three approaches for understanding european political co-operation: a case-study of ec — south...

Journal o f c o m m o n Market Studies Volume XXV, No. 4 June 1987 0021-9886 $3.00

Three Approaches for Understanding European Political Co-operation:

A Case-Study ofEC - South African Policy*

MARTIN H O L L A N D

European Universip Institute, and University of Canterbury, N e w Zealand

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the process of European Political Co-operation (EPC) from the perspective of national diversity rather than collective action and argues that EPC is often tantamount to an ‘alibi for inaction’. Working from this premise, three approaches are used to examine one particular EPC case-study: the Community’s common foreign policy towards South Africa. The approaches used to explain the changing shape of EPC are that of ‘domestic politics’, ‘symbolic and pseudo policies’ and ‘agenda management’. Each approach offers an alternative explanation to accommodate the Community’s policy dynamic and illustrates the constraints internal to the process of EPC.

A recent article by Bulmer emphasized the importance of domestic politics in determining EC policy outcomes (Bulmer, 1983, pp. 349-363). This article applies Bulmer’s general framework to the process of EPC. In addition, two related approaches drawn from the public policy literature are also employed: Gustafsson’s ‘symbolic and pseudo’ policies ( 1983); and ‘agenda management’ as used by Stringer and Richardson (1980). Rather than focusing on EPC as a supranational phenomenon, all these

*This paper is a substantially revised version of a conference paper delivered to the Europcan Conrorfium for Political Research workshop on ‘The European Community as an International Actor’, Barcelona, March, 1985. I would like to thank Dr Jeremy Moon for his invaluable comments on the original draft of this paper, as well as the journal’s two anonymous reviewers.

296 UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

address this process from a less global perspective. Each approach concentrates on different, though related, elements of EPC; together, they offer a synthesized rather than mutually exclusive explanation.

The case study chosen to illustrate the heuristic value of these three approaches is EC policy towards South Africa which, since its inception, has operated within the framework of EPC. The substance of the collective policy, and the often disparate record of co-operation and collective action, are described arid tested against the three approaches in an attempt to explain the content of EPC in relation to South Africa.

EPC arid South Africa

While there is no obligation under EPC for Community Member States to implement a cornmon foreign policy, agreement on consensus positions have increasingly come to characterize the EC’s international relations. However, according to Wallace, foreign policy co-ordination and co-operation has often served merely to “unite the participants behind a common position sufficiently loosely defined to allow each to add his own interpretation, so producing some forward movement without confronting the major obstacles ahead” (Wallace, 1983, p. 6). EC-South African relations provide an illustration of this characteristic of EPC - collective action where national diversity clearly exists. The history of this relationship can he divided into four periods: the pre-1977 poliLy vacuum; the 1977-84 formal policy harmony; the 1985 period of policy flux; and the 1986 period ofdissension.

The Pre- 1977 Polic_y Vacuum

Prior to the first enlargement of the Community in 1973, South Africa was essentially a non-issue for the then Six. Francophone Africa was the Community’s primary external concern: economic, cultural and historical ties all confirmed the impression that South Africa was a British foreign policy issue. For example, in 1967 South Africa constituted the third largest export market for the United Kingdom and between 1946-73,41.2 per cent (284,241) of all immigrants to South Africa were of British origin. An innovation indicative of this ‘special’ association was the introduction in 1974 of a Code of Practice for UK firms operating in South Africa.

With Britain’s accession to the Treaty ofIidme and the impetus created by political co-operation within the European Council, there was a transition from a bilateral to a Community-wide position on South Africa. This development, however, was not without its setbacks: for example, the 1975- 76 Angolan crisis highlighted the divisions within the Nine and exposed the absence of a coherent EC policy towards South Africa in general (Barber, 1983, pp. 20-24). Increasingly, anti-apartheid criticism (particularly of British economic involvement with the Republic) added momentum to the

MARTIN HOLLAND 297

development of a South African policy within the framework of EPC. On 28 September 1976, while addressing the United Nations, the then Dutch President of the Council of Ministers issued the first collective EC statement on South Africa. Within a year the rhetoric had been formalized into an EC- wide Code of Conduct for Community firms operating in South Africa.

1977-84: Formal Policy Harmony

The Community’s South African policy, defined as the removal ofapartheid, can only be understood within the context of EPC. During the 1977-84 period the Code of Conduct was the Community’s sole foreign policy instrument for promoting change in South Africa. Its provisions were designed to nullify apartheid legislation with regard to employment, although the operation of the guidelines was constrained by apartheid legislation. ‘The intergovernmental constraints of EPC determined the content of the Code as a collective policy. These constraints focus on the diversity of national interests, the pluralistic nature of Community decision-making and the limited range of foreign policy instruments available (Holland, 1985(b), p. 41 1 ) . The informal and voluntary nature of EPC ensurcs that collective action is often only tantamount to the lowest common denominator: this potentially debilitating characteristic has been a consistent element in shaping the Community’s Southern African policy.

