timing intrusion management ensuring resiliency (timer

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Mladen Kezunovic Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Peer Review November 6-8, 2018 Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER) Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station

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Page 1: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

Mladen KezunovicCybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Peer Review

November 6-8, 2018

Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER)

Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station

Page 2: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

372

Objective• Make end-to-end Synchrophasor

systems and applications more resilient under timing attacks

• Goal: to develop detection methods & tools to manage timing signal intrusions.

Schedule• 10/1/2016-9/30/2019

• Key deliverables: 1) Software & hardware solutions to detect timing intrusions; 2) Advanced testbed & field evaluations; 3) Risk-based evaluation methodology & metrics;

• Transition to the energy sector: Field demonstration at IPC; Promotional meetings with end-users.

Summary: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER)

Total Value of Award: $4,429,451

Funds Expended to Date: 38.93%

Performer: Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station

Partners: PNNL, Idaho Power, EPG

Page 3: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

373

Methodologies• System calibration• Abnormality

detection• In-service

troubleshooting • Nested testing• Type tests• Application tests• Assessment of

application impact

Focus: Tools and methodologies

Tools (references)• Uncompromised

GPS clock• Accurate “Gold”

PMU• Flexible portable

Field test set• Communication

tester (1588 and 37.118.2 packets)

• Selected application (FL)

Page 4: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

374

• SOA for GNSS Timing• High performance GNSS receiver & clocks• No known timing integrity checker solution

for substation/control center• Our approach

• Cross checking of different timing data –we have only one time reference

• Monitor GNSS signal behavior at different layers

• Off-the-shelf component Implementation

Advancing the SOA: Uncompromised GPS Clock

• Benefits over the SOA• Plenty signal data in commercial receivers suitable for behavior modeling• Hold-over clocks at user’s choice• Timing checker circuit -- first of its kind • Networking capable for wide area defense

• Benefits to the end user • Computing resources much cheaper than specialized RF equipment• Practical technology easily integrated with existing equipment

• Advance the cybersecurity of energy delivery systems• Detect critical timing anomaly which cannot be done by regular cybersecurity tools

Page 5: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

375

Challenge 1: Sites see different satellites • Environment adaption and Two phase operation

o Profiling of satellites, Pattern learning, followed by monitoring

Challenge 2: Inherent noise in GNSS signals • Qualification of satellite signals during different times

• Estimate the acceptable behavior range

• Experiments showed highly consistent patterns

Challenge 3: High cost of high performance RF equipment• A defense-in-depth strategy to use algorithm based, multiple behavior

criteria to detect anomaly

Challenges to Success

Page 6: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

376

• A custom made prototype system• Ublox receiver

• GNSS SDR

• GPSDO holder-over clock

• FPGA based 4-channels of IRIG-B, 1pps integrity checker,

• Multiple hold-over IRIG-B and 1pps outputs

• Monitoring software system• Management controller

• GNSS signal behavior statistic and update

o Database

o Graphic user interface

Progress to Date

Small Signal Generator(TAMU)

IRIGTest PMU (SEL-487E)

Port 5B

Port 5A with PTP

Test TimeTiming Source(SEL-2488)

ANT

Time IRIG

PTP Time

Production TimeTiming Source

(SEL-2488)

ANT

Time IRIG

PTP Time

RF

IRIG

Production PMU

(SEL-487E)

Port 5B

Port 5A with PTP

Production PDC (SEL-3573)

Test PDC (SEL-3573)

Substation Gateway(SEL-3620)

MPLS MUX

ET1

ET2

ET4ET3

ET8

R1

C3

C4

IRIG-B

IRIG

Time Reference

R1 C1 C2 C3

Rack Mount Switch

ET3

Reference PMU (TAMU Gold)

SDR

Switch – (SEL-2740S)

Time

ET5

ET6 ET7

Laptop for PNNL

SDR for PNNL

RFC1

1 PPS

IRIG-B

Ref. PDC(SEL-3573)

C2

1 PPS

A1

A3A4E2

A2

RF1 PPS

1 PPSIRIG-B

C4IRIG-B

IRIG-BIRIG-B

IRIG-BIRIG-B

1 PPS

ET9

BOBN PDC #1

V&ITime

Time IRIG

Laptop for EPG & Fault Locating

Control Center

Ethernet

Fiber

Coaxial

CCoaxial Tap

ETEthernet Tap

T3 T1

T2

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5

T4 T5 TTiming Signal

Legend

ET4 ET5 ET6 ET7 ET8 ET9

ET2ET1

E2

E1

E1

U1 U2

U3 U4

U5 U6

U7

U8

U16U10

U11

U9

U12

U15

U11

U18

Ribbon Cable Connection

MPLS MUX

U17

Fiber/Microwave

EEthernet Connection

CT’s CCVT+-

There are four CT connections to each PMU, only one is shown here for figure clarity.

