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Modern Europe is the product of the gradual evolution of political, economic, and social institutions, interspersed with cataclysmic events as the existing order resisted change. The early seventeenth century saw one of the worst of those events. The misnamed Thirty Years War of 1618-1648---it was really several interrelated wars, some starting before or ending after the nominal dates---tore through central Europe, depopulating large tracts of Germany, while subsidiary fights erupted on the high seas, in the Americas, and in the Far East. It melded the last of the Catholic-Protestant wars and the first stirrings of nationalism to ongoing dynastic struggles for European hegemony. Joseph Miranda brings his incisive writing to bear on this complicated story, aided by a profusion of colorful maps, to identify its major threads.

THIRTY YEARS WAR:

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more specialized and specific about a single subject.

• 116 pages• Over 2 dozen maps & diagrams

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46

STRATEGY & TACTICS QUARTERLY #08 | WINTER 2019

For all of its strategic importance, Khe Sanh was not happily sit-

uated for defense. The village was approximately six miles from

the Laotian border and about ten miles south of the DMZ. It lay

astride Route 9 on a plateau curving north between two ridges.

It was on this level ground, complete with an old French landing

strip, that a Green Beret team built a post in 1962. The camp

was overlooked by numerous rugged peaks ranging from 881 to

1,015 meters (2,900 to 3,300 feet) above sea level, 1,000 or more

feet higher than the airstrip. Scrub-covered hills to the north

and northeast—named for their height: 861, 861A, 881N (North),

and 881S (South)—dominated the camp. The ground between

the heights was heavily overgrown and crisscrossed by ravines.

Marines took over the post in early 1966—the Green

Berets moving west to Lang Vei—but never considered it

a permanent post due to its vulnerability. Westmoreland

would have none of it and ordered it occupied by a full

battalion, rechristening it Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB).

The airstrip was enlarged to handle C-130 cargo planes, a

necessity as the supply line along Route 9 could be easily

cut. Outposts were established on the controlling heights.

The increase in American activity did not escape the

attention of the North Vietnamese. NVA regulars—18th Regiment

of 325C Division—moved in during April 1967, engaging the

Marines in what became known as the “Hill Battles.” Marine

intelligence thought the attackers were only an ad hoc

grouping of platoons, so Marines were initially committed in individual companies. Running up against well-armed regulars in obscured terrain, they suffered heavily. Reinforcements arrived by the end of April and the Marines started deploying full battalions. Hills 861 and 881S fell first, then in early May Hill 881N. The North Vietnamese

Khe Sanh During Tet

46


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47


47

STQ8_V7.indd 47

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For all of its strategic importance, Khe Sanh was not happily sit

For all of its strategic importance, Khe Sanh was not happily sit-



























a permanent post due to its vulnerability. Westmoreland

would have none of it and ordered it occupied by a full

battalion, rechristening it Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB).

The airstrip was enlarged to handle C-130 cargo planes, a

necessity as the supply line along Route 9 could be easily

cut. Outposts were established on the controlling heights.

The increase in American activity did not escape the

attention of the North Vietnamese. NVA regulars—18

of 325C Division—moved in during April 1967, engaging the

Marines in what became known as the “Hill Battles.” Marine

intelligence thought the attackers were only an

grouping of platoons, so Marines were initially committed in individual companies. Running up against well-armed regulars in obscured terrain, they suffered heavily. Reinforcements arrived by the end of April and the Marines started deploying full battalions. Hills 861 and 881S fell first, then in early May Hill 881N. The North Vietnamese

