Research Papers N° 17

European  Post  Graduate  School  of  International  &  Development  Studies  

Implementing the United Nation's "New Horizon"

for Peacekeeping

Jeremy Drage

 

2011  

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Master of Arts in International Politics

CERIS

Implementing the United Nation’s

‘New Horizon’ for Peacekeeping

Identifying the Potential Roles for UK in Assisting UN to Improve the

Effectiveness of Current and Future Peacekeeping Missions, with

Particular Reference to those Conducted in Partnership with the

African Union

by

Jeremy Drage

Academic Supervisor: Ambassador Doctor Willy Stevens

June 2011

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ABSTRACT The scale of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping (PK) is as large as it has ever been

in both cost and numbers terms. Twenty-First Century PK faces increasingly

complex political, social and technical environments, the glare of the media and

insistent public opinion that “something must be done” to add to the traditional

demands of geography, multinationality and finance. The UN is attempting to adapt

to these challenges and recognises (and needs) the involvement of other

international and regional players, such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the African Union (AU); the latter is trying (but

struggling) to fulfil its vision of providing African solutions to African problems. The

2000 ‘Brahimi’ Report was an important milestone for UN, but its recommendations

have not been carried through fully. The 2009 ‘New Horizon’ Report by the

Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS)

endeavoured to rectify these shortfalls. The UK has both a responsibility and a

desire to act as a ‘force for good’ in PK and has various political, diplomatic,

economic and military levers available through its membership of the UN Security

Council (UNSC), the EU, the Commonwealth and NATO as well as bilaterally,

particularly in Africa, where so much PK effort is concentrated.

The aim of this thesis is to identify the levers available to UK to improve UN and AU

PK capability, particularly those supporting implementation of DPKO/DFS’s ‘New

Horizon’ Report, and to improve institutional processes between the UN and AU.

Research at UN HQ, AU HQ and in field missions found general agreement within

UN that UK was a ‘force for good’ and that it was viewed positively by the AU; it

uses its Permanent 5 (P5) status well, encourages others, joins ‘Friends of…’

groups, has flexible thinking and giving, and strives for coordination and

improvement. The thesis’ investigations span British Government Departments and

cover British activity at the HQs of UN and AU and in the regions and countries

affected. The thesis has found pragmatism in the aspirations for additional UK

support.

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The thesis’ key finding is the need for a new Ministry of Defence (MOD) policy on

UN, and more broadly on PK. This policy should be produced in harmony with

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International

Development (DfID) and reflect the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)

work, where the UK’s emerging so-called “prevent agenda” of pre-emption rather

than reaction fits well with the developing UN view of putting more resources into

conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution and traditional PK. The policy

should cover: intent, roles of soft power, regional and organisational priorities,

staffing and responses to the unexpected. It should also identify the most effective

ways for UK to increase the capacity and capability of global PK and how to

improve the effectiveness of the delivery of training and support in the field, as this

could be MOD’s most effective contribution.

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CONTENTS

Page Heading

ii Abstract

1 Introduction

2 The Current Situation with UN and AU

8 The British Government, UN and AU

15 The UN System

22 The AU System

27 Case Studies

28 Conclusions and Key Finding

Annexes:

A. New Horizon Recommendations.

B. UN-UK Relations - UNMIS Case Study.

C. UN-AU-UK Relations – Darfur Case Study.

D. UN-AU-UK Relations – Somalia Case Study.

E. List of Abbreviations.

F. Bibliography.

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INTRODUCTION

“There are no quick fixes for holding and sustaining peace. National actors face

enormous political, security and development challenges after conflict. But if the

international community, led by the United Nations system, is ready to respond

rapidly, coherently and effectively, we can help to give national actors a greater

chance of sustaining peace and laying the foundations for sustainable

development. All too often it is innocent men, women and children who pay the

price of war. We cannot ask them to pay the price of peace.”

UN Secretary General1

BACKGROUND

UN Peacekeeping (PK) is a global operation - over 122,000 military, police and

civilian UN Peacekeepers are currently deployed in 15 PK operations across the

world. The UN also provides key support to the mediation and prevention of

conflict and peace building efforts. However, the UN works increasingly alongside

regional actors to deliver regional peace and security. The UN ‘New Horizon’

Report2 by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the

Department of Field Support (DFS) recognises the significant role that partners play

in delivering national, regional and ultimately international peace and security.

Regional organisations, such as the EU and NATO, already play an important role

in delivering UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and operate or have

operated alongside the UN in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

and Chad, for example.

A developing strategic relationship is that between the UN and the African Union

(AU). In terms of scale, the UN is, and will be for some time, the largest provider of

peacekeepers on the African continent. However, in complex environments, such

as Darfur and Somalia, the AU is working alongside the UN, though not always with

1 UN Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881–S/2009/304, 11 Jun 09. 2 A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, New York, July 2009.

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the success the international community expects. This relationship will continue to

grow and develop as the AU, often in conjunction with the UN, delivers conflict

prevention, mediation, PK and peace building activities. At a UNSC debate3 on co-

operation between UN and regional organisations, Mark Lyall Grant, the UK

Permanent Representative to the UN, stated that the “partnership between the

United Nations and the African Union was of vital strategic importance and should

be enhanced.”

SCOPE

The overall scope of this thesis is broad, encompassing the full spectrum of

relations between UK, UN and AU. The research will focus on these relationships

specifically relating to PK in Africa, with emphasis on the identification of areas of

improvement within British Government and on areas where UK leverage can or

will enhance the effectiveness of the PK effort. Analysis of the UN’s effectiveness

in PK in partnership in Africa will help consider where improvements can be made

both in the field and in HQ, and identify areas where investment of time, effort and

resources by UK could be best placed.

AIM

The aim of the thesis is to identify the levers available to UK to improve UN and AU

PK capability, particularly those supporting implementation of DPKO’s ‘New

Horizon’ Report and improving institutional processes between the UN and AU.

THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH UN AND AU

THE UN TODAY “As practice has evolved, each part of the United Nations system has developed its

own set of external partners and stakeholders. This becomes a complicating factor

for unity of purpose and action on the ground. Various parts of the United Nations 3 UN Security Council Debate ‘Co-operation between UN and Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Maintaining International Peace and Security’, 13 January 2010.

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are very rightly linked to distinct international instruments, each with its own pace

and accountability. In this context, our efforts to “deliver as one” in the field are vital

but not sufficient. The fragmented nature of governance across the United Nations

system heightens the need for Member States to carry a common position into the

multiple United Nations organs dealing with peacebuilding-related issues, and to

work closely with us to better configure the Organization for a more rapid and

effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict.” (SG Report, Jun 09.)

Much has changed since the end of the Cold War with PK undergoing undulations

in terms of both scale and success. Prior to 1990, UN initiated 18 PK missions, yet

since then there have been 49 new PK missions. This period also saw the start of

involvement of NATO, AU and EU in PK. Despite high profile failures, missions

have achieved successes in the areas of separating belligerents across cease fire

lines (e.g. southern Sudan and Lebanon), assisting with the transition of states from

war to stable governance and rule of law (e.g. Sierra Leone and the Balkans) and

ameliorating humanitarian crises (e.g. Haiti), though in most cases the problems

and solutions are multi-facetted.

