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Bria Oneglia POLS 7343 Counterterrorism - Max Abrahms

26 April 2015 - Spring Final Paper

The Role of Islam in The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant


Since 11 September 2001, terrorism has become a household topic. Today, the organization

known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) has risen to sudden infamy across the world,

stunning the general public with its acquisition of capital and recruits, while sweeping large cities in

Iraq and Syria into their control.

A main topic of controversy surrounding Daesh is its place in Islam. A majority of Muslims,

those who could be identified as moderate, claim Daesh has no relation to Islam; it displays a strong

disconnect with their beliefs and popular teachings of a religion of peace. From another perspective,

Daesh has everything to do with Islam. The organization is lead by a religious scholar, Ibrahim

Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, known to the public as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-

proclaimed Caliph, a title which identifies him as a religious successor to the Prophet Muhammad.

Many actions taken by Daesh are expressly condemned in the Quran, including the use of fire in

executions of apostates, outlined in Al-Tamhid (5:316) , and the reinstatement of slavery, the 1

abolishment of which by the Prophet Muhammad is outlined in the Quran (3:64) . The 2

disagreement over the degree of religious validity is ongoing, with no end in sight, and as explained

by Reza Aslan, “there is no such thing as a Muslim pope, there is no such thing as a Muslim

Vatican. No one gets to tell you who is and who is not a Muslim.” Daesh closely identifies itself 3

with the Salafi-Wahhabi movement within Islam. Following the Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-

Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali ibn Abi Talib, Salafis place themselves within secular

proximity to the Prophet Muhammad, turning away from the kalam and adopting a closely literal 4

interpretation of the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Within this ideology,

strategies utilised by the leadership of Daesh to recruit followers and invigorate their mission can be

identified in a religious context, sustaining the belief that if one joins Daesh, they are following

their Islamic path and the word of Allah.


Daesh uses Islamic text to support their movement and their actions, but have received a

strong negative reaction from the world’s most respected Islamic scholars. Everything they claim,

from the establishment of the caliphate to their justifications for brutality towards apostates and

destruction of religious and historical relics, is accurately and effectively refuted by many Islamic

scholars, most equal to, if not more, religiously educated than Abu Bakhr Al-Baghdadi. Daesh

employs a rhetoric of Islam in its most fundamental form, refusing to diverge from the writings of

the Quran, in its quest to reinstate the purest form of Islam in this new caliphate. To those

unfamiliar or new to the religion, Daesh’s claims may seem authentic, tempting migration to the

caliphate to await a new world order. 5

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurashi, the self-proclaimed caliph of the Islamic

State Caliphate, was born and educated in Iraq, where he attended Islamic University and claims a

doctorate in Islamic Studies. The legitimacy of his academic accomplishments remain a myth to the

Iraqi government, as well as agencies seeking to verify his past. Advertised as a knowledgable and 6

respected sheikh in religious extremist circles, Al-Baghdadi was able to establish himself as a

qualified leader in the extremist community of Iraq, and was subsequently credited for large scale

operations while leading the Islamic State of Iraq, also known as Al-Qaida in Iraq. By qualifying

himself through religious education, Al-Baghdadi has positioned himself as a leader of Muslims

fighting for a strong religious cause.

By claiming religious justification for many barbaric acts of violence and destruction, Al-

Baghdadi and his organization have reached a dangerous level of recognition in the West as an

undeniably Islamically motivated group. They cite the Quran directly and consistently when issuing

public statements after beheading apostates, destroying ancient relics, or capturing large

populations. Advertising a path towards the apocalypse, Daesh’s declarations insist on a strict

application of Islamic law, as outlined in the Quran, reverting to outdated modes of life and societal

norms.


According to Al-Baghdadi, who appears as one of the few religious motivators behind the

organization of Daesh, the revival of the caliphate was his religious duty, citing the words of the

Prophet Muhammed that “this is a duty upon Muslims - a duty that has been lost for centuries. The

Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it.” Al-Baghdadi observes direct 7

relation to the caliph line of succession due to his Qurayshi heritage.