The success of EPC is partially dependent upon the diplomatic infrastructure below the level of the political elite, although the extent of harmonization between Embassies can never exceed that formally established (sot, 1984, p. 151). There has been an increase in consultation between the Member State diplomatic missions in South Africa; in particular, during the 1980s South Africa’s major Community trading partners regularly met to discuss the application of the Code, although each retained autonomy over its national monitoring of compliance. Despite this background of closer diplomatic liaison, was the Code really a collective policy? From the Community’s perspective, the Code was uniformly applicable (on a voluntary basis) to all EC firms with subsidiaries operating in South Africa. Each national government produced annual reports on its application, with the Commission compil;-g periodic summaries. Furthermore, all Community members were in agreement that the Code was sufficient; none, at any time, called for a more demonstrative policy.

As has been demonstrated at length elsewhere, the central aspiration of EPC, that of uniformity, has been missing in all but a superficial sense from the Community’s application of the Code as a foreign policy instrument (Holland, 1985(a), pp. 12-13). T o summarize these inadequacies: ( i ) No EC institution was responsible for the central supervision or CO-

ordination of the Code; ( i i ) There was no common reporting format and the quality of information


varied from year to year, and from national government to national government; (iii) The reporting responsibility was national, not European; (iv) Data presentation often precluded (whether intentionally or otherwise) comparative analysis; (v) Only one EC member, the UK, submitted annual reports for each of the first eight years of the Code’s existence; (vi) There was no consistency in terms of anonymity and access to information; (vii) The criteria used to determine which firms reported (voluntarily) under the Code varied according to national labour legislation; (viii) In addition to the national differences in the Code’s application, there were discrepancies between firms within a single country; and, lastly, (ix) The Code was voluntary - other than the possibility of public criticism and lobbying, no direct sanctions for non-compliance existed.

Without pre-empting the analysis suggested by the three approaches discussed in the second half of this article, the purpose of the Community‘s policy (the removal of apartheid) and the mechanism for that policy (the Code), raise two fundamental questions. Firstly, can the chosen policy mechanism fulfil the stated policy aims? Secondly, can the EC’s policy objectives be seen as either sincere or feasible? In short, was the Code being used beyond its capacity as a foreign policy tool? A brief survey of the Code’s record provides the necessary context for answering these two questions.

Statistics for the reporting period 1983-84 show that 218 Community firms submitted reports on their employment practices covering 13 1,074 black workers: 84.4 per cent of these reports were from British and West German companies who employed all but 7,674 of the black workforce (see Table 1). For this reason, the accompanying commentary concentrates on these two reports. For a voluntary code, compliance was fairly extensive for the 1983-84 period: 137 out of a possible 147 Category ‘A’ UK firms reported, and the German report covered 80 per cent of all employees of the 47 German subsidaries. However, these figures also expose the limited nature of the Code as a foreign policy tool. Only EC companies owning at least 50 per cent of the equity of a South African subsidiary and employing more than 20 black Africans are obliged to report. Contemporary estimates indicate 1200 British and 350 West German firms are involved in the South African economy; yet just one in seven fall under the Code’s rubric.’ The

’The comprehensiveness of future British reports will be further reduced: in 1986 two British-owned banks and significant employrrs reduced holdings in their South African subsidiaries to approximately 40 per cent. Neither arr now category ‘A’ firms and though encouraged to publish thrir labour practices, neither will be included in thr annual summary produced by the British Government. Similarly, the trend for forrign companies to sell off their South African subsidiaries (for example, Barclays in November 1986) will narrow the scope ofthr Code.

MARTIN HOLLAND 299

following analysis, therefore, only comments on the officially reported labour practices of the 184 UK and German firms covered in Table 1.

Table I

The Code 0fConduct: Summary Cmnparisolis of EC Reports, J ! W &

UK WC N F B c DK r Public Reports Yes .Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No. of firms reporting 137’ 47 17 6 5 2 2 2 No. not reporting 10 9 0 - - 0 0 0

No. of firms formally 41 24 18. 4* 0 0 2 2

No. of firms willing 51 29 17 - - - - -

No. of firms using 93 25 9 3 - - 2 -

No. of firms using 47 17 4 I * I 0 0 0

No. ofworkers employed +11OOo 1060 - - I 0 0 0

No. ofllack Africans 104000 k19oOo 4782 1629 - 40 223 loo0

recognise Black trade unions

to recognise Black trade unions

liaison committees

migrant labour

- - - - - No. of firms accept 129 47 - principal of equal pay for equal work

equal pay for equal work

total desegregation

in the work place 223 -

at HDL* YO 94.8 68.0 95.3 - 100.0 - 100.0 - below LDL’ YO 1.8 - 0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 -

Reject principle of 5 0 - - - - - - No. offirms with 37 41 14. 6 5 2 2 2

No. offirms with desegregation 115 - - - - - - - No. of employees paid 98900 12920 4555 - - -

No. of employees paid 1900 - 25 0 0 - 0 -

-: inconsistency in the reporting format: no information supplied by the report. I: relates only to category ‘A’ firmt as specified by the Code. ’: HDL = Higher Datum Level; LDL = Lower Datum Level *: estimate.