Khe Sanh During Tet

Khe Sanh During Tet

62

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#10 | SU

MMER 2020

German Evacua

tion

of Crimea

U S SR

ROMANIA

Cr imea

Carpathian Mtns

Caucasus Mtns

B L A CK S E A

Gulf of Finland

Gulf ofRiga

Sea of Azov

FINLAND

Marshes

U S SR

POLAND

L. Peipus

Bessarabia

Bug

Dnepr

Niemen

Dvina

Volg

a

Don

Kuban

Bug

Dnep

r

Oka

Volkhov

Don

Danu

be

Sozh

Prut

Mius

Dnepr

Seim

De

sna

Lova

t

Vel ik

aya

Wilya

Luga

Svir

Oskol

Psel

Siret

LakeLadoga

1 Mar

12 May

Kiev

Smolensk

MOSCOW

Konigsberg

Riga

Brest

Bialystok

VilniusKaunas

Grodno

Tilsit

Kursk

Voronezh

TulaKaluga

Rzhev

Klin

Kalinin

Velikiye Luki

Vitebsk

Orsha

Lublin

Galati

Leningrad

Novgorod

Pskov

Staraya Russa

Kholm

Demyansk

Tallinn

Tartu

Narva

Luga

Polotsk

Nevel

Dvinsk

Gomel

Roslavl

Konotop

OrelBryansk

Krasnodar

Rostov

Sevastopol

Yalta

Kerch

Armavir

Dnepropetrovs

k

Chernigov

RovnoKovel

Odessa

Kherson

Nikopol

Kirovograd

Cherkassy

Uman

Vinnitsa

Zhitomir

Pinsk

Mariupol

Perekop

Taganrog

Stalino

IzyumPoltava

Belgorod

Mosyr

Mogilev

Rogachev

Przemysl

Fastov

Krivoi Rog

Nikolayev

Tighina

Bacau

Yelets

Kolomna

Vyazma

Glukhov

Sumy

Voroshilovgrad

Feodosia

Viipuri

Helsinki

Hanko

Radom

Korosten

Livny

Balta

IasiKishine

v

Suwalki

Dubno

Lubny

Romny

Mozhaisk

Memel

Tikhvin

Yaroslavl

Ryazan

KostromaRybinsk

Bologoe

Bely

Parnu

Minsk

Liepaja

Jelgava

Siuliai

Warsaw

BELGRADE

BUCHAREST

Ploesti

Constanta

Roman

Kharkov

Millerovo

Novocherkassk

Kalach

Rossosh

Maikop

Melitopol

Krasnograd

Kupyansk

Stary Oskol

Oboyan

Tuapse

Borisov

Vologda

Vladimir

Stanislau

Balti

Simferopol

Kropotkin

Tiraspol

Razdelnya

Tashlyk

Sukhinichi

Podolsk

Kremenchug

Slavyansk

Novy Oskol

Lvov Ternopol

Proskurov

Cernoutsy

Bobruysk

Novorossysk

Yevpatoria

Zaporozhye

Turku

Pripyet

Dnest r

Donbas

Valdai Hi l ls

Donets

Berezina

Pripyet

Kamenets

-Podolsky

2 Ukranian

XXXXX

8

Center

XXXXX

NorthXXXXX

1

South

Ukraine

XXXXX

3

Western

XXXXX

Leningrad

XXXXX

1 Byelorussi

anXXXXX

4 Ukranian

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51

22

3S

4S

5

39

104

3

9

16

18

9

18

56

23

3 Ukranian

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1 Ukranian

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17

4

6

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5G

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Coastal

6

6G

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57

37

48

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18

42

67

54

2S

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65

61

1360

47

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1

4027

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6

3 Baltic

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21

7

43

North

Ukraine

XXXXX

4

1

Spring 1944

Miles

200

Map Key

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Soviet advance

German army g

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German army

German Panzer

army

1 Mar 1944

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1 Jun 1944

front line

German retreat

Romanian arm

y

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Soviet army

Hungarian arm

y

STQ10_V7.indd

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6/19/20 10:51

AM

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#10 | SU

MMER 2020

63

had stockpil

ed supplies, i

n this case

food and am

munition. H

e had also sen

t

most of his re

ar-area perso

nnel, the vita

l

logistic infra

structure of th

e army, south

across the Dn

iestr to clear h

is battle area

.

Hube had pl

anned to foll

ow suit

with his fight

ing units onc

e he was

given permiss

ion to withdr

aw. Zhukov

thought it the

likely route a

s well and

weighted his

perimeter gu

ard accord-

ingly. Manstei

n had other i

deas. A

southerly retr

eat would tak

e 1.PzA too

far south, lea

ving only 4.P

zA to guard

his main dep

ot at Lvov. H

e preferred

a westerly ro

ute, driving t

hrough the

weak wall of t

he Soviet per

imeter to

join 4.PzA’s l

ine south of T

ernopol.

Manstein me

t with Hitler

on 25

March and d

emanded—ta

ct was never

his forté—pe

rmission to e

vacuate 1.PzA

.

Hitler resiste

d just as vehe

mently, then

reversed him

self two days

later. He also

promised rei

nforcements

in the form o

f

Hausser's 2.S

SPzK, then ju

st finishing a

n

Auffrischung

(refreshment

) in France.

