.

If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the

accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority

which she claims to have received, nevertheless

she was not authorized to change the grades now

in question, because when she made the changes

she already knew that the papers belonged to her

coaccused Luis Mabunay. The accused Estela

Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under

what circumstances she raised the grades of her

coaccused so as to enable him to obtain thenecessary general average of 75 per cent. She did

not confer with the "correctors" who had graded

the papers in question. She did not attempt to

explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or

how she came to revise the grades in question,

how she happened to pick these two papers out of

eight thousand. She could not point to any other

grades that had been altered by her.

The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed

in two previous examinations, and that he failed in

the examination in question, receiving a general

average of only 72.8%. The bar examiningcommittee recommended that not only those

having the required general average of 75 per cent

be admitted, but also that those who had received

between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in

the record as "an automatic increase". It was not

automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by

the Supreme Court, and the committee was

directed to prepare a new list and to include

therein only those who had obtained a general

average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay

was included in the new list submitted three days

later, notwithstanding the fact that he had

obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent,

precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the

meantime raised the grades now in question so

that he appeared to have obtained the general

average required for admission to the bar.

The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis

Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust

Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez

deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine

Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did

not present any evidence to show for what purpose

he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after

the first list was disapproved.

Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510

P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10

by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily

prove where the remaining P400 came from. She

said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca

Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but

she could not name the person that brought the

money to her, or explain why she deposited it in

the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had

paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of

goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as

a witness.

The alterations in the grades made by Estela

Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit

of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made

willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court

had rejected those candidates that had received

less than 75 per cent. The alterations were

therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and hewithdrew the money after he had time to learn

from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under

those circumstances incumbent upon the accused

Mabunay to present evidence to show for what

purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from

the bank.

LEGAMIA v. IAC

SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner, vs. THE

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981

DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Salud P. Beradio, a lady-lawyer appointed as an

election registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales

Pangasinan, was convicted on 4 counts of the

crime of falsification of public or official documents

of the 7 separate informations filed against her for

making false entries in her daily time records. Shewas stationed as Chief of Office, Office of the

Election Registrar, COMELEC holding office beside

the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00

noon and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the

afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work

she was required to fill up and submit to the

COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time

records after having been counter-signed by he

provincial supervisor. The COMELEC by resolution

granted her request for permission to appear as

counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the


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case before the Court of Agrarian Relations in

Rosales, Pangasinan. One Raymundo Vasquez filed

an administrative complaint against her for

unauthorized practice of law. Beradio afterwards

tendered her resignation as Election Registrar.

Upon being informed of Beradios separation from

service, Vasquez initiated the criminal complaints

of falsification of public documents against

Beradio. The separate informations allege that

petitioner was absent the whole day on the daysmentioned therein but to the "damage and

prejudice of the National Government," she made it

appear in her time records that she was not so

absent from the office, when in fact she well knew

that on such date or time she was in the CFI of

Pangasinan, Branch XIV, appearing in her cases.

ISSUE:

Whether Beradio is liable.

HELD:

NO.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a

conviction of the offense of falsification of public or

official documents, defined and penalized under

Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,

the requisite elements thereof must be clearly

established, namely: 1) the offender makes in a

document false statements in a narration of facts;

2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of

the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by

him are absolutely false, and 4) the perversion of

truth in the narration of facts was made with the

wrongful intent of injuring a third person.

On the main point, assuming, however, that

petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep

and submit the daily time records (petitioner is not

required in this case), We are definitely inclined to

the view that the alleged false entries made in the

time records on the specified dates contained in

the information do not constitute falsification for

having been made with no malice or deliberate

intent. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner

consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all

candor her appearances in six (6) different ways.

The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales,

Pangasinan, is only two (2) meters from her own

office as Election Registrar in the said municipality.

She had standing authority to act as de oficio

counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in

furtherance of the free legal aid service program of

the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the

Government itself, 10 especially as COMELEC

lawyers, before any election had been held during

the regime of martial law, did not have much office

work to keep them busy. This state of virtual

absence of electoral activities is what prompted

COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active

part in the free legal aid program above adverted

to, if to do so would not unduly interfere with thei

work.

Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the

instant case, no criminal intent to commit the

crime with which she is charged can be imputed

against the petitioner.

On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution

belies its allegation of the wholeday absence in

office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that

petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or

45 minutes a day for her appearances therein, at

no instance exceeding 1 hour.

