thoughts are facts in possible worlds, truths are facts of a given world

Thoughts are facts in possible worlds, truths are facts of a given world *

Leszek NOWAK**

Summary Mentalism preserves the triad: brain’s state - thought - state of affairs whereas phy-

sicalism identifies the former two elements of it. Both stands meet the famous difficulties. But these presuppose ontological actualism. On the ground of ontological possibilism, claiming the existence of all possible worlds, one may identify a thought with the corresponding state of affairs in a possible world. Yet, possibilism turns out to be too narrow to carry such an identification and requires a significant generalization.

I. Thoughts are facts in possible worlds

1. The classical opposition as to the nature of thoughts is one between mentalism and physicalism. According to mentalism, a thought is something from the sphere of psyche; and something private; it is a certain unattainable creature comparable merely to consciousness itself (Wittgenstein [ 19581, par. 358). Physicalism instead identifies thoughts with states of brain (or their classes, or causal roles these states use to play, etc. in its more sophisticated versions). In other words, metalism preserves the triad:

(1) brain’s state - thought - state of affairs

whereas physicalism identifies the former two elements of it. As a result, for a metalist the variable ( ( p ~ in the expression:

* I would like to thank to the two institutions, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (Wassenaar) and the Australian National University, History of Ideas Unit (Canberra) for making the present writing possible. 1 am also indebted to Anne Simpson for correcting my Eng- lish. As to the contents of the paper, my special debts are with Andrzej Falkiewicz and Katarzyna Paprzycka. If this paper is not so deep as the former has required and not so precise as the latter has demanded, this is an entire fault of the present author.

** Dept. of Philosophy, Poznan University, Poland

Dialectica Vol. 45, N O 4 (1991)

274 Leszek Nowak

(2) X thinks that p

ranges over the set of thoughts, whereas for a physicalist it ranges over the set of (types of, causal roles played by, etc.) brain states.

As it is well-known, each of these positions suffers of some drawbacks. Mentalism introduces a really mysterious type of beings. The main, if not the only, legitimization for psychological objects is our introspection. But what if we wrongly, as I would like to argue below, interpret it? On the other hand, physicalism is unable to define the content of thinking of its terms. How to define the difference between 2 + 2 = 4 and 7 + 5 = 12 in terms of brain states (or the, physicalistically admissible, types of it, or causal roles played by it, etc.)? Apart from specific difficulties of these stands there is one which seems to be common to them: how to understand the fact that people think according to the logical tautologies? From the mentalist (resp. physicalist) stand-point this implies an identification of the laws of logic and those of psychology (resp. neurophysiology). How this can be reconciled with the fact that the former are, and the latter clearly are not, tautological? Why the latter are empirically tested and the former are not? Likely, it must be something wrong with the two alternatives at the same time.

2. In order to find another solution, let us consider the simplest mental activity. I imagine, contrarily to the facts, that my friend, F., is bald. The question is: what type of object the bald-F. is? According to mentalism, the bald-F. is a specific creature, the psychic one. But what do we actually know of him? What about the weight of the bald-F. - does he possess any? Is he educated? Etc. No answer to these questions seems to supersede the level of the entire arbitrariness. The bald-F., conceived of as a mental being, is undefined almost completely. So is, the bald-F. conceived of as a state of my brain.

Let us, however, admit after D. Lewis the existence of all possible worlds. This step opens some possibility to get out of the opposition between mentalism and physicalism'. We can namely simply identify the bald-F. with a mere-possible object who differs from my friend only in that he lacks hair (and obviously all the consequences of the fact). And every thought about him with the state of affairs holding in a mere-possible world on the bald-F. After the identification has been made, things appear much clearer. The weight of the bald-F. equals the weight of my friend minus the weight of his hair. He is

' This possibility has not been, however, noticed by D. Lewis who advocates in the mind- body controversy a certain sophisticated version of physicalism identifying the mental states with the causal roles. Cf. Lewis [1966]).

Thoughts are facts in possible worlds, truths are facts of a given world 275

educated in exactly the same manner as my friend (if we agree that being bald has no influence on the chances, and the level, of education), etc. The bald-F. conceived of as an existing mere-possible object seems to be quite well defined: he possesses all the properties F. has except for his having hair.

