THREE PSYCHOLOGIES Perspectives from Freud, Skinner, and Rogers

6th Edition

Robert D. Nye Professor Emeritus at State University of New York

at New Paltz

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nye, Robert D. Three psychologies : perspectives from Freud, Skinner,

and Rogers / Robert D. Nye. - - 6th ed. p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-534-36845-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Skinner, B.F. (Burrhus Frederic), 1904- 2. Freud, Sigmund,

1856-1939. 3. Rogers, Carl R. (Carl Ransom), 1902- 4. Psychoanalysis. 5. Behaviorism (Psychology) 6. Humanistic psychology. I. Title

BF121.N94 1999 150.19—dc21 99-23747

\ J This book is printed on acid-free recycled paper.

Dedicated to my parents and others who have given me, in various ways and at various times, ego-strengthening support, positive reinforcement,

and unconditional positive regard.

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 7

Biographical Sketch of Freud 7

A Deterministic View 8

Hypnosis 8

Sources of Data 9

Unconscious, Preconscious, and Conscious: "Layers"

of the Personality 10

The Id, Its Instincts, and Psychic Energy 11

Sex and Aggression 13

The Ego and Its Releasing and Controlling Functions 15

The Superego and Its Values 17

Topography and Structure: How They Fit Together 18

Psychosexual Stages of Development and the Oedipus Complex 21

vi CONTENTS

Anxiety and the Defense Mechanisms of the Ego

Psychoanalysis as Therapy

A Brief Review of Some Major Points

Commentary

References

3 B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM

Biographical Sketch of Skinner

Radical Behaviorism

Radical Determinism

Sources of Data

Respondent Behavior

Operant Behavior

The Shaping of Behavior

Maintaining Behavior: Schedules of Reinforcement

Self-Control and Creativity

Conscious Processes

Drives and Emotions

Aversive Control and Punishment

Problem Behavior: Causes and Remedies

A Brief Refiew of Some Major Points

Commentary

References

4 CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Biographical Sketch of Rogers

Humanistic Phenomenology

Determinism Plus Freedom

Sources of Data

The Actualizing Tendency

The Self and Self-Actualization

CONTENTS vii

The Organismic Valuing Process 106

Unconditional Positive Regard 106

Congruence and Incongruence 110

The Fully Functioning Person 111

Client-Centered or Person-Centered Therapy 112

Encounter Groups 118

Intimate Relationships 122

A Brief Review of Some Major Points 123

Commentary 124

References 129

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 133

Comparisons and Contrasts 133

Criticisms 148

Concluding Comments 155

EPILOGUE 161

Are There Other Psychologies? 161

Ellis s Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy 162

References for Epilogue 166

INDEX 169

PREFACE

This book presents and compares, in a relatively simple and straightforward way, a number of the major ideas of three men who have contributed greatly to contemporary psychological thought: Sigmund Freud, B. F.

Skinner, and Carl Rogers. Beginning students who need basic information, advanced students who need review, and lay readers who are curious about differing views of human behavior should find the book useful.

The introductory chapter gives an overview of each perspective and points out some of the differences among the theories. Chapters Two, Three, and Four discuss the basic ideas of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers, in that order. I tried to present these ideas as convincingly as possible, holding back judgments and crit­icisms until later. The commentaries at the ends of these chapters cover impor­tant subjects related to each approach. Chapter Five provides comparisons on specific issues, critical evaluations, and my own personal comments. The Epi­logue includes concise information about cognitive psychology and Albert El-lis's rational-emotive behavior therapy, so that these currently popular ap­proaches can be compared with those of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers.

For this sixth edition, "A Brief Review of Some Major Points" has been added to Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Also, the commentaries at the ends of these chapters have been expanded, with updated information. Other additions are several footnotes, some new references, elaborations on certain important topics, and a number of quotes that clarify significant issues. Overall, though, this edition remains close to its predecessors in structure, style, and substance.

ix

X PREFACE

For the content of this book, my primary debt obviously is to Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner, and Carl Rogers. All three remained active and produc­tive well into their eighties and allowed neither age nor physical ailments to stop them from promoting their views. Their contributions to psychology have provided a wealth of ideas for explaining human behavior.

A number of individuals aided in the preparation of the first edition, and their influence remains. My colleagues Kurt Haas, James Halpern, David Morse, and Mark Sherman made many helpful comments, and Alan Stubbs, of the University of Maine, provided numerous suggestions regarding my expla­nations of operant conditioning. Larry Wrightsman, Consulting Editor for Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, provided strong encouragement and sound advice; I appreciate greatly his important contributions to the first, and later, editions. Judy Bufano did the typing in her usual patient, efficient, and good-humored way, and Wokie David assisted with this task. Also, I am thankful to Dean Scher for information on ego psychology and object relations theory, which helped me to prepare the third edition.

The following reviewers contributed prerevision comments and sugges­tions: for the second edition, Glenn Carter of Austin Peay State University, Barbara Fulton of Western Michigan University, and Bill C. Henderson of the College of Alameda; for the third edition, Scott Fraser of the University of Southern California, Michael McGrath of the University of Nebraska at Om­aha, and Charles Scontras of the University of Maine at Orono; for the fourth edition, Ann Cochran of the State University of New York at Morrisville, Emery Cummins of San Diego State University, and Michael McGrath of the University of Nebraska at Omaha; for the fifth edition, L. Dodge Fernald, Frank L. Fox of the University of Southern California, and Harold Rosenberg of Bowling Green State University; for this edition, Charles Doyle of Three Rivers Community Technical CoUege-Mohegan Campus, Kevin Callahan of the University of North Texas, Algea Harrison of Oakland University, and Teri Nicoll-Johnson of Modesto Junior College.

Special thanks go to Claire Verduin, former Publisher at Brooks/Cole Pub­lishing Company, for her valuable advice and other help during the prepara­tion of previous editions, and to my wife, Eileen, for her continuing loving concern and support. Also Micky Lawler's copyediting, consideration, and optimism had a strong, positive effect on the evolution of this book. For their assistance with the present edition, I would like to thank Marianne Taflinger, Senior Editor at Brooks/Cole • Wadsworth, and Howard Severson, Associate Project Editor.

Robert D. Nye

THREE

PSYCHOLOGIES

1

Introduction

The main ideas of Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner, and Carl Rogers have been with us for decades. These ideas, however, have not grown old. They still attract attention, cause debate, stimulate research, and gather

criticism as well as praise. They form the bases for, or have influenced, many current attempts to understand and change human behavior, and they remain vital elements of present-day psychology—despite the rapid growth and ex­pansion of the field in numerous directions.

Freud's psychoanalytic approach, Skinner's radical behaviorism, and Rogers's humanistic views actually constitute three different psychologies. They differ in the answers they provide to basic questions such as: What are the inherent qualities of human beings? What are the most important influ­ences on personality development? What are the causes of problem behaviors, and how should these behaviors be treated? What should society do to maxi­mize human achievements? What is the most effective way to study human behavior?

The fact that all three of these different perspectives currently have consider­able vitality, and are not just significant historically, points out that psychologists have not achieved consensus on important basic issues. Psychology certainly is in good health if judged by the large number of persons entering the field, by the vast number of books and research articles being published, and by the public's interest in psychological matters. However, it is a field marked by nu­merous controversies. Psychologists often disagree. Reasons for this lack of agreement include the complexity of human behavior, the relatively short his-

1

2 CHAPTER ONE

tory of scientific psychology, and the problems caused by the fact that psychol­ogists are humans who are trying to study humans (one such problem is the difficulty of maintaining objectivity).

It could be argued that the controversies that exist among psychologists, though very disturbing when a definite answer is being sought, actually are ad­ditional signs of the fields good health. They show that psychologists often are unwilling to settle for a quick consensus and willing to take positions that they know will arouse criticism from at least some of their colleagues.

Psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and humanistic psychology have been at the forefront of this controversy; it would be difficult to find other viewpoints that have generated as much disagreement. Although many psychologists are eclec­tic, taking from each approach whatever seems useful, there also are firmly dedicated advocates of each of these perspectives and their offshoots, who try to defend and advance the approach they have adopted. This makes for an in­teresting state of affairs.

It is challenging to have different theoretical explanations for behavior, with researchers of different persuasions attempting to validate these explana­tions. Discomfort may develop, however, among those (both inside and out­side psychology) who are looking for firm conclusions. Typically, I advise stu­dents to try to develop tolerance for ambiguity, to learn different theoretical approaches well enough so that they can see clearly the similarities and differ­ences among them, to realize that a theory can be partly right and partly wrong, and to understand that a theory can be useful in practical situations even if it does not provide final answers.

The differences among the psychologies of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers will become clear in the following chapters. Psychoanalysis, it will be seen, emphasizes unconscious personality dynamics. Freud concentrated on unrav­eling what he believed to be at the core of human personality: the hidden forces and conflicts that are buried deep within the psyche. He attempted to reach the unconscious by interpreting dreams (including his own) and by lis­tening while his neurotic patients tried to verbalize their unrecognized, often socially forbidden, thoughts and longings. He believed strongly that sexual and aggressive drives are the root causes of our behavior and that early childhood is the critical period during which the individual's personality is formed through the interaction of these drives with the socialization process within the family.

Freud was skeptical about the possibilities for individual happiness, seeing a continuing conflict between primitive sexual and aggressive impulses and so­ciety's inhibition of these impulses. (He also was pessimistic about the future, believing that the destructive tendencies within us pose a serious threat to the continued survival of the human race.) Although he viewed happiness as an unrealistic goal, Freud saw his method of therapy (the psychoanalytic approach for which he is so famous) as a means for reducing neurotic anxiety and suf­fering by helping persons to better understand and cope with the powerful emotional tendencies within them.

INTRODUCTION 3

In contrast to Freud, B. F. Skinner avoided going inside the person to ex­plain behavior. Whereas Freud's ideas were influenced by his interactions with troubled patients, Skinner's basic assumptions were derived from studies of lab­oratory animals and were then extended to the human level. The behavioral psychology that Skinner developed, while acknowledging the role of genetic influences, places its emphasis on external conditions as causes of behavior. Also, although he agreed that our thoughts and feelings are important to us personally, he did not believe that these internal states determine what we do; they can be analyzed as effects, rather than causes, arising from genetic and en­vironmental conditions.

Human behavior, according to Skinner, is governed mainly by its out­comes. During our lifetimes, various positive and negative consequences fol­low our behaviors, and these consequences are the most important influences shaping our "personalities" (that is, our actions and reactions in various situa­tions). He argued that too often we ignore environmental effects and continu­ally waste time and effort in unproductive attempts to understand and change what is going on inside (beliefs, emotions, motives, and so on). He was con­vinced that school, work, and personal behaviors could be vastly improved if positive consequences were provided systematically for productive, desirable activities. He warned that our society is in danger of being overwhelmed by its problems because of our failure to establish the external conditions that consistently strengthen and maintain beneficial behaviors.

Carl Rogers s humanistic psychology differs from psychoanalysis and radi­cal behaviorism in significant ways. Rogers, for example, disagreed with Freud's view that humans are motivated primarily by sexual and aggressive dri­ves. He asserted that fully functioning persons want to fulfill and enhance all their potentialities and that it is pessimistic and limiting to assume that sex and aggression are the most basic forces within us. With regard to Skinner's ideas, Rogers acknowledged that external conditions are important, but he insisted that a person's feelings and self-concept play vital and undeniable roles in de­termining behavior.

Rogers developed his ideas while doing counseling and clinical work. He was profoundly affected by individuals who he believed were able to redirect their lives after achieving greater understanding of their real inner selves. He was a consistently strong advocate of the power of the person to move toward self-enhancement once he or she has been set free to do so. The therapeutic approach that he founded, called client-centered or person-centered therapy, is designed to allow the individual to explore inner feelings and to make life choices based on greater self-awareness.

These brief comments on the psychologies of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers should make it clear that they provide alternative perspectives on human be­havior. To be well informed about the current state of psychological thought requires familiarity with these perspectives. The following chapters give the basic information needed for understanding and evaluating the essential in­gredients of each approach and for comparing them with one another. The

4 CHAPTER ONE

references listed in the footnotes and at the ends of chapters will be useful for those who want further information.

The Epilogue provides a very brief discussion of cognitive psychology—its contribution to the contemporary field of psychology and its relationship to the approaches of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers. Also, Albert Ellis s rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT) is presented; this influential approach has had a significant impact on cognitive and cognitive-behavioral psychothera-pies. Cognitive psychology and rational-emotive behavior therapy reflect an important current psychological perspective: a view that considers the study of human cognition (for example, reasoning, decision making, and belief forma­tion) as critical for the understanding of emotions and behaviors.

2

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FREUD

Sigmund Freud was born in Moravia, the easternmost province of what is now the Czech Republic, on May 6, 1856. His father was a wool mer­chant, married for the second time. Five girls and two boys were born

after Sigmund, and his father also had two grown sons from his previous mar­riage. Freud's mother was a lively and intelligent woman, and apparently she retained these qualities until her death at age 95.

The family moved to Vienna when Freud was 4 years old. Although their circumstances were quite limited, Freud's education was not hindered, and he did very well in school. He received his medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1881, after which he practiced medicine at Vienna's General Hospi­tal and studied organic diseases of the nervous system. In 1886 he married Martha Bernays, to whom he had been engaged for four years. They had six children. The youngest, Anna, born in 1895, was to make significant contribu­tions of her own to the field of psychoanalysis.

Also in 1886, Freud set up private practice, specializing in nervous diseases. Gradually his interests began to shift away from an emphasis on the physical aspects of the nervous system and toward the investigation of psychological causes of nervous disorders. This change in focus intensified during the follow­ing several years, resulting in full-time study of the psychological origins of neuroses. He continued this pursuit, while expanding his interests to include

7

8 CHAPTER TWO

"normal" behaviors and social problems, until his death in London in 1939, at age 83. He had been persuaded to leave his long-time home in Vienna the pre­vious year in order to escape Nazi persecution.

Among Freud's many important published works are The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), The Ego and the Id (1923), and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). Some of his best-known contributions were published when he was in his sixties and seventies. His productivity remained at a high level throughout his life, and even the pain and suffering of cancer of the jaw, for which he had 33 operations, did not deter his efforts to probe the human psyche.

Freud changed certain of his theoretical assumptions over the years. Some of his earlier writings differ from the later versions of his theory as presented, for example, in his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933) and An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940). The ideas discussed in this chapter represent mainly the later stages of Freud's thinking.

A DETERMIN IST IC V IEW

Freud was a strict determinist who believed strongly that all behavior is caused; actions, as well as thoughts and feelings, do not occur accidentally or by chance. Making slips of the tongue, dreaming, hallucinating, forgetting, choosing, wishing, striving for success, repeating certain behaviors again and again, refusing to admit mistakes, being hostile toward others, writing novels, painting pictures, and on and on—these and all other behaviors were assumed to be explainable.

The Freudian view suggests that, if humans remain a mystery, it is because of inadequacies in uncovering the driving forces within them and the experi­ences that have influenced their behavior. Nevertheless, these forces and influ­ences do exist, and they do determine the person's functioning. It is the role of psychoanalysis to unravel the mystery by seeking the sources of thoughts, feel­ings, and actions in hidden drives and conflicts, and by investigating the ways in which the early experiences of the person interact with basic human nature to create the adult personality. The methods finally developed by Freud to ex­amine the underlying causes of human behavior were preceded by his interest in, and use of, hypnotic techniques.

HYPNOSIS

Early in his career, Freud came to believe that hypnosis could aid in the dis­covery of the underlying reasons for psychological problems. In 1885 he left Vienna for a year to study in France with Jean Charcot, who was using hyp-

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 9

nosis in his work on hysteria. (This ailment bears similarities to what is now called conversion disorder. The person "converts" a psychological problem into a physical one; that is, because of emotional conflict, the person becomes blind, loses the use of a limb, or suffers some other physical disability. Even when it is explained to the person that there is no physiological damage or disease, the disability continues. There is a psychological, rather than an organic, reason for the disability.) Charcot found that the symptoms of hysteria could be produced in patients under hypnosis. These symptoms were the same as those that oc­curred spontaneously in the nonhypnotic state, and this discovery suggested that the causes of hysteria were psychological rather than physiological.

Freud returned to Vienna impressed with what he had seen, and eventually he began to work with Josef Breuer, a Viennese physician. Breuer had already used hypnosis to relieve the mental and physical symptoms of hysteria. His procedure involved having the hypnotized patient recall forgotten traumatic experiences while giving free expression to the accompanying emotion. Breuer called this the cathartic method.

Freud's collaboration with Breuer was productive, and in 1895 they pub­lished a book, Studies on Hysteria. Their partnership was not to continue, how­ever. Freud became more and more convinced that emotional disturbances had as their root some problem that was sexual in nature. Sex was a sensitive issue in the late 1800s, and Breuer apparently became uncomfortable with Freud's insistence on the importance of investigating sexual factors as the prime causes of emotional disorders. Freud was determined to surge forward with his line of thinking, and the two eventually parted company.

Another important development in Freud's approach occurred around this time. He was not satisfied with hypnosis as a technique. He found that some patients could not be hypnotized, that sometimes the hypnotic trance was not deep enough, and that relapses occurred. As an alternative that he considered better, he gradually developed the technique of free association, in which the patient relaxes (on the well-known analyst's couch) and says whatever comes into consciousness. This technique, along with dream analysis, is one of Freud's greatest contributions to the methods of psychoanalytic therapy. More will be said later about both of these methods.

SOURCES OF DATA

As Freud continued his treatment of patients, he formulated various ideas about basic human nature and about the development and structure of the hu­man personality. These ideas were influenced not only by his contacts with patients but also by his reading of literature, by his consideration of events oc­curring in the world, and (very importantly) by his self-analysis. In about 1897 Freud began to investigate his own inner thoughts and feelings as well as his childhood experiences. He analyzed his dreams and sometimes exchanged thoughts with his associates about the meaning of his and their dreams.

10 CHAPTER TWO

Psychoanalysis is both a theory of personality and a method of therapy. Freud tried to explain how we get the way we are (that is, how our personali­ties are formed), and he also formulated techniques to use in treating neuroses. He did not develop first one aspect of psychoanalysis and then the other; ex­planation and treatment developed hand in hand. As mentioned previously, early in his career Freud began to suspect that unconscious sexual conflicts were at the root of psychological problems. This was the start of the theory of psychoanalysis and provided Freud with a stepping-stone to further theoretical developments, which occurred as he continued to treat neurotic persons and to engage in self-analysis. There was an interplay between his theoretical for­mulations and his analytic observations, each influencing the other. We will now consider some of the most salient features of psychoanalysis as a theory of personality (often called psychoanalytic theory), and then we wilL briefly dis­cuss psychoanalysis as a method of therapy

UNCONSCIOUS, PRECONSCIOUS,

A N D CONSCIOUS: "LAYERS"

OF THE PERSONALITY

The psychoanalytic theory that Freud developed, and continued to modify over a period of nearly half a century, has as its backbone an emphasis on the unconscious aspects of personality. He certainly was not the first person in his­tory to realize that humans are often unaware of their most basic drives, im­pulses, and internal conflicts. However, Freud's contribution is his systematic study of the unconscious. He made a prolonged and concentrated effort to tie to­gether many, many bits and pieces of data from various sources in order to make sense out of the unconscious dynamics of the human personality.

In his relentless emphasis on, and pursuit of, the unconscious, Freud was not following the mainstreams of either turn-of-the-century medical practice nor the relatively new field of psychology. Physicians were, by and large, not attempting to deal with psychological factors in disease. The tendency was to try to explain symptoms as resulting from some organic disorder or brain mal­function. Physical treatments were prescribed—drugs, tonics, hydrotherapy, electrotherapy. If these failed, it was generally assumed that the physical cause was unknown and that nothing much could be done.1

The field of psychology at that time was taken up with the study of con­scious states. For example, those psychologists who were following the ap-

1 Although it is commonly believed that Freud shocked and angered the medical commu­nity with his ideas, there are some conflicting opinions. For example, Frank J. Sulloway, in his book Freud: Biologist of the Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1979), suggests that much of what Freud said was quite acceptable but that he chose to picture himself as a loner who was under attack.

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 11

proach called "structuralism" were attempting to break down conscious expe­riences (such as the perception of objects) into basic elements. Since they were interested in what we experience as we make contact with our environment, they placed the unconscious in a category that, by definition, is not subject to critical scientific analysis.

Freud, on the other hand, viewed the unconscious as the part of the per­sonality that must be studied. An iceberg analogy is sometimes used to illustrate the amount of importance given by Freud to the unconscious. Just as the ma­jor portion of an iceberg lies below the water's surface, the major portion of the human personality lies below the level of awareness; Freud believed that the really important causative factors involved in human behavior reside in this realm of the personality. Therefore, to understand human behavior, the uncon­scious must be revealed.

In Freud's topography of the mind, there are three levels of consciousness. The unconscious consists of all aspects of our personalities of which we are unaware. The preconscious consists of that which is not immediately at the level of awareness but is fairly accessible; many of our ideas and thoughts be­come available to us when we concentrate on them or attempt to bring them into awareness, but they are not constantly at the conscious level. The conscious consists of that which is within our immediate awareness. Actually, these three states of consciousness are not absolute categories but points on a continuum, varying from that which is clear and present to that about which we are completely unaware, hidden deep within the recesses of our personalities.

THE ID, ITS INSTINCTS, AND PSYCHIC ENERGY

In 1923 Freud published The Ego and the Id, which presented another way of looking at the personality: from a structural model consisting of the id, ego, and superego. The id is the most primitive part of the personality; it is the original system with which the newborn infant comes equipped. The ego be­gins to develop soon after birth, as the infant starts to interact with his or her environment. The superego represents the moral aspect of humans; its devel­opment occurs as the parents or other adults pass on society's values and standards to the child.

The id does not know "right" from "wrong," has no perspective on the pos­sibilities and impossibilities of the real world, and has no inhibitions. It simply seeks gratification, operating according to the pleasure principle. Freud's concept of the id does seem to characterize the infant just after birth. The human at this stage of life has not yet experienced the difficulties of getting what it wants and has no moral convictions; thus, to think of the infant as "all id" is not unreason­able. After a while, the personality becomes elaborated as the ego and superego come into existence, being developed and molded by interactions between the

12 CHAPTER TWO

person s inborn nature and his or her nurture (experiences with the social and physical world).

The id is where the human instincts reside.2 Humans are born with life in­stincts (Eros) and the death instinct. The life instincts support and promote the survival of the individual and the species. Hunger, thirst, and sexual drives are aspects of the life instincts. Instincts have energy; in fact, the psychic energy of the instincts is what powers human activity. The energy of the life instincts is called libido (or libidinal energy). The term "libido" is often used synonymously with "sexual energy," since sex was the aspect of the life instincts with which Freud was most concerned.

The death instinct, sometimes expressed as the death wish, has a compli­cated origin. The theory of evolution suggests that the earliest, most primitive life forms emerged when certain chemical reactions brought inanimate mat­ter to a living state. Freud assumed that these life forms were at first quite un­stable; life was tenuous and reverted easily to its prior inanimate condition. Freud maintained that humans, though long removed in evolutionary history from these original forms of life, still carry within them a tendency toward death—that is, a tendency to return to the inanimate state. This tendency takes psychological form in the death wish, which may manifest itself directly, as in the case of suicide, or indirectly, as when people such as race-car drivers, mercenary soldiers, or other daredevil types engage in activities that involve high risks. Generally, however, the life instincts counteract the direct carrying out of the death wish. An important point must be stressed again: there is en­ergy associated with both life and death instincts. Freud never gave a specific name to the energy of the death instinct, and it is generally called simply de­structive energy.

All of the energy available to " run" the personality is provided by the in­stincts. This psychic energy is limited in quantity; that is, there is just so much available at any given time. As pointed out earlier, the seat of the instincts is the id. Therefore, the id initially contains the energy that eventually is "cap­tured" by the other parts of the personality—the ego and the superego. The id is the original source from which the personality begins and grows.

Freud conceived of the human personality as an energy system: the person­ality at any given time is a distribution of energy among the id, ego, and super­ego. Since this distribution is ever-changing, it is extremely difficult to make exact predictions about human behavior. For example, sometimes we may be driven more strongly by our impulses (in the id) than at other times; some­times we may be more realistic (as a result of ego functioning) than at other times; sometimes we may feel more morally bound (because of the influence of the superego) than at other times. However, even though there are changes in the distribution of energy, there is typically sufficient constancy to allow considerable, though not complete, accuracy in predicting a person s behavior.

2There is some confusion in various translations of Freud's works concerning the German word Trieb. Sometimes it is translated as instinct and at other times as drive.

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 13

SEX A N D AGGRESSION

The two most important drives with which humans have to cope are the sex­ual drive and the aggressive drive. These are basic; they are part of human inheri­tance as aspects of the life and death instincts residing in the id. It is easy to see the logic of considering the sexual drive as related to the life instincts. How­ever, it may be a bit more difficult to understand how aggressiveness toward other persons and objects is derived from the death instinct; after all, the death wish is originally aimed at oneself. A brief explanation is that self-destruction is usually prevented by the energy of the life instincts. Therefore, the typical person does not do away with himself or herself, despite the urgings of the death instinct.

The fact that the death wish is not often carried out directly in self destruction (because of the counteracting influences of the life instincts) does not mean that the instinct is inactive. It has energy, and this destructive force cannot be completely bottled up within the person. In other words, destruc­tive energy must be allowed some release. In fact, Freud believed that it is un­healthy to hold it back; illness can result if aggression is not vented in some way, either directly or indirectly. Release can be accomplished through dis­placement of the energy outward upon objects or persons in the environment. If this energy comes out in its raw form, direct destruction of property or other humans results. More commonly, however, because of social restrictions, some substitute for direct destructiveness is found. (This point will be dis­cussed in more detail shortly)

The idea of the death instinct was introduced in Beyond the Pleasure Princi­ple (1920), and Freud later made clear his belief that a tendency toward vio­lence and destructiveness is the natural human condition. He increasingly stressed this inborn death instinct, which tends to get turned outward in the form of an aggressive drive. Even when destructive energy gets diverted outward, however, some portion remains within. Eventually, of course, this portion of unreleased energy does win out and the individual dies. Freud sug­gested that perhaps death occurs when a person's libido (the energy of the life instincts) has been used up, allowing the destructive energy to have its way.

In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud emphasized the extreme conflict between our basic pleasure-seeking nature ("pleasure" meaning the release of sexual and aggressive energy) and the existence of civilized societies. According to Freud, our innate propensities are to use one another for sexual and destructive satisfactions. In pursuit of these goals, we exploit, humiliate, torture, and kill one another. Civilization has not been successful in bringing peace among humans because we are, in our most basic nature, "savage beasts" who do not take naturally to the controls of our behavior that are exerted dur­ing the socialization process.

A primary result of human socialization is the incorporation of guilt. Guilt is an internal authority (a function of the superego) that is erected in the place of, and as a result of, the impositions of external authority. In plainer terms, we

14 CHAPTER TWO

initially find that punishment and loss of love are forthcoming if we act on our basic, impulsive desires.This causes us to renounce our instinctive cravings, and we become afraid of our natural tendencies. The superego takes over the job of monitoring our behavior; "wrong" desires and wishes come to produce guilt feelings, and thus we control our own behavior.

Of course, it follows that civilization is in trouble whenever large amounts of instinctual energy are "bottled up" in individuals and denied release. This creates a very explosive situation, because it means that people are "boiling" below the surface; they are not releasing their libido and destructive energy and thus are in states of high tension. This might not be immediately apparent, since humans are capable of erecting defense mechanisms (discussed at length later in this chapter) against their inner, socially unacceptable impulses and drives. They may deny the existence of their sexual and aggressive tendencies; to ad­mit their existence would be too anxiety provoking and would result in low­ered self-esteem.

If society (represented initially by the parents and later by other influential persons in one's life) imposes strong, inhibitory demands on individuals and threatens to take away love and respect if these demands are not met, then it is likely that persons will come to reject, at the conscious level, desires that soci­ety deems wrong and immoral. These desires, since they are related to the ba­sic instincts that Freud assumed we are born with, do not disappear because they are repressed. They still exist and may, if frustration levels are heightened, break through and result in antisocial behavior.

Another possibility that exists when instinctual energy is denied outlets is that our defense mechanisms will become more and more extreme. Because of the buildup of inner tensions, there is an increased necessity for us to protect ourselves from our basic nature. It is as though dark and evil forces (as defined by society) were operating below the level of consciousness—pushing, de­manding, insisting on gratification. These forces can throw us into states of high anxiety; if they win out, love, respect, and self-esteem will be lost. The battle between these instinctual forces and the socialized aspect of humans is not fought out in the open; it rages mainly at the unconscious level, and we suffer from the effects of this internal conflict. Its rumblings disturb peace of mind and affect behavior; we are gripped by doubts and anxieties while only dimly recognizing the nature of the enemies at war within.

If civilization can provide socially acceptable avenues of release for libido and destructive energy, problems can be alleviated, though not completely solved. The process of channeling energy into alternative, substitute activities (rather than directly into sexual and destructive acts) is called displacement. If the displacement of instinctual energy results in socially desirable behavior, it is called sublimation. Civilizations progress because of sublimations; instinctual energy is used to write books, paint pictures, build bridges, do research, learn mathematical equations, and so on. It would seem, then, that a "good" civiliza­tion should make it possible for people to redirect their energies into various productive activities and that, the more this is done, the less the possibility that adverse outcomes will result from basic human propensities to engage in raw

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 15

manipulation and misuse of others. Also, if sufficient sublimations occur, indi­viduals are less likely to be tortured by internal tensions and anxiety. However, it should be made clear that Freud was not overly optimistic about these possi­bilities. He warned that the basic conflict between human instincts and civi­lization still remains. It must be remembered that sublimation is a substitute activity; as a substitute, it cannot completely satisfy the instinctive drives, and some tension will remain.

Freud believed that the greatest obstacle to a peaceful society is the destruc­tive tendency in humans. Although problems are created by sexuality, since certain restrictions (and therefore some unhappiness) are necessary, acceptable avenues of release are easier to achieve than in the case of aggression. Also, a point that is sometimes overlooked is that the life instincts (Eros) were thought by Freud to include an urge toward union with others in the community—an urge that supports society (in Civilization and Its Discontents, he refers to this as an "altruistic" urge). Thus, although Eros is not completely opposed to smooth social functioning, the death instinct and its derivative, aggression, create much greater difficulties for society.

THE EGO A N D ITS RELEASING A N D

CONTROLLING FUNCTIONS

In Freudian theory, the personality is considered to consist originally of the id. We are simply little pleasure-seekers when we begin life, and we do not know or consider reality. However, the realities of life soon begin to have an impact. For example, we are not fed every time hunger occurs, and therefore we expe­rience some discomfort and frustration. The response that the id makes to these tensions is called the primary process.

To understand the basis of the primary process, consider the example of the hungry infant who is eventually fed. During feeding, the infant sees, smells, touches, and tastes food. Repeated instances of this sequence result, in essence, in the storing of an image of food in his or her memory and in an association between food and hunger reduction. When hunger occurs in the future, the id engages in the primary process of attempting to achieve gratification (reduce in­ternal tension) by forming an image of the object (food) that brought satisfaction.

Although the example of hunger was used, the primary process is not lim­ited to the attempted reduction of this drive alone. Various images are formed to satisfy various drives. Dreams, wishful thinking, fantasies, and hallucinations are examples of the primary process in operation.

The primary process is active, but it cannot bring about a satisfactory re­lease of the tensions produced by the hunger, thirst, or sex drives. An image cannot be eaten, drunk, or erotically manipulated. To gain real gratification (that is, significant tension reduction), the individual must establish contact with the real world. This contact results in the formation of the second impor­tant system of the personality: the ego.

16 CHAPTER TWO

As the child interacts with his or her physical and social environment, the personality grows along a new dimension. Subjective functioning comes to be supplemented by increased reality testing as things in the world are related to things in the mind; objects, persons, and activities that will satisfy the inner cravings of the instincts are sought. The ego develops through this interaction with reality. Whereas the id is completely subjective, the ego represents the as­pect of the personality that strains toward objectivity; that is, it attempts to dif­ferentiate between what is desired and what is actually available. The reality principle guides the ego. In other words, more is considered than simply the im­pulse, the desire, the craving, the wanting. In a sense, the individual comes to ask "Is there something available to satisfy my longings, and is it attainable?" Realistic thinking, or the secondary process, is engaged.

The ego attempts to reduce the tensions of the id, and it tries to do so by successfully dealing with the environment. Part of the "raw" psychic energy of the ids instincts becomes invested in the ego's functioning, which consists of finding ways of releasing more of the instinctual energy (thereby reducing ten­sions) and of holding the id's promptings in check until an adequate and ap­propriate means of release can be found. The ego can be thought of as the "control center" of the personality, either releasing or holding back the expres­sion of basic instinctual drives, depending on internal and external circum­stances. (However, it originally comes into being to serve the id, and this point should not be forgotten.)

The ego's investment of psychic energy in some object that will gratify the id is an example of a "cathexis." In a general sense, cathexes involve the attach­ment of energy to objects or the concentration of energy in certain processes. A loved person, for example, is a cathected love object. Psychic energy is in­vested in thoughts and processes involving that person. Anticathexes, on the other hand, involve the use of energy to restrain or inhibit. An example of an anticathexis is the ego's repression of an unacceptable impulse. (Whereas the ego and the superego can be considered to have both cathexes and anti­cathexes, the id has only cathexes. It simply seeks gratification and has no re­straints or inhibitions.)

The ego's functioning is affected by the demands and requirements im­posed on the individual by parents and other influential persons—that is, the representatives of society. If parents and teachers are overly harsh and unyield­ing, allowing only very limited and highly specified outlets for instinctual en­ergy, the child's ego is likely to be retarded in development. In effect, the child will not have the flexibility to develop a variety of effective ways of releasing energy; he or she will not be able to sublimate adequately. The result may be a buildup of tension, with resulting anxiety and inefficient functioning.

Freudian theory clearly suggests that a strong ego is the bulwark of the healthy personality. Freud proposed the criteria of being able to love and to work as indicative of good mental health. If environmental circumstances are not overly oppressive and limited, and if one's childhood includes a normal family life, persons should find it possible to work out compromises between their instincts and the everyday world in which they live. Love and work provide socially acceptable outlets (sublimations) for instinctual energy. If given some

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 17

latitude and flexibility to investigate these possibilities, individuals should be able to develop reasonably satisfying adjustments to the real world while meet­ing, at least partially, the demands of basic human nature. If this can be accom­plished, the person can be considered to have developed a strong ego, which functions as both a releaser and a controller of instinctual demands. Complete happiness is not the goal, since this is an unreasonable expectation from the Freudian point of view. Humans must accept, to some degree, the restrictions that civilization places on the uninhibited satisfaction of instinctual desires.

THE SUPEREGO AND ITS VALUES We have been discussing the id and ego and the origins of these two aspects of the personality. To complete Freud's picture of the structure of the human per­sonality, we must also consider the development of the superego.

Parents typically are representatives of society. They have many values about the right and wrong ways to think, feel, and behave. These moral values are shared, more or less, by other adult members of their particular society. In the usual family situation, these values are passed on to the children; the result is that there is considerable continuity from generation to generation.

In Freudian theory, the superego represents the values and standards of the parents, incorporated into the individual's own personality. The superego de­velops as a result of the Oedipus complex (which will be discussed in detail shortly). The superego is a special agency of the ego, but it comes to consti­tute a third power within the personality, one that must be taken into account by the ego.

Most dramatically, we are aware of the superego's influence as a kind of in­ternal judicial system that is referred to as the conscience, a term frequently used by Freud. The conscience often is a harsh and uncompromising internal judge of our thoughts and intentions, as well as our actions. It can observe, com­mand, and threaten the ego with punishments, such as guilt. Although we sometimes *can escape from or avoid the coercion and judgments of parents and others, the superego is an integral and ever-present aspect of our personal­ities. Also, it is capable of going beyond parents and other persons in its sever­ity and unreasoning criticism.

In addition to its ability to punish, the superego can provide rewards. If the ego acts in harmony with the superego (for example, by resisting the tempta­tion to do something "wrong"), a feeling of pride and heightened self-esteem may result. By behaving in accordance with the superego's expectations, the person can feel good about himself or herself. (Freud sometimes used the term ego-ideal to refer to the part of the superego that is the idealistic internal mea­sure or standard of what the person should be.)

The superego strives for perfection and is seldom satisfied with less. It is, like the id, unrealistic. If it becomes too powerful (gains too much of the psy­chic energy that runs the personality), it will exert almost complete domina­tion over the id and the ego, creating intense guilt as well as inhibiting the id's

18 CHAPTER TWO

instincts and immobilizing the ego's attempts to achieve satisfaction in the real world. The number and intensity of do's and don'ts may be so great that the ego, figuratively, has nowhere to turn and shrinks into a corner of the person­ality, unresponsive to the cries for gratification emitted by the id and ineffec­tive in the face of reality's demands.

Of course, for most of us, it is impossible to escape the learning of some set of values; indeed, such an escape would not be desirable. The psychopathic personality is a vivid illustration of what a person is like if he (or she) does not incorporate the fundamental values of society, and such a person could be con­sidered to have a seriously underdeveloped superego. Psychopaths do not follow the rules and traditions of their society; neither do they consider the feelings and needs of others. Their behavior is impulsive and self-gratifying, without concern for consequences. Little or no anxiety or guilt is felt, even when serious harm is done to others.

A psychoanalytic explanation for the development of this type of person­ality would emphasize lack of parental love. In a typical home, parents do show love; that love makes it likely that children will identify with the parents and internalize their value systems (which usually reflect societal values). If there is no love, a child will not be afraid of losing it and therefore will be less likely to identify with the parents. (Other possible, nonpsychoanalytic explanations for the development of psychopathic personalities can be given: parents may be extremely deviant, fail to teach typical values, and serve as undesirable models for their children to imitate. Also, some cases of psychopathic behavior may be due to genetic or acquired brain damage, which can result in the inability to learn or retain moral values and standards.)

There are many in-between points on the morality continuum, with the extremely inhibited and restricted person at one end and the psychopath at the other. Somewhere along this continuum is the best position to point to when attempting to define the well-balanced personality. H o w to state precisely where that position lies is a difficult problem. Freud suggested that a strong ego is important for good functioning of the personality. Certainly from this it can be assumed that the superego must not rule or take over the personality. When we are functioning best as mature adults, the superego is a moral guide—but a guide whose directions can be considered realistically and accepted or denied on the basis of other feelings within us and also with consideration of the pos­sibilities offered by the environment.

TOPOGRAPHY A N D STRUCTURE:

HOW THEY FIT TOGETHER

The id, ego, and superego constitute Freud's structural model of the personality and can be said to represent impulsivity, rationality, and morality, respectively They refer to his conceptualizations of different aspects of the total personality. It is important to remember, however, that they are simply that: concepts. They have no reality in themselves and should not be thought of as having actual

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 19

Conscious

Preconscious

Unconscious

FIGURE 2.1 An integration of the structural and topographical mod­els of the personality.

existence. A personality cannot actually be cut apart and separated into id, ego, and superego, but for analytic purposes it is useful to distinguish among the various personality functions that these concepts suggest. A personality in­cludes all of a person's feelings, thoughts, and actions, and it is ongoing and dy­namic, not static. Freud's conceptualizations are meant to capture significant elements of the personality's structure as it undergoes a dynamic process of de­velopment during childhood and as it exists in a more firmly fixed state in adulthood.

Freud's topographical model of the personality (which preceded the struc­tural model) consists of three layers of consciousness: the conscious, the pre­conscious, and the unconscious. Figure 2.1 shows how the structural model and the topographical model can be fitted together. (Here again, caution is in order. The drawing is meant for clarification, but drawings generally oversim­plify abstract concepts and make them too concrete, giving a false impression that they actually exist and can be directly observed. This illustration is no ex­ception. My hope is that clarification will occur without simplification.)

As the figure suggests, the id can be considered as that part of the person­ality that is totally unconscious. Our most primitive, basic, instinctive impulses (which are generally socially condemned and therefore not allowed into con­sciousness) reside here, and, although we may be completely unaware of their presence, they motivate our behavior and create internal conflicts. Along with these instinctive impulses, the id also contains other repressed material. When we feel, think, or do something that we have come to regard as unacceptable or threatening, or when we have an unpleasant experience, we tend to push it into the unconscious (a process that is itself carried out unconsciously, as will be discussed shortly); this material takes up residence in the id, joining with unconscious instinctual impulses to stir up trouble. The amount of stored-up material in the id differs, of course, from person to person. Because of differ­ent childhood experiences, some people are more aware and accepting than others of their total personalities; they are more in contact with their basic impulses and less likely to repress certain feelings, thoughts, actions, and expe­riences. One goal of psychoanalytic therapy is to "open u p " the unconscious

20 CHAPTER TWO

and to allow the person to come into contact with his or her deeper self— that is, the id.

It can be seen in Figure 2.1 that both the ego and the superego have un­conscious, preconscious, and conscious aspects. Some ego functions (for ex­ample, realistic thinking and reality testing) are conscious processes; older children and adults consciously construct plans of action, think about alterna­tive ways of achieving goals, make choices, and so on. However, it must not be forgotten that the ego grows from the id. The instinctive demands of the id encourage contacts with reality, and the ego forms when some of the id's energy begins to be used for the pursuit of gratifications in the real world. The newly developing ego in the infant is not immediately distinguishable from the id; it becomes more clearly differentiated after significant attempts have been made to deal with the environment. Even after the ego has achieved some status of its own (exerting controls over instinctive impulses and giving consideration to reality), it still maintains, at its deeper levels, an interaction with the unconscious id. Also, it remains essentially in the service of the id. Thus there remains a part of the ego that extends through the pre­conscious and fades into the unconscious.

Freud pointed out another unconscious aspect of the ego: its repressing force. That which is unacceptable or unpleasant to the person may be cut off from consciousness—that is, repressed. To reduce anxiety and to protect self-esteem, the ego may act to remove discomforting impulses, thoughts, feelings, or memories. It does so in an unconscious operation; that which is repressed is unconscious, and that which does the repressing (the ego) does so uncon­sciously. A distinction can be made between repression and suppression. Repres­sion is an ego-defense mechanism that occurs unconsciously. In suppression, we consciously decide to forget about something or avoid thinking about it.

The various contents and processes of the superego also exist at differ­ent levels of consciousness. We are quite aware of some of our values and consciously apply them. On the other hand, we sometimes experience guilt, feelings of inferiority, and self-doubts without being aware of the causes: un­conscious workings of the superego. Many values are incorporated at a very early age and remain influential in affecting our feelings, thoughts, and actions, despite the fact that these values are not consciously realized in the present. Such values can make us feel good when we behave in accordance with them and can make us insecure, anxious, and guilty when we go against them.

Freud's concepts of unconscious, preconscious, and conscious layers of the personality seem to make sense intuitively. With a little introspection, most of us can realize that we are not always fully aware of the real reasons for all of our behaviors (that is, the "reasons" are at the unconscious level); we may at times feel vaguely troubled, guilty, or threatened without any apparent cause. At other times, we may not be immediately aware of why we are thinking, feeling, or behaving in particular ways, but with some effort we can come up with the reasons (which were at the preconscious level). Also, there are mo­tives and various aspects of the environment of which we are quite aware (at the conscious level).

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 21

The structural concepts—id, ego, and superego—also can be applied easily to one's own personality. Most of us, at one time or another, experience urges to behave impulsively or have feelings or thoughts that startle us because they seem so primitively hostile or sexual (the workings of the id). We also try to figure out the best ways to relate to our physical and social surroundings in or­der to satisfy our needs (an ego function), and we are affected by moral con­siderations and make various value judgments (the superegos influence).

PSYCHOSEXUAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

A N D THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

Freud believed that the adult human personality has a certain amount of flexi­bility and can be changed to some degree; psychoanalytic therapy attempts, through a process that is often slow and painful, to bring about alterations in a person's feelings, thoughts, and behavior. However, even though the personal­ity is not completely and permanently fixed by the time adulthood is reached, Freud believed that its basic structure and functioning are pretty well set during the first five or six years of life. He placed great importance on these early years and felt that much of what we are as adults is determined by early-childhood experiences.

Normal psychosexual development proceeds through a series of stages: the oral stage (roughly the first year of life), the anal stage (roughly the second year and part of the third year), the phallic stage (approximately the third through fifth years), a period of latency (from about age 6 to about age 12), and the gen­ital stage (after puberty has been reached). However, Freud cautioned against thinking that the progression occurs in a clear-cut, definite manner. For exam­ple, there may be overlap in the pregenital stages (oral/anal/phallic), resulting in the coexistence of two stages at a given time.

In Freudian theory, the child's progression through these stages represents a complex interaction between nature and nurture. Human biology influences the basic pattern of development. However, many environmental factors (for example, parental laxity or strictness and relationships with siblings) determine the specific outcomes of the stages. In essence, then, physical maturation processes cause the primary focus of pleasure to shift from one area of the body to another (from mouth to anus to genital organs), and experiences dur­ing the developmental sequence affect the final outcomes in terms of individ­ual personality differences. Dur ing socialization, the basic human needs and wants are gratified and frustrated in varying degrees in different individuals; because of our particular circumstances, each of us experiences somewhat dif­ferent pleasures and satisfactions as well as different pains and psychological conflicts.

The emphasis in psychoanalytic theory is on the first three stages—that is, the so-called pregenital stages. Each stage is named for the particular body zone that is the source of erotic pleasure during that phase of development.

22 CHAPTER TWO

Thus, during the oral stage, activity centers on the mouth, with sucking and biting occupying a good deal of the child's time. During the anal stage, the center of attention becomes the anus; the retention and expulsion of feces lead, respectively, to a postponement of pleasure and then to gratification. With the beginning of the phallic stage, the genital organs become important as the child engages in masturbatory activities and accompanying fantasies.

To pass through these stages successfully (with few resultant psychological conflicts or tensions) requires an optimal amount of gratification at each stage—not too much, not too little. If too much gratification is received at a particular stage, there may be reluctance to move on; if too little gratification is received, frustration and anxiety might retard future development. For exam­ple, overly abundant oral satisfaction during the first year of life may cause a certain degree of fixation at this stage. As a result, personality development may be incomplete, and as an adult the person may continue to be overly depen­dent on others and too optimistic that his or her needs will be met. On the other hand, if the infant is deprived during this period of life, his or her fixa­tion may result in self-centered, demanding, and hostile attitudes as an adult.

"Fixation" means that some libidinal energy remains devoted to the con­cerns of an earlier psychosexual stage and is not shifted to later developmental stages. Therefore, full personality development through the most mature (genital) stage is inhibited; concerns continue to be, to some extent, immature. Fixations may be relatively minor or quite significant, depending on the circumstances during the particular stage and on the individuals reactions. All of us carry at least minor fixations into adulthood. Overeating, smoking compulsively, talking too much, drinking beyond moderation, biting one's nails—these are some examples of possible oral fixations. Traits such as stinginess, obstinacy, and over-concern about cleanliness and order may indicate fixations resulting from strict toilet training during the anal stage; the child's holding back of feces may have become exaggerated, and this characteristic may then have generalized to other behaviors. If a child is made to feel shame and guilt about masturbation and sex­ual fantasies during the phallic stage, insecurity and anxiety can develop; as an adult, the person might be overly aggressive, with tendencies to "show off' and brag as a coverup for underlying, unresolved self-doubts and anxiety.

The most important event during the first five years of life occurs during the phallic stage: the Oedipus complex. Freud assumed this complex to be a nat­ural aspect of childhood. It occurs in both sexes: boys develop a sexual attrac­tion to the mother and want to possess her, displacing the father; girls desire to possess the father and displace the mother. (The female Oedipus complex is sometimes called the Electra complex, despite some resistance by Freud to the use of this term.)

As pointed out before, during the phallic stage, the genital organs begin to take on considerable importance. Manipulation produces pleasure, and fan­tasies are associated with this activity. The child also begins to notice differ­ences in the male and female sex organs by observing himself or herself, the father, the mother, brothers and sisters, and other persons. Since the dynamics

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 23

are somewhat different for each sex, let us first consider the Oedipus complex in the boy.

One of the erotic fantasies of the boy has to do with possession of his mother. Along with this incestuous craving, the boy experiences resentment and jealousy of his father, and he may wish that this rival were out of the way. As the boy's imaginings intensify, an inner conflict begins to build. He contin­ues to desire sole access to the mother, but he sees the father as a dominant and threatening figure who might seek vengeance if the boy's real feelings and thoughts were known. Therefore, castration anxiety or castration fear develops and becomes the main component of the male Oedipus complex. This particular type of anxiety or fear develops because the genital area is the most salient source of the boy's sexual attraction toward the mother. Other factors also play a role; for example, a father may warn his son not to "play with himself." Such warnings may be interpreted by the boy as threatening references to the feel­ings he has toward his mother, with an implication that something bad will happen to him if he doesn't behave himself.

So here we have a little boy undergoing great inner conflict resulting from a complicated mixture of conscious and unconscious longings, fears, and resentments. Of course, another complicating factor is that he still loves his fa­ther, even though he would like to get rid of him. How can all this be re­solved? The normal resolution comes about through identification of the boy with his father. This means that he incorporates his father's values and stan­dards within himself, thereby reducing his castration anxiety. (In simple terms, the father is unlikely to injure a son who is "Daddy's little boy"—that is, a replica of the father.) Identification with the father also serves social functions: cultural norms are passed on from one generation to the next, and the son learns the accepted masculine sex role.

Residues of sexual feelings for the mother and of hostility toward the fa­ther are likely to be repressed at this time. This repression may or may not cre­ate serious problems in the future, depending on the amount of material re­pressed and on the nature of events in the person's life. Events that are traumatic or highly stressful may precipitate a resurgence of repressed sexual or hostile feelings. An aid in bringing the Oedipus complex to a satisfactory con­clusion, and in preventing the necessity of repressing highly charged sexual de­sires, is the transformation of incestuous impulses into acceptable, affectionate love for the mother. The dynamics of the Oedipus complex are extremely in­volved, however, and it is difficult to predict outcomes and future problems.

An extremely important aspect of the identification process is that the boy's superego undergoes its most significant growth. Freud stated that the superego is "the heir of the Oedipus complex." Because of the internalization of the fa­ther's standards of morality, a set of rules and regulations about proper and im­proper feelings, thoughts, and actions is established within the boy's personality and is an internal force that must then be reckoned with throughout life.

The resolution of the boy's Oedipus complex is not always complete and can take various turns. For example, resentment and hostility toward the father

24 CHAPTER TWO

may continue and later generalize to all authority figures, or unusually intense inner turmoil may result in extreme passivity (a kind of "giving up" in the face of overwhelming forces). Among Freud's thoughts about homosexuality was the idea that it may result from an intense erotic attachment to the mother, es­pecially in the absence of a strong father; identification with the mother in­stead of the father is a possibility in such cases.

Another factor that affects identification is the relative strengths of one's inherent masculine and feminine tendencies. Freud felt that everyone is con­stitutionally bisexual, by which he meant that each person's basic makeup includes same-sex and other-sex components. If a boy has certain family ex­periences (such as an absent father) that combine with a relatively strong in­herent feminine tendency, the likelihood increases that he will identify with his mother rather than his father.

Freud's explanation of the female Oedipus complex is even more involved than that for males and seems somewhat incomplete. However, he did attempt to describe the critical events. For males, the threat of castration brings an end to the Oedipus complex; for females, the realization of the lack of a penis ini­tiates the Oedipus complex. When the girl begins to notice differences in the genitals of males and females, she feels that she is missing something. As this feeling intensifies, it develops into penis envy. (Penis envy in the girl and castra­tion anxiety in the boy are aspects of the total castration complex.)

