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PROMOTING JIHAD AGAINST CHINA

The Turkistani Islamic Party in Arabic Jihadist Media

Kirk H. Sowell

An Independent Report Commissioned by Sky News

August 1, 2010

www.kirksowell.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 3 Background 4 Sources, Methods & Scope 7 TIP Enters the Global Jihadist Media 8 Analysis 18

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Turkistani Islamic Party (TIP) is a jihadist organization which claims to represent China‟s Muslim Uighur population. It is the most militant of Uighur groups in the northwestern province of Xinjiang. While experts dispute TIP‟s origins, it claims to be a renamed continuation of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which appeared defunct in 2003 following the death of its leader. Since 2008, TIP has used the global jihadist media to present itself as the successor of the classical Islamic caliphate, operating parallel to Osama bin Ladin‟s al-Qaeda (AQ), with its avowed ambition the Islamization of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While marginal to Uighur society and never demonstrating significant capabilities, Uighur jihadists garnered increased international attention following al-Qaeda‟s 2001 attacks on the United States and TIP‟s own 2008 threat against the Beijing Olympics. This report, Promoting Jihad Against China, attempts to address two issues: (1) TIP‟s origins, including its relationship to ETIM; and (2) TIP‟s relationship to the global jihadist movement, including al-Qaeda. The evidence is derived from TIP publications in Arabic jihadist media supplemented by secondary sources in English and Arabic. While this report was commissioned by Sky News, it is an independent study and Sky News is not responsible for its contents. The key judgments are as follows:

TIP is a successor organization to ETIM, which likely ceased to exist in 2003. While TIP claims total continuity between the two groups, its emergence in 2008 is more likely a refounding of a defunct organization.

TIP has deep ties to the Taliban, but appears to have only tangential links to al-Qaeda. TIP supports AQ‟s war against the United States, but has criticized it for ignoring Asian Muslims. Media which habitually describe TIP as “al-Qaeda-linked” would be on firmer ground linking it to the Taliban.

The primary purpose of TIP’s Arabic publications appears to be fundraising, with little relationship to operations. TIP‟s publications feature highly-theoretical discussions of Islamic history and doctrine targeted to Gulf Arabs sympathetic to jihadism. While fundraising is typically a goal of jihadist publications, this seems more true of TIP than for jihadists in the Arab world.

TIP has failed to break into the mainstream Arabic information environment. While TIP‟s publications have sufficient presence on jihadist forums to give it exposure to its core audience, it has failed to have impact on mainstream Arabic media similar to that of other militant Islamist groups.

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BACKGROUND China‟s northwestern province of Xinjiang, referred by many Muslims as “East Turkistan,” was conquered by a China in the mid-18th century and incorporated into modern China in 1949. Its primary ethnic group, the Uighur, speak a Turkic language with many Arabic loanwords and have strong cultural commonalities with the Muslim world. Between 1949 and 1990, Xinjiang experienced sporadic violence, with Uighur grievances driven by a range of factors, including a desire for greater autonomy or outright seccession, cultural identity, demographic change caused by the migration to Xinjiang of Han Chinese, and religious conflict. Uighurs number around eight million and are now an ethnic minority in the province.1 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was the most Islamist of several Uighur separatist groups which arose in the early 1990s as violence escalated. Fleeing the iron grip of the Chinese security apparatus, ETIM took refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban around 1997. ETIM fought alongside the Taliban against U.S.-led forces following 9/11, and then fled with them to Pakistan. ETIM‟s leader, Hassan Mahsum, was killed by Pakistani forces in October 2003.2 ETIM is generally believed to also have been close to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).3 The Uzbeks and Uighurs are both Turkic peoples with mutually intelligible languages fighting secular authoritarian states. Information about ETIM prior to 2003 has been limited. In his 2004 study of Xinjiang violence, James Millward concluded that there had been no verifiable activity by ETIM prior to the 2002 U.S. designation of it as terrorist.4 Furthermore, a widely-cited 2002 official report, “‟East Turkistan‟ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” gives the PRC‟s point of view on Xinjiang violence in the 1990s.5 But tying ETIM/TIP to specific attacks continues to be difficult. This is made more difficult by the odd media synergy TIP and the PRC have developed; it serves the PRC‟s interests to link all Uighur violence with the most jihadist Uighur group, and taking credit for the same attacks allows TIP to support its claim to lead Uighur opposition to Chinese rule. It now appears that Mahsum arrived in Afghanistan in 1997, and may have received support from both the Taliban and its original patron, Pakistan‟s Interservice Intelligence

1 For general background on Xinjiang and the Uighur-China conflict, see Gaye Christoffersen in Elizabeth Van Wie

Davis and Rouben Azizian, Islam, Oil and Geopolitics: Central Asia After September 11, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 45-59; “Islamic Extremism as a Political Force: A Comparative Study of Central Asian Islamic Extremist Movements,” Michael Fredholm, Research Report No. 12, Asian Cultures and Modernity, 2006; “Radical Islamists in Central Asia,” Zeyno Baran, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2, September 12, 2005. 2 Mahsum is consistently referred to in TIP’s Arabic publications as “Hassan Makhdum” (حسن مخدوم). The reason for

this is not clear, but as “Mahsum” is universally used in English, I will follow that convention here. 3 See Christoffersen and Baran as in footnote 1 above.

4 “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment,” James Millward, Policy Studies 6, 29, East-West Center,

Washington, 2004 (http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf). 5 For a translation of the 2002 Chinese report, see:

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml.

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(ISI), prior to that time.6 The fact that ETIM was under Taliban refuge and fought with them thereafter is sufficient to establish close ties between the two groups, and that some Uighurs had trained with al-Qaeda suggests some relationship there.7 Mahsum himself, in a widely-quoted 2002 statement to a journalist, disclaimed ties to both.8 The 2002 U.S. designation of ETIM as terrorist followed the arrest of two Uighurs for an alleged plot to attack the U.S. embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.9 The state of Uighur jihadism 2003-2007 is murkier still. While many continue to refer to ETIM as existent, or to TIP and ETIM as synonymous, the lack of activity 2003-2007 suggests it ceased to exist. The Council on Foreign Relations‟ online file, last updated July 2008 after TIP‟s emergence, still referred to it as ETIM and could say only that “some counterterrorism experts” claimed that TIP was ETIM renamed.10 One regional expert testified before Congress in June 2009 that many experts had never even heard of ETIM before the U.S. recognized it as terrorist in 2002, and speculated that TIP might not even be a Uighur group at all, but a propaganda front for China or al-Qaeda.11 In 2008, a group claiming to be the remnants of ETIM reemerged as this new organization, the Turkistani Islamic Party (also spelled Turkistan Islamic Party), or TIP. Most prominent among them was Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani,12 who claimed a close relationship with Mahsum. Between mid-2008 and early 2010, TIP produced a series of Arabic-language journals and statements portraying itself as fighting a jihad deserving of global Muslim support. Abd al-Haq was killed in a February 2010 U.S. airstrike in