The establishment of a caliphate is perhaps the most important call to Muslims as issued by

Daesh. Existing in Quranic scripture, the concept of a caliphate can be seen as a “vehicle to

salvation,” in which the Prophet Muhammed calls to all Muslims to declare loyalty to a caliph. 8

Daesh continues this rhetoric by saying that if this loyalty is left undeclared, this leaves the

undeclared Muslims to die in a kuffar state, a state of disbelief, as an apostate. The qualifications of 9

a caliph are clear: Qurayshi descent, Muslim adult male, displaying a strong moral compass and

possessing ‘amr. ‘Amr is the requirement of authority, requiring the existence of territory in which

Islamic law can and will be enforced, Wood explained in his article What ISIS Really Wants,

published by The Atlantic. According to Islam, during the days of Muhammed, a hajj (pilgrimage)

must take place, bringing all Muslims together in the caliphate, living under their established

religious law. Daesh calls for this in many of its issued propaganda, dedicating the third edition of

their English language propaganda magazine to the concept of hijjrah as a religious obligation. In 10

this edition, they quote the Quran and the Hadith, in English, describing the Prophet Muhammed’s

hail to all Muslims, but especially foreigners, to the caliphate.

Daesh and Al-Baghdadi place importance on concepts emerging from commonly accepted

Sunni beliefs, such as the existence of 12 caliphs and the concept of the apocalypse’s initiation in a

northern Syrian city. This city, Dabiq, has remained quite unimpressive to the world, existing

mostly of farmland and a small, poor population. Naming their propaganda magazine, targeted 11

towards a Western audience and published in English, Dabiq, they can potentially insight recent

converts and those familiar with the name of the city, to read on.


During the establishment of the so-called caliphate, Daesh has maintained a rhetoric that

their movement, plagued with violence and destruction, is a form of offensive jihad. Jihad is a very

revered and nonviolent, personal concept in Islam, and by identifying their movement with this, as

well as issuing a call to violent jihad to all Muslims, they strengthen an already developed 12

negative concept and misunderstanding of jihad in the Western world. As narrated in their

previously mentioned English language magazine, Dabiq, Daesh calls specifically to Westerners

who have been unsuccessful in their jihad to join their group, guaranteeing subsequent successful

jihad in all aspects of life, the ultimate goal of a true Muslim.

By maintaining consistent content and relaying religious calls through Quranic citations and

eloquent rhetoric, Al-Baghdadi presents a compelling message to his current followers and potential

recruits. By flaunting his position as a religious scholar, as well as issuing propaganda attributing

violent and barbaric successes to the will of Allah, it is easy to see how many in the West,

unfamiliar with or fearful of the concept of Islam, can attribute its message to the religion and

connect its motivations with the will of their declared god.

There is a strong presence of esteemed and educated Islamic scholars and Imams around the

world that find no justification for the actions of Daesh in the Quran. Along with the large 13

majority of Muslims in the world, they speak out against the misleading information spread by

Daesh and detach from them any connection to Islam. In many instances, Daesh exploits partial

writings from the Quran and the Hadith, removing them from original context and replacing it with

context that supports their goals. One of Daesh’s claims to the caliphate is their application of the

Quran in every aspect of life, never diverging from the words of the Prophet Muhammed or the will

of Allah. In fact, this is their main explanation to many atrocities they have publicised through 14

propaganda to the world. However, merely extracting a piece of information from the Quran and

ignoring its context goes against the religion, as described in Surat Al-Ma’idah in the Quran, which

states “they pervert words from their contexts; and they have forgotten a portion of what they were


reminded of (Al-Ma’idah , 5:13),” as well as throughout the Quran in several other surahs. 15

Ignoring any part of the Quran or the Hadith is, in Islam, to deny it as the truth, which contradicts

the entire basis of Islam: the Quran is the word of Allah.

One of the initial matters of debate between Daesh and the Islamic scholar population is the

establishment of the caliphate. Al-Baghdadi maintains an accurate concept in Islam, however he

exploits it in several ways. Islamic scholars agree that a Caliphate is a requirement placed upon the

Muslim community, however it must have support from all Muslims, not merely a minority of a

minority. By declaring this caliphate, Al-Baghdadi has isolated the majority of Muslims. In his

public appearance, Al-Baghdadi claimed he had been given authority over the Muslim community, 16

however, he receives support from only several thousand, rather than the Muslim population of over

a billion. A caliphate, in order to be a true caliphate as described by the Quran and the Hadith, must

develop as a product of Muslim countries, Islamic scholars, and representatives from the entire

Muslim population. The establishment of the Islamic State’s caliphate is illegitimate and does not 17

uphold when juxtaposed with actual Islamic Law.

The enforcement of Sharia law in the newly established caliphate is an undeniable practice.