Meanwhile, hostility develops toward her mother, w h o m she sees as the cause of her physical inadequacy. She rejects her mother and turns to the fa­ther for love. Of course, it is difficult for a little girl to simply give up her mother, so she tries to replace the essence of her mother within herself by iden­tification with her. By trying to take her mother's place in relation to her father and to share his penis, the girl becomes vulnerable to jealousy toward her mother. This increases the girl's already brewing resentment.

Freud believed that girls do not resolve the Oedipus complex in as conclu­sive a fashion as do boys, mainly because they are not motivated by the fear of castration that generally causes boys to move toward a more definite and com­plete resolution. He suggested that, for girls, castration could be considered as having already occurred; therefore it is not a present or future threat but rather a fact of life. Since girls do not bring the Oedipus complex to the same signif­icant end as do boys, they also do not develop an equally strong superego. Freud believed that this lack of a well-developed superego accounts for femi­nine character traits such as emotionality, a lesser sense of justice, and a certain unwillingness to submit to the demands of life. (Feminists, and many other persons as well, have been very critical of these Freudian assumptions.)

To the extent that girls do resolve the Oedipus complex, identification with the mother and repression of the conflict are involved. (Freud suggested that girls may remain in the Oedipus situation, without resolution, for an in­definite period of time). If the feminine sex role is accepted, the wish for a pe­nis may be replaced by the wish for a baby. Having a baby is assumed to be a substitute satisfaction that compensates somewhat for not having a penis. If a

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 25

girl retains her initial wish for a penis—which, in essence, means that she wants to be a boy—she may grow up to have masculine traits and, in extreme cases, may be homosexual. Less dramatically, and more commonly, penis envy is likely to result in feelings of inferiority or shame because of "genital defi­ciency" (Again, it must be pointed out that Freud's views on the female Oedi­pus complex, especially the notion of penis envy and its supposed effects, have been severely attacked as biased, male-chauvinist ideas.)

The primary cause of identification with the same-sex parent seems to be quite different in the female Oedipus complex than it is in the male Oedipus complex. Whereas the girl's identification with her mother is an attempt to re­gain aspects of the lost love object (within herself), the boy's identification with his father serves to remove the fear of castration.

According to psychoanalytic theory, a reasonably adequate, positive resolu­tion of the Oedipus complex is an important step in the growth of a healthy personality. Residues of psychological conflict involving unresolved sexual and aggressive feelings and thoughts toward parents can continue to create prob­lems in adulthood. One goal of psychoanalytic therapy is to allow the patient to recognize and "work through" emotional conflicts and unrealistic parental attachments carried over from the time of the Oedipus complex.

Sometime during the fifth or sixth year of life, when the incestuous and aggressive impulses of the Oedipus complex have been partially repressed, par­tially converted into acceptable feelings, and partially resolved through the process of identification, the child enters the latency period. Sexual desires, hos­tile feelings, and fears are quieted to some degree. This period is often charac­terized by play with same-sex peers (which helps to strengthen sex roles through further identification) and feelings of affection and tenderness toward parents (although at the unconscious level there still remain some elements of sexual desire and aggression). This period of relative calm generally lasts until about age 12.

With the onset of puberty and adolescence, there is a reawakening of geni­tal sexuality, but with a new emphasis. The pregenital stages are characterized by self-centered gratification seeking; stimulation and manipulation of one's own body ate the primary sources of satisfaction, and other persons are sought mainly to heighten these pleasures. The adolescent, however, begins to seek heterosexual relationships involving mutual gratifications. The earlier selfish tendencies begin to give way to a sense of caring and responsibility for the chosen sex partner. The socialization process continues, and, if conditions are normal, individuals enter the genital stage reasonably ready to take their place as mature, productive members of society, able to love and work in effective ways and accepting of themselves and the demands of the world in which they live. This assumes, of course, that they were able to weather the storms of earlier years without fixating seriously at some preceding stage or stages of develop­ment. Reaching the genital stage is not an all-or-nothing condition; function­ing at this level is affected by the amount of libidinal energy available for appropriate concerns, which in turn depends on the extent of earlier fixations.

26 CHAPTER TWO

A N X I E T Y A N D THE DEFENSE

M E C H A N I S M S OF THE EGO

The person who has successfully passed through the various stages of psycho-sexual development and is functioning as a mature, well-adjusted adult has an ego that is well developed. This individuals ego is strong and is able to handle reasonably effectively the demands of reality, of the id, and of the superego. Such persons have integrated the various aspects of the personality and func­tion fairly smoothly in their environments. They are not beset with intense inner conflicts, do not feel racked by indecision and guilt, and do not feel over­whelmingly threatened or frustrated by everyday situations in their lives. How­ever, even these persons are likely to suffer occasionally from temporary periods of anxiety. This anxiety is usually accepted as part of the human condition. On the other hand, some individuals suffer intensely from anxiety; they are quite severely handicapped in dealing with themselves and with their social and physical environments. They have significantly lowered effectiveness in loving and working. Anxiety, which serves as a warning to the ego of impending dan­ger, is greater if the ego is weak than if it is strong, since a strong ego can deal effectively with a greater variety of situations.

Freud suggested that there are three types of anxiety: reality anxiety, neurotic anxiety, and moral anxiety

Reality anxiety results when there is some threat from the real world. The person is confronted with an external situation or condition that is perceived as dangerous. Anxiety may serve as a stimulus to take action to alleviate the threat; such an action then reduces the anxiety. If appropriate action is not taken, the anxiety may build up and incapacitate the person.

Neurotic anxiety results when the id's impulses threaten to break through and cause the person to do something that will be punished. The individual is afraid of losing control and getting into trouble. O f course, this fear is not likely to be fully conscious, and the person may experience anxiety without being able to describe its cause. General feelings of apprehension and impend­ing doom commonly occur.

Moral anxiety results from the superego's influences when the person thinks, feels, or does something that is in violation of incorporated values or moral standards. The superego is capable of producing guilt, shame, and feel­ings of inferiority when the person errs in his or her ways (or even thinks about doing so). Moral anxiety involves a fear of punishment from one's own conscience.

It should be pointed out that reality, at least initially, also serves as a basis for neurotic and moral anxiety. The original learning of what actions will be punished and the incorporation of values and moral codes occur in relation to external reality as represented by one's parents and other influential persons.

As mentioned previously, the person with a strong ego is able to cope ef­fectively with a variety of threatening environmental circumstances, has control over instinctual impulses while also providing constructive releases, and takes

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 27

into consideration (without being immobilized) the values and standards that have been learned. To this person, anxiety serves as a useful signal that some de­mand—environmental, instinctual, or moral—exists and requires attention. Ac­tion is then taken, and anxiety is reduced before it reaches a high level.

For most people, however, the process doesn't always work this smoothly. Most of us need at least temporary defenses against anxiety in order to get through particularly trying experiences. We are not always able to be rational and to cope with ourselves and with reality in realistic ways. When we adopt unrealistic methods for dealing with the environment, with our impulses, or with our consciences, we are using defense mechanisms.

According to psychoanalytic theory, defense mechanisms are employed by the ego to protect the person from anxiety. Their use indicates a weakened ego—a state that may be minor and temporary or serious and prolonged. De-

fense mechanisms involve falsifications of actual conditions and are assumed to operate unconsciously. If they are used extensively for long periods, the persons func­tioning will be seriously affected; more and more extreme defenses may have to be erected as conditions worsen because realistic coping is avoided. In short, some use of defense mechanisms is probably common, but they have the po­tential to destroy effective functioning if they become typical responses to un­pleasant internal or external realities.

Various writers (including Freud's daughter, Anna Freud) have attempted to enumerate the mechanisms to which Freud referred in his many writings. Among the mechanisms commonly described are repression, reaction forma­tion, undoing, projection, rationalization, denial, identification, displacement (including sublimation), fixation, and regression.

Repression is the most basic, fundamental defense mechanism. The ego ex­cludes from consciousness that which it cannot accept. Unpleasant or undesir­able impulses, thoughts, feelings, or memories are either kept in, or pushed into, the unconscious because of their anxiety-producing potential. The ego must use energy (anticathexes) to block the material from rising to the con­scious level.

Freud formulated his theory of repression in the early 1890s. He believed it to be a unique psychological discovery and gave it great importance as a primary and essential part of further theoretical developments. In his writings, he refers to repression as the "cornerstone" or "foundation-stone" of psychoanalysis.

In reaction formation, an anxiety-producing impulse, thought, or feeling is replaced in consciousness by its opposite. Hate may be replaced by love, resent­ment by affection, sexuality by "innocent" concern, and so on. The original impulse, thought, or feeling is not lost, however; it is simply hidden from con­sciousness by the opposite expression. Reaction formation can generally be detected because of the intensity with which the opposite emotion is ex­pressed. For example, the defensive person may display so much love, affection, and concern for another that the recipient feels uneasy and "trapped."

Undoing represents an attempt by the ego to reconstruct previous actions so that they are less anxiety provoking. If a behavior or its consequences can­not be accepted, the weak ego may try to undo the act by wishing it away and

28 CHAPTER TWO

making over the situation so that it is less unpleasant. Truth may be drastically distorted by the process of undoing, and the person may actually believe, at the conscious level, that he or she never behaved in an unacceptable way.

Projection is an attempt to get rid of one's own unacceptable characteristics by assigning them to others. It is as if the person were saying "These can't be my feelings, thoughts, or impulses, because they belong to him (or them)!" The person who is projecting may accuse innocent others of hating him, of wishing him harm, of wanting to "use" him, of being evil, of being hostile, and so on, when he (or she) is actually the one who is guilty of these emotions or thoughts.

Rationalization involves offering reasonable-sounding explanations for un­reasonable, unacceptable behaviors; the irrational is made to appear rational to oneself or to others. If a person does something impulsive for which she (or he) is later sorry, she may not be able to accept the fact that she acted impul­sively and may then construct a "good reason" for her behavior. Rationaliza­tion is also used to "explain" one's failure to achieve some goal. For example, saying "I wasn't really trying" can protect a person from the anxiety generated by being unsuccessful and losing self-esteem.

In denial, the ego is incapable of dealing directly with threatening facts in a present situation and therefore does not acknowledge the reality of this infor­mation. There is something in one's environment (external reality) that is too unpleasant to face; anxiety can be relieved, at least temporarily, by denying the existence of this aspect of reality. Denial may be accompanied by the substitu­tion of a fantasy for reality. For example, someone may deny that a person w h o m he or she loved is dead and may keep the fantasy alive by saving the loved one's clothes or by leaving a room just as it was before the person died. In another situation, married persons may unconsciously reject various signs of a troubled marriage and continue to act as if their relationship were happy and satisfying.

Identification involves the introjection or incorporation of the qualities of another person. It can serve the purpose of removing the fear of a more pow­erful person, in which case it is referred to as "identification with the aggres­sor." For example, to resolve castration fear during the Oedipus complex, the boy typically identifies with his father. There is also "object-loss identification," which is an attempt to regain or restore a lost love object (person). This may be the basis for a little girl's identification with her rejected mother in resolv­ing the Electra complex. Someone may also take on the characteristics of a loved one who has gone away or died, in an unconscious attempt to recreate in one's self that person's presence. As with other defense mechanisms, identi­fication enables the person to alleviate threats and insecurities without directly facing them.

Displacement is the channeling of instinctual energy into an activity that is an alternative to the most direct and satisfying outlet, either because such an outlet is unavailable or because it is forbidden. Often we cannot directly vent our most basic sexual and aggressive drives. If no outlets were allowed, how-

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 29

ever, unbearable frustrations would result. Displacement permits a shifting from the most immediate form of gratification to some substitute form of gratifica­tion. Someone who cannot sexually possess or aggress against the most desired or most hated person often directs his or her attention toward some substitute person or uses energy in some other way. If a displacement results in some so­cially acceptable or beneficial activity, it is called sublimation. Freud suggested that the progress of civilization stems from sublimations, in which primitive, instinctive drives are redirected into constructive, productive activities.

Fixation and regression are related defense mechanisms. During psychosex-ual development, the person may fixate to greater or lesser extents at various stages. Too much frustration (perhaps because of too little gratification) or too much anxiety about the next step in development (perhaps because of overindulgence) may cause the child's ego to defend itself by "staying put," re­sulting in retarded personality growth. Later, when some unpleasant experi­ence is encountered, the person is likely to be unable to cope effectively; as a defense against this uncomfortable situation, he or she may regress, or retreat to behaviors that characterized an earlier stage of development. Because of fixa­tion, adequate ways of dealing with increased complexities and frustrations were not developed; now, when the person is faced with difficult realities, there is a tendency to return to the only ways of coping that he or she knows. An older boy may continue to suck his thumb or "hide behind his mother's skirt" when faced with stressful circumstances. A young bride may run home to the security of her parents' house at the first sign of trouble in her marriage. A man in a new and difficult job may become "sick" and have to stay home and be cared for by his wife. A possible minor instance of regression (related to a mi­nor fixation during the oral stage) is nail-biting when under stress.

Most of the defense mechanisms have negative influences on human func­tioning. However, Freudian theory suggests that two of these mechanisms— identification and sublimation—have positive effects. Identification allows the values and standards of a society to be passed on from generation to genera­tion, ensuring some consistency in expected norms for behavior. Sublimation involves activities that are beneficial to society, and it thereby promotes the de­velopment of civilization. (Some psychoanalysts feel that sublimation should not be considered a defense mechanism, since it doesn't lead to repression or psychopathology and isn't really defensive in the same sense as the other mechanisms.)

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS THERAPY

Anxiety and related neurotic symptoms cause individuals to seek help from psychotherapists. In Freudian theory, as we have discussed, there are three ma­jor sources of anxiety: threatening circumstances in the external environment (reality anxiety), the threatened breakthrough of repressed material in the id

30 CHAPTER TWO

(neurotic anxiety), and the threat of guilt and other uncomfortable feelings generated by the superego (moral anxiety). Prolonged or intense anxiety indi­cates a weak ego, incapable of coping realistically with external problems or of managing internal conflicts. Unable to directly face and resolve external and internal anxiety-provoking circumstances, the weak ego brings defense mech­anisms into use. Through distortion and falsification, and by self-deception, de­fense mechanisms afford some relief from anxiety but they cannot be relied on to provide a permanently peaceful state of mind. On the contrary, since they prevent awareness of real emotions, impulses, desires, and so on and hinder an accurate assessment of the external environment, they lead away from insight, understanding, reality testing, and other possibly corrective, productive behav­iors; thereby they cause the person to get into deeper and deeper trouble.

When anxiety-producing conditions continue or intensify, causing various symptoms such as fatigue, depression, guilt, headaches, sexual problems, or feel­ings of inferiority and inadequacy, the person may decide or be advised to see a psychoanalyst. Not all psychoanalysts use exactly the same methods. Some are less traditional than others; that is, while maintaining an orientation that is basically Freudian, some analysts have made innovations on his techniques. The following brief discussion of psychoanalytic therapy focuses on the traditional methods developed by Freud.

As mentioned early in this chapter, Freud became attracted to the use of hypnosis in the 1880s. With Josef Breuer, he investigated its possibilities for bringing about cures for emotional disorders through catharsis, or emotional release, which was accomplished by the patient s talking out problems while in the hypnotic state. Freud's dissatisfaction with hypnosis- grew as he found it dif­ficult to hypnotize certain patients, to induce sufficiently deep hypnotic states, and to achieve permanent cures. He did, however, learn a great deal from his observations of hypnotized patients, and he came to the extremely significant conclusion that dynamic psychic forces operate unconsciously within the per­son to produce various neurotic symptoms.

To investigate these forces in a way that could be applied more generally, Freud developed the technique of free association. In order for this technique to be effective, patients must agree to follow the fundamental rule. That is, they must give up their efforts to maintain conscious and rational thought processes and must say whatever comes to mind, no matter how trivial, disconnected, or embarrassing. Spontaneity of expression during free association is extremely important, and the fundamental rule is designed to ensure that patients will do their best to be spontaneous.

The analyst's couch, which is one of the most salient features in the stereo­type of the psychoanalyst, was used by Freud to maximize conditions for the patient s deep reflections. Also, with the patient reclining on the couch, the an­alyst and patient do not have to face each other directly and continually; this makes for a more relaxed atmosphere and prevents unnecessary interferences with the analytic process (such as might result if the patient were to react to the analysts facial expressions). Freud also had a personal reason for using the couch: In a 1913 paper, "Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psy-

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 31

choanalysis," he said that he couldn't bear to be gazed at for eight or more hours a day.

Another very important treatment technique developed by Freud is dream analysis or dream interpretation. Dreams have two levels of content. The manifest content is the conscious aspect of the dream and is what the patient relates when describing the dream. The latent content of the dream is the aspect that is most important in psychoanalysis; this is the hidden, unconscious meaning. Dreams, according to Freud, are expressions of unconscious wishes. That which reaches the conscious level is disguised and symbolic.

It would be too disturbing for the person if his or her unconscious sexual and aggressive impulses and desires were expressed directly at the conscious level; therefore dream work operates. Dream work transforms the unconscious latent content into the more acceptable manifest content and involves several processes. Condensation can result in a number of latent elements being ex­pressed as a single manifest element. Displacement can result in a trivial aspect of the latent dream being expressed in the manifest dream as something very important; the opposite is also possible—that is, an important latent element may seem trivial in the manifest dream. Dramatization is the process whereby unconscious elements are transformed into the visual images or pictures of the situations portrayed in dreams. In addition to these processes of dream work, secondary revision is also a common influence. This refers to the tendency to fill in gaps and make connections, so that the elements of the manifest dream fre­quently (but not always) seem to have continuity.

Freud considered manifest dreams to be filled with symbolism, mostly re­lated to unconscious sexuality. For example, a penis may be represented in the manifest dream as a stick, a snake, a tool, or some other elongated object. A uterus may be symbolized as a hollow object, such as a box, an oven, a chest, or a cupboard. A woman might be represented by a house or a room, with the doorways being the body orifices. Sexual intercourse may be indicated by wa­tering a lawn or climbing stairs. Hostility may be expressed by death or by an accident. These examples are relatively straightforward and obvious; in actual dreams the symbols are often much more complex and are interwoven in intri­cate ways, requiring great interpretive powers on the part of the analyst. (It must be pointed out that there is considerable disagreement, even among psychoana­lysts, concerning the validity of Freud's views on dreams. Other ways of inter­preting dreams have been offered, but the issue is too complex to discuss here.)

In Freudian theory, manifest dreams are compromise formations. That is, an unconscious wish is allowed some expression, but only in disguised form. The ego exerts censorship, even during sleep, preventing unacceptable unconscious material from surfacing in its actual forbidden form. When the ego fails to per­form its censorship role adequately, the result is a nightmare (or, in psychoana­lytic terms, an "anxiety dream"). In such cases the ego has failed to fulfill one of its important functions: to protect sleep by allowing unconscious tension to be partially reduced in a harmless way.

To digress for a moment, it must be pointed out that manifest dreams aren't the only compromise formations. Freud believed that neurotic symptoms also

32 CHAPTER TWO

have this characteristic. That is, they too are disguised and distorted representa­tions of unconscious, forbidden wishes. A clarifying example has been given by psychoanalyst Charles Brenner (see page 186 in his revised edition of An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis). A woman's neurotic symptom of vomit­ing was assumed to be related to an unconscious wish to be impregnated by her father, a remnant of her unresolved Oedipus complex. Since the unaccept­able wish could not be realized in consciousness, a compromise occurred. Vomiting, though a very troublesome symptom, provided some gratification of the repressed Oedipal desire—it simulated morning sickness. The anxiety that accompanied her vomiting resulted from the ego s unconscious guilt and fear concerning the forbidden wish.

The techniques of free association and dream analysis are used in combi­nation in psychoanalytic therapy. Patients may be asked to free»-associate to some aspect of the manifest content of a dream in an attempt to have them reveal something about the latent content. The purpose of both of these tech­niques is to uncover unconscious material that is creating problems for the pa­tient. An important step in the process of psychoanalytic treatment is to get things out into the open where they can be dealt with in the present. R e ­pressed impulses, wishes, and conflicts must be brought to the conscious level.

The analyst attempts to take the role of an understanding and neutral lis­tener as patients free-associate or relate their dreams or other experiences. Trust must be developed so that patients will feel that they can express their deepest feelings, no matter what these feelings may be. As unconscious mater­ial begins to be revealed, patients typically develop resistances to further revela­tions; that is, they may develop mental blocks, change the subject, sidetrack the discussion, try to postpone further therapy sessions, and so on. These resistances are brought into play for various reasons, many of them unconscious. An ex­tremely unpleasant, hidden impulse or memory may be on the verge of be­coming realized at the conscious level; the resulting anxiety may overwhelm the ego, which then erects a block against the offensive material. In such a case, the person is not yet ready to accept this aspect of himself or herself.

Various types of resistance are common during the analytic process. In essence, they represent forces within the person that oppose the process of pos­itive change. In addition to the ego's attempts to prevent disturbing material from surfacing, resistance can occur for the following reasons:

1. Resentment and frustration may result when the analyst does not meet the patient's unrealistic expectations, and the patient may then become less cooperative.

2. Neurotic symptoms such as intense anxiety, persistent headaches, chronic fatigue, and depression may serve useful purposes for the person, despite the fact that they also cause much discomfort. They can provide excuses for avoiding responsibilities, and they may attract attention and sympathy from others; therefore they are not given up easily. These benefits are re­ferred to as secondary gains. Such symptoms also provide the primary gain of

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 33

drive gratification by allowing some release of unacceptable unconscious impulses.3 Because of the primary gain derived from their neurotic symp­toms, analytic patients may unconsciously sidetrack progress.

3. The self-destructive urge that Freud said is basic to human nature may operate to maintain harmful behaviors and states of mind.

4. The superego can exert influence, sometimes resulting in a deep-seated feeling in the patient that he or she should continue to suffer for various transgressions.

Although this list does not exhaust the possible sources of resistance, it does show that there are a number of forces acting against the patient s improve­ment. Resistances can occur with varying degrees of recognition by the pa­tient, from the conscious to the unconscious level.

The analyst must remove resistances if therapy is to proceed in a beneficial way, so that deeper and deeper levels of the unconscious can be exposed. A technique that is used is interpretation: the analyst tries to explain to patients the irrational qualities of their resistances. Timing is important in interpreta­tion. Done too soon, it may result in increased resistance, may give patients ex­planations that they accept too readily (so that they think they are "cured"), or may be accepted solely on an intellectual, rather than an emotional, level. Pa­tients must be persuaded to give up their resistances if they are to gain insight into the underlying dynamics of their neurotic symptoms.

Psychoanalytic treatment involves, in a sense, a reliving of one's past. Child­hood feelings and conflicts emerge from the deep recesses of the unconscious; there is, in effect, an emotional regression. As patients once again experience these old emotions, they tend to attach them to the analyst. This process is called transference. Patients may, at different times, see the analyst as a punitive father, as a demanding mother, as a seductive lover, and so on. These emotional attach­ments must be "worked through" if cure is to be the eventual outcome of the analysis. In "working through" transferences, patients have the chance to reexpe-rience earlier relationships and to bring them to a more satisfactory resolution.

Transference does not usually operate in an obvious and direct way; it is more likely that the emotions of the patient will manifest themselves toward the analyst in subtle ways. Here again, the analyst must be sensitive to these subtleties and must provide interpretations only at the proper time. Also, he or she must guard against countertransference, which is an emotional reaction to the patient. The ana­lyst must be able to remain objective in the face of adulation, praise, criticism, anger, and other emotional expressions by the patient. A common requirement during psychoanalytic training is that future analysts undergo psychoanalysis

3As noted previously, Freud considered neurotic symptoms to be "compromise forma­tions"; the ego prohibits the direct expression of the infantile, primitive wishes of the id and forces a compromise expression. In the earlier example, the woman's vomiting repre­sented an indirect, compromise expression of her unconscious wish to be impregnated by her father.

34 CHAPTER TWO

themselves. This personal analysis is intended to reduce the possibility that psy­choanalysts will bring their own unresolved conflicts into their professional work. They must retain sufficient distance from patients to allow careful, accurate, and penetrating interpretations of behaviors that are irrational and self-defeating.

Of course, analysts are human, not superhuman. They are bound to experi­ence various emotions toward their patients. They should, however, understand the nature of these countertransferences and, according to Freud, avoid acting on them. It was his view that responding emotionally to the patient is likely to disrupt the analytic process. (There are disagreements among contemporary an­alysts about the advisability of expressing countertransferences to patients. Some hold to the traditional Freudian view, but others have pointed out possi­ble benefits of revealing emotional reactions. For example, disclosure of feelings about the patient may increase the depth and genuineness of the^analytic en­counter and may help the patient to see clearly how he or she affects others.)

Here, in brief, is a summary of the basic psychoanalytic techniques and processes we have discussed: Free association and dream analysis are used to tap the patient's unconscious. When the patient offers resistances to the uncovering of unpleasant unconscious material or to the responsibilities involved in being cured, the analyst must supply interpretations of these irrational behaviors. The patient will engage in transferences, attaching past emotional feelings to the ana­lyst in the present situation. These transferences have to be "worked through" with the assistance of the analyst, who must avoid countertransferences. Obvi­ously, more is required for cure than simple insight on the part of the patient. He or she has to deal with the emotional components of unconscious mater­ial, which are manifested in resistances and transferences.

Psychoanalytic treatment is generally a long and arduous process, often re­quiring several sessions per week for years. The patient undergoes an educa­tional experience of a deeply emotional nature. The goals are self-awareness, honesty, better control over impulses, more effective interpersonal relations, more realistic assessments of potentialities, and the ability to accept that which cannot be changed. Happiness as an absolute state is not the goal; according to Freud, the human condition is not one that allows this achievement. We must learn to accept certain weaknesses and limitations in ourselves and in others. The person with a sufficiently strong ego can do this, and psychoanalytic treat­ment is designed to strengthen the ego.

It should be noted that psychoanalysis is not always applied in the standard, classical form just described. For example, the phrase psychoanalytic psychother­apy often is used to refer to approaches that require less time and that may in­clude more direct, face-to-face interactions between analyst and patient, with advice and suggestions being offered along with analytic interpretations. These approaches can be tailored to the individual's needs and may involve increasing the time intervals between therapy sessions, avoiding negative transferences that may prolong therapy, planning changes in the person's environment, using drugs to alleviate symptoms, or a combination of these. Psychoanalytic ap­proaches that focus more specifically on a particular problem, that are more di-

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 35

rective, and that impose more definite time limitations (perhaps involving as few as 12 sessions) often are referred to as short-term dynamic therapies.

Freud himself apparently was not completely consistent in his analytic ap­proach. As pointed out by Michael Jacobs in his 1992 book Sigmund Freud, "psychoanalysis has established a reputation for lengthy treatment, with hourly sessions several times a week, over a number of years," but "Freud himself pro­vided examples of short- and long-term therapy" (p. 87). Jacobs cites examples showing that Freud's analyses varied from a single meeting to six sessions a week for four-and-a-half years; some of his cases lasted even longer. Despite this variation, Freud generally did suggest that psychoanalysis requires a long period of treatment, and classical analysis has this characteristic.

Freud made various suggestions to those wanting to practice his method of psychoanalysis. For example, in his "Recommendations to Physicians Prac­ticing Psycho-Analysis" (1912), he emphatically urged his colleagues to behave like surgeons, putting aside their personal feelings, including sympathy, and to concentrate singlemindedly on performing their task as skillfully as possible. He believed that the patient thereby receives the greatest amount of help, while the analyst's emotional life is given needed protection. He added that the analyst should remain impenetrable and reflect only that which is revealed by the patient. If the analyst opens up or allows intimacy, the patient may become more interested in the analyst's concerns than in his or her own analytic issues; also, the analyst's intimacy with the patient may hinder the process of working through transferences.4

A BRIEF REVIEW OF SOME MAJOR POINTS

Freud was a determinist, believing that behaviors, thoughts, and feelings do not occur by chance. The determinants that he thought were most important lie at the unconscious level. This reasoning was influenced by his work with Josef Breuer, using hypnosis to get patients to recall and give expression to forgotten experiences.* Freud's search for more effective ways to tap the unconscious led him eventually to the techniques offree association and dream analysis.

4 A significant number of today's psychoanalytically inclined therapists have diverged from Freud's views about intimacy and self-disclosure, arguing that the patient's progress is facil­itated by the analyst's warmth and openness; for examples, see Self-Disclosure in the Thera­peutic Relationship (New York: Plenum, 1990), edited by George Strieker and Martin Fisher. Tori DeAngelis, in "Psychoanalysis Adapts to the 1990s," APA Monitor, September 1996, suggests that "today's analysts are leaving behind the 'detached observer' model of classical psychoanalysis for a more intersubjective style—what the field loosely terms 'rela­tional' analysis" (p. 1). A contemporary psychoanalyst is quoted as saying, "I am not a cold, detached surgeon—I'm very much a participant in this process" (p. 1).

As will be seen in Chapter Four, Carl Rogers's humanistic approach wholeheartedly supports the value of warmth in therapeutic relationships; contemporary psychoanalysis seems to be drawing closer to humanistic psychology regarding this issue.

36 CHAPTER TWO

Psychoanalysis is both a personality theory and a therapeutic method. As a theory, it suggests conscious, preconscious, and unconscious layers of the personality, the last being of greatest significance. The personality also can be conceptualized as the dynamic interplay between the id (unconscious instincts and impulses), the ego (realistic thinking), and the superego (morality). The nature of this dynamic in­terplay is affected by events during the psychosexual stages of development, with the pregenital stages {oral, anal, and phallic), up to about age 5 or 6, having the strongest impact; the prominent event is the phallic stage's Oedipus complex. The outcomes of this complex, as well as other pregenital events, can leave indelible imprints on our personalities, affecting our adult lives in beneficial or adverse ways.

Humans are susceptible to anxiety generated by threats from three sources: the external environment {reality anxiety), the id's unconscious impulses {neu­rotic anxiety), and the superego's condemnation {moral anxiety). The ego may not be sufficiently strong to deal effectively with these threats and may rely too much on various defense mechanisms, including repression, in which threatening material is kept from consciousness (a weak ego can result from disturbing early childhood events that inhibit the development of realistic, effective rea­soning). Suffering from ongoing or recurring anxiety and its accompanying symptoms may cause one to seek help. If the form of help sought is traditional psychoanalysis, the focus will be on probing the unconscious (using the tech­niques of free association and dream analysis). Though various forms of resis­tance will occur, the analyst, by supplying appropriate interpretations and provid­ing opportunities to work through transferences, will assist the patient to better understand and deal more effectively with underlying problems. Traditional or classical psychoanalysis generally is a long, arduous, expensive process; how­ever, shorter-term psychoanalytic therapies also are available.

COMMENTARY

Interesting questions continue to be raised about our understanding of psy­choanalysis. Bruno Bettelheim, the well-known psychoanalyst and child psy­chologist, claimed that English translations of Freud's writings have distorted certain basic concepts and have given a misleading impression of Freud's mes­sage.5 He gave many examples to support his argument that Freud's thinking has been misrepresented by translators. For instance, where Freud used the German word Ich, translators have used the Latin equivalent ego instead of the more accurate, simple, and personal /. Bettelheim suggested that ego and other translations, such as id, superego, and cathexis, make psychoanalysis seem coldly technical, impersonal, and esoteric. These terms do not arouse the personal and emotional associations that he believed are vitally important for a proper un­derstanding of Freudian psychology.

5Bruno Bettelheim, Freud and Man's Soul (New York: Knopf, 1982).

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 37

The word "psychoanalysis" is itself misunderstood, according to Bettel-heim. He suggested that Freud intended to emphasize the need to investigate one's own soul (psyche), meaning one's deepest human emotions, in order to live a fuller, richer life through self-discovery. In English usage, the emphasis often is on the latter part of the word (analysis), conveying an overly scientific and depersonalized meaning and implying that the behavior of others, rather than one's own, needs analyzing. In Bettelheim's view, Freud's concerns were deeply humanistic. That is, he wanted to pave the way toward a more gratify­ing life of work and love by encouraging individuals to recognize their own unconscious drives, and he attempted to appeal to our common humanity without being highly theoretical or formally scientific.

It is difficult to know whether or not Bettelheim overstated his case. Do those of us who read Freud in English translations really misunderstand his message? Was it more personal, simple, and humanistic than is commonly thought? Bettelheim was not the first person to point out possible problems in translations of Freud's writings, and it would seem wise to avoid being overly confident about our precise understanding of every aspect of psychoanalysis as Freud intended it to be understood. There are difficulties in conveying exact meanings even in one's own language, so certainly there are likely to be some problems in translations to a different language.

Addressing a very different issue with regard to our understanding of psy­choanalysis, Jeffrey Masson, former projects director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, has started a heated controversy.6 He paints a much less flattering picture of Freud than did Bettelheim. Masson asserts that Freud, for complex personal reasons, failed to persist in his original view that his patients gener­ally were the victims of childhood sexual abuse. Instead, Freud promoted the idea that memories of such events involve fantasies related to infantile sexu­ality and the Oedipus complex. In other words, Masson accuses Freud of unjustifiably shifting the causation of neuroses from external trauma to in­ternal conflict.

Freud, in 1896, stated his belief that his patients (mainly his women pa­tients) were suffering the effects of actual childhood sexual traumas, such as incest and rape. This came to be called the "seduction theory." During the fol­lowing years, Freud wavered in his position and finally settled on the idea that such experiences usually are not real but instead are based on fantasy. Masson contends that Freud had no sound basis for giving up his seduction theory; it seems that he lacked the courage necessary to hold fast to the unpopular and distasteful view that children were being made severely neurotic because of sexual abuse by their parents or other adults.

Among the reasons Freud gave for changing his belief were his growing doubts that sexual acts against children could be so widespread and his view

6Jeffrey M. Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1984). A briefer account can be found in Masson's article "Freud and Seduction Theory," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1984, pp. 33-60.

38 CHAPTER TWO

that patients were unable to distinguish clearly between fact and fiction emerging from the unconscious (and therefore were not likely to report accu­rately on events during early childhood). Masson suggests, however, that the real explanations for Freud's turnabout more likely were personal, including his reaction to ostracism by colleagues, his reluctance to pursue the idea that fathers (perhaps including his own) were guilty of sexually abusing their chil­dren (primarily their daughters), and his desire to protect an intimate friend, physician Wilhelm Fliess.

O n Freud's recommendation, Fliess had performed a nasal operation on one of Freud's female patients, after which she experienced severe bleeding from the nose. By suggesting that the patient's bleeding was the result of her wish to be cared for, rather than bungled surgery, Freud removed the blame from Fliess. (How severe bleeding could be caused by a wish was left unex­plained.) Masson believes that this case of downplaying an external cause (a surgical error), and substituting an internal cause (the patient's wish to be cared for), was an important step on Freud's path to the rejection of the seduction theory (which focused on external causes).

Of what consequence was Freud's rejection of the seduction theory? Mas-son argues that shifting the cause of neuroses from external traumatic events to internal fantasies (notably, sexual and aggressive fantasies that supposedly occur during the Oedipal period) does a serious disservice to patients. He suggests that children are abused sexually much more commonly than is generally ac­knowledged and that such abuse too often is ignored by analysts who convince their patients that memories of such experiences are fantasies. The whole ana­lytic process thereby becomes distorted. If the patient is to become "healthy," he or she must accept the view that internal fantasies, impulses, and conflicts are at the heart of the neurosis and must deny the possibility of actual child­hood experiences of sexual abuse. This is likely to cause continuing guilt, un­certainty, dependency, and lack of an adequate sense of self.

What is the truth regarding Masson's allegations? Did Freud abandon the seduction theory for personal, rather than objective, reasons? And—more im­portantly—are patients in analysis often the victims of actual sexual abuse who are being treated inappropriately by their analysts? Masson's opinions, as he himself has indicated, are the result of his interpretations of documents (in­cluding previously unexamined letters from Freud to his close friend,Wilhelm Fliess) that others might interpret differently. It is impossible to know with complete certainty what Freud's motives were; they can only be assumed. Also, it can't be known with absolute certainty whether or not actual events of childhood sexual abuse are as common as Masson suggests, although there are other recent authors who agree with his assessment.

There has been considerable hostility in the psychoanalytic community to­ward Masson and his ideas. Understandably, those who have long accepted Freud's revised view, emphasizing childhood sexual fantasies, are reluctant to consider that this revision may have been unjustified. In my own opinion, however, Masson's assertions deserve careful consideration, especially by ana­lytic therapists who may be ignoring the possibility that their patients are suf-

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 39

fering from the effects of actual sexual abuse.7 (In fairness to Freud, it should be mentioned that, even after he revised the seduction theory, he did not deny the possibility that actual sexual offenses against children sometimes do occur.)

Bettelheim and Masson are just two of the many scholars who have inter­preted Freud's work. Among the others are both strong supporters and harsh critics. Considering the extent and variety of his writings, there is little won­der that different opinions exist. Undoubtedly, there will continue to be con­troversies as further studies are done.8

Moving on from the topic of Freud's interpreters, let's consider briefly some current aspects of psychoanalysis. In the United States, as Jacob A. Arlow (1995) points out, "the American Psychoanalytic Association is the largest and most prestigious of psychoanalytic societies.... [with] almost 2,500 members and af­filiates" (p. 23). Standards for training set by this association include "(1) the training analysis [the student himself or herself undergoes an analysis], (2) for­mal courses in the literature and technique of psychoanalysis, and (3) the treat­ment of at least three or four patients under the supervision of a training analyst" (p. 23). Four to eight or more years may be spent completing these re­quirements.

The preparation for psychoanalytic training is an issue that has generated heated controversy. Freud himself suggested (despite the fact that he had a medical degree) that a medical education is not necessary. In the United States, however, a strong tradition developed that supported the M.D. degree as a pre­requisite for training at the most prestigious institutes, those affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association. Therefore, psychologists who desired psychoanalytic training had to attend nonmedical institutes and then were de­nied full acceptance and recognition in the physician-dominated psycho­analytic community. This is now changing. An out-of-court settlement of an antitrust lawsuit filed in 1985 included an agreement by the American Psychoanalytic Association to allow more psychologists to enter its institutes; also, the International Psychoanalytic Association agreed to grant membership to analytically trained psychologists and to nonmedical psychoanalytic insti­tutes.9 "Lay analysts" (that is, nonmedical analysts) thereby have made progress in their attempts to gain equity with psychoanalytically trained physicians.

7Richard Webster, in Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science, and Psychoanalysis (New York: Basic Books, 1995), has expressed a strong opinion on this issue, stating that "it is undeni­ably the case that Freud's repudiation of his seduction theory has repeatedly led to real in­stances of sexual abuse being overlooked or denied by psychoanalysts intent on treating memories as fantasies" (p. 212). 8An article that vividly illustrates the range of opinion about Freud and his work is "Re-examining Freud," Psychology Today, September 1989, pp. 48-52; prominent persons in psychology and related fields make comments that vary from very positive to very negative. In "Flogging Freud" (The New York Times Book Review, August 10, 1997, pp. 12, 14), Sara Boxer reviews several recent books that are highly critical of Freud and suggests that the criticism may be overdone; she asks, "Can he really have been bad in so many contradictory ways?" 9See "Psychoanalysis Barriers Tumble," APA Monitor, November 1988, pp. 1,15. Also, "Psychoanalysis Suit Starts to Bear Fruit," APA Monitor, November 1989, p. 16. (The Monitor is the monthly newspaper of the American Psychological Association.)

40 CHAPTER TWO

There are a number of psychoanalytic organizations in addition to the American Psychoanalytic Association, and modern psychoanalysts are a mixed group. Besides the more orthodox believers who stay relatively close to Freud's basic formulations and analytic techniques, there are those who fall along a continuum extending to theoretical views and therapeutic procedures that are considerably different from his. Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black (1995) have pointed out that the "impact of the revolution Freud pro­voked has expanded, changed, and flowered into concepts, methods, and un­derstandings that would have scarcely been imaginable to Freud and his con­temporaries" (p. xvii). Some differences are based on major issues, such as the extent to which cultural, versus instinctual, forces should be considered as de­terminants of personality development. Others are based on relatively minor points, such as whether the analyst should sit facing a seated patient, instead of following Freud's example of sitting behind a reclining patient.

Among various attempts to make theoretical changes in psychoanalysis, some have been more widely accepted than others. One of the major changes has been a growing emphasis by a number of analysts on au­tonomous ego functions. This emphasis is reflected in the phrase "ego psy­chology." A prime mover in this development was Heinz Hartmann.10

Whereas Freud saw the ego as essentially subservient to the demands of the id (though the ego could gain some amount of control), Hartmann and his colleagues give greater autonomy to the ego. In fact, they consider the ego, as well as the id, as having origins in basic human inheritance. In their view, the ego has its own developmental course and operates on neutralized en­ergy, which makes possible an interest in objects and activities that are not necessarily related to underlying sexual or aggressive drives. (Though Freud at times also seemed to be suggesting that such interests are possible, his dominant theme is different: objects and activities are "interesting" to the person primarily because they are related, directly or indirectly, to the basic personality components of sex and aggression.)

If Freud had lived longer, perhaps he would have moved in the direction of emphasizing autonomous ego functioning. In 1937 (in a paper titled "Analysis Terminable and Interminable") he suggested that the ego's develop­ment and characteristics may be determined by hereditary factors that are pres­ent prior to its existence. This implies a greater independence of the ego from the id than generally is assumed in Freudian theory. Though Freud himself did not have the time to further pursue this line of thought, Hartmann and others have advanced the assumption of ego autonomy

It's likely that the increased attention given to an independent ego has re­sulted partly from a change in the types of patients that psychoanalysts are treat­ing. The world is different from what it was around the turn of the century, when Freud and other psychoanalytic pioneers were developing ideas from their clinical experiences. In recent years, patients tend more often to be troubled by

10One of his works is Essays on Ego Psychology (New York: International Universities Press, 1964).

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 41

the problems of an increasingly complex society (vague anxieties, insecurities, and dissatisfactions) and are seeking ways to find meaning and values in work, family, and social roles. Since the ego is the part of the personality that must deal with the external world in some rational, decision-making way, it seems natural that more emphasis should be given to it. Perhaps for the contemporary patient it is important to focus more attention on conscious thought processes and cop­ing mechanisms; he or she is probably less likely to be plagued by unconscious guilt and repressed sexuality than by the uncertainties and rootlessness of mod­ern society that require the ego to grapple with existential problems.

A person who was very influential in bringing a strong social flavor to con­temporary psychoanalysis, while also emphasizing the ego's functions, is Erik H. Erikson. Trained in Vienna, he worked with Freud's daughter, Anna (also a psy­choanalyst), and in 1933 came to the United States, where he held various aca­demic and research positions and practiced psychoanalysis. His most important book is generally considered to be Childhood and Society, first published in 1950.

Erikson postulated eight psychosocial stages of development, which repre­sent an expansion and elaboration, in primarily social terms, of Freud's psycho-sexual stages. Freud was concerned mainly with personality development based on the working out of emerging sexual needs, and his last stage (the genital stage) did not detail the adult years. Erikson's emphasis was on the social influ­ences that occur during various developmental stages, and his last three stages cover the adult years from young adulthood to old age. He pointed out vari­ous social experiences, with their accompanying expectations and demands, that occur during the person's life span.

The human ego, according to Erikson, has the potential to deal creatively with these experiences and to produce such positive outcomes as compe­tency, a sense of purpose, the ability to love, and wisdom in old age. He also believed that failure at one stage does not necessarily doom one to lifelong failure; the person, sometimes with the help of a psychoanalyst, often is ca­pable of recovering. In Erikson's opinion, the ego has much potential strength, and he chose to concentrate more on this part of the personality and its conscious functioning than on the irrational, unconscious aspects of the mind. *

Analysts who have adopted ego psychology, and assume that there are stages of development throughout life, tend to give as much attention to later developmental stages as they do to early stages. These ego analysts may, for ex­ample, work with adolescents who are experiencing identity crises, young adults who have intimacy problems, middle-aged persons who sense stagna­tion in their lifestyles, and older individuals who feel despair at the prospect of death. The therapy is likely to focus more on current concerns, and less on un­resolved childhood conflicts, than does classical Freudian psychoanalysis. Still, the ego analyst may use classical techniques and processes, such as free associa­tion, interpretation, and transference. The duration of therapy may be long term—similar to classical analysis—or considerably shorter.

Another important, and currently popular, development that has its roots in Freudian psychology, and is related to ego psychology, is referred to as

42 CHAPTER TWO

"object relations theory." Actually, there is no single, widely accepted theory of object relations. Rather, many ideas have been presented by different psychoana­lytic theorists; these ideas generally stress that internal images (or "representations") of one's self and of "objects" can have powerful effects on relationships with oth­ers. (The term "object" is a technical term, usually referring to another person toward whom one directs emotion and action.)

Object relations theory focuses greater attention on the pre-Oedipal pe­riod of development than did Freud. Internalized images of objects (for exam­ple, the object "mother") presumably are formed during this very early period and determine, in a complex way, the patterns of our relationships with others. To illustrate: a male might develop distorted, idealized images of women as nurturing and supportive; therefore, his real-life relationships with women are doomed to failure because they cannot live up to his fantasies. This can be a continuing problem; as an adult, the man might go from one relationship to another, suffering disappointment and frustration time after time.

Although both object relations theory and Freudian theory are concerned with childhood experiences and the inner world of the person, the former puts more emphasis on discrepancies between inner-world and real-world per­sons and situations. The latter puts more emphasis on the role of factors such as instinctual drives and unresolved Oedipal conflicts. Object relations theo­rists tend to give greater weight to environmental influences (especially those occurring within the family during the pre-Oedipal period) than to the in­nate biological factors that are so important in traditional Freudian theory. R e ­garding therapy, object relations theorists vary in the extent to which they have moved away from traditional psychoanalysis; some have remained fairly close, whereas others have made substantial alterations.11

The changes offered by Hartmann, Erikson, and many others make con­temporary psychoanalysis a hard-to-define perspective and approach. Despite the objections of more traditional analysts, who argue that psychoanalysis is being watered down by those who deviate from Freud's basic teachings, the changes continue. In fact, it has been suggested that "more recent develop­ments in the field are too numerous to describe" (Arlow, 1995, p. 22) and that "very little of the way Freud understood and practiced psychoanalysis has re­mained simply intact" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. xvii). To understand and ap­preciate (or criticize) these changes, it is important to have a sound grounding in Freud's basic views and methods (a major purpose of this book). Also, it should be kept in mind that, even though alterations have been made, "psy­choanalysis is still largely the house that Freud built" (Karon & Widener, 1995, p. 45), meaning that Freud built the basic structure upon which modifications have been made.

According to some critics, psychoanalysis should no longer be with us. They have declared it dead and see attempts to redefine its emphases, or to maintain its vitality, as revival efforts that have come too late with too little sus-

11 For an excellent introduction to object relations theory (and to "self psychology," a re­lated development in psychoanalytic thinking), see Michael St. Clair's Object Relations and Self Psychology, Third Edition (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole • Wadsworth, 2000).

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 43

tenance.12 In contrast to these critics are those who see psychoanalysis, espe­cially in its updated forms, as being in good health with a promising future.13

The controversy about psychoanalysis's current standing was highlighted on the cover of the November 29,1993, issue of TIME magazine, which asked "Is Freud dead?" An article inside, titled "The Assault on Freud," briefly presented various points of view, pro and con, regarding the validity and usefulness of tra­ditional psychoanalytic thinking

Despite the controversy, and the negative evaluations by critics, there are current indications that interest in Freud and psychoanalysis is quite strong— perhaps even increasing. One such sign is the sheer amount of relevant mater­ial being published.14 Also, it seems that the attention devoted to psychoanaly­sis by psychologists is on the rise:

More psychologists are enrolling in training institutes and study groups. They are generating new ideas . . . [and] are applying psychoanalysis to to­day's problems, such as divorce and gender identity, and in new settings, such as family therapy [Youngstrom, 1992, p. 24].

Whether psychoanalysis eventually sinks or continues to swim as a for­mal approach and school of thought, its impact on our society has been assured, and that impact is unlikely to disappear for a long time. It has nu­merous manifestations:

1. Research projects continue to test aspects of Freudian psychology,15 and new books and articles on psychoanalysis continue to appear.

2. Many mental-health practitioners—including psychotherapists, counselors, and social workers—although not trained formally as psychoanalysts, have incorporated elements of Freudian thought and technique into their ap­proaches to the problems of their patients.

3. In many college courses in the social sciences and humanities, Freud's ideas are discussed and considered for their historical interest and possible contemporary relevance.

4. There afe scholars who remain interested in the study of Freudian theory as a social philosophy, apart from its clinical implications and applications. This approach was started by Freud himself; especially in his later writings,

12For example, see Carl Rogers's comments in Richard I. Evans's Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas (New York: Dutton, 1975), pp. 88-90. 13For example, see Calvin S. Hall's and Gardner Lindzey's comments in the third edition of their textbook Theories of Personality (New York: Wiley, 1978), pp. 75-87, and Peter Gay's introductory chapter in The Freud Reader (New York: Norton, 1989), pp. xiii-xxix. ,4For an expression of this opinion, see Rubin Fine's short review article, "Freud and Psy­choanalysis," Contemporary Psychology, 35, August 1990, 775-776. 15See Seymour Fisher's and Roger P. Greenberg's Freud Scientifically Reappraised: Testing the Theories and Therapy (New York: Wiley, 1996). For a very brief review of research rele­vant to aspects of Freudian theory, see Beth Azar's article "Was Freud Right? Maybe, Maybe Not," APA Monitor, October 1997, pp. 28, 30.

44 CHAPTER TWO

his attention turned increasingly toward the relationships and tensions be­tween individuals and society.

5. Much literature, both classic and popular, shows strong Freudian themes, such as the effects of early-childhood traumas, unconscious conflicts, and repressed desires.

6. Our everyday language is sprinkled with Freudian terms. People fre­quently talk about their own or others' repressions, defenses, hidden wishes, ego strength, and so on, often without knowing that these con­cepts are common because of Freud's influence on our culture.

As one observer has noted, "To a remarkable degree, Freud's ideas, conjectures, pronouncements have seeped well beyond the circle of his professional follow­ers into the public mind and discourse" (Gray, 1993, p. 47). Others have said, "Today, Freud's contributions are so broadly accepted, so tightly woven into the fabric of our culture and our experiences of ourselves, that, in the broadest sense, we are all 'Freudians'" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. xviii).

Clearly, Freud's ideas are with us in many forms. Whether or not this is de­sirable depends on one's assessment of his assumptions and suggestions. As has been noted, arguments concerning this issue abound. However, regardless of one's position on his ideas and methods, it can be said that "the legacy of Freud's contributions to personality theory and psychotherapy have been enormous" (Hockenbury and Hockenbury, 1997, p. 661). And whether he was right or wrong, 'Freud was one of those rare intellectual figures who cast his shadow over a whole century" (Gleitman, 1995, p. 691).

A final thought: in line with many other developments in contemporary society, traditional Freudian psychology is being increasingly affected by femi­nist perspectives. As more women enter the field of psychoanalysis, we see changes such as greater emphasis on integrating both masculine and feminine qualities in one's personality, acknowledging the possible importance of "womb envy" as well as "penis envy," and encouraging individuals to change social conditions rather than adapt to social roles.16

REFERENCES'

Primary Sources The following are paperbound edi-

(Freud's Own Writings) tions to which I referred while writing this book. They can be found relatively easily,

Translations of Freud's writings are found s i n c e m a n y bookstores stock them. The in-in many forms put out by various publish- t e r e s t e d r e a d e r s h o u l d b e a b l e t o o b t a i n

ers. Hogarth Press of London has published t h e m w l t h o u t difficulty. a complete Standard Edition of his works, Beyond the pleasure principle. New York: consisting of 24 volumes. Bantam Books.

u>See "Traditional Analysis May Be Changing," APA Monitor, January 1989, p. 19.

