50 GRIDIRON

THROWING OUT THE BOOK

KEVIN KELLEY

!e Saints’ onside kick in Super Bowl XLIV is one of the most memorable ‘gambles’ in the NFL’s history.

But should such a decision be commonplace? Meet Kevin Kelley, the coach of crack high-school out"t Pulaski Academy Bruins, who is #ying in the face of the establishment by showing the cojones we all have with PlayStation controllers in our hands.

Kelley talks to Gridiron’s Tom Ritchie about doing it his own way, and why his ideas will never get taken on in the “traditionalist” NFL.

GRIDIRON 51

THROWING OUT THE BOOK

I t’s fourth-and-four on your 45-yard line. You are ahead by 10 points with "ve minutes le$ in the

third quarter. You’re faced with a dilemma. Do you punt? Or do you put faith in your o%ense to convert?

For Kevin Kelley, head coach of Pulaski Academy in Little Rock, Arkansas, there’s no question. He’s going for it. Since 2003, Kelley has coached his teams with a revolutionary philosophy. He never punts and almost always onside kicks. And it has worked. Kelley’s Bruins have won three state championships during his tenure.

!is season proved no di%erent. Running through their regular season with a 10-0 record and over 550 yards of o%ense per game, the Bruins would eventually go on to lose 57-50 to Morrilton in the second round of the playo%s. But while Kelley’s bid for a fourth state championship will have to wait another year, one thing he won’t be compromising is his philosophy.

Like all coaches, Kelley craves nothing more than to win, and in his pursuit of it, he began to question everything. Why do we punt on fourth down? Well, because everybody else does. Why do we not onside kick at every restart?

What separates Kelley is his willingness to look beyond conventional wisdom. Using economic texts such as !e Tipping Point and Freakonomics as inspiration, Kelley’s distinctive approach could not be further from the insular tendencies of football’s monoculture. “I think it’s true in any of walk of life, especially if you own a business or are a coach, that we’re biased to thinking certain ways about something because we’ve been involved in it. Sometimes it’s better to get ideas from people who really have no idea how to play that game or how to run a certain business. !ey’re completely unbiased and haven’t been a%ected by the prevailing thoughts of that society. !at’s my thinking when I read non-football books and try to apply them to the sport.”

His philosophy naturally brought him to study the numbers. Rather than view the long kicko% and punting as a necessary part of the game, Kelley used research to support his newfound pragmatism. “An economist from the University of Chicago said you should

never punt on fourth-and-one, no matter where you are on the "eld. Some guys say you should never punt on fourth-and-four. Another says you should only punt between the 40-yard lines. All of the numbers say that teams should punt a whole lot less.”

While there are many di%erent studies out there that look at the functionality of punting – if you’re a real football nerd, you need to check these out – no coach had ever taken a step as drastic as eliminating the punt from their gameplan. But to Kelley, the move has given his team a decided advantage. “Percentage-wise, there’s no doubt in my mind, if you do exactly right, my system gives you a 10 per cent advantage. If the teams are truly 50-50. Both teams are as likely to win as each other. If you implement this strategy the odds are now 60-40. It’s something that should be imitated. I have an advantage so, if they do start to pick it up, I lose my advantage.”

!at 10 per cent advantage seemed like a whole lot more in September 2011. Facing Cabot, the Bruins would go up by 29-0 before the opposition touched the ball. Pulaski Academy recovered the "rst four onside kicks of the game, and drove down the "eld for four touchdowns and a two-point conversion. For Kelley, it served as vindication. “!ey’re a traditional powerhouse and physically we didn’t match up to them too well. But it was one of those games when you execute perfectly. !e decisions we made were magni"ed because everyone was watching to see if they work when you play a good team. And we proved that they do.”