This is true of all other “mental constructs”. We do not “create” them by somehow calling them into being in our “minds” (i.e., where?) but thinking we reach them in worlds where they are supposed to exist. Imaginary object is then an object in a possible world. And thought that p is thus identical with the state of affairs p holding in one of possible worlds. In general, the main reason for which the admitting the mental beings might seem to be necessary follows from adopting too weak a metaphysics. If one accepts actualism admitting our world alone, then the only plausible way to handle with a false thought - e.g., that F. is bald - is to put it into somebody’s “mind”. Modal possibilism offers an ontology rich enough to handle with false thoughts. Provided that one leaves the opposition mentalism/physicalism and interprets all the thoughts as (possible) states of affairs.

It is perhaps strange to admit that “mental objects” exist as objectively as physical ones. But it is even more strange to admit what we, post-Cartesians, accept so readily: that every one of us has an internal factory of spiritualities creating whatever we want ex nihilo. And it is less economic. For from the point of view outlined, there is only one the bald-F., whereas the mentalist must admit that their amount equals the number of minds “creating” it mul- tiplied by the number of renewed efforts to do so.

Notice that this proposal, however controversial it might be, allows to explain why it can be so that the laws of logic are the laws of our thinking. As it is sometimes recognized, the primary logical theory, the calculus of propositions, constitutes a formal theory of states of affairs2. Now, adopting that thought that p is simply identical with a possible state of affairs p , it becomes intelligible why a formal theory of states of affairs is at the same time a formal theory of thoughts. The answer is simply this: because thoughts are actually states of affairs. No surprise that the propositional calculus can be interpreted either as a formal ontology or as a formal theory of inference.

3. Let us add that the above claim identifying thoughts (judgments) with facts in possible worlds is not a “definition” of the notion of thought. The methodological status of this claim is the same as that of the materialist claim:

Cf., e.g., Ajdukiewicz 11965). The standard propositional logic suffers, however, from the lack of proper formalization of the identity relation between the states of affairs. The so-called non-Fregean logic (Suszko [1968]) referring to some ideas of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [I9211 removes this difficulty.

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it is, true or false, a thesis identifying what people normally term “thoughts”, “judgments” etc. with something else. The sense of the materialist claim is the following:

(3) people are inclined to think that their thoughts are contained in spi- ritual containers called ‘minds’ or soul^'^. There are no containers of the kind. lWhat does exist are facts of the actual world including states of our brains, and what people term ‘thoughts’ can be justifiably identified with some states of their brains].

It would be far not fair to say that (3) is nothing more than a conventional definition of the term “thought”. If there is one in this, false but interesting, story at all, then this definition is certainly the least important element of it. Now, if that is correct, then the same may be applied to the story said in this paper. For the only difference between the view adopted here and the materialist one is that the last statement of (3), i.e. one bracketed as [. . .], has to be replaced with another claim: [What does exist are all facts in all possible worlds and what people term ‘thoughts’ can be justifiably identified with some of these possible facts].

There is some difference between the two views but it is of the substantial character. Methodologically, both remain theses identifying what we think is made of the matter of which the dreams are composed with something else. The theses are factually true or false. And this has little, if anything, to do with “terminological conventions”.

II. idealization and possible worlds

1. The idea outlined above identifies psychic creatures with possibilia. Yet, the intuitive meaning of “possible world” as applied by D. Lewis (e.g., (19731) seems to be too narrow:

“I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been beside the way they actually are. (. . .) I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them possible worlds” (Lewis [1973], p. 84).

It would be perhaps of some use to add that there is the crucial difference between ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ in ordinary languages. The problematics of this paper is limited to that connected with the notion of mind. not of soul.


The so-understood notion of “possible world” seems to be too narrow. Take the state of affairs that the mass-point M has the velocity v. Now, M is not equipped in all the properties that normally pertain to physical bodies and lacks part of them. The mass point is, as it were, a deformed physical object: it possesses only some of the properties that pertain to physical objects. Therefore, it is not a possible object: no thing “could have been” a mass- point. And the set of states of affairs holding on M differs from a “possible world” in the above sense holding on a physical object with regard to the space of properties, and not only with regard to a combination of possible values of one and the same space of features. If this is correct, then the “ideal world” composed of states of affairs holding on mass points is not a “possible world” in the meaning considered above. This might be assessed as saying in favour or against the ontology of modal possibilism (for me, it is an argument against it), but what matters is that, for our goals, this notion of possible world is too narrow, indeed. For one may believe in the existence of mass- points or not, but it is beyond doubt that people do think of mass-points. And if idealizing thoughts are to be, according to the above-sketched view, identified with possible states of affairs of a kind, then the notion of possible world must be enlarged.