If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the

six days in question making it appear that she

attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon

and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more than

color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown

that she did not report first to her office as Election

Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to

the courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitioner

thus likened her appearance to going out for the

usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even

apt for during the while she appeared in court, she

was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the

public good, than just for her own well-being as

when she goes out for snack during the coffee-

break period. The court being only two (2) meters

away from her office, she did not even have to goso far as when one goes out for snack. What is

more, everytime she appeared in court, she surely

must have made this fact officially of record in the

court proceedings, something which is not done

with leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In

fine, the entries in petitioner's daily time records

were not absolutely false. The alleged false entry

may be said to have a color of truth, not a

downright and willful falsehood which alone would

constitute falsification as a crime.

In thus preparing her daily time record the way she

did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief thatshe was just making of record the fact that, as was

her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive her

full pay even for those days she appeared in court,

rendering what she felt was no less a public

service, being in furtherance of a public policy on

free legal assistance. On this point, if one fills up

his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis

of the time so indicated therein, she is merely

making an honest claim for the pay corresponding

to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the

crime of falsification of public document can be


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ascribed to her. In the case of the herein petitioner,

she was only submitting a time record she knew

would be the basis for computing the pay she

honestly felt she deserved for the period indicated.

Indeed, the time record is required primarily, if not

solely, for the purpose of serving as basis for the

determination of the amount of pay an employee is

entitled to receive for a given period.

Although the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a

third person is unnecessary, this Court emphasized

that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that

the change in the public document must be such

as to affect the integrity of the same or change in

the public document must be such as to affect the

integrity of the same or change the effects which it

would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens,

there could not exist the essential element of the

intention to commit the crime which is required by

Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal Code.

While it is true that a time record is an official

document, it is not criminally falsified if it does notpervert its avowed purpose as when it does not

cause damage to the government. It may be

different in the case of a public document with

continuing interest affecting the public welfare

which is naturally damaged if that document is

falsified where the truth is necessary for the

safeguard and protection of that general interest.

In the instant case, the time records have already

served their purpose. They have not caused any

damage to the government or third person

because under the facts duly proven, petitioner

may be said to have rendered service in the

interest of the public, with proper permission fromher superiors. They may now even be condemned

as having no more use to require their continued

safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed

by their contents, and continuing faith in their

verity is not affected.

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22,

1982

PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner, vs.THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk died at the G.B.

Tan Memorial Hospital. Thereafter, the then Bureau

of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary

warrants to the Superintendent of schools at

Catarman Northern Samar who in turn forwarded

them to the District Supervisor, Florencio

Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied

the checks. The checks werepersonally received by

Pilar S. Luague.For signing the name of he

husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three

treasury warrants for purposes of endorsement

appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa

thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note

The appellant was charged with three counts o

estafa thru falsification of commercial document

but was convicted of falsification only.]

It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as

in the Court of Appeals that she acted in good faith

or had no criminal intent when she cashed her

deceased husband's paychecks.

ISSUE: whether the appellants conviction should

be sustained

HELD: NO

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court

of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure o

applying literally the letter of the law, namely

there was falsification because the petitione

"signed her husband's name in indorsing the

treasury warrants in question." The Court o

Appeals failed to take into account the following

facts: That the petitioner signed her husband's

name to the checks because they were delivered

to her by no less than her husband's district

supervisor long after the husband's death which

was known to the supervisor; that she used the

proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of

her husband's last illness and his burial; and that

she believed that she was entitled to the money as

an advance payment for her husband's vacation

and sick leave credits the money value of whichexceeded the value of the checks. In the fight of

these circumstances, We cannot ascribe crimina

intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claim that

she acted in good faith.

During the hearing, it was brought out that the

government did not sustain any financial loss due

to the encashment of the checks because the

petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation

and sick leaves the money value of which

exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the

value of the checks was simply deducted from the

money value of the leaves. This explains why thepetitioner was not convicted of estafa but o

falsification only. While we do not mean to imply

that if there is no damage there can be no

falsification, We do say that the absence o

damage is an element to be considered to

determine whether or not there is criminal intent.

CABIGAS vs PEOPLE


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G.R. No.L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January

20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN

SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT,

defendants. JUAN SAMSON anddefendant-

appellant.

Aquino, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners were all charged with malversation

through falsification for allegedly using six forged

provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the

road and bridge fund the total sum of

P57,048.23.Samson played a stellar role in the

processing of the six vouchers. He represented the

Carried Construction Supply Co. in its dealings with

the offices of the governor, provincial auditor,

provincial engineer and provincial treasurer.

The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with theirrespective supporting papers, were hand-carried

by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita

Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial

engineer's office, for recording. Thereafter, Samson

brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's

office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who

performed the chore of recording the vouchers and

payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871

and 11872.

Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers

to indicate that he presented them to the

provincial treasurer's office. Crusade said that after

Samson had presented the said papers to him,

Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-

keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for

processing and for the latter's signature. From

Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers

to the provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia

Cruz, a clerk to record the same.

Afterwards, Samson asked DonatoRosete the

assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the

voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers,

Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office

where the amounts covered by the voucher were

paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by

check) as representative of the Carried

Construction Supply Co.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two

signatures on each of the six vouchers showing

that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts

covered thereby as representative of the lumber

and hardware firm and that he presented the

vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office.

Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are

genuine.

Sendaydiego and Samson were convicted. Pending

appeal, Sendaydiego died. Hence, we shall now

focus on Samsons culpability. Samson's brief has

no statement of facts. He contends that the tria

court erred in disregarding the expert testimony

that his signatures on the vouchers are not his

signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers

and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying

on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Is the trial correct in convicting him of falsification?

HELD:

Yes. After examining the questioned and genuine

signatures and analysing the evidence and

contentions of the parties, we find that the expert

is correct in declaring that there are radica

differences between the questioned and authenticsignatures.But the expert is in error in concluding

that Samson did not forge the questioned

signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand

in the writing thereof.

The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as

the representative or collector of the supposed

creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand

carried the vouchers in question to the offices of

the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and

then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He

actually received the cash payments. Under those

circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the

forger of the vouchers.

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a

falsified document and be made use of it (uttered

it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the

presumption is that he is the material author of the

falsification. This is especially true if the use o

uttering of the forged documents was so closely

connected in time with the forgery that the user o

possessor may be proven to have the capacity of

committing the forgery, or to have close

connection with the forgers, and therefore, had

complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a

satisfactory explanation, one who is found in

possession of a forged document and who used o

uttered it is presumed to be the forger

MANUEL L. SIQUIAN vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 82197. March 13, 1989


7/19

CORTES, J.:

FACTS: It appears from the evidence that

sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years

old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to

the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the

Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to

apply for employment in the office of the Mayor.

Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal

Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was

any vacancy. When she was informed that there

was, she went to see the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her

because he accompanied her to the office of the

Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter,

however, was not there. Even so, the accused told

Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day

and that she should be included in the budget. The

accused then accompanied her to the Office of the

Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung. The Treasurer

agreed that she could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the

Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there.

When she went to the accused, she was told to go

back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her

appointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary

in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1,

1975 by the accused.

Accompanying her appointment is the certification,

among others, of the availability of funds (C.S.

Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the

accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the

requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5,

Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of

Civil Service, Manila.

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office on July 1,

1975, and promptly began to work on the same

day. Her monthly salary was P120.00. She

rendered services for the months of July, August,

September, October, November and December

1975. She was not, however, paid. As early as

October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer

to receive her salary, but she was told that therewas no money yet. In November 1975, she went to

see the accused, but the latter told her to see the

treasurer. She went to the Treasurer who told her

that there was no money. Because of this, she

went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the

Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic)

information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was

interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosio, Provincial

Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had

complete appointment papers. Thereafter, she filed

her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against

the accused. Her complaint is addressed to

Governor Faustino N. Dy.

It also appears from the evidence that the

Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to

enact the annual budget for the municipality for

the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. Accordingly, and

pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the

previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re

enacted. Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personne

for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the

Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976

No supplemental budget was enacted by the

municipal council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which

was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-

1976, there was no new item or appropriation for

the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipa

Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position

of clerk in the office of the Municipal Counci

appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personne

for 1974-1975, was filled-up as early as October

16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita

G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2")

With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the

office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla fo

1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the

appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16

1975, by the accused. As early as June 28, 1974

the same position was held by Miss Felicidad

Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but

she resigned.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty.

HELD: YES.

It is settled that in the fourth kind o

falsification, the following requisites must concur

(a) That the offender makes in a documen

untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b)

That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth

of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts

narrated by the offender are absolutely false.

All these requisites had been fully met in

the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being

then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan

Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the

narration of facts contained in the certification

which he issued in connection with the

appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon.

The certification, having been issued by a

public official in the exercise of the function of his

office is a public document.


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The requisite of absolute falsity of the

statement made in the document is met when

there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in

what is declared in the narration of facts.

The existence of a wrongful intent to injure

a third person is not necessary when the falsified

document is a public document.

The rationale for this principal distinction

between falsification of public and private

documents has been stated by the Court in this

wise: "In the falsification of public or official

documents, whether by public officials or private

persons, it is unnecessary that there be present

the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third

person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to

private documents, the principal thing punished is

the violation of the public faith and the destruction

of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed".

In falsification of public documents

therefore, the controlling consideration is the

public character of a document and the existence

of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at

least, the intent to cause such damage becomes

immaterial.