Even at high-school level, he doesn’t see his system copied all that o$en. “I don’t think

PULASKI ACADEMY BRUINS 2013 SCHEDULE

REGULAR SEASON:Memphis University 29 - Bruins 37Warren 30 - Bruins 42West Memphis 35 - Bruins 56Bruins 48 - North Pulaski 27Central 28 - Bruins 50Bruins 49 - Little Rock Christian Academy 19McClellan 12 - Bruins 49Bruins 50 - Mills University Studies 21Bruins 49 - Sylvan Hills 25Jacksonville 36 - Bruins 65

5A STATE PLAYOFFSWatson Chapel 36 - Bruins 50Morrilton 57 - Bruins 50

Kelley and his coaching team look on as his unorthodox tactics are executed on the !eld.

52 GRIDIRON

anybody is going to do exactly what I do with onside kicks or not punting. It di%ers. Slowly but surely we’re seeing some coaches starting to experiment with it. !ey’re still scared of losing their jobs. In the games against Pulaski you see teams try some of our strategies, which is kind of strange. If you use it against us why not use it against other teams?” When quizzed about whether it could be copied in the NFL, the response is similar. “People will try and experiment with it. But we’re not in danger of it taking over the game anytime soon.”

!e experiment, though, has worked. !e numbers, and Kelley’s success, persuasively suggest that teams should put their o%ense on the "eld on fourth down. But despite the evidence, the upholders of the game’s traditions will be loath to let the philosophy spread. “Most coaches are traditionalists, most sports people are traditionalists. Most coaches disagree with what we’re doing, but I know it’s decent, because they don’t like preparing for it. I know I’m doing something right.”

!is traditionalism is exacerbated by the coverage of the NFL. How o$en during an NFL broadcast does the colour commentator lambast a coach for taking a shot on fourth down? No such call has been more scrutinised than Bill Belichick’s ‘fourth-and-two from the 28’ versus the Indianapolis Colts in 2009.

!rowing a short out pattern to Wes Welker for a yard, the Patriots would not convert and ultimately lost the game. Despite the percentages being in the favour of the future Hall of Famer, Belichick was lambasted for weeks. Kelley, of course, agrees with the call. “Picture an average NFL coach, who punts in that situation. Everyone says your team couldn’t get it done, you relied on your defense to get the job done. Belichick does it and doesn’t lose his job. !e average coach might have got "red the Monday a$er the game. !at’s why nobody will do what I do.”

Kelley is quick to point out that converting on fourth down is a di%erent proposition for his teams. During his tenure as Pulaski coach, the Bruins are around 50.3 per cent in fourth-down conversions, a number that should make even the staunchest of coaches reconsider his style. !e luxury of an extra down allows Kelley

to call more diverse plays on earlier downs. “When you know you’re going for it on fourth down, it changes your play-calling on every other down. If it’s third-and-seven in the NFL or college, every defense brings in extra defensive backs. If we know we’re going for it on fourth down, we don’t necessarily have to throw the ball in that situation. !e defense can’t commit to stopping the pass.”

In making for a more entertaining brand of football, Kelley feels his style is what many NFL fans want. “If you look at it from a fan’s point of view, the fans at the game are chanting for the coach to go for it on fourth down. From purely an entertainment standpoint, it makes for a more exciting game.” Factor in the onside kicks, of which the Bruins have recovered over 25 per cent this year, and the scores of games become almost unrecognisable. “What in#ates the scoring more than anything is that the onside kick shortens the "eld. It increases the total number of possessions. In an average high-school game there may be 12 possessions each; in our games there are 15.”

It is here that Kelley truly excels. Using a collection of varied plays, he has managed to turn the crapshoot of onside kicks into an (in)exact science. “We’ll use some year in, year out. We have had 12 or 15 di%erent

‘There is no doubt in my mind I could show an NFL team how to improve their rate of success’

Spot the punter.

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kicks, but we line up our onside kick team like an o%ense. We use di%erent formations and di%erent shi$s.” Compare his team’s remarkable recovery percentages to that of the average NFL team. “!ey just onside kick when they have to. I can go and show them a way to up their recovery rate. !e average is 7 per cent recovery. !ere is no doubt in my mind I could show an NFL team how to improve their rate of success.”

Despite his attention to practice and drawing up di%erent ways to reclaim the ball, Kelley also sees the NFL’s di&cult relationship with the onside kick as psychological. “When people work on it, you’re telling the team that because we’ve failed for the "rst 58 minutes of the game, we have to do this. !ey take that mentality into practice and into the game, and because it’s not a big part of the game it’s not practised enough.”