Rack Mount ServerU13

SynchrophasorComparison

Software

Page 7: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

377

• Current “state of the art”:- Field test set do not posses automate type and application test

tailored to TI impact evaluation on applications- Highly accurate PMU with adaptive algorithm selection is not available

• The feasibility of our approach

- We developed prototype to test feasibility

• Why our approach is better than the SOA

- It is tailored to the specific TI detection and impact evaluation methodology

• How the end user of our approach will benefit

- Synchrophasor system resiliency to TI attacks will be enhanced

• How our approach will advance the cybersecurity of energy delivery systems

- By making sure operators are made aware of the attacks timely

Advancing the (SOA): Waveform generation and accurate measurement

Page 8: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

378

Challenge 1: Feasibility• Develop porotypes and demonstrate the use

• Instrument end-to-end systems with porotypes

• Steps taken to overcome challenge of implementing the methodology

Challenge 2: Effectiveness• Set the metrics to evaluate performance

• Engage a Red team to preform independent evaluation

Challenge 3: Acceptance• Allow long term demonstrations in test bed and field

• Create a community of interested users

Challenges to Success

Page 9: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

379

Major Accomplishments• The tools are conceived,

designed and implemented

• The methodology for the use of tools is well defined and partially tested

• The designs for testbed and field installation are accomplished

• Initial implementation of the test bed production system evaluation is under way

• Use cases for test bed and field demonstration and evaluation are already specified

Progress to Date

Small Signal Generator(TAMU)

IRIGTest PMU (SEL-487E)

Port 5B

Port 5A with PTP

Test TimeTiming Source(SEL-2488)

ANT

Time IRIG

PTP Time

Production TimeTiming Source

(SEL-2488)

ANT

Time IRIG

PTP Time

RF

IRIG

Production PMU

(SEL-487E)

Port 5B

Port 5A with PTP

Production PDC (SEL-3573)

Test PDC (SEL-3573)

Substation Gateway(SEL-3620)

MPLS MUX

ET1

ET2

ET4ET3

ET8

R1

C3

C4

IRIG-B

IRIG

Time Reference

R1 C1 C2 C3

Rack Mount Switch

ET3

Reference PMU (TAMU Gold)

SDR

Switch – (SEL-2740S)

Time

ET5

ET6 ET7

Laptop for PNNL

SDR for PNNL

RFC1

1 PPS

IRIG-B

Ref. PDC(SEL-3573)

C2

1 PPS

A1

A3A4E2

A2

RF1 PPS

1 PPSIRIG-B

C4IRIG-B

IRIG-BIRIG-B

IRIG-BIRIG-B

1 PPS

ET9

BOBN PDC #1

V&ITime

Time IRIG

Laptop for EPG & Fault Locating

Control Center

Ethernet

Fiber

Coaxial

CCoaxial Tap

ETEthernet Tap

T3 T1

T2

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5

T4 T5 TTiming Signal

Legend

ET4 ET5 ET6 ET7 ET8 ET9

ET2ET1

E2

E1

E1

U1 U2

U3 U4

U5 U6

U7

U8

U16U10

U11

U9

U12

U15

U11

U18

Ribbon Cable Connection

MPLS MUX

U17

Fiber/Microwave

EEthernet Connection

CT’s CCVT+-

There are four CT connections to each PMU, only one is shown here for figure clarity.

Rack Mount ServerU13

SynchrophasorComparison

Software

Page 10: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

380

• SOA for Network Integrity• IEEE 1588 and C37.118.2 packets

• No known modeling or integrity check for malformed packets, attacks on IEEE 1588 Time Distribution Protocol, or attacks on C37.118.2 Synchrophasor protocol.

• Our approach• Alert on detection of malformed packets (IEE 1588 and C37.118.2)

• Monitor and model normal operation of IEEE 1588 Time Distribution Protocol and C37.118.2 Synchrophasor protocol and alert on deviation from the modeled norm.