h b o u r Relations. Despite the legalization of black trade unions since 1979,18 West German subsidiaries (employing 2,096 black Africans) and almost a third of UK companies failed to negotiate with their black workforce. Migrant Labour. Although this is one of the harshest features of apartheid legislation, EC firms have maintained a limited dependency on migrant labour despite the Code’s policy objective of dismantling apartheid


practices. Four-fifths of the 1 1,000 immigrant workers used by British firms were employed by one company; four firms accounted for nine-tenths of the German workforce. Pq. The Code requires European employers to pay at an independently defined Higher Datum Level (HDL). Although in the region of90 per cent of British and West German firms adhered to this minimal uniform level, more than 10,000 black African employees fell below the HDL in 1983-84. In explaining the activities of 13 firms (employing 5,315) who paid below the HDL, the West German report argued that companies “if urged to pay higher wages than are justified by the market situation and productivity, would be inclined to speed up rationalization and staffing cuts” (Fifth Summary Report of German Companies, p. 7 ) . Two British firms were responsible for 1800 of the 1900 individuals paid below the Lower Datum Level (LDL). An additional feature that clouds the uniform application of the Code was the basis on which the HDL was calculated: it varied according to type of employment, area and family size. Advancement. A handful of firms (all British) continued to reject the principle of equal pay for equal work. While both British and West German firms have concentrated their efforts on providing training, black advancement beyond semi-skilled employment has been negligible. The piecemeal and cosmetic nature of these changes was reflected in the Commission’s fifth summary report which conceded that “the fact that many black workers are under-qualified is still a major problem for companies and continues to be at the root of the persisting concentration of these workers in the least specialized and least well-paid jobs” (1985,

Fringe BeneJIts. Here the pragmatic rather than uniform aspects of the Code are best expressed. An amelioration of apartheid has clearly been achieved in this area, but progress has been incremental and as a result of individual employer initiative, rather than due to any collective policy for equal treatment. Housing loans, pension, insurance and medical schemes are the most common forms of assistance provided. Desegregation. This is the most evocative measure of the Code’s success. Desegregation, even in the workplace, has yet to be achieved by the Community’s policy; as for the wider societal impact, this remains circumspect even by the Community’s own modest standards.

Faced with the contradictions within the EC’s policy between 1977-84, the inescapable conclusion is that there hardly existed a collective policy in any meaningful sense as the basis of that approach, a uniform and vigorous application of the Code, was absent. Clearly, the post- 1984 political climate in South Africa accelerated the need for a changed Community response: however, the revision of the policy, in particular the nature of the Code, was already widely accepted among Community members.

p. 1 1 ) .

MARTIN HOLLAND 30 1

1985: A Policy in Flux

In contrast to the 1977-84 period ofpolicy complacency, the events of 1985 led to a critical appraisal of Community-South African relations and jeopardized the continuance of foreign policy co-operation. The catalogue of escalating civil unrest which began in September 1984, coupled with renewed Western media attention and intensified anti-apartheid lobbying forced the Community to address the shallowness of the Code as an instrument designed to eradicate apartheid.

In Ju ly 1985, a committee was established by the presidency of the European Communities with the brief to report back ‘urgently’ on how to strengthen the Code so that i t would be more effective in the abolition of apartheid. The Community’s initial response to the State of Emergency imposed by the South African Government on 22 July 1985, was to issue a joint Declaration, the content of which generally reaffirmed previous statements on South Africa. O n 25 July this seeming unity was disturbed by French unilateral action: their Ambassador was recalled to Paris, new investments in South Africa were prohibited and France formulated a UN resolution calling for comprehensive international sanctions.

In a belated attempt to stabilize an evidently floundering policy and to maintain at least diplomatic unity, on 31 July all EC Ambassadors were recalled in preparation for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers specifically scheduled to address the Community’s response. Even this united expression of collective diplomacy appeared vulnerable, with at one extreme Denmark oficially closing its consulate, and at the other the United Kingdom insisting that the recall of its Ambassador was just for ‘consultation’ and did not imply an alteration in Britain’s policy of constructive dialogue. T o bolster this shaky facade, the Commission issued a further Declaration reiterating the EC’s “total condemnation of the apartheid system in all its forms”.

On 30 August an EC investigative committee conducted a three day tour of South Africa (consisting of the Commissioner responsible for External Relations, Willy de Clerq, and the Foreign Ministers of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands -Jacques Poos, Giulio Andreotti and Hans van den Broek). Their report was considered at the 9 September Council of Foreign Ministers meeting (which Spain and Portugal attended as observers). Athough the Community fell short of endorsing economic sanctions (despite French advocacy), a joint package was proposed: the new policy called for the withdrawal of Member States’ military attaches to Pretoria, and banned nuclear co-operation and the sale of EC oil and sensitive technology. The United Kingdom was alone in objecting to the proposal and its isolation was both significant and unexpected. Prior to the State of Emergency, West Germany had always opposed economic sanctions. However, in response to Botha’s moratorium on foreign loan repayments, on 4 September the


Federal Republic unilaterally withdrew export credit guarantees for exports to South Africa. At the 9 September meeting, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, fully supported the call for firmer collective action.

With unanimity absent, the question of unified response beyond rhetorical condemnation was left in abeyance. Faced with mounting EC, UN and Commonwealth criticism, Britain subsequently adopted the new Community policy on 28 September. ‘The change in attitude was largely cosmetic: the U K Government already operated all but one ofthe provisions - the withdrawal of military attaches. At this stage Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, argued that the United Kingdom would not comply with any form of mandatory sanctions promoted under the auspices of EPC. Collective action was bolstered, however, by the announcement of a revised Code of Conduct on 19 November 1985. Greater emphasis was placed on relations with black trade unions, training and promotion, supplementary benefits and improving co-ordination in applying the Code. Future reports on the operation of the Code are to be scrutinized by the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.