^Chapter footnotes contain additional references.

SIGMUND FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 45

The interpretation of dreams. New York: Avon Books.

All of the following are published by W. W. Norton and Company, New York:

An autobiographical study Civilization and its discontents The ego and the id The Freud reader (Edited by Peter Gay, and

published in 1989, this is a comprehen­sive survey of Freud's writings. A gen­eral introduction to Freud and his work and a chronology of important events are included.)

New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis On dreams On the history of the psycho-analytic movement An outline of psychoanalysis The problem of anxiety

The following is a clothbound volume:

The basic writings of Sigmund Freud. (1938). New York: Random House. (Intro­duction by A. A. Brill.)

Secondary Sources

ArlowJ. A. (1995). Psychoanalysis. In R. J. Corsini & D. Wedding (Eds.), Current psychotherapies (5th ed., pp. 15-50). Itasca, IL: Peacock.

Brenner, C. (1973). An elementary textbook of psychoanalysis (rev. ed.). New York: International Universities Press.

Freud, A. (1966). The ego and the mechanisms of defense (rev. ed.). New York: Interna­tional Universities Press.

Gleitman, H. {1995). Psychology (4th ed.). New York: Norton.

Gray, P. (1993, November 29). The assault on Freud. Time, pp. 47-51.

Hall, C. S. (1954). A primer of Freudian psy­chology. Cleveland: World.

Hall, C. S., & Lindzey, G. (1978). Theories of personality (3rd ed., pp. 31-73). New York: Wiley.

Hockenbury, D. H., & Hockenbury, S. E. (1997). Psychology. New York: Worth.

Jacobs, M. (1992). Sigmund Freud. Lon­don: Sage.

Jones, E. (1961). The life and work of Sig­mund Freud (abridged ed.). New York: Basic Books.

Karon, B. P., & Widener, A. J. (1995). Psy-chodynamic therapies in historical perspective. In B. Bongar & L. E. Beutler (Eds.), Comprehensive textbook of psychotherapy: Theory and practice (pp. 24-47). New York: Oxford.

Kline, P. (1984). Psychology and Freudian the­ory. New York: Methuen.

Malcolm,J. (1981). Psychoanalysis: The im­possible profession. New York: Vintage.

Menninger, K. (1958). Theory of psychoana­lytic technique. New York: Basic Books.

Mitchell, S. A., & Black, M.J. (1995). Freud and beyond: A history of modern psycho­analytic thought. New York: Basic Books.

Pervin, L. A. (1989). Personality: Theory and research (5th ed., pp. 71-168). New York: Wiley.

ProchaskaJ. O., & Norcross,J. C. (1994). Systems of psychotherapy: A transtheoreti-cal analysis (3rd ed., pp. 25-66). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Strupp, H. H. (1972,July). Freudian analy­sis today. Psychology Today, pp. 33-40.

Youngstrom, N. (1992, April). Field of psy­choanalysis undergoes resurgence. APA Monitor, pp. 24-25.

3

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SKINNER

Burrhus Frederic Skinner was born on March 20, 1904, in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. He died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on August 18,1990, at age 86, of complications from leukemia. His childhood was spent, as

he described it, in a warm, stable family environment. His father was a lawyer; his mother, according to Skinner s description, was "bright and beautiful," with rigid, unchanging standards of what was "right." While growing up, Skinner was an avid% builder of things— scooters, wagons, sleds, rafts, seesaws, slingshots, blowguns, model airplanes, and so on. He even tried to build a glider in which to fly and worked unsuccessfully on a perpetual-motion machine.

After graduating from a small high school that he claimed he liked, Skin­ner went on to Hamilton College (a small liberal arts school in New York State). There he majored in English and served as a tutor in a family from whom he acquired a heightened appreciation of music, art, writing, and the "art of living." He also became involved in various troublemaking activities: he helped perpetrate a hoax involving a scheduled visit to the college by Charlie Chaplin, the famous movie actor and comedian (a large crowd gathered in vain); he attacked Phi Beta Kappa in a student publication; and he and a group of other students created such a disturbance at commencement exercises that they were reprimanded by the college president.

47

48 CHAPTER THREE

After college Skinner attempted to make his mark as a writer. During the next two years he became discouraged with writing, discovered that he was interested in psychology (partly because of reading about early behavioristic ideas), lived in Greenwich Village for several months, and spent a summer in Europe. In the fall of 1928, Skinner entered Harvard University and began studying psychology.

After getting a Ph.D. in 1931, he stayed on at Harvard for five years doing research. He then took a teaching position at the University of Minnesota. In 1945 he became Chairman of the Department of Psychology at Indiana Uni­versity, and in 1948 he returned to Harvard as a professor. He remained associ­ated with Harvard for the rest of his career.

Skinner married in 1936.Two daughters were born; his older daughter went into the field of educational psychology, and the younger became an artist.

Skinner s first important book was The Behavior of Organisms, published in 1938. Among his later works are Walden Two (1948), Science and Human Behav­ior (1953), Verbal Behavior (1957), The Technology of Teaching (1968), Contingen­cies of Reinforcement (1969), Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), About Behavior­ism (1974), Reflections on Behaviorism and Society (1978), (with M. E.Vaughan) Enjoy Old Age (1983), Upon Further Reflection (1987), and Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior (1989).

RADICAL BEHAVIORISM

Because he was such an insistent and influential spokesman for behaviorism, B. F. Skinner could be considered the successor to John B.Watson, founder of the behavioristic approach to psychology. In 1912 Watson, a Johns Hopkins University professor, began to espouse a point of view about the study of hu­mans that was to resound throughout the field of psychology. His most impor­tant book, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, was published in 1919. He was vehement in his assertion that psychology should not be a science of the mind but rather a science of behavior. He showed great impatience with the techniques of introspection being used by psychologists to investigate con­scious states; also, he criticized the complexity and vagueness of psychoanalytic interpretations of human behavior. To understand humans, Watson insisted, psychology must focus on the study of observable conditions and not get lost in speculations about inner, unobservable states of mind; psychology must be objective and avoid falling into subjective approaches.

Watson sometimes made extreme statements; for example, he said that he could take any healthy infant and make it into whatever was desired—doctor, lawyer, artist, beggar, or thief—by providing the proper environment. An infer­ence frequently drawn from his comment is that he completely ignored genetic factors (although this is not actually true). Also, his explanation of thinking as subvocal speech implied that he didn't really accept the phenomenon of

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 49

thought. These kinds of statements have resulted in Watson's being considered an extreme environmentalist.

Although Skinner was similar to Watson in his strong advocacy of an ob­jective behavioral approach, he believed that Watson's more extreme state­ments helped to create some wrong impressions of behaviorism. As Skinner made clear, especially in his book About Behaviorism (1974), modern radical be­haviorism (1) does consider feelings, thoughts, and other inner events, though not as causes of behavior; (2) does acknowledge the importance of genetic en­dowment in determining aspects of behavior; and (3) does consider topics such as self-knowledge and creativity, though not in the traditional ways.

It must be emphasized that, while acknowledging that humans are feeling and thinking organisms, Skinner did not look within the human psyche for any of the causes of behavior, and he denied the necessity of postulating states of mind or internal motives for explanatory purposes. It is perhaps in this sense that Skinner's behaviorism most deservedly can be termed "radical." His ap­proach is also radical because he applied the same type of analysis to covert be­haviors occurring "within the skin" (that is, feelings, thoughts, and so on) as he did to overt, publicly observable behaviors.

Skinner stressed the importance of discovering functional relations (or, infor­mally expressed, "cause-and-effect connections") between environmental con­ditions and behaviors. He made a special contribution by repeatedly pointing out that the social and physical conditions of our environments are critically important in determining our behaviors. He proposed that much behavioral control is exerted by observable factors that can be sought out and specified in objective and detailed terms. Importantly, he believed that this control extends to the internal behaviors of feeling and thinking, as well as applying to exter­nal actions.

In the process of investigating the effects of environmental conditions on behavior, Skinner and his colleagues developed sophisticated research tech­niques, collected a huge amount of scientific data, and came up with a number of significant behavioral concepts. Radical behaviorists are able to describe with considerable detail various observable factors that affect learning, thereby buttressing*their arguments that human behavior is controlled in many ways by circumstances that can be objectively specified and manipulated.

Many contemporary psychologists are moderate behaviorists, holding some midposition when attempting to explain human functioning. They tend to include certain internal determinants, such as attitudes, cognitive processes, and motives, while also focusing on determinants in the social and physical environments. To a limited extent, even psychoanalysts are behavioristic. They do observe behavior, as when they listen to (observe) patients' free associa­tions and descriptions of dreams (verbal behaviors); also, they believe in the importance of certain environmental factors, such as traumatic events during early childhood. They go off the behavioristic track, however, when they move the explanation for their patients' problems inside the person and at­tribute these problems to some internal cause, such as an unresolved Oedipus

50 CHAPTER THREE

complex, an overly strict superego, repressed impulses, or other psychody-namic conflicts or forces.

RADICAL D E T E R M I N I S M

Being a thoroughgoing behaviorist, Skinner was also a radical determinist. The as­pect of his determinism that is most important here is his consistent disdain for mentalistic explanations of behavior and for assumptions that the mind is capa­ble of originating behavior; the determinants of behavior, in his view, are to be found by focusing on environmental and genetic variables. He acknowledged Freud's contribution to deterministic thinking in Western psychology: Freud emphasized that human behavior is lawful and not accidental; that is, there are causes for everything we do. Skinner agreed with this position. However, he also was critical of Freud, pointing out that the explanations suggested by psychoan­alytic theory are often confused because of the insertion of some mentalistic concept between the behavior and the antecedent causal event. For example, a father may severely punish his young son for masturbating, causing the boy to have later problems in his sexual behavior. The cause-and-effect relationship, ac­cording to Skinner, need include only a description of the punishing event and the abnormal sexual behavior. Why relate the sexual problem to guilt or anxi­ety? What is gained by inserting these sorts of concepts? If used, they too have to be explained; in other words, where does the anxiety or guilt come from? To answer this question, one is forced back to environmental events.

Skinner said that mentalistic concepts only confuse and mislead, drawing at­tention away from real causes, such as punishment. A further danger is that con­cepts such as guilt and anxiety may come to assume a role that is too important and concrete. They may then be used in and of themselves to explain behavior, and the actual environmental circumstances that brought about the behavior may be ignored. Skinner said that such concepts are explanatory fictions; they are used for explanatory purposes but in fact explain nothing. He gave no ground to mentalistic explanations in his psychology. He took a strong deterministic stand, firmly committing himself to the search for observable causes of behavior.

In Skinner's view, there also is no place in scientific psychology for an as­sumption that human behavior is governed by "individual choice," as that phrase is commonly used. He argued against traditional conceptualizations of persons as free agents who decide their own fates. Rather, the individual's be­havior ("personality") is determined by past and present events in the objective world (relevant past events include not only the person's life history but also the evolutionary processes that have contributed to his or her genetic endowment).

Skinner acknowledged that innate, hereditary factors contribute to aspects of behavior. For example, genetic endowment determines the general range of responses of which we are capable and is also influential in determining that certain outcomes strengthen the behaviors they follow. He pointed out, how­ever, that if genetic endowment is to be explained, it is the environment once

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 51

again that must be considered. He indicated that "contingencies of survival" determine what is hereditary for a given species (that is, the environment se­lects those behaviors that allow survival). If environmental conditions remain sufficiently constant for a prolonged period, those members of the species who behave in the particular ways that allow survival in this environment will be the ones who reproduce; in this way a species comes to have certain genetic characteristics. But it must be remembered that it is the environment that has had, and continues to have, control over this process.

While acknowledging the importance of genetic factors, Skinner warned against attributing specific behaviors to "instincts" or quickly assigning the cause of a person's behavior to his or her genetic endowment. These explana­tions tend to ignore environmental effects on behavior and draw attention away from the particular conditions to which the individual has been exposed during his or her lifetime.

The effects of exposure to various events during one's life span are criti­cally important in Skinnerian psychology. It is assumed that information about the relationships between such events and the resultant behaviors is essential to an adequate account of a person's functioning. Skinner suggested strongly that, if genetic factors could be clearly specified and if neurophysiological processes were known in detail (and Skinner viewed these as worthwhi le pursuits for other researchers), this would not rule out the necessity for the scientific analysis of the effects of current environmental factors on behav­ior. Environmental manipulation, in Skinner's view, provides the key to im­proving human behavior.

In brief, then, Skinner indicated that both genetic makeup and personal history are responsible for an individual's behavior, but he concentrated on the latter by emphasizing the effects of objective, observable conditions in the in­dividual's environment. He believed that full knowledge of these two sets of factors (genetic makeup and personal history) is necessary for a complete ac­count of human behavior. If Skinner's prescriptions were followed, such knowledge would be pursued with vigor; mentalistic concepts that impede progress would be cast aside, never again to darken the door of science.

SOURCES OF DATA

Skinner's ideas developed and were nurtured through close contact with the experimental laboratory. He and his colleagues conducted study after study under carefully controlled laboratory conditions, typically using rats or pigeons as subjects, in attempts to collect data relevant to conditioning processes. The concepts of behavior that are associated with Skinnerian thinking can be traced to findings derived from these studies. There was a consistent emphasis on the collection of precise quantitative data.

The "Skinner box" (a term that Skinner himself did not endorse) provides one means for the type of controlled observation that is at the heart of radical

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behaviorism. This device is a small chamber in which an animal can be iso­lated from the external environment and subjected to conditions specifically created by the experimenter. The behavior that is typically studied is lever pressing by rats or key pecking by pigeons (the term "key" refers to a disc or other device that, when sufficient pressure is applied, triggers a food dispenser); responses are usually recorded electromechanically, and rates of response under various conditions provide the data of primary interest.1 For example, the ex­perimenter may be interested in observing changes in response rate when the time of presentation of some reinforcer (such as food) is varied, or when an aversive stimulus (such as an electric shock) is applied or withdrawn as a con­sequence of the animal's responses.

You may be asking at this point "What can such studies have to do with human behavior?" After all, we are not isolated from the real world, and our most important and interesting behaviors do not involve pressing levers or per­forming other such simple responses. The answer to this question is found in the observations that Skinner and his followers made when concepts derived from relatively "artificial" laboratory experiments with lower animals were applied to humans. Such applications are called various terms, including "be­havior modification," "behavioral engineering," and "applied behavior analy­sis." Skinnerian concepts have been effectively applied in such areas as (1) stu­dent performance (Skinner was a pioneer in the development of programmed instruction, teaching machines, and other educational innovations); (2) the treatment of autistic children, retarded persons, and psychotics; (3) industrial management; and (4) behavior therapy for problem behaviors.

Another question might be "Why not simply study humans to begin with, instead of doing research with animals such as rats and pigeons?" A number of studies have been done at the human level; efforts by behaviorists to arrive at fundamental behavioral concepts have not been limited to the use of lower an­imals. However, the relative simplicity of lower organisms, and the fact that the environments of these organisms can be controlled by the experimenter to a much greater extent than is the case with human experimental subjects, have made them the frequent choice for basic research projects.

Although Skinner's basic behavioral concepts often have been shown to apply to human behavior, some of his generalizations are more difficult to test. For example, one of his great interests was in proposing plans for improved so­cial structures. His novel, Walden Two, is an expression of that interest. It is a de­scription of a Utopian community in which his basic laboratory-derived ideas are used. In 1967 an actual community (Twin Oaks, near Louisa, Virginia) was formed by a small group of persons (not including Skinner) interested in

'The use of rates of response as basic data reflects Skinner's view that numerous assump­tions made about organisms—humans as well as lower animals—are based on the fre­quency with which they perform specific acts. For example, when we say that a given person has a particular "habit" or "attitude," or that he or she is "enthusiastic" or "very interested," we are generally basing these statements on observations that this person often behaves in certain ways. Therefore it is critical to study the conditions that determine changes in the rate of performing various behaviors.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 53

putting Walden Two's ideas into practice.2 With various modifications, the com­munity survived; however, because of these modifications, it cannot be consid­ered an actual test of Skinners views.

A community that apparently has remained closer to Skinner's concepts is Los Horcones, Mexico.3 Founded in 1973, it began with six adults and one child; in 1989 there were 28 adults and 11 children. Behavioral concepts are used to promote cooperation, equality, sharing, and pacifism, and reinforce­ment plays an important role in educating children. Residents take seriously the notion that behavior is maintained or changed because of surrounding conditions. The apparent success of the community supports the applicability of Skinner s ideas to human society. However, the extent to which these ideas would work in other community settings on a larger scale is an open question, and even Los Horcones has faced difficult problems, such as turnover (perhaps the reason that people come and then leave is that their previous histories of reinforcement have strengthened behaviors that are inconsistent with the be­haviors necessary at Los Horcones).

In his 1971 book of social criticism, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner also went far out on a limb to suggest drastic changes that he thought are nec­essary if our society is to survive and flourish. To create these changes in our social institutions and practices, under carefully controlled conditions that would allow precisely measured effects, would certainly be an interesting ex­amination of the generality of Skinners concepts. However, this is not likely. Too many people reject his strong emphasis on environmental determinants of human behavior and his exclusion of such traditional concepts as free will and individual autonomy. (More will be said about this later.)

RESPONDENT BEHAVIOR

We will now get more specific about the concepts applied by Skinner in his analysis of behavior. He distinguished between two general categories of be­havior: respondent and operant. In this section we will briefly discuss the former; the latter is far more important in Skinnerian psychology and will be discussed in the next section.

The term "respondent" refers to a specific kind of behavior that is elicited by a specific kind of stimulus. It indicates a reflexive-type response, and the stimulus precedes the behavior. For example, changes in light intensity cause the pupil­lary reflex, a sharp puff of air directed at the eye causes a blinking response, a

2See Kathleen Kinkade's A Walden Two Experiment: The First Five Years of Twin Oaks Com­munity (New York: Morrow, 1972) and Colleen Cordes's "Easing toward Perfection at Twin Oaks," APA Monitor, November 1984, pp. 1, 30-31. 3See "Isolated Desert Community Lives by Skinner's Precepts," New York Times, November 7, 1989, pp. C l , C8 and "The Town B. F. Skinner Boxed," In Health, January/February 1991, pp. 50-57. The latter article is reprinted in Annual Editions: Psychology (Guilford, CT: Dushkin, 1993).

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tap on the patellar tendon causes the knee reflex, and contact with a sharp ob­ject causes a withdrawal response. Another example, familiar to all psycholo­gists and many laypersons, can be found in Ivan Pavlov's work with dogs. This noted Russian physiologist is famous for his studies, in the early 1900s, of classical-conditioning processes (Skinner used the term "respondent condi­t ioning" instead of "classical condi t ioning," which is commonly used by non-Skinnerians). Basic to Pavlov's observations is the fact that the placement of food in a dog's mouth causes the animal to salivate (this salivation reflex is respondent behavior, in Skinner's terms). When the presentation of food is paired repeatedly with some originally neutral stimulus, such as the sound of a bell, the dog eventually begins to salivate to the sound of the bell alone, with­out the presentation of food. Thus, respondent conditioning has occurred.4 If the bell were then sounded a number of times but never again paired with food, the salivation response would gradually diminish and eventually disap­pear; this process is called extinction.

A study by John B.Watson and Rosalie Rayner suggests that Pavlovian condit ioning principles apply to human, as well as animal, learning.5 They condit ioned an 11-month-old boy named Albert to fear a white rat by re­peatedly presenting the rat at the same time that they created a loud noise (by striking a hammer against a steel bar). They knew beforehand, by testing, that the loud noise elicited a fear reaction (a respondent behavior) from Al­bert. Thus, through pairing of the loud noise and the white rat (to which the boy initially showed no fear), the white rat finally came to elicit fear re­sponses.

A phenomenon called stimulus generalization also occurred. Albert not only came to fear the white rat, but he also began to show fear in the presence of similar stimuli, such as a rabbit, a dog, and a fur coat. The significance of this finding is that learning experiences may result in emotional responses to whole classes of stimuli. Watson and Rayner s study makes clear the possibility that seemingly "irrational" fears and emotions may have their origin in respon­dent-condit ioning situations. A child bitten by a dog ("neutral" dog paired with a painful bite) may then fear all dogs; the person who experiences pain in a dentist's office ("neutral" office paired with painful drilling) may then fear not only that office but also similar offices, such as might be encountered when he or she changes dentists.

The point to be stressed here is that respondent behavior can be conditioned. An originally neutral stimulus (for example, a bell or a white rat) can be made to elicit a particular response (for example, salivation or fearfulness) by being associated with a stimulus (for example, food or a loud noise) that already elic-

4In common classical-conditioning terminology, the food is called an unconditioned stimulus; it elicits the unconditioned response of salivation. The assumption is that this is an innate, rather than a learned, connection between a stimulus and a response. The originally neutral stim­ulus, the bell, is called a conditioned stimulus because it eventually elicits, by itself, the condi­tioned response of salivation. This connection is learned. 5"Conditioned Emotional Reactions, "Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, February 1920, 1-14.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 55

1. Food > Salivation

2. Foodl ^ c r . _ „ > ^ Salivation Bell )

3. Bell > Salivation FIGURE 3.1 Steps in the classical conditioning procedure.

its that response. Figure 3.1 attempts to sum up and clarify the process of re­spondent conditioning; the respondent behavior is salivation. (A word of cau­tion is in order: although the bell comes to elicit salivation after being paired repeatedly with food, it does not become qualitatively identical to the food. As mentioned previously, if the bell is presented alone time after time, never be­ing paired again with food, extinction occurs; that is, the salivation response gradually decreases in intensity.)

Skinner acknowledged this type of conditioning, in which a conditioned stimulus precedes and elicits a conditioned response. However, he believed that the most significant and complex behaviors are not merely conditioned reflex­ive responses to specific stimuli; rather, they are responses that are emitted and that produce consequences. He was much more interested in the active or­ganism than in the relatively passive organism emphasized in respondent conditioning. In his emphasis on operant conditioning, Skinner differed from Watson, who gave a great deal of attention to reflexive-type, stimulus/re­sponse relationships.

OPERANT BEHAVIOR

Operant behavior is behavior that operates on the environment to produce conse­quences. It is emitted rather than elicited behavior, and it is characteristic of an active organism. To Skinner, the study of emitted responses and their con­sequences constitutes the essential subject matter of psychology. Whereas re­spondent behavior is under the direct control of its antecedents, operant be­havior is initially produced by an organism in the absence of any easily identifiable eliciting stimulus and is controlled by its consequences (the ef­fects that it has).

Respondent behaviors such as eye blinks, knee jerks, salivation, and certain fear responses can be contrasted with operant behaviors such as reading, writ­ing, playing a musical instrument, eating with a knife and fork, and driving a car. Operant behaviors constitute most of the significant responses that define

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us as individuals. There are differences among individuals in their behaviors (each person has his or her own "personality"), and operant-conditioning con­cepts help to explain these differences.

What consequences can an emitted behavior have? The most important consequence in Skinner's analysis of behavior is reinforcement. If a behavior is reinforced, it is strengthened: the probability increases that that type of behavior will be repeated in similar circumstances in the future. It is essential to realize that this does not necessarily mean that exactly the same behavior will be re­peated; a similar behavior having the given effect may occur. A whole class, or set, of behaviors, not simply the specific response, is strengthened by reinforce­ment. (Skinner used the term "operant" to refer to a class of responses that produces certain consequences.)

A distinction must be made between "reinforcement" and "reward." Be­havior that is reinforced is strengthened, whereas behavior that is rewarded may or may not be strengthened. Skinner explained that something is a reinforcer only when it actually strengthens the behavior that produces it; in other words, reinforcers are defined by their effects. What is reinforcing may vary, depending on the person, the behavior, and the situation. The notion of re­ward does not include the strengthening effect explicit in the concept of re­inforcement. Rewards such as prizes, money, awards, and so on sometimes do strengthen the behaviors they follow (in which case they are also rein-forcers), but they don't always do so. Also, Skinner pointed out that rewards usually are not immediately contingent on behavior, whereas effective rein-forcers are. Generally, we speak of "rewarding the person" for desirable be­havior, whereas Skinner spoke of "reinforcing the behavior" that is desirable. The latter emphasizes the importance of immediate consequences for spe­cific behaviors.

Perhaps reinforcement, which is the essence of operant conditioning, seems very simple; however, its ramifications are far-reaching and dramatic. Essen­tially, Skinner would have considered a newborn infant to be a behavior emit­ter, and, as the infant matures, he or she becomes capable of producing a wide variety of responses. Some of these responses have consequences that are rein­forcing, and some do not. For example, certain responses allow one to success­fully ride a bicycle, but others are unsuccessful; the former are thus reinforced, whereas the latter are not. Many responses (for example, speaking, eating, or dressing in accepted ways) are reinforced by the approval and praise of parents, teachers, peers, and others; these social reinforcers are very important in con­ditioning behavior. In brief, then, responses that are reinforced tend to be repeated, increasing in frequency and becoming established as common responses in the person's behavior repertoire. These responses constitute condi­tioned behavior.

An interesting situation develops when the connection between a re­sponse and the reinforcer that follows it is an accidental one, occurring by chance. In such cases, there is no actual cause-and-effect relationship between the response and the reinforcer. Skinner called responses conditioned in this way superstitious behavior and pointed out that human behavior is "heavily

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 57

superstitious."6 The rain dances performed by some groups of people pro­vide dramatic examples of superstitious behavior. The occasional chance oc­currence of rain after such an appeal reinforces the dancing sufficiently to cause it to continue.

Everyday instances of superstitious behavior are numerous. A common example can be observed when a group of persons is waiting for a self-oper­ated elevator; often someone begins pushing the button repeatedly despite the fact that the elevator light is already "on," signaling that the button has already been pushed. This behavior has probably been reinforced several times by the chance arrival of the elevator just after repeated button push­ing. The person very likely would admit that repeated pressing is actually unnecessary and has no real effect; nevertheless, the behavior persists. Many people have an elaborate set of behaviors for starting their cars on cold days. Only a couple of these responses are actually effective; yet, because the car has started in the past (providing reinforcement) after the performance of these behaviors, the routine is continued. Athletes often show superstitious behaviors: baseball players at bat may go through a ritual (hitching up their pants, touching the plate with the end of the bat, kicking dirt, and so on) that is sometimes followed by getting a hit; therefore the ritual is repeated time and again.

Behaviors that are ignored or that produce no reinforcing consequences tend not to increase in frequency—that is, they are not strengthened. A child would not be likely to learn to read if she or he were never reinforced with praise or attention for attempts to read; a college student probably would not become "politically involved" if an audience were never gained for his or her ideas; and a business executive would be unlikely to continue a procedure that was not having the effect of increasing business.

Also, if conditioned behavior (previously reinforced behavior) no longer results in reinforcement, it tends to become less and less frequent. This process is called operant extinction. For example, a child who has been conditioned to speak quietly at home, through parental reinforcement of this behavior, may continue to do so on initial trips to the local playground. However, if other children da not respond to (do not reinforce) this quiet talking, it will gradu­ally disappear (extinguish) in the child's playground interactions—perhaps to be replaced by shouting and loud chatter, which do get attention (reinforce­ment) from peers.

In Skinnerian psychology, "personality" is considered to be primarily the result of the individual's personal history of reinforcement. (Although genetic en­dowment also plays a role, reinforcements determine the specific behaviors

Superstitious behavior has been illustrated vividly in the laboratory. A pigeon is placed in a Skinner box, and food is delivered every 15 seconds, regardless of what the bird is doing at the time. Whatever behavior is being emitted when the reinforcer (food) arrives will tend to increase in frequency. Before long the pigeon is performing the behavior at a high rate. Skinner found that various responses could be conditioned in this way, including turning in a circle, hopping from foot to foot, and lifting the head.

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that are shaped and maintained and that are typical for the individual.) Con­trast the man who is very argumentative and engages in physical violence with the man who is affable and nonviolent. How did these differences in behavior come about? Skinner's concepts suggest that the critical factor is different his­tories of reinforcement. The former person's aggressive behaviors may have been encouraged and praised (positively reinforced) by his parents or peers; also, in the environment in which he typically operates, these behaviors are probably successful and therefore are positively reinforced adaptations. In addi­tion, negative reinforcement (to be explained more fully shortly) has probably operated to increase his aggressive behaviors. That is, aggression may have ef­fectively removed him from uncomfortable or dangerous situations, as when punching an annoying or threatening person results in a cessation of the an­noyances or threats.

The affable, nonviolent person's experiences very likely have been such that pleasant, nonaggressive behaviors have been reinforced, and his present environment continues to maintain these kinds of behaviors. An assumption in Skinnerian psychology is that both these individuals (barring significant ge­netic differences or defects) would have been capable of developing either set of behaviors. Different reinforcement contingencies resulted in the actual be­haviors that became typical for each person.

A point that is often missed by those who are freshly introduced to oper-ant-conditioning concepts is that reinforcements often are subtle. In other words, it is not always easy to find the significant reinforcing events in a per­son's life history. For example, identical twins raised in the same family envi­ronment may turn out to be quite different in their behaviors as adults. In such cases it is tempting to think that something mysterious and unexplainable has occurred; it seems that both persons were exposed to the same environ­ment and the same events. How could they turn out differently? The explana­tion is not to b.e found by taking into account only the general characteristics of their reinforcement histories; detailed information would be necessary if the behavioral differences were to be understood. If specific details could be ob­tained, there would be a number of instances in the personal histories of each twin when emitted behaviors and the consequences of these behaviors dif­fered from those of the other twin. It is impossible to imagine a case in which two individuals, even identical twins, have produced exactly the same behaviors with exactly the same consequences. Therefore, no two individuals have exactly the same "personality," although of course there may be many similarities due to histories of reinforcement that are approximately (even if not precisely) the same.

Skinner indicated that there are two types of reinforcement—positive rein­forcement and negative reinforcement—that can occur as a consequence of behav­ior. Both types increase the probability of response—that is, they both strengthen behavior. Positive reinforcement involves the addition of something (a positive reinforcer) to a situation when a response is made. For example, a response may be positively reinforced if the obtaining of food, water, sexual contact, money, or praise is a consequence. Negative reinforcement involves the removal

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 59

of something (called either a negative reinforcer or an aversive stimulus) from a situation when a response is made. For example, a response may be negatively reinforced if the removal of extreme cold or heat, a loud noise, a threat, a te­dious task, or a headache is a consequence. In short, much of our behavior is conditioned because it gains us something (in the case of positive reinforce­ment) or because it allows us to escape or avoid something (in the case of neg­ative reinforcement).

Skinner s terms "positive" and "negative" should not be thought of as hav­ing the same meanings that they typically have in everyday life. For example, rejection by an admired person typically would be considered negative, but such rejection actually may increase one s approaches to that person (perhaps being rejected is better than being ignored completely). If rejection has the ef­fect of strengthening approach responses, it is then considered a positive rein­forcer.

Similarly, negative reinforcers are not always stimuli or events that com­monly would be considered "negative." For example, overt displays of parental affection toward a teenage son actually may be negative reinforcers (especially if they occur in front of his friends). Therefore, offensive behaviors by the son may be strengthened if they remove the parents affectionate responses. Again, the important point is that positive and negative reinforcers are defined by their effects, not by popular conceptions.

Something cannot be considered a positive reinforcer or a negative re­inforcer (aversive stimulus) until its effects have been observed. Before call­ing something a positive reinforcer, we must determine that its addition does increase the probability of response; for a negative reinforcer, its removal must be observed to increase the probability of response. This sort of ex­plicit specificity prevents confusion when attempting to predict and control behavior.

A sloppy interpretation of Skinnerian concepts can be very misleading. We should not assume, for instance, that haphazardly applied reinforcers will be ef­fective or that the same things will be reinforcing in all cases for all individu­als. As an example, parents sometimes are incapable of understanding and deal­ing with their children's "offensive and irresponsible" behaviors. They may say something like this: "We've given our children the best clothes, plenty of money, and the use of the family car; we send them to good, private schools. How could they turn out this way?" The indirectly expressed assumption here seems to be that, with all these "positive reinforcers" the children should be behaving in accordance with the parents' wishes. A vague knowledge of oper-ant conditioning might lead them to believe that Skinner was wrong and that positive reinforcement doesn't work. A more complete knowledge of operant conditioning would help clarify the situation. Perhaps the clothes, money, and so on are not made contingent on "desirable" behaviors; that is, maybe the par­ents simply provide everything for the children without supplying the reinforcers as a consequence of certain behaviors. Another possibility is that at least some of these things are not really positive reinforcers; "the best clothes" or "good, private schools" may be effective reinforcers for the parents but not for the

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children. Also, the children's "offensive and irresponsible" behaviors may be strongly positively reinforced by the approval of their peers.

The implications of negative reinforcement also are very significant for everyday situations, and an adequate grasp of this concept can elucidate many problems of behavior control. Skinner himself was an advocate of pos­itive reinforcement; he believed that conditions are best when our actions gain us something and that it is less desirable to do things in order to escape from something (as in the case of negative reinforcement). Some situations are loaded with negative reinforcers. In certain school systems, for instance, the academic work is so dull and dreary that any behavior that removes a child from having to do this work is highly negatively reinforced. Remem­ber the effect of negative reinforcement: a behavior that removes a negative rein-forcer tends to increase in frequency. If cutting classes, daydreaming during lec­tures, or creating havoc in the classroom removes the child from an aversive learning situation (a negative reinforcer), then these behaviors can be ex­pected to increase; the child will be conditioned to emit these behaviors reg­ularly. A similar situation exists on many boring and tedious jobs. Employees may be conditioned to escape from this type of work (a negative reinforcer) by taking extended coffee breaks, sustaining injuries, being absent, or simply quitting. Reinforcement, both positive and negative, provides the key to much human behavior.

To explain the vast range of human behavior that is subject to control by reinforcement, Skinner referred to conditioned reinforcers—for example, money, academic grades, attention, approval, and affection. These conditioned rein­forcers are initially paired with primary reinforcers such as food and sexual contact. Money is associated with the provision of many necessities (primary reinforcers), and school grades are also associated, though less directly, with the attainment of primary reinforcers (passing grades lead to a diploma, which leads to a job, which leads to self-support, which leads to independence, the ability to purchase food and other necessities, and the ability to attract a mar­riage partner).

Attention, approval, and affection from others become conditioned rein­forcers because of their association with the provision of primary reinforcers by other persons. For example, parents who give approval and attention to their children also provide primary reinforcers such as food, warmth, cud­dling, and so on. In addition, signs of attention, approval, and affection from members of the opposite sex are likely to be associated with sexual contacts. The main point here is that a whole variety of stimuli can attain reinforcing properties through their associations with primary reinforcers, and these conditioned reinforcers can then operate independently to control behavior. The types of conditioned reinforcers we have discussed here are called gener­alized reinforcers; they are associated with more than one primary reinforcer. (It should be mentioned that it sometimes is argued that attention, approval, and affection are more than conditioned reinforcers; they also may have some characteristics of primary reinforcers—that is, they may be related to basic biological factors.)

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 61

A very important reinforcer that affects human behavior is success in ma­nipulating the environment. Skinner indicated that simply "being effective" or "being right" may reinforce behavior, and he suggested that the human capac­ity to be reinforced in this way may have its roots in our evolutionary history That is, part of the effectiveness of this reinforcer may be unconditioned; per­haps the survival value of successful environmental manipulations has resulted (through evolution) in the tendency for human behavior to be reinforced by these types of consequences. He gave the example of a baby who repeatedly shakes a rattle; apparently the simple effect created by this behavior is reinforc­ing. This notion is very significant, since it means that we perhaps engage in a great deal of behavior partly because it produces some change in our environ­ment. Of course, primary reinforcers may also be involved; food, water, sexual contact, and so on often are obtained only through successful manipulations of the environment.

Another way in which behavior is controlled, or in which control is at­tempted, is through punishment. Skinner believed that the effectiveness of this technique is limited and that generally it is an undesirable means of control. He defined two cases of punishment , both occurr ing as a conse­quence of behavior. In one case a negative reinforcer is presented after a re­sponse, and in the other case a positive reinforcer is removed after a response. The first case can be illustrated by some c o m m o n situations: slapping or scolding a child for misbehavior, berating a worker who has made a mistake, or fining a driver who has violated the speed limit. Examples of the second case include taking away a teenager's driving privileges for "talking back," sending a child to his or her room dur ing dinner for displaying bad table manners, deducting money from an employee's paycheck for being late, or walking away from a person who brings up a topic you don't want to talk about.

The term "punishment" is used appropriately only if a known negative re­inforcer is presented or if a known positive reinforcer is removed. It is not suf­ficient simply to assume that some event will be punishing. A common result of punishment is the suppression (at least temporarily) of the type of behavior that precedes it; however, many intended punishments do not accomplish this goal. For example, students put on detention often continue to be disruptive in class, criminals put into jail often commit crimes again, and employees who are reprimanded often continue to perform poorly; the actions taken in these cases are not effective and therefore should not be considered "punish­ments." In fact, some circumstances commonly thought to be punishing may actually result in the reinforcement of undesirable behaviors. The student sent to the principal's office may gain the admiration of classmates for being " tough" or "brave," and therefore the types of behaviors that result in expul­sion from the classroom may increase; the person who goes to jail may find acceptance and approval among fellow prisoners for antisocial behaviors, and therefore these behaviors may be even more likely to occur after imprison­ment (but perhaps with more caution about getting caught); the worker who is yelled at by his or her boss may gain the attention and sympathy of fellow

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employees who resent oppressive working conditions, which might result in further mistakes on the job.

More will be said about Skinner's views on punishment in a later section. Be aware, however, that Skinner differentiated between "negative reinforce­ment," in which an aversive stimulus is removed, resulting in an increase in the probability of the kind of behavior that preceded its removal, and "punish­ment," in which an aversive stimulus is added or a positive reinforcer is re­moved, generally resulting in at least temporary suppression of behavior. These two behavior-control techniques are commonly confused by persons newly acquainted with Skinnerian psychology, probably because the term "negative reinforcement" seems to imply a situation that is "not reinforcing." This is not the case, however, in Skinner's usage.

We need now to return briefly to a discussion of "stimuli." Remember that in respondent conditioning a specific stimulus elicits a response. We said that this is not the case in operant conditioning, since operant behavior is emitted rather than elicited. However, operant behavior does come to be affected by certain stimuli. For example, a pigeon may be exposed to a situation in a Skin­ner box in which key pecking is reinforced only when a light is on. When the light is off, pecking does not result in reinforcement. Eventually, the pigeon will peck only when the light is on; also, the light's being on will result in pecking behavior. The light has become a discriminative stimulus, and it exerts a kind of control over pecking behavior. The establishment of this relationship between a stimulus and a response is not the same as in respondent condition­ing. Pecking was initially an emitted behavior; it was not elicited by any specifiable stimulus. Only after the pecking was emitted by the pigeon and then reinforced in the presence of the light did it come to bear any relation to the light stimu­lus. When a response is likely to occur in the presence of particular stimuli be­cause of the availability of reinforcement at that time, a discrimination has been established. For example, a child eventually learns to call "mommy" and "daddy" only in the presence of his or her parents, because their presence is associated with reinforcement for those verbal responses (that is, they give ap­proval or attention).7

We are conditioned to make many discriminations in everyday life, from those that are relatively trivial to those that are crucial, such as proceeding on a

7Induction (or generalization) and discrimination are related concepts in Skinner's psychol­ogy. Induction refers to the fact that, when behavior comes under the control of a particu­lar stimulus, it is also controlled by other stimuli with similar properties. If we are rein­forced for responding in the presence of a particular stimulus, we will also tend to respond in a similar (but probably not identical) way to similar stimuli. This concept accounts for the fact that we do not have to be conditioned to respond appropriately to every "new" situation we meet. Since many situations have certain common properties, our behavior generalizes to these situations. For example, a person who can drive one car can also drive other cars. Also, the person who has been reinforced in one social situation for responding in a certain way will make similar responses in another similar social situation. Obviously, induction has its advantages.

Discriminations are also essential, however. If discriminations didn't exist, inappropriate responses would often occur. The reinforcement of certain responses and the extinction of others in the presence of different stimuli bring about discriminations.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 63

green, but not red, light when we are driving. Banana eating is controlled in part by the yellowness of bananas; eating them when they are a particular shade of yellow has been reinforced (they tasted good). Our approaches to strangers are determined partially by their facial expressions; approaches often are reinforced (we are "accepted") by smiling strangers but not by scowling strangers. Opening the door is controlled by the ringing of the doorbell; mak­ing this response when the bell rings has been followed by reinforcement in the past (someone has been at the door). Going to the mailbox is controlled by the time; this behavior is followed by reinforcement (the mail is there) when we go at a particular time. In the preceding cases the discriminative stimuli are a particular shade of yellow, a smile or a scowl, a ringing doorbell, and a particular time, respectively. Other illustrations of discrimination could be given, and each would be an example of how the environment exerts an in­fluence on our behavior. Skinner elucidated important aspects of environmental control through discrimination and the other concepts discussed in this section. The argument has been strengthened that environmental factors, rather than "inner dynamics," determine our behaviors.

The following are some of the highlights of this section:

1. Operant behavior is emitted and is affected by its consequences. 2. The most significant consequence of operant behavior is reinforcement (ei­

ther positive or negative), which results in the strengthening of behavior. This process is called operant conditioning.

3. Conditioned (reinforced) behaviors constitute the typical responses in our behavior repertoires.

4. Superstitious behaviors are the results of accidental relationships between re­sponses and reinforcers.

5. We make many responses that are not reinforced, and therefore they de­crease in strength; that is, they undergo extinction.

6. Our unique "personalities" result mainly from our individual histories of re­inforcement, with genetic endowment also playing a role.

7. Many conditioned reinforcers, such as money, affect our behavior. These rein-forcers gain their influence by being associated with primary reinforcers, such as food.

8. Punishment is a behavior-control technique designed to suppress behavior. (Skinner generally opposed its use.)

9. Discrimination results when reinforcement is available only in the presence of a particular stimulus (or particular stimuli).

THE SHAPING OF BEHAVIOR

Skinner suggested an analogy between the way operant conditioning shapes behavior and the way a sculptor shapes a piece of clay. Operant behaviors such as bar pressing for food by a rat in a Skinner box or reading and writing by a

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student in a classroom do not emerge full-blown. They are shaped in successive stages. The term "shaping" refers to the differential reinforcement of successive approximations; responses that are closer and closer to the desired response are required in order to maintain reinforcement. Consider the child who is learn­ing to speak: at first almost any approximation to words is reinforced; later, re­inforcement is no longer available for this behavior and closer approximations are necessary; eventually, only fairly exact pronunciations are reinforced.

Shaping results in many desirable behaviors, such as learning to speak and write well, becoming proficient at sports, driving carefully, and performing highly refined job skills. However, it also may result in undesirable behaviors. A parent may ignore a child's quiet questioning but then respond (give rein­forcement) when she raises her voice. To get attention on subsequent occa­sions, she may have to increasingly intensify the demands, until her typical behavior (inadvertently shaped by the parent) is to "make a fuss."

Campus and urban violence during the 1960s could also be viewed as be­ing at least partially the result of shaping. Reasonable approaches to officials by students, African Americans, and other minority and deprived groups were of­ten ignored. Louder demands were sometimes listened to and concessions sometimes made, but, when this intensity no longer brought sufficient rein­forcement to the disadvantaged, they again heightened the level of protest, which in some cases escalated to physical violence and large-scale destructive-ness. It would seem wise for those in authority to give serious attention to rea­sonable demands made in a moderate and nonviolent way, rather than to close their eyes and ears (giving no reinforcement) until escalation occurs and they then find themselves in the position of having to yield to (thereby giving rein­forcement for) extreme, aggressive behaviors. This kind of process can go on and on—starting with the initial resistance of authorities, then yielding in the face of increased pressure, then holding back again, then yielding again when the intensity of behavior increases—until very violent and socially destructive activities have been inadvertently "shaped up."

A very positive application of shaping can be seen in education. Skinner advocated the use of programmed instruction, in which subject matter is broken down into a series of small steps leading toward more and more complexity. The material is presented to the student in easily manageable portions. Be­cause of the arrangement of the material in small sequential steps, from very simple to complex, the student is not likely to "get lost." He or she should be able to make a high proportion of correct responses to the accompanying questions (which are also programmed to increase gradually in complexity), and thereby progressively more complex responses are reinforced.

Programmed textbooks presenting material in small progressive steps have been developed, and there are also various teaching machines that present pro­grammed material. (With the rapid growth of computer technology, there is great potential for developing more efficient and effective instructional aids.) Some of these machines provide conditioned reinforcers that involve more than simply getting the correct answer (although this in itself can be a very po ­tent reinforcer). For example, a correct answer may be signaled by a flashing

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 65

light and/or a ringing bell. In this way, teaching machines shape behavior while "holding the student's interest" by quickly reinforcing every correct re­sponse. (This type of immediate, reinforcing feedback is often missing in regu­lar classrooms, where students sometimes wait days or weeks to receive com­ments or grades on their exams or projects.) Because of these factors, plus the factors of the constant interaction between the machine and the student, the high rate of activity of the student, and the progression to more complex ma­terial only after the preceding material has been thoroughly understood, Skin­ner suggested that teaching machines are similar to private tutors.

He also pointed out that certain aversive conditions typically present in learning situations, as well as factors that make little or no contribution to ed­ucation, can be avoided with programmed instruction. Students do not study in order to escape negative consequences such as reprimands or low grades, and each person moves ahead at his or her own pace, which reduces competi­tive behavior. In addition, reinforcement that is given consistently and imme­diately for small increments in performance is often more effective than long-range reinforcers such as "passing the course" or "getting a diploma."

The potential of teaching machines appears quite impressive. However, there are some problems. One is the development of good programs. It isn't al­ways easy to break down subject matter—English, history, science, or what­ever—into small, meaningful, progressive units. This task often requires a great deal of effort. Once accomplished, however, the benefits seem numerous. As Skinner suggested, we don't really know the full capabilities of humans, be­cause environments have never been constructed that "push human achieve­ment to its limits." Perhaps complete development of the possibilities offered by teaching machines would move us closer toward the goal of full human achievement. Also, teachers benefit from teaching machines by having time for involvement in activities beyond those of "drillmasters."

Despite its strong potential, the use of programmed instruction in schools has been limited. E. A.Vargas and Julie S.Vargas (1996) have explained that "the understanding and accepting of the science Skinner founded has been slow, and therefore the technologies based on that science are often misunderstood or rejected" (p. 251). Still, they are optimistic about the future, suggesting that as the educational establishment becomes more accepting of Skinner's scien­tific approach, programmed instruction "will be given the attention it deserves, and his hope that schools could be designed so that students learn enthusiasti­cally and effectively will be realized" (p. 251).

Besides his interest in the shaping of behavior through the use of pro­grammed instruction and teaching machines, Skinner was very concerned with the general state of American education. Responding to the many criti­cisms of our educational system, he pointed out that reformers too often make broad and meaningless recommendations, such as suggesting that we need more commitment, a greater national effort, or some sort of imaginative, in­novative change. He also believed that many specific suggestions, such as lengthening the school day or providing merit pay for teachers, are not ade­quate solutions.

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What is needed, in Skinners opinion, is the application of a technology of teaching based on the scientific analysis of behavior. This, in short, involves clarifying the goals of education (that is, being specific about what is to be taught), allowing each student to progress at his or her own rate, and maintain­ing "motivation" by providing immediate and appropriate positive reinforcers for progress. (Of course, programmed instruction and teaching machines play important roles in accomplishing these steps.) Skinner maintained that a sound technology of teaching would permit students to learn twice as much as they are learning now, without additional time or effort.

Rather than disbanding schools of education, as some critics of our school systems have suggested, Skinner advised that teachers be taught the technol­ogy that will allow them to do their jobs more effectively. He believed that teachers too often are misguided by vague and relatively useless humanistic and cognitive theories of learning. Such theories, in his view, lead teachers and others away from practical solutions to educational problems.

Skinner's interests in programmed instruction, teaching machines, and the educational system continued in some of his last writings.8 He was concerned that, although teaching machines are "alive and well in industry," their use in schools is rare (largely, he felt, because cognitive theories of learning dominate education and teaching machines are portrayed falsely as dehumanizing, asocial, and unable to promote creativity). If they were used widely, Skinner believed, our schools would be improved greatly Also, the increase in well-informed, re­sponsible graduates would make the world's future much brighter.

Skinner suggested that a clearer concept of education would result if teach­ing were seen as involving priming, prompting, and vanishing. Priming involves getting people to behave in a certain way so that the behavior can be rein­forced. Often this is done by giving verbal instructions or by demonstrating how something is done. When the behavior is performed, reinforcement must follow (immediately, if possible) for learning to take place. For a time, prompt­ing of the behavior often is necessary; part of the instructions or demonstration is repeated in order for the behavior to be performed correctly and reinforced. Finally, when the behavior is strong enough, the prompts are removed or van­ished (this is a magician's term that Skinner used). Although this process leads to effective learning, it is difficult to implement in most classrooms, in part be­cause the teacher has to cope with too many students. Programmed instruc­tion and teaching machines, according to Skinner, can provide to all students the necessary conditions (including immediate reinforcement of appropriate behavior and allowance for each student to move at her or his own pace) for effective learning.

While on the topic of education, an area of controversy that is relevant to Skinner's approach should be mentioned. There has been much debate in re-

8For example, see "The School of the Future," pp. 85-96, and "Programmed Instruction Revisited," pp. 97-103, in his 1989 book, Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior, refer­enced at the end of this chapter.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 67

cent years about the use of "rewards" to produce consistently high perfor­mance and creativity, with critics (for example, Kohn, 1993) arguing that praise, incentives, high grades, and so on, actually tend to reduce interest in the activity and inhibit creativity. This view is based partly on the assumption that individuals function best when they guide their own behavior, rather than be­ing controlled by others through the use of rewards.

Among those researchers who have supported the effectiveness of rewards are Eisenberger and Cameron (1996).9 They found that "analysis of a quarter century of accumulated research provides little evidence that reward reduces intrinsic task interest . . . . Recent research also has shown that reward for a high degree of creative performance can be used to increase generalized creativity" (p. 1162). Despite their findings, as is common in science, the debate continues and involves various complexities (for example, see American Psychologist, Vol. 53, 1998, pp. 673-679, for both criticisms of their work and their responses to these criticisms).

For most researchers, the important issue is not whether rewards or rein-forcers can be used effectively, but how their effectiveness can be maximized while possible undesirable outcomes are minimized. Skinner would support the continued collection of data that clarify this issue, helping to make rein­forcement an even more powerful positive influence on behavior.

MAINTAINING BEHAVIOR: SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT

Reinforcements do more than shape behavior; they also maintain established behaviors. Current contingencies of reinforcement™ must be studied if the range and complexity of a person's present activities are to be understood. We need to know the prevailing conditions under which reinforcements occur. To spec­ify these conditions in full detail as they exist in the real world is extremely difficult in*most cases, but even a cursory look at how and when reinforce­ments occur often reveals very significant determinants of behavior.

Some behaviors are reinforced every time they are emitted. This is called continuous reinforcement. Often the behaviors that are continuously reinforced

9For a simplified explanation of their findings, see Bridget Murray's article, "Rewards Should Be Given When Defined Goals Are Met," APA Monitor, June 1997, p. 26. Eisen­berger is quoted as saying, "When you reward a child for high-quality work, you send a message that they're doing a good job. The reward motivates the child to keep trying and to take pride in their work."