6 Christoffersen, 46-48; 52-56. Christoffersen also says that al-Qaeda supported Uighur jihadists, but doesn’t give

any specific examples. TIP’s biography of Mahsum gives 1997 as the year, and this is consistent with other sources. 7 “Evaluating the Uighur Threat,” The Long War Journal, October 9, 2008

(http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/10/evaluating_the_uighu.php). According to testimony from Uighurs captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, it appears that some trained in Taliban-protected ETIM camps and others with al-Qaeda. Christoffersen, citing a report in Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, states that al-Qaeda was funding the IMU, and thus ETIM, and that Uighurs were found in several camps. 8 “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Asia-Pacific Center for Security

Studies, January 2008. “We don’t have any organizational contact or relations with al Qaeda or the Taliban… Maybe some individuals fought alongside them on their own.” Nonetheless, elements of the Taliban have also distanced themselves from AQ in recent years, so even if Mahsum was having second thoughts in 2002 this doesn’t necessarily mean there were not close ties previous. And the abundant evidence of ETIM’s reliance on the Taliban makes this statement not credible. The quote is attributed to an August 31, 2002 article from the Washington Post which is not presently on its website. 9 Millward, 24.

10 “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, July 31, 2008

(http://www.cfr.org/publication/9179/east_turkestan_islamic_movement_etim.html). 11

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Sean R. Roberts, PhD, George Washington University, June 16, 2009 (http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/rob061609.pdf). 12

“Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani” is of course a nomme de guerre. In Uighur he is known as Memtimin Memet; see “Will Xinjiang’s Turkistan Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its Leader,” TerrorismMonitor, Volume VIII, Issue 10, March 11, 2010. The U.S. Treasury release designating him as a terrorist has a variety of other spellings for his name: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg92.htm.

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Pakistan,13 and it is not clear whether TIP‟s military commander, Sayfullah al-Turkistani, may have taken over leadership. While other jihadists operated on the ground for years before building an online network, TIP emerged when jihadist media had matured. Arabic is the primary language of this world, although there are jihadist websites in other languages. While Uighur is the native language of TIP members, they use Islam‟s lingua franca to amplify their message. Jihadists do not have a static websites like political parties, but rely on a network of discussion forums. Groups publish their material in forums through two main distributors, al-Fajr Media Center and the Global Islamic Media Front. Distribution by either gives a publication credibility it would not otherwise have. Al-Fajr distributes TIP publications, which are produced under the brand Islam Awazi (“Voice of Islam”).14 Jihadist media may be used to build support, or in operations – to recruit members or teach techniques such as bomb making – and also for fundraising. The latter function is worth emphasizing for TIP, which is short on operational success and long on propaganda. As reported in the Jamestown Foundation‟s TerrorismMonitor, Iraqi jihadists use the web prolifically, and while some jihadists are broke, some forum members report making $1,000 a month in salary.15 While open sources do not make it possible to estimate TIP‟s financial return on its Arabic publications, there is no reason to think that TIP might not get a portion of jihadist money sent to south Asia. TIP‟s contribution to jihadist media includes a mixture of Uighur videos (mostly untranslated) and Arabic print publications in PDF format and postings to discussion forums. Online media is not, of course, the only or even the primary form of communication; jihadists also spread their message through mosque networks, word-of-mouth, print publications, CDs, and so on.

13

“Al-Qaeda-linked Chinese Terrorist Leader Reported Killed in US Airstrike in Pakistan,” The Long War Journal, March 1, 2010 (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/al_qaedalinked_chine.php). 14

For a visual illustration of this system, see Evan Kohlmann’s NEFA Foundation presentation, “Al-Qaida’s Online Couriers,” The NEFA Foundation, May 2009 (http://nefafoundation.org/fajrchart.html). 15

“Jihadis Debate Methods of Financing the Mujahideen Network in Iraq,” Abdul Hameed Bakier, TerrorismMonitor, Vol. VII, Issue 32, October 30, 2009.

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SOURCES, METHODS & SCOPE This report‟s primary sources are TIP‟s Arabic publications on Arabic jihadist online forums. The bulk of these are contained within its flagship periodical, Islamic Turkistan (IT). There have been six issues, each about 50 pages, with the first appearing in July 2008 and the most recent in July 2010. While there are hundreds of webpages on jihadist websites with TIP statements, these consist of a small number of statements copied over and over into various posts. Even where statements are issued outside of IT, most are later republished in it. This report supplements this material with comments by others about TIP on jihadist forums as well as secondary sources in English and Arabic. This report does not cite specific webpages where copies of Islamic Turkistan can be found because the URLs change over time. To obtain copies, perform an internet search for the name of the publication (تركستان االسالمية) and this will bring up jihadist forums from which it can be downloaded. You will likely need to try multiple file-sharing links before finding one which still works, although occasionally the PDF is linked directly on the page. For citations to jihadist websites other than IT, we have cited the URL. Regarding dating, where the statement itself does not have a date, we have dated it by the earliest still-existing forum posting. However, because jihadists forums do not usually have a stable URL – forums often move around on the internet from one URL to another – statements could have been published previously to those cited here and gone down. The methodology combines a reading of TIP‟s publications, which are distributed in PDF format, and Google searches of specific jihadist forums using TIP-related names and keywords. While Google‟s Arabic search technology is better than any alternative, there is no guarantee that even repeated searches will find every online publication. As noted above, the scope of this study is limited to TIP‟s historical relationship to ETIM and its contemporary relationship to global jihadists. As this study is limited to sources in English and Arabic, it does not attempt an assessment of TIP‟s following or military operations in China, or how it relates to other Uighur groups. Information about TIP operations outside China from secondary sources is taken into account in evaluating claims made in TIP publications.

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TIP ENTERS THE GLOBAL JIHADIST MEDIA This section outlines TIP‟s Arabic media campaign from its reemergence in 2008. TIP‟s first Arabic publication was in July 2008, and the last in July 2010. The bulk of TIP‟s Arabic media is within the six issues of Islamic Turkistan (IT), totaling 341 pages. While there are hundreds of pages on jihadist forums with individual TIP statements, many are the same statement copied over and over, and much is material also published in IT.16 For the first issue, we provide a summary of each article to give a sense of the material. For issues two through six, we have translated the table of contents and then only cite details which bear direct relevance to the core questions posed here; the ETIM-TIP relationship, and TIP‟s relationship to global jihad. Islamic Turkistan No. 1, July 2008 This is the introductory issue of TIP‟s flagship periodical, Islamic Turkistan. The main purpose was to introduce the organization to the global jihadist community and make the case for their fight against China as a legitimate jihad. Key points on the front cover: “In this issue: *An Introduction to East Turkistan *Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime *Why do we fight China? *Statement from the Turkistani Islamic Party *The Turkistani Islamic Party in the International Press” The following is printed on the second page, next to the table of contents: “The Program of the Turkistani Islamic Party: We are a group working for Islam and warriors (mujahiddin) in the cause of God in order to liberate Turkistan. Our doctrine: It is that of the Sunna [Sunni Islam], among those who follow the understanding of the companions of Muhammad, the followers of righteousness.” At the bottom of the page there is an email at which they can be reached: tipawazionline@yahoo.com. This is a summary of each article from volume one:

The “editorial” is “Why We Publish Islamic Turkistan.” The article cites a series of passages from the Quran and hadith about Islam and jihad, and argues that the monopolization of media by “occupying” powers requires a publication like this.