The PK environment is getting more difficult – future operations are more likely to

compare with the complex political/social/geographical environments of DRC and

Sudan than the interposition model of Cyprus. Indeed there are some countries in

which bringing peace seems almost impossible, notably Somalia. Yet there

remains an expectation among the international community that “something must

be done”, based on a variety of reasons from the threat to international stability

from ungoverned space to the desire to protect civilians4.

Western nations have seemed unwilling to commit more troops to UN PK as a

result of overstretch in Iraq and Afghanistan, cost, risk or negative public opinion5.

Sub-continental and African troops make up the majority of UN PK forces. With

both the trends for scale and the complexity of PK on the rise, the pressure is on

4 Manifested in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Agenda. Following on from the momentum of R2P endorsement by the 2005 World Summit, the UNSC included a re-affirmation of R2P in Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. 5 Only 6.5% of deployed UN personnel are from “western countries” – UN Military Advisor speaking to EU Military Committee Jun 11.

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UN to meet the growing demand. For UN to do so, donor nations will have to be

willing to work cooperatively to produce practical mandates through the UNSC,

provide the requisite funds and personnel and relieve the pressure on UN by

invigorating other organisations to take up some of the strain. The UN Secretariat

will need to develop the managerial and logistic structures necessary to sustain

parallel missions of greater organisational and task complexity6.

The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations7, better known

as the ‘Brahimi Report’, was the UN’s significant attempt to realign itself for the

challenges posed by PK in the 21st Century. A report8 by the Center on

International Cooperation (CIC) captures progress to date: “The UN Secretariat has

made progress on meeting that Report’s recommendations, but still has a great

deal of unfinished business, especially in the areas of procurement and human

resources, information technology (IT) (where the Brahimi recommendations need

updating) and command and control. Meanwhile, the Security Council and Member

States also made great headway in implementing the Report’s vision after its

release, but recent decisions have fallen short of the political and strategic

approach to peacekeeping advocated by Brahimi….. There are growing tensions

over decision-making around peacekeeping that risk creating mistrust between

troop contributors, members of the Security Council and the UN Secretariat.

Ironically, all three sides are motivated by concerns over control of operations. The

Secretariat and troop contributors are wary of micro-management of operations by

the Security Council, while the Council and some troop contributors question the

efficacy of the UN command and control. These tensions come into focus in the

2008 crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in which all sides

blamed each other for the UN’s slow and ineffectual response.”

It is worth noting: that the provision of forces is heavily concentrated in a small

number of countries; there is a general shortage of modern equipment and

6 It should be noted that at the time of writing, the Chad Mission (MINURCAT) has recently closed, the Congo Mission (MONUC) has been reprieved, refocused and renamed MONUSCO and of Sudan the 2 Missions UNMIS is being revisited post-Referendum, UNAMID is under pressure and a new Mission for South Sudan is being considered. The end of the need for PK operations is certainly not imminent! 7 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 Aug 00. 8 Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty. NYU Center on International Cooperation. Apr 09.

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enablers, especially helicopters; caveats on the use of troops are on the increase;

the global financial crisis increases the pressure on UN funding; and the complex

nature of missions and mandates puts questions on the current command and

control system of using highly independent Special Representatives of the SG

(SRSG) and Force Commanders (FC).

While challenges are always evolving, improvements within the UN would occur if

they were able to fully implement the recommendations of Brahimi. The ‘New

Horizon’ Report notes that "subsequent reform initiatives have maintained the

momentum for improvement and for adapting UN PK to changes in the strategic

environment.” CIC is more circumspect and notes that, after a slow start,

significant elements of the Brahimi agenda were adopted between 2000 and 2005.

However, the growth in operations coincided with more divisive politics at the UN

after the start of the war in Iraq, which slowed the momentum for change. Efforts to

develop ‘integrated missions’, where all elements of the UN should cooperate in

PK, have been frustrated on the ground. More recent reform efforts, such as the

“Peace Operations 20109” agenda (2005) and the fundamental reorganization of PK

machinery launched by the SG in 200710, have yielded some initial benefits. The

problems are compounded by the perception that the UNSC has also forgotten

Brahimi’s guidance to match politics to PK and resources to mandates, resulting in

a negative attitude among UN staff towards the mandates they receive. The African

Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a hybrid mission with the AU,

demonstrates many of these problems: large and austere geography, complicated

and fragmented ‘players’, no clear peace to keep, under-resourcing of the military

(numbers, equipment and experience), significant humanitarian pressure,

international expectation, complicated command and control, limited host

government consent and interference by external events.11

9 Peace Operations 2010, UN DPKO, 2005. 10 Report of the Secretary General on Strengthening of the Capacity of the Organization on Peacekeeping Operations, UN, 2007. 11 Such as the indictment of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

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UN ‘NEW HORIZON’ REPORT

The ‘New Horizon’ Report aims to build on Brahimi at a time when there are over 5

times as many peacekeepers in the field as there were at the time of his writing.

The Report lays out the challenges faced by DPKO and DFS in response to likely

demands for PK and recognises the complications of the global financial crisis,

environmental change and international organised crime: “Success in coping with

these strains and meeting future demand requires a new way of doing business.

UN PK must be ready to act in ways that are more flexible, effective and efficient.

Piecemeal approaches are not an option. A global approach is required.” This is a

brave vision, but will be no more than rhetoric unless the string of internal and

external recommendations, aiming at partnership in purpose and action are

executed. A summary of the key strands of the Report are at Annex A. The EU

has responded positively to the report12, making recommendations that are now

being taken forward in the UN-EU Steering Committee. The UN Military Advisor

(MilAd) pressed the EU in Jun 11 to support its implementation, notably in terms of

training support and over-the-horizon reserves.

THE AU TODAY

In 2009, Africa contributed around 40% of the 65,000 PK troops on the continent

and around 30,000 globally, but there are significant imbalances. Just 12 states

provided 85% of these troops, and the availability of enablers is very low: only 3 of

the 26 engineering units deployed with the UN are African and 5 of 177

helicopters13. African states have a much greater concern about external threats

and internal stability than do most European or American nations, for example;

often, the commitment or not of troops to PK is a response to one or more such

threats. The contribution of finance or equipment by donors enhances the

likelihood of their participation14.

12 EU Delegation to UN EUNY/16, 3 Mar 10. 13 Figures from CIC Report, Apr 09. 14 Victor, Journal of Peace Research, Vol 47, No 2, Mar 10.

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The AU is a relatively new body, emerging from the Organisation of African Unity

(OAU) in 2002. It has many flaws, yet its achievement of attempting to take a

strategic view of pan-continental issues cannot be overlooked, and it needs to be

encouraged by those willing and able to do so. AU has had the advantage of being

able to look at UN and EU as possible models and has received support from both

organisations as well as from donor states, notably UK. Regional Economic

Communities (RECs) cover Africa in a complex way, with some nations belonging

to more than one. These often pre-date the AU, and although they vary in strength

and scope15, they can be either competitors to AU authority or a complementary

tier, dependent on the degree of cooperation of the member states.

In 2004, AU launched its Peace and Security Council (PSC), marking a change of

policy from the OAU’s position of PK in Africa being primarily the UN’s responsibility

to one of Africa taking responsibility for Africa’s problems16 and significantly this led

to a position where intervention in the name of peace was agreed as a possible AU

option by the member states, with 6 scenarios identified for the embryonic African

Standby Force (ASF)17 from military advice to full intervention. Since inception, it

has imposed sanctions on member states (including Togo, Mauretania and

Madagascar) and authorised PK operations in Sudan, the Comoros and Somalia.

