Thomas Nagel, “Death” (1979),

and

Stephen E. Rosenbaum, “How

to be Dead and Not Care”

(1986)

PHIL 102, Fall 2015

UBC

Christina Hendricks

Except images noted otherwise, this presentation is licensed CC-BY 4.0

Nagel: Even if there is nothing after death, is death

still

a bad thing for the one who dies?

Isn’t it obvious that it is? Why even ask the question?

Epicurus & Lucretius

Death can only be bad for a person if they can

experience it as bad.

BAD for that

person

Nagel’s argument

Conclusion: Death is bad for the person who

has died.

What did you get from his article as to his

argument for this?

(Outline it on the board)

Objections

1. How can we say the dead person has “lost”

anything once they’re dead? They no longer

exist.

Reply: think of persons as extended temporally: a

combination of their history, their present state,

and their future possibilities

Icon by Harold Weaver, from the Noun Project

Makes sense of

the bad of

betrayal?

Objections

2. If death is bad for the person who dies, then

why isn’t the time before birth also bad for

him/her? (or is it?)

Reply: If born earlier,

wouldn’t be the same

person, so couldn’t be

bad for him/her.

Time 1

Time 2

Can’t be Person A

Person A

Icon by Creative Stall, from The Noun Project

Objections

3. Must we take the loss of life as always a bad

thing, because a loss of future possibilities, since

we are naturally mortal?

Reply: From perspective within our lives, it would

be good to have more, even if we recognize (from

outside) that we can’t; so loss is still bad.

Icon by Harold Weaver, from the Noun Project

…

Summary

Death is bad for the person who dies b/c it’s a

loss to that person of future possibilities of a

good thing (life).

…

Putting it all together

Fill out the outline of Nagel’s argument

(on other screen)

Rosenbaum: “How to be Dead and

Not Care: A defense of Epicurus”

(1986)

Definitions of terms

Dying

Death

Being dead

Experience: one experiences something only if it

can causally affect one (124)

• e.g., imagining something ≠ experiencing it

Rosenbaum’s reconstruction of

Epicurus’ argument

• See pp. 121-122 (or 218 in JSTOR version)

• Shown on separate screen

Supporting Premise A

Inductive arguments: claim the conclusion follows from the premises with a significant degree of probability

Deductive arguments: claim the conclusion follows from the premises with certainty

o If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true

Generalization from normal cases (induction)(123)

Premise 1

Premise 2

Premise 3

Conclusion

Premise 1

Premise 2

Premise 3

Conclusion

Supporting Premises C and D

Premise (C): comes from def. of “experience” (124-125)

1. For a person P to experience a state of affairs, it must have causal effects on P

2. States of affairs can only have causal effects on a person who exists

3. At death, P ceases to exist

4. Therefore, “P can experience a state of affairs only if it begins before P’s death”

Premise (D): “true by definition” (126)

Conclusion follows from the

premises?With certainty/necessity or with high probability?

Hint: look at the intermediate conclusions (B) and

(E) and their connection to the final conclusion

Premise APremise

DPremise C

Premise BIntermediate

conclusion

Final conclusion

Premise EIntermediate

conclusion

Response to Nagel

What in Rosenbaum’s argument does Nagel

disagree with?

Rosenbaum’s response:

• Deception, betrayal, brain injury example

compatible with (A)

o (A) just requires that P could experience something

Response to Nagel

Nagel: time before birth & after

death are different; latter bad,

former not

What is Rosenbaum’s

response?