The first article reprints their famous March 1, 2008 statement threatening to attack the Beijing Olympics.

16

Some of TIP’s earlier Arabic publications have been reviewed by other secondary sources. See “Mounting Efforts on Jihadi Forums to Target China for Terrorist Attacks,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, April 2010 (reviews the first three issues of IT); “Journal of Turkistan Islamic Party Urges Jihad in China,” TerrorismMonitor, Volume 7, Issue 9, April 10, 2009; and “Will Xinjiang’s Turkistani Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its Leader,” TerrorismMonitor, Volume 8, Issue 10, March 11, 2010. TIP’s threat to attack the Olympics was widely circulated in translation, see “The Turkistan Islamic Party Warns China One More Time,” Jihad Watch, July 27, 2008.

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The third article contains claims for several terrorist attacks in China in 2008. The first, for example, has a picture of two burned out buses with the caption “Explosion of Two Buses in the city of Shanghai on May 5, 2008.” This statement is dated July 23, 2008.

The fourth article is entitled “Why We Fight China?” and is written by “Shaikh Bashir.” The four-page article gives five reasons. One, because “China is a despotic enemy to Islamic countries occupying their territory, Islamic Turkistan…” Two, “We fight China until it declares „that there is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God‟ and enter into the religion of Islam.” TIP is not fighting for Uighur rights or autonomy; it has much grander ambitions. Three, “we fight China to awaken those oppressed among Muslims to liberate themselves from injustice.” Four, TIP fights China so as to free Muslim prisoners imprisoned for being Muslim. Five, “we fight China because they have violated and raped our land and exploited our wealth, starved our people and enforced sanctions upon us.”

Bashir then goes on to rebut the claim, which presumably TIP members face when trying to raise money in the Arab world, that fighting China is a distraction from fighting the United States. The author gives several responses to this, including that China is the near enemy and a greater threat in that sense than the U.S. The author feels the need to rebut the claim that China is too strong, pointing to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and their power differential with the U.S. This is one of the few references to OBL in IT.

“The Turkistani Islamic Party in the International Media” contains reprints from mainstream Arab media such as the pan-Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Jazeera. The stories mainly focus on TIP‟s own threats to attack the Olympics.

“What Do You Know About East Turkistan?” is an introduction to the region. It assumes no prior knowledge and begins with the region‟s geography and the etymology of the name, and then traces the history of the region and its interaction with China since 1616. Over three pages it comes up through 1949 when China “occupied” Turkistan and the December 1955 “revolution” under the leadership of two individuals – Abd al-Hamid Damallah and Fatah al-Din Makhdum – in which it claims thousands of “mujahiddin” died fighting China. It states that in April 1990, hundreds of mujahiddin were killed in jihad against China under the leadership of Diya‟ al-Din Yusuf, leader of the “East Turkistan Islamic Party.” The article ends: “And the Muslim people of Turkistan are still to this day fighting the Communist regime and seeking their Islamic identity.”

The next article is about how the earthquakes which had taken place recently were punishment by God to China.

The next two chapters are about the concept of hijra, or migration, which dates to the time of Muhammad, and derives from his departure from Mecca, then a pagan

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city, to Medina, in order to found the first Islamic state. The first article, by one Abu Amru Abd al-Hakim Hasan, is theoretical and focused on expositing the doctrine of hijra in language which could be found in many Islamist texts in the Arab world. The second article is by one Um Abdullah al-Turkistaniya, meaning a woman who is the mother of a man named Abdullah al-Turkistani, and is a personal story. The article appears to have been dictated orally, as it begins “The mother of Abdullah says this, speaking of the story of her hijra, the reason for my hijra was the martyrdom of my brother in jihad…” This was also posted to the jihadist forum al-Faloja, where the title was changed to correct an apparent mistake in the original Islamic Turkistan article.17 The remainder of the article is in the first person, and describes how the woman traveled to Pakistan – “land of majesty and jihad” – by way of Shanghai and then Thailand.

“The History of the Islamic Conquest of East Turkistan” summarizes Turkistan‟s Islamic history is one page, beginning with Qutaiba bin Muslim al-Bahli, who conquered Turkistan for Islam, and ending with the emergence of the Turkistani Islamic Party which “raised the standard of jihad” in modern times.

The next chapter is entitled “The Turkic Peoples and their Geographical Divisions.” This article divides Central Asian Turks into east, west, north and south, and provides some basic information about each.

Next is an article by TIP‟s spokesman, Abdullah Mansur, “The Life of Abu Muhammad,” or Ahmad Mahsum (Makhdum), the leader of ETIM. Notably, it states that in 1997 Mahsum moved to “the land of jihad,” Afghanistan, and makes clear Mahsum‟s dependence on the Taliban. It also states that Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani had become the military commander by Mahsum‟s death in 2003.

“On Salafist Doctrine” is a six-page exposition on what it means to be a Salafist Muslim. The article has nothing to do with the Uighurs and is intended only to show the likely intended readership – i.e. Gulf Arabs – that TIP is made up of true believers. The topics include such basic Islamic concepts as “The meaning of testifying that there is no god but God.”

“The Responsibility of the Ulema and Preachers to Defend East Turkistan,” calls upon religious authorities (“ulema”) to play the same role in promoting jihad against China as they had against other non-Muslim powers. It gives precedents such as how a scholar from Egypt opposed Napoleon and how the Deobandis of Pakistan promoted jihad against Britain. It ends with nine specific steps the ulema should take, ranging from the education of exiled Uighur Muslims to promoting violence against Chinese embassies, businesses and social gatherings abroad.

17

“The Story of the Hijra of the Um Abdallah al-Turkistaniya,” al-Faloja.net (http://alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=45877). In the original, the title referred to “Um Abd al-Rahman” but then “Um Abdallah” in the text. They are consistent in the Faloja version; this was probably a correction.

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“The Conditions of Mosques and Islamic Schools in East Turkistan” discusses how China‟s limits on mosques and religious studies shows its hatred for Islam.

The journal concludes with an appeal – “Save Turkistan Before it is Too Late!” – by Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. This urgent message essentially summarizes the remainder of the contents, warning of the threat to Islam in Xinjiang and chastising Muslims elsewhere for turning a blind eye to the region‟s Muslims.