A fuller explanation of the evolution of the AU is in Okumu (2009)18 and of the PSC

in Williams (2009)19.

The PSC takes its place in the AU structure alongside the AU Commission and

Council and is composed of the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning

System, the ASF and a Special Fund. However, the reality is that member states

do not fully support the AU or the PSC with appropriate funding, diplomatic talent or 15 The strongest and most active in PK being the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The presence of a regional hegemon tends to strengthen the REC – Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in Southern African Development Community (SADC). 16 Though after some debate, in 2005, the AU did accept that UNSC did retain primacy, noting that it will seek UNSC authorisation of its enforcement actions. (AU 2005a: 5) The same roadmap stated that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) will seek AU authority for their interventions. 17 The ASF was to comprise a standby brigade in each of the 5 regions: North, South, East, West and Centre. Note the mismatch between the ASF regions and the distribution of the RECs. For example, the East African Standby Brigade covers three RECS (IGAD, COMESA and EAC). 18 W Okumu. The African Union: Pitfalls and Prospects for Uniting Africa. Journal of International Affairs, Vol 62, No 2, Spring/Summer 2009. 19 P D Williams. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution, The Journal of Modern African studies, Vol 47, Issue 04, Dec 09.

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troop contributions…”African states have not provided the PSC with enough funds

to fully equip the Commission in Addis Ababa, let alone active peace operations in

the field.” (Williams 2009). While there are capable and willing personnel in many

top jobs, the layers of quality and quantity are both very thin. This affects

significantly the effectiveness of the organisation and it means that noteworthy

additional effort is needed from both member states and international supporters to

transform the AU into a PK organisation able to act independently beyond merely

the bottom end of the PK spectrum. There is significant scope for UK leverage,

which will be explored below.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THE UN AND THE AU THE FCO

Relations with the UN and AU are managed jointly by the PK Team and the

geographical Regional Teams. General financial support to PK is through the PK

Budget (c£450M), which funds all PK contributions to UN, OSCE and EU. FCO

and DfID cooperate in the Sudan Unit. With so few military staff committed to the

UN, UK comes under pressure from larger troop contributing countries (TCCs) over

the influential positions that it holds20. One counter argument is that as a P5

member “we pay, so we don’t play”, but with UK lobbying to reduce the expenditure

on field missions, this argument could weaken. There is no doubt that UK’s

influence in both UN and AU is very strong. This is most evident in the respective

HQs and results from P5 status and financial clout rather than presence. However,

this influence is felt much less on the ground due to paucity of numbers, despite the

quality and disproportionate influence of those in post.

UK is in an envious position with both UN and AU in that it has engagement routes

as a P5 member, as a UN member state with significant links with many African

countries, and through its membership of the EU. The EU is raising its involvement

profile in Africa and is becoming an increasingly influential player in New York. The

multi-strand approach to influence in PK is of significant benefit to UK leverage with 20 Including Deputy Force Commander (DFC) and Military Assistant to FC in MONUSCO, Chief of Staff (COS) and Lieutenant Colonel Operations in UNMIS and COS in UNFICYP.

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UN and AU. UK should continue to retain its independence rather than being

drawn solely into acting through the EU; this is likely as the coalition government

retains a degree of Euro-scepticism, evidenced by the Foreign Secretary’s

comments on the consular role of the European External Action Service21.

FCO is committed to the support for the AU, both financially and through selective

placement of staff. It is well known that AU HQ is a hollow organisation, lacking

both numbers and quality below the leadership. There is far too much

centralisation – partly for this reason and partly for cultural reasons. It is important

that the British Government recognises the tiers of engagement in Africa: AU,

RECs and member states, with appropriate involvement and support at each level

in each circumstance. There is no ‘one-size fits all’ solution. The UK Mission in

New York is endeavouring to improve relations between the UNSC and the AU’s

PSC and the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat. There is scope in Addis

Ababa to guide UN in refining its many elements working alongside AU22.

Therefore, the UK’s AU Strategy should recognise the tiers of engagement, monitor

their relative effectiveness and adjust, in a smooth manner, the degree of support

for and engagement with each tier.

THE MOD

“There seems to be a lack of knowledge of the UN in MOD.” MOD officer

Despite the importance of the UN in world peace and security, notably in the post-

Cold War era, there has been a lack of a clear MOD policy on the UN. Given the

very small, in real and proportional terms, numbers of MOD personnel involved in

UN PK missions23 and the dominating involvement with NATO’s peace and stability

operation in Afghanistan, this is perhaps not surprising. However, the UN is the

predominant PK organisation in the world and the authority of the UNSC for any

intervention is paramount, even if not essential under International Law. The NATO

operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the coalition operation in Iraq have 21 The Times, 24 May 11. 22 Discussions with FCO staff, May 11. 23 The numbers vary but are less than 10 staff, plus the commitment to UNFICYP in Cyprus.

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demonstrated the relationships between governments, coalitions, alliances and

UNSC Resolutions24. The question of whether UN involvement in PK will remain at

its current high level or whether it will begin to decline as inter-nation conflicts

reduce, funds become more scarce and other organisations become more

competent and/or willing to take the lead is moot. As MOD’s commitment in

Afghanistan draws closer to its end, it is worth MOD considering the role it would

wish to play with the UN if it had greater freedom of action.

Responsibility for the UN within MOD resides on a C2 grade desk within the

department with the prime responsibility for Arms Control and Proliferation (ACP).

The Assistant Head (Colonel) level officer covers Conventional Arms Control,

International Humanitarian Law, OSCE and UN Policy, which is one of 5 pillars

under the 1* Head of ACP. Officers are posted to the few agreed, established UN

posts in UNHQ and field missions with other requests being considered on a case-

by-case basis. In the current operational environment, they receive low priority.

The operations and regions with UK personnel involved are monitored by

Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ), though the operation in Afghanistan (and until

recently Iraq) is so dominant that there is little horsepower left for attention to UN

operations.

The MOD has to determine what emphasis to place on PK (other than through

NATO and the EU) and more specifically where to target its resources and

influence25. It is a conundrum as to whether there is a lack of focus in MOD on UN

and PK because there is no policy, or whether there is no policy because there has

been limited focus on the UN and PK. It is easy to be convinced that the small

numbers of UK posts in UN means little UK impact, but the influence exerted by

these “few good men (or women)” is disproportionate, and therefore the addition of

a few more would expand on this disproportionate benefit. A defined MOD policy

would aid cross-Government activity, over Somalia for example. Also, the recent

decision to remove the Training Team from West Africa to concentrate on East

24 See NATO Defense College Committee 4. “Will NATO ever again throw the first punch?” Unpublished. Jan 10. 25 The continued UK presence in UNFICYP cannot be guaranteed. The implications of a withdrawal from this task need to be considered in the wider ‘UK influence in PK’ role.

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Africa may have been necessary financially, but the negative implications in terms

of British image and influence in that region may well outweigh the savings.