'"According to Skinner, contingencies of reinforcement involve the interrelationships among "(1) the occasion upon which a response occurs, (2) the response itself, and (3) the rein­forcing consequences." For more on this subject, see Skinner's Contingencies of Reinforce­ment (especially p. 7), which is referenced at the end of this chapter.

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are those that act on the physical environment; pushing or pulling a door has the consistent result of opening or closing it, and turning a faucet results con­sistently in the flow of water. These are simple examples of cases in which cer­tain results (reinforcements) occur each time a particular response is made. Continuous reinforcement also maintains more complex physical activities; certain responses always result in successful skating, skiing, bicycle riding, writ­ing, swimming, and so on, and therefore we continue to emit the behaviors ap­propriate for these accomplishments.

If the usual response/reinforcement relationship suddenly does not occur after a long period of continuous reinforcement, the result may be "disturb­ing," "weird," or perhaps "humorous." Skinner suggested that the "house of mirrors" in an amusement park is an example of changed consequences of be­havior. People are unaccustomed to the kind of feedback they receive from looking into these mirrors. Previously, there was a consistent, regular conse­quence each time a mirror was looked into. Another example of the effects of changing a continuous-reinforcement situation would be a wife who for years has hugged her husband when he returned home but suddenly, one day, didn't provide this reinforcement. Her husband would probably say something like "What's wrong? Aren't you feeling well?" Or consider the case of an aspiring young business executive who has had all her ideas responded to favorably by her colleagues and supervisor; if her next suggestion caused no favorable re­action, she might be quite taken aback. Her surprise would be less if her suggestions had been reinforced less consistently in the past. The self-doubts experienced by the "great lover" who finally does not succeed in a seduction attempt provide yet another illustration of the possible "upsetting" results of the breakdown of continuous reinforcement.

Behaviors that are maintained on a schedule of continuous reinforcement extinguish quite rapidly when reinforcers are no longer available. Extinction takes longer if a behavior is being maintained by a reinforcement schedule on which not every response is reinforced. The phrase "schedule of reinforce­ment" refers to the particular pattern or rule by which reinforcement occurs. If reinforcement occurs less than every time a particular type of behavior is emitted, a schedule of intermittent reinforcement is operating, and behavior main­tained by such schedules is generally more resistant to extinction than is be­havior maintained by continuous reinforcement. The "great lover" mentioned above would probably quit his or her seduction attempts more quickly than would a person who had a history of successes mixed with failures.

A pigeon whose key-pecking behavior has been reinforced continuously may peck somewhere from 50 to 200 times after the reinforcement is cut off. However, on an intermittent schedule, 4000 to 10,000 pecks may be emitted during the extinction period. Similar outcomes can be expected with regard to the extinction of human behaviors in everyday life. If a child's temper tantrums are being maintained by attention from the parents each time they occur (continuous reinforcement), and if there is no physical problem in­volved, then the tantrums will very likely stop relatively soon after the parents start ignoring them (extinction). However, if the tantrums are being main-

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 69

tained on an intermittent schedule—that is, if sometimes they receive attention and sometimes they do not—it will be harder for the parents to extinguish them. Very persistent behavior often results from schedules of intermittent reinforcement.

Much human behavior is maintained by intermittent reinforcement. This is generally true in cases in which other people are involved. We seldom find complete certainty in our interactions with others. Even our best friends don't always react favorably to our friendly behaviors; still, we persist. Other exam­ples of the effectiveness of intermittent reinforcement abound: athletes who continue to compete even though they don't always win; writers who con­tinue to write even when they publish only once in a great while; would-be gourmet cooks who keep trying despite the disappointing meals that occur between their successes. In short, human behaviors are in many cases main­tained by reinforcements that occur only occasionally.

There are two major types of schedules of intermittent reinforcement: in­terval schedules and ratio schedules. Interval schedules are based on the passage of time, as when a pigeon in a Skinner box receives a food pellet for the first key-pecking response after a certain interval of time has passed. The time interval may be constant, or it may vary around some average. If the interval is un­changing (for example, if it is always a one-minute interval), then the schedule is called a fixed-interval (FI) schedule. If the interval varies (for example, some­times it may be 50 seconds, sometimes 70 seconds, and so on, with an average time of one minute), then the schedule is called a variable-interval (VI) sched­ule. If the intervals are short, there will be a relatively higher overall rate of re­sponding than when the intervals are long.

The man who picks up his mail each day at exactly 10 A.M., because the mail delivery is very regular and his behavior is thus always reinforced at 10 A.M., is operating on a fixed-interval schedule. Compare the behavior of this person with that of someone who is operating on a variable-interval schedule with regard to picking up his mail. Let's imagine that the mail carrier comes on the average at 10 A.M. but some days delivers at 9:30, some days at 10:30, and so on. (Compared with VI schedules typically used in laboratory studies, the average interval in this example is long and the variability of intervals quite re­stricted.) This man will probably check his mailbox when he sees that it is 9:30 and will continue to do so until his behavior is at last reinforced (until the mail has come). A variable-interval schedule yields a more constant rate of respond­ing than does a fixed-interval schedule. Our hypothetical person who is on the variable-interval schedule is likely to go to the mailbox regularly until he finally gets his mail, whereas the other person will go only once. Some behaviors that we refer to as "anxious" (for example, continually checking the mailbox, repeat­edly looking out the window to see if a member of the family is coming home, or going to the stove time after time to see if the pot is boiling) result from variable-interval schedules.

Different effects of fixed-interval and variable-interval schedules of rein­forcement have been dramatically demonstrated in carefully controlled labora­tory studies. It is typical to find that behavior reinforced at fixed intervals does

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not occur regularly There is a tendency for a pause in responding to occur im­mediately after each reinforcement, since responses are never reinforced again right after reinforcement has just occurred. This pause in responding is fol­lowed by a gradual increase in response rate, which accelerates as the time for the next reinforcement draws near.

This pattern of responding—pauses followed by an increasing response rate—can be eliminated with a variable-interval schedule. On this schedule the probability of being reinforced at any given time remains low and constant. Since reinforcement sometimes occurs just after a previous reinforcement, the organism continues to respond at a stable and uniform rate, and the pause noted in fixed-interval schedules tends to disappear. Skinner noted that pi­geons operating on a VI schedule with an average interval of five minutes (with food as the reinforcer) performed for up to 15 hours at a rate of two or three responses per second, pausing no more than 15 to 20 seconds during the entire period of time. Thus, the more random the occurrence of reinforce­ment, the more constant the response rate is likely to be.

With regard to ratio schedules of reinforcement, the important considera­tion is "the ratio of reinforced to unreinforced responses." A fixed-ratio (FR) schedule requires a specific, constant number of responses for each reinforce­ment. A variable-ratio (VR) schedule requires a varied number of responses for each reinforcement, with the ratios varying around some average number. For example, a rat operating on a fixed-ratio schedule may have to press the Skin­ner-box lever 20 times for each pellet of food. If the rat were operating on a variable-ratio schedule, the average number of presses would be 20, with the re­quired number being sometimes 2, sometimes 40,15, 25, and so on.

The following table may help you keep straight the four basic schedules of intermittent reinforcement.

Schedules of Intermittent Reinforcement

Interval (Time) Ratio (Number)

Fixed (FI)

Variable (VI)

Fixed (FR)

Variable (VR)

An important difference between interval schedules and ratio schedules is that, in the former case, reinforcement is not dependent on the amount of be­havior, but in the latter case it does depend on the amount of behavior.

A classic example of a fixed-ratio schedule is factory piecework. The em­ployee produces a certain number of "pieces" for a certain amount of pay (reinforcement). Skinner also gave examples such as a student who has to complete a project in order to get a grade and a salesperson who is working on commission. If the number of responses required for reinforcement is not too great, a high response rate is commonly maintained by a fixed-ratio schedule.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 71

In plain language, working hard pays off. However, as Skinner pointed out, fa­tigue may occur and become a limiting factor.

With fixed-ratio schedules that are in operation for long periods, and espe­cially when the ratios are high, an effect similar to that found with fixed-interval schedules may occur. That is, there may be a pause in responding just after rein­forcement. However, in contrast to fixed-interval schedules, once responding be­gins again on a fixed-ratio schedule, the rate tends to be high immediately; the more gradual acceleration in response rate seen on FI schedules is not typical of FR schedules.

When the number of responses required for the next reinforcement ex­ceeds some limit, responding sometimes stops completely for a considerable length of time; Skinner referred to this condition as abulia. An example is the case of a person who works extremely hard to get a college degree and then is unable to begin the difficult task of finding a good job. The reinforcement schedule has "strained" the person. Laboratory studies with pigeons suggest that this "strain" is not physical fatigue but can be considered as a failure to continue performing that is related to a very high fixed-ratio schedule.

Just as the pause after reinforcement with a fixed-interval schedule can be eliminated by a variable-interval schedule, the pauses with a fixed-ratio schedule can be gotten rid of with a variable-ratio schedule. A variable-ratio schedule es­sentially provides a constant probability of reinforcement for each response. Sometimes successive responses are reinforced; at other times many responses may be made before reinforcement occurs. The result is a high, sustained rate of response. Skinner indicated that pigeons will respond at a rate of five times per second and will keep this up for many hours.

A classic example of human behavior that is maintained at a high rate by a variable-ratio schedule is gambling. Roulette wheels, horse races, slot ma­chines, and so on provide variable-ratio reinforcement: the outcome of any particular bet is unpredictable. Skinner suggested that "the pathological gam­bler exemplifies the result" of such a schedule.11 There are many, many other examples of behaviors that are reinforced on a variable-ratio basis: getting to know strangers, hunting and fishing, going to the movies, dining out, playing golf, going»to parties, writing letters, cooking, tinkering with broken house­hold appliances, watching television, and so on. These behaviors are sometimes reinforced and sometimes not. We engage in many of them often, time after time, year after year, which shows the extent to which we are controlled by this type of schedule of reinforcement. However, to prevent over-simplification, it must be pointed out that sometimes the behaviors just listed may be explained

"An article on gambling, "Tricks of the Trade," in the March 14, 1994, issue of U.S. News and World Report (pp. 48-52), includes examples of the application of Skinner's con­cepts in casinos. In one case, an undergraduate psychology major studied Skinner's ideas at college in 1966. He told his casino operator father about them, and the ideas were applied to slot machines, sending "gamblers into a . . . quarter-dropping frenzy" (p. 50). It is not likely that Skinner was pleased with this use of his concepts, even though it suggested their effectiveness.

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in ways other than by variable-ratio schedules. For example, going to the movies and watching TV may be maintained on a variable-ratio schedule, but they also may be behaviors that allow escape from aversive conditions in everyday life.

The basic types of schedules and the main response characteristics associ­ated with each can be summarized as follows:

• Interval Schedules: The overall rate of response is generally low as compared with ratio schedules. The longer the interval, the lower the overall re­sponse rate. If the intervals are fixed, there is a pause immediately after re­inforcement, then a gradual increase in the rate of responding, and then increased acceleration as the time for the next reinforcement approaches. If the intervals are variable, the pause is eliminated and more constant re­sponding occurs.

• Ratio Schedules: The rate of response is generally high (unless the ratio is too high). If the ratios are fixed, typically there is a pause immediately after reinforcement and then an abrupt acceleration to a high response rate. With very high ratios, the pause after reinforcement may be long. A vari­able-ratio schedule tends to eliminate the postreinforcement pause and generally results in a high, sustained response rate.

This discussion of reinforcement schedules could go on and on, and we could get involved in tremendous detail and complexity. In their 1957 book, Schedules of Reinforcement, C. B. Ferster and Skinner covered 16 different classes of reinforcement schedules, within which there are numerous individual arrangements. Although space limitations prevent a detailed discussion of these various complicated schedules, a few brief examples can be given.

On a multiple schedule the reinforcements occur according to two or more independent schedules, which may alternate randomly. A stimulus change sig­nals a change in schedules, and this stimulus (or stimuli) remains in effect as long as the particular schedule is operating. Life, in general, might be consid­ered a multiple schedule. We are faced with various stimulus situations—work, classrooms, parties, various persons, and so on—each of which may demand different kinds of behavior for reinforcement.

A concurrent schedule consists of two or more independent schedules operat­ing at the same time; reinforcement can be obtained on any of these schedules if the appropriate behavior is emitted. In everyday life, concurrent schedules are usually operating. We can do one of two or more things—play or study, go here or there, see one friend or another—and be reinforced for different be­haviors. We also may alternate between the schedules.

On a chained schedule, behavior in the presence of one stimulus produces a second stimulus, behavior in the presence of the second stimulus produces a third stimulus, and so on, until behavior in the presence of the "final" stimulus produces (at least sometimes) a primary reinforcer. The stimuli in the "chain" serve as conditioned reinforcers as well as discriminative stimuli. A chain be­gins with the presentation of a discriminative stimulus; an appropriate response

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 73

in the presence of this stimulus produces a conditioned reinforcer, which also serves as a discriminative stimulus for the next response, and so on. If we trace the sequence of responses leading to eating in a restaurant, we might find the following: in the presence of the discriminative stimulus "dinner time," we look for a restaurant; finding a restaurant reinforces looking for it and also acts as a discriminative stimulus for entering; entering is reinforced by the presence of tables, which are also discriminative stimuli for sitting down; sitting down is reinforced by the appearance of a waiter, who is a discriminative stimulus for ordering; ordering is reinforced by the appearance of food, which is the dis­criminative stimulus for eating. The ingestion of food provides primary rein­forcement and maintains the chain of responses involved in going to the restaurant. We certainly wouldn't continue to repeat the sequence if we never received food. Although somewhat oversimplified (because all behaviors and stimuli in the sequence have not been considered), this example illustrates the important role of "chaining" in our lives; much operant behavior occurs in chained sequences.

Chaining also can be applied in training situations. Chains of behavior are conceived of as developing initially in a backward direction (that is, the last re­sponse produces an important reinforcer, and responses are built backward from that point to some starting point). Toilet training, for example, may begin by reinforcing (with praise) elimination on the toilet. Next, the child can prac­tice how to remove the required clothing. In further training, he or she can be encouraged to go to the toilet regularly, and so on. This behavioral sequence can be conditioned by the praise given after the last response in the chain. Something similar to this process is what happens in millions of homes, but toilet training sometimes might occur more efficiently with systematic appli­cations of chaining procedures.

Skinner demonstrated that pigeons can be trained to perform in a variety of ways through the manipulation of schedules. Since the publication of Sched­ules of Reinforcement, a number of studies have shown that human behavior also is susceptible to specifiable conditions of reinforcement. Although the day has not yet arrived when all human behaviors can be explained in detail by refer­ring to reinforcement schedules, Ferster and Skinner showed that this possibility exists. They clearly gave us a systematic scheme within which a great variety of behaviors can be interpreted.

It is possible to look around and see that many behaviors are dramatically affected by the ways in which reinforcements occur. Various schedules can be operating. At the risk of oversimplifying, we might explain the hard-driving, highly assertive behavior of a rising business executive in a very competitive industry as resulting from a ratio schedule—he or she must produce at a high rate in order to climb rapidly up the executive ladder via promotions. The harder this executive works, the faster the reinforcements occur (ruling out all those environmental factors that we refer to as "bad luck").

Of course, to show that high productivity results from certain schedules of reinforcement does not mean that these schedules are always desirable in a

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general sense. For example, misuse of these types of schedules may cause em­ployees to "wear themselves out" or to develop "rigid personalities." The latter may result when the behaviors emitted by a person become almost solely job related (because these behaviors are the main sources of reinforcement). Other behaviors (such as enjoying a hobby, talking about current events, or develop­ing athletic skills), which are said to indicate a "well-rounded personality," may be emitted less and less frequently as work behaviors increase. If these other behaviors are not emitted, there is no chance for them to be reinforced; there­fore they will not be strengthened. When this happens, we are likely to say "All he (or she) ever thinks about is work" or "That person is really closed-minded." The individual has a relatively limited behavior repertoire due to the contingencies of reinforcement that have been operating in his or her life.

Although the examples just given involve work behaviors, reinforcement schedules also significantly affect our other activities. Consider sexual activity. If a sexual partner has you operating on a fixed-interval schedule, your behav­ior is likely to be quite different from what it would be if the schedule were variable-ratio. Once a fixed interval schedule is established, such as a pattern involving sexual intercourse once a week on Saturday night, sexual approaches to the partner are likely to occur only on Saturday evenings. In between, there will be few, if any, approaches. For contrast, let's assume that a variable-ratio schedule is operating. Since reinforcement (sexual intercourse) occurs irregu­larly, and each approach to the partner has some probability of success, seduc­tive attempts will be relatively constant and frequent.

As with most psychological concepts, the application of schedules of rein­forcement can be oversimplified and misused if done carelessly. Human behavior is complex and subject to many influences. However, careful study of a situation with attention focused on the occurrence of reinforcements can yield enlight­ening and useful findings.

SELF-CONTROL A N D CREATIVITY

An extremely interesting question to ask of Skinnerian psychology is "Do we as individuals have any control at all over our own behavior?" In discussing schedules of reinforcement, it seemed that behavior control was exerted by en­vironmental contingencies rather than by people themselves. Is the individual helpless and simply a victim of changes in the environment?

Skinner believed that "self-control" can be explained within the frame­work of radical behaviorism. In self-control, the person is able to identify the behavior to be controlled (this is one way in which it differs from creativity). Often this behavior has had aversive consequences. Drinking heavily, losing one's temper, being lazy, stealing, driving too fast, eating too much, and so on—these responses may have been punished, or there may be the threat of punishment if they occur. Behavior (self-control) that reduces the probability

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 75

of such punishable responses will be reinforced (here we are talking about neg­ative reinforcement, which, as explained earlier, also strengthens behavior).

Techniques for self-control vary. Some examples are as follows:

1. Engaging in some behavior involving physical restraint, such as keeping your hands in your pockets to avoid nail biting.

2. Removing yourself from the situation in which the behavior is likely to occur—for example, walking away from a person who is a stimulus for "losing your temper."

3. Removing "temptation"—for example, throwing away cigarettes, which are the stimuli for smoking.

4. Staying away from situations likely to provide stimuli that influence the undesirable behavior—for example, avoiding parties or certain friends in order to stop drinking.

5. Doing something else, thereby making it impossible to engage in the be­havior that is likely to be punished.

These self-control behaviors can be negatively reinforced if they reduce the possibility of being punished. Also, they may be reinforced in other ways. For instance, giving up smoking is negatively reinforced by avoiding possible aversive consequences (heart disease, lung cancer, and so on) but also is posi­tively reinforced by others' praise and by the increased ability to perform vari­ous physical activities.

Of course, self-control sometimes fails, and the person continues to smoke, to get drunk, to avoid work, and so on. When this happens, it is common to say that the person is "weak" or has "poor character." However, a radical be-haviorist does not accept these explanatory fictions. The environment must be analyzed carefully to see why these undesirable behaviors are being main­tained; it does no good to look for the answer inside the person.

If undesirable behaviors continue, they are being maintained by positive or negative reinforcement. Human behaviors usually have a variety of conse­quences, and it is not easy to specify which outcomes will be most effective in controlling behavior. Immediate reinforcement often maintains behaviors that have aversive consequences in the long run. Consider alcoholism. The imme­diate changes caused by drinking may be positively reinforcing, and negative reinforcement may also occur (that is, perhaps the person can escape from the aversiveness of "facing reality"). Therefore, drinking often is strongly influ­enced by its immediate reinforcing outcomes. If the consequences of drinking become sufficiently aversive (physical illness, loss of income, and so on), then the person may emit behaviors that we refer to as "self-control." Continued self-control will depend on the reinforcing consequences of giving up drink­ing as well as on the aversive consequences that develop (for example, if "real­ity" becomes too hard to face, the individual may start drinking again). It should be noted that the whole emphasis in this discussion is on environmen­tal factors, not on "willpower" or other hypothetical "inner strengths."

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Overeating is a common problem behavior that is relevant in a discussion of self-control. A number of steps can be taken to control eating. (Don't for­get, though, that the immediate effects of eating are reinforcing and that this is a major problem to be overcome.)

1. Using a graph to plot the daily or weekly progression of weight loss can provide relatively quick reinforcement for small losses—one can "see" the results that are difficult to "feel."

2. Reprimanding oneself, or having one's friend supply reprimands, can pro­vide aversive consequences for snacking or for taking second portions; conversely, self-praise, or the praise of friends, can provide positive rein­forcement for eating less.

3. Eating a balanced diet lessens the chance of extreme deprivatiori and loss of self-control.

4. Avoiding stimuli that promote eating makes it easier to "resist tempta­tions." This approach involves everything from staying away from good restaurants and the pastry counter at the grocery store to keeping fattening foods out of the refrigerator and avoiding social functions at which eating is encouraged.

5. Doing other things is important, especially when the craving for food is strong: go for a walk, go to a movie, call a friend, mow the lawn, and so on.

These activities prevent eating, and they also may provide alternative rein-forcers. These five suggestions deal with changing the environment, and they do not begin with advice about "being strong." If they result in significant weight loss, then lowered eating behavior is often maintained by positive rein-forcers associated with being slimmer (for example, greater social acceptance, more favorable attention from others, and heightened physical abilities).

It should be stated explicitly, in case there are any lingering doubts about Skinner's position on self-control, that he believed that control rests ultimately in variables in the environment and in the individual's reinforcement history, not in "personal responsibility." It is unnecessary to assume that any inner force exists. Even when "self-determination" appears to be at work, the real control still resides in environmental conditions and in the past and present experi­ences of the person; even when an individual's behaviors alter the environ­ment, the environment still influences the person's behaviors. We may escape or avoid aversive conditions by behaving in various ways (thereby "exerting self-control"), but the new conditions produced by these behaviors will affect our subsequent actions.

What about "creativity?" What happens when someone comes up with a "new" solution to a problem, paints a "unique" picture, "invents" a compli­cated machine, and so on? These kinds of behaviors are often attributed to "genius," and much credit is given to the person for his or her "insight" or "talent." However, if the person's history of reinforcement and genetic endow­ment could be taken fully into consideration and if present contingencies of reinforcement could be described in detail, there would be less mystery about

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 77

creative acts. Persons who perform creatively are not operating in a vacuum; they often have large repertoires of behaviors resulting from their reinforce­ment histories. Stimuli in the situations in which creativity emerges usually bear some resemblance, however vague, to previously encountered stimuli as­sociated with reinforcement. In the presence of such stimuli, various responses are likely to be made, and these responses may then be differentially reinforced until "unique" behaviors are shaped up.

Skinner suggested that "mutations" in behavior sometimes result from the accidental occurrence of unusual environmental conditions and may con­tribute to creativity. For example, an artist or worker to whom the usual equipment, tools, or materials are not available may emit quite novel behav­iors. If these behaviors are successful (reinforced), the person may be said to be creative. In much the same way that genetic mutations are selected because of their survival value, behavioral mutations are selected because of their reinforc­ing consequences.

CONSCIOUS PROCESSES

Skinner did not ignore phenomena that we refer to by such terms as "self-awareness" and "thinking." A common misconception concerning radical be­haviorism is that these "conscious processes" are given no attention. Skinner indicated that these private events, which can't be observed directly by others, can be analyzed similarly to public events.

Just as is true of observable behaviors, the covert behaviors of feeling, thinking, and so on are possible because of genetic endowment, and their specifics are determined by environmental factors such as contingencies of rein­forcement. Simply because feeling and thinking are going on "within the skin" does not mean they are of a special nature. They still can be considered as re­sponses (though they are covert) and subjected to a behavioristic analysis.

An important and controversial aspect of Skinner's psychology is his view that it is inappropriate and misleading to consider conscious states as causes of behavior. Simply put, feelings and thoughts are considered to be effects (of ge­netic endowment and individual experiences) rather than causes of action. (More will be said about this later.)

Would each of us know what is "going on inside" if reinforcements were not available for making self-observations? Skinner argued that we wouldn't. In his view, we become self-aware primarily through the effects of other people (whom he called the "verbal community") who direct us to make self-observations and who then reinforce this behavior. They ask us how we feel, what we're thinking, what we know, and then they provide attention, acceptance, concern, and so on when we respond in appropriate ways. This process, continued over a lifetime, results in a great deal of self-observing be­havior, commonly called "conscious activity" by non-Skinnerians.

Skinner pointed out that the exteroceptive nervous system allows us to see, hear, taste, smell, and feel certain things in the world around us and also to

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make limited observations of our own bodies. Also involved in his analysis of conscious processes are interoceptive stimuli, arising from our digestive, respira­tory, and circulatory systems, and proprioceptive stimuli, arising from the posi­tions and movements of our bodies. These stimuli are private in the sense that only the individual directly experiences them, but other people encourage the labeling and "understanding" of these inner events.

The way our responses to our internal stimuli are conditioned can be im­portant. Consider a case in which parents give immediate attention to (rein­force) the slightest sign of discomfort in their child and make suggestions about "being ill." The child then is likely to interpret (respond to) many pri­vate stimuli as indications of sickness, and he or she may eventually become a hypochondriac. Similar private stimuli might not be significant to another person whose minor complaints and small physical changes have been ignored by others.

Skinner indicated that our knowledge of ourselves may be quite limited. We are likely to make more precise discriminations among external stimuli than among our own internal stimuli. Consider how difficult it is to explain to a doctor the exact nature of an ache or pain. Although other persons have di­rect access to external stimuli and therefore can help us to make fine discrimi­nations by applying reinforcers in a relatively consistent fashion, this is not the case when the stimuli are internal.

To illustrate further: we learn to label accurately many subtle differences among colors, but among how many different types of "love" or "anger" or "embarrassment" can we discriminate? Skinner pointed out that it is easier to teach a child the difference between the stimuli "red" and "orange" than the difference between one pattern of private stimuli called "diffidence" and an­other called "embarrassment." Perhaps this is why people so often are con­fused about their thoughts and feelings and why self-knowledge is so difficult to obtain.

In Skinners analysis of the types of conscious processes that we speak of as "thinking about the solution to a problem" or "deciding which course of ac­tion to take," he rejected suggestions that they are self-generated, autonomous functions of the mind. Individuals, in his view, do not find solutions to prob­lems somewhere within themselves, and they don't autonomously "make-up their minds" to do certain things.

Cognitive problem solving, Skinner proposed, involves covert problem-solving behaviors and their consequences and is under the control of environ­mental conditions. This process has the advantages of speed and privacy; in other words, a sequence of covert behaviors and consequences can occur much more quickly and unobtrusively than in their overt forms. Despite its rapid, private quality, thinking is behaving in Skinner s view and can be analyzed as behavior. What we think about (for example, the problem-solving strategies that we consider) is influenced by what we have learned through our own ac­tual experiences and through the instructions and advice of others.

Conscious decisions and choices also are controlled by environmental cir­cumstances. When we do one thing rather than another, we often feel that we

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 79

are making a rational, conscious decision. Free choice seems to be involved, but Skinner's approach suggests that this is an illusion. When we choose or de­cide, we are simply behaving—and that behavior is influenced by the situa­tions, behaviors, and behavioral consequences of the past and the present (in other words, past and present contingencies of reinforcement are the critical determinants of what we decide or choose to do).

The behaviors of covert problem solving and decision making obviously occur frequently. From a Skinnerian perspective, they are explained by the concept of reinforcement. Both solving problems and making decisions can re­sult in gaining something positive (positive reinforcement) or in avoiding or escaping something aversive (negative reinforcement). Also, if most of the problem-solving or decision-making process occurs covertly, unobserved by others, the person may be admired and praised (reinforced) for his or her "reasoning ability." In addition, the private nature of the process means that a number of alternative behaviors can be tested without suffering real-world consequences for the wrong moves.

Skinner admitted that his account of thinking was not complete, but he added that an explanation of thought as a function of the mind is no explana­tion at all. He strongly believed that more progress will be made by investigating the relationships between thinking and environmental events than by focusing on some assumed inner-directed process. Also, if we want to teach people how to reason well, the more we know about the effects of environmental factors, the better that job can be done.

The concept of "rule-governed behavior" should also be mentioned. We don't necessarily have to experience directly the actual consequences of par­ticular behaviors in order to learn; we can be informed or instructed by others about those consequences. In this way, our behavior sometimes is " rule-governed" rather than "contingency-shaped" (this latter phrase refers to the ef­fects of the natural contingencies of reinforcement to which we are exposed). Much of what we learn is passed on verbally to us by parents, teachers, work supervisors, colleagues, friends, and so on, based on their experiences. Related to the topic we have just been discussing, an important part of our thinking behavior is controlled by "rules" (that is, instructions, proverbs, advice, sugges­tions, laws, warnings, and so on) that are communicated orally or in writing.

Following or considering rules is behavior that is conditioned in the same way as other behaviors. If doing as we have heard or read is reinforced (as it often is), this behavior will thereby be strengthened, and we will continue to follow or consider such information.

There often are great differences between behaviors that are rule-governed and those that are contingency-shaped. Skinner said that rule-governed behav­ior could be considered "knowledge by description," whereas contingency-shaped behavior could be considered "knowledge by acquaintance"; the latter is "much more effectively executed" (Skinner, 1989, p. 87). For example, the rule-governed behaviors of individuals who are instructed verbally about how to operate machines, swim, write novels, do plumbing, practice martial arts, or conduct scientific experiments are likely to be relatively crude and ineffective

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compared to the contingency-shaped behaviors of those who have actual, first­hand experience (their behaviors are the product of immediate contingencies of reinforcement). It should be noted that "the feelings associated with the two kinds of behavior are also different, but they do not explain the difference in the behaviors" (Skinner, 1974, p. 126).

In many situations, behavior initially is controlled by instructions but even­tually comes under the control of real existing conditions. Education in our schools generally involves knowledge by description. Skinner pointed out that, if this learning is worthwhile, eventually students' behaviors will have reinforc­ing consequences, and knowledge by acquaintance will be acquired. A prob­lem is that often there is a long delay before the latter type of learning occurs.

DRIVES AND EMOTIONS

It is commonly suggested that behavior results from some force operating within the individual. Let's consider the term "drive." People are said to eat be­cause of the hunger drive, to have intercourse because of the sexual drive, to try to get ahead on their jobs because of a drive to succeed, and so on. Skinner believed that this is not the best way to explain behavior. Using the concept of drive in these ways draws attention away from the actual causes of human be­havior, which are to be found primarily in the environment. Skinner preferred to use the term "drive" simply to refer to the effects of environmental factors that can change the probability of behavior (for example, conditions of depri­vation or satiation and various schedules of reinforcement). To state his main point simply: the most important causes of behavior are environmental, and it only con­fuses matters to talk about inner drives.

Skinner stated specifically that we should not consider drives to be (1) stim­uli, (2) physiological states, (3) psychic states, or (4) simple states of strength. (For example, it is misleading to talk about a gambler's "strong drive" to gam­ble; a high rate of gambling behavior may be the result of a variable-ratio schedule of reinforcement.)

If Skinner's advice were taken seriously, the way we view human behavior would be altered dramatically. It is quite easy to believe that behavior results from internal forces; it is harder to accept the often complex task of looking at the environments in which people function to try to determine what factors in these environments are influencing behavior. Also, this latter approach might lead to the conclusion that, in order to bring about significant changes in behavior, it would be necessary to change the status quo, which can be a very threatening proposal. Rather than considering changes in the environ­ments of schools, industries, prisons, marriages, families, and so on, we often would rather talk about "unmotivated" students and teachers, "lazy" workers, "rebellious" prisoners, "irresponsible" wives and husbands, "unconcerned" fa­thers and mothers, and "wild and disrespectful" children—as if all these prob­lems were generated by "perverse" internal states.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 81

Let's now briefly consider emotions. Did Skinner deny that we are influ­enced by our emotional states? Don ' t we sometimes strike out at others be ­cause of "anger"? Don't we sometimes touch and hold another person because of "love"? Don' t we sometimes hastily retreat from certain situations because of "fear"? A radical behaviorist's answer to such questions again emphasizes that simply referring to inner states, such as emotions, does not really explain anything. The inner states that we call emotions must themselves be explained, rather than being used to explain behavior. (Skinner himself occasionally talked about emotions, but he was referring to a pattern of internal and exter­nal responses and not to inner causes of behavior.)

The problem in a behavioristic analysis of emotion is to determine the environmental conditions that result in "emot ional" responses. As in other behavioral analyses, contingencies of reinforcement are important; that is, sit­uations, responses, and behavioral consequences must be considered. Some simple examples follow. In each case, both the inner emotional response and the overt emotional behavior are explained by referring to environmental events. Also, both respondent and operant conditioning may be involved.

A person may feel angry and strike someone because of past and present aversive conditions and negative reinforcement. Perhaps the person struck re­sembles someone who in the past was annoying or abusive—that is, someone who provided aversive stimuli. Generalization may occur, so that the present person is reacted to the way the original annoying individual was reacted to (thereby a feeling of anger is aroused). In addition, negative reinforcement for hitting may have occurred in the past: striking annoying or abusive persons may have stopped their aversive behaviors (therefore, hitting is likely in the present situation).

Persons who feel love often behave "lovingly" by touching and holding their loved ones. But, rather than saying that these behaviors result from the emotion of love, Skinner would have suggested that both loving feelings and loving behaviors often result from mutual positive reinforcement: shared atten­tion, expressions of approval and affection, sexual contact, and so on are pow­erful reinforcers, capable of giving rise to the inner responses that we call "love" and of strengthening overt behaviors such as touching and holding.

Let's consider one more situation involving emotion. If someone suddenly starts shouting loudly at us, we may be "startled"; our hearts may beat faster, our muscles may contract, and other physiological reactions may occur. We may label these private, internal stimuli as "fear" (because of past conditioning by the verbal community). Also, we may respond to the situation by moving away quickly (because this response was negatively reinforced in the past—that is, moving away resulted in the termination of aversive stimuli). It is interesting to consider that some persons might, because of different conditioning, label the private stimuli as "anger" and respond to the situation by aggressing against the person doing the shouting. In this type of analysis, the emotions of "fear" and "anger" are explained in behavioristic terms, involving stimuli, responses, and consequences. Both reflexive responses (such as faster heartbeat) and oper­ant behaviors (such as moving away) are involved.

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AVERSIVE CONTROL A N D PUNISHMENT

Some issues to be mentioned in this section have already been touched on. However, they are related so importantly to Skinner's psychology that they need to be repeated and expanded upon somewhat.

"Aversive control" is a very popular method for getting people to behave in desired ways. Conditions are arranged so that individuals do what is ex­pected of them in order to escape from or avoid aversive consequences. Gov­ernments, churches, schools, industries, and other social institutions often use this method to control the behavior of citizens, members, students, and work­ers, respectively

Individuals also control one another's behaviors through aversive measures. A husband may get his wife to be submissive and subservient by* controlling her economic condition; if she doesn't behave the way he wants her to, he may refuse to give her money. If she has no independent source of support, this can be a very effective means of control. Controls such as this often operate in very subtle, unspoken ways; the behavior of both persons is controlled by what is going on, but the actual situation may never become obvious. Aversive control also is often characteristic of parent/child relationships. Children may behave "appropriately" to avoid having their allowances or other privileges taken away or in order to stop their parents' constant nagging. Conversely, the parents may sometimes "give in" to a child's demands in order to stop the crying, sulking, pleading, or other behavior that is aversive to them. In this case, it is the child who is using aversive control.

Skinner was opposed to the use of aversive control in human relations or for the purposes of society's institutions. He believed that positive reinforce­ment is a much more effective means of controlling behavior, mainly because its outcomes are more predictable and because it is less likely to generate un­desirable behaviors. As an example of the possible ill effects of aversive control, consider students who react to teachers' threats (designed to promote studying) by skipping classes, dropping out completely, committing acts of vandalism, or becoming apathetic and uncaring. Skinner suggested that such behaviors are in­evitable outcomes of aversive control.

Punishment, in most cases, is no good either, according to Skinner. In general, he was firmly against its use. Whereas aversive control is intended to promote expected behaviors, punishment is intended to suppress unwanted be­haviors. In his 1948 novel, Walden Two, Skinner argued that punishment is an evil, and he continued that line of thought in various subsequent writings. He claimed that punishment (presenting an aversive stimulus after a response or removing a positive reinforcer after a response) is not the opposite of rein­forcement. It does not weaken the overall tendency to respond, although it may temporarily suppress certain behaviors. As with aversive control, punish­ment often has undesirable outcomes.12 For example, (1) situations similar to

l2Strong punishment may permanently suppress behaviors, but it also may cause extreme "emotional" reactions and responses that seriously hinder further learning. Whenever pun­ishment is used, there is the chance of creating "emotional by-products."

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 83

those in which punishment has occurred may be avoided, as when a punished student stays away from all learning situations; (2) the punished person's "bad" behavior may be suppressed only in the presence of the punisher; (3) if punish­ment occurs intermittently, there may be a conflict between the tendency to emit the response and the tendency to hold it back (this kind of conflict may be seen in the behavior of persons referred to as "indecisive" or "unsure of themselves"); (4) if no alternatives to the punished behavior are available, the person may become "unresponsive" and "withdrawn."

If punishment generally is a poor technique, what other methods can be used to get rid of undesirable behaviors? Here are a few:

1. The circumstances that result in unwanted behaviors sometimes can be modified. Cheating on exams can be reduced by giving open-book or take-home ex­ams, by changing the emphasis on grades, or by arranging the situation so that it is not possible to cheat. Another problem behavior, stealing, would be greatly reduced if the economic system provided sufficiently for every­one. Aggressiveness can usually be decreased by reducing "frustrating" ele­ments in the environment. These kinds of examples could go on and on.

2. Unwanted behaviors sometimes can be ignored and thereby extinguished. If rein­forcement (such as "attracting attention") doesn't occur, behavior tends to diminish in frequency. One major problem with extinction is that it is sometimes a lengthy process. Another problem is that "emotional" out­bursts may result when reinforcement is withheld; responses commonly re­ferred to as "anger" or "frustration" may occur. These responses can be very aversive, and it is sometimes difficult to continue ignoring such behavior.

3. Incompatible behaviors sometimes can be conditioned. For example, if a child is very aggressive and continually makes loud demands of others, changes might be brought about by ignoring (extinguishing) these aggressive be­haviors and giving attention and approval (positive reinforcement) for qui­eter, more cooperative behaviors. Using this technique may get results faster than using extinction by itself.

Why aren't these alternatives to aversive control and punishment used more often? Probably because they are more difficult to implement and may take some time before they are effective. The easy and quick way to control others' behavior is to use threats or to punish; all that is required to use these methods is power. In the long run, however, they may backfire.

As has been stated, Skinner came out strongly against the use of punish­ment. He is quoted as saying "If I have done anything for the human race, it's to find alternatives to punishment" (Krasner, 1989, p. 247). However, he was not totally opposed to it. Late in his career he clarified his position, noting that there are exceptional circumstances when punishment is justified.13 For exam­ple, sometimes "brief and harmless aversive stimuli" may be effective in treat­ing self-mutilating autistic children. These children hit or bite themselves, bang

13See his brief clarification, "A Statement on Punishment," APA Monitor, June 1988, p. 22.

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their heads against hard objects, and harm themselves in other ways. Briefly ap­plied punishments (such as a slap or an electric shock) have been shown in some cases to stop this self-abuse; once this behavior is halted, positive behav­iors can then be shaped. Even while acknowledging that punishment some­times may serve useful purposes, Skinner emphasized that it would be a real mistake to "remain satisfied with punishment without exploring nonpunitive alternatives."

PROBLEM BEHAVIOR:

CAUSES A N D REMEDIES

Skinner suggested that the explanations for neurotic, psychotic, and other problem behaviors often may be found in environmental factors such as unique histories of reinforcement, conditions of extreme deprivation or satia­tion, intense aversive control, and harsh punishment. It is likely that the same basic explanatory concepts apply to both "normal" and "abnormal" behaviors (except that in the latter case the effects of environmental factors are more dra­matic). The troublesome or dangerous behaviors that often are considered to reflect "mental illness" may simply be learned.

The extremely emotional behaviors that characterize phobias can be used as an illustration. A sudden, dramatic change in behavior can be observed when the phobic individual encounters certain situations (a situation may be "encountered" by thinking about it). Rapid heartbeat, sweating, blanching, and other conditioned reflexive responses may be seen as well as operant behav­iors, such as escape or avoidance responses. The question is "Why do these re­actions occur?" To say "He has a phobia" or "She has an emotional conflict" or "You have an unconscious fear" may get us off on the wrong foot in looking for the answers and in making suggestions for treatment. It might be more productive, as Skinner suggested, to consider these behaviors as learned re­sponses (for example, the result of the punishing consequences of some past behavior in a particular situation) and then to set out to change them directly, without attempting to analyze some "inner emotional problem." According to this view, the problem is in the behavior, not in the person.

Someone might ask "Well, what about the panicky thoughts and feelings that this fearful person has? Don't they exist within him (or her)? How do you deal with them?" It must constantly be remembered that Skinner did not differentiate between the basic nature of events "within the skin" and events in the surround­ing environment. Whatever occurs, occurs in a world of stimuli, responses, and consequences. An individual's thoughts and feelings are responses that can be conditioned and affected by stimuli and consequences, just as overt responses are. Many conditions affect both overt and covert responses; punishment and aversive control may result in emotional responses that anyone can see (overt escape and avoidance behaviors) as well as responses that only the individual directly expe-

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 85

riences (particular "feelings" and "thoughts"). The fact that some events are pub­lic and others are private does not necessarily make them subject to different prin­ciples—the explanations for both may well be the same.

As indicated earlier, much problem behavior can be traced to excessive aver-sive control or punishment. To escape, individuals may physically withdraw or run away, or they may do so through behaviors that are less easily observed, such as hallucinating, daydreaming, not paying attention, and so on. Counteraggres-sion against the controlling forces may occur; if there is no opportunity for this response, passivity may be an alternative way of avoiding aversive control.

Since various stimuli are present when a person is subjected to aversive control or punishment, these stimuli (through respondent conditioning) may later elicit the same emotional reactions of fear, anxiety, depression, anger, and so on that were elicited in the original situation. This process accounts for many of our "irrational" reactions. If a child is severely punished in school for not studying, various emotional responses will be aroused in the presence of school stimuli. These same responses—fear, anxiety, and so on—may then oc­cur whenever the child is in school or when she attempts to study. If other conditioning does not occur and if the emotional reactions do not extinguish, the child may eventually drop out of school and perhaps avoid educational sit­uations for the rest of her life. Obviously, this could have far-ranging effects on her. More extreme punishment might have even stronger effects; such intense fear, anxiety, or other reactions might occur that she would be considered "very neurotic" or "psychotic." Of course, seldom does a single occurrence in one's life have these dramatic effects. However, think about the possible effects of re­peated punishments and attempts at aversive control, applied year after year.

Problem behaviors can result from factors other than aversive control or punishment, such as inadequate positive reinforcement and reinforcement for inappropriate behaviors. For example, in a crowded home or school situation the parent or teacher may be too busy to pay attention to a child who is be­having well. This neglect may not be important if his good behavior is being reinforced in other ways, such as by peer approval and attention or through ac­tivities that can be engaged in alone. However, suppose these positive rein-forcers don't exist; for example, reading, writing, drawing, doing math, and other activities that can be done alone are not likely to produce reinforcing outcomes unless some level of proficiency is reached or unless progress is being made (that is, the student must be effectively manipulating the environment).

If children are being ignored when they are behaving well and good behav­ior is not being reinforced in other ways, there will be a tendency to develop a repertoire of behaviors that do get reinforced. Dramatic behaviors often get at­tention: crying, complaining, screaming, hitting, tardiness, truancy, vandalism, and so on. These behaviors may be shaped up and maintained by the attention they receive, even when the attention consists of reprimands and threats {any type of attention may be better than no attention). Children who behave in these ways are often given some label such as "extremely disruptive" or "emo­tionally disturbed," and the existing contingencies of reinforcement are ig­nored. When this happens, an explanatory fiction is being invoked.

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Behavior that is dangerous or troublesome to the individual or to society may require treatment. Skinner suggested that therapy should focus on changing observable behaviors and conditions, not on detecting some inner mental or emotional problem. His assumption was that troubling thoughts or feelings will improve when external behaviors and conditions are im­proved. An analysis of the contingencies of reinforcement in the person's life often indicates what needs to be changed. This involves evaluating the situa­tions to which the person is exposed, the specific ways in which she behaves in those situations, and the resulting consequences. Once these details are known, the person can be helped to change conditions that she finds aver-sive, to shape up and maintain more constructive behaviors, and to extin­guish unwanted behaviors.

Psychologists and other professionals who apply Skinnerian*concepts in treating problem behaviors usually are called "behavior modifiers" or "behav­ior analysts," and their approaches are called "behavior modification" or "ap­plied behavior analysis."14 Unlike many psychotherapists, they do not try to change something inside the person, such as a "weak ego" or a "distorted self-concept." They believe that success lies in finding and manipulating the conditions that produce and maintain problem behaviors, and their methods are being used with increasing frequency in a wide variety of situations. (The fundamentals of these methods also can be taught relatively quickly to parents, teachers, and others.) A first step in a behavior-modification program is to de­scribe precisely the behaviors of concern, so that there is an objective and spe­cific account of what needs changing. Then, as attempts are made to alter these behaviors, changes are monitored closely to assess the amount of progress be­ing made.

Some brief examples may help clarify the application of certain behavior-modification procedures. A child who behaves in withdrawn, antisocial ways may be "brought out" if those behaviors are ignored (extinguished) while at­tention (reinforcement) is given for any minor social acts. Next, increasing so­ciability would be required to maintain attention. (This is "shaping," a process that was discussed earlier.) Overly aggressive behavior sometimes can be dealt with by ignoring tantrums and other disruptive behaviors (if they are not so intense that the child or someone else may be injured) and by giving attention and approval for nonaggressive, cooperative behaviors. In mental hospitals, bizarre behaviors of psychotic patients sometimes change when such actions no longer are reinforced (when they do not result in attention from nurses, at­tendants, and so on) and when alternative, "normal" behaviors do bring rein­forcement. Autistic, nonverbal children and catatonic, mute adults have been treated effectively with shaping techniques; at first, any attention given to the "teacher" is reinforced (for example, with a treat such as gum, candy, or soda),

14For more information on the wide range of approaches used by behavior modifiers, see Raymond G. Miltenberger's Behavior Modification: Principles and Procedures (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1997).

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 87

then any sound, then closer and closer approximations to words, then responses to questions, and so on, until the person initiates speech.

A system used to change behaviors in various settings (including mental hospitals, schools, and homes for juvenile delinquents) is the token economy. "Tokens" (which may be in the form of poker chips, play money, and so on) are conditioned reinforcers; once earned, they can be exchanged for food, privileges, or other basic reinforcers. To earn tokens, individuals have to per­form some specified behavior: a mental-hospital patient may have to clean up his room; a student may have to complete a homework assignment; a delin­quent may have to refrain from fighting and attend classes regularly. Although generalization of the positive behaviors beyond the token-economy system is not always assured, this is a desirable possibility. In some cases the outcomes of the behaviors themselves become reinforcing, and therefore the token system can be fazed out. For example, the patient's cleaning may be reinforced by more tidy surroundings, the student's studying may be reinforced by what she is learning, and the delinquent's improved behaviors may be reinforced by new friendships and accomplishments.

Skinner provided an interesting analysis of why some traditional psy­chotherapists are effective in dealing with certain problem behaviors: they pro­vide a "nonpunishing audience." In receptive and uncritical therapy situations, patients may begin to emit behaviors that have been suppressed in other situa­tions because of punishment or threatened punishment. Forgotten experiences may be recalled, aggression may be displayed, and there may be illogical be ­haviors. Some of the effects of punishment extinguish when previously pun­ished behaviors occur in the presence of the nonpunishing therapist. In other words, the "emotional" reactions generated by these behaviors decrease. The patient feels less guilty, sinful, and so on and also is less likely to engage in es­cape or avoidance behaviors.

It should be mentioned that Skinner did not deny the possibility that some neurophysiological disorders (such as brain damage) can result in problem behaviors. He did, however, continually emphasize the importance of envi­ronmental determinants and felt that these factors should always be carefully analyzed to avoid jumping to premature conclusions about other causes.

As well as being applicable to more serious "abnormal" or troublesome be­haviors, Skinner's concepts can be applied to common personal behavioral problems in everyday life. Most of us would like to "improve ourselves" in some way or other. For example, we may feel that it would be better to be more pleasant to others. To bring about this modification of behavior, we could keep a week-long record of the number of times we say something pleasant to someone else (simply seeing these data is sometimes sufficient to cause a behavior change); this record gives a "baseline" with which to compare later frequencies of behavior. We can then set a goal to increase slightly the number of pleasant remarks; this goal should be reasonable enough to allow success (reinforcement) to occur. To help achieve this goal, some enjoyable (re­inforcing) activity that we perform regularly—having an extra cup of coffee,

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going to the movies, playing golf, or whatever—should be made contingent on saying something nice to another person. In other words, a positive rein-forcer is made to occur after the desired behavior is emitted.

Once the established goal is reached, then a new goal involving a higher response frequency can be set. Sometimes a point system (similar to a token economy) helps; each pleasant comment may be counted as a point, and a cer­tain number of points must then be earned before our improved behavior is reinforced by engaging in the enjoyable activity. The number of points re­quired can be gradually increased. An important aspect of "self-improvements" is that they are often maintained by their own reinforcing consequences; for example, other people are likely to react in "nicer" (more reinforcing) ways when we are more pleasant to them.

One of Skinner's interests in later life was the problems associated with growing old. As expected, he approached these problems from his behavioral perspective, emphasizing practical techniques that can be used to cope with the physical and intellectual limitations that result from aging. To remember to bring your umbrella, you should hang it on the doorknob whenever the weather forecast predicts rain; to remember good ideas, keep a notepad or tape recorder handy; to avoid forgetting what you were going to say while talking with someone, speak in shorter and simpler sentences; to be intellectually pro­ductive, work fewer hours per day and avoid taxing leisure-time activities such as chess or complicated puzzles (it's better to do nonintellectual things when relaxing); and, to lessen the fear of death, avoid continually talking about it, spend more time with younger people who are absorbed in life rather than death, and try to get involved in interesting activities. (His point was that, if more time is spent enjoyably, less time will be spent fearing death.)15 These are just a few of Skinner's suggestions for more successful aging. (For more sug­gestions, see Enjoy Old Age, referenced at the end of this chapter.)

A BRIEF REVIEW OF SOME MAJOR POINTS

Radical behaviorism emphasizes the effects of the environment on behavior, while also accepting the role of genetic endowment. Inner states (such as thoughts and feelings) are not seen as causes of behavior, but rather they need to be explained as effects resulting from environmental and genetic conditions.

15In an article by Alfie Kohn in Boston Magazine ("B. F. Skinner: Reinforced by Life," July 1984, pp. 100-101, 130, 132), Skinner was quoted as saying that he did not fear death but did fear not finishing his work. Shortly before his death, the New York Times (August 8, 1990, p. A15) reported Skinner as saying that he was neither worried nor anxious despite knowing that he would be dead in a few months from leukemia. Apparently, he was able to face death in the ways that he had suggested. (On August 10, 1990, about one week before he died, he gave a short keynote address at the American Psychological Associa­tion's annual convention and received an unprecedented award for his lifetime contribu­tions to psychology.)

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 89

Skinner's view was deterministic, giving no room to free will; to hold that hu­mans are capable of free choice would be to deny his basic assumption that be­havior is controlled by the environment and genes.

Though he acknowledged genetic influences on behavior, Skinner spent his career concentrating on environmental influences. The experimental labo­ratory, in which animals were studied under highly controlled conditions (using the "Skinner box"), provided him with ideas that he extended to many human situations, including education, the management of problem behaviors, and so­cial planning. His books Walden Two and Beyond Freedom and Dignity illustrate the extent to which his concepts were broadly applied.