The non-Muslim understanding of Sharia is often connected to Saudi Arabia, a country that claims

Sharia as its primary legal system. Daesh supporters identify the application of Sharia in Saudi

Arabia as misleading; they remove the social and economic justices provided for those living under

Sharia, while strictly enforcing the harsh punishments outlined in Sharia for crimes such as murder

or theft. While Sharia does outline severe punitive measures for those acting outside the moral code

of Islam, it calls for the provision of free housing, free healthcare, and free living essentials for

anyone living under its rule. 18

Another religious requirement to Sharia is the observance of fiqh al-waq’i, or practical

jurisprudence. This requires the application of Sharia to include the assessment of current realities

and circumstance. This calls for fatwas and assigned punishment to reflect current social norms, as


well as circumstances surrounding the crime. It also requires all evidence to be collected and

examined before sentencing. Prior to implementing any punishment, there is a clear procedure that

must be followed to satisfy a number of conditions. It is generally extremely difficult to satisfy

these conditions. It is clear through Daesh’s issued propaganda and advertised implementation of 19

Sharia that they do not observe practical jurisprudence in this way. They publicize the social

benefits of Sharia as implemented in their caliphate, however they do not uphold the requirements

of Sharia in accordance with the Quran or the Hadith by observing fiqh al-waq’i.

Daesh is recognized worldwide for their exuberance in the killing of those they declare

apostates. They have repeatedly cited Surat Muhammad in Al Hayat issued videos to justify these

actions. The surah used by Daesh’s propaganda team declares “so when you meet those who

disbelieve, smite their necks.” The full surah states:

“So when you meet those who disbelieve in battle, smite their necks until,

when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either confer

favor afterwards or ransom until the war lays down its burdens. That is the command. And if

Allah had willed, He could have taken vengeance upon them, but He ordered armed

struggle to test some of you by means of others. And those who are killed in the cause of

Allah - never will He waste their deeds (Muhammad 47:4).” 20

This surah, so often cited as the commanding force behind the fighters of Daesh, specifically refers

to those captured in battle, and does not call for the killing, merely the temporary capture of

disbelievers. While there is no doubt the Quran describes and makes allowance for violence in a

time of war, as do most religions, this illustrates the careful selection and condensation of Quranic

verses by Daesh.


The act of killing those unarmed and non-combatant, no matter the religion, is one of the

most forbidden acts outlined in the Quran, expressly condemned in Surat Al-Ma’idah. By 21

committing an overwhelming number of murders and destroying cities and populations, Daesh

expressly violates one of the most important commands of the Quran, a religious text which they

claim to follow without divergence. 22

Daesh rose to notoriety after broadcasting the beheadings of journalists and aid workers over

video, accompanied by a rhetoric threatening various governments and leaders. This falls under the

killing of innocents, but additionally, journalists fall under the categorization of emissaries of truth,

and aid workers, emissaries of mercy. This protects them by placing them under a cross-religious

prohibition of killing of emissaries, something that is clearly forbidden in Islam, as well as all other

religions of the scripture. Additionally, the method of decapitation used on these hostages, the use of

a small knife, is forbidden as torture under Sharia, as is the mutilation of a body post-mortem . 23

One of the foundations Daesh rests upon is the declaration of apostates (takfir). They declare

anyone who does not welcome their rule and their views of Islam as apostates. By declaring any

Muslim who does not accept them as a non-believer, the organization acts without religious

consequence, targeting specific Muslim populations and destroying religious materials that they feel

are inappropriate to their message. Takfir exists in Islam, however the religion declares a Muslim 24

as anyone who gives the Shahada, the statement that there is no god but God and Muhammad is the

Messenger of God (ال إإلهھ إإال هللا محمد ررسولل هللا). Ironically branded on their flag, this removes any

religious right from Daesh in declaring Shia or non-accepting Sunni Muslims as non-Muslims. In 25

this light, it is incorrect to declare those in Daesh as non-Muslim as well, however the term un-

Islamic can be used in reference to their actions against the Quran and the religion of Islam. In the

Quran, Surat Al-Nisa outlines this condition, and continues to state “and whoever slays a believer

deliberately, his requital is Hell, abiding therein, and God is wroth with him and has cursed him,

and has prepared for him a mighty chastisement… and so if they stay away from you and do not


fight you, and offer you peace, then God does not allow you any way against them (Al-Nisa,

4:93). ” As displayed in a Daesh issued video, a common practice is to ask of unarmed Muslim 26

civilians the details of specific prayers and religious obligations. This practice results in the

execution of those who answer incorrectly, diverging in an extreme way from Surat Al-Nisa, a

direct extraction of the Quran.