All this points to the need for a new MOD policy on UN, and more broadly on PK,

(as will be seen from the comments on AU below). This policy should be produced

in harmony with FCO and DfID and in line with the new Strategic Defence and

Security Review (SDSR), where the UK’s emerging so-called “prevent agenda” of

pre-emption rather than reaction fits well with the developing UN view of putting

more resources into conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution and traditional

PK. It should cover: intent, roles of soft power, regional and organisational

priorities, staffing (including Defence Diplomacy, secondments and operations staff)

and responses to the unexpected. It should also identify the most effective way to

increase the capacity and capability of global PK and how to improve the

effectiveness of the delivery of training and support in the field as this could be

MOD’s most effective contribution.

There is no articulated MOD policy on the AU either. This is probably reasonable,

given the AU’s embryonic state and the recent emergence of a tri-Department UK

policy paper. However, the growing interrelationship between the AU and the UN in

Africa indicates that the proposed MOD policy on UN should incorporate a stance

on relations with AU.

The small numbers of UK military staff in UN posts has another impact above the

thinly spread talent and influence – it generates only a small pool of officers with

UN experience when it comes to competing for more senior posts. Thus, a larger

number – which would not have to be huge – would be a benefit for both UN

efficiency and UK leverage. The Policy should include targets for UK placements in

senior posts and identify the number of more junior staff posts that need to be filled

to generate the weight of argument for more posts as well as creating the pool of

suitable officers26. It is recognised that the pressure from operations in Afghanistan

will make change difficult; however, the Policy should establish contribution to PK

26 It should also consider the relative merits of 6, 9 and 12 month tours. UN is pressing Western nations to extend the length of their tours, which are mostly 6 months. Longer tours benefit the UN, should be easier for the Service Personnel offices and will suit some officers. However, they do reduce the number of officers gaining UN experience.

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operations in the list of Military Tasks, with a priority, which will then stand

contribution to PK in good stead as and when the pressure from Afghanistan

eases27. Permanent Training Teams exert significant UK influence and

demonstrate lasting intent, but they are expensive and consume military liability.

Thus they should be placed where their impact is greatest and in line with priorities

for influence/effect. Short Term Training Teams (STTTs) can be generated at

relatively short notice, be funded by non-MOD money28, have low/no infrastructure

requirements yet respond to requests or identified needs/opportunities, show UK

military presence in unusual locations and are often enjoyable for the participants.

The Policy should encourage greater use of STTTs, where operational pressures

allow, and lay down the guidelines for coordinating this training support with other

international donors29.

The placement of Defence attachés (DA) under the Defence Diplomacy programme

is inextricably linked with the subject of this thesis. The requirements of ‘soft power’

mean that the proposed MOD Policy on PK should both link with and influence the

process of determining locations and grades of DAs. A recent example shows that

this may not be as joined up as it might be: Sudan hosts 2 of the largest UN PK

missions, yet the DA post has been downgraded from Colonel to Lieutenant

Colonel. In the status-conscious Sudan and UN, this indicates a reduced

involvement by HMG and will make it more difficult for the current incumbent to

have influence30. By way of positive contrast, the upgrading of the post in Kenya to

Brigadier reflects the focus of UK interest in eastern Africa, as well as the significant

British military presence there.

DfID

DfID cooperates well with FCO and MOD over allocation of the Conflict Fund,

particularly in Africa through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) Fund.

However, its primary interest is on peacebuilding rather than PK. The DfID White 27 The UK appetite for involvement in another ‘Afghanistan or Iraq’ will be low for some time. Committal to PK could be seen as a lower risk option for British forces, while they recuperate. 28 See remarks on Africa Conflict Prevention Pool below. 29 Such as the cooperative work being set up by DA Khartoum. 30 In the author’s view this should have waited until the closure of the 2 PK Missions. See further comment in Annex C.

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Paper ‘Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future’31  notes  that  

international action has been successful in stopping wars. Since 1946 fewer than

6% of conflicts ending in a peace agreement have returned to conflict within 5

years, but the conflicts that remain have become more entrenched – half of current

conflicts are deemed intractable, having continued for more than 20 years, so it is

committed to consider commitments to peace and security as part of its

development partnerships. The White Paper states that UK wants to improve the

way the international community works in 5 main ways:

• Strengthen international PK.

• Strengthen UN’s work on post-conflict recovery, including UN Peacebuilding

Commission and Peacebuilding Fund, to which funding will be increased if

efficiency improves.

• UK will press the UN, World Bank and EU to agree and implement clear

roles and responsibilities in post-conflict recovery work.

• UK will press the EU for a stronger, more coherent effort in fragile and post-

conflict countries.

• UK will continue to promote a shared understanding of the R2P.

All of these ways were raised during this thesis’ research as areas where UK could

have more effect, so the White Paper has clearly identified appropriate areas for

UK effort. The British Government should press ahead with the implementation of

the ‘Eliminating World Poverty’ White Paper across the 3 Departments, including

tying in to the MOD PK Policy.

DfID welcomes the move within ‘New Horizon’ to better link PK and peacebuilding

and supports the reform of the international peacebuilding architecture. It is

pressing UN to generate a greater civilian response capability, to achieve better

integration between UN elements in the field and is committed to improving AU’s

capability32, noting that the AU can respond faster and more cheaply, with greater

language and cultural empathy (than UN), to crises in Africa – if it has the capacity.

31 DfID, July 2009. 32 Through the ACPP, for example, HMG supported the mediation efforts of Kofi Annan under the auspices of the AU in response to the Kenyan violence in 2007.

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UK should press UN to insist on better integration in the field33, including the

production, evaluation and monitoring of mission integration strategy papers.

TRI-DEPARTMENT RELATIONS ON PK

It is clear from discussions that the 3 Departments engage and cooperate well, at

least at desk level, on PK, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict

resolution34. A strategy paper on British Government relations with the AU has

been produced and requires implementation. The ACPP (c£171M in 2010) is jointly

managed by the 3 Departments and has 4 regional programmes plus one

supporting international organisations, including AU. This Fund pays for

secondments and bi-lateral training support. It has been under severe pressure

(50% cut in 2009), resulting in tough decisions on continuation of support. The

almost complete withdrawal from West Africa was one outcome. It was commented

upon in London and in the field that the short-term financial commitment from this

Fund stymies mid-term planning of more substantial projects and leads to last-

minute committal of underspends. An example is the funding of staff posts in AU; if

funding can be guaranteed for only one year, then it is very difficult to attract staff of

the right quality in a timely manner. Once the next Comprehensive Spending

Review (CSR) is agreed, then a 3-year plan should be possible.

UK, with France, has assisted UN in implementing reforms, such as the production

of clearer mandates, better coordination with TCCs and positions on Robust PK

and Protection of Civilians (POC). Support to DPKO/DFS will continue during the

implementation phase of these reforms. This includes the implementation of ‘New

Horizon’; recommendations from which that are appropriate to member states are

listed at Annex A. Additional UK involvement comes through the tri-Department

Stabilisation Unit, whose key tasks are: assessment and planning, deployments of

experienced civilian personnel to work in insecure countries, and identifying and

sharing best practice both in the UK and internationally. UK is able to coordinate its

33 Such as ensuring effective implementation of the ‘One UN’ approach. Field research has shown that that in the Missions visited there is little commitment to this, due to disagreements over approach, protection of stovepipes and/or personality clashes. 34 Not surprisingly, the links between MOD and FCO are stronger than those with DfID.

15

own efforts with those of EU, particularly in the areas of support to UN operations,

including logistics, planning, operational standards, lessons learned and funding.