Skinner distinguished between respondent behavior (which is elicited by spe­cific stimuli) and operant behavior (which is emitted and produces consequences). His studies of the latter allowed him to formulate various concepts of operant conditioning, including positive and negative reinforcement. In positive reinforce­ment, behavior is strengthened by the addition of a positive reinforcer; in negative reinforcement, behavior is strengthened by the removal of a negative reinforcer (or aversive stimulus).

Complex behaviors result from shaping, in which simpler responses are re­inforced initially, but then increasingly advanced behaviors are required for re­inforcements to continue. Once behaviors are established, they are maintained on schedules of reinforcement; an interval schedule is in effect if a response is rein­forced only after a passage of time, and a ratio schedule is in effect if the number of responses determines reinforcement.

In addressing issues such as self-control, creativity, conscious processes, drives, and emotions, Skinner emphasized environmental influences that control the ob­servable and covert behaviors involved. He argued strongly against views that these are internally controlled processes.

Skinner consistently opposed the widespread uses of aversive control and punishment as means of influencing behaviors and advocated substituting posi­tive reinforcement for these approaches. To deal with problem behaviors, he sug­gested analyzing the environment for both the causes and the remedies; again, he believed that changing the controlling environmental conditions results in behavioral changes.

COMMENTARY

Skinner s radical behaviorism is not the only form of behaviorism that exists to­day, but it has attracted the most attention, partly because of its many practical applications. It is also a strong, dramatically stated challenge to our traditional ways of explaining human behavior. An important aspect of this challenge that too often is given inadequate consideration is Skinner s approach to inner states, such as feelings and thoughts. As detailed earlier, he did not allow them to en­ter into his explanations of observable behaviors. Although acknowledging that feelings and thoughts exist, he did not consider them to be causes of our actions.

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In his view, they can be analyzed as effects: genetic endowment supplies the neu-rophysiological means to feel and think, but individual environmental histories and current circumstances determine the details of feelings and thoughts.

Skinner analyzed feelings, thoughts, and other inner events in essentially the same way as overt behaviors such as reading aloud, writing, driving a car, or throwing a ball. Whether an event is internal and publicly unobservable, or external and publicly observable, the crucial factors are genetic endowment and, most specifically, environmental experiences of the individual.

This brings us again to the controversial Skinnerian perspective: feelings and thoughts don't cause our behaviors; rather, they too are responses to be ex­plained. This contradicts much that we have learned as members of our society, which relies heavily on inner states—happiness, joy, hope, courage, depression, anxiety, sadness, anger, and so on—when explaining overt behaviof.

To repeat a very important point made earlier: Skinner would have us avoid the mistake of using states of mind or emotion as "explanatory fictions." For example, behavior is often attributed to feelings in statements such as "He didn't go to work today because he felt discouraged" or "I worked hard today because I felt good." In a Skinnerian analysis, however, it might be found that a lack of positive reinforcement on the job causes an employee to stay home from work and to feel discouraged, whereas working hard and feeling good can result from the presence of positive reinforcement. In other words, feelings and states of mind are collateral or accompanying products of the same environ­mental factors that affect overt behaviors.

Is it really important to avoid using feelings and states of mind as explana­tions of behavior? What harm does it do? The answer to these questions, from Skinner's perspective, is that it has led us astray in our attempts to deal with per­sonal and social problems. We focus too much on internal conditions that cannot be observed and changed directly and pay too little attention to environmental factors that can be directly observed and altered. In simple terms, we are wasting our time when we do not go immediately to the source of our problems.

Skinner believed that analyzing and changing contingencies of reinforcement (the situations in which behavior occurs, the behavior itself, and the conse­quences of behavior) provide the key to better individual and social function­ing. Attempting to analyze and change inner states is, at best, an indirect and inefficient route. In Skinner's view, in one way or another, sooner or later, ex­ternal conditions have to be changed if overt behaviors and feelings, thoughts, decisions, plans, motives, and so on are to improve.

To Skinner, there was no mystery as to why feelings and other inner states often are relied on to explain behavior. For one thing, they are immediate; that is, they frequently accompany overt behavior and are experienced "firsthand." For example, if we write a letter of complaint to a store from which we bought a defective product, we are likely to feel annoyed as we write the let­ter. If asked why we are writing the letter, the most immediate reason seems to be our annoyance. However, both the letter writing and the annoyance actu­ally are caused by objective, environmental circumstances. Because of their in-

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 91

tensity, stronger inner responses, such as anger, hatred, love, joy, or acute anxi­ety, are especially likely to be stated as causes for action.

Another reason why inner states are so often used to explain behavior is that environmental explanations frequently are very difficult to construct. A com­plex, very subtle, or long-past set of conditions may be determining a person's feelings and overt behaviors in a current situation. Given the difficulties of find­ing the critical environmental factors, the feelings become the explanation used.

By suggesting that inner states are not causal factors, Skinner by no means belittled their importance. In fact, he encouraged the widespread use of posi­tive reinforcement, which he believed produces good feelings. He contrasted this result with the unpleasant feelings produced in those whose behavior is controlled through negative reinforcement or punishment. Also, the methods of education that he proposed are designed to improve the covert behavior of thinking, as well as overt skills and performance. The implication of Skinner's approach is that better feelings, thoughts, and other inner states result from bet­ter external conditions.

Along with his challenge to traditional ways of considering inner states, Skinner suggested that our concepts of "freedom" and "dignity" also are outdated. In fact, they involve behaviors that hinder the development of a better-functioning society. In his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), he explained that attempts to escape or avoid control in any form prevent the widespread use of behavioral technology. In his view, we are so involved in preserving our freedom and dignity that we ignore the major advances, both individual and societal, that could be brought about through systematic, broadly applied behavior-management techniques (which are based on the concept of positive reinforcement).

Although agreeing that we should be free from aversive controlling mea­sures, such as threats of punishment, Skinner suggested that it is dangerous to label all control as bad. Also, if dignity or worth is given to individuals only when it seems that they have behaved autonomously, there will be a reluctance to use behavioral technology as a means of furthering human achievements. He believed that these are critical issues and that our survival may depend on whether or 'not we design a culture in which more desirable and constructive behaviors are shaped and maintained.

Skinner's assumption was that in one way or another our behaviors are controlled but that the greatest benefits are derived individually and socially (and the most freedom is felt) when control consists of systematic positive re­inforcement. He mentioned that he himself had been fortunate because so much of his behavior (for example, his research and writing) had been positively reinforced; therefore he felt free, even though he assumed that his behaviors (as well as everyone else's) were completely the result of genetic endowment and environmental conditions.

There are at least two levels at which Skinnerian psychology can be con­sidered. We have just discussed some issues that are related to one level, which has to do with larger, more "molar" applications of Skinner's approach. It is at

92 CHAPTER THREE

this level that the greatest amount of controversy exists. His challenges to long-established concepts of the causal role of inner states and of freedom and dig­nity have drawn much harsh criticism. The issues that he raised at this level are likely to be debated with fervor for quite some time.

At another, more "molecular" level, the behavioral approach consists of a number of concepts and procedures that have many practical uses. Skinner's ideas at the molar level do not have to be accepted completely before behavioral con­cepts and procedures can be applied at the more molecular level. Positive reinforcement, extinction, schedules of reinforcement, shaping, contingencies of reinforcement, and so on—all provide a basis for analyzing, controlling, and im­proving behavior. There are applications in settings such as institutions and hospi­tals, businesses and industries, schools and colleges, families, individual therapy situations, and self-control programs, with results that frequently are impressive.

The concept of "rule-governed behavior," which often is overlooked in dis­cussions of Skinnerian psychology, adds to the practical applicability of radical behaviorism. It points to the fact that behavior can be affected by advice, warn­ings, suggestions, instructions, laws, and so on. These "rules" generally refer to contingencies of reinforcement; that is, they indicate the probable consequences of certain responses in particular situations. Clearly expressed rules that accu­rately convey real-world contingencies are important in therapy, education, busi­ness, government, and, in fact, all situations in which persons interact verbally.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, whether or not a person typically fol­lows advice, warnings, suggestions, and so on is affected by the reinforcing consequences of doing so. We "trust" someone who gives us advice that, when followed, results in reinforcement; we therefore are more likely to follow fu­ture advice from that person (also, the effect may generalize, so that we are more likely to follow advice from others). Something similar occurs with re­gard to "imitation"; the tendency to imitate the behavior of others is strength­ened if doing as others do has reinforcing consequences.

As important as some "rules" are, they may not be followed. For example, Skinner saw serious difficulties facing those who are attempting to alleviate critical world problems by advising or warning others that certain current practices are likely to destroy us. Socially harmful actions such as polluting the environment, building nuclear weapons, and overpopulating the earth are of­ten immediately and powerfully reinforcing to those who are benefiting from them, and the dangerous long-range consequences are more remote, with less impact. He emphasized that, generally, "the more remote the predicted conse­quences, the less likely we are to follow advice" (Skinner, 1987, p. 5). Also, there is a tendency to avoid or ignore those who are sounding warnings, since the warnings are likely to be aversive stimuli.

Skinner was not optimistic about the future of the world, saying that it "may be fatally ill."16 Although he was optimistic about changing the behav-

U)See Kathleen Fisher's article "World's Prognosis Grim," APA Monitor, October 1982, p. 25. Included are a number of quotes from Skinner.

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 93

ior of individuals if the relevant environmental variables could be controlled, he thought that the relevant variables may be out of reach in the cases of some of our most pressing social problems. The most influential persons and institutions may be responding to factors that are difficult or impossible to al­ter. The best chance seems to be that political, industrial, and religious leaders eventually will be governed by the advice and warnings being offered. But how, or if, that will come about is uncertain. It would help if more immed­iate consequences for the behaviors of leaders could be established—conse­quences that would strengthen constructive actions on their part. In addition, perhaps the young can be educated to become more responsive leaders. Skinner believed that, if the future is to be a promising one, science and technology must lead the way and findings from the experimental analysis of behavior must be applied.

This "Commentary" began with a discussion of Skinner's views on feel­ings, thoughts, and other inner states. It should be vividly clear that he did not ignore these phenomena, but provided an analysis of them that differs radically from traditional views. Unfortunately, this analysis often is over­looked or misunderstood, even by those who give attention to other aspects of his contributions. Jensen and Burgess (1997) examined 15 recent in t ro­ductory psychology texts and found that "Skinner's viewpoint [on cognitive processes] is either said not to exist, is distorted in a brief acknowledgement, or is simply ignored. The result is that the student receives an incomplete or distorted picture of the discipline and one of its key thinkers" (p. 229). D e -Bell and Harless (1992) questioned undergraduate and graduate psychology students, as well as faculty members in psychology departments, and found "that individuals at varying levels of education in psychology maintain some misperceptions about his ideas" (p. 71); they point out that this occurs even though "B. F. Skinner is probably the most prominent figure in American psychology" (p. 68).

When Korn, Davis, and Davis (1991) surveyed 93 psychology department chairpersons, Skinner was rated first for both "all-time" and "contemporary" importance in the field. How can it be that a psychologist as renowned as Skinner is so frequently misinterpreted? Possibly, some of his ideas are avoided or altered because they suggest that our behaviors, including thinking, are con­trolled by environmental and genetic influences; we are not, in his view, able to make autonomous, "free" decisions. It may be easier to acknowledge the eminence of B. F. Skinner than it is to accurately acknowledge his ideas in a society that values (reinforces) notions of individual autonomy and freedom from control. However, as indicated on the back cover of Mecca Chiesa's 1994 book, Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science, it is likely that "mis­conceptions, misinterpretations, and misrepresentations have kept the human­ity and the promise of this approach . . . from those who would have welcomed and used it if they had been properly informed."

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REFER

Primary Sources (Skinner's Own Writings)

The behavior of organisms. (1938). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Walden two. (1948). New York: Macmillan.

Science and human behavior. (1953). New York: Macmillan.

Teaching machines. (1961, November). Sci­entific American, pp. 90-102.

Behaviorism at fifty. (1963, May 31). Science, pp. 951-958.

Autobiography. (1967). In E. G. Boring & G. Lindzey (Eds.), A history of psychol­ogy in autobiography (Vol. 5, pp. 385-413). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

The technology of teaching. (1968). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis. (1969). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

The machine that is man. (1969, April). Psychology Today, pp. 20-25, 60-63.

Beyond freedom and dignity. (1971). New York: Knopf.

Cumulative record: A selection of papers (3rd ed.). (1972). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

About behaviorism. (1974). New York: Knopf.

Particulars of my life. (1976). New York: Knopf. This is the first volume of Skinner s autobiography. The other two volumes are The shaping of a be-haviorist (1979) and A matter of conse­quences (1983), also published by Knopf.

Reflections on behaviorism and society. (1978). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Enjoy old age: Living fully in your later years. (1983). New York: Norton. The coau­thor is M. E. Vaughan.

Origins of a behaviorist. (1983, Septem­ber). Psychology Today, pp. 22-33.

"Chapter footnotes contain additional references.

NCES*

Upon further reflection. (1987). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Recent issues in the analysis of behavior. (1989). Columbus, OH: Merrill.

Can psychology be a science of the mind? (1990). American Psychologist, 45, 1206-1210.

Secondary Sources

Bjork, D.W. (1993). B. F Skinner: A life. New York: Basic Books.*

Bower, G. H., & Hilgard, E. R. (1981). The­ories of learning (5th ed., pp. 169-211). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Chiesa, M. (1994). Radical behaviorism: The philosophy and science. Boston: Authors Cooperative.

DeBell, C. S., & Harless, D. K. (1992). B. E Skinner: Myth and misperception. Teaching of Psychology 79(2), 68-73.

Eisenberger, R., & Cameron, J. (1996). Detrimental effects of rewards: Reality or myth? American Psychologist, 51, 1153-1156.

Evans, R. I. (1968). B. F Skinner: The man and his ideas. New York: Dutton.

Hall, C. S., & Lindzey, G. (1978). Theories of personality (3rd ed., pp. 637-680). New York: Wiley.

Hall, E. (1972, November). Will success spoil B. E Skinner? Psychology Today, pp. 65-72,130.

Hall, M. (1967, September). An interview with "Mr. Behaviorist"—B. E Skinner. Psychology Today, pp. 21-23, 68-71.

Jensen, R., & Burgess, H. (1997). Myth-making: How introductory psychol­ogy texts present B. F. Skinners analy­sis of cognition. Psychological Record, 47,221-232.

Kohn, A. (1993). Punished by rewards. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

KornJ . H., Davis, R., & Davis, S. F. (1991). Historians' and chairpersons'judgments

B. F. SKINNER AND RADICAL BEHAVIORISM 9 5

of eminence among psychologists. American Psychologist, 46,789-792.

Krasner, L. (1989). A Utopian voice speaks out. The Behavior Therapist, 12,247,257.

LangoneJ. (1983, September). B. F. Skin­ner: Beyond reward and punishment. Discover, pp. 38-46.

Lattal, K. A. (Ed.). (1992). Reflections on B. F. Skinner and psychology [Special issue]. American Psychologist, 47.

Nye, R. D. (1992). The legacy ofB. F Skin­ner. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Vargas, E. A., & Vargas, J. S. (1996). B. F. Skinner and the origins of pro­grammed instruction. In L. D. Smith & W. R. Woodward (Eds.), B. F Skinner and behaviorism in American culture (pp. 237-253). Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press & Associated Univer­sity Presses.

ssa

4

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC

PHENOMENOLOGY

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ROGERS

Carl R . Rogers was born January 8, 1902, in Oak Park, a suburb of Chicago; he died in La Jolla, California, on February 4, 1987, at age 85, following surgery for a broken hip. His father was a contractor and civil

engineer. Both his parents were religiously oriented, although his mother was the more firmly fundamentalist in her views. The family was closely knit, and Rogers indicated that his parents were "devoted and loving," very practical, and "down to earth." There were six children altogether, five of whom were boys.

When Rogers was 12, his parents bought a farm 30 miles from Chicago. During his high school years, he was expected to take responsibility for chores and other farm work. His school grades were very good, and in 1919 he en­tered the University of Wisconsin. There he took part in many activities, in­cluding a trip to China as a delegate to a World Student Christian Federation Conference. He also developed a duodenal ulcer, which forced him out of col­lege for a time. He received his degree in history in 1924, having taken only one psychology course, and that same year he married. (Rogers's wife died in 1979; they had two children. His daughter sometimes worked with him on projects, and his son entered the field of medicine.)

Rogers's graduate studies began at Union Theological Seminary in New York. Although he found his studies there to be very stimulating, he began to realize that he didn't want to be tied to a specific religious doctrine. Eventually

97

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he transferred to Teachers College, Columbia University, to work in clinical and educational psychology. He received his Ph.D. from this institution in 1931.

In 1928, before receiving his doctorate, he began working in Rochester, New York, primarily with delinquent and underprivileged children referred by courts and agencies to the Child Study Department of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Later, for a brief time, he was director of the Rochester Guidance Center. In 1940 he went to Ohio State University as a professor, and from 1945 until 1957 he was associated with the Counseling Center at the University of Chicago. He then moved on to the University of Wisconsin. In 1964 he joined the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute as a resident fellow. From 1968 until his death, he was a resident fellow at the Cen­ter for Studies of the Person in La Jolla, California.

Some of Rogers's books are Counseling and Psychotherapy (1942), Client-Centered Therapy (1951), On Becoming a Person (1961), Carl Rogers on Encounter Groups (1970), Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives (1972), Carl Rogers on Personal Power (1977), A Way of Being (1980), and Freedom to Learn for the 80's (1983). Two collections of Rogers's works, published after his death, were edited by Howard Kirschenbaum and Valerie Land Henderson. These are The Carl Rogers Reader (1989) and Carl Rogers: Dialogues (1989).

HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Rogers's view of humans generally is referred to as a "self theory," a "phe -nomenological theory," or an "actualization theory." Each of these labels emphasizes some important aspect of his thinking. The phrase "humanistic phenomenology" isn't commonly used. However, in my opinion, it is quite appropriate for summing up Rogers's position.

According to Abraham Maslow, the well-known former professor at Bran-deis University, humanistic psychology constitutes a "third force" in American psychology, the other two forces being psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Rogers can be considered part of this "third force." Like Maslow, he saw humans as having a natural tendency toward actualization. (Although "actual­ization" is not identical in Maslow's and Rogers's theories, in both cases it includes the growth and fulfillment of basic potentialities. Humans are viewed as essentially growth oriented, forward moving, and concerned with existential choices.) Rogers assumed that basic human nature is positive—that there is nothing inherently negative or evil about us. He suggested that, if we are not forced into socially constructed molds, but rather are accepted for what we are, we will live in ways that enhance both ourselves and society. According to Rogers, humans basically need and want both personal fulfillment and close, intimate relationships with others. All in all, it certainly seems that his perspec­tive is a humanistic one.

How does phenomenology fit in? Phenomenology stresses the importance of the individual's immediate conscious experiences in determining reality, and

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 9 9

Rogers maintained that knowledge of these individual perceptions of reality is required for the understanding of human behavior. He suggested that each of us behaves in accordance with our subjective awareness of ourselves and of the world around us. The implication is that objective reality (whatever that might be) is not the important determinant of our actions; rather, we react on the basis of how we view that reality. Some people try to test very carefully their subjective assumptions about reality by considering as many sources of infor­mation as possible (for example, various sensory data, other persons' opinions, and the results of scientific studies), whereas others are less attuned to possibly conflicting information and hold more rigidly to particular perspectives.

There is no one sure path to a "true reality" by which to live, but Rogers believed that openness and responsiveness to all information-gathering possi­bilities will generally keep the individual going in a satisfactory direction to­ward increasing growth and fulfillment (actualization). The person must be open and responsive to inner experiencing (sensations, feelings, thoughts, and so on) as well as to the external environment. Humans, according to Rogers, do not know their full potential. We are in a state of "being and becoming," and it is inappropriate at the present time to establish absolute criteria about the level of actualization that can be achieved. Everything possible should be done to promote an atmosphere in which we can continue to expand ourselves per­sonally and socially, but the long-range outcomes of the unfolding of human development are beyond the realm of present knowledge.

In both his therapeutic and his research work, Rogers used a phenomeno-logical approach in his attempts to understand human behavior. He tried to unravel the difficulties of perceiving reality through another person's eyes. Of special importance are his efforts to understand how individuals view them­selves—that is, the assumptions they make about who and what they are and about the nature of their relationships with others.

A few simple examples may clarify further the importance of considering an individual's view of reality when attempting to understand his or her be­havior. One person might perceive a large approaching dog as something to be feared, whereas another person might see the same dog as neutral or friendly. As*a result, the behaviors of these two individuals in response to the dog are likely to be different. Similarly, the behaviors of each of three persons undergoing a job change will be different if one sees the change as a challenge, another views it as a threat to security, and the third perceives it as an annoy­ance. The way each of us perceives the reality of ourselves is also extremely im­portant. Persons who think of themselves as having little worth and who don't trust their own decision-making power are bound to behave differently from those who feel that they are worthy and who are confident of their ability to make choices about their lives.

In brief, then, referring to Rogers's theory of personality as "humanistic phenomenology" calls attention to his respect for human beings as individuals who have, as their most basic nature, a tendency to strive for growth and fulfillment and who must be understood in terms of their particular concep­tualizations of reality. Rogers was fundamentally an optimist about human

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potential. He felt that, if people are freed from restricting, corrupting social in­fluences, they can achieve a high level of personal and interpersonal function­ing and can avoid the reality distortions that prevent the achievement of ever-greater growth and fulfillment (actualization).

D E T E R M I N I S M PLUS FREEDOM

The issue of determinism (the view that behavior is determined by various fac­tors outside the person's control) versus freedom (the view that behavior is a function of personal choice or free will) is rather complex in Rogers s think­ing. He advocated a position that acknowledges both of these possibilities. He stated that determinism "is the foundation stone of present-day science" (Rogers, 1983, p. 295), and as a scientist he accepted the fact that behavior is absolutely determined. He believed that valuable information can be gathered by studying the objective factors that influence human behavior; however, he went on to suggest that this information is used most productively only when it is combined with data from other sources— namely from one's own subjec­tive experiencing and from the empathic understanding of others. In other words, objective scientific inquiry (based on deterministic assumptions) has a place in the study of humans, but this approach is limited because it leaves out something: inner human experiencing (that is, the totality of inner sensations, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories, and so on). To understand this expe­riencing more fully, persons must subjectively evaluate themselves and attempt to gain empathic understanding (phenomenological knowledge) of the expe­riencing of others.

As a scientist Rogers recognized the usefulness of a deterministic view. As a therapist his emphasis was different. He saw the utility of conceiving of hu­mans in the therapeutic relationship as having freedom of choice based on an openness and responsiveness to the totality of their experiencing. He suggested that, as therapy progresses, individuals become more and more able to make decisions and to choose to act on these decisions. He believed that his clients (Rogers preferred to use the term "client" rather than "patient") developed toward freedom as they became less defensive and less distorted in their reac­tions to their total inner experiencing and their social and physical environ­ments. Maladjusted persons, according to Rogers, are less free; their behavior is patterned more rigidly; they are relatively incapable of exerting free choice and often feel uncomfortably inhibited or restricted. This is because they are denying or distorting their inner experiencing as well as their environmental circumstances.

Rogers believed that, when persons are functioning well, they experience a feeling of considerable freedom. Such individuals also behave as if they were free. It can be said that they choose to act in effective ways, consistent with all the internal and external stimuli that are present. However, from a different perspective it can be said that their behavior is determined by all the existing

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factors, since certain behaviors will be more satisfying than others. Rogers seemed to mean that, at the same time the individual chooses, his or her behavior is being determined by all the relevant conditions that exist. The open, responsive person is fully aware of all that is going on inside and also has an accurate pic­ture of existing external factors. This individual is free, but he or she will take a particular course of action; in the presence of all available stimuli there are cer­tain behaviors that are most productive from both subjective and objective points of view. In this case there isn't any contradiction between free will and determinism—in a sense, they coincide.

If this discussion seems labored, take heart; Rogers himself admitted that he was "perplexed" about the paradox that exists between determinism and free­dom. One of his most important thoughts on the matter is that both assump­tions are important. In his view, determinism serves a vital function in scientific analyses of behavior, and the notion of freedom is critical for effective personal and interpersonal functioning (for example, in therapeutic relationships).

SOURCES OF DATA

Rogers's ideas developed mainly in the context of client-centered therapeutic relationships. A word must be said at this point regarding this type of therapy, which originated with Rogers. (The subject will be discussed in greater de­tail in a later section of this chapter.) The term "client" is used because it em­phasizes the person's active, voluntary, and responsible participation; also, it suggests equality between the therapist and the person seeking help, avoiding the implication that the individual is sick or that he or she is being experi­mented upon.

The focus in client-centered therapy is on clients' efforts to come to grips with their true experiencing and to develop more meaningful and satisfying ways of living. Rogers believed that individuals have the capacity within them to discover what is making them anxious and unhappy and to bring about changes in their lives. This capacity may be latent, however, because of various negative parental and social forces; in such cases client-centered therapists may be able to help mobilize inherent tendencies toward personal understanding and growth. The therapist provides a warm, accepting atmosphere within which clients can express themselves openly It is not the therapist's job to give advice or to "set the clients straight." Rather, the task is to provide honest ac­ceptance and understanding during the clients' struggles toward greater aware­ness of their inner experiencing and of the environmental influences that are affecting them.

Some of these ideas, and a realization of their uniqueness, crystalized for Rogers in 1940. There was an interplay between therapy and theory as he formulated hypotheses from his clinical practice and then attempted to sub­stantiate these hypotheses in further clinical work. He felt that his clinical ex­periences provided considerable support for his views on human nature and

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the ways in which its development can be either stunted or fostered. Expand­ing on his findings as a therapist, he gathered additional support for his ideas as he moved into other areas of interest: encounter groups, intimate relation­ships, education, and conflict resolution. He cont inued to believe in the validity of his basic concepts, and his ongoing experiences with people sustained this belief.

Rogers was not satisfied with simply making subjective judgments about the validity of his theoretical assumptions. He and his colleagues attempted to substantiate various hypotheses about the conditions favoring human growth and fulfillment by objectively studying the changes that occur in individuals during client centered therapy. For example, recordings were made (with clients' permission) of various sessions during the therapeutic process (Rogers and his students pioneered this approach in 1940). Through analysis of these recordings, it was determined that certain typical and fairly orderly changes take place under the conditions of genuine acceptance and empathy that exist in the client-centered therapeutic relationship:

1. Verbal statements of "problems" and derogatory comments about oneself tend to diminish as therapy progresses.

2. Insightful and self-accepting statements (and, in some cases, statements in­dicating acceptance of others), as well as discussions of plans, goals, and de­cisions, tend to occur with increased frequency in later sessions.

Of course, not all clients show this pattern, but Rogers was encouraged by the number who do.

A method that has been applied in the study of changes in clients' concepts of themselves before, during, and after therapy is the Q-sort. At the beginning of therapy it is common for a large difference to exist between clients' percep­tions of what they are like (the self) and their perceptions of what they feel they should be and want to be (the ideal self). This discrepancy between the self and the ideal self can be measured with the Q-sort, which provides an ob­jective measure of the client's subjective experiencing. The client may be asked to sort 100 or so statements, each printed on a separate card. Statements such as "I am lazy," "I often feel guilty," "I am usually happy," and "I express my feel­ings openly" are put into various piles along a continuum ranging from one extreme ("very characteristic of me") to the opposite extreme ("not at all characteristic of me") . Typically the client has the opportunity to use from 9 to 11 different piles, with the middle pile the one for statements about which he or she feels neutral. The client may be told that a certain number of state­ments must be placed in each pile; this is to encourage discriminations among the statements as they relate to him or her and to facilitate statistical analyses.

When clients sort the statements first according to the way they see them­selves at present (the self-sort) and then according to the way they feel they would like to be (the ideal-sort), the correspondence between their selves and their ideal selves can be computed quantitatively (using a statistical technique called correlational analysis). As mentioned previously, this procedure may be

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 0 3

used before, during, and after therapy in order to measure changes in the dis­crepancy between the self and the ideal self. This discrepancy should decrease as client-centered therapy progresses; clients should become more the way they want to be as well as, to some extent, less "idealistic" about what they should be. Even though these results haven't always been obtained, there has been some support for Rogers's hypotheses concerning positive changes in self-perceptions during therapy. What is most important here is that Rogers attempted to provide objective, quantitative evidence for his assumptions.

We have covered two major examples of research efforts to provide objec­tive, scientific evidence for some of Rogers's assumptions. There are additional efforts that could be mentioned, some providing substantial support for Rogerian thinking and others yielding contradictory data. The main point is that his views remain viable, important, and well worth considering. Next to be discussed are a number of concepts that Rogers developed to explain per­sonality development and structure and that constitute his theory of personal­ity. Some of these have been mentioned before.

It must be pointed out that Rogers did not make the construction of a personality theory his primary concern. His main focus was on the process of personality change. Out of that central interest, however, certain ideas emerged that do constitute a theory of personality. His theoretical concepts are primar­ily inferences drawn from his clinical experiences and other observations.

THE A C T U A L I Z I N G TENDENCY

According to Rogers, the actualizing tendency is the single, basic human motive. He believed that the human organism inherently tends to maintain itself and to strive for enhancement; this is what he meant by "actualization." The phrase "growth and fulfillment," used earlier, refers to major aspects of actualization and in general can be considered as synonymous with that term. Actualization, however, also includes maintenance of the organism.

In Rogers's view we are set at birth to grow productively toward fulfill­ment. We are basically active and forward moving, and, if conditions are favor­able, we will attempt to develop our potentialities to their maximum. The specifics of human growth vary from person to person; in other words, not everyone will do exactly the same things when conditions are proper for ac­tualization. To illustrate: one individual may choose to become intensely in­volved in family life and the nurturance of children, striving to heighten his experiences within that context, whereas another person may be heavily in­volved in increasing her professional competence and in developing meaning­ful nonmarital relationships. Rogers suggested that there is no need to assume separate motives for these different behaviors; it is sufficient to posit one pri­mary motive—the actualizing tendency—and then to go on and study the con­ditions under which actualization occurs, whatever this involves in terms of specific behaviors.

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Although actualization differs from person to person with regard to specifics, there are still some generalizations that apply. Some common charac­teristics resulting from the actualization process are flexibility rather than rigidity, openness rather than defensiveness, and autonomy (increased freedom from external control) rather than heteronomy.

Rogers was holistic in his thinking, tending to look at the complete organ­ism in order to understand and explain behavior. He conceptualized a total functioning individual rather than trying to analyze each behavior as an iso­lated event. His concept of the actualizing tendency applied to the organism as a whole; this tendency is the only central source of energy, and it mobilizes the entire organism toward maintenance and enhancement. It involves (in addi­tion to those things mentioned in the preceding paragraph) such areas as attempts to get air, water, food, and so on, the differentiation of the body's organs and functions, increased effectiveness in using tools and other cultural implements, and fulfillment through reproduction. The healthy human organ­ism is moved toward greater and greater growth in its capabilities as a result of the actualizing tendency—if conditions exist that are conducive to this growth. Rogers stressed that developing individuals need to experience un­conditional acceptance from other persons who are significant in their lives.

THE SELF A N D SELF-ACTUALIZATION

The notion of self or self-concept is so important in Rogers s psychology that his theory is often referred to as a "self theory." In The Carl Rogers Reader (refer­enced at the end of this chapter), he stated that "the way that the person looks at him or herself is the most important factor in predicting future behavior, because along with a realistic self-concept goes a realistic perception of exter­nal reality and the situation in which the individual finds him- or herself" (p. 209). The self is an outgrowth of certain aspects of individual experiencing. The newborn infant is an organism whose inner experiencing (also referred to as the phenomenal field or subjective world) is a relatively undifFerentiated total­ity of sensations and perceptions that constitute his or her reality. As the actu­alizing tendency moves the infant toward maintenance and enhancement of experienced potentialities, interaction occurs with significant other persons (for example, the mother and father). As this happens, part of the infant's or-ganismic experiencing differentiates into a "self" or "self-concept." Certain sensations and perceptions become discriminated as "I," "me," "myself" or as related to "I," "me," "myself." These are self-experiences.

Rogers pointed out that there is a tendency for the self to be a fluid and changing totality, but at any given time it has certain properties that can be at least partially measured by objective methods such as the Q-sort. As the self is portrayed here, it is a special part of the individual's total organismic experi­encing. The person may not be fully aware at any given time of all experienc­ing that constitutes or relates to the self, but such awareness is a possibility.

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 0 5

Sometimes it is difficult to state something in simple terms without losing essential meanings. However, the following is an attempt to rephrase the two preceding paragraphs in easier-to-understand language and to make a few ad­ditional points: Infants at birth are not aware of themselves as unique entities, except perhaps in a very general way. As they develop and as their parents and other significant persons interact with them, there is a growing awareness in each child that there is something that is him or her. The child begins to make statements such as "J want . . .," "/ feel like . . . , " "Give that to me," "This is mine/' and "Let me do it." These self-perceptions initially tend to be change­able, and the child sometimes feels "happy," sometimes "insecure," sometimes "aggressive," and so on. Some persons continue to remain quite aware of many of their sensations, perceptions, feelings, thoughts, memories, and so on and in­corporate a large number of these inner experiences into their self-concepts. Other persons develop more limited and static views of who and what they are. Rogers believed that humans have the potential to be aware of their total experiencing, but to do so requires openness and responsiveness to this experi­encing; this may or may not be encouraged by significant others (such as parents during childhood and marriage partners or close friends during adulthood). If significant others are accepting of the full variety of a person s inner experi­encing, the self-concept of that individual is likely to be very "rich"—it will not have to be molded according to someone else's criteria (this topic will be discussed in more detail shortly).

As the self or self-concept develops, the actualizing tendency operates to actualize this emerging portion of the organism. Rogers referred to this as the tendency toward 5e/^actualization.The self-actualizing tendency can be consid­ered as a subsystem of the more basic actualizing tendency. (Remember, the ac­tualizing tendency is the underlying organismic motive. The development of the self is an outgrowth of the general tendency toward maintenance and en­hancement of the organism; as this self is forming, some of the actualizing ten­dency expresses itself in self-actualization.)

Before we continue, here is a summary of what has been said so far in this chapter: Rogers was humanistic, believing that humans are innately good and that they ar£ growth oriented. He also held a phenomenological view, which im­plies that it is important to understand an individuals perceptions of reality if his or her behavior is to be understood. He believed that determinism is an appro­priate view for the scientist who is looking for cause-and-effect relationships but that it is essential in other circumstances to consider humans as having freedom. Rogers pursued his study of humans both through objective research and through therapeutic and other subjective interpersonal relationships. A basic assumption in Rogerian psychology is that the organism (which can be consid­ered as the locus of all experiencing—it is a more technical term than "human being") has an actualizing tendency as its single, basic, underlying motive. The actualizing tendency serves to maintain and enhance the organism s experi­ences and potentialities; that is, it encourages actualization. An outcome of the growth and elaboration of the organism is the development of a self or self-concept. Some of the actualizing tendency becomes invested in the expansion

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and fulfillment of the self or self-concept, and this subsystem of the actualizing tendency is referred to as the self-actualizing tendency.

THE ORGANISMIC VALUING PROCESS

The organismic valuing process supplements the actualizing tendency It is associ­ated with actualization and helps to explain in more detail the positive direc­tion of organismic growth.

In Rogers's opinion, the organismic valuing process in infants is very effi­cient and soundly based. The infant s values are very clear; preferences and dis­likes are quite obvious. Experiences that maintain and enhance (actualize) the organism are preferred; experiences that do not actualize the orgahism are re­jected. Infants value food positively when hungry and negatively when sati­ated. Positive values are generally associated with the warmth and security of "cuddling" and with new experiences, such as investigating their own bodies, learning to walk, and playing with new toys (as Rogers pointed out, infants display an "endless curiosity"). Pain, sudden loud noises, and bitter tastes are negatively valued.

We start out in life knowing what we like and dislike and, generally speak­ing, what is good and not good for us. In the infant stage the valuing process is ongoing and flexible and operates smoothly. The criterion for whether some­thing is positively or negatively valued rests on whether or not it maintains and/or enhances the organism and, once developed, the self. The valuing process at this early period of life functions spontaneously, without precon­ceived judgments or concerned and detailed thought.

Rogers believed strongly that we would all be better off if we were able to retain this kind of functioning—that is, if the organismic valuing process could continue to operate smoothly and flexibly This evaluating process occurs within the individual and is intimately tied to inner experiences of desirability or unde-sirability for the individual. As mentioned above, each of us begins life subjectively knowing what is appropriate or inappropriate for our own development and ful­fillment. What happens to this internal guide for living? Rogers pointed out that, by adulthood, many of us have lost contact with our organismic valuing process. We tend to become inflexible, uncertain, and uncomfortable in our val­ues and often live unproductively with defensiveness and anxieties. Somewhere along the way to adulthood the inherent valuing process that should have led to ever more fruitful and fulfilling ways of living (that is, toward higher and higher levels of actualization) ceased to operate properly. Why? The answer to this ques­tion, which has already been hinted at, will now be discussed more fully

UNCONDITIONAL POSITIVE REGARD

When the self develops, the individual wants love and acceptance; there is a need for positive regard from others. Rogers suggested that this need for love and affection is innate (Frick, 1971, p. 90). Because of this need, certain other

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 107

persons in a child's life (and later in the adult's life) assume great importance. These significant others (for example, parents) can strongly influence the indi­vidual by giving and withholding love and acceptance, and their influence may overcome that of the organismic valuing process. In other words, to be ac­cepted and to gain needed love and affection, the child may be forced to please parents and other significant persons and to ignore his or her own inner expe­riencing. The child may gradually become less and less "tuned in" to himself or herself and more and more a product of social influence. If other persons determine what is "right" or "wrong" and "good" or "bad," the role of the in­dividual's organismic valuing process is usurped.

Early in life, then, we learn to view ourselves as others view us. We come to like or dislike our total configuration of self-experiences independently of the immediate presence of our parents or other significant persons. In other words, we incorporate within ourselves a set of values that initially was applied externally. The internalization of these values of significant others results in alienation from our own organismic valuing process.1

The introjected values of others, which we come to live by to greater or lesser extents, generally tend to be rigid and unchanging, in contrast to the flexible and changing values of the organismic valuing process operating in early infancy. Rogers suggested a number of introjected values that are often learned in the home, at school, in church, from the government, and so on; these values may be out of line with organismic experiencing, but they are of­ten accepted in order to retain the positive regard of significant other persons:

1. Sexuality is bad. 2. Unquestioning obedience to authority is good. 3. Making money is very important. 4. Scholarly learning is good. 5. Unstructured, aimless learning is a waste of time. 6. Communism is totally bad.

Other examples might be the common beliefs that it is improper for men to cry or hug each other and for women to be independent or assertive.

An important point is that the person's self-regard (one's view of one's own worth) is determined by these introjected values. As Rogers indicated,

'According to Rogers, the incorporation of parents' values and standards, if they are incon­sistent with one's own organismic experiencing and valuing process, can be detrimental to society as well as to the individual. The person who loses contact with basic organismic experiencing, and the organismic valuing process, is more likely to develop characteristics such as anxiety and hostility and less likely to contribute to a harmonious society.

This reasoning can be contrasted with Freud's view. He held that the incorporation of the parents' values and standards through identification (during resolution of the Oedi­pus complex) is important for ensuring that society's norms are passed on to the next gen­eration. This event, which results in growth of the superego, socializes the child and brings more control over instinctual, infantile impulses. As a result, it contributes to mak­ing society more, rather than less, harmonious (though the fundamental conflict between basic human nature and society's demands will continue to exist).

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the individual "becomes in a sense his own significant social other" (Rogers, 1959, p. 224). Conditions of worth develop in this way, so that we have regard for ourselves only when we think, feel, and act in certain specified ways; other thoughts, feelings, and actions (which have not been accepted by sig­nificant others) are considered unworthy and tend to be excluded from our self-concepts in order to maintain self-regard. Some self-experiences may be excluded even though they are valid according to the organismic valuing process (that is, certain self-experiences may be rejected despite their actual­izing value; the basic, natural maintenance and enhancement of the organism and self are therefore disregarded in favor of imposed standards).

The thoughts, feelings, and actions approved by significant others (and eventually approved by individuals themselves in order to maintain positive re­gard and self-regard) may be so different from the experiences appfoved by the person's own organismic valuing process that an almost complete dissociation develops between the self-concept and basic inner experiencing. This situation is very unhealthy and causes the person to function in a restricted and ineffi­cient way and to experience tension and anxiety.

Does the alienation of the person from the organismic valuing process have to occur? No, it does not, according to Rogers. However, in a world in which there are so many imposed values of good and bad, right and wrong, desirable and undesirable, it is highly unusual when an individual escapes the deadening influence of social norms and standards passed on by parents, teachers, employ­ers, friends, marriage partners, and the other significant persons from whom acceptance is needed. Nevertheless, it is still hypothetically possible that indi­viduals can remain in contact with the organismic valuing process and con­tinue throughout life to maintain and enhance themselves according to their natural organismic potentialities. A necessary condition for this to happen is the experiencing of unconditional positive regard, which is one of the most sig­nificant concepts in Rogers s psychology.

Unconditional positive regard is received when a person perceives that all of his or her self-experiences (feelings, thoughts, sensations, and so on) are equally worthy of positive regard from significant others. Unconditional positive re­gard is given when all of the self-experiences of another person are valued equally; in other words, no conditions of worth are imposed on that individ­ual. Rogers suggested that "acceptance" and "prizing" are generally synony­mous with "unconditional positive regard" If we are accepted or prized, we are valued unconditionally; we are allowed awareness of the full range of our in­ner experiencing and do not have to deny or reject any aspect of that experi­encing in order to gain and maintain positive regard from others.

Unconditional positive regard should not be considered an absolute, all-or-nothing concept. It is probably impossible to experience complete uncondi­tional positive regard from another person or for another person. It exists to greater or lesser extents in various interpersonal situations, and it can often be increased.

To clear up a possible area of confusion, I should point out that, if a person is accepted or prized, it does not necessarily follow that all of his or her behav-

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 0 9

iors must be valued equally (Rogers, 1959, p. 225). For example, hitting another person may be frowned on; but the person who hits, and the desire to hit, can be accepted. In this way, unconditional positive regard is maintained.

Following this line of reasoning, it would be possible for parents to express displeasure with certain of their child's actions, such as throwing food at the dinner table, beating up a younger sibling, banging on the wall with a ham­mer, being rude to a neighbor, or pulling the dog's tail, while at the same time making it known to the child that they accept the fact that he or she wants to do these things. That is, they would not let the child's behaviors interfere with their overall love or with their acceptance of the child's feelings.

Practical applications of unconditional positive regard are obviously quite difficult to accomplish at times. In the face of a child's (or anyone's) annoying and disruptive behaviors, it isn't always easy to be accepting of that individual's essential being. We often tend to get angry and threaten to withdraw love, af­fection, or acceptance. Yet anger needn't have the ill effects associated with withdrawing love; it is possible to "prize" others even though we are angered by them. (In Rogers's earlier writings the emphasis seemed to be on a rather even-tempered approach to others, specifically by therapists. Later he suggested that, within the context of an accepting relationship, a. variety of emotions can be expressed mutually and productively even if anger or annoyance is involved [Frick,1971,p. 102].)

A parent, teacher, or friend can convey to a child, student, or peer that love and acceptance are not at stake, despite the fact that annoyance, anger, or disap­proval of a particular behavior is being expressed. It is important that respect for persons and their thoughts and feelings be maintained regardless of the specifics of the interaction at any given time. If this occurs, individuals should not have to cut themselves off from their inner experiencing, even though they may inhibit some disruptive behaviors.

The inhibition of behavior is most desirable when persons choose to do so as a reaction to their total experiencing, which might include the knowledge that a certain action will harm or displease someone else. As persons mature under circumstances of unconditional positive regard, they come more and more to be able to choose and decide on the basis of a complete flow of expe­riences; the organismic valuing process incorporates all sorts of factors, and the maintenance and enhancement of the organism and the self come to include considerations of the social consequences of behavior. In other words, persons can choose to act or not to act on the basis of their inner evaluations of the whole complex array of relevant internal and external factors, including the effects of their behaviors on others.

As will be made clear when client-centered therapy is discussed, uncondi­tional positive regard is essential for a therapeutic relationship. The therapist must feel that the client is worthy of respect regardless of the client's feelings or behaviors. When clients are accepted for what they are, they can then begin to drop their defenses against, and denial of, self-experiences that have been disowned because of previous exposure to conditional, rather than uncondi­tional, positive regard. Rogers s observations and studies of the positive changes

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that occur during the course of client-centered therapy supported his belief in the effectiveness of unconditional positive regard.

CONGRUENCE AND INCONGRUENCE Congruence is a state of consistency or harmony; incongruence is a state of dis­crepancy or disharmony. The concepts of congruence and incongruence in Rogers s theory grew out of his therapeutic experiences, as he observed clients struggling to revise their self-concepts in the direction of greater consistency with organismic experiencing. In other words, the clients were moving from a state of incongruence between their self-concepts and their organismic expe­riencing and toward a state of increasing congruence between these aspects of themselves. Rogers suggested that the terms "integrated," "whole," and "gen­uine" can be considered synonymous with "congruent." A major goal of client-centered therapy is to allow the client to achieve a congruent state.

How does the self become incongruent with organismic experiencing? This question has been answered in part already. It is such a vital question, however, that reiteration and further clarification are warranted. Rogers sug­gested that the alienation of the self from natural organismic experiencing (and the organismic valuing process) is the "basic estrangement" in humans.

This "basic estrangement" begins when conditional positive regard is ex­perienced. The need for self-regard causes individuals to develop conditions of worth when love, affection, or acceptance from significant others is offered conditionally. They come to see themselves in essentially the same way that others see them: when they feel and behave "appropriately" (as initially defined by others), they maintain regard for themselves; when they feel or behave "in­appropriately," their self-regard is lowered.

The person, because of conditions of worth, develops a selective self-con­cept; certain self-experiences are accepted, whereas others are rejected, denied, or distorted. Clear awareness of these latter experiences is lost. In other words, some organismic experiences are no longer allowed into consciousness as self-experiences (to put it another way, these experiences are no longer symbol­ized), or they are allowed into consciousness only in some misrepresented form (they are not accurately symbolized). As a result, there is a breach between ones self and one's organismic experiencing. Incongruence exists.

When the self-concept becomes incongruent, the implication is that there is also incongruence between the self-actualizing tendency and the more basic actualizing tendency. These tendencies then work at cross-purposes, because actualization of the incongruent self is not in keeping with actualization of the organism. (For example, self-actualization in the direction of introjected values of professional success and the attainment of wealth may be inconsistent, for some persons, with more basic actualization needs for warm interpersonal re­lationships and the freedom to explore alternative lifestyles.) This situation can lead to stagnation of healthy development and to serious psychological dis­comfort—unless the person can somehow restore congruent functioning. The

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 1 1

organismic valuing process falls into an inoperative state; this inner guiding voice no longer shows the way toward actualization. The person also loses freedom of choice. To choose effectively, the individual must be aware of inner experiencing and be able to test reality effectively. The incongruent personal­ity is too threatened to bring into full awareness the vital aspects of organismic experiencing and environmental conditions; too much is "unacceptable" or "unpleasant" and therefore is defended against, denied, or distorted.

As Rogers pointed out, the person does not consciously get into a state of incongruence. Because the positive regard of others is needed, particularly during infancy, disharmony between the basic organism and the developing self generally begins early in life. This "basic estrangement" does not have to occur if the individual experiences unconditional positive regard.

THE FULLY FUNCTIONING PERSON

The concept of the "fully functioning person" is an ideal; according to Rogers, this hypothetical individual would represent the ultimate actualization of the human organism. Such a person would have experienced unconditional posi­tive regard from significant others; because no conditions of worth would ex­ist, the individual would experience unconditional self-regard.

In actuality, no one has achieved this absolute state. People in real life are fully functioning in relative terms—some more, some less. Also, Rogers pointed out that it is best to conceive of full functioning as a process rather than as a sta­tic condition. A person who is functioning well is an adaptive organism, chang­ing to meet new situations in the most satisfying ways and moving toward higher levels of actualization. So, even though the term "fully functioning" can be used in a hypothetical sense to refer to the ultimate in human development, it should be realized that Rogers was most concerned with the process of actual­ization. In a practical sense, a fully functioning person is one who is able to move constructively in the direction of ever-increasing growth and fulfillment.

Rogers considered the ideal fully functioning person to be in a state of congruence; no disharmony exists between the self and organismic experienc­ing. Such a person is accurately aware of inner experiencing and does not de­fend against or distort experiences. The fully functioning person effectively tests reality in order to maximize satisfactions, rather than "making d o " with unsatisfying life conditions. Also—and this is very important—to be fully func­tioning is to be able to carry on relationships with others in harmonious ways.

Rogers made it clear that persons who are sensitive to their total experi­encing are very "trustworthy" beings; their behaviors benefit both themselves and society, and they make sound choices. Rogers s optimism about basic hu­man nature was very strong. Fully functioning persons are "in tune" with this basic nature, and their reactions as they move through life are firmly grounded in their total organismic experiencing. To function fully is to function in a to­tal, organismic way, integrated and unified; it is not intellectual, self-conscious functioning.

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According to Rogers, conscious and rational thought, on its own and out of touch with the totality of one s inner experiencing, is not an effective means of arriving at life's decisions. The fully functioning person chooses wisely be­cause of intimate contact with the organismic valuing process. Rogers pointed out at various times that "man is wiser than his intellect." This is not to de­grade the human ability to reason but rather to indicate that humans function optimally when they operate as total, unified organisms—open and responsive to all their experiencing—rather than as solely cognitive, self-consciously ratio­nal beings. In short, we should be in touch with our basic feelings, sensations, and tendencies in such a way that they mix with reasoned considerations in a kind of fluid process, creating effectively integrated responses on the basis of total organismic functioning.

The most important factor in full functioning is the positive regard re­ceived from significant other persons, especially during the early years of life, when we are most vulnerable. If love and acceptance are conditional and are experienced only when the "proper" feelings, thoughts, behaviors, and so on are expressed, then the likely outcome will be restricted, ineffective function­ing. If love and acceptance are unconditional and are experienced regardless of particular feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, then full functioning is more likely

What happens to persons who experience mainly conditional, rather than unconditional, positive regard? Are these individuals doomed to spend their entire lives in states of poor functioning, plagued by psychological discomforts and maladaptive behaviors? Not necessarily. Client-centered therapy, which has been referred to repeatedly, can help such persons to regain contact with organismic experiencing and to reduce incongruence.

CLIENT-CENTERED OR PERSON-CENTERED THERAPY

The traditional and still widely used phrase for the type of psychotherapy de­veloped by Rogers is "client-centered therapy" The newer phrase, used by Rogers and his colleagues later in his career, is "person-centered therapy." In the Commentary section at the end of the chapter, this name change will be discussed further.

Rogers suggested that "psychotherapy is the releasing of an already exist­ing capacity in a potentially competent individual" (Rogers, 1959, p. 221). This "already existing capacity" is likely to be released if the following three attitu-dinal conditions exist:

1. The therapist is congruent in the relationship—that is, real, genuine, unified, and integrated, without defensive facades—and is able to meet the client on the basis of the therapists own organismic experiencing. There is har­mony between what the therapist feels and what is communicated to the client. Rogers indicated at times that congruence or genuineness may be the most basic condition for therapeutic growth (Raskin & Rogers, 1989, p. 172). The therapist who is congruent does not deny the feelings that he

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 113

or she is experiencing during therapy and is willing to openly express per­sistent feelings.