Alongside the Muslim population targeted by Daesh, there is much media attention directed

towards the treatment of the Christian and Yazidi populations of the regions currently controlled by

Daesh. Christians were offered the chance to convert to the Daesh supported version of Islam;

alternatively, they could choose execution or the payment of non-Muslim tax, jizyah. Churches,

homes, and relics were destroyed, and huge numbers of Christians were killed and driven from their

homes. As stated in Surat Al-Mumtahanah, “God does not forbid you in regard to those who did not

wage war against you on account of religion and did not expel you from your homes, that you

should treat them kindly and deal with them justly. Assuredly God loves the just (60:8),” the 27

Quran commands Muslims to accept Christians (as well as all religions of the scripture) and treat

them with nonviolence.

The Yazidi population remains a battered target of Daesh, identified as pagans and idol

worshippers in propaganda material and rhetoric issued by the organization. Subject to slavery,

mass killing, and exploitation of their women and children by Daesh, Yazidis are protected under

true Sharia as people of the scripture. They are identified as such in the Quran, in Surat Al Hajj, as

well as in the Hadith, and the consensus of scholars worldwide supports this. 28

By identifying Christians and Yazidis as protected under Sharia, these populations are

therefore exempt from any Islamic obligation or Sharia ruling, as well as any requirement of jihad

or targeting of jihad. By declaring apostates, specifically Christians and Yazidis, as unprotected

under Islam against violence and savagery, Al-Baghdadi and his followers have chosen to ignore


two important surahs in the Quran (Al-Hajj 22:17, Al-Mumtahanah 60:8), as well as teachings of

the Hadith.

Slavery has been another popular topic in the media when discussing Daesh, its actions, and

its treatment of those it has captured. Most notably, Yazidi women and children have been

kidnapped, trafficked, and subjected to sexual slavery, distributed via slave markets to the highest

bidder. In their fourth edition of Dabiq, Daesh explains that they (exclusively) have found Yazidis

unprotected under Islam, and therefore they are subject to slavery. Following their pattern of

obsession with the apocalypse, they further state that “slavery is mentioned as one of the signs of

the Hour.” 29

Unanimously, scholars acknowledge that the abolishment of slavery is one of Islam’s

goals. The sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed is that he freed all slaves belonging to him, 30 31

illustrating that all those following should do the same. Throughout Dabiq Issue 4, the organization

attempts to support their claim to slavery by describing the process in which they sent Daesh’s

Sharia students to research and conclude the position of slavery, and by doing this, they decided

upon a position in direct disagreement with the collective and unanimous interpretation of Islamic

scholars and sheikhs around the world. 32

The above outlined discrepancies between Daesh’s falsely pious rhetoric and the Quran and

Hadith display the weak placement of Islam as a driving force for the establishment of the Islamic

State’s caliphate. While there are more instances in which Al-Baghdadi and his followers veer from

their declared path, these are some of many that have been established and supported by over 100

professors, Islamic scholars, and sheikhs from around the world, identifying with various

interpretations and Islamic schools of thought. There is unanimous agreement among this group, as

well as the majority of Muslims worldwide, that Daesh falsely represents Islam as a religion of

brutality in order to justify their cause and recruit fighters. 33


If Daesh is, in fact, not a fair representation of Islam, what is their motivation and how are

they effectively recruiting Muslims, especially those in the West, to their cause? Currently, the

majority of active Daesh members are young, Sunni, male, and from the Middle East. This is an 34

incredibly small portion of the worldwide Muslim population, which illustrates the fact that most

Muslims are denying Daesh’s legitimacy. Daesh has a remarkably low standard in who it accepts,

especially when compared to similar groups like Al-Qaida. While Daesh claims to revolve around 35

religious views surrounding the apocalypse, the main body of Daesh, fighters hailing from the West,

Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, most likely did not and do not share these specific views. Instead,

Daesh recruitment seems to rest on Islam as a tool, a platform through which to promote

millenarianism outside of the limits of Islam.