2. The source of trouble lies, at it seems, in the fact that the considered notion of possible world presupposes the standard notion of negation, whereas the procedure of idealization makes use of some other notion. The classical notion of negation is the following: given the universe Ucomposed of elements A, B, C, . . .,N, non-A is the same as B or C or. . .or 2. This notion is not fully appropriate even for the natural language: the colloquial notion of lack of something is not reducible to that of negation. The lack of A is not the sum of the remaining properties different from A. When one says that this man lacks a wife one is not inclined to say that the man is either happy or courageous or reasonable or . . . or green. One is rather inclined to say that he is unmarried which implies, obviously, that he is not married but the colloquial meaning of the term “unmarried” carries also much more important informa- tion. Namely, that the man under consideration belongs to such class of people of whom certain categories of properties cannot be sensibly predicated at all. And this implies that negations of these properties cannot be predicated either. If one is unmarried, then one is neither divorced nor non-divorced, neither widowed nor non-widowed, neither happy-in-marriage nor non-happy- in-marriage, etc. That is why a bachelor, when asked whether he has (already) divorced or not (yet), does not respond “yes” or “no”, but is inclined to answer in a way which abandons the hidden assumption of the question. His

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answer places him in the category of unmarried persons to whom the mentioned further specifications do not apply at all. And “at all” implies that the negations of these are also not applicable in his case.

It is difficult to answer precisely what are the conditions of adequacy for the expression “un-” as applied in colloquial language. Certainly, it is to fulfil the triviality: if x is un-A, then x is non-A, but not the reverse. Apart from that, a rough approximation to the sense of un-A would perhaps be this. If x is un-A, then there is a family of properties, let us label it A, such that for every property G of A: neither x is G, nor x is non-G. Let us label x then as G-less object for it differs from its full-equipped original in being deprived of the property G . A linguistic expression of the fact is that the act of predicating both G and non-G of objects being un-A is neither true nor false but senseless.

3. This point may not be clear enough also because of the negligence of the method of idealization in the dominating trends of the philosophy of science (cf. more on this in Niiniluoto 119861). However, if the above intuitions are defensible, then we may interpret this procedure quite simply.

In the constitution of the mass-point what is explicitly written (i.e., the idealizing condition: “the dimensions of x equal zero”) is less important than what is silenced. And what is silenced in the act of assuming that, say, the Earth is a mass-point is the claim that all the geological, climatic, etc. properties pertaining to the Earth are lacking in its model when considered in an astronomer’s reasonings. And thus it is meaningless to say that this mass- point labelled “the Earth” in astronomic equations, possesses, for instance, oceans. Equally, it is meaningless to deny this. For it is obviously an object incapable of being divided into land and oceans, an un-ocean (or oceanless) object.

4. The crucial point for a proper metaphysical understanding of the idealizational procedure is, I believe, that it differs fundamentally from that of abstraction4. Abstraction, i.e. the omitting of properties, leads from indi-

This distinction (cf., e.g., Harre [I9701 or my [1971a, c]) is perhaps quite obvious but far from being methodologically exploited. Quite the reverse so, the two procedures are often mixed. In part this is due to the prevalence of the empiricist tradition of “abstraction” in the philosophy of science which differs greatly from the Hegelian tradition (cf. Coniglione [1989]). But in part it is also a matter of the terminology. Let us then compare the terminology applied here with those of other authors. For instance, Hempel [I9521 and Cohen [ 19771 apply the term “idealization” in the meaning similar to what is termed here so. Rudner [1966] and Barr [I9711 apply the term “idealization” in the meaning close to what is termed here as ideation. Suppe [I9721 terms “abstraction” roughly which is labelled here idealization but in reference to the data, not to the general statements; Wojcicki [ 39741 employs in this context again the term “idealization”. Zie- linska [1981] labels “abstraction” which is termed below reduction and “idealization” which is termed below idealization, whereas “idealization” is used in the sense similar to what will be termed below “ideation”. Etc.


viduals to sets of individuals (and from sets of individuals to families of sets, etc.). Idealization does not do this. Omission of the dimensions of physical bodies does not yield any set of physical bodies but the mass-point. Abstrac- tion is generalization. Idealization is not.