2. The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client, relating on a person-to-person basis and feeling that the client is a worthy individ­ual, regardless of the clients condition, feelings, or behavior. The client is "prized" for what he or she is and may become. Other terms that cap­ture aspects of this condition are "warmth," "acceptance," and "nonpos-sessive caring."

3. There is empathic understanding of the client. The therapists approach is phe-nomenological; the attempt is to sense the client s inner experiencing by entering and remaining within his or her subjective world. Rogers indicated that the therapist should be sensitively involved with the client s experienc­ing and be able to convey effectively that this experiencing is understood. However, the therapist should not get bound up in anger, confusion, fear, or other emotions that the client may be feeling. Accurate sensing and sharing of the clients experiencing are essential, but the therapist should remain sufficiently disentangled from the emotional impact to allow clear perspectives to be maintained. In this way, the client can be helped to gain clearer perspectives. Rogers believed that, when he was most empathic, he could clarify not only apparent meanings but also meanings just below the level of the clients awareness.

These three attitudinal conditions are interrelated. For example, congru­ence or genuineness is necessary if the therapist is to be most effectively ac­cepting and empathic. For maximum benefits, all three conditions should exist to a substantial degree (in actual client-centered-therapy situations, they exist in varying amounts). There is some evidence to suggest that, the more a client perceives these conditions, the greater that person s gains.2

Congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathy help to create a climate in which clients can dismiss their fears of expressing themselves and come into increasingly closer contact with their organismic experiencing. O b ­viously, these conditions are not conveyed to the client by simply saying that they exist; therapists should genuinely feel that they unconditionally accept their clients, and they should feel empathic. It is not a good situation if the therapist denies or distorts actual feelings of discomfort or lack of acceptance. In short, the therapist needs to be a fully functioning person. Attempts to arti­ficially manipulate conditions in the therapeutic relationship are unlikely to produce constructive changes in the client; the therapist has to be real.

In a 1986 article reprinted in Kirschenbaum's and Henderson's The Carl Rogers Reader (1989, pp. 135-152), Rogers suggested two more conditions, in

2Are the conditions of congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathy necessary, and are they sufficient, to produce positive changes in clients? Rogers believed that they are. The available research, however, suggests that they are neither necessary nor suffi­cient, although they do seem to be "valuable contributors to outcome" (Prochaska & Norcross, 1994, p. 146). Whereas they appear to facilitate positive changes in clients, the evidence does not support these conditions as essential for positive therapeutic results.

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addition to the three major ones indicated above, that promote growthful change. O n e is basic trust in people. According to Rogers, individuals (and groups) are most likely to develop their full potential when they are trusted to set and achieve their own goals. The other condition is, as Rogers put it, "mys­tical" or "spiritual" and has nothing to do with rational thought processes. Rogers explained that, when he was at his best as a therapist, he was closest to his "inner, intuitive self," his state of consciousness was altered slightly, he was relaxed and close to his "transcendental core," and he was able to reach out from his inner spirit to the other's inner spirit. When this transcendental state occurred, Rogers found that his presence profoundly affected the growth and healing of the other person.

After reading about the conditions that Rogers suggested for a therapeutic climate, you may think that a client-centered therapist has to be *a superper-son. This is not the case. Even though therapists are not always completely congruent, accepting, and empathic (and may not be able to be continually trusting or to achieve the transcendental state mentioned above), they can still be of help. It is fortunate, as Rogers put it, "that imperfect human beings can be of help to other imperfect human beings" (Rogers, 1959, p. 215). It is not unusual for a therapist to experience some uncertainties during a therapeutic relationship; the condition that is most likely to lead to failure is the therapists defending against these uncertainties by denying or distorting their existence. If therapists are accurately aware of their own inner experiencing, including their feelings of discomfort, doubt, or fear, then there is less likelihood that harm will be done to the therapist/client relationship.

Should the therapist communicate such feelings directly and openly to the client? For example, should a therapist tell a client that something they are talking about has triggered a long-standing unresolved conflict or that he or she feels afraid because the client is expressing so much hostility? Interestingly, there has been a trend in client-centered therapy toward such open expressive­ness on the part of the therapist. Perhaps by being more self-expressive, the client-centered therapist helps provide an even richer therapeutic relationship and may find it easier to maintain "realness" and sincerity in feelings toward the client. Of course, it is still of primary importance for the process of therapy to be focused on the client's unfolding discovery of his or her own inner expe­riencing; it is this unfolding that guides the therapeutic relationship, determin­ing its pace and direction.

The basic problem that client-centered therapy is designed to resolve is the alienation of persons from their organismic experiencing and the organismic valuing process. Troubled clients have incorporated conditions of worth, result­ing in conditional self-regard and incongruence between the self and organism. The self-actualizing tendency and the actualizing tendency are not operating in harmony. The client experiences anxiety because he or she is not functioning as a unified, integrated being.

The concept of subception is important here. In Rogers s theory, subception refers to the discrimination of an experience without full, clear awareness of that experience. Subception accounts for clients' feelings of threat from organismic

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experiences that are not fully conscious. In other words, when incongruence ex­ists between the self and the organism, individuals are not clearly aware of their basic experiencing; still, they may be threatened by aspects of this experiencing that are inconsistent with self-concepts developed under the influence of condi­tional positive regard. Put more simply, we can be made to feel troubled by basic stirrings within us, even though we have pretty much cut ourselves off from these feelings and sensations in order to maintain positive regard from others and to maintain our own self-regard. Despite the fact that we have disowned them and do not accept them as being part of us (and therefore have lost clear and im­mediate contact with them), these feelings can still make us feel uncomfortable, threatened, or anxious. We subceive, rather than clearly perceive, these feelings and sensations, and they disturb our overly restricted self-concepts.

The major responsibility for change during client-centered therapy is on the client; it is the client who must rediscover his or her own inner experi­encing and become sensitive once again to the directions indicated by the organismic valuing process. Rogers's assumption was that the client can do this if the therapist meets the three major attitudinal conditions mentioned earlier. By being congruent , accepting, and empathic, the therapist sets the stage for clients to examine, in a nonthreatening atmosphere, those inner ex­periences that are inconsistent with present self-concepts and that they are only dimly aware of (through subception) or aware of in some distorted way. Only the client can accomplish this—the therapist cannot do it for the client—and Rogers believed that humans have this capacity once the proper conditions are provided. (The therapist's role used to be called "nondi rec-tive," but this term has become misleading because of more active participa­tion by client centered therapists; also, as Rogers suggested, the term does not sufficiently emphasize the therapist's focus on the factors that promote the client's growth.)

We've discussed three necessary attitudes on the part of the therapist. But what about specifics? What does the therapist do during therapy? The respon­sibility is placed on clients to search out their own lost experiencing and to in­tegrate this experiencing into their self-concepts so that they become more integrated ahd unified (congruent) beings, but how does the therapist behave during this process? Some of the communication during therapy is nonverbal; for example, the therapist may convey congruency, acceptance, and empathy through facial expressions. His or her verbal behavior is intended to clarify the feelings of the client, perhaps by restating something the client says. Also, the therapist's comments indicate that he or she is "with" the client—that is, that they are sharing involvement in the therapeutic relationship. What the thera­pist says is often phrased in a tentative way, so that the client can be the final judge of whether those comments are appropriate. The following dialogue is hypothetical and is meant merely to illustrate (in an oversimplified way) the kind of interchange that might take place between a client and a therapist:3

3A much more complete example has been presented by Fred Zimring (1991)—see the reference at the end of this chapter.

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Client: I don't know why I'm so sensitive.... It just seems that every­thing . . . well, I don't know. For example, if my boss says the slightest thing about my work, I feel hurt. If my wife brings up some small fault, I react with a sort of pouting, and maybe I'll even get angry and . . . maybe even walk out of the house.

Therapist: You have the feeling . . . you feel that you're too sensitive about what others say?

Client: Yes, damn it! Why can't I be a man and either stand up and say that I am right or else admit that I'm wrong? No, not me. Why do I make such a big deal out of things? I just get this sinking feeling inside and end up . . . well, just feeling all raw and exposed and stupid.

Therapist: It really hurts... .You'd like to react differently to criticism.... It really bothers you that you can't.

Client: You bet I would. This bad feeling that I get—it's not doing me any good. Or anybody else either. But how can I change? I've tried— boy, have I tried! It just seems that I get too emotional and can't see things straight—and end up doing the same things again and again . . . just keep on doing the same dumb things.

Therapist: M-hm . . . it just seems so hard to change Nothing changes—the bad feelings just keep happening Is that it?

Client: Yes, that's the way it is. I go on and on in the same pattern. I guess it's hard to admit to myself that I do have faults—that I'm not per­fect—and I guess I just feel that people won't care about me if they see my faults. Maybe that's why I'm so sensitive Maybe it's because I don't want people to see any flaws—because maybe I'm afraid that they won't like me or respect me.

Therapist: I see . . . m-hm . . . you keep doing the same things because it's hard to admit that you might have some faults. And you feel afraid that perhaps others won't like you or respect you if they see your faults.... It's pretty tough to change, isn't it?

A written exchange between a therapist and a client misses much of the full dynamics of the real situation. The warmth and ongoing feelings, the length of pauses and hesitancies, the tone of the statements, and other critical features that characterize the therapeutic relationship are lost in the above ac­count. However, it does convey something about the therapist's role as a clari-fier and organizer of the client's expressions and as a person who cares about and accepts the client. By helping to set free the client's own capacities for actualization, the therapist aids the client's development in a deeply under­standing but noninterfering way.

The desired outcome of client-centered therapy is a more fully function­ing person—a person who is in immediate and accepting contact with deep, personal feelings and who is fluid, changing, and richly differentiated in reac­tions. This contrasts with the functioning that often characterizes clients at the

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 1 7

beginning of therapy, when they tend to be out of contact with real feelings and are more rigid and static. This change in functioning can be observed dur­ing the therapeutic process as the client moves away from more past-oriented, intellectually toned statements and toward statements that are more expressive of basic, immediate experiencing in the here-and-now.

A critical aspect of traditional psychoanalytic therapy, as indicated in Chap­ter Two, is "transference." Rogers contrasted his view of transference with that of Freud. According to Freud, the patient transfers feelings that originated in early childhood (for example, hostility toward the father resulting from the Oedipal conflict) to the analyst in the present; "working through" these feel­ings is essential in order for the patient to gain understanding and control over unconscious impulses. Rogers viewed this line of reasoning as erroneous. Al­though clients do experience many positive and negative feelings during ther­apy, including emotional reactions based on past experiences, he believed that it is unnecessary to pay special attention to any particular category of feelings. Rogers stressed that, if the therapist is able to be genuine, accepting, and em-pathic, the meanings of all feelings (including those that might be labeled "transferences") tend eventually to be accurately perceived by the client. (Rogers also issued a challenge to psychoanalysts to provide data that would validate their view that special attention to transferences is necessary for signif­icant personality and behavioral changes.)

It should be pointed out that successful therapy, regardless of the method used, often is hard to define. Since it is not possible at present to measure pre­cisely all the important dimensions of human functioning, exact statements about the effectiveness of client-centered therapy (or any other kind of psy­chotherapy) cannot be made. Rogers, however, was convinced that the suc­cesses of the client-centered approach were sufficient to warrant enthusiastic, continued use, and analyses of available research suggest that it tends to heighten self-esteem and has at least a moderate effect, being "clearly superior to no treatment" (Prochaska & Norcross, 1994, p. 149). Meanwhile, research on the effectiveness of various therapies continues, along with attempts to de­velop better ways of measuring outcomes.

Although client-centered therapy is Rogers s best-known contribution to psychology, his concerns went far beyond individual-therapy situations. He was very interested in intensive group experiences as a means of allowing individuals to experience more deeply and meaningfully and to enrich their interpersonal relationships. He also was concerned with the dynamics of intimate relation­ships, such as marriage. Other major interests were education, the problems of maintaining world peace, and applications of his ideas internationally.

It is clear that Rogers expanded his thinking into significant areas of hu­man experiencing, retaining certain fundamental ideas but pushing forward to ­ward fresh applications of those ideas. Let's look next at two of the areas just mentioned: encounter groups and intimate relationships. The topics of educa­tion, world peace, and international applications will be discussed in the C o m ­mentary section.

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ENCOUNTER GROUPS

An encounter group is a small group that, through intense interaction, allows individuals to find out more about themselves and the way they relate to oth­ers. Rogers was greatly interested in the potential of these groups for helping individuals to become more fully functioning. Although encounter groups may have therapeutic value, they usually are differentiated from "group ther­apy." The latter is designed to help persons who have more serious problems and who are in more immediate need of assistance. Encounter groups typically are designed for improving the capacities of those who already are functioning fairly normally. ("Normal functioning" may not represent a very high level of human potential. In other words, so-called normal persons may not be living life nearly as fully as they could be, and encounter groups provide one possible means of increasing personal growth.)

The size of an encounter group typically varies from about 8 to 15 mem­bers (although Rogers conducted much larger encounter-type workshops). Sometimes a group may meet for one long session; in other cases, the group may meet for a number of shorter sessions. Generally, there are from 20 to 60 hours of intensive contact. No specific agenda is made up beforehand; the set­ting is unstructured, so that the members can freely investigate their feelings and their interactions with others through the evolving group process. Al­though there may be hostile exchanges and periods of much discomfort during the experience, the overall context is supposed to be one of mutual acceptance and helpfulness.

There has been a great deal of controversy concerning the encounter-group phenomenon. Some persons vehemently tout the beneficial outcomes of these group experiences, others just as strongly oppose them, and still others hold more moderate opinions. Rogers was not a fanatic in his belief in the possibilities offered by intensive group experiences, but he did strongly sup­port them, with certain reservations (to be mentioned later). He believed that they can lead to increased awareness of inner experiencing and can help indi­viduals to develop more satisfying interpersonal relations. He also felt that they can be useful for a variety of purposes (such as reducing interpersonal and in-tergroup conflict) in a number of different settings, including government, in­dustry, schools, churches, and the family.

Many different methods are used by group "facilitators" (this is one of the terms used to refer to encounter-group leaders, who do not "lead" the group in the traditional sense). A facilitator generally is concerned with providing an atmosphere in which persons can openly express themselves and can focus on their own experiencing and on their exchanges with others in ways that give fresh perspectives. Our concern in the following discussion is with Rogers's way of facilitating encounter groups.

He began the encounter in a very unstructured way, making some com­ment such as "Here we are. We can make of this group experience exactly what we wish." He set no specific goals and allowed the group to determine its own direction. Rogers pointed out that this approach is very similar to the

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 1 9

one he used in client-centered therapy, although he tended to be more expres­sive in encounter groups than he was in one- to-one therapy situations. He maintained that, as a result of the personal growth he experienced in groups, he liked to be as much a participant as a facilitator.

The following are some of the attributes that, according to Rogers, charac­terized him as a group facilitator:

1. He listens carefully and sensitively, considering each person as having some­thing worthwhile to say. He is most interested in the present meanings and feelings that accompany members' expressions. Clear and respectful listen­ing on his part helps to create a psychologically safe climate; thus, individ­uals should feel more comfortable about taking some risks in disclosing important aspects of themselves.

2. He accepts both the group and individuals. He has patience in allowing the group to "find itself" and to discover the directions it wants to follow. Also, he personally is willing to have members enter into the group's process to greater or lesser extents; if someone wants to stay on the side­lines, he is not disapproving (sometimes other group members may disap­prove, however, and put pressure on a stand-offish person). He also tends to accept what individuals say at face value and thus avoids "reading in" meanings or attributing unconscious motives.

3. He attempts to be empathically understanding. He believes that it is extremely important to understand from the other person's point of view what is being expressed.

4. He operates in terms of his own feelings. (Rogers became increasingly free in using the feelings that he had toward himself, other group members, or the group as a whole.) He usually feels genuine concern for others and is especially empathic if someone is hurt psychologically. Expressions of feel­ings may include anger, annoyance, and frustration, as well as affection and love, especially if these feelings are persistently experienced by him.

Rogers emphasized the expression of presently existing feelings, so that re­actions are to the here-and-now Divulging honest feelings may be painful to oneself or to others, but Rogers believed that this pain often can be growth producing. However, if he saw that someone was experiencing a great deal of distress, he gave the person the opportunity to say that he or she had had enough for a while. Rogers also thought that facilitators should not be reluc­tant to express their own problems to the group and should let it be known if they are upset. (The exception to this advice is if the facilitator develops a se­vere personal problem, in which case it is probably best not to take the group's time to deal with it; rather, he or she should seek help from colleagues or from other persons outside the group.)

What happens if someone in the group becomes seriously disturbed—per­haps because defenses have been broken down too quickly, causing sudden awareness by the individual of something that is extremely devastating to his or her previously protected self-concept? Rogers believed that encounter

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groups have great therapeutic potential (although, as mentioned previously, therapy is not the group's primary function). He had great trust in the groups ability to cope wisely with disturbances—even with pathological behavior—if the group is functioning well in general.

Rogers granted that other facilitators might find that different approaches work for them. He cautioned, however, against certain procedures that he felt were unwise for a facilitator to use:

1. Pushing or manipulating the group toward some specific, but unstated, goal. 2. Emphasizing dramatic performances by group members. 3. Emphasizing attacks by group members on one another and continually

insisting on the expression of hostility. 4. Frequently interpreting members' motives. 5. Pressuring members to engage in certain exercises or activities without

giving them a real chance to decide for themselves whether they want to participate.

6. Remaining aloof from emotional participation in the group process and acting like an expert who has the ability to perform superior analyses of the group or of individuals.

In addition, Rogers suggested that the person who has serious personal prob­lems should steer away from the role of facilitator.

What is the typical process of an encounter group? Of course, not all groups behave in exactly the same way, but there are certain patterns that are fairly common.

During the early stages, there tends to be confusion and perhaps anxiety about what the group is supposed to do. The unstructured atmosphere may be threatening to those who are used to having definite goals or procedures. There is often a great reluctance to go beyond superficialities. The notion of simply being together with a small number of other people to talk about whatever comes to mind, or to try to open up to others about personal con­cerns, is not easy to handle for many persons. After a time, however, certain group members generally begin to make hesitant moves toward expressing their feelings. They may talk about their reactions to the situation, their rea­sons for being there, their desire to get the group going in some direction, and so on. Some members may express annoyance or frustration with the group's lack of structure or, on the other hand, may "put down" someone who is try­ing to become the group's leader. As more and more feelings are expressed, persons who are holding back may be encouraged by others to speak out and to get involved in the interactions; continued resistance to active participation by a group member may bring accusations from others of defensiveness or aloofness.

During the middle stages, there is a tendency toward increased honesty and mutual trust. Some of the earlier suspiciousness, impatience, and other con­fused and negative feelings start to be replaced by feelings of group unity and supportiveness for the exploration of both personal and interpersonal experi-

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 2 1

encing. Members begin to make perceptive comments about their own expe­riencing and become more empathic about the experiencing of others; it is at this point that the real possibilities for growth and heightened functioning be­gin to emerge. By being in a supportive atmosphere, in which spontaneity and the dropping of defenses are encouraged, the group members have the oppor­tunity to see themselves in clearer and more honest ways, although there may be a great deal of discomfort when revealing some long-hidden personal prob­lem or conflict. Also, each person can get feedback from others, perhaps gain­ing unique insights into how his or her behavior is perceived and what effects it has on other persons. Some feedback may not be favorable, and this may lead to anxiety, anger, or great hurt. However, the group's members have the p o ­tential to deal effectively with these reactions by reaching out to one another in honest, accepting ways and by developing empathic understanding.

By the time the later stages of the group process are reached, there often are feelings of great closeness and supportiveness among the members as an out­growth of the sharing of deep experiencing. They have encountered one an­other with degrees of openness, responsiveness, and intimacy that are unique in this society. For perhaps the first time in their adult lives, they have allowed themselves and others to express ongoing inner experiences in a straightfor­ward, honest way. They have allowed themselves to "be themselves," without the pretense and superficial social niceties that normally characterize interper­sonal situations, and they have found that they are accepted by others even when their most basic feelings are revealed. If someone made them uncom­fortable, they were allowed to say so; if they felt shy or inhibited, they were given the chance to "come out of their shells"; if some problem or conflict was bothering them, they could "get it off their chests." In short, facades have been dropped and real selves have surfaced without negative consequences; significant lessons have been learned with regard to individual experiencing and interpersonal behavior. (The picture being painted here is, of course, an ideal one. Some groups are more successful than others in achieving these outcomes.)

An encounter group should increase the actualization of its members. They should be more fully functioning after this intensive group experience, and there should be less incongruence between their self-concepts and their or-ganismic experiencing. This does not necessarily mean that achievement of all-around happiness (whatever that is) is a goal. The group process is intended to open up individuals to new dimensions of experiencing, thereby setting the stage for continued growth. Some of this growth may be painful, but life changes often are painful. Learning to be oneself, dealing honestly with others, and admitting long-inhibited fears can be upsetting and depressing and can cause unhappiness. However, it can also be deeply satisfying and fulfilling to face oneself and the world openly and to develop independence and the courage to choose one's own life patterns.

Rogers believed that research evidence proved most encounter-group ex­periences to be positive. (Not all psychologists would agree with this conclu­sion.) He also was cautious, however, and among the shortcomings he

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pointed out are the following, some of which may be remedied by improved procedures:

1. The effects tend to be short-lived.

2. Sometimes individuals may be left with unresolved problems.

3. The possibility exists that a group member may experience a psychotic episode.

4. A husband or wife who is involved in a group experience may change in ways that are disturbing to the spouse or may leave the group experience with unresolved sexual feelings toward another group member.

5. Individuals who join a number of encounter groups may try to "run things" in new situations, thereby interfering with the natural group process. (Rogers felt that this is especially likely to happen if such persons have been in phony-type groups.)

6. Higher-status persons may have more difficulty than lower-status persons in letting down their defenses—they may feel that they have more to risk—and, when they finally do, the situation may be quite explosive.

Obviously Rogers was not blind to the risks that are involved in intensive group experiences. Yet he felt that well-facilitated encounter groups are suffi­ciently beneficial to warrant their continued use. More follow-up studies are needed, however, to indicate with greater precision the immediate and long-range effects of group participation.

INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS

In his 1972 book, Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives, Rogers at­tempted to delineate the critical aspects of successful intimate relationships. His method was phenomenological in that he focused on the experiencing of those involved in these relationships, carefully examining interview and writ­ten material supplied to him by various couples. His emphasis was on mar­riages, but the implications of what he said are also relevant to other close, long-lasting relationships. Some of the couples he studied were relatively monogamous, whereas others were more open in sexual expression, with one or both partners having extramarital relations. Rogers cautioned strongly against holding traditional notions of what is most desirable in a marriage; he felt that a wide variety of possibilities exists and that couples should be free to search for the most satisfying and fulfilling lifestyles for them.

From interviews and the written material he received, Rogers extracted certain elements that he felt are present in meaningful, relatively permanent, growth-oriented relationships:

1. Individual commitment to the changing process of the relationship, which leads to working together in the here-and-now because mutual enrich­ment is experienced and growth is desired

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 2 3

2. Communication of persistent inner feelings, even at the risk of disturbing the relationship, and empathic understanding of the partners response

3. Dissolution of roles, so that behaviors in the relationship can evolve rather than being determined by prior expectations, such as "A wife should . . ." or "A husband should. .. "

4. Discovery and sharing of separate, strong, and independent selves, with each partner becoming more and more accurately aware and accepting of his or her experiencing

It should be noted that Rogers again emphasized certain themes that are familiar throughout his writings: living should be an ongoing process rather than something static; reactions should be to here-and-now situations; inner experiencing should be clearly perceived and expressed; empathy is important; individuals should develop their own lifestyles without having to live by out­wardly imposed standards and values; and the discovery and development of ones unique self are vital for good functioning.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF SOME MAJOR POINTS

The phrase "humanistic phenomenology" captures two vital aspects of Rogers s approach: First, persons are viewed positively and as growth oriented; these are common humanistic perspectives. Second, the importance of immedi­ate conscious experiencing is emphasized; this phenomenological perspective makes the understanding of subjective experiencing vital for understanding behavior.

As a scientist, Rogers saw the value of determinism, objectively seeking the causes of behavior. However, as a therapist, he believed that it is essential to view persons as having free do m to make choices. His ideas grew primarily from his contacts with clients, which he then applied to other situations. He devel­oped both an influential method of psychotherapy and a number of concepts that constitute a personality theory.

A central concept of Rogers s personality theory is the actualizing tendency, which refers to a natural propensity for growth and fulfillment. When the per­son s self (or self-concept) develops, part of the actualizing tendency (referred to as the self actualizing tendency) becomes devoted to the self's enhancement. This self-actualization goes well if the person remains in touch with the organismic valuing process, that is, her or his real preferences and feelings. This is most likely to happen if unconditional positive regard is received from significant others (for example, parents and influential teachers). It is not likely to happen if condi­tional positive regard is received; to maintain the positive regard (acceptance) of others, one's own real preferences and feelings are abandoned, and self-actual­ization is guided more by others' preferences and feelings. The basic estrange­ment of self from natural organismic experiencing and the organismic valuing process thereby occurs, and states of incongruence, rather than congruence, exist; progress toward becoming a fully functioning person is blocked.

124 CHAPTER FOUR

Client-centered (or person-centered) therapy is a means by which a person can regain contact with real preferences and feelings, resolve the "basic estrange­ment," and develop a richer and more congruent self. The therapist establishes the essential conditions of redness or genuineness, unconditional positive regard, and empathy, trusting the client s own capacity for change under these conditions. The therapist neither directs nor advises the client but rather relies on the client's self-discovery in a therapeutic setting that is warm, accepting, and hon­est. The main ideas of client-centered therapy were applied by Rogers to other situations, including encounter groups and intimate relationships.

COMMENTARY

Rogers's therapeutic approach was called nondirective in its earlier stages. Later it became widely known (as it still is) as client-centered. Many psychologists and others remain attached to the client-centered label, although Rogers and his colleagues, since the middle 1970s, used the name person-centered. The point of the name change was to reflect more strongly that the person, in his or her full complexity, is at the center of focus. Also, Rogers and his colleagues wanted to emphasize that their assumptions are meant to apply broadly to almost all aspects of human behavior and are not limited to therapeutic settings. Exam­ples of broad applications of the person-centered approach are Rogers s sug­gestions regarding education and conflict resolution and his workshops in other countries.

His views on education followed his basic assumption that persons are able to direct their own lives if the proper conditions exist. He advocated that teachers be "facilitators" of learning, providing an atmosphere of freedom and support for individual pursuits. The facilitating teacher has the same attitudes as the effective therapist: he or she is genuine, accepting, and empathic. When students can choose their own paths to discovery, and are encouraged to do so, Rogers believed that real learning is likely to occur. Also, he stressed that learning should involve feelings as well as ideas; students who respond emo­tionally as well as cognitively learn most effectively (Rogers s views on educa­tion obviously were quite different from Skinner's, although both wanted to promote better learning.)

Especially during the later years of his career, Rogers devoted considerable effort to the problems of reducing conflicts and maintaining peace in a world threatened by nuclear war (he warned against trivializing nuclear horrors, as il­lustrated by video games that treat war and destruction playfully).4 He believed that the conditions necessary for establishing peaceful relations between oppo­nents are similar to those in encounter groups. That is, if enemies can meet face

4For example, see his article "Nuclear War: A Personal Response," APA Monitor, August 1982, pp. 6-7 . Also in the APA Monitor, November 1984, p. 15, is an informative report on his work in this area.

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 2 5

to face for a prolonged period to discuss openly their differences in an infor­mal way, conflict is likely to subside.

The goals in such a situation, Rogers suggested, are to get each side to lis­ten to and accept the hostile attitudes of the other, to break down the " I 'm right and you're wrong" pattern, and to get each side to focus on the personal and human characteristics of the other. He gave the real-world example of the Camp David agreements between former Egyptian President Sadat and for­mer Israeli Prime Minister Begin as evidence of what can happen if conditions are favorable. In Rogers s view, the relative informality of that situation, former President Carter's facilitative efforts, and the intensive contact between the men were critical factors that brought about effective communication and greater mutual understanding.

In the last two years of his life, Rogers continued to demonstrate a long held interest in applying his approach internationally.5 In 1985 he participated in a four-day workshop in Rust, Austria, at which 50 political leaders, govern­ment officials, authors, and other prominent persons from 17 nations met to focus on "the Central American challenge." Nine facilitators from the Center for Studies of the Person at La Jolla, California, also participated. The group met as a whole and also in smaller group sessions. A main purpose was to cre­ate an atmosphere in which opinions and feelings would be expressed freely, trust would develop, and ideas for peaceful international relations would be generated. Rogers felt that the workshop succeeded in reducing tensions, opening up lines of communication, and allowing personal growth for most participants. He attributed these benefits in part to the "person-centered way of being" that the facilitators brought to the workshop; they created a climate that fostered positive changes. Also, the deep trust that the facilitators had in the group and the group process was important, especially at times when anger, bitterness, and strong differences were being expressed. Rogers noted that high-status persons have desires for closeness, deep communication, and personal contact, just as others do, and that a person-centered climate helps them to move in these directions.

In 1986, Rogers and a colleague, Ru th Sanford, went to the former Soviet Union to meet with psychologists, educators, and researchers in two cities: Moscow and Tbilisi. The emphasis was to be on humanistic education, indi­vidualized instruction, and ways to encourage creativity. Large meetings were held, but the highest priority was given to intensive four-day workshops with about 40 persons in each city. Rogers and Sanford tried to maintain a person-centered way of being in their contacts with the Soviet professionals (this in­cluded being open and accepting toward negative as well as positive feelings, a willingness to express their own persistent feelings, and a willingness to allow things to develop at their own pace). The intensive groups were allowed to find

5See "The Rust Workshop, "Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 26, 1986, 23-45, and "Inside the World of the Soviet Professional," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 27, 1987, 277-304. Both of these articles are reprinted in Kirschenbaum's and Henderson's The Carl Rogers Reader, referenced at the end of this chapter.

126 CHAPTER FOUR

and take their own directions; a wide range of personal and professional con­cerns were voiced, often with strong negative emotions surfacing, including vicious hostility, accusations, and resentment toward other group members. (Rogers, at one point, expressed to the group that he was "horrified" at the way persons were dealing with one another; this was expressed as his reaction, a persistent feeling that had developed during the group process.) By the fourth day, however, in both cities, the group members were better at listening to one another, and a feeling of unity had developed. From their comments af­ter the workshops, a number of participants seemed to have undergone signif­icant personal growth and to have gained more understanding of themselves and others, in both their personal and their professional lives.

Rogers's experiences in Austria and the former Soviet Union, added to similar experiences in other countries, bolstered his faith that a person-cen­tered climate produces similar effects in different countries: it generally seems to foster individual growth and sets into motion a group process that eventu­ally results in more harmonious relationships. This climate contains elements of the three attitudinal conditions that were discussed previously (genuineness, acceptance, and empathy), as well as trust in individuals and groups. Earlier in his career, Rogers was quick to admit that his thinking was rooted in his par­ticular cultural background—a democratic, Judeo-Christian tradition. His per­sonal experiences, therapeutic work, and research took place mainly within that context in the United States. He did hope, however, that his ideas would have universality. His goal was to develop certain basic concepts concerning human functioning that would apply to all humans. In his later years, his ex­periences outside the United States suggested progress toward this goal. It should be noted that on the more specific issue of his impact on psychotherapy abroad, "client-centered therapy has over the years sustained a prominent po­sition in Western Europe among clinical scholars and practitioners" (Weiner, 1991, p. 1002).

As beneficial as the person-centered approach might be if applied in a wide variety of situations, from interpersonal to international, Rogers saw difficul­ties in achieving general acceptance of his ideas. A theme in his book Carl Rogers on Personal Power is that the person-centered approach raises "political" issues; that is, it has to do with power, control, and decision making at many levels and is, therefore, revolutionary. Since it is revolutionary, Rogers believed, it threatens established authorities (professionals, administrators, and so on), who consciously and unconsciously want to destroy it.

The person-centered approach, wherever it exists, puts control for people s lives into their own hands. According to this view, persons can and should be trusted to make responsible decisions, and it is assumed that this can occur at every level of society. Rogers suggested that individuals, groups, and organiza­tions function best (and society as a whole benefits) when the strength and wisdom that reside within persons are tapped and allowed to flow outward into constructive actions. Whereas social institutions can now be seen as exert­ing a great deal of direct, and often coercive, control over individuals, Roger-ian psychology maintains that this is neither healthy nor productive in the long

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 2 7

run. At whatever social level persons are functioning, and in whatever role they find themselves, they should be in touch with their inner experiencing and should be relating to others in accepting, empathic, and genuine ways.

As noted in the previous chapters, Freud and Skinner suggested broad so­cial applications of their approaches. Rogers also moved his ideas out of the relatively specific situations in which they were developed and attempted to show that they have a vast amount of generality. At this point in time, the con­cepts of each of these three theorists are viable and their implications for com­plex social problems are worthwhile considering. (It can be argued, however, that they are not equally viable and worthwhile; sharp disagreements exist about this.)

At the level at which Rogers's ideas were developed originally, in therapy and counseling situations, his impact certainly has been significant and far-reaching. A wide range of individuals—psychotherapists, counselors, social workers, clergy, and others—have been influenced by Rogers's assumption that, if one can be a careful and accurate listener, while showing acceptance and honesty, one can be of help to troubled persons.

Perhaps part of Rogers s influence is due to the fact that his therapeutic approach appears to ensure, at the very least, that no further damage will be done. Rather than taking the chance that direct advice and guidance will be inappropriate, thereby creating additional problems, the therapist or counselor may prefer to take the Rogerian stance, which puts responsibility for change on the client. Critics, of course, could point out that this attitude can lead to further damage if the client does not take corrective action quickly enough or if he or she makes a bad decision. According to Rogers, however, constructive change can come about only when clients choose their courses of action by being in touch with their own basic experiencing. One person cannot decide or choose wisely for another person.

Rogers has a strong following among those who are not trained profes­sionally at the doctorate level in psychology. This popularity has been stimu­lated by his position that professionals are not always the best qualified to help others. He believed that the essential conditions of unconditional acceptance, empathy, and genuineness often can be provided by those who have little or no formal training. Conversely, not all highly trained mental-health profession­als are capable of providing these conditions, since their training has often em­phasized techniques instead of ways of relating. This position has endeared him to many who resent the assumption that professional credentials are necessary in order to provide therapy and related services. (Controversy continues about the type and extent of training needed.)

Rogers's optimistic focus on the positive aspects of human nature also has contributed much to his popularity, at least among those who share his hope­ful outlook. His view has been compared to a fresh breeze, purifying and re­freshing. Asked about his optimism, he once replied that it could be glandular (see Evans, 1975, p. 71). He went on to point out that he always had been in­terested in growth, whether it be in plants or in animals. O n e of his favorite activities was gardening, and he saw similarities between plants that grow well

128 CHAPTER FOUR

when conditions are favorable and persons who flourish when their circum­stances support growth. (Could water, fertilizer, and adequate sunshine for plants be likened to unconditional positive regard, empathy, and congruence for people?)

The apparent simplicity of Rogers s approach is another aspect of its wide appeal. He saw no need to probe deeply into unconscious layers of the per­sonality, to provide insightful interpretations, to analyze dreams, to use involved behavioral manipulations, or to use psychological tests to diagnose and categorize problems. The key to helping another person is to establish an honest relation­ship, involving nonpossessive caring and empathic understanding. According to Rogers, what is happening here and now, in the dynamic interaction between individuals who are attempting to respond to each other on the basis of their real inner experiencing, is critical for producing healthful changes. Through such relationships, persons are able to discover their own hidden feelings and to become more fully functioning. For those who are in positions of helping others, this approach seems clear and understandable, free from complicated concepts and procedures. Of course, in actual practice, things often are not so simple; maintaining positive regard, empathy, and genuineness can be very dif­ficult. Therapist Fred Zimring (1991) has noted that "it is surprisingly hard to learn to do client-centered therapy.... because this skill involves the ability to hear the other person without intruding oneself" (pp. 61-62). However, the point remains that, though they can be difficult to carry out, the essential ideas of person-centered therapy do appear relatively simple and straightforward.

Rogers s contributions have been significant, especially in the areas of psy­chotherapy and counseling. His approach has proved to be a useful one, and it has stimulated research efforts to validate its basic assumptions about the condi­tions and processes of healthful change. Still, the potential of the person-centered approach as a major social force is not known. Limited attempts have been made to evaluate its applications in marriages, educational systems, industries, community organizations, and so on, but these situations are very complex; it's difficult to pinpoint the critical determinants of constructive change, even when such change does occur.

Though Rogers was favorably impressed with the results of applications of the person-centered approach, there are numerous skeptics who are less easily convinced. Also, some of the same features of Rogerian psychology that many have found attractive—its placement of responsibility for change on persons themselves, its deemphasis on the need for professional credentials, its strongly optimistic view of human nature, and its relatively simple concepts and proce­dures with regard to therapy—have turned off others, both inside and outside the field of psychology.

The critics, however, have not prevailed over those who have assessed Rogers's work favorably. For example, it has been pointed out that "Rogers's major contributions have been gratefully incorporated by most practitioners.. . .These lasting influences include the centrality of accurate empathy, the im­portance of the person of the therapist, and the healing context of the thera-

CARL ROGERS AND HUMANISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 1 2 9

peutic relationship" (Prochaska & Norcross, 1994, p. 154). Also, after complet­ing a retrospective review of three of Rogers s best known books, psychologist C. H. Patterson (1996) suggested that "Rogers was—and still is—beyond the times. . . . [and] other writers .. . have added little of significance to these clas­sics" (p. 762).

REFERENCES'

Primary Sources (Rogers's Own Writings)

Counseling and psychotherapy. (1942). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Some observations on the organization of personality. (1947). American Psycholo­gist, 2, 358-368.

Client-centered therapy. (1951). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

"Client-centered" psychotherapy. (1952, November). Scientific American, pp. 66-74.

The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change. (1957).

Journal of Consulting Psychology, 21, 95-103.

A theory of therapy, personality, and inter­personal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework. (1959). In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science (Vol. 3, pp. 184-256). New York: McGraw-Hill.

On becoming a person. (1961). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Actualizing tendency in relation to "mo­tives" and to consciousness. (1963). In M. R.Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp. 1-24). Lincoln: Uni­versity of Nebraska Press.

Toward a science of the person. (1964). In T. W. Wann (Ed.), Behaviorism and phe­nomenology (pp. 109-140). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dealing with psychological tensions. (1965). Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 1, 6-24.

Autobiography. (1967). In E. G. Boring & G. Lindzey (Eds.), A history of psy­chology in autobiography (Vol. 5, pp. 343-384). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Person to person: The problem of being hu­man. (1967). (Coauthored by B. Stevens, with contributions from E. T Gendlin, J. M. Shlien, & W. Van Dusen.) Lafayette, CA: Real People Press.

The group comes of age. (1969, Decem­ber). Psychology Today, pp. 27-31, 58-61.

Carl Rogers on encounter groups. (1970). New York: Harper and Row.

Becoming partners: Marriage and its alterna­tives. (1972). New York: Delacorte.

A humanistic conception of man. (1972). In G. B. Carr (Ed.), Marriage and family in a decade of change (pp. 8—24). Read­ing, MA: Addison-Wesley.

The person of tomorrow. (1972). In G. B. Carr (Ed.), Marriage and family in a decade of change (pp. 3-8). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Carl Rogers on personal power. (1977). New York: Delacorte.

A way of being. (1980). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

*Chapter footnotes contain additional references.

130 CHAPTER FOUR

Freedom to learn for the 80's. (1983). Colum­bus, OH: Merrill.

Carl Rogers: Dialogues. (1989). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Edited by H. Kirschenbaum and V. L. Henderson.

The Carl Rogers reader. (1989). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Edited by H. Kirschenbaum and V. L. Henderson.

Secondary Sources

Evans, R. I. (1975). Carl Rogers: The man and his ideas. New York: Dutton.

Frick,W. B. (1971). Humanistic psychology: Interviews with Maslow, Murphy, and Rogers (pp. 86-115). Columbus, O H : Merrill.

Gendlin, E. T. (1988). Carl Rogers (1902-1987). American Psychologist, 43, 127-128.

Greening, T. (1987). Carl Rogers: 1902-1987. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 27,134-140.

Greening, T. (Ed.). (1995). Carl Rogers—the man and his ideas [Special issue]. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 35(4).

Hall, C. S., & Lindzey, G. (1978). Theories of personality (3rd ed., pp. 279-309). New York: Wiley.

Hall, M. H. (1967, December). A conversa­tion with Carl Rogers. Psychology To­day, pp. 19-21,62-66.

Holdstock, T. L., & Rogers, C. R. (1983). Person-centered theory. In R. J. Corsini & A. J. Marsella (Eds.), Person­

ality theories, research, & assessment (pp. 189-227). Itasca, IL: Peacock.

Kirschenbaum, H. (1979). On becoming Carl Rogers. New York: Delacorte.

Patterson, C. H. (1996). Still relevant-^till revolutionary. Contemporary Psychology, 41,759-762.

Pervin, L. A. (1989). Personality: Theory and research (5th ed., pp. 171-228). New York: Wiley.

ProchaskaJ. O., & NorcrossJ. C. (1994). Systems of psychotherapy: A transtheoreti-cal analysis (3rd ed., pp. 127-155). Pa­cific Grove, CA: Brooks/Gole.

'Raskin, N.J., & Rogers, C. R. (1995). Person-centered therapy. In R.J. Corsini & D. Wedding (Eds.), Cur­rent psychotherapies (5th ed.,pp. 128-161). Itasca, IL: Peacock.

Thorne, B. (1992). Carl Rogers. London: Sage.

Weiner, I. B. (1991). Developments in client-centered therapy. Contemporary Psychology, 36,1002.

Wood,J. (1972, November/December). Carl Rogers, gardener. Human Behavior, yip. 16—22.

Zimring, E (1991). Person-centered ther­apy. In R.J. Corsini (Ed.), Five thera­pists and one client (pp. 59-101). Itasca, IL: Peacock.

*Although Rogers appears as coauthor, the first author did the writing. Rogers served as a consultant.

P I

^m - m ^ ^

Ji 1

5

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS,

AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

COMPARISONS A N D CONTRASTS

There are various ways to compare and contrast the views of Freud, Skin­ner, and Rogers. The following discussions center on certain important issues in relating these three psychologies to one another. Some points

will be familiar from preceding chapters.

Views of Basic Human Nature

FREUD rrfade very strong assumptions about basic human nature. He posited powerful inherent factors that create tensions demanding relief: the sexual drive and the aggressive drive (which emerge, respectively, from the life and death instincts) urge humans toward selfish satisfactions. Freud tended to be quite pessimistic about human nature and was skeptical about our future. With the unconscious forces of sex and aggression pushing for gratification, humans can survive only if society inhibits or redirects these energies. To Freud, we are basically "savage beasts," and only the processes of civilization can bring wan­ton sexuality and destructiveness under control (for elaboration on this and the following points, see Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents).

The problem is not solved by socialization, however, since this process contradicts our instinctive self-seeking tendencies, which continue to gener­ate various degrees of tension. In tracing human history, Freud suggested that one of the reasons why people first submitted themselves to social control was

133

134 CHAPTER FIVE

to gain protection from one another, but this gain leads to the loss of happiness that could be obtained from unbridled self-indulgence. Thus the unconscious is continually at war with civilization's controlling rules and values. Because Freud doubted that this conflict could ever be completely resolved, he suggested that civilization must use the processes of identification (incorporation of others' values, especially those of the parents) and sublimation (channeling of in­stinctual energies into socially desirable activities) to combat basic human nature. Psychoanalytic therapy is intended to strengthen the ego (the con­scious, rational aspect of the human personality) so that it can both acknowl­edge and control instinctive, impulsive tendencies and attempt to find appro­priate outlets for them—that is, outlets that are neither personally nor socially destructive.

SKINNER made no assumptions about behavior being caused by innate drives, nor did he believe that complex behaviors (for example, aggression, sympathy, altruism, jealousy, and love) are adequately accounted for by referring to "human nature." Although genetic endowment presumably makes some contribution to these behaviors, they are affected strongly by our individual environmental histories and our presently existing circumstances. The inter­mingling of the effects of genetic factors and the effects of the individual's past and present experiences can create problems when we attempt to explain be­havior. Skinner believed that genetic research will help to tell the whole story of behavior, making clearer the contributions of genes.1

An important point is that, because of our genetic endowment (or, in loose terms, "human nature"), we are capable of emitting certain behaviors, and cer­tain consequences of those behaviors are reinforcing. Therefore, genetic makeup is responsible for the processes of operant conditioning. As Skinner put it: "Operant conditioning is as much a part of the genetic endowment as digestion or gestation" (Skinner, 1974, pp. 43-44; referenced at the end of Chapter Three).

Since a genetic susceptibility to reinforcement exists, the environment ex­erts strong effects on our behavior. In a sense, we are predisposed at birth to become products of our physical and social surroundings. In Skinner's ap­proach, then, human nature is neither good nor bad. It could be said that it sets the stage for the conditioning of good or bad behaviors (our genetic endow­ment provides the opportunity for the environment, through operant condi­tioning, to shape our behaviors).

ROGERS made definite assumptions about human nature, emphasizing that we are naturally growth oriented and will progress toward fulfillment if condi­tions are favorable. He was optimistic, rather than pessimistic or neutral, about our essential characteristics and felt that the freedom to develop these charac-

lFor more on this, see "Genes and Behavior," pp. 49-56, in Skinner's Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior (Columbus, O H : Merrill, 1989).

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 3 5

teristics results in positive and beneficial behaviors. At the theoretical level, Rogers s "growth-motivated person" is quite different from Freud's "tension-reducing person" or Skinner's "environmentally controlled person."

In Rogers s approach, basic human nature can and should be trusted. It is only when individuals become alienated from their basic nature that they be­come personally or socially harmful. His position clearly suggests that persons should have the freedom to choose and should make decisions on the basis of their own inner experiencing. O n the other hand, Freud stressed the need for the control and sublimation of basic impulses if civilization is to survive, whereas Skinner emphasized the need for well-structured environments that shape and maintain desirable behaviors.

At the risk of some oversimplification, it can be suggested that, with regard to their views of basic human nature, Rogers was an optimist, Freud was es­sentially pessimistic, and Skinner was neutral.

Views of Personality Development

F R E U D emphasized psychosexual stages of development (oral, anal, phallic, latent, and genital) through which we move more or less successfully. We are set at birth to pass through these stages, during which there is a vital interac­tion between our strong inherent nature (as reflected, for example, in sexual and aggressive impulses) and factors involved in nurture (for example, toilet-training procedures, parents' behaviors toward sexuality, and strength of parental love). Early childhood, up to age 5 or 6, is of critical and lasting im­portance in the determination of the personality's structure and dynamics; the first three stages—oral, anal, and, especially, phallic—are the most significant and strongly affect later development.

SKINNER saw a continual action of the environment on the individual. What is happening now (for example, present reinforcement contingencies) may be as important in determining behavior as what happened in the past. The per­son's behavior repertoire, which in Skinnerian psychology is what "personal­ity" consists of, results from the consequences of behaviors emitted over time. The richer the person's history of reinforcement, the more likely it is that he or she will have a "well-developed, interesting personality." In Skinner's ap­proach, no specific stages of development are assumed.

Essentially, Skinner considered us to be behavior emitters, and what we become is determined primarily by the outcomes that our behaviors have. Some behaviors will increase in frequency, whereas others will remain rela­tively stable, decrease in frequency, or completely disappear, depending on their consequences.

R O G E R S stressed the possibility of continual growth and fulfillment. Unfa­vorable circumstances (such as conditional love) may cramp development and

136 CHAPTER FIVE

cause maladaptive behaviors. But, if given the chance (for example, through exposure to unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding), most persons can reestablish their actualization tendencies. No specific stages are posited, and humans are capable, through awareness and sound choices, of an ever-upward spiraling in their development.

According to Rogers, a personality that is flexible and able to adapt to the requirements of new situations will result when an individual experiences un­conditional positive regard. A relatively static and defensive personality is likely to result if conditional (rather than unconditional) positive regard is experi­enced to a significant degree.

Views of Maladjustment and Therapy

FREUD saw neurosis as an internally rooted problem brought about primar­ily by conflicts between unconscious desires and the demands of society. Civi­lized humans suffer emotional conflicts and tensions that have all sorts of behavioral manifestations. The inner dynamics of the person are extremely important; initially these dynamics result from instinctive impulses, but the outer world also has its effects and greatly complicates the inner workings. For example, when certain experiences are repressed, this material, plus the instinc­tive impulses, can generate various disturbances. Psychoanalytic therapy at­tempts to get at the unconscious sources of problems—that is, to reveal them and work them through so that individuals can adapt realistically to their inner impulses and to their environments.

SKINNER stressed environmental causes of maladaptive behavior. Excessive punishment or aversive control, the reinforcement of undesirable behaviors, or the loss of important reinforcers can create individuals labeled by others as "neurotic" or "psychotic." Skinner did not view such persons as having uncon­scious conflicts, distorted self-concepts, or some other "inner problem." He be­lieved that it is inefficient to try to deal with such hypothetical inner states; it is best to stay at the behavioral level, where objective analyses can take place.

Since observable behaviors are emphasized, and maladaptive behaviors are considered to result from aversive conditions and poorly controlled, misap­plied, or lost reinforcers, Skinner s recommendations for "therapy" involve pro­viding opportunities for alternative, adaptive behaviors that can be shaped and maintained through positive reinforcement, the extinction of undesirable be­haviors, and better control of the contingencies of reinforcement operating in the individuals life. (Very importantly, these methods are likely to improve the person s feelings and thoughts, as well as overt behaviors.)

ROGERS s theory suggests that maladaptive feelings and behaviors can be traced to the interruption, sidetracking, or stunting of actualization processes. Condi­tional positive regard inhibits or distorts normal growth and self-development.

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 3 7

Since Rogers considered human nature to be primarily positive (oriented toward intimate and accurate awareness of one's experiencing and toward good relation­ships with others), people will develop serious problems in how they feel or behave only if their basic nature is corrupted by social influences.

Therapy involves creating an atmosphere of acceptance, empathic under­standing, and genuineness that alleviates the need for defensiveness and allows the exploration of all feelings and other inner experiencing. There is a much greater emphasis on conscious capacities in client-centered therapy than in Freudian therapy; that is, Rogers advocated accepting what the client says in the here-and-now, and he had a great deal of confidence in human powers of self-discovery within a warm, accepting atmosphere. Rogers felt that it is best not to interpret hidden meanings in what clients say but rather to allow them to revise their statements as therapy proceeds so that they will come closer and closer to expressing their real experiencing. The responsibility is on the clients to accurately understand and express themselves, and this ability increases dur­ing therapy.

A great deal of emphasis is placed on the client s developing freedom of choice, and Rogers was opposed to viewing the person in therapy as an " o b ­ject" to be changed by the therapist. Behaviorists are sometimes accused—al­though probably seldom with justification—of treating persons as objects to be controlled or manipulated. It has also been suggested that orthodox Freudian analysts impose their interpretations on their patients, rather than al­lowing therapy to be an open and free-flowing process. There are various pro and con arguments on the issue of the extent to which a patient has the ability to determine the therapeutic process, and Rogers s view represents the "client-determined" end of the continuum. Even here, however, the therapist is influ­encing the client by establishing a particular therapeutic "climate."

Views of Society's Role

F R E U D believed that there is continual conflict between human nature and civilization. Instincts promoting sex and aggression are not easily reconciled with the amenities demanded by society. By providing numerous possibilities for sublimation, however, society can ease this conflict. It is the task of parents, educators, and other agents of the culture to inhibit basic human drives to some extent, but constructive outlets should also be offered. Society is often too restrictive; it should make compromises possible by providing constructive channels for the use of instinctive energies. Civilization survives and grows through sexual and aggressive drives that are partially inhibited and partially sublimated.