The 3 Departments will need to decide how best to respond to this challenge.

Whilst this could be done independently, ACPP could fund a workshop, facilitated

by experts from Chatham House or RUSI.

UK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

The UK is an influential member of 2 major international organisations with a role to

play in PK. Both EU and NATO work on the basis of consensus in determining

their commitment to PK operations, which means that any Member State effectively

has a veto. As one of the more ‘forward leaning’ nations in both organisations, UK

has to use its influence and diplomatic wiles to persuade reluctant nations to agree

to let action happen, even though they may not be willing participators. The recent

involvement in North Africa is a good case in point. UK and France, notably without

significant US support, managed to get Resolution 1973 through the Security

Council35. There were then convoluted negotiations in both EU’s Political and

Security Committee (PSC) and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC). There was

notable resistance to agreeing to action, even with the Resolution; the UK faced

French obfuscation, US ambivalence and initial German resistance in the NAC, but

with support managed to achieve agreement for NATO to take over the No Fly

Zone and the possible humanitarian assistance tasks from the Coalition. In the EU,

the level of ambition was lower, but again UK was able to influence less willing

nations to agree to be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance, including on

Libyan soil, on request from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(OCHA), with Operation EUFOR Libya36. UK can also use its influence in New

York to guide UN in its relations with EU and NATO.

35 UNSC/10200 dated 17 Mar 11. 36 EU Council Decision 2011/210/CFSP EUFOR Libya, 1 Apr 11.

16

THE UN SYSTEM “Everyone agrees on the need to reform the UN. But people disagree sharply on

what kind of reform is needed and for what purpose. NGO leaders aim for a more

democratic UN, with greater openness and accountability. Technocrats seek more

productivity and efficiency from the UN staff. Delegates favour reforms that

conform to national interests and promote national power. Idealists offer plans for a

great expanded body that would reduce states’ sovereignty, while conservatives

push for a downsized UN with sharply reduced powers. Agreement is exceedingly

hard to achieve.” de Benedetti, 2008

“The UN is walking well – but has forgotten its destination.” A UN Official

The complex nature of PK operations, politically, physically and economically,

makes operations where the UN chooses or has to operate in partnership with

another organisation more likely. Recent examples show that there are various

ways of achieving this:

• Integrated effort, as with AU in Darfur and OSCE in Kosovo.

• Division of effort, as with NATO in Afghanistan and EU in DRC.

• Follow-on effort, as with UN following EU in Chad, or NATO/EU following UN

in the Balkans.

CIC has identified 4 factors needing to exist between the partners for potential

success in such enterprises:

• Shared political framework.

• Shared planning mechanisms. This is probably the most important factor for

making the venture work on the ground. These first 2 points are vital to

avoid misunderstanding of intent/expectation and the potentially disastrous

(for the target country and the reputation of organisations) effect of an initial

PK deployment based on an expectation of relief/support by a partner who

fails to materialise or one that is dragged in reluctantly, unprepared and

uncommitted.

• Shared personnel, though this is much less important for follow-on

partnerships. ‘Re-hatting’ of troops can be a helpful way of smoothing the

transition.

17

• Predicable funding. Note that this does not have to be shared, but it has to

be affordable by the donor(s) and palatable for the recipient. This is

particularly pertinent for operations with the AU.

It is in these 4 areas that UK can have a positive effect, directly or through influence

activity and improving levels of understanding.

UK MISSION VIEWPOINT

The UK Mission (UKMIS) to UN HQ in NY is well-placed to observe the UN and

both report on and develop UK influence. They noted the relatively low level

(Colonel-equivalent and below) of routine engagement on UN issues within the

MOD and the need for a strategy on UN, in line with DfID and FCO. They echoed

DfID’s aim of improving deployable civilian capacity, both within UK and UN, and

note that UK should support the UN advisory group on this.

On ‘New Horizon’, it was noted that this might be a defensive report by UN to

deflect criticism about lack of success in implementing Brahimi and even to cement

the UN’s position in PK in relation to developing regional organisations, such as

AU. To prevent it becoming an end in itself, UK should build on its investment in

improving the effectiveness of the UN through the Report by insisting on the

production of an implementation plan and through regular monitoring of success

against milestones. With the report spanning DPKO and DFS, this offers the 3

Departments a wide spectrum of potential engagement and assistance, particularly

in the logistic and training support areas.

UN HQ VIEWPOINT

Political. “Only the UN offers the option of a political (sic) diverse but operationally

capable mission – but only if the P5 and other major powers invest in UN

operations.” (CIC Report, Apr 09). This thesis has found general agreement that

UK was a ‘force for good’ within UN; that it used its P5 status well, encouraged

others, joined ‘Friends of…’ groups and strived for improvement. Those suffering

from the lack of coordination within the UN wished UK to use its influence to

demand more cooperation, evidence of integration within missions and of progress

18

with the implementation of mandates. Some felt there was too much obscuration

and back-sliding by missions. Therefore, UKMIS should continue to use its good

offices to insist on reports of implementation against mission mandates and

evidence of better cooperation within the UN.

There was a feeling that the UN has not been getting the message out about its key

role in world PK. It has appreciated that President Obama has been more positive

in doing this and yet it would appreciate more from both UK and EU is this regard.

The British Government should consider its message regarding the role and value

of UN and strengthen it if appropriate.

‘New Horizon’ Report. The ‘New Horizon’ Report was raised with each

interviewee in UNHQ (DPKO and DFS) in March 2010. Some were barely aware of

it. Most acknowledged its existence. Few had positive or constructive comment on

it other than noting that it made sense and needed to be implemented, yet no-one

proposed their own part in its ownership and implementation! After UK’s

investment in the production of the Report, which most acknowledged as necessary

given the lull since Brahimi, it is evident that impetus is required from UK to

invigorate it, monitor progress and see results through implementation.

C2. The UN operates a decentralised form of Command. It is widely accepted

within the UN that the UN is so large that good coordination is often lacking, either

due to process or reluctance. Usually, it appoints a civilian SRSG with Force and

Police Commanders who work to the SRSG. DPKO and its Office of Military Affairs

(OMA) act in preparation, assistance and overwatch roles rather than as a senior

command HQ. That said it can work well, particularly in less complex environments

and critically where the selection of personnel has been got right. It is more fraught

in complex37 missions, such as the so-called ‘Integrated Mission’38, and where

missions conjoin, where actions in one affect others. In the last case, most

noticeable in east/central Africa, a more centralised command system may well be

more effective. The MilAd recognised this in 2008 and began a series of inter- 37 Politically and geographically. Also, where key posts are left gapped for long periods, reporting chains are unclear and personality clashes occur. 38 Integration between the DPKO-led PK mission and the other parts of the UN ‘family’, such as UNDP and OCHA. UNMIS is an example, on paper.

19

Mission conferences for FCs and key staff in that region. DFS is starting to support

missions on a regional basis and it was felt that there could be benefit for this

occurring at mission HQ level. UK could prompt, or even offer to fund, such

conferences, with this offering influence over attendance, location and particularly

agenda items. Also, UK could discuss with UN HQ its own experience39 with

NATO, EU and in PJHQ regarding models of HQs.