1986 - Policy Dissension

Despite these minor policy revisions, by the end of 1985 the widely discredited Code (in its revised form) continued to constitute the substance of EPC towards South Africa. Tlie inertia and vacillation that typified the Community’s earlier history of reactive foreign policy towards such international crisis as the Iranian hostages, Afghanistan and Poland, again became the dominant characteristic of political co-operation.

Britain’s unique membership of both the Commonwealth and the Community, and the former’s Eminent Persons Group initiative, essentially suspended the development of the EC’s South African policy during the first halfof 1986. I t was not until the European Council meeting of26 June in The Hague that the Community decided that further collective measures were needed, although a three month delay in their application was conceded. In the interim, acting in his capacity as president of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Sir Geoffrey Howe visited Southern Africa. Pressured by the negative impact of this visit and by the Commonwealth communiquk of August (in which the United Kingdom adopted certain sanctions and agreed to implement any EC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, steel and gold coins from South Africa), on 15 September 1986 the EC finally moved towards ‘limited measures’. Despite Danish, Dutch and Irish demands, the June Hague package of sanctions was not fully adopted. The Community agreed to ban (as of27 September 1986) the importation of steel and iron (worth L275 million per annum) .and to invest- igate Community-wide legislation prohibiting the sale of Kruggerands

MARTIN HOLLAND 303 (implemented on 27 October) and new investment in South Africa. In the cause of preserving the facade of collective policy, West German and Portuguese opposition to the proposed coat embargo was sufficient to forestall the introduction of this sanction. Positive measures were also adopted. A special programme to assist the victims of apartheid was established (under the jurisdiction of the Commission) with funds of 10 million ECUs for 1986, and 20 million for 1987.

The irony of the UK position during its third term as president of the European Council (July-December 1986) illustrates the constraints of chairing EPC. It is the responsibility ofthe country holding the presidency to engineer, wherever possible, conditions for consensus decision-making. As an ordinary Member State, the United Kingdom had successfully resisted the call for sanctions. However, once in the chair, she was unable to exclude the issue from the agenda or advocate such a strong national position. Consequently, sanctions, albeit reluctantly, were introduced under the auspices of a British presidency.

T H R E E APPROACHES: D O M E S T I C POLICIES, SYMBOLIC A N D P S E U D O POLICIES, A N D AGENDA MANAGEMENT

Domestic Politics

The domestic politics approach as outlined by Bulmer offers a number of useful perspectives for reconciling the seeming contradictions between collective action and national diversity in the South African case. Bulmer’s central assertion is that domestic politics “may have a vital impact on the policy-making out-put of the EEC” and that the dimensions affecting this relationship are domestic policy-making structures and domestic attitudes (p. 350). A key question that the domestic politics approach seeks to answer is “why a member state sees the EC as the most appropriate level ofaction on some issues, whilst on other issues, the nation-state or other international organizations are seen as the most appropriate’’ (p. 356). This emphasis offers some interesting interpretations for the relationship between the individual Member States of the EC and the EC collectively with South Africa. Why is EPC seen as the appropriate mechanism for structuring relations rather than bilateral interaction? EPC effectively institutionalizes the relationship at the EC level and yet allows the different domestic political environments to dictate the content or expression of EPC. Simply, from the European perspective the best of both worlds seem to be available - collective foreign policy harmony together with virtual domestic autonomy.

The emphasis on the national rather than the Community level of analysis is also the dominant feature of Hill’s treatment of EPC. In particular, he draws attention to the function of EPC as “a cover for national positions”


which would be difficult to explain as independent national positions (Hill, 1983, p. 199). Similarly, Wallace has argued that “political co-operation also serves as an alibi for inaction, a means for deflecting external pressure and a cover for shifts in national policy” ( 1983, p. 10). Hn order to survive as a collective enterprise, EPC must offer individual benefits to states, though these two conditions may ultimately be incompatible. Taken together, Bulmer, Wallace and Hill provide compelling evidence for adopting some form of domestic politics approach to EPC. The following analysis applies this approach to EPC and South Africa.

The importance ofdomestic political environments has been instrumental in shaping the Community’s response to South Africa; as already noted, relations with South Africa only date from the time of UK accession, and the EC Code of Conduct closely parallels the early UK Code of Practice. The smaller states of Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands in response to their active domestic anti-apartheid lobbies have been active in criticizing EC policy. In contrast, the larger Community states have been more successful in defusing the issue, or, to paraphrase Wallace, successful in using EPC as an alibi for inaction. In consequence, co-operation during the 1977-84 period has been tantamount to the maintenance of the status quo; the different domestic situations of the Community partners has limited the likelihood of significant change.