Daesh’s millenarianist philosophy allows them to function as a trans-nationalist

organization. Religious scholar Reza Aslan goes so far as to call it anti-nationalist, an accurate

identification when examined under the notion of a caliphate. The organization’s goals are 36

immaterial; they do not demand political action, they do not demand land or borders. Reza Aslan

explains Daesh in an interview as “an organization…whose ambitions and goals are purely

imaginary. Who have no sort of earthly ideology, they have no political goals. They do not want

land; they want the world. They are not fighting a real war between individuals and armies. They

are fighting a war of their own imagination, between the forces of good and evil.” 37

This type of philosophy can be a powerful recruitment tool. A great deal of attention has

been directed towards the number of Western recruits traveling to Syria after being in contact with

Daesh recruiters via social media or through specific mosque communities. The U.S. State

Department recognizes that approximately 12,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria from at

least 50 countries. While there is no confirmed pathway to terrorism, when examining patterns 38

among Daesh’s wave of foreign fighters, they are jarringly similar. Well educated teenagers and

young adults hailing from middle class backgrounds are leaving their lives in Western countries like


America, Britain, Canada, as well as Europe. Another commonality among foreign Daesh recruits is

their status as recent converts or secular Muslims. “The vast majority of Westerners joining up with

Daesh are extraordinarily ignorant when it comes to religion,” explains Max Abrahms. 39

An important connection among Daesh recruits, especially those from the West, is their

search for a path, their desire for a collective identity. Daesh has been able to advertise a rhetoric

that addresses resentment, grievance, and social isolation, enabling their recruiters to cast a “wide

net,” drawing in people from a range of situations, lifestyles, and ideologies. Where nationalist 40

terrorist groups such as Hamas are able to recruit those displaced or stranded in poverty, using

defined situations to motivate defined goals, Daesh is able to recruit by declaring an undefined lack

of grievance. Rather than issuing a specific call to revenge, they issue a call to a new order, a 41

utopia where no matter your grievance, if you adhere to the will of Allah (as defined by them), you

will be free from it.

The Islamic rhetoric used by Daesh as a platform for their actions is effective in the sense

that it provides cause to those unfamiliar with Islam, recent converts, or secularly raised Muslim

young adults. While ever present in propaganda material, the Quran seems to take a less than

significant role in the day to day functions of Daesh. Often, recent converts to Islam, an especially 42

controversial religion in today’s West, experience resistance or isolation in their homes, social lives,

and work. Targeting an audience new to their religion and declaring compellingly and eloquently

that their way is the true way, Daesh is able to exploit these conditions, giving those in unstable

social situations a new possibility. According to John Horgan, a psychologist specialising in

terrorism at UMass, “people who join these groups are trying to find a path, to answer a call to

something, which would basically mean that they’re doing something meaningful with their

lives….There’s typically a very very strong moral pull. You often see recruits are driven by this

passionate need to right some perceived wrong, to address some sort of injustice, to restore honor to

those from whom it’s been taken.” Research on Western recruits has established that foreign 43


fighters are generally isolated within their own societies, often disagreeing with their home

country’s foreign policies. These people often emerge from ethnic enclaves, where they 44

experience alienation from the rest of their country. Understanding this, it proves imperative to

examine the Western media in their representation of Daesh and its message. By directing attention

to the role Islam as the driving force behind their actions, Daesh strategically guides the media in

alienating Muslims of the West. Because recruitment techniques used by the group target those

isolated within their own societies, by accepting Daesh’s dramaturgically expressed rhetoric, the

Western media and its audience work as a team to unintentionally widen the pool of potential

recruits.

Capitalising on the common feeling of social isolation experienced by youth in the West,

Daesh is also able to appeal to a wide array of personalities and capabilities. Their typical narrative

outlines a place for everyone, whether it be on the battlefield, behind the keyboards of Al-Hayat,

Daesh’s media center, or as a mujahideen bride. In addition to touting financial support, free

housing, and a guaranteed wife, Daesh also offers the comfort of extreme fundamentalism. Jessica

Stern emphasizes the value of this by asking “wouldn’t it be nice to have easy answers to every

morally complex question?” Moral simplicity allows good and evil to be identified as black and 45

white.

It can be argued that Daesh employs a strong religious narrative in order to promote a

philosophy of millenarianism, a quest to create a new world order based off fundamentalism. The

most effective way to rally support for such an idealistic movement is attaching it to a compelling

ideology with which the majority of the world is familiar yet uneducated. Daesh placed itself in a

region defined by political strife, guaranteeing success in its conquest and declaring this region the

new caliphate, subsequently assigning great importance to a small, unimpressive town in northern

Syria. While the most important battle of the apocalypse, resulting in the revival of Jesus, a revered

prophet in Islam, will take place in Jerusalem, Daesh directed its attention and energy toward 46


Dabiq. This suggests a capitalization on convenience, as does the recruitment of converts, secular

Muslims, and a generally isolated, lost group of people, and the rhetoric formed around carefully

selected Quranic excerpts.