Hube had al

ready begun

prepara-

tions for mov

ement, reorg

anizing his

four corps int

o two Korpsgr

uppen,

making liaiso

n with the Lu

ftwaffe for

the airlandin

g of supplies

, mostly fuel

,

and contracti

ng his lines to

concentrate

strike forces

on his weste

rn front. The

Korpsgruppen

moved abre

ast, each usin

g

one corps to

push west and

the other as

a rearguard to

the east. Foll

owing the

north bank o

f the Dnestr, t

he army had

to cross four

rivers along

its route. Sov

iet

resistance fo

rtunately wa

s weak, thoug

h

Zhukov quic

kly made adj

ustments to

bring addition

al forces to b

ear on either

German flank

. Like Stemm

ermann’s

“wandering p

ocket” but on

a much

larger scale,

1.PzA made

its way west.

Hausser’s SS

Panzerkorps

was already

arriving beyo

nd Ternopol,

though

it would be m

any days befo

re it was

fully assemb

led. Moving

east, it too

made slow b

ut steady pro

gress against

scattered Sov

iet resistance

and harsh

terrain. Some

units were d

etached to

assist Erhard

Raus’ 4.PzA in

a failed relie

f

of Ternopol, w

hich had bee

n encircled

with 4,500 m

en inside on

25 March.

While Hube

was still mov

ing, Hitler

exacted a pri

ce for the co

nstant calls

for retreats. Th

e southern arm

y group

commanders

, Manstein an

d Kleist, were

relieved of th

eir commands

along with

Hollidt of 6.A

. Manstein’s p

lace was take

n

by Model, th

en at AGN, w

hile Hollidt w

as

replaced by F

erdinand Sch

örner. AGS

was renamed

AG Nordukra

ine (AGNU)

and AGA beca

me AG Süduk

raine

(AGSU). The

Carpathians

had cre-

ated an obvi

ous new sepa

ration of the

German line

in the south,

so control of

8.A was trans

ferred to AG

SU. Model’s

area of respo

nsibility wou

ld include

Hungary, Sch

örner’s Rom

ania; each

commander

would contro

l the associ-

ated allied a

rmies, just no

w returning

to action afte

r a year’s reb

uilding.

The reorgani

zation had n

o impact

on the escap

e of 1.PzA. Fir

st contact wa

s

made with H

ausser on 6 A

pril, and all

the army’s div

isions made

it out of the

pocket over

the course o

f three days.

All

were intact,

but only a ha

ndful remain

ed

operational.

Most of Hube

’s tanks and

other heavy e

quipment ha

d been lost,

along with a

s many as 45

,000 men

(reports vary

). Several div

isions would

be disbanded

, several othe

rs reduced

to Kampfgrup

pe (battlegro

up) status,

and most of t

he rest were s

hadows.

Hube’s army

was neverth

eless

pressed back

into service, h

is divisions

performing a

n about-face

to man the

new front. H

ausser and H

ube’s stronge

st

units made an

other drive to

Ternopol.

As had happe

ned at both S

talingrad and

Cherkassy, t

he relief effo

rt fell short an

d

the garrison

was called on

to breakout.

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2016

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Bug

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Prut

Studenitsya

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Nemlya

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va

Mar

kovk

a

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Siret

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l’skiy

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Proskurov

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23 Mar-9 Apr 1

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ine

26 Mar Front l

ine

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e

German counte

rattacks

German retreat

s

Soviet initial a

ttacks

Soviet counte

rattacks

STQ10_V7.indd

63

6/19/20 10:51

AM

strike forces

on his weste

rn front. The

moved abre

ast, each usin

g

one corps to

push west and

the other as

a rearguard to

the east. Foll

owing the

north bank o

f the Dnestr, t

he army had

to cross four

rivers along

its route. Sov

iet

resistance fo

rtunately wa

s weak, thoug

h

Zhukov quic

kly made adj

ustments to

bring addition

al forces to b

ear on either

and AGA beca

me AG Süduk

raine

(AGSU). The

Carpathians

had cre-

ated an obvi

ous new sepa

ration of the

German line

in the south,

so control of

8.A was trans

ferred to AG

SU. Model’s

area of respo

nsibility wou

ld include

Hungary, Sch

örner’s Rom

ania; each

commander

would contro

l the associ

ated allied a

rmies, just no

w returning

to action afte

r a year’s reb

uilding.