The 1977-84 period clearly illustrates the value of a domestic politics approach for understanding the limitations imposed upon EPC by national diversity. A number of domestic political factors that encourage national diversity are evident. While the Cornmunity is by far South Africa’s most important trading market (in 1983, 43.9 per cent of South Africa’s imports and 3 I .2 per cent ofher exports were with the Community - in comparison, trade with the USA was 18.8 percent and 15.4 per cent respectively), trade is not of equal salience throughout the Twelve. The Community’s trade is dominated by the United Kingdom, West Germany and to a lesser extent the Benelux countries, France and Italy; the remaining Member States have limited or no commercial ties with South Africa. The higher levels of economic interaction of Britain and Germany demand that these two national governments view EPC as a significantly different type ofissue than the governments of Member States with limited or no economic involvement with the Republic.

Table 2 illustrates the 1977-84 intra-CommunitylSouth African trade pattern. While still significant, the United Kingdom’s predominance in the South African market has declined substantially since the 1970s: in comparison, West Germany has steadily increased trade over the last decade and is rapidly replacing Britain as South Africa’s most important European partner. In 1983, 17.1 per cent of imports and 6.6 per cent of South Africa’s exports were with West Germany. Although accounting for less than 2.0 per cent oftheir foreign trade. South Africa is now West Germany’s third largest

MARTIN HOLLAND 305

non-EC market. West German opposition to imposing coal sanctions can be explained by the fact that one-third of South Africa’s coal exports to the EC (valued at some €825 million in 1985) go to West Germany. In contrast, the economic salience of the South African market to France, for example, is limited: in 1984 South Africa was France’s twenty-third supplier and its twenty-ninth customer. However, for South Africa, France is the Republic’s sixth most important trading partner, accounting for 4.0 per cent of imports and 2.4 per cent ofexports in 1984.

Table 2

Distribution of JEC-South African Imports and Exports, 19774‘4

1977 1981 1984

EC IMPORTS FROM SA E C U * ( m ) % E C U ( m ) % E C U ( m ) %

U K West Germany France

Netherlands Belgium- Luxembourg Ireland Dr n m a r k Greece

Italy

TOTAL

3,154 47.5 1,612 22.6 1,527 17.8 930 14.0 1,226 17.2 1,284 15.0 43 I 6.5 886 12.4 853 9.9 729 11.0 1,549 21.7 2,190 25.5 107 I .6 I93 2.7 1 go 2.2

1,244 18.8 1,486 20.8 2,337 27.2 I 1 0.2 9 0. I 14 0.2 24 0.4 I54 2.1 153 I .8 - - 19 0.2 37 0.4

6,630 100.0 7,134 100.0 8,585 100.0

EC EXPORTS TO SA

U K W ~ s t German\

Italy Nrthrrlands Brlgiuni-Luxembourg Ireland l h m d r k Greece

FrdIKP

889 31.7 981 34.9 435 15.5 229 8.2 I27 4.5 1 1 7 4.2

9 0.3 20 0.7

2,196 2,451

968 656 285 270 31 61

6

31.7 35.4 14.0 9.5 4. I 3.9 0.4 0.9 0.1

2,033 2,971

637 66 1 352 320 53 88 6

28.6 41.7 9.0 9.3 4.9 4.5 0.7 1.2 0.1

TOTAL 2,807 100.0 6,924 100.0 7,121 100.0

*ECU = European CurrPncy Unit Source Eurostal, section I I (1985), Commission ofthe European Community, Brussels

Since 1973, collectively the Community has never been responsible for less than half of all direct and non-direct investment in South Africa, with the United Kingdom and Germany the leading contributors. In 1983, direct investment in South Africa by British companies came to €296 million (8.4


per cent of the €3,535 million total). More significantly, South Africa was Britain’s second most important area for overseas direct investment, only exceeded by British investment in the USA (Survey, 1985, pp. 191-192). German direct investment was estimated at DM2.6 billion at the end of 1984 (Die Zed, 2 August 1985). An additional domestic factor is the extent of private European bank loans servicing South Africa; in 1985 it was estimated that out of a total foreign debt of US4618.5 billion, $5.5 billion was with British banks, $2.0 billion West German and $1.1 billion with French banks (Week& Guardian, 1.5 September 1985). This skew in intra-Community dependency is further reflected in the dissimilar levels of reliance which Member States have on South African supplies ofstrategic minerals with the highly industralized economics of the United Kingdom and Germany especially vulnerable.

The uneven trading ratios between Community members and South Africa clearly have an impact on the policy options available to individual states and on any collective policy acceptable to both major and minor trading partners. That the EC’s joint approach was disrupted by France in 1984 should not be surprising. The possibility of any initiative originating from Britain or West Germany was precluded by significant investment considerations. The salience of the South African issue is of greater importance to the United Kingdom and West Germany and their response is sauged in relation to domestic factors absent from the criteria employed by many of the other EC members. EPC served as the necessary alibi and incentive for inaction. In contrast, France’s economic stake was less problematic; the exchange of a minor economic market for the political gain accrued through a demonstrative anti-apartheid stance heightened the domestic rationality of the French initiative for the Socialist Government of Mitterrand and Fabius.2

A related factor that facilitates national diversity is the structural organization of domestic lobbies. National governments react both to the demands of anti-apartheid campaigners as well as to the pressures of actors who favour maintaining extending relations. The Republic’s government directly through representation at the domestic and EC level, or indirectly, through support groups such as the UK-South African Trade Association and the South African Foundation, attempts to dissipate any coherent EC- wide anti-apartheid momentum. This lack of cohesive EC-level criticism is a factor that further exacerbates the natural tendency towards diversity within EPC. This process of bilateral lobbying within a multilateral organization was extremely successful during the 1977-84 period. South African based Chambers ofCommerce were established in major export markets to protect trade and to deflect anti-apartheid criticism. The ‘success’ of this bilateral

‘With the election of Chirac in March 1986 there has been a transition in French policy. The unequivocal pro-sanctions stance under Fabius has given way to pragmatism and a policy of continued economic and diplomatic relations.