The distinction between idealization and abstraction can perhaps be explained by the following formula. Let the universe of individuals U be given and a subset of it determined by the property P. To abstract from P means simply to take into account those objects from U which are P or not-P; this operation leads thus from the set of objects which are P to those which are P or not-P, i.e. to the set U. To idealize the property P means to take into account those objects which are neither P nor not-P, which are somehow P- less. This thus implies a passage to a new universe containing objects lacking P and lacking not? at the same time. The mass-point is neither courageous nor not-courageous, it belongs to a universe to which such characteristics do not apply at all. Similarly, it is neither yellow nor not-yellow, it lacks yellow- ness, it is yellow-less. Etc.

Thus, it is not so that the problem of idealized objects is a special case of the problem of universals, at least in its modern version when the universals are understood as sets. If this is correct, then the Platonist cannot argue that idealized objects are placed among the sets. And an instrumentalist cannot refer to his well-known arguments when considering the status of idealizations because idealizational statements are not therefore special cases of generic claims “Every A is B” (cf. [1972]). What applies to sets need not to be applicable to idealized objects. The main difference between abstraction and idealization is that the former leads from a given level of the set-theoretical hierarchy to the next, higher, one, whereas the latter remains on one and the same level.

The opposition idealization/abstraction is not the only one to be discussed when dealing with the peculiarity of the procedure under consideration. Another is that the above is far from being sufficient to characterize idealization. For one should distinguish between the two other similar but different procedures - idealization and ideation.

5 . One should thus distinguish between the counterfactual negation of a property and counterfactual predication the lack of the property. In the former case we omit a certain positive property of the given object ascribing it the complement of this feature. In the latter case we omit that feature in the sense of predicating the lack of it. And this is what we do when making idealization.

These intuitions might be clarified a little in the following way. Given is the object X with property A . To make ideation of X means to take into

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account an individuum X’ which differs from X insofar as it is non-A. To idealize A means to take into account such an individuum X’ which differs from X insofar as it is A-less, i.e. neither x is A nor x is non-A.

One could thus say that both procedures, ideation and idealization, deform an object under consideration, but they do so in various ways. Idea- tion deforms the object weakly by preserving its space of properties and assigning to some of them their negative values (“zero-s” in case of all-or-no properties). Idealization deforms the object under consideration strongly by depriving it of some of its properties at all; idealization diminishes then the space of properties of the idealized object.

In a more general case, when the quantitative properties (magnitudes) are considered, the difference between the two procedures might be expressed as follows. Given is the (quantitative) property P of the object X which pertains to it in the degree v. Now, ideation consists in that it is counterfactually postulated that P pertains to X to the degree zero (i.e., P(X) = 0). Idealization, instead, consists in something else, namely that is counterfactually denied that P pertains to X in whichever degree, the minimum value of P included, i.e. that X i s P-less.

6 . Notice, that the mass-point is oceanless, climaticless etc. but it is not dimension-less; as to the latter it simply possesses zero value of all the space dimensions. Therefore, in the constitution of the mass-point the two counterfactual procedures are combined. One is the (counterfactual) predicating the lacks of properties, the other is the (counterfactual) predicating the minimum (e.g., zero) value of the possessed properties.

On the other hand, if it is so that one counterfactually attaches the minimum value to a given object, then it is imaginable that also the maximum value (the infiniturn included) can be attached counterfactually to the object under consideration. And, in general, every value of a given magnitude different than that by which this object is actually marked can be counterfactually ascribed to it. Similarly, if it is so that one counterfactually diminishes the space of properties of an object, then it is imaginable that one may counterfactually enlarge the space of properties pertaining to it .

Let us consider this more systematically.

7. Given the space P of properties and an object X with a certain area of properties, each of them occurs on it in a certain intensity.

Now, potentialization of X consists in postulating an object, X’, which differs from X in that X’ has some property P in a degree different from that X has P. If the degree pertaining to X’ is greater (resp. lesser) than that per-

Thoughts are facts in possible worlds, truths are facts of a given world 28 1

taining to X , we shall speak of positive (resp. negative) potentialization. Idea- tion is the extreme case of negative potentialization which consists in that a given object is (counterfactually) postulated to possess some of its properties in the minimum (“zero”) degree. The extreme case of positive potentialization can be termed mythologization. This consists in maximization of a given property, so that a given object is (counterfactually) stipulated to possess some of its features in the highest degree.