PrPrP urur t

and AGA beca

me AG Süduk

raine

(AGSU). The

Carpathians

had cre

ated an obvi

ous new sepa

ration of the

German line

in the south,

so control of

8.A was trans

ferred to AG

SU. Model’s

area of respo

nsibility wou

ld include

Hungary, Sch

örner’s Rom

ania; each

commander

would contro

l the associ-

ated allied a

rmies, just no

w returning

to action afte

r a year’s reb

uilding.

The reorgani

zation had n

o impact

on the escap

e of 1.PzA. Fir

st contact wa

s

“I am worried to death. I think the game is pretty near up.’’—Gen. George Washington, in a letter to his brother following the Continental Army’s defeat in New York

Times that Try Men’s Souls OMLMarch 1776 to January 1777

Men’s Souls OMLMarch 1776 to January 1777March 1776 to January 1777

March 1776 to January 1777

26

STRATEGY & TACTICS QUARTERLY #09 | SPRING 2020

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27


27

T he military chessboard had been wiped nearly clean as winter turned to spring, and even before Howe pulled out of Boston both sides were think-ing ahead to the coming year. One clear change was that the coming campaign would not be a repeat of the extemporized operations of 1775. The Americans had put their war effort on a solid footing, with Congress taking an active role in planning and procurement. Britain was stretch-ing its imperial muscle, dispatching men and ships to North America, and harnessing its global wealth. The result would be a series of hammer blows to put an end to the colonial rebellion.Divide & ConquerIn London, Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for America, saw the uprising—with some accuracy—as a simple rebellion of fractious and fractured colonies, not a genuine national uprising. That was the single factor most in Britain’s favor; large numbers of Americans still saw themselves as loyal subjects of the king protesting unjust policies of British ministers. It was by all appearances con-centrated in New England; there were stirrings elsewhere, but many colonies were still in the charge of loyal governors.Germain, 3,000 miles from the seat of war, was willing to leave most decisions up to his generals. He had reason to believe, however, that the southern states contained many Loyalists. The burning of Norfolk had snuffed out one con-

centration, but the governor of North Carolina had organized

militia units to protect royal interests. Howe, while still in

Boston, was ordered to dispatch an expedition to North

Carolina, where it would be joined by the loyalists, plus seven

regiments Cornwallis was bringing from the home country.

Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton was chosen to lead the

expedition, though delays kept him in Boston until

mid-February. He sailed with a token detachment, stop-

ping briefly in New York to consult with the governor,

also loyal, before continuing to his destination.

A month later Howe and the main army departed Boston

for Halifax. There he was joined by a fleet commanded by

his brother, Adm. Richard Howe, and troops more than

tripling the size of his army. More would be forthcom-

ing, but the great distance from home—at best a six-week

crossing—meant there could be no rapid reinforcement

or exchange of information. Howe was on his own.

He knew time was short. Not only did rebellions have a habit

of expanding if not tamped down quickly, but Britain was frac-

tured as well. The Whigs in Parliament at least sympathized and,

in some cases, openly sided with the colonies. The Tory major-

ity held together, but their power was by no means absolute.

Howe therefore aimed to crush the rebellion in a single stroke.

New York, the largest city (25,000) and busiest port in North

America, was the key to this plan. Invoking another British

strength, the mobility supplied by the Royal Navy, he would

The Delaware Regiment at the Battle of Long Island (27 August

1776). Delaware consisted of three sparsely populated counties

on the Chesapeake peninsula. They had long been associated with

Pennsylvania but were effectively autonomous by the outbreak

of war, and would achieve statehood in 1776. The state never

contributed more than a single regiment to the Continental Army

at any one time, at one time just two companies strong, but its

ranks included Robert Kirkwood, “the American Cincinnatus.”