MARTIN HOLLAND 307

approach was evident in Botha’s European tour of 1984. At that stage, no collective EC response was forthcoming, either at the political elite level, or from EC anti-apartheid organizations; national pragmatism reigned. If not with open arms, Botha was received officially by Thatcher, somewhat less enthusiastically and unofficially by Kohl, and denied recognition by Mi tterrand.

Clearly, a different set o f domestic pressures, either on one Community member or several, ifsufficiently strong would cause a reconsideration of the collective policy. The example of the divestment campaign in the American Congress during 1986 offers an interesting parallel to the European domestic politics framework. Without any such shifts in domestic pressures there would seem little likelihood or need to alter EPC. Such shifts occurred in mid-1985 and again in 1986. A change in the substance of EPC, however, does not reduce the explanatory power of the approach; rather, domestic politics helps to make intelligible the factors that shaped the origins of EPC in South Africa, the period of cohesion from 1977-84, and the post 1984 period of Community dissension.

Symbolic and Pseudo PolicieJ

An alternative perspective of conceptualizing EPC can be found in the public policy literature, particularly the work ofGustafsson (1983). Between the public facade and the real ‘insiders’ purpose, he argues that “many policies are either not intended to be fully implemented or are characterized by unsatisfactory usage of available knowledge regarding preconditions for implementation” (p. 269). Such policies Gustafsson characterizes as pseudo or symbolic. They are a response to “inconsistent demands, diffusion of power and uncertainty about means and goals in the short and long run” (p. 271). Moreover symbolic and pseudo policies are often represented in a document or policy statement that is flexible enough to allow for changes in policy “without consultation or other democratic procedures”. Such plans or statements, “create an impression of legitimacy which makes it possible for the actors to muddle-through in the absence of a coordinated organised rationale” (p. 275). The parallels with the development of EPC are all too clear: conflicting demands and interests; confusion between the mechanism for defining and achieving long-term objectives; and, most obviously, the creation of a document, the Code, that has generated a spurious ‘legitimacy’ enabling the Community “to muddle through in the absence of a coordinated organised rationale”. As Barber argues, “From the very beginning . . . the Code was designed to defend the European Governments from international criticism” ( 1983, p. 94).

Focusing on the gap between public and ‘insider’ policy reality, Gustafsson offers a simplified typology for political decisions (see Figure 1) . Decisions based on available knowledge for their implementation can either be ‘real’ (if


such decisions are actually meant to be implemented), or ‘symbolic’ (if no such intention exists). Decisions that are not based on sufficient knowledge for their enactment are either ‘Pseudo’ decisions (if there is an intent to implement them) or ‘nonsense’ decisions (where no such intention prevails). Where does the EC’s South African policy fit in this matrix?

Fisurr 1: Typology oJPolitica1 DerisionJ

YES NO

Arc dccisions bawd on av;iilahlc knowledge regarding preconditions for implcmcntaiion’!

REAL

PSEUDO

SY MBOLIC

NONSENSE

YES

NO

Arc dccisions intcndcd to bc implcmcntcd?

Source: Gustahson (I 983), p. 276

(i) Pseudo Policy. To fit in this quartile, i t has to be accepted that the purpose of both the Code and of the limited economic measures taken since 1985 - the removal of apartheid - is meant to be implemented. However, the typology posits that the necessary knowledge for implementation is absent. More importantly, the effect of the Code and sanctions on the wider societal application of apartheid is not quantifiable; knowledge remains impressionistic. (i i) Nonsense Policy. In addition to the Community not possessing adequate knowledge to implement the policy, this alternative perspective argues that the political will to execute such a policy is also missing. The supporting evidence is substantial: the voluntary nature of the Code, the lowest common denominator characteristic of EPC, major trade and investment links together with the history of selective and ineffectual economic sanctions, all indicate that the policy was essentially status quo oriented rather than an agent for radical change. (iii) Symbolic Policy. Similarly, this perspective questions the sincerity of the stated policy objective; however, symbolic policy differs from nonsense policy in that the actors do have suflicient knowledge to calculate rationally the ‘success’ of the policy. Clearly, this is the most critical of the four

MARTIN HOLLAND 309

alternatives. ‘The Community, i t is argued, is intimately aware of the foreign policy action needed in order to achieve their policy objective (be it sanctions, embargoes, compulsory codesor divestment); and yet the policy objective was never designed to be realized. ‘The ‘symbolic’ policy ofcodes and rhetoric were employed in an attempt to disguise policy duplicity. The events since the Community’s first ‘common package’ of measures in October 1985 have served to enhance the feeling ofsymbolism. In contrast to the action taken by the United States, Japan, the Commonwealth and the Nordic countries, the combined intransigence ofthe British, West German and latterly Portuguese governments over the efficacy of sanctions and the inability of the EC to act unequivocally, has underlined the symbolic nature of Community action.