Good faith is a valid defense to falsification

of public documents by making untruthful

statements in a narration of facts.

Such defense cannot serve to exonerate

the petitioner since the element of good faith has

not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan,

Isabela was aware that there were no funds

appropriated for the position of clerk to the

municipal secretary under the Municipal Plantilla of

Personnel for that fiscal year when the Municipal

Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal

Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted for failure to enact

a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976.

Criminal intent and the will to commit a

crime are presumed to exist on the part of the

person who executes an act which the law

punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. In this

case, the presumption that petitioner committedthe act with criminal intention, which arose from

proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands

unrebutted.

Abuse of public office is considered present

when the offender falsifies a document in

connection with the duties of his office which

consist of either making or preparing or otherwise

intervening in the preparation of a document.

G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs

HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and

FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Complainant Mariano Carrera and his

brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parce

of land registered in their names.On February 5

1964, complainant allegedly executed a specia

power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B

Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico

de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On

February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged

the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust

Company in Dagupan City using the said specia

power of attorney, and was able to obtain the

amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee

bank. Both the special power of attorney and the

mortgage contract were duly registered in the

Registry of Deeds.

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage,

and the mortgage account not having been paid,

the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and

the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and

ViletaQuinto. In January, 1972, complainant

allegedly discovered that their property was

already registered in the name of said Ramon

Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action

for the ejectment of the former from the premises.

A case for estafa thru falsification of a public

document was filed against private respondent. A

motion to dismiss was filed, wherein it was alleged

that the crime charged would not lie due to the

partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the

effect that he authorized private respondent to

mortgage the said one-half portion of the land

owned by him and his brother. Said partia

testimony of complainant was quoted, with the

emphasized portions, as follows:

"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the

title of your property at present?

A Yes, sir, I know.

Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?

A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank

Do you know the reason why it was forelosed by

the Bank?


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A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was

foreclosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother

Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to

sign a document as a witness and I asked him he

interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico

de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half

portion of the land which belongs to me, my

brother said.

Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo

Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to

sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to

mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned

by you and your brother. Do you have any

document to show that?

x xx

ATTY. DIAZ:

Q Can you recognize that document which you

signed in 1964 if shown to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a

document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of

identification, and may we request that it be

marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This

document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor,

and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the

second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two.

Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this?

A This is the document brought by my brother to

Manila for me to sign, sir.

x xx

Based on the aforequoted testimony, private

respondent contends that there is no sufficient

basis for the charge and this fact warrants the

dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a

public document filed against the private

respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law

and in fact.

HELD:

YES. The falsification of a public document may be

a means of committing estafa because before the

falsified document is actually utilized to defraud

another, the crime of falsification has already been

consummated, damage or intent to cause damage

not being an element of the crime of falsification of

public, official or commercial documents. The

damage to another is caused by the commission of

estafa, not by the falsification of the document

hence, the falsification of the public, official o

commercial document is only a necessary means

to commit the estafa.

Petitioner posits that the offense charged is

supported by the fact that what was intended to be

mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to

Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to

complainant, otherwise complainant would no

have quoted his brother's words. The theory o

petitioner and the findings of public respondent are

substantially the same. We agree that the offense

charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained

in the findings of the court below:

"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the

partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera

and of the record, as regards the first ground, the

court finds that the contention of the defense thatthe authorization given to him to mortgage the

whole property is not sustained by the evidence

because a cursory study of the answer made by

the witness complainant clearly shows that what

was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half

(1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera

excluding that portion pertaining to said

complainant. In other words, the alleged

authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a

loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land

referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This

finding is based on the following quoted answer:

'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that

this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to

get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the

land which belongs to me, my brother said.'

Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-

quoted testimony. He merely quoted his brothe

Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the

land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by

Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which

belongs to you.'"

G.R. No. 146731 January 13, 2004

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO

BERNANTE

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a

criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification

of public document. Enemecio asserted tha


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Bernante made it appear in his leave application

that he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996 to

21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May

1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was

serving a 20-day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to

2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime

of slight physical injuries. Bernante was able to

receive his salary during his incarceration since

then CSCST-CFT Superintendent Andres T.

Melencion approved Bernantes application forleave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not

entitled to receive salary for that period because of

his "falsified leave applications."

Issue: whether Bernante should be held liable for

falsification

Held:No. Enemecios contentions do not deserve

serious consideration.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised

Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public

documents through an untruthful narration of facts

are: (a) the offender makes in a document

untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b)

the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the

truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by

the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the

perversion of truth in the narration of facts was

made with the wrongful intent to injure a third

person.24

As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out,

Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon

Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he

was going to spend his leave of absence. "Legalobligation" means that there is a law requiring the

disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.

Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of

falsification of public document by making false

statements in a narration of facts absent any legal

obligation to disclose where he would spend his

vacation leave and forced leave.

LEONILA BATULANON vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated

(PCCI) employed LeonilaBatulanon as its

Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December

22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits

from and releasing loans to the membesa of the

cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982,

certain irregularities concerning the release of

loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon

falsified four commercial documents, al

checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans

to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion

Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appea

that said names were granted a loan and received

the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in

truth and in fact the said persons never received a

grant, never received the checks, and never signed

the check vouchers issued in their names. In

furtherance, Batulanon released to herself thechecks and received the loans and thereafter

misappropriated and converted it to her own use

and benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through

Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed

against Batulanon. The prosecution presented

Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist

Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers

testified that Batulanon forged the signatures o

Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that

Oracion is Batulanon sister-in-law and DennisBatulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in

1982. He averred that membership in the

cooperative is not open to minors.

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a

Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through

Falsification of Commercial Documents.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the

trial court, hence this petition.

Batulanon avers that the crime of falsification o

private document requires as an element prejudiceto a third person. She insists that PCCI has not

been prejudiced by these loan transactions

because these loans are accounts receivable by

the cooperative.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon

was Falsification of Private Documents.

HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the

Information is Estafa through Falsification o

Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be

convicted of Falsification of Private Documents

under the well-settled rule that it is the allegationin the information that determines the nature of

the offense and not the technical name given in

the preamble of the information.

The elements of falsification of private document

under Article 172, par.2 of the RPC are: (1) that the

offender committed any of the acts of falsification

except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that

the falsification was committed in any private

document; and (3) that the falsification caused

damage to a third party or at least the falsification

was committed with intent to cause such damage.


11/19

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI

has not been prejudiced because the loan

transactions are reflected in its books as accounts

receivable. It has been established that PCCI only

grants loans to its bona fide members with no

subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not

members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a

loan.

The CA correctly ruled that the subject vouchers

are private documents and not commercial

documents because they are not documents used

by merchants or businessmen to promote or

facilitate trade or credit transactionsnor are they

defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or

other commercial law.Rather, they are private

documents, which have been defined as deeds or

instruments executed by a private person without

the intervention of a public notary or of other

person legally authorized, by which some

disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced orset forth.

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through

Falsification of Private Documents, it is important

to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged

with Falsification of a Private Document or with

Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is

committed as a means to commit estafa, the

proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the

Estafa can be committed without the necessity of

falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa.

We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held

Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofFalsification of Private Documents in the cases of

Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that

Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis.

What she did was to sign: by: Ibatulanon to

indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan

in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any

of the modes of Falsification under Article 171

because there is nothing untruthful about the fact

that she used the name of Dennis and that as

representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds

of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsificationis the act of making untruthful or false statements,

which is not attendant in this case. As to whether,

such representation involves fraud which caused

damage to PCCI is a different matter which will

make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification.

Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold

that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of

Private Document with respect to the case

involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

NIZURTADO vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Galeos vs People

GR No. 174730-37 February 9, 2011

Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayoof the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986

He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in

1988 and served as such until 1998.

Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos

and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of

Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I

respectively, in the Office of the Municipa

Engineer.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities

and Net Worth (SALN), Galeos answered "No" to

the question: "To the best of your knowledge, areyou related within the fourth degree o

consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in

the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on

the space for the list of the names of relatives

referred to in the said query.

Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree

of consanguinity as his mother is the sister o

Galeos mother, and to Rivera within the fourth

degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the

mother of Riveras wife.

Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved therecommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman fo

the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against

Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public

documents under Article 171 of the Revised Pena

Code.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed

Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera.

Issue:

Whether the accused herein are guilty of the crime

of falsification?

Ruling:

Yes. Art. 171.of the RPC provides: Falsification by

public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic

minister. any public officer, employee, or notary

who, taking advantage of his official position, shal

falsify a document by committing any of the

following acts: 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any

handwriting, signature or rubric; 2. Causing it to

appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;


12/19

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in

an act or proceeding statements other than those

in fact made by them; 4. Making untruthful

statements in a narration of facts;

The elements of falsification in the above provision

are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public

document untruthful statements in a narration of

facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the

truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts

narrated by him are absolutely false.

All the elements of falsification of public

documents by making untruthful statements have

been established by the prosecution.