Training. The standard of training, equipment and experience of troop contingents

on deployment varies hugely, dependent on a number of factors, such as cost,

time, language and motivation. Even when contingents are well prepared, there is

seldom any training between the contingents that will make up a force. Training

once deployed may be possible, subject to the circumstances, but is far from ideal,

and when the situation is least conducive to ‘on the job’ training’ is when such

preparation is most needed! This applies to commanders, other individuals (such

as military observers (called MILOBs/UNMOs) and staff officers), as well as formed

contingents. DPKO has an Operational Advisory Team (OAT) that is responsible

for advice to TCCs on training for operational military issues40. Despite OAT,

contingents may receive little Mission-specific preparation, and therefore might

struggle with the mental as well as physical interpretation of the Mandate on the

ground. This was noticeable in UNMIS with the POC aspect of the Mandate in

2008-9.

DPKO is responsible for monitoring and if necessary enforcing training standards,

but has very little capacity for doing so, and has a reluctance to upset member

states by acting. Options include building on the US Global Peace Operations

Initiative41, partnerships with organisations with a capable military arm, such as

NATO and EU, with individual nations, through provision of training teams and /or

training centres, or brokering inter-nation partnerships for training and even

deployment and operations. While DPKO would wish to have control of the

coordination of TCC preparation, it would welcome greater UK involvement 39 or encourage NATO to take the lead if preferable to UN. 40 This can be for TCCs new to UN or for TCCs contributing to new Missions. 41 The US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a multilateral, five-year program with U.S. contributions of some $660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. Its primary purpose was to train and equip 75,000 troops, a majority of them African, for PK operations by 2010.

20

(unilaterally or in cooperation with other donors), both directly through STTTs42,

sponsored courses43, course places on UK courses and assistance with course

design and the definition and monitoring of standards (both pre-deployment44 and

in-mission), and indirectly through influencing NATO, EU and other countries to do

likewise. UKMIS should discuss with DPKO their requirements and partnership

options for specific PK preparatory courses and for assistance with the

development and monitoring of standards. Bids for training support should then be

raised in relation to the new MOD PK Policy. UKMIS should also review UK course

places available to overseas students and review them against the requirements

identified by DPKO/DFS and confirmed by the MOD PK Policy. UKMIS could also

influence other potential donors to do likewise.

It was felt by UKMIS that UK may not be capitalising on the influence available

through the overseas alumni of UK-sponsored courses. If resourced and

maintained thoroughly, such tracking could assist with the selection of returning

students and help UKMIS to be more informed in the promoting of non-UK

candidates for key posts within DPKO and missions. Each Service and some

Defence providers (such as Royal College of Defence Studies) hold a database of

students, and these should be tapped by UKMIS. It was felt by the author and

Service Staff that there was no obvious developer of a more dynamic database and

that the cost and effort in doing so was of unproven worth, so current International

Defence Training databases should be more accessible/used, but the development

of a dynamic database is unlikely to find a sponsor or be cost-effective.

Capability. Demand for military and civilian peacekeepers is growing. Most of the

basic requirements, such as infantry, are met by the traditional donor member

states. However, there are shortages of some critical capabilities, as a result of

members’ unwillingness to provide them, general shortages worldwide or host 42 See above. 43 A UN Staff Officer Course was mentioned specifically as was the training of Force Chiefs of Staff. English language is vital in most missions, yet the standards vary considerably. English language training is another area where UK could enhance the effectiveness of contributors. 44 Evaluation of contingents before deployment is sensitive. It has been done for Formed Police Units going to UNAMID, but not for TCCs. The first step is to set and agree standards. UN may not have the capacity to evaluate TCCs even if countries agree to this process. It would be an interesting test of who needs who most – the countries or the UN? Countries might see it as a step towards implementing the Robust Peacekeeping agenda, which many think is too bold, and thus resist it. UK should encourage improved readiness and capability of TCCs, while being cognisant of the sensitivities felt. UK is seen as a “robust” country and its direct involvement in evaluation will be seen as negative by some nations.

21

governments’ reluctance to see them as part of the mission. The UN’s 2009 list

included the expected items, such as strategic airlift, helicopters45, information

gathering means and engineers along with less obvious skills such as strategic

planners and female personnel. Although possessing many of these desired

capabilities, the UK’s commitments elsewhere make a significant change to its

contribution unlikely. However, UK’s expeditionary expertise makes it well suited to

assist DPKO/DFS for specific tasks in mission start-up or to cope with surge/crisis

situations46. Its current skills in combating improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

make this an area where UK expertise may be welcomed. It was widely noted that

UK officers make a real difference in UN wherever they are placed, and their value

in times of mission ‘stress’ is disproportionate. The small numbers were lamented.

MOD should be prepared to consider short-notice and specific requests for

assistance from DPKO/DFS and have the mechanisms in place to respond, utilising

those with existing UN experience, preferably as volunteers. Although potentially

disruptive for the smooth running of personnel management, there can be

significant advantages to such a response: for the UK through influence and good

will, for the MOD through the broadening of operational experience of officers, for

the UN through the provision of expertise and willingness and for the individual

through variety of opportunity and location, disproportionate responsibility,

enhanced experience and a UN profile. Contingency. The responsiveness of the UN is enhanced if contingent forces and

equipment are earmarked. This is good in principle, but nations are highly unlikely

to commit troops to deployment without first assessing the political impact (at home

and abroad), the risk, the cost and the longevity of commitment. Nonetheless, a

generic commitment of standing forces would at least provide DPKO a first port of

call. Member states may be more likely to agree to this if they felt that the UN

Secretariat had the capacity to move quickly to first support them and then relieve

them. There was no expectation around UN HQ of UK providing contingent forces.

Indeed there was a common view that a UN contingent force was no longer a viable

aspiration, though there has been some preliminary discussion with EU over

45 This is a lasting problem. The UN press website of 22 Feb 11 reported 56 of 137 helicopters short. 46 Such as operational planning teams or support elements, of which the Strategic Military Cell (SMC) for UNIFIL in 2006 was an example.

22

double-hatting of EU Battlegroups (BG). There was a hope that UK would provide

strategic enablers (notably airlift) on request. (The same view was expressed by

the AU.)

Field Support. “The fundamentally civilian logistics system of the UN is not

keeping pace with the demands of mission startup in harsh conditions.” (CIC

Report, Apr 09) The levels of ready stocks and funds are those determined by

Brahimi, yet there are over 5 times the number of peacekeepers deployed

compared with when that Report was written. DFS is beginning to address these

problems, though there was no evidence that the fundamental weakness of a

civilian-run system47, lacking the robustness to continue to function fully in threat

situations, can be truly resolved. The development of a regional logistics hub in

Entebbe is a sensible measure both in terms of logistic efficiency and cost. It was

noted that much of the training provided by nations to UN contributors is more

‘combat’ than logistic orientated. Given commanders’ wide responsibility, it was

requested that courses run for future UN commanders include a logistic element.

Thus, courses run by UK should include a logistics element where appropriate, and

offers of STTT support should include logistics. Bilateral logistic (including

deployment) support by UK to TCCs is appreciated by UN, though UN would

appreciate greater transparency from donors to avoid duplication of

planning/provision. Throughout, UK support to both DPKO and DFS needs to be

well coordinated. UKMIS should consider how to assist DFS to secure the

necessary budgetary authority to make advanced procurement to assist future

mission start-up, or swifter response to in-mission changes of demand. UKMIS

should increase visibility to UN HQ of UK support to TCCs, as appropriate.