The religiosity of Daesh is the most discussed aspect of the group by Western media, leading

to a potentially dangerous misunderstanding of the group and its purpose. The established location

of the new caliphate appears strategic in several ways outside of religion. While Daesh claims

importance to Dabiq, they faced no resistance in gaining control of the city, displaying a lack of

necessity in establishing control over surrounding areas. Syria and Iraq, however, are strategic

power vacuums that almost guaranteed a successful takeover by Daesh. With the Assad regime

maintaining a blanket of instability and violence, Syria has been the center of unrest for years. In

close proximity to Iraq, the country in which Daesh initially departed from its inaugurate

organization, Al-Baghdadi and his fighters are able to maintain control over critical Iraqi cities 47

and populations, as well as make a display of the treatment of a majority Shia population in the

name of their mission.

In addition to Iraq, Syria holds borders with Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. These three

countries hold large populations of uneducated Sunni youth, enabling successful recruitment of an

especially vulnerable group of people. As previously mentioned, Daesh experiences a large influx

of foreign fighters, and the proximity to Turkey allowed the group to build an underground railway

of sorts, guiding foreigners with Western passports into Turkey and subsequently into Syria, where

they become virtually nonexistent. It seems as if Daesh may have chosen to establish their

caliphate in a convenient power vacuum where they would face little resistance by the Assad regime

and have a population of potential fighters at their fingertips, rather than based on religious

necessity.

While there is much attention directed to the recruits and actions of Daesh, identifying an

approach to disabling the group has proven difficult for the West. In fact, any potentially successful


campaign against the group is unlikely to gain approval on any stage. In the case of Daesh, an

extremely violent group that does not appear to be slowing down, military action seems to be the

most effective option. To borrow the term from George W. Bush, a “surgical removal” of 48

leadership must take place. Based on the actions and recruitment patterns of Daesh, it appears that

those in the fighting ranks wield little decision making power and, without their revered Caliph, the

organization of the caliphate would disintegrate. In an interview, Reza Aslan explains that there is

no potential for negotiation with an organization such as Daesh, a group with no political goals

except to take over the world and await the apocalypse. Therefore, the removal of leadership is the 49

only viable option. For true success, it seems that a grassroots movement must arise in Syria, in

tandem with the removal of Bashar Assad, a regime leader who poses little resistance to the terrorist

group setting up in his country. In reality, Daesh is viewed by the Syrian resistance as merely

another face of the regime, and the fight encompasses an upheaval of the entire region, not just

those areas controlled by the terrorist organization. 50

With the possibility of a military approach limited due to politics and lack of public support

in many countries, it may prove beneficial to focus on lessening the appeal of Daesh to future

recruits on a social stage. Because Daesh centers their recruitment tactics on the grievances held by

a younger generation of adults, governments and communities across the world need to address the

problems perceived by their citizens, whether political, economic, social, or personal. Because 51

Daesh experienced a fairly recent entry onto the international media stage, there is a lack of

educational platforms specifically addressing the complaints held by those following Daesh.

Because of their complex message and perceptive ideology, targeting educated communities such as

universities or mosques with large convert attendance would be more likely to reach Daesh’s

specific audience. With international religious leaders already speaking out against the group’s

claim to Islam, bringing the same dialogue into local mosques will raise awareness among those

who rely on their English speaking Imam for religious education. By educating Daesh’s target


audience on what Daesh is actually doing, how they diverge from Islam, and what the community is

doing to address the same issues Daesh claims they will resolve, the appeal of traveling to the

perceived caliphate will diminish, encouraging potential recruits to refocus on their own

community. In essence, it is imperative to do what Daesh recruiters do, only better and on a larger

platform. This, however, is extremely idealistic and would require a large, unified effort by

countries and communities worldwide, many of whom face larger political and social strife that

claims priority.

In conclusion, the emergence of Daesh and its quick rise to notoriety has caused a media

frenzy that focuses the West’s attention on the wrong facets of the organization and its motives.

Lending emphasis to the discussion of Islam as the driving force behind Daesh’s actions merely

plays into the hands of the militant group, alienating the majority of the world’s Muslim population,

a valuable ally in combatting the ongoing evolution of a brutal terrorist organization whose end goal

is to take over the world.

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