A narration of facts is merely an account or

description of the particulars of an event or

occurrence.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the

question in his SALN if he has relatives in the

government service within the fourth degree of

consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement

therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was

then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree

of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins

(their mothers are sisters). When a government

employee is required to disclose his relatives in the

government service, such information elicited

therefore qualifies as a narration of facts

contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

MICHAEL T. DAVA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURTG.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:The information specifically charges the

petitioner with having made it appear in hisdriver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the

Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-

preparation and with having used the said driver's

license knowing that it was falsified. The charges

therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172

(1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any

private individual who shall commit any the

falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically

paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of

causing it to appear that persons (public officials)

have participated in any act proceeding when they

did not in fact so participate. The information also

charges Dava with having knowingly used a false

document under the last paragraph of Article 172.

The evidence at hand proves that petitioner

misrepresenting that he had no driver's license

asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him

Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used

to get his own driver's license in San Fernando

Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's

license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land

Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said

locality. 46 On January 24, 1978, petitione

renewed his license at the said office by paying the

amount of P10.00 for which he was issued officia

receipt No. 0605870. 47

In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then

was simply to present an official receipt showing

that at the previous year the licensee had paid for

his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to

pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did

not involve the issuance of "another form," a driverdid not have to fill up an application form for the

renewal of a license. The said agency would then

issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of

the license but the driver's license itself would not

be changed. 48

Thus.on January 24,1978, when driver's license No

2706887 together with official receipt No. 864321

49 were presented to the San Fernando LTC

agency, the personnel therein issued official

receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner

Although the receipt was not personally signed by

office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistantthe receipt 50 was genuine and the amoun

indicated therein was actually paid to and collected

by the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver's

license itself may not have been issued by said

agency 52 but its form was likewise genuine

However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK

because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a

facsimile was not printed over" his name therein

53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of

the license Division of the Bureau of Land

Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non

professional driver's license No. 2706887 in the

name of Michael DavaTolosa "is not registered" intheir index card. 54

ISSUE: Is there a violation of Art. 172?

HELD:Yes.Hence, while there is no doubt that

driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one

the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the

actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are


13/19

pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable

doubt at he caused the falsification and made use

of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.

The elements of the crime of using a falsified

document in transaction (other than as evidence in

a judicial proceed penalized under the last

paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the

offender knew that a document was falsified by

another person; (b) the false document is

embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions

Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such

document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the

use of the false document caused damage to

another or at last it was used with intent to cause

such damage. 55 Except for last, all of these

elements have been proven beyond reason doubt

in this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who

requested Manalili to get him a license. He

misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any

time been issued a driver's license. 56 Through thismisrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili

awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a

driver's license the shortest time possible to enable

petitioner to perform duties as detailman,

petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner,

to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing

the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was

no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so

short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus,

as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to

have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a

friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers

whom he knew were not employees of the LTC towhom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the

legal fee then was only P15.00. 57 As it was in

truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with

no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that

it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly

with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from

the charge of falsification. He is, beyond

reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the

commission of said crime.

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious

character of his second driver's license No.

2706887. Having already obtained a driver'slicense, he knew that it was not legally possible for

him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would

have been no need for him to misrepresent to his

friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a

driver's license. But even with this

misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to

believe that Manalili would be able to secure a

driver's license through legal means in about an

hour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtaining

driver's license No. 2706887 was more than

sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary

cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness

and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he

himself was surprised when the fixer handed to

him the plastic jacket of the driver's license o

Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours

after he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 In

those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the

LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay

in the release of the license applied for. Under

these circumstances, no "reasonable andfairminded man" would say that petitioner did not

know that his license was a fake. 60

A driver's license is a public document within the

purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of

the drivers license becomes a public document the

moment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when driver's

license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's

personal data and the signature of the region of

the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein

even if the same was simulated, the driver's

license became a public document.

The third element of use of the falsified document

is proven by the fact that when petitioner was

apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in

his possession and it was what he presented Lising

to show that he had a license. Because he was a

detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is

probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of

issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used

driver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof

of the fourth element of damage caused to another

person or at least an intent to cause such damagehas become immaterial. In falsification of public o

official documents, the principal thing being

punished is the violation of the public faith and the

destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts

that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,

63 should be applied in his favor:The rule is that i

a person had in his possession a falsified document

and he made use of it (uttered it), taking

advantage of it and profiting thereby, the

presumption is that he is the material author of the

falsification. This is especially true if the use outtering of the forged documents was so closely

connected in time with the forgery that the user o

possessor may be proven to have the capacity of

committing the forgery, or to have close

connection with the forgers, and therefore, had

complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a

satisfactory explanation, one who is found in

possession of a forged document and who used o

uttered it is presumed to be the forger.