(iv) Real Policy. Historically. this is the least feasible of the four options. Given that sufficient knowledge existed, i t then follows that the Code was a meaningful policy designed to promote change. On the Community’s own admission, this is not a viable interpretation. In its original format, although contributing to a climate of change, single-handedly the Code was an insufficient foreign policy tool for eradicating apartheid as witnessed by the necessity to strengthen it in 1985. Nor can the economic measures applied since October 1985 bc regarded as the appropriate mechanism for change, given that South Africa’s major source of foreign revenue, its mineral exports ofgold and coal, are excluded from embargo.

Clearly, ‘reality’ fits somewhere between these neat models; however, the dynamic nature of policy analysis need not be restricted by the static matrix provided by Gustafsson. Over time, EC policy towards South Africa has shifted within the matrix. At best the policy of the 1977-84 period is described as ‘pseudo’, at worst as ‘nonsense’; individual assessments of intention constitute the differentiating criterion. 1985 witnessed a move towards symbolic policy; information needed for policy formation exists, and yet the inability of the Community to develop a collective response has left the Code and partial sanctions as metaphors for the Community’s real concern: the maintenance ofwestern influence and the protection ofcapital, not the introduction of racial equality. The opportunity for ‘real’ policy to emerge does exist. I f the Community’s South African policy can be remodelled (possibly by the Danish Presidency) rather than stultified by the United Kingdom, there may eventually be a union of knowledge and policy intention. Such an outcome, however, is far from guaranteed.

The problem for the academic is in estimating correctly the ‘intentions’ of practitioners; this dilemma is nowhere better expressed than in the politically sensitive area of EC policy regarding apartheid. The number of unknowns in any policy decision make the realization of ‘real’ decisions difficult to achieve; situations and demands are in constant flux making pseudo decisions often the only feasible outcome. Gustafsson goes as far as to argue that the use of pseudo or symbolic policies to ‘buy time’ may be both appropriate and desirable in achieving long-term goals. Such a rationale is


dangerous. Gustafsson’s comments, although originally directed to welfare policy in Scandinavia, echo precisely the potential dilemma that faces the EC’s collective policy towards South Africa.

In a specific situation there might, for example be a strong pressure (economic, political, or other) either to carry out a policy which is unfavourable in the long run or to stop a policy which is favourable. Skilled politicians might overcome this by “speaking with double tongues”, thereby making decisions which are not to be implemented and assumed to be of n o substantial damage in the future. There are, however, always risks that such a policy becomes “too smart” and, contrary to expectations, leads to implementation when this is not intended, or vice versa. (p. 278).

In the South African context, the economic and political pressures in favour of continued engagement jeopardize long-term objectives (a favourable future relationship with a non-apartheid majoritarian government) in exchange for short-term benefits (continued profits and mineral supplies). The policy of non-implementation was ‘too smart’: rather than deflect criticism, the Community has been forced to move towards a firmer policy which since 1977 both the lJnited Kingdom and West Germany have sought to avoid.

Managing the Political Agenda

A related public policy perspective is that of agenda management. Rather than examining policy ‘intention’, this approach focuses on policy definition as a prerequisite to problem solving. As Stringer and Richardson argue, “the way in which a problem is defined will greatly influence the decision about the best policy to adopt. Ill-defined or mis-defined problems will almost certainly lead to policy failure” (1980, p. 23) . They delineate two separate stages: first, problem definition, and secondly (and more crucially), the agenda management of a problem thus defined. The utility of the approach is that i t facilitates the examination of policies “formulated simply in order to remove (or exclude) an issue from the political agenda, involving no real attempt to solve a particular problem” (p. 23). The application of this analysis to the EC’s South African position is that up until 1985 the problem had been successfully defined out ofexistence. ‘The EC displayed the Code of Conduct which sought to remove apartheid; they acted in unison; in consequence, a potentially volatile and divisive political issue was simply re-defined in non-contentious terms and legitimately removed from the political agenda.

Echoing Stringer and Kichardson’s example ofair pollution or drug-abuse in the United Kingdom, “it is difficult to argue that there is a serious

MARTIN HOLLAND 31 1

problem . . . if official figures show otherwise”: the dilemma is compounded when there is a “reluctance to improve monitoring systems” (p. 25). Furthermore, the treatment of the symptoms by placebo policies as defined by the policy makers (in the South African case, wages, desegregation, advancement, etc.) is used to solve the issue and hence lead to its removal from the political agenda. Such was the case with South Africa between 1977-84. The statistics provided by the Community relating to the Code skilfully bore witness to the policy ‘success’: evidently, the Community was the most enlightened of employers and one of the most outspoken Western anti-apartheid critics in various international forums. For example, a Community statement as late as Ju ly 1985 argued that the Code “had proved to be a useful instrument for the emancipation of black workers” (.SUTU<Y, 1985, p. 260). This process ofplacebo policy constitutes a vital aspect of agenda management; in a similar manner to symbolic or pseudo policies, such an approach serves to ‘buy time’ until the issue, though in essence unresolved, lacks immediate saliency in the minds of the public. The relative lack of media interest in South Africa’s internal policies prior to 1985 supports this interpretation. The danger of placebo policy is that the problem is suspended rather than ameliorated and its return to the political agenda at some undetermined future date may lead to a major and highly critical policy revision- as was the case in the second halfof 1985 and 1986. The weak problem definition characteristic of the Code, coupled with its voluntary nature and the selective use of data, have all contributed to inevitable policy failure. In consequence, the Community has been forced to embark upon the substantial policy revision some Member States had hoped to avoid.