Notice that potentialization preserves the area of properties the object Xis supposed to possess. The only changes this procedure requires are those in the degrees the given properties are to pertain to the postulated objects. There- fore, the negative potentialization, including ideation, and the positive potentialization, including myt hologization, might be termed weak-deformation.

In contrast to these, the strong-deformation procedures consist of actually stipulating changes in the area of properties of the initial object. Reduction therefore consists in that the object X is (counterfactually) postulated as lacking some of the properties it actually has. Instead, by transcendentalization it is postulated (counterfactually) that X has such properties which it actually lacks.

8. The four elementary procedures may be combined on par in various manners. The joint procedure of reduction and positive potentialization (including mythologization) seems to appear in the arts. Caricature is both a result of omission of some properties and exaggeration of the remaining ones, which is why it might be termed fictionalization. The joint application of transcendentalization and positive potentialization (including mythologization) seems to appear in religious thinking. God is supposed to have all properties in the highest degree: infinitely good, infinitely wise, etc. Therefore the procedure in question can be termed absolutization.

Idealization is another type of complex deformation procedures. It can be identified by a joint reduction and negative potentialization (in particular, ideation). Indeed, the mass-point we have discussed so long possesses only some mechanical properties and all the remaining physical, let alone chemical, and possibly geological, etc., are neglected. Moreover, even some of these mechanical properties which can sensibly be ascribed to the mass-point, e.g. the space dimensions, are postulated to appear in the zero degree’.

9. Let us come back to the initial opposition of idealization and abstraction. Idealization is one of possible combinations of the four elementary

I have changed my earlier claim (e.g.. 119701, 119721) that idealizing conditions make, in the present terms, both ideation and reduction under the criticism of Zielinska [1981].

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deformational procedures. Abstraction is not. Abstraction is a procedure allowing passage from a given level of the set-theoretical hierarchy to a higher one, while all the deformational procedures mentioned above remain on one and the same level of the set-theoretical hierarchy. If a physical body is an individuum, then the mass-point is also an individuum, although a poorer one as far as the area of its properties is concerned. Let us refer to such individuals as ideas. Mass-point, homogeneous cosmos, closed economy, rational legis- lator, etc. are ideas. On the one hand, they are individuals ontologically poorer than the objects of our world and, on the other hand, they possess in the minimum degree some of the properties they share with the latter.

I l l . Three types of possible worlds

1. The fact that idealization is so commonly applied in science, that fictionalization seems to be the foundation of the precedures applied in the arts, etc. witness that the counterfactuality is not simply an extreme case of the fac- tualist constructions we normally apply in our thinking, but lies at the very foundations of our minds. Rather, one might doubt whether we are able to think factually, i.e. about-the-world-we-live-in-and-not-about-anything-else, at all. Take the most trivial example of an arbitrary physical magnitude, e.g. temperature. It is normally said that the set of physical bodies is divided into classes of abstraction by the relation of the thermal equivalence and that to each of these classes a real number is assigned as its numerical representative. That sounds reasonable. But take the number 36,666(N) with “6” repeated N times. Where is any guarantee that there is a physical body with exactly such a temperature? There is no guarantee of that kind. Even more puzzling: no need to have such a guarantee at all. Therefore, the claim that the initial universe was composed of physical bodies is unsound: it had to be much larger, to say the least. So large that it includes, e.g., perfect gases.

2. Let us consider then the object correspondents of the deformation procedures. Given again a single object X and the space P of properties. Let a k-element subset S of P be composed of those properties which pertain to X in definite degrees (the area of properties of X). Call X an actual object. X has thus anyway a non-empty area of properties Sand the non-empty area of lacking properties (or, briefly, lacks) P-S.

Now, a mere-possibile (a mere-possible object) relative to X will be such an object X’which possesses all the properties of the set S, and all the lacks of P-S, but at least one of them pertains to X’in a degree different than that in which it pertains to X . All the possibilia relative to X are thus equipped in the same k


properties which Xpossesses, but they differ from one another as to the intensi- ties with which these properties pertain to them. In other words, all the possibilia (possible objects) relative to the actual object Xpossess the same properties but they are distinguished from one another by the values of these properties.