27

STQ9_V7.indd 27STQ9_V7.indd 27

1/14/20 6:36 PM1/14/20 6:36 PM

U S SR

U S SR

Marshes

Bug

Dnepr

NNNiemen

Don

DDnep

rrroz

h

Seiimimi

De

sna

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Oskol

Psel

1 Mar

Kiev

Brest

Bialystok

VilniusKaunasKaunas

Grodno

Tilsit

Kursk

Voronezh

OrshaOrsha

Lublin

Gomel

Roslavl

Konotop

Konotop

OrelBryansk

Bryansk

Chernigov

Chernigov

RovnoKovel

Cherkassy

Vinnitsainnitsa

Zhitomir

Pinsk

IzyumPoltava

Belgorod

Mosyr

Mogilev

Rogachev

Przemysl

Przemysl

Fastov

Yelets

Glukhov

Glukhov

Sumy

RadomRadom

Korosten

Livny

Suwalki

Suwalki

Suwalki

Dubno

Lubny

Romny

Minsk

Kharkov

Millerovo

Kalach

Rossosh

Krasnograd

Kupyansk

Stary Oskol

Oboyan

Borisov

Stanislau

Kremenchug

Kremenchug

Kremenchug

Novy Oskol

Lvov Ternopol

ernopol

ernopol

ernopol

ernopol

ernopol

ernopol

ernopol

Ternopol

TProsku

rovProsku

rov

Bobruysk

PrPrP irir pipiyet

Berezinini aa

Pripyet

Kamenets

Kamenets

-Podolsky

-Podolsky

2 Ukranian

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Center

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1

1 Byelorussi

anXXXXX

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104

9

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1 Ukranian

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4

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4027

NorthXXXXXXXXXXX

most of his re

ar-area perso

nnel, the vita

l

logistic infra

structure of th

e army, south

across the Dn

iestr to clear h

is battle area

.

Hube had pl

anned to foll

ow suit

with his fight

ing units onc

e he was

given permiss

ion to withdr

aw. Zhukov

thought it the

likely route a

s well and

weighted his

perimeter gu

ard accord-

ingly. Manstei

n had other i

deas. A

southerly retr

eat would tak

e 1.PzA too

to cross four

rivers along

its route. Sov

iet

resistance fo

rtunately wa

s weak, thoug

h

Zhukov quic

kly made adj

ustments to

bring addition

al forces to b

ear on either

German flank

. Like Stemm

ermann’s

“wandering p

ocket” but on

a much

larger scale,

1.PzA made

its way west.

resistance fo

rtunately wa

s weak, thoug

h

Zhukov quic

kly made adj

ustments to

bring addition

al forces to b

ear on either

German flank

. Like Stemm

ermann’s

“wandering p

ocket” but on

a much

larger scale,

1.PzA made

its way west.

ated allied a

rmies, just no

w returning

to action afte

r a year’s reb

uilding.

The reorgani

zation had n

o impact

on the escap

e of 1.PzA. Fir

st contact wa

s







63

to action afte

r a year’s reb

uilding.

The reorgani

zation had n

o impact

on the escap

e of 1.PzA. Fir

st contact wa

s

made with H

ausser on 6 A

pril, and all

the army’s div

isions made

it out of the

pocket over

the course o

f three days.

All

were intact,

but only a ha

ndful remain

ed

operational.

Most of Hube

’s tanks and

other heavy e

quipment ha

d been lost,

along with a

s many as 45

,000 men

(reports vary

). Several div

isions would

be disbanded

, several othe

rs reduced

(battlegroup)

status,

and most of t

he rest were s

hadows.

Hube’s army

was neverth

eless

pressed back

into service, h

is divisions

performing a

n about-face

to man the

new front. H

ausser and H

ube’s stronge

st

units made an

other drive to

Ternopol.

As had happe

ned at both S

talingrad and

Cherkassy, t

he relief effo

rt fell short an

d

the garrison

was called on

to breakout.

Times that Try Times that Try Times that Try Men’s Souls Men’s Souls

“I am worried to death.