I he agenda management model offers some clear, if disquieting, insights into the factors that have determined the EC’s South African policy. Superficially, it appears a successful example of EPC with precise, if limited, policy objectives. The deeper one examines the processes behind the collective policy, however, the reality of ill-defined problems and goals (conscious or otherwise) and the ‘fit’ ofagenda management in removing the issue from the political arena becomes compelling. The only reservation (and one common to Gustafsson’s approach) is that of methodology:

r l

When critizing governments for their failure adequately to define a problem or for deliberately attempting to manage its definition, we labour under the dificulty in many instances of lack of knowledge. When knowledge is confined in this way, how much easier it is for governments to control the emergence of issues, to define or redefine problems out of existence, with a view only to short-term expediency. (P. 36)


CONCLUSION

Focusing on domestic and policy-making processes has offered insights into the operation of EPC, with particular reference to the Community’s South African policy. The domestic politics analysis emphasized the different levels of issue saliency amongst the Community as the major factor in shaping EPC. Policy evolution was described in terms ofthe changing values of the various national domestic factors during the 1977-86 period. I n contrast, the symbolic/pseudo policy approach questioned the relationship between policy intention and the mechanism chosen for its expression. Dissonance between these two factors did not necessarily infer a lack of policy ‘success’: all four options (real, symbolic, nonsense and pseudo policies) could be regarded as successful, depending on the policy objective sought by ‘insiders’, rather than the policy objective as stated for public consumption. The transformation of the Community’s policy was documented from its period as pseudo or nonsense policy (1977-84) to that of a symbolic policy (1985-86), with thc possibility of a ‘real’ policy emerging left for future consideration. Lastly, the agenda management approach argued that the South African issue had not been correctly defined by the Community (for essentially pragmatic motives). The resultant policy that rmanated from this misrepresentation of the problem was, by definition, inappropriate. However, from the Community’s perspective, reducing the salience of the South African issue through this process of il l- definition facilitated the opportunity for agenda-management, at least until 1985.

Clearly, each of the three approaches is of utility for the entire period of EC-South African relations. Equally as clearly, the Community’s response has not been static: the three approaches accommodate and explain this dynamic. l h e pre-1977 period is best conceptualized from an agenda management perspective: for the 1977-84 period all three approaches offer valid explanations (but not mutually exclusive ones); 1985-86 has seen the agenda management approach succumb to a direct confrontation between symbolic and domestic politics. ‘These competing forces internal to EPC have shaped the EC’s response to the South African crisis, rather than a political or moral commitment. Given the dominant characteristic of EPC (that of national diversity), it is doubtful that ‘real’ policy will replace the constraining domestic factors that have to date promoted just a symbolic response and conscious agenda management.

R E F E R E N C E S

Barber, J . (1!)83) The lineaty Relationship: Britain and South Africa ( London, RIIA/Heinrmann Educational Books).

Bot, B. R . (1984) “Co-operation brtwcen the Diplomatic Missions of the Ten in Third Countrics and Iriternational Organisations”, L q a l Irsucs oJ European Integration, 10, pp.

MARTIN HOLLAND 313 149-1 69.

Bulmer, S . ( 1983) “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 21, pp. 349-363.

Commission of the European Community, Application of the EC Code of Conduct ly CommuniQ Companies with Subsidiaries in South Africa: j f t h summary analysis ( I Ju!y 1983-30 June 1984) (Brussels, 1985).

Code of Conduct f o r Companies with InLerests in South Africa: anatysis and summary of companies’ reports fortheperiod I JuLv 1983to30~June I984 (London, Dept. ofTrade and Industry, HMSO, 1985).

Fifth Summay Report of German Companies with Subsidiaries in South Africa on the Application of the EEC Code of Conduct (Embassy of the Federal Republic ofCermany, Pretoria, 1985, English translation).

Gustafsson, G. (1983) “Symbolic and Pseudo Policies as Responses to Diffusion of Power”, Policy ScienceJ, 15, pp. 269-287.

Hill, C. (1985) National Forcign Policies and European Political Cooperation (Ed.) (London, RIIAI Allen and Unwin).

Holland, M. (1985) (a) “The EEC Code for South Africa: a reassessment”, The World

Holland, M. (1985) (b) “The European Community and South Africa: Economic Reality or

Stringer, J . K. and J. J. Richardson (1980) “Managing the Political Agenda: Problem

Suroq ofCurrent Affairs( 1985, vol. 16, London, HMSO). Wallace W. (1983) “Cooperation and Convergence in European Foreign Policy”, in Hill

Tod<v, 41-1, pp. 12-14.

Political Rhetoric?” Polihcal Studies, 3 5 3 , pp. 3 9 W I 7.

Definition and Policy Making in Britain”, Parliamentary Affairs, 23, pp. 23-39.

(1983).

three approaches for understanding european political co-operation: a case-study of ec — south...

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