The extreme case of possibilia are ideal types. An ideal type of X is a possible object X’ which has at least one of the properties shared with X in the minimum degree. Symmetrically, a mythical type is a possible object marked by the maximum degree of certain properties shared with the original. Ideal types are reached by ideation while mythical types by mythologization.

Let us come back to the actual object X . A reduct of X is such an object. X’ which lacks at least one of the properties of the set S. A reduct of X has a nar- rower area of properties than S i.e. than that of X itself. There are reducts of the first rank of X lacking one property of S, reducts of the second rank lacking two properties of S, etc. The limiting case of reducts is the reduct of k-th rank (the nothingness) lacking all the properties of the set P.

A transcendentale of the actual object X is such an object X’ which does possess in some degree at least one of the properties which X is lacking. Tran- scendentalia of X are thus equipped with larger property areas than S, i.e. than the area of properties of X itself. There are transcendentalia of the first rank possessing one property more than X, of the second rank possessing two properties more than X , etc. The limiting case of a transcendentale of X is an absolute relative to X: it is an object X’equipped in all the properties from the space P in some degrees. The nothingness has thus the empty area of properties and the full area of the lacks, whereas an absolute has the full area of properties and the empty area of lacks.

Ideas relative to the object X may be thus identified with an extreme type of reducts. They are namely reducts lacking some of the properties of the area S and possessing at the same time in the minimum degree some other properties pertaining to X. Ideas of X are thus those reducts of X which are at the same time its ideal types. Admitting such entities is, certainly, a kind of platonism; this is actually what the term ((idea)) suggests. Yet, it differs from what is usually termed so in putting aside this question which is by platonists considered to be crucial, viz. the question of existence of sets and constructs built over them (e.g., Church [1956]). Ideas are not sets over individuals but individuals themselves.

Symmetrically, we could distinguish transcendentalia as being at the same time mythical types.

3. If the above is correct, one could distinguish some types of possible worlds. Obviously, the area of different objects in our world is different. Yet,

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in order to make things simpler, let us adopt a strong idealizing condition that all the objects in the world are equipped in the same area of properties and their lacks (or, to put it otherwise, that there is one object in the world). Call such a world elementary. Now, given the set of actual objects a, there are three categories of the elementary possible worlds:

I. All the possible worlds built over the objects a which are equipped with the same amount of properties which these objects possess; the possible worlds of the category I differ only in that the objects a have the properties under consideration in different combinations of degrees. One of the possible worlds of the category I is (an idealization of) the actual world. The worlds of that category can be termed numerical alternatives in regard to a given one, e.g. to the actual world.

11. All the possible worlds built over reducts of the objects a will be termed contractions of the actual world. They are numerical alternatives in relation to a reduct of the actual world. The limiting case of worlds of the category I1 is the possible world over the nothingness; the states of affairs occurring in it contain exclusively lacks of the properties pertaining to the objects a.

111. All the possible worlds built over transcendentalia of the objects a will be labelled extensions of the actual world. They are numerical alternatives in relation to a transcendentale of the actual world. The limiting case of that category is the possible world over the absolute; the states of affairs occurring in it contain all the properties, and no lacks, pertaining to the objects a.

In other words, all the possible worlds of the first category are ((ways the things could have been)). Those of the two remaining categories are “ways a given reduct (resp. transcendentale) of things could have been”.

IV. Truths are facts in a given world

1. The ontic framework outlined above seems to be large enough to include our idealizing, fictionizing, and absolutizing thoughts. If so, then a more plausible solution than mentalism and physicalism obtains, I conjecture, when identifiying a thought with the corresponding state of affairs in the triad (l), i.e. identifying the latter two elements of it. Or, in other words, assuming that ‘3’’ in (2) ranges over the set of all states of affairs appearing in the possible worlds of the categories I - 111. They occur either on the actual or mere-possible objects, or reducts or transcendentalia6. This is similar to physicalism in

Undoubtedly, this leads in the direction of a platonistic ontology of a sort. It is presented in my [ 1989a-bI and [in print].


its reductionist tendency but thoughts are reduced not to the brain’s states but to the objective states of affairs of whatever type. Thinking is thus conceived of as a relation between the state of brain and the external state of affairs. We, people, possess an ability to attach the states of actual, merety-possible, ideal, fictional etc. objects to the states of our bodies (of our nervous system). And the former, not the latter, are actually our “thoughts”.