Islamic Turkistan, No. 2, November 2008 The second issue of Islamic Turkistan appeared in November 2008. Unlike the first issue, it lists the editorial staff: Abu Jaafar al-Mansur, General Director; Abdullah Mansur, Editor; and Abd al-Hakim Arif, Technical Production. It continues the key themes of the first publication, has 57 pages, and, unlike the first issue, is paginated. The articles are similar in content to those in the first issue.

The editorial reprints a fatwa, or religious opinion, from the Islamic scholar Abdullah al-Faqih. The fatwa calls upon Muslims to aid TIP‟s cause with both human and financial resources. Faqih is the director the “Islamic Network,” an organization which publishes its fatwas on the well-known “Islam Web” website.18

The second article begins a three-part interview with TIP‟s recently deceased leader, Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. This article begins with Abd al-Haq‟s early life and describes his travel to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan up through 1998. The content of the interview is detailed, with numerous names, dates and personal impressions. While remembrances by any political leader must be read with some caution, the document seems credible.

18

This is the homepage of al-Faqih’s website: http://www.islamweb.net/mainpage/index.php. The original text of the fatwa is here: http://islamweb.net/ver2/fatwa/ShowFatwa.php?Option=FatwaId&lang=A&Id=75447. A search for the title of the fatwa did not return significant results, however, so it does not appear to have been widely read.

Islamic Turkistan, Table of Contents, No. 2

Editorial: Fatwa of Dr. Abdullah al-Faqih – East Turkistan and How a Muslim Helps His Brother

Interview with Amir of the Turkistani Islamic Party, Brother Abd al-Haq The Mujahiddin Bring Down Spy Plane in Waziristan Lessons from the Life of the Prophet (Invasion and Parties) China‟s Ethnic Cleansing Policy Against the Turkistan People Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime The Enemy Becomes Terrified of Our Operations The Turkistani Islamic Party in the Global Media America Leads the Capitalist World into Recession and Collapse The Slogans of Democracy Sayings of the Leader Hassan Mahsum This is Our Religion We Owe to God, So Examine Yourselves On Salafist Doctrine Pioneers of Philosophical Thinking in Islamic Civilization

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TIP Introduction Statement to al-Fajr February 2009 “The Turkistani Islamic Party Introduces Itself to Our Brothers in al-Fajr Media” was posted to two different forums, Muslm.net19 and Forsanelhaq20 (“Knights of Truth”), on February 26, 2009. Its purpose may have been to avoid problems TIP had with getting IT No. 2 published promptly. Apparently, al-Fajr doubted its authenticity and while it was waiting to publish there emerged an online fight about who would publish it.21 This statement is from your brothers in the Turkistani Islamic Party so that you may know and learn more about the conditions of your Muslim brothers in East Turkistan and what they are subjected to through various forms of oppression and abuse at the hands of the Chinese Communist usurpers. For it is known that the region of East Turkistan borders Pakistan and Afghanistan from the west, and entered into Islam in this region during the reign of the Umayyad Caliph Walid Abd al-Malik in 96 H., at the hands of the mujahid Qutayba bin Muslim, and from that time Islam became the official religion in the region, and this Islamic state remained until the last Islamic state died out in 1355 H…. The statement goes on to discuss the various means China is using to undermine the Islamic nature of the region, such as prohibiting prayers, burning Islamic books, sending women outside the region to work in factories, and the migration of Han Chinese. Islamic Turkistan No. 3, March 2009 The third issue continues the themes begun in the previous issues, with a mixture of polemics, theology, classical history, and contemporary historical narrative.

19

http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=333945 20

http://www.forsanelhaq.com/showthread.php?t=103767 21

See the Jihadica blog post, http://www.jihadica.com/infighting-over-distribution-of-new-uighur-magazine/.

Islamic Turkistan, Table of Contents, No. 3

Editorial: The Chinese Government Mocks the Prophet Muhammad From the Guidance of the Quran: How Often the Small Group Overcame the

Larger Group by God‟s Will Interview with Amir of the Turkistani Islamic Party, Brother Mujahid Abd al-Haq Lessons from the Life of the Prophet: Perspectives and Reflections on the

Battle of Uhud Letter to the Ulema The Jurisprudence of Jihad: Rule of the Spy On Salafist Doctrine Our Martyrs: The Martyr Diya‟ al-Din bin Yusef Notes of a Prisoner in the North Lost Pages from Islamic History: The Sultan Mahmud al-Ghaznawi The International Press China and the Islamic Caliphate When the Era of Caliphal Leadership Came The Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime Women Immigrants: A Real Story in Hijra Slogans of Democracy Raised by the West The Truth of Chinese Enmity Toward Muslims Save Turkistan While There is Still Time

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The editorial is “The Chinese Government Mocks the Prophet Muhammad.” It cites a Chinese television channel, CCTV, and a program called “The Tang Dynasty.” The article states that this production claimed that Muhammad sent gifts to Chinese rulers – a sign of submission – and that Muslims brought a picture of Muhammad.

The second installment of Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani‟s personal account shows ETIM as essentially a ward of the Taliban. It picks up shortly after Abd al-Haq‟s coming to Afghanistan and goes through the destruction of the Buddha statues in March 2001. In this segment Abd al-Haq describes himself and his Uighur comrades as essentially being under the command of the Taliban‟s Mullah Omar; on page 10 he talks of how “the Commander of the Faithful” had appointed a new military commander for them and opened up the Jalalabad camp for them. Then he traveled to Kabul and Kandahar and met with IMU leader Juma Namangani, whom Omar had placed in command over the immigrants (like Abd al-Haq).

“Letter to the Ulema” – this article, written under the byline of Abd al-Haq himself, is another appeal for support. It is five pages, filled with quotes from hadith and statements like “…your Turkistani brothers are now in the greatest need of your support and assistance, especially after your Turkistani sons in the Turkistani Islamic Party declared jihad in 2008. Some of these mujahiddin, based on this, executed a series of successful military operations against the Chinese.”

“On Salafist Doctrine” in this issue cites the founder of Saudi Arabia‟s Wahhabi establishment, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, and it is the only TIP article to do so.

Preserverence and Preparation in Jihad, April 2009 TIP has posted a series of videos on Arab jihadist forums over the past two years, mostly in Uighur without Arabic translation, not even subtitles. It is not clear why they do this, although it may be that TIP does not want to set up its own Uighur online network, so they just use the Arabic network for Uighur videos. One of the few which would be intelligible to Arabs is “Preserverence and Preparation in Jihad,” 22 placed on YouTube in April 2009. It is a ten-minute jihadist training video, with camouflaged jihadists training in small-arms and hand-to-hand combat. There are some Arabic subtitles, and most of it is set to jihadist songs, some in Arabic, some in Uighur. Islamic Turkistan No. 4, June 2009 A major theme of the fourth issue is the interconnectedness of TIP‟s fight with China and the war between South Asian jihadists and the Pakistani government and the U.S. This partly grows out of TIP‟s strong relationship with the Taliban, and Pakistan‟s historical relationship with China. But it also seems intended to pressure mainstream Pakistani Islamists to ensure that the Pakistani government doesn‟t target TIP.