SKINNER emphasized that society needs to take seriously its responsibilities, since it does control the behaviors of its members (whether or not this is ac­knowledged openly). He believed that the many problems of human conduct are too serious and complex to leave to chance or to antiquated and ill-formed

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concepts of freedom and dignity. He suggested that those who continually es­pouse the values of freedom and dignity generally miss the point that human behavior is always affected by environmental factors; they confuse the issue by assuming that humans can somehow operate outside the cause-and-effect con­cepts of conditioning. Also, in their attempts to avoid aversive control, they often resist any form of control; this causes them to overlook the benefits of systematically applied positive reinforcement.

The primary role of society in Skinners view is to set up planned, system­atic contingencies of reinforcement that will maximize desirable behaviors. Since humans are malleable, behavioral engineering is the crux of the matter. Environmental control is needed to foster behaviors that are both personally and socially advantageous (for example, behaviors that are "peaceful," "cooper­ative," and "considerate"), and programs should be instituted to shape and maintain these behaviors. Also, techniques that tend to produce undesirable problem behaviors should be done away with; for example, the use of punish­ment and aversive control generally should be avoided.

R O G E R S saw society as generally too restrictive and static. Humans are des­tined at birth to grow and flourish as individuals and as social beings, but par­ents, teachers, employers, and others upset this destiny by imposing established values and forcing adherence to them. If Rogers's views prevailed, society's institutions (the home, schools, government, workplaces) would become processes rather than rigid and static structures. In his opinion, human poten­tial for actualization is great, and we cannot know now what humans will be in the future if this potential is developed. Therefore, society should allow free­dom for experimentation in alternative lifestyles and for creative outlets of all types; also—very importantly—society should allow failures to occur without condemnation. Humans are engaged in a struggle "to be and to become," and society should maintain flexibility and avoid censuring different attempts to achieve growth and fulfillment.

Views on the Study of Human Behavior

F R E U D favored an inductive-type approach to theory development. He tied together various observations in order to form general concepts (rather than first constructing an elaborate theory from which to draw specific assump­tions). These concepts were then refined or altered as he continued to treat his patients, to investigate his own unconscious, to study literature, and to observe social events. He was not experimentally oriented, and he didn't collect quan­titative data; instead, his data were qualitative and subject to interpretation. He concentrated heavily on the intensive study of individual therapy cases, at­tempting to verify his ideas by noting consistencies and inconsistencies relat­ing to those ideas.

Freud advocated an openness concerning definitions of concepts, suggest­ing that definitions be changed if observations provide new information. This attitude is reflected in his writings during the many years in which he was ac-

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 3 9

tive in developing psychoanalytic theory. (In fact, the reader who is unaware of Freud's tendency to assign somewhat different meanings to terms at different times is likely to be led astray in attempts to understand Freudian psychology.)

Yet Freud did not change his ideas quickly or easily. He often showed a re­luctance to give up a formulation once it had been developed and did not al­ways follow his own advice about being open to modifications. However, the history of psychoanalytic theory shows that, in the long run, he did make sub­stantial changes.

S K I N N E R emphasized the experimental method of gaining information about behavior. He advocated precise determinations of functional relations (or, in less formal terms, "cause-and-effect connections") between independent and dependent variables. An independent variable is a factor that is varied sys­tematically in order to study its effects on some specified behavior, which is referred to as the dependent variable. For example, the length of time between reinforcers might be varied (this would be the independent variable) in order to study the effects of these variations on a pigeon's key-pecking behavior (a dependent variable). With humans, the dependent variable might be behavior such as job or academic performance.

In short, Skinner felt that it is of primary importance to investigate the observable factors of which behavior is a function. Experimental conditions provide the means for careful manipulations of various factors and for the ac­curate quantitative measurement of resulting behaviors.

The Skinner box provides a way of objectively studying the behavior of lower animals. Findings from such studies allow the formation of basic con­cepts that can then be tested at the human level. Methods for precise control and measurement are also applicable to the study of human behavior. For ex­ample, if the effectiveness of a change in reinforcement contingencies is to be studied, baseline data are first collected. Baseline data allow the comparison of the frequency of particular behaviors before the change is introduced with the frequency of these behaviors after the change has been made.

Skinner was not "theoretical" in the typical sense of that word. He was op­posed to the use of abstract concepts and formal hypothesis testing. He be­lieved that research can be performed effectively without a theory. In fact, he felt that theories can distract from the basic goal of finding out what causes what, because they may misrepresent the basic facts, give the illusion that more is known than actually is, and result in the persistent use of ineffective meth­ods. In general, Skinner took the position that theory testing is a waste of time and that psychologists should concern themselves with collecting data and re­lating these data to observable variables. He suggested that there is a use for "theory" if that term indicates a formal representation of data that have already been collected and analyzed; in other words, Skinner acknowledged the need for tying together significant findings in a meaningful way—once these find­ings have been obtained. This descriptive approach differs from using a rela­tively abstract theory from which hypotheses are formulated and tested, a

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practice commonly engaged in by psychological researchers but frowned on by Skinner.

Like Freud, Skinner concentrated heavily on the study of individual cases, although with Skinner the "individuals" were most often rats or pigeons in ex­perimental situations rather than humans in therapy situations (in more recent years, however, other behaviorists have conducted numerous studies with hu­mans in a variety of situations). Skinner believed that a science of behavior should be able to control, with exactness, the behavior of each individual or­ganism and should not be satisfied with statements about what occurs "on the average." He performed detailed analyses of environmental factors that cause specific changes in the behaviors of individual organisms, and in this way he developed precise behavioral concepts.

Although Freud's work involved the intensive study of individual subjects, he did not seem convinced that precise statements about behavior are possible; Freud's approach was not designed to make psychology an exact science. Also, of course, Freud's data were qualitative, whereas Skinner's basic data were quantitative.

R O G E R S indicated that objective, quantitative approaches to the study of human behavior (such as those used by Skinner) are important means of ob­taining knowledge. However, he also placed great emphasis on subjective knowledge (knowing oneself) and on empathic, or interpersonal, phenomeno-logical knowledge (understanding the subjective states of others). He felt that it is necessary to pursue all of these avenues—objective, subjective, and empathic. Rogers was inclusive, rather than exclusive, in his recommendations about methods for studying humans and believed that an adequate behavioral science depends on the interweaving of these three ways of knowing. To him, there was no absolutely certain path to " t rue" scientific knowledge; different meth­ods must be used in an interrelated fashion to allow more complete under­standing of human behavior. This can be contrasted with Skinner's view that there is only one science and one way of knowing, based on objectivity. (He made his position very clear in his 1962 dialogue with Rogers; see Carl Rogers: Dialogues, p. 90; referenced at the end of Chapter Four.)

Although stressing the importance of all three of the above ways of know­ing, Rogers proposed that the most basic is subjective knowing. He felt that science always begins from internal frames of reference; that is, inner subjective experiencing provides the basic material from which consciously stated hy­potheses are formed. He believed that even strict behaviorists, who revere ob­jective and quantitative scientific techniques, start out with feelings and hunches (inner subjective experiences) that carry them forward along certain lines of research. Rogers suggested that creative inner hypotheses emerge from individual experiencing, that these hypotheses are then checked through fur­ther experiencing, and that eventually they may reach the stage of formally stated concepts that can be tested by objective scientific methods.

As Rogers noted, even when hypotheses are tested objectively, the objec­tive evidence is fitted to subjective experiencing; if it doesn't fit right, it may

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 4 1

be evaluated much more critically than if it does fit right. He used the research on extrasensory perception as an example (see Rogers's article in Wann's Be-haviorism and Phenomenology, 1964, p. 114; referenced at the end of Chapter Four). Even though there is some evidence to suggest the possibility of ESP, many psychologists reject it strongly because it does not fit their subjective ex­pectancies. In brief, Rogers felt that both subjectivity and objectivity are as­pects of the scientific process and that this fact must be given attention.

In Rogers s view, Freud was too wrapped up in his notions of our uncon­scious and irrational qualities, and radical behaviorists concentrate too much on studying humans as objects. Rogers s recommendations involved looking at humans more as conscious and rational beings and attempting to understand their subjective experiencing. Rogers used research data to support some of his contentions about human behavior, but he did not put these data on a pedestal of special scientific respectability. He believed that there is such a thing as "the whole person," and he saw the value of a variety of means of attempt­ing to understand individuals.

Rogers often reiterated his opinion that psychologists typically adhere too rigidly to traditional and confining research methods and statistical designs.2

Instead of being so concerned about the use of particular methods and designs, their emphasis should be on ensuring that they themselves are (1) well in­formed but open minded; (2) able to be "in-dwelling"—that is, able to enter the inner world of subjects' experiencing while also maintaining objectivity; (3) able to avoid premature or preconceived conclusions; and (4) able to ex­press findings in a clear, well-organized manner.

Views on a Vital Social Problem: Destructive Aggression

FREUD stressed, with much concern, our propensity for destruction. He be­lieved that this tendency is inherent in human nature as an outgrowth of the death instinct. For example, in a 1932 letter to Albert Einstein, Freud expressed the belief that wars can be attributed to aggressive impulses that can never be gotten rid of completely. He suggested that these aggressive impulses may, however, be brought under at least partial control through the establishment of emotional ties among people (for example, shared interests cause identifica­tions among people, or a "community of feeling") and through the strength­ening of humans' conscious reasoning and controlling functions. In addition, Freudian theory suggests that aggressive impulses can sometimes be redirected into socially constructive activities (that is, they can be sublimated) and that certain inhibitions against aggression (such as moral values) can be developed during the socialization process. Despite these possible means of controlling innate destructive tendencies, Freud's writings generally seem to be pessimistic about civilizations ability to cope effectively with the problem of aggression.

2See APA Monitor, May 1985, p. 16. For a more complete treatment, see "Toward a More Human Science of the Person," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25, 1985, 7-24. This arti­cle is reprinted in Kirschenbaum's and Henderson's The Carl Rogers Reader, referenced at the end of Chapter Four.

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SKINNER suggested that an innate component may be involved in certain types of aggressive responses (for example, hitting or biting when physically at­tacked) as a result of the possible contribution of these responses to the sur­vival of the species during evolutionary history. However, the main thrust of his explanation of harmful, destructive behaviors relies on environmental fac­tors affecting the individual, such as past and present contingencies of re­inforcement. For example, if aggressive behavior results in "getting what you want," then you will tend to repeat that type of behavior.

According to Skinnerian thought, if the world could be changed so that there were no payoff for destructively aggressive behaviors, they would be drastically reduced in frequency. The "payoff" might involve removing some­thing aversive, such as a threat from another person, or obtaining something positive. The former is negative reinforcement, and the latter is'positive re­inforcement. A reduction of harmfully aggressive behavior requires a change in conditions that negatively and positively reinforce such behavior.

ROGERS's theory suggests that harmful or unreasonable aggression is most likely to be shown by persons who aren't fully functioning. People who are more fully functioning (that is, those who are more in touch with their deep inner experiencing and who have clearer perspectives on the world around them) are not likely to be destructively aggressive. Such individuals are highly social beings who want harmonious interpersonal relationships; if they do en­gage in aggression, it is likely to be realistically appropriate—that is, justified and suitable.

Rogers emphasized our abilities to be rational and to be able to make appropriate responses to situations. These abilities will supposedly develop nat­urally if the proper conditions exist (for example, we receive unconditional positive regard). Therefore, a solution offered by Rogers for the problem of human destructiveness is the creation of conditions that allow fulfillment of basic human potentialities. (It is particularly interesting to reflect on the dif­ferences between Freud's and Rogers's thinking about basic human nature when considering the problem of destructive aggression.)

Rogers versus Skinner on Controlling Human Behavior

An article entitled "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behav­ior" was published in the November 30, 1956, issue of Science. The material was from a symposium held at the annual meeting of the American Psycho­logical Association, during which Rogers and Skinner presented their respec­tive views. We will consider briefly some of their differences.

Skinner emphasized that human behavior is controlled. He believed that this is an inescapable fact. According to him, each person is involved in both controlling and being controlled; a scientific, experimental analysis of behavior can provide data to elucidate these processes of control and can be used to im­prove areas of human functioning such as personal control, education, and

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 4 3

government. Skinner suggested that traditional ways of looking at behavior, which often assign responsibility to forces within individuals rather than to en­vironmental factors, impede progress in improving the human situation. He advocated letting science lead the way by using its objective, experimentally derived techniques (such as the application of positive reinforcement) to de­velop more productive and socially beneficial behaviors.

Rogers s main reservation with regard to Skinner s proposals was the ques­tion of what purposes or values should guide the use of control. Also, he felt that Skinner did not give adequate attention to the problem of power and to matters such as who will be controlled, who will do the controlling, and what kind of control will be utilized.

Rogers and Skinner both agreed that the behavioral sciences have made significant progress in predicting and controlling behavior. They differed sharply, however, in their views of how to proceed with this knowledge and in their views about the limitations of science. Rogers believed that there are subjective value choices that must be made outside the scientific endeavor; he suggested that the goals of science are necessarily established subjectively and that these goals guide the scientist and those who use scientific findings. To Rogers, the role of these subjective value judgments cannot be dismissed; such values are chosen, and they do dictate scientific pursuits by determining the problems to be investigated, the methods to be used, the acceptability and ap­plication of the findings, and so on. Science itself cannot determine its own progress; this responsibility, according to Rogers, rests with persons who make choices and decisions. Furthermore, he argued that subjective judgments must be made about the use of scientific findings in the critical and sensitive area of behavior control.

In response, Skinner disagreed that subjective, inner choices have to be considered in relation to science. Arguing along lines that are familiar in his reasoning, Skinner suggested that "choices" of goals and values do not take place in some realm removed from external, environmental circumstances. He warned that an emphasis on the importance of human subjectivity distracts from the intelligent use of scientific findings to better the world in which we live. The major points in Skinner s presentation were as follows:

1. An objective science of behavior can and should be applied to correct the ills of society and the problem behaviors of individuals.

2. The effects of attempts to control behavior can be observed, and changes can be made in those attempts that do not promote cultural survival.

3. References to subjective value choices simply cloud the issue by drawing attention away from the effects of the environment on behavior.

The issues raised during the symposium were not settled at that time, nor have they been settled yet. Rogers consistently argued for the importance of individual feelings, thoughts, and other inner experiences; to him, these expe­riences are central, and science must include them. Objective scientific meth­ods have their places too, according to Rogers, but they should be considered

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primarily as means of aiding personal growth and fulfillment. He felt that human development is a fluid process and that end states are unpredictable if adequate opportunities for actualization are available; therefore, concepts of science should also be in a continual state of change to meet newly arising hu­man needs and wants.

Skinner, on the other hand, believed that an objective science of behavior should be in the forefront, providing the data needed for maximizing the con­ditions for human survival. He indicated that, like it or not, external factors do operate on individuals and do determine their behaviors. In his view, the best way to deal with this fact is to investigate as fully as possible the various ways in which we control others and are ourselves controlled; experimental analyses of behavior provide this information. If we accept the fact of control, and gain as much scientific information about it as possible, we can plan intelligently. The environment can be structured in the best ways to produce "healthy, happy, secure, productive, and creative people" (these are the results Skinner foresaw if his behavioral approach were put into effect).

Another meeting between Rogers and Skinner, in which they engaged in more extensive and direct dialogue, occurred on June 11 and 12,1962, at the University of Minnesota at Duluth. The transcript of this "Dialogue on Edu­cation and the Control of Human Behavior" went unpublished until it ap­peared in the 1989 book Carl Rogers: Dialogues (pp. 79—152), referenced at the end of Chapter Four.

Certain points made during this meeting are similar to those made in their earlier encounter. However, it is worthwhile to consider some of their clarify­ing remarks and additional comments. (Please realize that the rich detail and flavor of the dialogue can be appreciated fully only by reading the complete transcript.)

Rogers opened the dialogue by expressing his opinion that there is "a fresh breeze blowing through the world" (p. 82), bringing increased attention to the subjective side of human experiencing and placing individual choice and freedom in more prominent positions. Self-understanding, personal choice and responsibility, and self-fulfillment are emerging as important di­mensions of human growth. He suggested that these concepts have little or no meaning to behaviorists, which reveals a strong distinction between his ap­proach and behaviorism.

Skinner opened by acknowledging the persuasiveness of Rogers s com­ments, but he reaffirmed his own dedication to the view that the most pro­ductive assumption about human behavior is that it is controlled. He made it clear, however, that this does not mean that a particular form of control will necessarily be 100 percent effective. For example, a highly effective wage sys­tem does not ensure that a worker will go to work every day; other variables, outside of the wage system, may also be influential in controlling the worker's behavior. Skinner went on to emphasize that, although our behaviors are to­tally controlled by genetic and environmental variables, we do modify our physical and social worlds. (What he seemed to be suggesting is that our de­termined behaviors can modify the environment, which then exerts different

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 4 5

influences on our behavior, and so on. This ongoing process results in chang­ing physical and cultural conditions and changing behaviors.) He then ex­pressed his agreement with Rogers that the resources and potentialities of the individual can be released as the culture evolves, but he disagreed that this re­lease results from the person's gaining inner control or individual freedom. Rather, it results from the culture s movement away from aversive control and toward techniques involving positive reinforcement.

Rogers then tried to draw Skinner out on the role of subjectivity in expe­riencing and wondered if, from Skinner s strictly scientific perspective, the "person" actually exists. Skinner responded that the individual does not vanish because of the assumption that human behavior is determined by genetic and environmental variables; each person is an absolutely unique combination of genetic and environmental factors, and this fact, he said, gives him a sense of his own individuality. "There is never any question of the uniqueness of the individual . . . or of his possible importance in the evolution of a future cul­ture" (p. 94).

Rogers again pressed the point that Skinner gave no importance to inner, subjective influences on a person s behavior and that this "is insufficient, inad­equate, and gives a picture of man as meaningless" (pp. 96-97). Skinner replied that this is a point on which they would likely continue to disagree. For him, there was ample evidence that external causes often account for what are more commonly seen as inner-driven behaviors. (At this point, Skinner gave several examples to support his argument, including that of the person who spends a lot of time reading. Is this enjoyment of literature due to some inner quality or to a particular history of reinforcement? Skinner said it is due to the latter.) Rogers responded by acknowledging that progress has been made in under­standing external causes of behavior, but there is a subjective life that plays a significant role and should not be ignored.

A discussion followed regarding the role of subjectivity in teaching, with Rogers stressing the importance of students' bringing their own internal inter­ests, values, and decisions into the learning process. In his view, education in­volves more than simply shaping behavior. Skinner agreed that students should want to leaf n, but he disagreed that this wanting arises spontaneously within them; rather, it results from external factors in their past histories (for example, the kinds of contacts they have had with the material), and it can be taught. In his response, Rogers suggested that his differences with Skinner might be at­tributable to their own different past experiences; he mentioned his opportu­nities to learn what goes on within human beings and Skinners lack of similar opportunities while working with rats and pigeons.

Rogers and Skinner continued to make various points related to their re­spective views about the role of inner experiencing. Rogers argued that we are most basically subjective beings with feelings that give dimension and perspec­tive to the more objective aspects of our lives, and Skinner maintained that our subjective experiencing is not what determines our behaviors.

On the second day of their dialogue, Skinner began by pointing out that the main issue of the previous day had been inner experience and its role in

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human behavior. He then went on to examine three cases in education in which inner experience is mistakenly considered to be of prime importance: the teaching of (1) knowledge, (2) thinking, and (3) personality traits. He sug­gested that teaching knowledge actually involves teaching verbal behavior; if an idea is taught "in depth," the student will be able to make a number of rele­vant verbal responses pertaining to the idea. (Skinner indicated that it is a fun­damental mistake to suppose that verbal behavior is simply the symbol of some kind of preceding nonverbal cognitive activity.) In the case of teaching think­ing, he criticized the ideas that something latent in the student must be brought out and that students must discover things for themselves in order to develop thinking abilities. (He believed that good teaching involves shaping the behaviors of students by positively reinforcing increasingly complex re­sponses.) Regarding the teaching of personality or character traits, Skinner ex­pressed his view that moral and ethical self-control can and should be taught, and this can be done in a systematic way. Also, we should not consider charac­teristics such as bravery as residing within individuals; rather, we should shape these desirable behaviors so that more people behave in brave ways.

Rogers responded to Skinner's long statement by saying that it made him feel compelled to give a speech of his own. He then proceeded to explain his ideas about the design of a culture—a design in which subjective experiencing is valued, "a culture which would maximize truly human qualities . . . a culture for persons, not for pigeons" (p. 120). In this culture, parents, teachers, and oth­ers would genuinely prize and value the person and convey deep understand­ing of that individual's own inner experiencing. (Rogers mentioned that these were conditions that he found helpful in psychotherapy.) Such conditions in­crease the person's capacity for personal choice, self-direction, self-confidence, independence, flexibility, spontaneity, and creativity. Applied in educational settings, Rogers said, these conditions provide a climate that promotes self-directed learning, in which students can use modern resources to reach self-chosen goals. The result of placing more worth on individual choice and self-determination would, in his view, "produce an open, changing kind of so­ciety" (p. 121).

The dialogue then moved gradually to a discussion of the effectiveness of using reinforcers in a planned way to control behavior. Rogers suggested that reinforcers lose their effectiveness if persons become aware of their use. Skinner replied that this is not the case, pointing out that he continued to work for a living, even though he knew that his behavior was being reinforced by money.

Rogers then raised another issue related to the planned control of human behavior (he referred to Skinner's book Walden Two, which portrays a fictional community run according to behavioral science concepts): Isn't there an un­real, "pseudo" quality to everything if people are controlled surreptitiously, ac­cording to a plan figured out by someone behind the scenes? Skinner's lengthy reply included the suggestion that, when planning a community, one always has to begin with some design. (He seemed to be indicating that Rogers s con­cern about a "pseudo" quality was not warranted because changes must be planned by someone.) Also, he pointed out the importance of total planned

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 4 7

environmental control for young children, so that self-management and self-control will develop; after these behaviors have developed, there is less need for explicit external control. (The terms "self-management" and "self-control" do not imply that management and control come from within the person; rather, they refer to behaviors that have been shaped and that result in effective modifications of other behaviors.) Additionally, Skinner emphasized that plan­ning should be done on an experimental basis, so that the design can be tested and changed as necessary.

At this point, Rogers indicated his and Skinner's basic agreement that hu­man potential has not been fully tapped; how to accomplish this is where they differed. He then returned to his central theme by stating that "I cannot be­lieve that any study of man which excludes the subjective can be a science at all" (p. 130). Skinner reaffirmed that he did acknowledge the existence of in­ternal events and the importance of feelings in his own life, but he questioned whether they precede and determine actions.

Following Skinner s comments, Rogers suggested a break, after which the two responded to questions posed by the audience. Their responses expanded on their earlier comments and also brought out different aspects of their views. Finally, both made closing statements. (All of this material is well worth reading.)

Both Rogers and Skinner continued their work for decades after their 1962 dialogue. The differences in their basic assumptions about inner experi­encing remained. Rogers continued to emphasize the role of subjectivity in determining our behaviors, believing that we must be in touch with basic feel­ings in order to function fully. Skinner continued to emphasize the role of the environment in determining our behaviors, believing that subjective experi­encing does not play a causal role.

It should be noted that the majority of contemporary psychologists do not seem to be vitally concerned with the subjectivity controversy between Rogers and Skinner. Currently, there appears to be widespread acceptance of the idea that cognitive states (plans, thoughts, expectations, beliefs, and so on) affect behavior. Many theorists, researchers, and practitioners have contributed to this view; which is central to a strong trend referred to as "cognitive psy­chology" (see the Epilogue following this chapter). This trend has different emphases than does Rogers s approach; however, it is consistent with the Rogerian idea that inner, subjective states influence behavior. It is not consis­tent with Skinner s idea that inner states should be considered as effects rather than causes. Skinner believed that cognitive psychology represents movement in the wrong direction, looking for causes of behavior within persons rather than focusing on environmental determinants.

The presence of a strong cognitive perspective in much of today s psychol­ogy does not mean that the subjectivity issues discussed by Rogers and Skin­ner are now irrelevant. First, not all psychologists are cognitive psychologists; some are humanistic or radically behavioristic in their orientations, keeping alive the views expressed by Rogers and Skinner. Humanists tend to believe that cognitive psychology pays too little attention to the basic human feelings

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and experiencing that affect one's self-concept and actualization, whereas radi­cal behaviorists tend to fault cognitive psychology for assuming that significant variables affecting human behavior can be found within the person. Second, whether or not cognitive psychologists explicitly consider Skinner's challenge to the assumption that there are inner determinants of behavior, the challenge remains. In other words, the issue of whether or not subjective or mental states actually cause behavior has not been adequately resolved. Third, each of us is able to consider more clearly the role of subjectivity in our lives because of the positions expressed by Rogers and Skinner; they have given us opposing per­spectives, vividly stated.

CRIT IC ISMS

Criticisms have been leveled at each of the three approaches we have been discussing. Followers of each approach, of course, tend to make certain nega­tive evaluations of the others. Also, interested "outsiders," who have no partic­ular vested interest, have criticized various points. Although occasionally someone argues for the total rejection of one or another of these approaches, such arguments seem premature. Presently, each view has something to con­tribute; more study, however, will likely result in the development of increasingly sophisticated concepts of human behavior that may firmly displace certain exist­ing ideas.

What follows are some of the common criticisms made of each approach. I have tried to avoid being highly technical by sticking to fairly major, general types of criticisms.

Criticisms of Freud

Criticisms of Freud that were incorporated into Chapter Two included the sexist tone of some of his ideas (most notably, the concept of "penis envy") and the possibility that he rejected seduction theory for personal reasons. Other is­sues will be covered here.

Freud was not greatly concerned about the empirical specificity of his terms and concepts. Therefore his theory is difficult to validate. For example, how can the notion of the death instinct be put to a reasonably rigorous test? It can be inferred from various verbal statements or from other behaviors, but these are subject to many alternative interpretations. For example, suicide or destructively aggressive behavior can be explained in various ways that have nothing to do with a death instinct. Vague constructs are prevalent in Freud's theory: the Oedipus complex, libido, fixation, castration anxiety, and so on. These concepts are stimulating, but they are extremely difficult to operational-ize (that is, they lack the concrete specificity necessary for applying the meth­ods of objective science).

Freud pieced together bits of information from his own behavior, the be­havior of his patients, and events in the world at large in order to develop his

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 4 9

many notions. Was he accurate in his observations? Was he able to be objec­tive enough to avoid his own biases? Were his interpretations correct? These and other questions can and should be asked. In the absence of more reliable, objective evidence, it is difficult to accept many of Freud's ideas as having proven validity. This should not be interpreted to mean that Freud's ideas have never been tested.3 There have been various attempts, but many are inconclu­sive, partly because of questionable operational definitions (an operational defini­tion involves the translation of an abstract concept into specific terms so that the concept can be manipulated or measured objectively). Even the concept of "repression," which is the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, rests on a shaky base. How can it be shown convincingly that a causal connection exists between re­pression and neuroses or dream content?

Another point of controversy is that the persons Freud studied while de­veloping his theory constituted a fairly restricted sample. In other words, the cultural and socioeconomic range of his patients was rather limited, and this fact perhaps limits the general applicability of his ideas. Also, he relied heavily on observations of neurotic persons (his patients) in forming his theory. Can a theory developed largely on the basis of observations of a limited group of neurotic persons be considered a valid theory of human behavior? Abraham Maslow, a noted humanistic psychologist, felt strongly that such theories are necessarily incomplete. He believed that different assumptions are needed to explain the behavior of better-functioning persons. This may or may not be true. Again, it is very difficult to put Freud's theory to a thorough test to de­termine its generality.

A number of criticisms have been made concerning Freud's methods of accumulating evidence to build and support his theory. He did not keep a ver­batim record of therapy sessions (if he had, it might have hindered the thera­peutic process); rather, he tended to rely on his memory in making notes hours later. Certainly this procedure could have allowed omissions and distortions to creep into his accounts of the therapeutic process. Furthermore, Freud has been faulted for accepting his patients' verbalizations without trying to check them out adequately with outside sources such as records or interviews with relatives. H e may not have had the time for outside investigations, but the lack of such supportive data does decrease the credibility of his assumptions. An ad­ditional criticism is that he was not systematic in presenting the steps by which he arrived at certain conclusions. It is next to impossible for another person to repeat the processes Freud went through in deriving and attempting to sub­stantiate his theoretical concepts.

An objection often made about psychoanalytic theory is that it explains too much too easily. For example, persons who engage in a great deal of sex­ual behavior are supposedly expressing their instinctual impulses; persons who

3For surveys and analyses of studies of Freud's ideas, see the references in footnote 15, Chapter 2, and Paul Kline's Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1981). For a discussion of how psychoanalytic research might be improved, see Marshall Edelson's Hypothesis and Evidence in Psychoanalysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

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do not display much sexual behavior may be said to be engaging in repression; persons who show a moderate amount of sexual interest may be assumed to have worked out a compromise between their sexual impulses and their moral inhibitions. No matter what the case may be, Freudian theory is ready with an explanation. A problem arises, however, in trying to determine which behav­ior is the most likely under a given set of conditions. It is not enough to have a possible explanation; a strong theory should be able to state when and why a particular outcome will occur, and psychoanalysis does this only in a very gen­eral and often confusing way.

Freud's model of personality as an energy system totally propelled by in­stincts also can be seriously questioned. It certainly seems doubtful that all hu­man behavior can be traced to sexual and aggressive drives that demand release in one form or another. This tension-reduction view of human activity (that is, that all behavior stems from the need to reduce inner tensions) is contra­dicted by research indicating that humans and lower animals often seek, rather than avoid, stimulation. Even casual observations of children at play seem to bear out the idea that "curiosity" is prevalent and that novel experiences are sought. These data from research and observations cannot be easily explained from the Freudian point of view, which stresses human strivings to achieve a state in which tension is absent.

Finally, it has frequently been noted (by behaviorists, as well as others) that those who adopt Freud's intrapsychic focus tend to pay insufficient attention to environmental factors as contributors to various disorders. Inadequate con­sideration of the role of reinforcers in maintaining behaviors, or of the roles of social conditions such as discrimination, disturbed family relationships, and oc­cupational stressors, may result in the inappropriate treatment of patients.

Criticisms of Skinner

Skinner often stressed the importance of collecting objective, scientific data and of basing one's assumptions on this type of evidence. However, there were times when Skinner himself went far beyond his experimental findings to make recommendations on a grand scale. He has been accused of doing so in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, in which he made certain assumptions and proposals concerning behavior at the societal level. Was this attempt justi­fied? On the basis of animal and human research that focused on the behav­ior of individual organisms (mainly in highly controlled situations), could he validly deal with problems of enormously greater magnitude, such as the running of a whole society? Was Skinner presumptuous in his reasoning? It certainly is true that he uncovered, and supported with much data, certain basic concepts of behavior, which have proven to be quite effective for use in mental institutions, educational programs, business and industrial settings, and so on. But are they really sufficient to cope fully with very complex so­cial problems? These types of questions cannot be answered adequately at this time. It may be that Skinner's behavioral concepts do apply to the whole range of human activities, but not many persons are now willing to accept that assumption.

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 5 1

Although strongly advocating that society operate on the basis of a scien­tific approach, using behavioral technology to solve its problems, Skinner was not very specific about how this broad social change could occur. W h o will exert the power to set up certain contingencies of reinforcement, and who will determine which behaviors are to be reinforced? He addressed these issues, but in such a way that the answers sometimes seemed philosophical rather than practical. He didn't satisfy those who are skeptical about the possibilities of so­cial change based on positive reinforcement. Perhaps the best answer he gave is that those who already are in positions of influence—teachers, parents, work supervisors, government officials, and so on—are the ones who can apply be ­havioral techniques. How this could occur on a society-wide scale, and which specific behaviors would be reinforced if society as a whole were involved, are more difficult questions.

Skinner has been criticized by humanistic psychologists and others who say that his ideas directly or indirectly encourage treating persons as objects to be manipulated. It's easy to see how his emphasis on behavior control might be considered dehumanizing. His defenders, however, indicate that he pro­vided effective techniques that can be used by individuals themselves to change their own behaviors. Also, knowledge of his approach allows a degree of countercontrol; that is, the controllers can be controlled. Still, Skinner per­haps was not sufficiently clear in pointing out the line between use and misuse of his behavioral concepts.

Another sticky question that could be asked is: If we are all controlled by our environments, and if we have no free choice, how can we "decide" to fol­low his recommendations and put his suggested programs into effect? Accord­ing to Skinner's approach, there is no such thing as free choice; therefore, it seems inappropriate for him to have suggested that we "accept" his proposals. He at times responded to questions of this type, but his answers don't seem fully satisfying (for example, see pp. 246-248 in About Behaviorism). They leave the lingering feeling that he was asking us to do something that is apparently in violation of his approach, and a thorough understanding of radical behav­iorism is necessary in order to resolve that feeling. The basic notion is that the behavior of each of us is controlled by our environmental experiences. This holds whether one is in the position of proposing the acceptance of behavior­ism (as Skinner was) or of "accepting" that proposal (as his readers are). "Ac­ceptance," then, is not a freely chosen alternative; if one accepts Skinnerian psychology, it is because of one's history of reinforcement and presently exist­ing circumstances. (For example, if following advice in books has been re­inforced in the past, readers may follow the advice given in Skinner's books; in Skinner's terms, they would be engaging in "rule-governed behavior.") Many critics of Skinner find great difficulty with this type of explanation, which is based on his completely deterministic view of human behavior.

Also, a difficult problem remains when it is asked: If we are all (including Skinner) under the control of environmental contingencies, how can it be that he alone "discovered" the correct way to view human behavior? How could he be sure that his ideas were shaped by the environment so that they have greater validity than do other ideas? Putting ideas to the test of experimental

152 CHAPTER FIVE

research provides one type of answer with regard to "validity," but such re­search certainly has not yet resolved the controversies about human behavior.

As stated previously, Skinnerian concepts have been used quite effectively in various therapeutic, educational, business, and industrial settings. However, there sometimes are shortcomings even when environments within such set­tings are carefully controlled. Behavioral engineering has often brought about impressive results, but it has not always been as effective as was hoped. How can results that are short of the mark be explained? If psychotic or neurotic behaviors are improved, but not to the point at which the individual can func­tion "normally," what is being neglected? If a child learns more than usual when exposed to a teaching machine, but still is unable to completely master the subject, what is wrong? Perhaps cases in which success falls short of expec­tations can be explained by oversights on the part of the person or persons re­sponsible for the behavioral-engineering program; that is, certain significant environmental factors might have been overlooked or not adequately con­trolled. However, it is also possible that there is more to behavior than meets the radical behaviorist's eye; maybe additional or more complex principles are operating. The answer awaits more extensive and detailed study.

Critics also have pointed to the weaknesses of Skinner's explanations of novel behaviors, such as unique verbal expressions, creative problem-solving approaches, and artistic accomplishments. It's true that his explanations seem strained. However, it must be asked whether the alternative explanations are any better. Skinner acknowledged that radical behaviorism cannot be expected, at this time, to provide fully adequate accounts of all complex behaviors.

Strong objections also have been voiced regarding his radical, unorthodox view that feelings, thoughts, and other inner states do not cause behaviors. Freud and Rogers have been faulted for paying too little attention to environ­mental influences on behavior, whereas Skinner has been faulted for paying too much attention to environmental influences.

Other aspects of Skinner's approach that have been criticized are his ten­dency to dismiss alternative psychological approaches (for example, cognitive psychology) without being adequately informed of the research supporting these approaches (the same could be said of Freud); his failure to encourage the integration of findings from experiments done by him and other behavior analysts with findings from other important experiments in psychology; and his assertion that behavior is accounted for in large part by a person's history of reinforcement, despite the fact that such a history can never be completely known (in other words, there is no way to prove or disprove his assertion).4

4Robert W. Proctor and Daniel J. Weeks have expanded on these and certain other criti­cisms of Skinner's approach in The Goal of B. F. Skinner and Behavior Analysis. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990). The book is quite harsh regarding Skinner and other behavior analysts, maintaining that they are dogmatic and have not provided sufficient scientific evidence for their concepts. Some of the opinions expressed by the authors are very con­troversial. A more extensive evaluation of Skinner's contributions, by a number of distinguished academics, is B. F. Skinner: Consensus and Controversy (New York: Falmer, 1987), edited by Sohan and Celia Modgil. This book deals with very complex issues and requires considerable background knowledge to be understood fully.

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 5 3

Criticisms of Rogers

Rogers has been accused of practicing naive phenomenology by accepting at face value what his clients said. A large amount of psychological evidence in­dicates that it is extremely difficult for a person to understand and express ade­quately "real" feelings or thoughts. Even though Rogers listened carefully to his clients in order to understand their inner experiencing, it still may be that he did not discover the most basic determinants of human functioning. Since the verbalizations of his clients were a major source of data for Rogers s theo­retical assumptions, it is important to question the reliability and validity of these data. Is it possible to get a satisfactorily complete picture of individuals by simply listening to them? Also, there is the possibility of bias on the part of the listener. To what extent was Rogers able to remain objective in his obser­vations of clients'behaviors?

It must be said that Rogers was aware of the problems of his phenome­nology, and he advocated and even employed other techniques (such as the Q-sort) to test and support his theory. The fact remains, however, that he was affected strongly by clinical experiences during which he attempted to listen with care and empathy to his clients. Did they reveal their "true selves" —that is, the critical aspects of human experiencing? The possibility exists that conscious or unconscious distortions may have been present in their statements. (These distortions also can affect the Q-sort and other self-report measures.)

Another kind of naivete of which Rogers has been accused concerns his view of basic human nature. If humans are inherently good, why have they made such a mess of things? Perhaps Rogerian theory places too much em­phasis on our "better side." It is easy to see how a person can become "bad" if he or she has been raised under severe circumstances of conditional positive regard. But how did we initially get so far off the track, so that we now raise generation after generation of inadequately functioning individuals?

Also, what is the explanation when a child raised with love and freedom turns out to be a selfish, manipulative, and generally maladjusted adult? (Rogers might have said that unconditional positive regard was more apparent than real in such a case.) O n the other side of this coin, how about the child who is made to adhere to a rigid code of ethics and behavior and who nev­ertheless develops into a relatively well-adjusted, sociable adult? Of course, theories of human behavior cannot be expected at this point in psychologi­cal history to be perfect—there are exceptions to the rules established by any existing theory. However, attention to these exceptions can help to ensure a proper perspective on the general validity of various theories.

Rogers assumed that we have a built-in mechanism that allows us, if we remain in tune with it, to make the appropriate choices in our lives. This or-ganismic valuing process will supposedly direct us to wise decisions and be ­haviors. What firm evidence is there for an innate mechanism that helps us make the right choices? Perhaps a more important question is this: H o w can the operation of the brganismic valuing process be separated from the effects of learned cultural values? We begin to learn at birth—that's obvious. Can all

154 CHAPTER FIVE

these subtle, as well as direct, learnings be separated from some supposedly in­nate process? Where can the line (if any) be drawn between "learned" and "natural"?

A criticism leveled by psychoanalysts against Rogers is that he gives too lit­tle attention to unconscious processes. He does, of course, refer to inadequately symbolized experiences (experiences of which the person is not fully conscious), but his view is that the individual can become aware of these experiences if un­conditional positive regard, empathy, and genuineness exist. Psychoanalysts reject this position, saying that analytic interpretations and the "working through" of transferences are necessary for understanding the unconscious. Also, psycho­analysis holds that certain portions of the personality will always remain at the unconscious level.

Radical behaviorists see Rogers's theory as being based on observations made under uncontrolled conditions. In other words, they believe that much of what he claimed to be the result of unconditional positive regard is actually due to unspecified contingencies of reinforcement. To Skinner, there is no such thing as giving a person the freedom to behave as he or she wishes; con­tingencies of reinforcement are always in operation. Therefore, to Skinner and others of his persuasion, Rogers fooled himself into thinking that his clients developed freedom of choice as therapy progressed; if client-centered thera­pists do not actively apply reinforcers, the client's behavior will be affected by other reinforcements, such as those existing outside the therapy situation.

It may be that client-centered therapists, despite themselves, bring about changes in the client's behaviors through inadvertent, subtle reinforcements (for example, nodding their heads or changing their facial expressions when clients speak about "interesting" things and remaining more passive when clients speak about "uninteresting" things). The client's behavioral changes may then cause other persons to react to him or her differently in everyday life (that is, different contingencies of reinforcement go into operation). This type of process could, in the long run, result in significant changes that the client-centered therapist would attribute to unconditional positive regard, empathy, and genuineness.

Even if one is not a radical behaviorist, it is possible to criticize Rogers's suggestion that psychotherapists should mobilize the inner resources of clients without exerting influence. Can the authority of the therapist really be dimin­ished to the point of insignificance, or is it inherent in therapist/client relation­ships? If it does remain, even in subtle, indirect ways, then clients' decisions and behaviors cannot be considered truly self-directed or freely chosen.

Like many of Freud's ideas, certain Rogerian concepts are very broad and vague. For example, "organismic experiencing" includes so much that it comes dangerously close to being meaningless. The terms "self-concept" and "fully functioning" are also so inclusive that they almost defy comprehension. Per­haps more specific subclassifications within these general concepts would help. Also, Rogers sometimes attempted to convey ideas that he admitted he could not explain precisely and for which there is little available research evidence. Perhaps in these cases the only reader he touches is the one who already agrees

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 5 5

with him; the skeptic may not be able to relate adequately or appropriately to Rogers s statements. In other words, it may be that one has to be a "believer" already in order to understand some of Rogers s theoretical notions.

Rogers spent much of his career on university campuses, surrounded by many bright, enthusiastic undergraduates, as well as by "a group of highly mo­tivated and innovative colleagues and graduate students" (Thorne, 1992, p. 14; referenced at the end of Chapter Four). Isn't it likely that his very positive views of human capabilities were strongly influenced and maintained by this exposure? It must be noted that his experiences were not limited to these fa­vorable surroundings; for example, early in his career he worked for more than a decade with deprived and abused children in Rochester, New York. How­ever, a critic might suggest that Rogers's ideas about human nature and poten­tial would have been different if he had spent more time, throughout his life, working with severely disadvantaged adults in undesirable settings.5

Finally, the criticism previously made regarding Freud's intrapsychic focus can also be made regarding the extent of Rogers's focus on subjective experi­encing. Important environmental variables may be overlooked if attention is directed primarily at the person's inner experiencing.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Some General Comments

The criticisms made in the previous section should not be disheartening. Only if perfection were expected (and this expectation is premature if psychology's relatively brief history and the complexity of its subject matter are considered) would there be cause for discouragement concerning the weaknesses in these three major approaches. Each view has something of interest to offer to those who want to understand their own behavior and the behavior of others. Also—and very importantly—each view is serving as a spur to research in psy­chology and other behavioral sciences. The ideas of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers are •sufficiently stimulating to produce researchers of each persuasion who attempt to support their adopted point of view; perhaps the best way for science to progress is to have dedicated researchers pursue different avenues of thought with vigor and determination. In the future, when various dead ends

5We all have perspectives that are influenced by our surroundings—the people and situa­tions we encounter. This fact is of concern when evaluating psychological theories for their generalizability. Both Freud and Rogers developed their concepts while working with particular ranges of persons and situations; to what extent their ideas apply beyond those ranges is difficult to assess. Skinner derived his concepts from working with rats and pigeons, and he then applied them to human behaviors. The basic problem of generaliz­ability in his approach is whether the concepts apply to humans. If they do, they should apply generally; there is no reason to think that certain individuals are more like rats and pigeons than are others. The question of whether his concepts can be applied effectively to manage a society, as he argued they should be, raises questions of generalizability at a dif­ferent level.

156 CHAPTER FIVE

have been reached and alternative paths have been relatively successful, there may be a weeding out, a slimming down, a tying in, and so on, so that as a re­sult facets of each theory will become integrated into a thorough understand­ing of human behavior.

For the present, each theorist can be appreciated for his contributions. Freud focused on many aspects of human functioning that typically received little systematic attention: irrational fears, fantasies, dreams, sexual conflicts, psychosomatic disorders, childhood neuroses, and so on. His ideas are broad in their coverage and stimulating in their content. Skinner developed concepts that have wide practical applicability, and his emphasis on the environment's effects on behavior helps to ensure that due consideration is given to these "outside" determinants. Rogers helped to sustain and guide interest in the concept of "self," which puts an emphasis on unique human qualities. Also, he often reminded psychologists and others that there is no single, sure road to "truth" and that the full range of human abilities—subjective, empathic, and objective—can be applied in the pursuit of knowledge.

Some Personal Comments

Aside from their scientific value, and in terms of personal philosophies of life, of what use are these different views? On this point each person must speak for himself or herself.6 I will try to state some of their meanings for me.

Freud makes me ask myself "Do I really know why I'm doing what I'm doing?" He causes me to question my motives and to try to reduce my possi­ble blindness to characteristics, prejudices, or biases that I might have. The idea of "defense mechanisms" has always been fascinating to me. Freud saw these mechanisms as operating unconsciously, but I believe that sometimes we can recognize and change our own defensive behaviors.

Also, it seems to me that the notion of defense mechanisms is valuable in dealing with other people. Caution must always be exerted in applying the term "defensive" to another's behavior, and I would urge that this practice be avoided in general. The importance of the idea of defensiveness in interper­sonal (and intergroup) relations is not in labeling the behaviors of others but in trying to react reasonably to those behaviors. I sometimes have found that my reactions to others have changed for the better (occasionally this has meant avoiding someone who is extremely hard to get along with) when I have seen clearly that they are operating defensively. This awareness can effectively pre­vent certain everyday conflicts.

Although I believe that defensiveness is an important and useful psychoan­alytic concept, I also believe that certain other Freudian concepts and notions

6The noted psychologist Edward C. Tolman, commenting on the "tremendous realms of the uncertain and the unknown" in his field, offered the following advice to those who study human behavior: "The best that any individual . . . can do seems to be to follow his own gleam and his own bent, however inadequate they may be. . . . In the end, the only sure criterion is to have fun" (see p. 152 in Sigmund Koch's 1959 edited volume, Psychol­ogy: A Study of a Science (Vol. 2), New York: McGraw-Hill).

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 5 7

are totally (or almost totally) off base. A prime example is the idea that de­structive aggression is instinctive. Whereas an instinctive component may be involved in some aggressive acts (for example, when we strike out at someone who is inflicting pain on us), I believe that aggression primarily is learned be­havior. Aggressive persons often imitate the aggressive acts of others (parents, friends, movie and TV heroes), and both positive and negative reinforcement can strengthen such behavior. Environmental factors, such as stressful or highly competitive situations, can trigger learned aggression. Another factor in some cases is brain pathology; a brain that is malfunctioning because of inherited or acquired damage may not be able to regulate behavior adequately. Blood chemistry also seems to play a role in aggression; certain hormonal changes ap­pear to affect the occurrence of aggressive behaviors.

I see no reason to hold to Freud's motivational theory of instincts, even if we were to talk about sex rather than aggression. Sexual behavior, as well as aggressive behavior, is largely under the control of environmental conditions. The "strength" of the so-called sexual drive is influenced by past reinforcing and/or punishing sexual experiences, the availability of sexual partners, amount of deprivation, and so on. Such factors are more useful for explaining human behavior than is the notion of a "basic sexual drive."

With regard to Skinner, he made an extremely important contribution by pointing repeatedly to the environment's effects on behavior. Though his con­cepts may fall short of providing an adequate account of the whole range of human functioning, I believe that they have a potential that is far from being fully realized at this time. He opened the door to the investigation of all the influences that our physical and social environments have on our behaviors, and the prospects are exciting. His approach encourages the systematic study of the ways in which the environment acts on the genetic endowment of in­dividuals to select certain behaviors. By using the obtainable information, we can improve ourselves and society.

Skinner drew attention to an obviously important aspect of human life: reinforcement. It is significant for controlling our own behaviors, raising chil­dren, improving education, getting along with others, and most other activi­ties. Reinforcement seems so simple that we often ignore it. Many behaviors have become more understandable when I have focused on the occurrence of positive and negative reinforcers. Also, many social problems—delinquency, criminal activities, school failures, violence, and so on—seem to stem at least partially from the lack of positive reinforcement for "desirable" behavior and the immediate reinforcement of "undesirable" behavior.

The behavior of the deprived person who successfully steals is reinforced right away; if the only alternative is to wait endlessly to save money while do­ing a menial (perhaps even degrading) job, then the immediate reinforcement of stealing may control behavior. I don't think that all problem behaviors can be explained this simply (nor did Skinner), but sometimes we overlook the ob­vious. Another example is violent, destructive behavior. The person who be­haves violently may have no other means of escaping from punishment or

158 CHAPTER FIVE

aversive conditions, or this may be the only way that positive reinforcers such as money or "respect" can be obtained. (It should be noted that a radical be-haviorist does not have to be "soft on crime," even though the environment is seen as the main cause for criminal behaviors. To protect the public from the outcomes of unfortunate histories of reinforcement, those who behave crimi­nally may have to be confined.)

Reinforcement can be personally relevant also. In my own life, I've ob­served changes in my behavior as contingencies of reinforcement changed. It's sometimes possible to set up effective contingencies that help ensure produc­tive activity. For myself, simple devices often have yielded big gains. When I plan to do a great deal of writing (or studying or reading) over a prolonged period (weeks or months), I try to set up a schedule that allows reinforcement after a number of hours of concentrated effort each day It seems that, if I reg­ularly quit working after a certain number of hours and spend the rest of the day doing something enjoyable, I am better able to keep up the effort on a day-after-day basis. (More immediate consequences also may be reinforcing. For example, typed pages, completed assignments, or turned pages may strengthen our writing, studying, or reading behaviors.7 However, when these activities become tedious and difficult to maintain daily, it can help if our ef­forts are positively reinforced in some other way, such as by listening to music, going to the movies, or talking with friends. If no reinforcement occurs, even­tually we are likely to "give up.")

Beyond the useful and broadly applicable concept of reinforcement, an as­pect of Skinner's approach that makes a lot of sense to me is his strong deter­ministic stance regarding the causes of behavior: Put simply, our behaviors originate from genetic and environmental conditions, rather than from some autonomous internal force or "the mind." If a person's behavior is explained by referring to some inner state, such as a feeling or thought, an "explanatory fiction" has been used, and the question is "How did the feeling or thought come about?" To answer this question, isn't it necessary to consider genetic and environmental variables? For Skinner (and for me) the answer is "Yes." Our genetic endowments give us the neurophysiological means to feel and think, and the environment shapes the specifics of our feelings and thoughts.

The preceding paragraphs should help illustrate why I like aspects of Skin­ner's thinking. His ideas have practical appeal to me, and I believe that he pointed out very significant factors that control human behavior, including my own. (I have expanded on these issues in The Legacy of B. E Skinner, Brooks/Cole, 1992.)

What about Rogers? After I read his works, I generally come away feeling good. However, this is sometimes tempered by my impression that he was overly optimistic about the force toward growth and fulfillment that suppos­edly resides within each of us. I'm not at all sure that we will spontaneously

7Here is an example given by Skinner: "When we are writing a difficult paper and just the right word comes, a hole is filled and our behavior is reinforced" (see p. 100 in his 1989 book, Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior, referenced at the end of Chapter 3).