2. Our thoughts can well be false. Where they are then? This traditional difficulty seems to be less serious than it is usually admitted. For the source of it lies in the actualist ontology. On the ground of the possibilist ontology, this difficulty appears not so acute.

For if one relativises the notion of truth-value to a possible world, then the stand presented above forces siniply an identification of truth with existence in a given world. Thought that p is true in a possible world W if p is a fact in W. The thought is false in W if p is not a fact in W but there is such a possible world W’ that p is a fact in W‘. A truth in a given world is thus a fact from that world. Facts of all other worlds are falsities in a given world.

3. Truth-values turn out thus to be not semantical but ontological categories. Is such a grasp justified? Nobody knows as long as the work of refor- mulating of many specific epistemological problems in these terms is not done. Here, I shall iimit myself to two remarks.

First, there are some traditional ideas that seem to gain some clarity, or even obviousness, in the light of the proposed definitions. One is the idea of the intimate connection of truth and existence. Indeed, if to exist is to be a fact in a possible world, then truth is simply identical with existence. Another is Spinoza’s claim that “falsity is a wrongly localised truth”. Indeed, if a scheme to be qualified as true or false is p holds in W, then p is always a fact - we are unable thus to think entirely mistakenly, i.e. to think something that does not exist in a world. At worst, we may be mistaken in identifying a world in which p does hold.

And this is what agrees, I conjecture, with the scientific practice. Every scientific theory, if not contradictory, holds somewhere, i.e. in an idealised world. At worst, it may hold not in a world we wish it to hold; in case of science understood as in our culture, we wish a scientific theory to hold in the actual world. But even if it does not, it remains something worthwile for science. The proposed grasp allows, 1 believe, to do justice to the standard scientific attitudes by saying that every such theory enligthens us as to some worlds which are, unfortunately, too far away from that of ours as regards the accepted criteria of approximation.

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The proposed identification of truths with facts of a given world and falsities with facts of all the other worlds allows us also to do justice to ordinary language. For the most natural sense of true is the following: it is snowing =

the fact is that it is snowing = “it is snowing” is true (sc. in a given world). This notion of truth is non-semantical. Were the proposal contained in this paper correct, this would testify not to the primitivity of ordinary language but to the depth of the ordinary reason. Likely, to use the ontological (non- semantic) notion of truth, the latter must presuppose much richer ontology than one expressed in the actualistic metaphysics.

4. The present author is fully aware that the said does not remove serious problems known from the philosophical literature. One of the most obvious is the question of truthfulness of mathematical statements. But maybe the source of this difficulty lies not so much in the more or less alleged existence of two types of truth but rather in the fact that it is not so easy to find a place for mathematical facts in the possible-worlds approach. I do not have, unfortunately, too much to say about this.

V. Conclusion: Our mind is outside of us

The final idea of the paper is thus that “my thoughts” are outside of me’. They are not “private” but actually “public”, because other people may reach the same states of the same (possible) objects. For very many people may coordinate somehow (how, is a problem for neurophysiology) the states of their brains with the objective states of affairs, including the states of the most idealized, or transcendentalized, objects. This ability of ours is wrongly termed “introspection”. As a matter of fact, this ability should be labelled “extraspection” as it allows us to reach what exists apart from us.

Needless to say, the stand roughly outlined above is but a rough hypothesis. Its development and substantiation must be left to other occa- sions. In this place I would like only to point out that the hypothesis that there exists full table of deformed individuals generated by a given one is more plausible than the mentalist hypotheses which we accept so readily. For the sense of their is that there are incomplete tables of the kind (if we agree that

Let us add that what is assumed in claiming this is a very strong epistemological idealization. It requires that the subject is epistemologically sovereign, i.e. that his means are sufficient to distinguish between any two different states of affairs. Clearly, we are not sovereign in that sense. Witness the vagueness and unclearity of our thinking and language. There is a possibility to enlarge the presented approach to cover the non-sovereign thinking, at least of certain types, but it presupposes a much larger conceptual apparatus than the one which has been employed above (cf. my [in print]).


nobody is able to “construct” a complete table of the kind “in” his “mind”) and that the number of these incomplete tables equals the number of acts of thinking.

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Dialectica Vol. 45, NO4 (1991)

thoughts are facts in possible worlds, truths are facts of a given world

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