22

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TYol9sYsfU.

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The editorial deals with the April 2009 meeting between American and Chinese leaders and agreements reached which TIP frames as hostile to the mujahiddin.

The second article, on Chinese and Pakistani media, was prepublished on forums in May 2009.23

The third article completes the three-part biographical sketch of TIP leader Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. It starts with Abd al-Haq in Kabul in 2001 in the months before 9/11, and finishes with the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan later that year and the retreat into Pakistan. The text states that they ended up in “Shin Warsak,” part of “Wana,” in Wazirstan, Pakistan.24

An article “Our Martyrs, Martyr Bilal” provides a biographical sketch of an religious authority, Yusuf Qadir Khan, nomme de guerre Bilal. It states that he died in Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan, at the time of the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

An article with the interesting title “The Beautiful Masks Fall and the Ugly Faces are Revealed” by spokesman Abdullah Mansur attacks Pakistani Islamists for negotiating with the Chinese government. The criticism is focused on the Jamaat-i-Islami and several of its leaders are mentioned by name.

23

http://alshahada.maktoobblog.com/663/%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A/ 24

The text puts these place names in quotes; it appears that they are spelled with Farsi characters.

Islamic Turkistan, Table of Contents, No. 4

Editorial: The Sino-American Agreement to Fight the Mujahiddin in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Statement: Deception of the Chinese and Pakistani Media and Their Reliance on Lies and Falsehood

Statement of the Military Leader: On the Occasion of the Chinese Massacre in Urumqi

Interview with Brother Abd al-Haq, Amir of the Turkistani Islamic Party

The Crimes of the Chinese Communist Party (The Secret Revealed)

The Muslim Turkistani People Deprived of Passports for Travel Our Martyrs, Shahid Bilal The International Press From the Guidance of the Quran: The Story of Talut and Jalut War is Deception Security in the Quran The Islamic Nation is a Body without Spirit and Writing without

Clarity The Beautiful Masks Fall and the Ugly Faces are Revealed The Political Means the Chinese Have Used to Corrupt Turks and

Bring Them into Submission Through Several Agreements

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The Suffering of East Turkistan, July 2009 An online essay was published on several websites in mid-2009 recounting the suffering of the Turkistani people, identified as the “archive” of the Turkistani Islamic Party.25 The origin of the article is not clear, but it reflects the standard claims made by TIP. On the Occasion of the Chinese Massacre in Urumqi, July 2009 This statement, issued by Sayfullah, is identical to the article with the same title in the fourth issue of IT.26 What makes it notable is that it is easily the most widely copied TIP statement on the forums. The riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang on July 5, 2009 resulted in approximately 200 deaths and got widespread attention internationally.27 The Believer’s Obligation and Assistance, August 2009 This is a presentation given through video, part in Arabic, and part in Uighur translated, published on jihadist forums, as well as on Youtube. 28 It is approximately 40 minutes long, and is the most comprehensive video presentation of TIP‟s views. Revive Turkistan, al-Qaeda in Iraq, August 2009 This 38-minute video from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) includes material about a range of topics, mostly Iraq, but begins with Turkistan and returns to it later in the video around minute thirty-six. It mentions ETIM and TIP the second time around.29 The Forgotten Wound, Abu Yahya al-Libi, October 2009 TIP‟s cause received a boost when the famous al-Qaeda propagandist Abu Yahya al-Libi produced a 20-minute video presentation about Turkistan entitled “The Forgotten Wound.” 30 The content of the presentation is identical to TIP‟s own propaganda and some of the same references as the AQI Turkistan video, but notably, he never mentions

25

http://www.bdr130.net/vb/t594111.html (second link: http://alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=72721) 26

This is the Sayfallah video presentation, which is in Uighur: http://www.archive.org/details/Sayf-Allah. This is an Arabic text published into the jihadist forum Omaniyat: http://www.omaniyat.com/vb/showthread.php?t=13476. 27

The Wikipedia entry seems to have the fullest account: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2009_%C3%9Cr%C3%BCmqi_riots. The incident got attention from Islamists who don’t normally focus on China, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; see “The Muslims of East Turkistan… Massacres Ignored,” IkhwanOnline, July 11, 2009 (http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=51381&SecID=344). 28

“The Believer’s Obligation and Assistance.” On Youtube: Part one, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTxVyc0b8yE. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XO-iUIOfupA&feature=related; part two, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0H6fhR7m44M&feature=related; part three, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTxVyc0b8yE; part four, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-fbrj7hoqw&feature=related. The Youtube counter indicates that these are not highly-watched videos, although some will watch them over jihadist forums or CDs. 29

The video is hard to find on jihadist forums in easily downloadable format, but is conveniently broken into four parts on Youtube: Part I (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbNaAJzunR4), Part II (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03mXHedDzzI&feature=related), Part III (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kSJI_3iFdE&feature=related), Part IV (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvzgCKJdEGQ). 30

“The Forgotten Wound,” Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-Roshd Forum (http://www.al-roshd.com/vb/showthread.php?t=601). If that URL does not work, search on Youtube for (الجرح المنسي). For background on Abu Yahya, whose real name is Muhammad Hasan Qaid, see “The Next Osama,” Foreign Policy, September 10, 2009 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/10/the_next_osama).

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TIP. The significance of this video is Abu Yahya‟s own prominence. Note also that Abu Yahya‟s video was produced by al-Sahab, al-Qaeda‟s own media production organization. It also got coverage on Al-Jazeera.31 Islamic Turkistan No. 5, January 2010 The fifth issue of Islamic Turkistan was published in January 2010. The second-page mast-head noted a change in the journal‟s management; the General Manager is now listed as Shihab al-Din Fatih. The picture at the top of the page dramatically shows two Chinese police holding a man down – presumably a Uighur man – while a third kicks him.

The second article, “The Massacres and Attacks of the Chinese Will Not Continue without Response,” was prepublished in late 2009 as a separate statement.

The article on “Turkic Lands Occupied by Russia” is notable because it is the only TIP publication focused on Russia. Russia is identified as an enemy elsewhere, but is only rarely mentioned. There are significant Uighur populations in the Central Asian states where Islamists view Russia as a key enemy.

Islamic Turkistan No. 6, July 2010 The sixth issue of Islamic Turkistan appeared on several jihadist websites on July 13, roughly four months after the death of Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani. It contained no references to either Abd al-Haq or the group‟s military commander, Sayfullah, and no comment regarding a new leadership. While some of the material reprinted statements published prior to February 2010, it contained references to events as late as March 2010, so its publication was finalized after Abd al-Haq‟s death.