THE AU SYSTEM

“Like its predecessor, the OAU, the AU is to a large extent a reflection of the nature

of its members – poorly governed, weak and heavily dependent on external support

to survive. The organisation’s performance is severely undermined by the poor

47 It needs to be remembered that UN logistics includes aviation and engineering, which do not normally sit within the military logistic domain.

23

quality – or complete lack – of management systems and resources.” (Okumu,

200948)

The AU is a fine idea that offers the prospect of a pan-African voice and promotion

of democracy, rule of law, human rights and peace and stability. It has espoused

many of these issues, in some cases to a greater degree than observers would

have expected, notably in its desire to be a force for peace across the continent. It

is unfortunate that it has been mired in bureaucracy and hamstrung by the harsh

realities of funding and weak support by member states. The international

community has recognised that the AU is worth supporting: politically, through

presence in Addis Ababa, and through finance and training:

• The EC and its Commission is the largest and most-engaged donor. It has

an Africa-EU Strategy and a €300M Africa Peace Facility. The UK plays its

part through the EU’s offices.

• The UN supports AU through UNSC resolutions, targeted support from the

UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), capacity building from UNDP

and in peace and security operations from UN-AU Task Force.

• G8 partners are tackling conflict through support to the African Peace and

Security Architecture and the training of African peacekeepers49.

• Nations, notably China, act bi-laterally with AU. UK has an AU Strategy

owned by a core group, including FCO, DfID and MOD, which forms the

framework for all UK engagement as part of a wider UK Africa Strategy.

The UK Strategy acknowledges that UK engagement must be coordinated with AU

to ensure effective targeting of resources and the minimising of costs to AU of

donor management. There is a generally positive view on UK engagement; UK is

seen as influential rather than interfering and flexible in both thought and allocation

of support. Continued bi-lateral engagement is encouraged.

The main focus for attention by MOD within the AU structure will be the Peace and

Security Department (PSD). Within the PSD lies the Peace and Security

Operations Division (PSOD), which is equivalent to UN’s DPKO. This Division

48 W Okumu, The African Union: Pitfalls and Prospects for Uniting Africa. Journal of International Affairs, Vol 62, No 2, Spring/Summer 2009. 49 The author is personally involved in the recent EU team taking over the second AMANI AFRICA cycle from France.

24

typifies the AU at present – it has some good personnel and a willing leader (Mr

Bam), but is woefully under-resourced in terms of personnel (numbers and general

quality) and funds. It is endeavouring to run the AU’s current operations50 and plan

and develop the capacity for future AU PK with a fraction of the resources of

DPKO51. Part of the PSOD is the Strategic Planning and Management Unit

(SPMU), which does contain staff from EU and NATO to fill some gapped posts and

boost the experience level. UK support has been largely through training of

member states, but was described by the SPMU interviewee as “the father and

mother of this Unit.” There was no demand for UK staff to be placed in SPMU, with

some concern expressed over the mechanics of trying to do so. UK was

encouraged to continue to act bi-laterally in its training and sponsoring efforts,

particularly of prospective staff for posts in PSOD, and to encourage other nations

to do so too. This is already recognised in the UK AU Strategy, which notes that

“UK should engage on how PSOD can reach the proposed UN staffing levels

ahead of wider AU Commission restructuring….the UK should work to create Joint

Funding Mechanism that would enable sustainable funding for these posts…being

ready to fund these posts in co-operation with donors.” The MOD PK Policy should

respond to requests for building staff capacity in PSOD, identify specific targets for

staff training, sponsorship and secondment for posts and apportion the task of

encouraging EU/NATO partners to undertake similar work.

Training of specialist military personnel, in the medical and IT domains for example,

in addition to the extant, more generic operations/plans staff training, was a need

identified by SPMU. The Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) is scoping the

development of a Peace and Security Academy for the AU, to become an

intellectual engine for education and pre-employment training. There is scope for

UK to shape its development by joining with ISS. The UK training effort should

consider provision of more specialist training courses on top of generic staff

training.

50 The AU part of the UNAMID hybrid mission in Darfur is treated separately. 51 A UK official described the primary difference between UN and AU mission funding mechanisms as “the UN receives assessed contributions and commits to action, the AU commits to action and then searches for donor funds.”

25

AFRICAN PK FORCES

The balance within PK between the AU and the RECs has been touched upon

earlier. It is a thorny problem for Africa to resolve, but it is also one for interested

parties, such as UK and also UN, to address. Despite its many problems, the AU

itself cannot be ignored, and this having been accepted, it needs significant support

and encouragement. Thus, the dilemma is over the relationships with the RECs,

which are evolving their own responsibilities for regional PK in different ways and at

varying speeds. This would be simpler if the relationships between AU and the

RECs were coordinated, but this is not (yet) the case. As it is possible that some at

least of the RECs offer the best chance of producing an effective PK response to a

crisis, they are worth cultivating, while always encouraging them to operate as a

second tier to the AU rather than as a competitor. This approach will need the AU

to formalise its relationships with them over PK. Furthermore, individual nations,

such as Kenya and Uganda, are developing rapid deployment capabilities (RDC)

that will form part of the AU’s ASF regional brigades, and seeking international

partners in so doing52. The UK AU Strategy does not adequately reflect the

potential roles and influence of the RECs and the place for national RDCs and this

should be rectified in the next review of the Strategy; there is a need for a balance

of investment decision53. This should be developed in the MOD PK Policy.

THE EU AND THE AU

The EU is the AU’s biggest supporter and has a large delegation alongside the AU

in Addis Ababa. This offers UK a second opportunity to exercise leverage with AU,

particularly in light of the funding reductions for PK in the CSR and the resulting

withdrawal from support to West African PK. An example is the placement of UK 52 At this stage at least, these should be seen as national forces with a second string to AU, and the funding and support allocated accordingly. 53 The contrast between East and West Africa demonstrates the choices. In the west, ECOWAS is well-established and is strongly influenced by the regional hegemon, Nigeria. It has acted in a PK role in its region, yet is not overtly challenging the overall responsibility of AU. In the east, there are 3 RECs covering the region, none of which have shown a strong interest in regional PK, yet due to north-south rivalry, there is not the universal support for AU to cover the role. The AU PK operation in the region (AMISOM) has been very weakly supported, other than by Uganda and Burundi. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia (at least) are developing RDCs while only loosely committing them to AU (in the form of East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)) or a REC. UK is supporting some of these RDCs. EASBRIG is in danger of being a marginal player, largely due to the rivalry between Kenya and Ethiopia and the lack of a clear hegemon. In Kenya, UK has the choice of supporting some or all of International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), EASF Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) – the Brigade HQ is ‘isolated’ in Addis - and the Kenyan RDC, then it needs to carefully apportion its support between Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as others.

26

personnel in Addis in EU positions: both UK and AU is benefitting from UK taking

one of the 2 Colonel-level posts in the EU mission. Another example is UK can

chose whether to apply pressure, which might be seen as critical of AU, through the

EU route, rather than bi-laterally. The EU suffers from a more rigid financial

scrutiny regime than does UK operating directly through ACPP, so UK donorship is

generally seen as positive. In contrast, UK can choose to express its concerns

over AU progress through the EU, where the combined weight (and financial

bargaining) can be more effective. The primary means of determining the balance

should be the UK AU Strategy, but it should also be made clear from the MOD

viewpoint in the new PK Policy.