• Use of reference (gold) PMU and PDC to establish norm.

• Benefits over the SOA• Alerts on possible communication path timing attack which is not currently done.

• Benefits to the end user • Implemented with minimal hardware infrastructure (TAPs, switch, and server)

• Advance the cybersecurity of energy delivery systems• Detect possible timing intrusion attacks which is not currently implemented .

Advancing the SOA: Communication Tester

Page 11: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

381

Challenge 1: Determine normal deviations in packets• Monitor test network and determine statistical variations over time.

Challenge 2: Lost packets / Missing data• Use model to fill in gaps between lost data packets.

• Determine if reference PMU/PDC agree with received traffic and update variations accordingly.

Challenge 3: Alarm Message Integration• Working with subcontractor to verify message format and compatibility with

their existing framework to integrate into their software model.

Challenges to Success

Page 12: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

382

Major Accomplishments• Network architecture finalized, including

ETAPs, server, IRIG-B receiver, and network switches.

• TAPs to collect IEEE 1588 (Time-Distribution Protocol) and C37.118 (Synchrophasor Protocol) traffic integrated into test system.

• Server to store packets and examine for intrusions installed.

• Script to filter aggerated TAP traffic and store in MySQL database completed.

• Test traffic data is now being collected on TAMU test system.

• Intrusion detection algorithm is now being developed.

• Alarm aggregation message and implementation methodology determined.

Progress to Date

Small Signal Generator(TAMU)

IRIGTest PMU (SEL-487E)

Port 5B

Port 5A with PTP

Test TimeTiming Source(SEL-2488)

ANT

Time IRIG

PTP Time

Production TimeTiming Source

(SEL-2488)

ANT

Time IRIG

PTP Time

RF

IRIG

Production PMU

(SEL-487E)

Port 5B

Port 5A with PTP

Production PDC (SEL-3573)

Test PDC (SEL-3573)

Substation Gateway(SEL-3620)

MPLS MUX

ET1

ET2

ET4ET3

ET8

R1

C3

C4

IRIG-B

IRIG

Time Reference

R1 C1 C2 C3

Rack Mount Switch

ET3

Reference PMU (TAMU Gold)

SDR

Switch – (SEL-2740S)

Time

ET5

ET6 ET7

Laptop for PNNL

SDR for PNNL

RFC1

1 PPS

IRIG-B

Ref. PDC(SEL-3573)

C2

1 PPS

A1

A3A4E2

A2

RF1 PPS

1 PPSIRIG-B

C4IRIG-B

IRIG-BIRIG-B

IRIG-BIRIG-B

1 PPS

ET9

BOBN PDC #1

V&ITime

Time IRIG

Laptop for EPG & Fault Locating

Control Center

Ethernet

Fiber

Coaxial

CCoaxial Tap

ETEthernet Tap

T3 T1

T2

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5

T4 T5 TTiming Signal

Legend

ET4 ET5 ET6 ET7 ET8 ET9

ET2ET1

E2

E1

E1

U1 U2

U3 U4

U5 U6

U7

U8

U16U10

U11

U9

U12

U15

U11

U18

Ribbon Cable Connection

MPLS MUX

U17

Fiber/Microwave

EEthernet Connection

CT’s CCVT+-

There are four CT connections to each PMU, only one is shown here for figure clarity.

Rack Mount ServerU13

SynchrophasorComparison

Software

Page 13: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

383

Plans to transfer technology/knowledge to end user• What category is the targeted end user for the technology or

knowledge? (e.g., Asset Owner, Vendor, OEM)

- The targeted end-users are asset owners and vendors

• What are your plans to gain industry acceptance?oDemonstrate the concept in production type testbed at TEESoEvaluate the concept in field environment at IPCoOrganize visits of interested parties to the testbed and/or field

installationoMeet with prospective end-users and vendors in discussion sessions

about the needs for timing intrusion detection, and how our tools and methodologies may meet the needs

oPrepare evaluation report with assessment metrics and use case test results

Collaboration/Technology Transfer

Page 14: Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER

384

Approach for the next year or to the end of project

• Complete tool developments

• Integrate the tools in the production testbed

• Perform testbed evaluation to demonstrate the methodology and objectives

• Instrument the field environment with the solution to enable field evaluation

• Monitor in-service behavior to demonstrate effectiveness

• Develop a community of interested prospective users and engage them in tuning the specifications

Next Steps for this Project