31

“Al-Qaeda Calls for Uighurs to Fight China,” al-Jazeera, October 7, 2009 (http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/653EF122-29DB-427B-952C-B08290584B9B.htm).

Islamic Turkistan,Table of Contents, No. 5

Editorial: The Duty of Muslims Toward Their Brothers in Turkistan The Massacres and Attacks of the Chinese Will Not Continue without

Response Review of Military Operations in 2009 (Military Commander Sayfullah) Our Martyrs (Shaykh Shahid Ibn Amr) East Turkistan… the Forgotten Wound (Abu Yahya al-Libi) The Crimes of the Chinese Communist Regime in East Turkistan The Present War Between Chinese and Turkistanis is a War of Religion

and Doctrine The International Press Lion of the Islamic Call: Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani The Conquest of Beijing Participants in the Journal The Obedient Descendant Revives the History of the Righteous

Ancestor Security in the Quran The False Representation of Abidallah Khan and China‟s Aggression

Against East Turkistan Turkic Lands Occupied by Russia Peace to the Brothers in East Turkistan How the Story of East Turkistan Resembles that of Palestine Save Turkistan Before it is Too Late

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The editorial focuses on Chinese-Afghan cooperation against jihadists, and a reference to Afghan President Hamid Karzai‟s March 24 visit to Beijing establishes that this was published after Abd al-Haq‟s death. The editorial also criticizes China‟s CCTV for opening a new Arabic-language TV channel to promote what it calls anti-Muslim policies. There is also a reference to testimony before the U.S. Congress crediting them with attacks in Xinjiang.32

The second and third articles are both reprints from statements issued previously in jihadist forums. The second is a February 2010 statement attacking secular Uighur parties. The third is a statement first published in 2009 disclaiming that a website, www.tipislam.net, speaks for the group.

“Statement from the Turkistani Islamic Party Clarifying its Position on Democratic and Secular Turkistani Parties,” is TIP‟s most explicit statement on other Uighur groups.33 It is published under the name Muhammad Yasin and the “Shura Council of the Turkistani Islamic Party.” It gives a list of nine Uighur organizations it condemns as unislamic. The list includes: The Uighur Union of America, the Uighur Union of Australia, the International Uighur Conference, the Swedish Uighur Association, the Canadian Uighur Association, the Uighur Educational Union, the Organization for Education and Social Cooperation of East Turkistan, the Association of East Turkistan Culture and Cooperation in Turkey, and the Association for the Defense of Uighur Human Rights.

32

Reprinted in “China Stalls on the AfPak Road,” Asia Times, May 20, 2009 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KG17Ad02.html). 33

Published previously on several forums, including Hanein: http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?164706.

Islamic Turkistan Table of Contents, Vol. 6

Editorial: Here the Crazy Duo Enters Vicious War Against Mujahiddin in Afghanistan

Statement: The Turkistani Islamic Party Clarifies its Position on Democratic and Secular Turkistani Parties

Statement: Response to Website Published in the Name of the Turkistani Islamic Party

Our Martyrs: The Martyr Shaykh Qurban Ata Crimes of the Communist Chinese Regime in East Turkistan The International Press The Conquest of Beijing Participants in the Journal The Secret Which the Ottoman Caliphate Sent to Kashghar Security in the Quran Learn About Muslims in China The Jihadist Experience of the Mujahiddin of the Islamic Party of

East Turkistan Uighur Muslims… Preserverence in Islam Despite Chinese

Persecutions Save Turkistan Before it is Too Late

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ANALYSIS

The Relationship Between ETIM and TIP TIP appears to be a successor organization to ETIM. (1) TIP claims complete continuity with ETIM, with its contemporary leadership working

closely under and succeeding directly from ETIM‟s known leadership in the pre-2003 period. While TIP‟s claims of ties to ETIM pre-2003 are presented credibly, it presents no evidence of activities during the 2003-2007 period.

(2) The global jihadist community is convinced of TIP‟s claims. This study finds only a couple of random forum comments even referring to ETIM over the past three years, and none casting doubt on TIP‟s claims about its origins. The willingness of al-Fajr Media Center to distribute TIP publications reinforces this point.

(3) There are no statements from jihadist media claiming to be from ETIM, even going back several years. Any forum member could post a statement from another Uighur group were there another one active in jihadist circles.

This suggests that there is no need for media to say that TIP is “also known as” ETIM or even refer to ETIM as an existing group. It would be correct, if necessary for context, to refer to TIP as a successor organization to ETIM, or as the group once known as ETIM. The degree of continuity which TIP claims is less convincing, however, and undermined by two facts. First, there is the simple lack of affirmative evidence of ETIM/TIP activity during the 2003-2007 period. While it adds to the credibility of Abd al-Haq‟s self-narrative that he ends in 2002, he provides no evidence of activity after that point. Sources which report ETIM/TIP activity during this period, such as an August 2008 report from Stratfor,34 appear to rely entirely on PRC claims that the group it is attacking is ETIM. There is evidence from a 2008 arrest in the United Arab Emirates linked to TIP, based on information from the trial published in July 2010. The alleged plot involves two Uighur residents of the UAE who were plotting to create a home-made bomb to destroy a statue of a dragon wrapped around a globe outside of a shopping mall selling Chinese-made goods.35 Published sources from the trial indicate that they had money wired to them

34

“China and the Enduring Uighurs,” Stratfor, August 6, 2008 (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china_and_enduring_uighurs). In part, the Stratfor report relies on Chinese reports of their own raids against a group they associate with ETIM, but as the PRC has an interest in labeling any Uighur militant activity with ETIM/TIP, this does not establish that TIP was active. The article also refers to videos from 2005 and 2006 which are described in a way that sounds a lot like the material in IT, but without either indicating what language these videos were in, or citing any specific sources. 35

“Revealed: The Plot to Blow Up Dragonmart,” The National, July 9, 2010 (http://thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100709/NATIONAL/707089840/0/FRONTPAGE); “Two Chinese Uighurs Held for UAE Bomb Plot,” Reuters, July 1, 2010 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE66004X); “Uighurs Convicted in East Turkestan Islamic Movement Plot in Dubai,” TerrorismMonitor, Vol. VIII, Issue 29, July 22, 2010. The National article states that the plotter was recruited in December 2007. The TerrorismMonitor article, which claims to be relying on court documents, claims he was recruited sometime in 2006.