14/19

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption

enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute

as it is subject to the exception that the accused

should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in

possession of a false document. 64 His

explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it

consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend,

Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not

have acted on his own accord without the prodding

of petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's

allegations on the role of fixers in government

agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who

could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not

necessarily involved in the commission of forgery

or falsification of official documents" and he shares

his fees with "insiders." 65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in

government licensing agencies. Why they

proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our

bureaucracy but also on our own people. While notall fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some

simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless

provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing

common people who transact business with the

government and for corruption of the gullible

government employees. Their unwanted presence

must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest

this is undertaken by our government agencies the

better for all of us.

The decision of the respondent appellate court is

hereby affirmed.

ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF

FLASE BANK NOTES

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City

Jail. An informant in the person of inmate Francis

dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and

Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he

received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant

with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the

Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee,

however, recognized the bill as a fake and refused

to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and

Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to

appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant

to their agreement, the informant entered the

cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in

bed. The informant returned to appellant the

latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered

the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1

Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black

wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet weretwenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which

were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated

the same and marked them sequentially with IIB

2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00

bill that was returned by informant to appellan

with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrested

and brought out of his cell into the office of the

Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the

Manila City jail for interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills

confiscated from appellant were turned over to the

BangkoSentralngPilipinas for analysis. Pursuant toa Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting

Assistant Manager LoidaMarcega Cruz of the

BangkoSentralngPilipinas examined and found the

following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00

bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00

bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9

P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five

(5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388

one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062

and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Numbe

WW164152.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession

and use of false bank notes under Article 168[3] of

the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

ISSUE: Whether the accused is criminally liable for

the crime charged.

HELD:NO.The elements of the crime charged fo

violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury orbank note or certificate or other obligation and

security payable to bearer, or any instrument

payable to order or other document of credit not

payable to bearer is forged or falsified by anothe

person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the

said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that

he either used or possessed with intent to use any

of such forged or falsified instruments. As held in

People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or

bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a

criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense


15/19

under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must

be with intent to use said false treasury or bank

notes.In this case, the prosecution failed to show

that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that

he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis

dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the

fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not

presented in court. According to the jail officers,

they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that

petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at theManila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In

short, the jail officers did not have personal

knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz

use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is

hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.

USURPATION

PEOPLE vs CORTEZ

G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988

MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

YAP, C.J.:

On May 14, 1981, as an employee of Black

Mountain Mining Company, Gigantoni went to the

office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to

conduct verification of some travels made by Black

Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PAL

office, he falsely represented himself to the PALlegal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a

kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown

the PAL records particularly the passenger

manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering

the period February 1 to 3 1981. To further

convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission,

Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card

purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS

agent.Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the

requested manifest and the used PAL tickets of one

Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of

a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black

Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises.

PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr. subsequently

learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni

was no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as

he had been dismissed from the service for gross

misconduct. Atty. Puno immediately alerted the

NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL

office the following day.

When Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office,

in the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security,

Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his

real Identity. He later admitted that he was no

longer with the CIS; that he was working for the

Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he

was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of

their employees who had travelled. Upon the

arrival of NBI agents, Attys. Puno and Boro turned

over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI.

ISSUE: Whether Gigantoni was guilty of usurpation

of authority

HELD: No.Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on

usurpation of authority or official functions, under

which the petitioner was charged, punishes any

person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents

himself to be an officer, agent or representative of

any department or agency of the Philippine

Government or of any foreign government; or (b

who, under pretense of official position, performs

any act pertaining to any person in authority o

public officer of the Philippine Government or any

foreign government or any agency thereof, withoutbeing lawfully entitled to do so. The forme

constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority

under which the petitioner stands charged, while

the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of

official functions.

The failure of the prosecution to prove that

petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from

the service negatives the charge that he

"knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a

CIS agent. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as

to the offense charged lies on the prosecution

Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution toestablish by positive evidence the allegation that

the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS

agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he

was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly

notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present

proof that he actually knew at the time of the

alleged commission of the offense that he was

already dismissed from the service. A mere

disputable presumption that he received notice of

his dismissal would not be sufficient.

The Solicitor General has argued in his

memorandum, that it makes no difference whetherthe accused was suspended or dismissed from the

service, "for both imply the absence of power to

represent oneself as vested with authority to

perform acts pertaining to an office to which he

knowingly was deprived of ". The observation of

the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were

charged with usurpation of official function (second

part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely

with usurpation of authority (first part of Article

177). The information charges the accused with the

crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and


16/19

falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent

or representative of any department or agency of

the Philippine Government."

Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official

functions. It has not been shown that the

information given by PAL to the accused was

confidential and was given to him only because he

was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his

official function. He was not charged in the

information for such an offense. In fact, it appears

from the record of the case that the information,

which was not claimed to be secret and

confidential, was readily made available to the

accused because PAL officials believed at the time

that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only

offense with which he was charged in the

information, that he knowingly and falsely

represented himself to be a CIS agent.

USING FICTITIOUS NAME

LEGAMIA v. IAC

CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:

Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in

violation of CA No. 142, as amended. The facs

appear that Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for

19 years. uring their live-in arrangement they

produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael

Gabriel L. Reyes. From the time Corazon and Emilio

lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was

known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as

Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as

Mrs. Reyes.

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of

the Agricultural Credit Administration when hedied. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's

death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael

with the Agricultural Credit Administration for

death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L.

Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment was also

signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a

complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is liable under CA 142.

HELD:

NO.

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a

woman to represent herself as the wife and use the

name of the man she is living with despite the factthat the man is married to another woman. The

practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither

is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can

be Identified who are living with men prominent in

political, business and social circles. The woman

publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and

uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that

he is not her husband. And yet none of the women

has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142

because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and

understanding society. It is in the light of ou

cultural environment that the law must be

construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with

Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to

the public as his wife and she assumed that role

and his name without any sinister purpose o

personal material gain in mind. She applied fo

benefits upon his death not for herself but fo

Michael who as a boy of tender years was under

her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not

have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done

especially because some of them probably had

their own Corazons.

ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORMS OR

INSIGNIA

PERJURY

G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990


17/19

REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

According to the information filed Reolandi M.

DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad SantosHigh School and, therefore, a public employee, did

then and there feloniously commit falsification of

official documents, to wit: by executing and filing in

the office of the Civil Service Commission of said

municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No.

212(65), an official document, stating and malting

it appear therein that he was a fourth year

Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the

Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which

document is a requirement for his reappointment

as School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose

Abad Santos High School and wherein the

academic requirement to said Position is at least a

fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth

and in fact, the said accused well knew that the

statement is false and he did not reach the fourth

year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and

consequently, by reason of said untruthful

narration of facts, his appointment to the said

position was approved by the Civil Service

Commission.

ISSUE: whether thr crime commited was

falsification

HELD: no.

In the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz and the earlier

case of United States v. Tupasi Molina the crime

committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury.

This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the

Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt

assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation

administered by authority of law on a material

matter.

The elements of the crime of perjury are

(a) That the accused made a statement under oathor executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made

before a competent officer, authorized to receive

and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused

made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit

containing the falsity is required by law or made for

a legal purpose.

All the foregoing elements are present in the case

at bar.

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DES

TOMAS, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Brion, J.:

FACTS:

Tomas was charged in court for perjury unde

Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for

making a false narration in a Certificate against

Forum Shopping.The accusation stemmed from

petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sumof money with prayer for a writ of replevin against

the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John

Doe. The first complaint was filed on April 13

1998. The second complaint, was filed on March

15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay

City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed

and signed the Certification against Forum

Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged o

deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by

falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate

against Forum Shopping in the second complaint

that she did not commence any other action o

proceeding involving the same issue in anothertribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the

venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City

court (where the Certificate against Forum

Shopping was submitted and used) and not the

MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against

Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has

jurisdiction over the perjury case.

ISSUE:

What court has proper jurisdiction in perjury cases?

HELD:

It is the court where the Certificate against Forum

was subscribed and sworn to which is Makati City

in this case.

Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action

shall be instituted and tried in the court o


18/19

municipality or territory where the offense was

committed or where any of its essential ingredients

occurred. [emphasis ours]

In relation to the crime of perjury, the material

matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is

the truth of the required declarations which is

designed to guard against litigants pursuing

simultaneous remedies in different fora.Tomas

deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood

was allegedly shown when she made the false

declarations in the Certificate against Forum

Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,

despite her knowledge that the material

statements she subscribed and swore to were not

true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and

MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the

perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section

15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements

constituting the crime of perjury were committed

within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not

Pasay City.

MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC

AUCTIONS

PATERNO J. OUANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ

G.R. No. 40203. August 21, 1990

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a

parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square

meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, identified as

Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1. It was covered by

Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the

registered owner, Rehabilitation Finance

Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of

the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands

belonging to Francisco Echavez, private

respondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano.

What will have to be resolved are the conflictingclaims over this lot by the vendee thereof,

Echavez, and Ouano.

The property was offered for sale by public bidding

by the RFC on April 1, 1958. Actually this was the

second public bidding scheduled for the property.

The first in which both Ouano and Echavez

participated, together with others was nullified

on account of a protest by Ouano.

Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding,

Ouano and