Men’s Souls OMLMarch 1776 to January 1777March 1776 to January 1777


12

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

62

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#10 | SU

MMER 2020

German Evacua

tion

of Crimea

ROMANIA

Cr imea

Carprpr athian MMttnnss

B L A CK S E A

Sea of Azov

Bessarabia

Bessarabia

KuKuKba

Bug

Danu

be

Prut

Mi

Mi

Muiui s

Dnepr

Siriri et

12 May

GalatiGalatiGalati

Krasnodar

Krasnodar

Rostov

Sevastopol

Sevastopol

Sevastopol

Yalta

KerchKerch

Dnepropetrovs

kDnepro

petrovsk

OdessaOdessa

Kherson

Kherson

Kherson

Nikopol

Nikopol

Nikopol

Nikopol

Nikopol

Kirovograd

Uman

Mariupol

Mariupol

Mariupol

Mariupol

Mariupol

Perekop

Perekop

Perekop

Perekop

Perekop

Perekop

TTaganrog

aganrog

Taganrog

TTaganrog

T

Stalino

Krivoi Rog

Nikolayev

Nikolayev

Nikolayev

Nikolayev

Nikolayev

Tighina

Bacau

VVoroshilovgradoroshilo

vgrad

Feodosia

Feodosia

Feodosia

Feodosia

Balta

IasiIasiIasiKishine

vKishine

vKishine

vKishine

v

BUCHAREST

Ploesti

Constanta

RomanRoman

Novocherkassk

Melitopol

Tuapse

Stanislau

Balti

Simferopol

Simferopol

Simferopol

Simferopol

Simferopol

TTiraspoliraspoliraspoliraspol

Razdelnya

Razdelnya

Razdelnya

Razdelnya

Razdelnya

Razdelnya

Razdelnya

TashlykTashlykTashlykTashlykTashlykTashlykTashlyk

Slavyansk

Slavyansk

Cernoutsy

Cernoutsy

Cernoutsy

Novorossysk

Novorossysk

Yevpatoriaevpatoria

Zaporozhye

Dnest r

Donbas

-Podolsky

-Podolsky

-Podolsky

-Podolsky

8

South

Ukraine

XXXXX

3

4 Ukranian

XXXXXX

51

9

18

56

3 Ukranian

17

6 2G

5S

7G

46

4G 53

Coastal

57

37

8G

6

North

Ukraine

4

1

Miles

200

12

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

“Take up the w

eapons

of the glorious

army

for the salvatio

n of

many thousands

”–Adela

of Normandy

12

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

STQ7_V7.indd

12

7/16/19 11:29

AM

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

13

Caucasus Mtns

ban

DDoon

Rostov

Armavir

oroshilovgrad

Novocherkassk

Maikop

Kropotkin

Donetstst

MilesMiles

200

southerly retr

eat would tak

e 1.PzA too

far south, lea

ving only 4.P

zA to guard

his main dep

ot at Lvov. H

e preferred

a westerly ro

ute, driving t

hrough the

weak wall of t

he Soviet per

imeter to

join 4.PzA’s l

ine south of T

ernopol.

Manstein me

t with Hitler

on 25

larger scale,

1.PzA made

its way west.

Hausser’s SS

arriving beyo

nd Ternopol,

though

it would be m

any days befo

re it was

fully assemb

led. Moving

east, it too

made slow b

ut steady pro

gress against

scattered Sov

iet resistance

and harsh

larger scale,

1.PzA made

its way west.

Hausser’s SS

Panzerkorps

was already

Panzerkorps

was already

Panzerkorps

arriving beyo

nd Ternopol,

though

it would be m

any days befo

re it was

fully assemb

led. Moving

east, it too

made slow b

ut steady pro

gress against

scattered Sov

iet resistance

and harsh

on the escap

e of 1.PzA. Fir

st contact wa

s

made with H

ausser on 6 A

pril, and all

the army’s div

isions made

it out of the

pocket over

the course o

f three days.

All on the esca

pe of 1.PzA. F

irst contact w

as

made with H

ausser on 6 A

pril, and all

the army’s div

isions made

it out of the

pocket over

the course o

f three days.

All

were intact,

but only a ha

ndful remain

ed

operational.

Most of Hube

’s tanks and

other heavy e

quipment ha

d been lost,

along with a

s many as 45

,000 men

(reports vary

). Several div

isions would

be disbanded

, several othe

rs reduced

Kampfgrupp

e (battlegrou

p) status,

Kampfgrupp

e (battlegrou

p) status,

Kampfgrupp

e

and most of t

he rest were s

hadows.

Hube’s army

was neverth

eless

pressed back

into service, h

is divisions

performing a

n about-face

to man the

new front. H

ausser and H

ube’s stronge

st

units made an

other drive to

Ternopol.

As had happe

ned at both S

talingrad and

Cherkassy, t

he relief effo

rt fell short an

d

the garrison

was called on

to breakout.

“I am worried to death. I think the game is pretty near up.’’—Gen. George Washington, in a letter to his brother following the Continental Army’s defeat in New York

the garrison

was called on

to breakout.