THE UN AND THE AU

The UN and AU are formally linked in cooperation by a joint declaration54

“conceived as the UN overall strategic framework for cooperation with the AU, and

whose main objective should be to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission

and African subregional organisations to act as effective UN partners in addressing

the challenges to human security in Africa.” At the AU HQ level in Addis Ababa,

UN is well-represented by its many parts. AU benefits from this – the UN offers

legitimacy and support - yet the usual lack of coordination between the UN

elements proves a complication for AU55. The UN struggles to keep abreast of the

variety of international support relationships across Africa56, as does AU. The UN

has the same choices to make as UK and EU in balancing its support between AU,

RECs and nations. The UN Liaison Office to the AU, reporting to Department of

Political Affairs (DPA), wants a greater UN and AU emphasis on conflict prevention

than on PK. It assessed that AU was much less likely to commit PK troops again

after the Sudan and Somalia experiences and that action by RECs, as with SADC

in Madagascar, was more likely. The DPKO office in Addis feels that UN HQ is

54 Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, 16 Nov 06 55 Perhaps perversely, a fully integrated UN could overwhelm the AU. This full integration is unlikely to happen despite the arrival of an ASG in Addis covering Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO and DFS, but it is another reason for pressing ahead with the capacity building within AU. 56 Its awareness is probably most complete in East Africa, through its presence in Addis Ababa and Nairobi particularly, and through the UK involvement. UN would welcome better coordination between donors in each region, which would allow them to better understand what is already being done, and thus target UN support.

27

pressing AU too hard to get “African boots on the ground” without understanding

the complicated inter-relationships and the lack of both readiness (political and

military) and actual capability. A meeting between UNSC and PSC in mid-09 went

very badly, despite a UK joint-chair. An EU official described the AU-UN relations

as “in disastrous shape”, though most interviews with AU and UN officials, whilst

critical, did not support this extreme view. The EU official also criticised the UN

organisation and coordination and its lack of senior political engagement, proposing

that the reality in Addis is not what was agreed or expected by the UNSC, and that

UK should press through UNSC for greater visibility of UN ground truth. The UK

can also use its good offices to draw these 2 bodies back together. DPKO in Addis

also feels that the paternalistic approach adopted by UN HQ to RECs is not

appreciated by AU, so if UK determines the best balance of support between the

PK options in Africa, then it could attempt to influence the UN’s view through the

UNSC. UK has an important diplomatic role to continue to play in NY and in Addis

in improving the fragile relations between AU and UN, and in improving the

efficiency of both organisations, through its good offices.

UNDP identified the need for a training needs analysis for senior AU staff, which

could be done by UK. This would help UNDP focus the acquisition of training

providers. It was felt that there would be significant benefit in running short

leadership courses for AU and national officials lacking training/education outside of

their own countries. This would foster multi-nationalism and the Comprehensive

Approach57, raise the standard of incumbents and candidates for AU positions and

offer influence opportunity for the provider(s).

CASE STUDIES

This thesis has investigated the UK support to UN and AU from the perspective of

UK Government and from the HQs of the 2 organisations. It has also analysed the

interactions between the HQ of each organisation and their constituent parts (within

the PK domain). It has investigated the relationships between the 2 organisations

themselves at HQ/liaison level.

57 Africa tends to see solutions to peace and security problems through a military prism.

28

It is beyond the scope of the thesis to comment fully on UN command and control,

or indeed the full spectrum of interplay between organisations in Africa. However, it

has been possible to investigate in more detail the 2 Missions where the AU and

UN are cooperating and a more straightforward UN-only mission. The provision of

UN logistic, technical and administrative support has been critical to the successful

functioning of AU peacekeepers to date: the light and heavy support packages to

AMIS, the build-up of UNAMID in Darfur, and its Jan 09 mandate to support

formally the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) logistically (by the UN Support Office

for AMISOM (UNSOA)) and to some extent politically (by the UN Political Office for

Somalia (UNPOS)). These 2 Missions offer lessons for the future of UN-AU

cooperation and have been addressed in more detail in case studies, from which

additional recommendations fall. The case of the so-called integrated Mission

UNMIS is used as a comparator and also generates some recommendations on

UK-UN relations.

UNMIS. The case study on UNMIS is at Annex B. Many of the recommendations

are relevant to wider UN PK as well as UNMIS.

Darfur. The case study on UN support to AMIS and the transition to the hybrid

Mission in Darfur, including the role of the Addis-based Joint Support and

Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), is at Annex C.

Somalia. The case study on UN support to AMISOM is at Annex D.

CONCLUSIONS AND KEY FINDING

The scale of UN peacekeeping (PK) around the globe in both cost and numbers

terms is as large as it has ever been. Twenty-First Century PK faces increasingly

complex political, social and technical environments, the glare of the media and

insistent public opinion that “something must be done” to add to the traditional

demands of geography, multinationality and finance. The UN is attempting to adapt

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to these challenges and recognises (and needs) the involvement of other

international and regional players, such as the European Union, NATO and the

African Union; the latter is trying (but struggling) to fulfil its vision of providing

African solutions to African problems. The 2000 ‘Brahimi’ Report was an important

milestone for UN, but its recommendations have not been carried through fully.

The 2009 ‘New Horizon’ Report by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations

(DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) endeavoured to rectify these shortfalls. The UK

has both a responsibility and a desire to act as a ‘force for good’ in PK and has

various political, diplomatic, economic and military levers available through its

membership of the UN Security Council, the EU, the Commonwealth and NATO as

well as bilaterally, particularly in Africa, where so much PK effort is concentrated.

This thesis aimed to identify the levers available to UK to help enhance UN and AU

PK capability, particularly those supporting implementation of DPKO/DFS’s ‘New

Horizon’ Report and improving institutional processes between the UN and AU.

Views at UN HQ, AU HQ and in field missions showed general agreement that UK

was a ‘force for good’ in the UN and alongside the AU; it uses its P5 status well,

encourages others, joins ‘Friends of…’ groups, has flexible thinking and giving, and

strives for coordination and improvement. The investigations cover British activity

at the HQs of UN and AU and in the regions and countries affected as well as in the

3 Ministries in London. The research has found pragmatism in the aspirations for

additional UK support. It is noteworthy in this tight economic climate that greater

involvement in PK comes with the benefit of a high effect-to-effort ratio.

The key finding is the need for a new MOD policy on UN, and more broadly on PK.

This policy should be produced in harmony with FCO and DfID and in line with the

Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), where the UK’s emerging “prevent

agenda” of pre-emption rather than reaction fits well with the developing UN view of

putting more resources into conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution and

traditional PK. It should cover: intent, roles of soft power, regional and

organisational priorities, staffing and responses to the unexpected. It should also

identify the most effective ways for UK to increase the capacity and capability of

global PK and how to improve the effectiveness of the delivery of training and

support in the field, as this could be MOD’s most effective contribution.

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ANNEXES:

A. New Horizon Summary.

B. UN-AU-UK Relations – Darfur Case Study, including JSCM.

C. UN-AU-UK Relations – Somalia Case Study.

D. UN-UK Relations - UNMIS Case Study.

E. List of Abbreviations.

F. Bibliography.