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from a member in Turkey. The main plotter was recruited by the deputy leader of ETIM while on the Hajj in Saudi Arabia, perhaps as late as December 2007, but sources do not give the leader‟s name. The plotter traveled at a later unspecified date to Waziristan to a Uighur jihadist camp. But this overlaps with TIP‟s emergence in 2008. Second, TIP‟s claim that ETIM changed its name in 2000 to TIP suggests revisionism. The “Background” section above reviews the available secondary sources on ETIM/TIP, and it is notable that not one source refers to it as TIP until 2008. Had the group changed its name in 2000, it is unlikely that no observers could have taken notice. One possible explanation for ETIM remnants during those years is that they might have simply melted in with Uzbek jihadists from the IMU also based in Waziristan, the west Pakistan province where various militant groups have sanctuary. As noted, Uighur and Uzbek are mutually intelligible. The IMU changed its name to something similar to TIP‟s current name in 2001,36 broadening its focus and perhaps confusing observers. Abd al-Haq even indicated that he had fought under the command of the IMU‟s military commander for a period in the late 1990s.37 The Relationship Between TIP, AQ and the Global Jihadist Network TIP‟s relationship to al-Qaeda needs to be addressed because it is very often mentioned in media reports as linked to al-Qaeda, as if the most important fact about TIP were its relationship to AQ. It is worth asking, though, whether it makes sense to describe TIP in these terms. TIP‟s ideology is jihadist, and so it would be a threat regardless if its relationship to AQ if it had greater capabilities. Moreover, as al-Qaeda portrays itself as the global umbrella group for jihad, to consistently identify Islamist groups according to their relationship to AQ feeds the organization‟s narrative. That said, we conclude that TIP has a strong relationship to the Taliban, but appears to view al-Qaeda more as “brothers-in-arms” than a close ally. (1) TIP‟s references to al-Qaeda distinguish it from affiliates known to be loyal to Osama

bin Laden. TIP‟s publications rarely mention either AQ or OBL, and never mention other AQ leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. At one point they even criticize al-Qaeda for neglecting Asian Muslims, although they are generally respectful of “Shaikh Osama.”38 Nor does TIP‟s leadership ever mention any relationship with AQ

36

See Christoffersen, 54. 37

“Interview with Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani,” Islamic Turkistan, November 2008, No. 3, p. 10. 38

The six issues of IT show just three references to Osama bin Laden, and while all are respectful, none express any loyalty to him. There are no references to Ayman al-Zawahiri, or any other al-Qaeda leader outside of quoting Abu Yahya al-Libi’s video on Turkistan. There are about a dozen total references to al-Qaeda as an organization, not counting quotes in news articles. But several of these references are to state that China claims a TIP-AQ link without having any evidence (for example, see No. 5, 27). One of the references actually criticizes al-Qaeda for neglecting the jihad in Asia (No. 3, 45): “… for although al-Qaeda is the one Islamic jihadist organization which has raised its voice for the Islamic nation, nonetheless the cause of Muslims in Central Asia generally and in China in particular lies outside their concerns and published strategic plans, except for a brief mention by Abu Musab al-Suri…”, that being a reference to the noted Syrian AQ thinker captured by the U.S. in 2005.

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leaders. This contrasts strongly with, for example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP statements often praise both OBL and Zawahiri as a way of validating themselves, and AQAP‟s leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, worked under Bin Laden for an extended period, a fact which he advertises.

(2) TIP strongly presents itself as an independent vanguard of the new caliphate, not subservient to any group, although its historical narratives and some independent evidence suggest that it has been a virtual ward of the Taliban.

(3) The word choice, topical emphasis and writing style of Islamic Turkistan is mostly ambiguous on the issue, although the lack of anti-Saudi rhetoric does distinguishe it from AQ. The quality of the language indicates that its writers are native Arabs, with at least some likely educated in Saudi Arabia.39 The ideological and doctrinal content of Saudi-Wahhabi and al-Qaeda writings overlap significantly, so the use of al-Qaeda-like language means only that TIP is targeting the same core audience and that its writers have the same educational background.40

(4) The claim by the U.S. Treasury Department that Abd al-Haq al-Turkistani is a member of al-Qaeda‟s Shura Council is not confirmed by evidence from open jihadist sources. AQ has not issued a statement even commenting on Abd al-Haq‟s death.

(5) Abu Yahya al-Libi‟s video on Turkistan which pointedly did not refer to TIP may have been an attempt by AQ to fend off TIP‟s claim that it ignores Asian Muslims. Furthermore, Zawahiri‟s most recent video, on July 27, 2010, mentions a list of AQ martyrs over the years and does not mention Abd al-Haq.41 AQI‟s video mentions them, but it is an AQ affiliate, whereas Libi and Zawahiri are AQ core leadership.

These factors suggest that if media outlets feel the need to relate TIP to an outside organization, it would be better to describe TIP as a “Talban-affiliated” rather than an “al-Qaeda-affiliated” group. The impression from TIP‟s historical accounts that it was under Taliban control is reinforced by a story circulating on jihadist forums about how Hassan Mahsum came to give the baya, or Islamic loyalty oath, to Mullah Omar. The story has apparently been around for a while, and when posted in 2009 to the al-Hanien forum readers responded

39

The “On Salafist Doctrine” from Islamic Turkistan No. 3, 30, cites Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and reads like something produced by a Saudi cleric. That said, this is the only reference to him, and while much of the language in a range of articles sounds very “Wahhabi-like,” this kind of material can be read outside Saudi Arabia. 40

For example, TIP believes in the doctrine of “disavowal” – hostility toward and non-association with non-Muslims (al-wila wa al-bira). But both AQ and the Wahhabis share this view. See, for example, Islamic Turkistan No. 5, 5. 41

This link has all five videos: http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%D8%B1%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A1+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%84+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB+%2F%2F+%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1+%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A&aq=f.

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that the story was well known.42 We found no evidence that TIP has denied this story. Although there have been reports that China reached an agreement with the Taliban in the 1990s to limit ETIM activities, there is no evidence in TIP‟s publications that the Taliban carried out its side of the bargain if it existed at all. As noted in the Background section, the fact that some Uighurs captured by U.S. forces were training with al-Qaeda suggests a relationship during that time. More relevant to the movement‟s current form, the U.S. Treasury Department claims that Abd al-Haq was a member of al-Qaeda‟s Shura Council “as of 2005.” 43 If true, this would establish a strong link between the two groups, although the wording suggests the classified assessment may rely on information which has not been confirmed recently. A search of jihadist websites returned no references to Abd al-Haq being on the Shura Council, although a search for individuals who are members of al-Qaeda‟s Shura Council does return some results. This does not prove that he was not a member, as there is no complete list of Shura Council members on the web. Yet it is worth noting since Treasury does not disclose the basis of its assessment. A more recent potential Uighur-AQ link came as the New York Times reported in July 2010 a Uighur resident of Norway being involved in a bomb plot. Details released so far suggest that the Uighur, a member of ETIM, had been in Norway since 1999, and had traveled to Waziristan to meet with al-Qaeda over the past two years. The same plot involved two other men – an Iraqi Kurd and an Uzbek.44 Norwegian officials have not stated whether these men met with TIP‟s new leadership or whether TIP had any direct role. A comment from a Uighur writer in Norway who claims to have known the individual states that he hung around Arabs and studied Arabic, which, if true, suggests he may have come into contact with AQ directly instead of through TIP.45 But if TIP arranged for their travel to Pakistan, this would suggest a stronger TIP-AQ relationship. The safest conclusion is that TIP‟s relationship with AQ since 2008 is unclear. At the very least, it seems highly unlikely that theories about TIP being a Chinese or AQ front are true. Aside from some common ideological underpinnings, TIP‟s publications share none of the typical characteristics of AQ-affiliated publications. The Purpose and Impact of TIP’s Arabic Publications The weight of the evidence suggests that TIP‟s Arabic publications serve as a fundraising tool, with little or no relationship to operations. 42

http://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?136529-!!. 43

The Treasury press release: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg92.htm. This is the UN designation: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9636.doc.htm. 44