COMPARISONS, CONTRASTS, CRITICISMS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1 5 9

actualize ourselves and tend toward sociable relations if we simply are accepted unconditionally by others. I lean toward Skinner's notion that achievement, cooperation, and other desirable behaviors must be reinforced if they are to occur regularly. Nevertheless, it can be encouraging to read Rogers s favorable comments about human nature; it's interesting to consider that, after a long ca­reer of listening to and helping troubled individuals, he strongly believed that persons are essentially rational, trustworthy, and forward-moving.

Although I've become most interested in the behavioral approach, Rogers s writings help keep me open and responsive to a variety of ideas, views, and ap­proaches to "truth." His emphasis on the necessity of different perspectives and techniques for acquiring personal and scientific knowledge seems to me to be important, though I may not agree that all approaches are equally valuable. I do think that Rogers s writings are satisfying (reinforcing) in certain ways, and, once read, they become part of our "environmental histories," perhaps causing us to behave in more personally and socially beneficial ways.

A potential tie between the person-centered approach and behaviorism may lie in a clearer analysis of the specific behaviors involved in unconditional positive regard, empathy, and genuineness. Rogers suggested that these "attitu-dinal conditions" can have very beneficial effects. If they could be defined more precisely in behavioral terms (that is, what someone actually does when being accepting, understanding, and real), and if the consequences of these be­haviors were known in more detail (particularly, in what specific ways others respond), this would be useful information. It would reveal details of interper­sonal behaviors that possibly are positive reinforcers, and might make it easier to teach persons how to improve their interactions and relationships.

Perhaps you have a different estimate from mine of the three views of hu­man behavior that have been discussed here, or perhaps you have found some other view to be more adequate for your purposes. Whatever the case may be, our perspectives are always limited by our particular time. The future will un­doubtedly change these perspectives, but it is my opinion that the ideas of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers occupy critical niches in the progression of our thoughts about ourselves as human beings.

Epilogue

ARE THERE OTHER PSYCHOLOGIES? Many approaches other than those of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers have influ­enced the field of psychology. Some examples are Carl Jung's analytic psychol­ogy, Alfred Adler's individual psychology, Karen Horney's social analytic ap­proach, Kurt Lewin's field theory, Fritz Perls's Gestalt approach, Miller's and Dollard's stimulus-response learning theory, Albert Bandura's social learning theory, and Hans Eysenck's typological theory. However, compared with the three psychologies featured in this book, these other approaches have not achieved similar broad acknowledgment or widespread application. N o r have they received as much popular attention.

If you are familiar with trends in contemporary psychology, you might be thinking "What about cognitive psychology? Isn't that currently having an extensive and powerful impact on the field?" The answer is "yes." It has been suggested that "the cognitive approach is one of the strongest forces today in psychology, and it has inspired an explosion of research on the complex work­ings of the mind" (Tavris & Wade, 1997, p. 29). However, cognitive psychology is more difficult to circumscribe than are psychoanalysis, radical behaviorism, and humanistic phenomenology. Its identity is not as clearly established, and it cannot be considered as a particular, integrated set of assumptions and con­cepts. It has numerous contemporary manifestations; many theories, research programs, and forms of psychotherapy have a cognitive tilt.

161

162 EPILOGUE

Cognitive psychology, in a broad sense, is concerned with human thought processes and the ways in which these processes interact with behavior. Whereas Freud's psychoanalysis emphasizes unconscious processes, Skinner's radical behaviorism emphasizes environmental influences, and Rogers s hu­manistic phenomenology emphasizes feelings and the self-concept, cognitive psychology emphasizes the mental operations involved in problem solving, reasoning, decision making, and other cognitive activities.

There have been many contributors to cognitive psychology. No specific person can be identified as central to its development in the same way that Freud, Skinner, and Rogers were associated with their approaches.1 "Cognitive psychology does not yet have a unifying theory, and unlike other 'brands' of psychology . . . it lacks an acknowledged spokesperson" (Wade &Tavris, 1990, p. 20). However, regarding counseling and psychotherapy, one very .influential perspective deserves special attention: Albert Ellis s rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT), which previously had been called rational-emotive therapy (RET).2 It has been said that "the cognitive revolution in psychotherapy started with the publication of [Ellis s 1962 book] Reason and Emotion in Psycho­therapy" (Rorer, 1998, p. 600).Though his psychotherapeutic approach incor­porates various elements, the main focus is on changing irrational thought processes.

ELLIS'S R A T I O N A L - E M O T I V E

BEHAVIOR THERAPY

REBT, a predecessor of current cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies, is an approach that continues to evolve and gain adherents. Its founder, Albert Ellis, has been called "an American classic . . . [who] has made an outstanding contribution to psychotherapy that is international in scope" (Freeman & Bux, 1991, p. 324). REBT has been referred to as "one of the most popular ap­proaches to counseling and psychotherapy in the Western world today" (D'Zurilla, 1990, p. 958), and the April 1986 issue of American Psychologist indi­cated that Ellis s "theoretical contributions have had a profound effect on the professional practice of psychotherapy.... His theories on the primacy of cog­nition in psychopathology are at the forefront of practice and research in Clini­cal Psychology" (p. 380). A survey of 800 clinical and counseling psychologists showed that Ellis ranked second (Rogers was first and Freud was third) among psychotherapists considered to be the most influential (Smith, 1982, p. 807).

' T o avoid misconceptions, I must point out that Freud, Skinner, and Rogers did not sin-glehandedly develop their psychologies. Other people worked with them, or worked in­dependently, to advance these approaches, and various efforts continue. However, it is still true that psychoanalysis, radical behaviorism, and humanistic phenomenology are closely and strongly identified with Freud, Skinner, and Rogers, respectively. 2In this Epilogue, direct quotations from published works retain the earlier label, R E T .

EPILOGUE 163

Ellis received his Ph.D. in clinical psychology from Columbia University in 1947. He began using REBT in the 1950s, after becoming disenchanted with the psychoanalytic approach. He felt that there had to be a more efficient way to help his clients. Influenced in part by his own earlier personal experi­ences of overcoming his fears of public speaking and of talking with women and making dates, he developed a direct and active approach that focused on confronting clients' irrational and unscientific beliefs. Thus, the early version of REBT was born, with further developments to be fostered by Ellis and others who were attracted to his ideas and methods of therapy.

An effective way, often used by Ellis and his colleagues, of explaining ratio­nal-emotive behavior therapy is to refer to the ABCs of REBT. A is some "ac­tivating event" (for example, loss of your job), B is your "belief system" (which may include rational beliefs, irrational beliefs, or both), and C represents "con­sequences" (both emotional and behavioral).Troubled clients, experiencing unpleasant events, tend to hold irrational beliefs that intensify negative emo­tional reactions and maladaptive behaviors. Losing your job is usually an un­pleasant event, resulting in negative emotions. However, if you harbor irra­tional beliefs—"I'll never get another good job," "Its totally unfair that I should lose my job," "I must be inadequate," "I should be treated better," "I can't stand this happening to me," or "I know that my future is ruined"—feelings of de­spair, anger, inadequacy, anxiety, depression, and so on are likely to be intense. You may then behave in counterproductive ways, such as complaining con­stantly, acting in aggressive rather than assertive ways, or failing to actively seek other employment.

REBT attempts directly and actively to get clients to dispute their irra­tional, unscientific beliefs and replace them with rational beliefs. For example, you might more realistically believe "I'll have a tough time getting another job," "Its unfortunate that I have to be among those out of work," or "This is an unpleasant experience."These more moderate beliefs are less likely to be as­sociated with extremely negative emotional states or maladaptive behaviors. (Ellis was very impressed with certain thoughts of the first-century philoso­pher Epictetus, who pointed out that people are disturbed not by events, but by the way»they view the events.This is a key concept underlying REBT)

Irrational thinking takes various forms, some obvious and others more sub­tle. According to Ellis (1987), there is a "biological tendency of humans to think irrationally" (p. 364). Although acknowledging that our environments affect the ways we think, he hypothesized that "virtually all people are born with very strong tendencies to think crookedly about their important desires and preferences and to selfdefeatingly escalate them into dogmatic, absolutistic shoulds, musts, oughts, demands, and commands" (p. 373). Despite these views, Ellis's REBT is an optimistic approach, emphasizing that "people have enor­mous power to think about their thinking, to use rationality and the scientific method, and to radically control and change their emotional destiny—provid­ing they really work at doing so" (p. 374).

Most of us have strong preferences or desires for success, comfort, accep­tance, and approval. We get into trouble emotionally and behaviorally, according

164 EPILOGUE

to Ellis, when these preferences or desires become absolute requirements that should and must be met. Inevitably, we do not always succeed, we are not always comfortable, and we do not always enjoy acceptance or approval. When these unpleasant events occur, we may philosophically accept the facts that life can be difficult, that we don't always get what we want, and that sometimes we will suffer setbacks. Or, we may believe irrationally that these are awful circum­stances that we just can't stand (the tendency to "awfulize" combined with " I -can't-stand-it-itis"), that bad things will always happen to us, and that we are worthless.

Ellis s colorful, and sometimes profane, language highlights the importance of absolutistic thinking (especially "musts" and "shoulds") in the R E B T view of emotional and behavioral problems. He has said that, whereas masturbation is good,"musturbation" is bad; also,"Shouldhood equals shithood" (Newhorn, 1978, p. 30), meaning that, if you believe in absolute "shoulds," you're likely to feel shitty when things don't turn out as you think they should. He also has characterized irrational thinking as consisting of "Bullshit Beliefs" (Newhorn, 1978, p. 32).

The job of the psychotherapist or counselor who uses R E B T includes de­tecting irrational beliefs and helping the client to effectively dispute them. Cognitive disputation may focus on limited and specific beliefs related to par­ticular events or situations, or it may attempt to bring about broad, general changes in the clients belief system. The most desirable outcome is a profound philosophical change. As Ellis (1988) put it, the essence of R E B T "is to zero in, as quickly as possible, on the clients basic philosophy of life; to get him to see exactly what this is and how it is inevitably self-defeating; [and] to pro­foundly change it" (p. 58).To accomplish this, the therapist can use a variety of cognitive disputational techniques, such as the following:

1. Directly pointing out and debating the client s irrational beliefs, clearly re­vealing why they are irrational, and restating them in rational form.

2. Helping the client to objectively appraise his or her circumstances, focus­ing on the advantages and disadvantages of holding particular beliefs and behaving in certain ways.

3. Teaching methods of thought-stopping and constructive distraction.

REBT, although centrally concerned with cognitive methods of disputing and changing clients' irrational beliefs, also uses emotive and behavioral meth­ods. Emotive methods include using imagery (for example, having clients imagine some negative event and not overreact to it) and gaining clients' ac­ceptance of the view that neither they nor others are perfect (which serves to lessen clients' tendencies to downgrade themselves and get depressed or to downgrade others and get angry).

Behavioral methods include homework assignments that may involve rein-forcers for completion and penalties for noncompletion. For example, clients may be assigned a twice-a-week task of completing the R E B T Self-Help Form (Corsini, 1991, pp. 112-113).This form helps clients to identify, dispute, and replace irrational beliefs that promote emotional disturbances and self-

EPILOGUE 165

defeating behaviors. When the assignment is completed, clients reward them­selves by doing something they enjoy; if the assignment is not completed, they impose a penalty on themselves, such as doing an unpleasant chore. Other types of behavioral methods are activity homework tasks (for example, asking an overly shy client to initiate five conversations with strangers) and skills training (for example, teaching a nonassertive client how to effectively articu­late his or her opinions).

In addition, REBT practitioners often recommend appropriate pamphlets, books, and audiocassettes to their clients. The clients may also be encouraged to attend group therapy sessions, workshop sessions, or both.

Ellis frequently has indicated that insight regarding one's irrational beliefs is not sufficient. Work and practice are required to build and maintain rational­ity. He suggests that the client has to be persuaded "to work his ass off, cogni-tively, emotionally, and behaviorally" (Ellis, 1988, p. 58). Although the essential assumption of REBT is that we disturb ourselves mainly by holding irrational beliefs, Ellis (1989) points out that "people's self-defeating feelings and behav­iors also importantly create and affect their irrational beliefs" (p. 217). He also stated that "RET believes thoughts, feelings, and behaviors interact" (p. 211) and "RET practitioners are trained in being solidly interactional in their use of cognitive, emotive, and behavioral methods of therapy" (p. 212). The overall goal is to bring about "a profound philosophic change, since RET hypothe­sizes that unless an attitudinal restructuring is effected, therapeutic results will tend to be moderate and unlasting" (p. 212).

Although it is not a purely cognitive approach to human behavior, REBT's emphasis on belief systems places it among the vital forces affecting contem­porary cognitive psychology. It provides a perspective that is different from that of psychoanalysis, radical behaviorism, or humanistic phenomenology, both in the importance attributed to thought processes and in the therapeutic meth­ods advocated. Certain behavioristic concepts (such as reinforcement) and hu­manistic elements (such as unconditional acceptance of clients despite their ir­rationalities and maladaptive behaviors) can be found in REBT. However, its most basic assumptions and its direct and forceful attempts to dispute and re­place irrational beliefs (in order to bring about substantial changes in clients' philosophical outlooks) set it apart from these other approaches.

How effective is REBT as a form of psychotherapy? A review of a number of existing studies suggested that clients demonstrated "significant clinical im­provement over those not receiving RET" (Prochaska & Norcross, 1994, p. 336); no general differences in effectiveness were found, however, between REBT and other therapeutic approaches. This is consistent with the following

•'This general conclusion is relevant when different psychotherapies are applied to a wide variety of disorders. It does not rule out the possibility that specific therapies may be more effective than others for treating certain problems. For example, behavioral approaches seem to be more effective than psychoanalytic or client-centered approaches in reducing specific fears or phobias. Continued research is needed "to determine the disorder for which each therapy is particularly effective. Matching the right therapy and therapist with the right patient will improve the overall effectiveness of treatment" (Atkinson et al., 1993, p. 695).

166 EPILOGUE

conclusion, derived from an evaluation of a variety of psychotherapies: " R e ­search indicates that psychotherapy does help [in a majority of cases] but that different approaches do not differ greatly in effectiveness" (Atkinson, Atkin­son, Smith, & Bern, 1993, p. 708).3

For more information about Albert Ellis and REBT, consult either the ref­erences that follow or Ellis s own books, which include Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy (1962), Humanistic Psychotherapy: The Rational-Emotive Approach (1973), A New Guide to Rational Living (1975; coauthored with R . A. Harper), A Guide to Personal Happiness (1982; coauthored with I. Becker), and How to Stubbornly Refuse to Make Yourself Miserable about Anything—Yes, Anything! (1988). A biography by Daniel N.Wiener, Albert Ellis: Passionate Skeptic (1988), also is available.

REFERENCES FOR EPILOGUE

Atkinson, R. L., Atkinson, R. C , Smith, E. E., & Bern, D. J. (1993). Introduction to psy­chology (3rd ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Corsini, R. J. (Ed.). (1991). Five therapists and one client. Itasca, IL: Peacock. D'Zurilla,T.J. (1990). Current status of rational-emotive therapy. Contemporary Psychol­

ogy, 35,958-959. Ellis, A. (1987). The impossibility of achieving consistently good mental health. Ameri­

can Psychologist, 42,364-375. Ellis, A. (1988, September). Albert Ellis on the essence of RET. Psychology Today, p. 58. Ellis, A. (1989). Comments on my critics. In M. E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.),

Inside rational-emotive therapy: A critical appraisal of the theory and therapy of Albert Ellis (pp. 199-233). New York: Academic Press.

Freeman, A., & Bux, D. (1991). RET-Straight from the horse's mouth. Contemporary Psychology, 36,324-325.

Newhorn, P. (1978,January). Albert Ellis. Human Behavior, pp. 30-35. ProchaskaJ. O., & NorcrossJ. C. (1994). Systems of psychotherapy: A transtheoretical analy­

sis (3rd ed., pp. 313-345). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Rorer, L. G. (1998). Attacking arrant nonsense forthrighdy. Contemporary Psychology, 43,

597-600. Smith, D. (1982).Trends in counseling and psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 31,

802-809. Tavris, C , & Wade, C. (1997). Psychology in perspective (2nd ed.). New York: Addison

Wesley. Wade, C , & Tavris, C. (1990). Psychology (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Row.

Photo Credits

Cover: (top and top right) Mary Evans/Sigmund Freud Copyrights; (center top and lower left) courtesy of Natalie Rogers, Ph.D.; (center left) Bob Van Doren; (center right) courtesy of The B. E Skinner Foundation; (bottom right) courtesy of Gerbrands Corp.

Chapter 1: x, (top) Mary Evans/Sigmund Freud Copyrights; (bottom left) cour­tesy of Natalie Rogers, Ph.D.; (bottom right) courtesy of Hamilton College

Chapter 2:6, Mary Evans/Sigmund Freud Copyrights

Chapter 3: 46, (top) courtesy of Gerbrands Corp.; (all others) courtesy of The B. E Skinner Foundation

Chapter 4: 96, courtesy of Natalie Rogers, Ph.D.

Chapter 5: 132, (top) Mary Evans/Sigmund Freud Copyrights; (bottom left) courtesy of Carl Rogers Memorial Library, photo by Nozizwe S.; (bottom right) courtesy of The B. E Skinner Foundation

167

Index

About Behaviorism (Skinner), 48, 49,151 Abulia,71 Acceptance. See Unconditional positive

regard Actualization

defined, 98,103 encounter groups and, 121 natural tendency toward, 99-100 self-actualization and, 104-106

Actualizing tendency as basic human motive, 99-100,

103-105,123 self-actualizing tendency and, 105—106

Adler,Alfred, 161 Aggression

as basic human drive, 13-15 destructive, 141-142,148,157 Freud's views on, 13-15,141, 148, 157 as learned behavior, 157 Rogers s views on, 142 Skinners views on, 86-87,142

Aging, Skinners views on, 88, 88n Albert Ellis: Passionate Skeptic (Wiener), 166 Altruistic urge, 15 American Psychoanalytic Association, 39

American Psychological Association, 142 American Psychologist, 162 Anal stage, 21-22, 36 Analytic psychology, 161 Anger

in humanistic phenomenology, 109 in radical behaviorism, 81

Anticathexes, 16, 27 Antisocial behavior, 14 Anxiety

castration, 23 defense mechanisms and, 14, 26-29 moral, 26, 30, 36 neurotic, 26, 30, 36 nightmares and, 31 psychoanalysis to treat, 29-35 reality, 26, 29-30, 36 sources/types of, 26-27, 36

Anxiety dream (nightmare), 31 Applied behavior analysis, 52, 86 Autistic children, punishment and, 83-84 Autonomous ego functions, 40-41 Aversive control

alternatives to, 83 to control behavior, 82-84, 85, 89

1 7 0 INDEX

Aversive stimulus, 59, 62, 89

Bandura, Albert, 161 Baseline data, 87,139 Basic estrangement, 110-111,123 Becker, I., 166 Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alterna­

tives (Rogers), 98,122 Behavior. See also Human behavior studies

antisocial, 14 conditioned, 57-59 contingency-shaped, 79-80 control. See Behavior control creative, 76-77 Freud's explanation for, 2,149-150 maintaining, 67-7'4, 75 mutations of, 77 operant,55-63,81,89 problem. See Problem behavior reinforced, 56-57 respondent, 53-55, 89 Rogers s explanation for, 98-100 rule-governed, 79-80, 92,151 self-control and, 74-76 shaping, 63-67, 86-87, 89 Skinners explanation for, 3, 51 superstitious, 57, 57n suppression of, 61, 62 unconditional positive regard and,

109-110 Behavioral engineering, 52,152 Behavior analysis, applied, 52, 86 Behavior control

aversive stimuli and, 82-84 conditioned reinforcers and, 60 positive reinforcement and, 60, 82, 91 punishment as, 61-62 Rogers vs. Skinner on, 142-148 self-control and, 74-77 Skinners views on, 60-61, 76,142-148

Behaviorism and Phenomenology (Wann), 141 Behaviorism. See Radical behaviorism Behavior modification, 52, 86-88 Behavior Modification: Principles and Proce­

dures (Miltenberger), 86 Behavior of Organisms, The (Skinner), 48 Belief systems, rational-emotive behavior

therapy and, 163-165 Bettelheim, Bruno, 36-37 Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner), 48,

53,89,91,150

Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud), 8,13 B.F Skinner: Consensus and Controversy

(Modgil), 152n Bisexuality, in Freudian theory, 24 Black, Margaret J., 40 Brain damage, problem behaviors and, 18,

87 Brenner, Charles, 32 Breuer, Josef, 9, 30 Burgess, H., 94

Cameron, J., 67, 67n Carl Rogers: Dialogues (Kirschenbaum &

Henderson), 98,140,144 . Carl Rogers:The Man and His Ideas (Evans),

43n Carl Rogers on Encounter Groups (Rogers),

98 Carl Rogers on Personal Power (Rogers), 98 Carl Rogers Reader, The (Kirschenbaum &

Henderson), 98,104,125n, 140,144 Castration anxiety, 23 Castration complex, 24 Cathartic method, 9,30 Cathexes, 16 Cause-and-efFect relationships, 49, 50, 88,

139 Center for Studies of the Person, 125 Chained schedules, 72-73 Charcot,Jean, 8-9 Chiesa, ML, 94 Childhood

early, as determinant of adult behavior, 21,135

Erikson s psychosocial stages of, 41 Oedipus complex as natural aspect of,

22-25 punishment in, 82 sexual trauma in, seduction theory and,

37-39,39n Childhood and Society (Erikson), 41 Civilization, conflicting with human s

primitive instincts, 3,13-15,134,137 Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud), 8,

13,133 Classical conditioning, 54-55, 55 / Client-centered therapy See also Person-

centered approach attitudinal conditions for, 112-114 clients role in, 115,137 criticisms of, 153-155

INDEX 1 7 1

desired outcomes of, 116-117 focus of, 101-102,124,137 generality of, 127 inner experiencing and, 3, 101, 137 international applications of, 124-127 name change of, 112, 124 summary sketch of, 3, 124 therapist's role in, 115-117, 124, 137 transference in, 117

Client-Centered Therapy (Rogers), 98 Cognitive processes. See also Inner experi­

encing; Inner states in humanistic phenomenology, 99,105 in psychoanalytic theory, 20-21 in radical behaviorism, 3, 77-80, 89 as subvocal speech (Watson's view),

48-49 Cognitive psychology, 147-148,152,

161-162 Communities, Skinnerian, 52-53 Compromise formations, 31, 33n Concurrent schedules, 72 Condensation, in dream work, 31 Conditional positive regard

fully functioning person and, 111-112 incongruence and, 110-111 organismic valuing process and,

107-110,107n, 123 Conditioned behavior, reinforcement and,

57-59 Conditioned reinforcers, 60-61, 63, 72-73 Conditioned response, 54n Conditioned stimulus, 54n Conditioning

classical, 53-55, 54n, 55 / operant, 56-63 respondent, 53-55, 54n, 55 /

Conditions of worth, 108, 110, 111 Conflict resolution, person-centered ap­

proach to, 124-126 Congruence

defined, 110 as goal of client-centered therapy,

110 incongruence vs., 110—111, 123 in therapeutic relationships, 112-113,

113n, 114 Conscience

defined, 17 moral anxiety and, 26, 30, 36 superego and, 17

Conscious defined, 11 in radical behaviorism, 77-80, 89 repression and, 27

Contingencies of reinforcement analysis of, to explain behavior, 90 conscious processes and, 77, 79 defined, 67, 67n emotions and, 81 individual's history of, 58, 63, 74, 76-77,

89-90,135 problem behaviors and, 86 unconditional positive regard and, 154

Contingencies of Reinforcement (Skinner), 48 Contingency-shaped behavior, 79-80 Control of behavior. See Behavior control Conversion reaction, 9 Correlational analysis, 102-103 Couch, analyst, 30-31 Counseling and Psychotherapy (Rogers), 98 Countertransference, 33—34 Creativity, in radical behaviorism, 76—77,

152

Death and dying, Skinner's views on, 88,88n Death instinct/wish, 12, 13, 141. See also

Destructive energy DeBell,C.S.,93 Decision making, in radical behaviorism,

77-80 Defense mechanisms

as an explanation for behavior, 156 defined, 14,27,36 functions of, 27-29, 30 types of, 27-29

Denial, defined, 28 Dependent variable, 139 Destructive aggression. See Aggression Destructive energy

death instinct and, 12 need for release of, 13-15

Determinism of Freud, 8, 35 of Rogers, 100-101,105,123 of Skinner, 50-51, 89

Development psychosexual stages of, 21-25, 36 psychosocial stages of, 41

"Dialogue on Education, and the Control of Human Behavior" (Rogers & Skinner), 144

1 7 2 INDEX

Discriminations, 62-63, 62n Discriminative stimulus, 62, 72-73 Displacement

characteristics of, 28-29 defined, 14 in dream work, 31

Dramatization, in dream work, 31 Dream analysis

defined, 31-32,34,35 free association and, 32

Dream work, 31 Drives/instincts

aggression, 13-15,141-142,148,157 death, 12,13 energy of. See Instinctual energy id and, 12,12n, 13-15 life, 12,15 in radical behaviorism, 80-81, 89 sexual, 13-15,28-29

Education behavior shaping and, 64-67 innovations pioneered by Skinner, 52 Rogers's views on, 124,145-146 Skinner's views on, 52,64—67

Ego. See also Id; Superego anxiety and, 26-29 autonomy of, 40-41,40n conscious aspects of, 20 defense mechanisms of, 27-29 defined, 11,36 Erikson's views on, 11,41 formation of, 15-17 functions of, 15-17 Hartmann's views on, 40 hereditary factors and, 40 nightmares and, 31 as the personality's control center, 16 preconscious aspects of, 20 relationship to id, 16, 40-41 relationship to superego, 17-18 repression and, 27 unconscious aspects of, 20

Ego-ideal, 17 Ego and the Id, The (Freud), 8,11 Ego psychology, 40-41, 40n Einstein, Albert, 141 Eisenberger, R., 67, 67n Electra complex, 22, 28 Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis, An

(Brenner), 32

Elicited behavior. See Respondent behavior

Ellis, Albert approach of, 162-165 biographical sketch of, 163 cognitive psychotherapy and, 162,165 published works of, 166

Emitted behavior. See Operant behavior Emotions. See also Inner experiencing; In­

ner states analyzed as effects, rather than causes of

behavior, 89-92,152 in client-centered therapy, 114-115 encounter group facilitators, and,

119-120 in humanistic phenomenology, 3,

114-115 in psychoanalytic theory, 9,19,20 in radical behaviorism, 3, 54, 77,81 Rogers vs. Skinner on, 147-148 stimulus generalization and, 54 as subject of behavioral analysis, 77, 81 unconditional positive regard and,

108-109 Empathy

in therapeutic relationships, 113,113n, 115,124,128

transference and, 117 as a way of knowing, 100

Encounter groups defined, 118 facilitating, 118-120 shortcomings of, 121-122 size and function of, 118 stages of, 120-121 typical process of, 120-122

Energy destructive, 12-15 instinctual, 12,14,28-29 libidinal,12,14-15,22,23 psychic, 12,14,28-29 sexual, 12,14-15,22,23

Energy system, of the personality, 12,150 Enjoy Old Age (Skinner &Vaughan), 48, 88 Environmental factors

cognitive problem solving and, 78-79 creativity and, 76-77 in humanistic phenomenology, 100,155 in object relations theory, 42 in psychoanalytic theory, 11-12,13,15,

16,150

INDEX 173

in radical behaviorism, 49-51, 63, 80, 87,89,134,135,136,144-145,157

self-control and, 74-76 Epictetus, 163 Erikson,ErikH.,41 Eros (life instincts), 12,15 Essays on Ego Psychology (Hartmann), 40n Evans, Richard I., 43n Evolution theory, Freud's analysis of, 12 Experimental methods

in humanistic phenomenology, 140-141 in radical behaviorism, 51-53,139-140

Explanatory fictions, 49, 50,75,90 Exteroceptive nervous system, 77-78 Extinction

defined, 54 intermittent reinforcement and, 68 operant, 57-58 respondent behavior and, 55 undesirable behavior and, 83

Eysenck, Hans, 161

Facilitators attributes of, 119 of encounter groups, 118-120

Fear. See also Anxiety in radical behaviorism, 81, 88 respondent conditioning and, 54

Feelings. See Emotions Females

Electra complex and, 22,28 object-loss identification, 28 Oedipus complex and, 22,24-25

Feminine tendencies, Oedipus complex and, 24-25

Feminism, Freudian theory and, 24, 44, 148

Ferster,C.B.,72,73 Field theory, 161 Fisher, Seymour, 43n Fixation

as a defense mechanism, 27,29 defined, 22 regression and, 29

Fixed-interval (FI) schedules, 69-70, 72 Fixed-ratio (FR) schedules, 70-71,72 Fliess,Wilhelm,38 Free association

defined, 9,30,34,35 dream analysis and, 32

Freedom, vs. determinism, 89,91, 100-101,105,123,138

Freedom to learn for the 80s (Rogers), 98 Free will

in humanistic phenomenology, 100-101 in radical behaviorism, 77-79, 89,151

Freud: Biologist of the Mind (Sulloway), lOn Freud,Anna,7,27,41 Freud Scientifically Reappraised: Testing the

Theories and Therapy (Fisher & Green-berg), 43n

Freud, Sigmund, 7-45. See also Psycho­analysis

biographical sketch of, 7—8 commentary on, 36-44,155-156 criticisms of, 37-40, 39n, 148-150,157 on destructive aggression, 141-142 determinism of, 8, 35 feminist perspective and, 24, 44,148 on human nature, 133-134 hypnosis and, 8-9, 30, 35 influence of, 40,44 Masson's criticism of, 37-38 misrepresentation of, by translators,

36-37 on neurosis and psychosis, 136 on personality development, 135 pessimism of, 2,133,135,141 published works of, 8,44-45 seduction theory and, 37-39,39n self-analysis by, 9—10 sex drive in humans and, 13-15 sexist tone in works of, 148 Skinner's criticism of, 50 sources of data, 9—10 structural model of personality, 11-21 on study of human behavior, 138-141 suggestions for practicing his method,

35 summary of major points, 2, 35-36 topographic model of personality, 11,

18-21 unconscious and its importance to,

10-11 Fully functioning person, 3,111-112,123 Functional relations, 49,139

Gambling, 71, 7In Generalizations

discrimination and, 62n emotions and, 81

174 INDEX

Generalized reinforcers, 60—61 Genetic factors

behavior and, 3, 50-51 conscious states and, 77-80 creativity and, 76-77 ego development and, 40 personal reinforcement histories and,

58, 63, 89 self-control and, 76-77 Skinner on role of, 3, 134

Genital stage, 21, 25 Gestalt psychology, 161 Goal o/B.E Skinner and Behavior Analysis,

The (Proctor & Weeks), 152n Greenberg, Roger P., 43n Group therapy, encounter groups vs., 118 Guide to Personal Happiness, A (Ellis &

Becker), 166 Guilt, 13-14,17

Hall, Calvin S.,43n Harless,D.K.,93 Harper, R.A., 166 Hartmann, Heinz, 40, 40n Henderson,Valerie Land, 98, 125n Heredity. See Genetic factors Homosexuality, in psychoanalytic theory,

24-25 Horney, Karen, 161 How to Stubbornly Refuse to Make Yourself

Miserable about Anything— Yes, Anything! (Ellis), 166

Human behavior studies. See also Behavior Freud's views on, 138-139 Rogers s views on, 140-141, 141n Skinner's views on, 139-140

Humanistic phenomenology actualizing tendency in, 103-104 congruence vs. incongruence in,

110-111 criticisms of, 153-155 defined, 98-100,123-124 determinism in, 100-101 encounter groups and, 118-122 fully functioning person in, 111-112,

123 generalizability of, 155,155n organismic valuing process, 106-108,

110-112,114,123 self-actualization and, 104-106

simplicity of, 128 summary of major points, 3, 105—106,

123-124 unconditional positive regard and,

106-110 Humanistic Psychotherapy: The Rational-

Emotive Approach (Ellis), 166 Human nature

Ellis s views on, 163 Freud's views on, 133—134 Rogerss views on, 98-99,105, 111,

127, 134-135,153 Skinner's views on, 134

Hypnosis Breuer's work and, 35 Freud's early beliefs about, 8-9, 30

Hypochondria, 78 Hysteria, 9

Iceberg analogy, 11 Id. See also Ego; Superego

anticathexes/cathexes and, 16 defined, 11-12,36 ego autonomy and, 40-41 pleasure principle and, 11 the unconscious and, 19-20

Ideal self, according to Rogers, 102-103 Identification, 23-25, 28

positive effects of, 29 Imagery, in rational-emotive behavior

therapy, 164 Imitation, 92 Impulsivity, id as representing, 18 Incestuous impulses, 23-24, 25 Incongruence, 110-111,123 Independent variable, 139 Individual psychology, 161 Induction. See Generalizations Inner experiencing

actualization and, 99 client-centered therapy and, 3,101,137 decision-making on basis of, 135 empathic understanding of, 113 in encounter groups, 118-122 maladjusted persons and, 100 of newborn infant, 104 Skinner vs. Rogers on, 145-146 unconditional positive regard and, 109

Inner states. See also Emotions defined, 3, 77

INDEX 1 7 5

as effect, rather than cause of behavior, 77-81,88,89-92,152

Instincts/drives aggression, 13-15,141-142,148,157 death, 12,13 energy of, 12,14,28-29 id and, 12,12n, 13-15 life, 12,15 in radical behaviorism, 80-81, 89 sexual, 13-15,28-29

Instructional aids, 64-67 Intermittent reinforcement, 68-74 International Psychoanalytic Association, 39 International relations, Rogers s person-

centered approach to, 124-125,124n, 125n

Interoceptive stimuli, 78 Interpretation of Dreams, The (Freud), 8 Interpretations, psychoanalytic, 33, 34, 36,

137 Interval schedules

defined, 69, 89 rate of response for, 72 ratio schedules vs., 70

Intimacy in client-centered therapy, 35n, 114,119 in psychoanalysis, 35, 35n

Intimate relationships, 122-123 Introjected values, 107-108 Intuitive self, 114 Irrational thinking, 163-165

Jacobs, Michael, 35 Jealousy, 24 Jensen, R., 94 Jung, Carl, 161

Kirschenbaum, Howard, 98,125n Knowledge by acquaintance, 79-80 Knowledge by description, 79-80 Koch, Sigmund, 156

Latency period, 21, 25 Latent content of dreams, 31 Lay analyst, 39 Learned responses, 54, 54n

as an explanation for problem behavior, 84, 157

Learning behavior shaping and, 63-67, 86-87

knowledge by description and, 80 person-centered approach to, 124

Learning theory social, 161 stimulus-response, 161

Legacy o/B.F Skinner, The (Nye), 158 Lewin, Kurt, 161 Libido (libidinal energy), 12, 14-15, 22, 23 Life instincts (Eros), 12,15 Lindzey, Cardner, 43n Los Horcones, Mexico (Skinnerian com­

munity), 53

Maintaining behavior, 67-74, 75 Maladjustment

in humanistic phenomenology, 100, 136-137

in psychoanalytic theory, 136 in radical behaviorism, 84-88, 136

Males, Oedipus complex in, 22-25, 36 Manifest content of dreams, 31 Marriage, 122-123 Maslow, Abraham, 98 Masson, Jeffrey, 37-38 Medical practice, Freud's impact on, 10,

lOn Mental health

anxiety and, 26—29 ego strength as sign of, 16-17, 26-27 problem behaviors and. See Problem

behavior Mental illness

ego weakness as sign of, 30, 36 encounter groups and, 120,122 Freud's views on, 9, 10, 30, 36, 136 as learned response, 84,136 neuroses. See Neuroses psychopathic personality, 18, 87 psychotic behavior, 18, 84 Rogers's views on, 100,136—137 Skinner's views on, 84-88,136 unconscious sexual conflicts as root of,

2 ,9 ,10,136 Miltenberger, Raymond G., 86 Mitchell, Stephen A., 40 Modgil, Celia, 152 Moral anxiety, 26, 30, 36 Morality, superego as representing, 11,18 Multiple schedules, 72 Mutations, of behavior, 77

1 7 6 INDEX

Negative reinforcement. See also R e ­inforcement

defined, 58-60,89 implications of, 60 maintaining undesirable behavior and,

75 punishment vs., 61-62 unpleasant inner states and, 91

Nervous system, exteroceptive, 77-78 Neurophysiologic disorders, problem be­

haviors and, 87 Neuroses

external trauma vs. internal conflict as cause of, 36-37

in humanistic psychology, 136—137 neurotic anxiety, 3,26,30, 36 in psychoanalytic theory, 9-10,38,136,

149 in radical behaviorism, 84,136 symptoms of, as compromise forma­

tions, 31-32,33n New Guide to Rational Living, A (Ellis &

Harper), 166 New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis

(Freud), 8 Nightmare (anxiety dream), 31 Nondirective therapy, 115, 124 Nye, Rober tD. , 158

Object-loss identification, 28 Object relations theory, 42, 42n Oedipus complex

defined, 22 female, 22, 24-25 male, 22-25, 36 resolution of, 23-25, 42 superego and, 23

On Becoming a Person (Rogers), 98 Operant behavior

defined, 55, 63, 89 reinforcement and, 56-61, 63

Operant conditioning, 55-63, 81, 89 Operant extinction, 57-58 Operational definitions, 149 Oral stage, 21-22, 36 Organism, defined, 105 Organismic valuing process

actualizing tendency and, 106 alienation from, client-centered therapy

and, 114

defined, 106,123 in fully functioning person, 112 incongruent states and, 110-111 unconditional positive regard and,

107-108 Outline of Psychoanalysis, An (Freud), 8 Overeating, self-control and, 76

Parent/child relationships, punishment in, 82

Patterson, C.H., 129 Pavlov, Ivan, 54 Penis envy, 24, 44,148 Perception, in client-centered therapy, 115 Perls, Fritz, 161 Personality

as an energy system, 12,150 drives/instincts of, 12,13-15 Freud's views on, 10-25 layers/levels of, 10-11, 36 psychopathic, 18, 87 Rogers s views on, 99-100,103,123 Skinner s views on, 58-59, 63 structural model of, 11-21,19 topographic model of, 11,18-21,19 unconscious dynamics of, 2,10—11

Personality development Freud's views on, 135 Rogers's views on, 135-136 Skinners views on, 135

Person-centered approach. See also Client-centered therapy

in conflict resolution, 124-126 international applications of, 124-126 potential of, 128

Phallic stage, 21-22, 36 Phenomenal field, 104 Phenomenological view, 105. See also Hu­

manistic phenomenology Phobias, 84 Physicians, psychologic factors in disease

and, 10 Pleasure principle, 11,13 Political conflicts, Rogers's person-cen­

tered approach to, 124-126 Positive regard, 106-108,123 Positive reinforcement. See also Reinforce­

ment defined, 58-60, 89 negative reinforcement vs., 58-59

INDEX 1 7 7

operant conditioning and, 59-60 positive reinforcers and, 61 Skinner's advocacy of, 60, 82, 91

Preconscious level of personality, 11 Pregenital stages, 21,36 Primary gains, 32 Primary process, 15 Primary reinforcers, 60-61, 63 Priming, educational, 66 Private events, 77, 85 Problem behavior

in Freud's theory, 9-10,14, 18, 38, 136, 149

in Rogers s theory, 136-137, 153 in Skinner's theory, 84-88, 89

Problem solving, in radical behaviorism, 77-80

Proctor, Robert W.,152n Programmed instruction, 64-67 Projection, 28 Prompting, educational, 66 Proprioceptive stimuli, 78 Psychic energy of instincts, 12 Psychoanalysis

Bettelheim's analysis of, 37 as both theory and therapy, 10, 36 contemporary approaches to, 35n, 40,

42-43 countertransference in, 33-34 criticisms of, 42-43,149-150 current trends in, 39 dream analysis in, 31-32, 34, 35 free association in, 9, 30, 32, 34, 35 Freud's suggestions for practicing, 35 genetics and, 40 interpretations in, 33, 34, 36 lay (nonmedical) analysts, 39 object-relations theory compared to, 42 professional training for, 33-34, 39 resistance in, 32—33, 34, 36 role of, 8 societal impact of, 43-44 summary of major points, 2, 34, 35-36 theoretical changes in, 40-41,139 as therapy, 2, 9, 19-20, 29-35,134 for today's patient, 41 transference in, 33, 34, 36, 117 Watson's criticism of, 48

Psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 34-35 Psychology: A Study of a Science (Koch), 156

Psychology analytic, 161 cognitive, 147-148,152,161-162 field theory, 161 gestalt, 161 individual, 161 professional training in, 33-34, 39,

127-128 social analytic, 161 study of the unconscious and, 10-11 summary of three perspectives in, 1-3 trends in contemporary, 161

Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behavior-ist (Watson), 48

Psychopathic personality, 18, 87 Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The

(Freud), 8 Psychosexual stages of development

Erikson's psychosocial stages and, 41 Freudian model of, 21—25, 36

Psychosocial stages of development, Erik-son's model of, 41

Psychotherapy. See also Therapy behavioral, 52, 86-88 client-centered, 112-117 cognitive, 161-162 professional training, person-centered

approach and, 127-128 psychoanalytic, 34-35 rational-emotive behavior therapy,

162-165 Rogers's views on, 112,136-137 short-term dynamic, 35 Skinner's views on, 136 success of, 117, 165-166,165n therapist as facilitator, 118-120 therapist as nonpunishing audience, 87

Psychotic behavior psychoanalytic explanation for, 18 in radical behaviorism, 84, 85

Public events, 77, 85 Punishment

alternatives to, 83 defined, 61-63 negative reinforcement vs., 62 problem behavior and, 85 self-control and, 74-75 to control behavior, 82-84, 89, 91

Q-sort, 102-103, 104, 153 '

178 INDEX

Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science ((Chiesa), 93

Radical behaviorism applicability to everyday life, 92 commentary on, 89-93 conscious processes and, 77-80 creativity and, 76-77 criticisms of, 150-152 defined, 48-50 drives and, 80-81 emotions and, 77, 80-81, 89 experimental methods of, 49, 51-53 genetics and, 50-51, 58,63,76-80,89 origins of, 48-50 overview of, 3 ,48-50,88-89 reinforcement in. See Reinforcement self-control and, 74—76 shaping behavior and, 64—67, 86-87,

89 shortcomings of, 152

Radical determinism, of Skinner, 50-51 Rates of response, 52, 52n

for interval schedules, 72 for ratio schedules, 72

Rational-emotive behavior therapy (REBT)

behavioral methods in, 164—165 effectiveness of, 165-166,165n emotive methods in, 164 origins of, 162 overview of, 163—165

Rationality, ego as representing, 18 Rationalization, defined, 28 Ratio schedules, 69, 89

interval schedules vs., 70 rate of response for, 72

Rayner, Rosalie, 54 Reaction formation, defined, 27 Reality anxiety, 26, 29-30, 36 Reality principle, 16 Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy (Ellis),

162,166 REBT. See Rational-emotive behavior

therapy Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior

(Skinner), 48,66n,158n Reflections on Behaviorism and Society (Skin­

ner), 48 Regression, defined, 29 Reinforcement

abulia and, 71

contingencies. See Contingencies of re­inforcement

continuous, 67-68 histories. See Reinforcement histories importance of, in explaining behavior,

157-158 intermittent, 68-74 maintaining behavior by, 67-74,75 negative vs. positive, 58-61 operant conditioning and, 56-61, 63 overeating/weight loss and, 76 personality as the sum of, 58 positive vs. negative, 58—61 problem behavior and, 84—88 problem solving and, 79-80 punishment as, 61—63 in rational-emotive behavior therapy,

164-165 rewards vs., 56 schedules of, 67-74 self-control and, 74—76 shaping behavior by, 63-67,86-87,89 superstitious behavior and, 57, 57n token economies and, 87-88 types of, 58-59

Reinforcement histories creativity and, 76-77 as explanation of behavior, 74,152 personality as sum of, 58,63,135

Repression defined, 27,36 instincts and, 14 Oedipus complex and, 23 suppression vs., 20

Resistance defined, 32,36 interpretations and, 33—34, 36 types of, 32-33

Respondent behavior, 53-55, 89 Respondent conditioning, 53-55, 54n,

55/, 81 RET (Rational-emotive therapy). See

Rational-emotive behavior therapy Rewards, 67, 67n

reinforcement vs., 56-57 Rogers, Carl, 97-130. See also Humanistic

phenomenology on behavior control, 142-148 biographical sketch, 97-98 client-centered therapy of. See Client-

centered therapy

INDEX 1 7 9

commentary on, 158-159 congruence and, 110-111 contributions of, 128-129 criticism of psychoanalysis, 43n criticisms of, 153-155,156 on determinism vs. freedom, 100-101,

105,123,138 encounter groups and, 118-122 fully functioning person concept of,

111-112,123 on human nature, 98-99,105, 111, 127,

134-135,153 incongruence and, 110-111 influence of, 126-128 on intensive group experiences, 117,

118 international applications of his ap­

proach, 124-126 on intimate relationships, 122-123 on maladjustment and therapy, 136-137 optimism of, 100,127,134,155,

158-159 on personality development, 135-136 published works of, 98,129-130 sources of data, 101-103 summary of major points, 3,105-106,

123-124 unconditional positive regard and,

106-110 views on intimacy/self-disclosure, 35n,

114,119 Rule-governed behavior, 79-80, 92 Rust (Austria) workshop, 125,125n

Sanford, Ruth, 125-126 Schedules of reinforcement, 67-74, 89 Schedules of Reinforcement (Ferster & Skin­

ner), 72,73 Science, 42 Science and Human Behavior (Skinner), 48 Secondary gains, 32-33 Secondary process, 16 Secondary revision, 31 Seduction theory, 37-39, 39n, 148 Self, in Rogers s psychology, 102-106,123 Self-actualization, 104-106 Self-actualizing tendency, 105-106,123 Self-analysis, by Freud, 9-10 Self-awareness

in humanistic psychology, 3 radical behaviorism and, 77-80

Self-concept in Rogers s psychology, 104-106 role of, in determining behavior, 3

Self-control alcoholism and, 75 Freud's views on, 14 overeating and, 76 in radical behaviorism, 74-75, 89 Skinner's position on, 76 techniques for, 75-76

Self-disclosure Freud's views on, 35, 35n Rogers's views on, 35n, 114,119

Self psychology, 42n Self-regard, introjected values and,

107-108 Self theory, Rogerian psychology as, 98,

104 Sexism, Freudian theory and, 148 Sex roles, Freud's views on, 24-25 Sexual behavior

environmental factors and, 157 reinforcement schedules and, 74

Sexual drive, 13-15 Sexual energy, 12,14-15, 22, 23 Sexuality

bisexuality, 24 childhood abuse, seduction theory and,

37-39,39n development of. See Psychosexual stages

of development homosexuality, 24 importance of, in Freudian theory, 2 ,9,

10,21,24,31,136 unconscious, symbolism in, 31

Shaping, behavioral defined, 64, 89 educational applications of, 64-67 examples of, 86-87

Short-term dynamic therapies, 35 Sigmund Freud (Jacobs), 35 Skinner, B.F., 47-95. See also Radical be­

haviorism on aging, 88 aversive controls and, 82-84 on behavior control, 142-148 biographical sketch of, 47-48 on cognitive processes, 77-80 commentary on, 157-158 criticisms of, 92,150-152,155-156 on death and dying, 88, 88n

1 8 0 INDEX

on destructive aggression, 141-142 on drives and emotions, 80—81 on education, 52, 64-67, 66n experimental approach of, 3, 51-53, 89,

139-140 on human nature, 134 on maladjustment and therapy, 136 on personality development, 136 on punishment, 61-62, 82-84, 84n radical determinism of, 50—51 on self-control, 74, 76 on society's problems, 92-93 on society's survival, 53 sources of data, 51-53 summary of major points, 88—89 Watson's influence on, 48-49, 55

Skinner box, 51-52, 89,139 Social analytic approach, 161 Social learning theory, 161 Society's role

in humanistic psychology, 126-127,138 in psychoanalytic theory, 3,13-15,18,

137 in radical behaviorism, 3, 53, 137-138,

150-152 "Some Issues Concerning the Control of

Human Behavior" (Rogers & Skin­ner), 142

Stimuli aversive, 59, 62 discriminative, 62 internal vs. external, 78 interoceptive, 78 proprioceptive, 78

Stimulus generalization, 54 Stimulus-response learning theory,

161 Structural model of personality

characteristics of, 11-21 how topographic model fits with, 19,

19-21 Studies on Hysteria (Freud & Breuer), 9 Subception, 114-115 Subjective world, 104 Sublimation

defined, 14-15 ego and, 16 positive effects of, 29

Sulloway, Frank J., lOn Superego. See also Ego; Id

conscious aspects of, 20

defined, 11,36 development of, 17-18 Oedipus complex and, 17, 23 preconscious aspects of, 20 relationship to ego, 17-18 relationship to id, 17-18 unconscious aspects of, 20

Superstitious behavior, 57, 57n Suppression

in radical behaviorism, 61, 62, 82, 82n

repression vs., 20 Symbolism

in dream analysis, 31 in Rogerian psychology, 110, 154

Teaching machines, 64—67 Technology of Teaching, The (Skinner),

48 Theories of Personality (Hall & Lindzey),

43n Therapy. See also Psychoanalysis; Psy­

chotherapy behavior, 52, 86-88 Freud's views on, 3,136 group, vs. encounter groups, 118 nondirective, 115,124 psychoanalytic, 29-35 psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 34-35 Rogers's views on, 112,136—137 short-term dynamic, 35 Skinner's views on, 136

Thinking/thoughts irrational, 163-165 in radical behaviorism, 77-80, 89 as subvocal speech (Watson's view),

48-49 Token economy, 86-87 Tolman, Edward C , 156n Topographical model of personality

(Freud) characteristics of, 11,18-21 how structural model fits with, 19,

19-21 Transcendental state, in client-centered

therapy, 114 Transference

in client-centered therapy, 117 in psychoanalysis, 33, 34, 36

Trust, in client-centered therapy, 114 Typological theory, 161

INDEX 181

Unconditional positive regard behavior and, 109-110 contingencies of reinforcement and, 154 defined, 106-108,123 organismic valuing process and,

107-108 personality development and, 136 in therapeutic relationships, 109-110,

113,113n Unconditioned response, 54n Unconditioned stimulus, 54n Unconscious

characteristics of, 10-11 defense mechanisms and, 27-29 dream work and, 31-32 id, ego, superego and, 19-21 importance of, to Freud, 10, 35-36 instinctual energies, inner conflicts and,

14 Rogers s views on, 154

Undoing (defense mechanism), 27—28 Upon Further Reflection (Skinner), 48

Values in Freud's view, 17-18,107n identification defense mechanism and,

29 introjected, 107-108 in Rogers s view, 107-108, 107n

Valuing process. See Organismic valuing process

Vanishing, 66

Vargas, E.A., 65 Vargas, Julie S., 65 Variable-interval (VI) schedules, 69, 72 Variable-ratio (VR) schedules, 70-72 Vaughan, M.E., 48 Verbal Behavior (Skinner), 48 Verbal community, 77 Violence. See Aggression; Destructive

energy

Walden Two (Skinner), 48, 52-53, 82, 89, 146

Wann,T.W, 141 Watson, John B., 48-49, 54 Way of Being, A (Rogers), 98 Webster, Richard, 39n Weeks, Daniel J.,152n Weight loss, 76 Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science, and Psy­

choanalysis (Webster), 39n Wiener, Daniel N., 166 Willpower, 75 Womb envy, 44 Women

Electra complex, 22, 28 object-loss identification and, 28 as psychoanalysts, 44

World peace, Rogers s person-centered ap­proach to, 124-126

Zimring, Fred, 115n, 128