!e players at Pulaski Academy have no such mental blocks. Buoyed by their coach’s distinctive strategies, they enjoy being di%erent from everyone else. “!ey take pride in being a little bit di%erent and we’re winning. !e funny thing is they’ve grown up playing video games, not punting and going for onside kicks. It kind of "ts in with a video-game style and kids love video games.” And while the system a college prospect plays in may harm his professional future, Kelley does not think his schemes impact his students’ chances of playing at the next level. “!ey look at a kid on "lm and see if he’s big enough, fast enough and strong enough. And where you think it might hurt, it actually helps. People want winners on their team. If you’re a college coach and you’ve got two kids that are the same, and one kid comes from a winning programme and the other just went 5-5, o$en they want the winning kid. !ey know how it feels to win; he’s frustrated when he loses, and he strives for excellence.”

It is that moment that Kelley for once sounds like the traditionalists he rails against. So o$en we hear coaches express their desire for perfection or excellence, but very seldom do they muse over a paper written by a Professor of Economics at Stanford. Kelley readily admits that he has a “big ego” just like every other coach and, while he is willing to look further a"eld for inspirations, underneath he is just like every other coach: he just wants to win.

GOING FOR IT While the Pulaski Academy Bruins may be going for it on every fourth down, it’s always a big deal when a head coach doesn’t opt to punt in the NFL. Here, Gridiron looks at some of the most notable fourth-down calls in NFL history.

4 + 4

DON SHULA FAKE PUNTS IN THE 1972 AFC CHAMPIONSHIP GAME

In Issue III of Gridiron we spoke to legendary Dolphins coach Shula about his team’s perfect 1972 season. Trailing the Pittsburgh Steelers 7-0 a$er the "rst quarter, the Dolphins were held to a fourth down on their own 20. !e Dolphins faked, with punter Larry Seiple running through a huge hole in the Steelers’ line for 37 yards. Shula did not directly make the call, later admitting that he had given Seiple the option to take o% if he saw an opportunity. !e Dolphins would go on to win 21-17.

4 + 3

JEFF RUTLEDGE TAKES THE FAKE PUNT IN SUPER BOWL XXI

On the opening drive of the second half, with the New York Giants trailing the Denver Broncos 10-9, Bill Parcells made one of the gutsiest calls in NFL history. Facing a fourth-and-one in his own territory, Parcells decided to run a fake, with the snap going to backup-quarterback and protector Rutledge. What made the call all the more brave was the fact that Parcells had run the same play on the Broncos just nine weeks earlier when the teams had met at the Meadowlands. Knowing the opposing special teams coach was expecting the play, Rutledge twice looked over at Parcells to abort the call before eventually eking out a yard when his number was called. A huge momentum swing, the play was massive in securing the Giants’ "rst Super Bowl crown.

4 + 2

BILL PARCELLS GOES FOR THE FAKE.... AGAIN (SORT OF)

Never one to rest on their laurels, the Giants once again used a fake punt to create history. Facing the San Francisco 49ers in the 1991 NFC Championship Game, the Giants were down 13-9 in the third quarter. Noticing the 49ers only had 10 men on the "eld, linebacker Gary Reasons called the same fake used in Super Bowl XXI, allowing him to gain 30 yards. !e Giants won the game 15-13 before going on to defeat the Bu%alo Bills in Super Bowl XXV.

4 + 2

BILL BELICHICK GOES FOR IT FROM HIS OWN 28

Whereas all of our other fourth-down calls have been either in the playo%s or Super Bowl, perhaps the most famous of all took place in the 2009 Week 10 match-up between the New England Patriots and Indianapolis Colts. Down by six with two minutes to play, the Colts held the Patriots to a fourth-and-two on their own 28-yard line. Rather than give the ball back to a rampant Peyton Manning, Belichick opted to make one of the gutsiest calls in the NFL history. While Tom Brady would complete a pass to Wes Welker, the Patriots came up a yard short, ultimately losing 35-34 to the then undefeated Colts.