“Norway Announces Three Arrests in Terrorist Plot,” New York Times, July 8, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/europe/09norway.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1279443617-HilVROkN1hUL0nzqScDz4g); “Chinese Separatists Tied to Norway Bomb Plot,” New York Times, July 9, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/10uighur.html?_r=1). 45

“Diaspora Uyghurs in America, Norway on Norway Terror Plot,” The New Dominion, July 10, 2010 (http://www.thenewdominion.net/1799/diaspora-on-terror-plot/).

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1) TIP‟s use of jihadist media contrasts with jihadist groups which are known to be close

to al-Qaeda such as AQAP and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Both AQAP and AQI coordinate public statements with operations. The time iming and content are related to operations in that they will take credit for something or deny something, and where there are mainstream media reports of important jihadists being killed, they will either eulogize the individual or assert that he is still alive. Some AQ-related publications also provide instructions about how to carry out attacks. TIP‟s publications, by contrast, are dominated by theoretical and polemical materials and if they claim attacks, they do not do so in ways that make the claims verifiable. They also don‟t publish articles about how to carry out attacks, or comment on the killing of their leaders.

2) TIP‟s message has made no substantial impact on mainstream Arabic media, not only in comparison to Arab groups such as AQI and AQAP but also in comparison to the Somali group al-Shabab. This can be demonstrated by a search of Al-Jazeera‟s website. A search for the Somali group returned 956 unique pages, while a search for stories on TIP returned just one.46 Even a broader search for just “Turkistan” returned only 88 stories, and the bulk of these were about Uighurs but not TIP.

3) There is no evidence of Arabs taking up TIP‟s cause and joining the jihad against China. If there were any Arab jihadists showing up in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities would have a strong incentive to advertise their presence to the world.

If TIP has benefited from its Arabic publications, it is probably through fundraising. It is possible that some contributions to Pakistan have been diverted to TIP. The fact that the sixth issue of Islamic Turkistan continued to be published after Abd al-Haq‟s death, but without even commenting on it, strengthens this impression. Their income is probably not great, but they are likely bringing in enough money to pay their Arab writing staff to be able to produce another 52-page publication. Why has TIP generally failed to gain greater traction? Four factors may explain this. First, TIP lacks a verifiable track record of success in launching attacks. While all jihadist groups work in the shadows to a degree, AQI, AQAP and the Shabab are able to convince journalists that they are responsible for the attacks they claim, with video statements by the suicide bomber, for example, as AQI did with the video which mentioned the Turkistani cause without mentioning TIP. Second, TIP faces a hostile media environment as most influential Arabic media is funded by states which need to maintain good relations with China. This is true of Qatar, which funds al-Jazeera, and even more so of the other key sovereign media moguls, Saudi Arabia – which owns al-Arabiya satellite TV, and the pan-Arab newspapers al-Sharq al-Awsat, and al-Hayat – and Iran, which owns the third and fourth most prominent satellite TV channels, Hizbullah‟s al-Manar and its own al-Alam. 46

“China Continues to Benefit from War on Terror,” al-Jazeera, April 22, 2009 (http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/EB8CA696-C306-44F6-B415-A4398CF92EBC.htm).

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Third, Turkistan faces significant competition as a front for jihad in the eyes of even the most sympathetic Arab reader. There are a certain number of Arabs willing to abroad for jihad. But anyone from the Arab world who could travel to Xinjiang could travel to Afghanistan or Pakistan, or even more easily, to Iraq, Yemen, the African sahel or Somalia. And whatever one might be willing to suffer for the cause, TIP‟s readers could have no illusions about the fate awaiting them were they captured by Chinese security. Fourth, the importance of forum publications to jihadist recruiting could be overrated. An analysis published by Clinton Watts in Small Wars Journal of jihadists accounts of their recruitment suggests that jihadists going to Iraq are overwhelmingly recruited by former foreign fighters from Iraq who return to their home towns, not from the internet.47 Watts‟ concludes that there are clusters of recruitment in a limited number of cities, creating a cycle of recruitment. With no such pattern existing for Xinjiang, TIP struggles to create a network over the internet. Even the sole example of recruitment they have in the Arab world, the UAE case, was by word-of-mouth through the Uighur diaspora. The Future of the Turkistani Islamic Party Until the publication of issue six of Islamic Turkistan in July there had been no TIP communications after Abd al-Haq‟s death in February. There were a few postings to forums, but all of the material had previously been posted. TIP‟s renewed publication with the sixth issue of IT maintains their visibility, but that the 52-page document made no reference at all to the death of their leader raised more questions than answers. The renewed publication does suggest that TIP must be getting enough money to at least justify the effort. Even if on the ground TIP has blended back in with the much larger Uzbek jihadist movement, it might nevertheless make sense for TIP‟s remaining members to continue publishing as an independent group to raise money. ETIM/TIP has never had sufficient capacity to operate independently. From the time it left China in the 1990s, ETIM/TIP has been highly dependent on the Taliban. Assuming Uighur jihadists maintain a separate organization from the IMU at all, the fortunes of both will depend upon the success of the Taliban‟s war in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as regional stability. And the recent instability in Kyrgyzstan, which like other Central Asian states has a notable Uighur population, could be to their benefit. Further studies of Uighur jihadism will likely need to exploit sources in Uighur and Uzbek to provide a better picture of TIP‟s true standing. But as far as Arab jihadists are concerned, it remains to be seen if TIP can start to act more like a jihadist movement with a media wing, and less like a media outlet with just a jihadist cache.

47

“Foreign Fighters: How are they Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models,” Clinton Watts, Small Wars Journal, 2008 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/69-watts.pdf). Given the recent concern in the U.S. over online radicalization, it is worth noting that Watts says that online forums may have relatively greater impact in the West among second and third-generation Muslims who are unlikely to be able to meet a returned jihadist in the city where they live. In the Arab world, however, the influence of jihadist forums is fairly limited compared to other sources of radicalization.