Times that Try Times that Try Times that Try Men’s Souls Men’s Souls OMLMarch 1776 to January 1777

March 1776 to January 1777“I am worried to death. I think the game is pretty near up.’’—Gen. George Washington, in a letter to his brother

following the Continental Army’s defeat in New York

Men’s Souls OMLMarch 1776 to January 1777

26



ba

Rostov

oroshilovgrad

Novocherkassk

Miles

200

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

#07 | FAL

L 2019

13

owns of the

eleventh cen

tury generally

created little

wealth. With

exceptions lik

e

the fabulousl

y rich weaving

towns of

Flanders, “ind

ustry” was h

ighly localize

d

to support w

idespread ag

riculture, the

artisans living

alongside th

eir peasant

neighbors in

hamlets dott

ing the landsc

ape.

Larger popul

ation centers

drew susten

ance from the

sur-

rounding co

untryside. Ri

ches came fr

om the agricu

ltural

surplus—dra

wn as taxes o

r rents—and

from imposts o

n

trade passing

through. Larg

e sea or river

ports could e

ffec-

tively extend

their tax base

over the trad

e of entire reg

ions.

The real imp

ortance of to

wns was the

role they play

ed in

society and cu

lture, drawing

the landown

ing class into

the

more sophist

icated urban

life, and abov

e all as center

s of

government a

nd religion, t

he latter two

often conjoi

ned.

Nations, usin

g the term in

its modern fo

rmulation,

did not yet e

xist. Polities, b

y whatever n

ame they wer

e

known—king

dom, principa

lity, duchy, co

unty, electora

te—

belonged to t

heir rulers re

gardless of la

nguage, bloo

d, or,

in some case

s, religion. W

ar and marria

ge might tran

sfer

this or that to

wn, with its a

ssociated hin

terland, betw

een

rulers, but lif

e for the aver

age person c

hanged not a

t all.

In this world

some places

counted mo

re than others

.

As towns dom

inated their d

istricts, some

towns domin

ated

others. That p

ower—somet

imes political

, sometimes

commercial,

sometimes r

eligious, occa

sionally all

three—would

enable a tow

n to grow, at

some point

earning the t

itle “city” (th

ough in Euro

pe at least, th

e term

technically re

ferred to a to

wn with a co

nsecrated cat

hedral).

The cities des

cribed here w

ere such plac

es. Their stori

es

were mirrored

in those of t

he empires t

hat came and

went around

them, and w

ent far towar

d describing

the

Mediterranea

n world at th

e end of the

first millenni

um.

Jerusalem

The Levant is

located at th

e nexus of th

ree

continents—

Asia, Africa, a

nd Europe—

and acts as a

crossroads f

or trade betw

een them. Je

rusalem was

not one of its

great comm

ercial entrep

ôts, being

located in th

e Judean Hil

ls dividing t

he coastal pl

ain

from the val

ley of the Ri

ver Jordan.

It was of som

e

local import

ance, thoug

h, occupying

the junction

of

the north-so

uth “Ridge R

oute” runnin

g the length

of

the mounta

ins, and an e

ast-west rou

te connectin

g the

port of Jaffa

(Haifa) with

Jericho on t

he Jordan. T

he

path from th

e coast asce

nded the val

ley of the Ri

ver

Sorek, one o

f the easier r

outes across

the mounta

ins.

The site of J

erusalem ha

s signs of pr

e-Bronze

Age habitati

on, probably

because the

Gihon Sprin

g

provided a d

ependable w

ater supply in

an arid regi

on.

By around 20

00 BC it had

become a Ca

naanite city,

and within a

few centuri

es of that tim

e had acquir

ed

a defensive

wall. It fell u

nder the sw

ay of Egypt a

nd

March and d

emanded—ta

ct was never

terrain

. Some units

were detache

d to

terrain. Some

units were d

etached to

along with a

s many as 45

,000 men

(reports vary

). Several div

isions would

be disbanded

, several othe

rs reduced

Kampfgrupp

e

and most of t

he rest were s

hadows.

Hube’s army

was neverth

eless

pressed back

into service, h

is divisions

performing a

n about-face

to man the

new front. H

ausser and H

ube’s stronge

st

units made an

other drive to

Ternopol.

As had happe

ned at both S

talingrad and

Cherkassy, t

he relief effo

rt fell short an

d

the garrison

was called on

to breakout.

the garrison

was called on

to breakout.



Men’s Souls View of the To

wer of David

—Jerusalem

Citadel—nea

r the Jaffa G

ate on the w

estern

edge of the o

ld city of Jer

usalem.

T

STRATEGY &

TACTICS Q

UARTERLY

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L 2019

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