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The Education Reform and Management SeriesVol. II . No.1 .1999

The Politics of Education Reform:Bolstering the Supply and Demand; Overcoming Institutional Blocks

Javier Corrales 22549

EDUCAT)ONT H E W 0 A I D 8 A N K


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The Politics of Education Reform:Bolstering the Supply and Demand; Overcoming Institutional Blocks

JavierCorrales

The Education Reform and Management SeriesVol. II. No. 1 1999


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Table of ContentsPage

About heAuthor........................................................... IIIAcknowledgements........................................................... VExecutive ummary........................................................... VIlIntroduction............................................................ 1Part1.TheObstacleso Education eform.................................................. 3

Three mpedimentso Reform........................................ ................... 4Concentratedosts,Diffused enefits................................................. 4LessPowerful ndLow ncidence f PolicyEntrepreneurship 7in Education.

Education eform s. Economic eform................................................... 7Implication : Instability ndShortTenure t the Ministry evel....................... 9Implication: Different argaining ower etweenMinisters 11andTeachers' nions........................................................................

Decentralization:heMixedand nsincereMotives f States.................... 12Part2. Overcoming bstacleso Reform...................................................... 15

FourStrategiesor Overcoming oliticalObstacles...................................... 17Reform ype........................................................... 18Bolsteringhe SupplySide........................................................... 23Bolsteringhe Demandor Reform.......... ........................................... 28Neutralizing eformOpponents; vercomingnstitutional bstacles.......... 33

Conclusion........................................................... 41Appendix ........................................................... 43References........................................................... 47

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About the AuthorJavierCorrales btained is Ph.D.n politicalciencen 1996 romHarvard niversity,here especializedncomparativend ntemationalolitics f Latin merica.Hecurrentlyeaches oliticalscience tAmherst ollegenAmherst, assachusetts.isareas f nterestncludehepolitics fpolicyeformndevelopingountries. r.Corrales as onductedxtensiveield esearchn LatinAmerica ndpublishedarious rticles n he politics f economiceform.He s currently ritingbookon heconnectionsmong ulingparties, ressure roups ndeconomiceforms.He hasbeena visiting rofessort the Instituto e Estudios uperiorese Administraci6nn Caracas,Venezuela,visitingesearchert he nstituto orcuatoi Tella n Buenos ires,Argentina,ndaconsultantor he Harvardnstituteor ntemationalevelopment. ismost ecentwork ocuseson hepolitics f social ectoreform.

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AcknowledgementsNumerousndividualsrovided ssistance,uidance nd feedback.PatrickSupanc, arbaraBruns ndYasuhiko atsudo rovidednvaluableupport. alsoam gratefulo SueBerryman,MerileeGrindle, hilipKeefer,DanMorrow, oanNelson, effreyPuryear, emando eimers,GaryTheisenndMichael rabbleor heir omments.manda nayati dited nd ormattedhetext, nddesignedhecover.Thispaper lsobenefitedrom eedback rovidedy he participantsin heworkshopnovercomingoliticalbstaclesoeducaboneform, ponsoredy he EducationReform ndManagementeamof theWorldBank,Washington,C,on April7, 1999. remainexclusivelyesponsibleoranyerrors.

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Executive SummaryThispaper xploreshe politicalonditionshatmayenhance r hinderhe adoption f educationreforms. t doesnotoffer efinite,tatisticallyested onclusions.nstead,hispaper elies nex-isting tudies f reform doptiono extract ypotheseshatseemapplicablen somecases ndtestablen others.Thispaper hould e eadmoreas a review f the iteraturenda guideo u-ture esearchhanasan endorsementfspecificecommendations.At he outset,t is arguedhat he politicalonditionsor theadoption fquality-orientedducationreformsemain nfavorable,espite new mpetusn favorof reform.Qualityeforms roduceconcentratedosts nddistributedenefits,eadingo the riseof strong etogroups e.g.,each-ers'unions, ureaucratsnduniversitytudents).Often,hese etogroups re highly rganized,resourcefulndwellconnectedo political arties,herebymagnifyingheir apacityo contesthereforms.Beneficiariesf educationeform o exist, ut hey end o be essorganizedndmoti-vated han reform pponents. common nbdoteo theseproblems-policyntrepreneurs-istheoreticallyossible,utstil less ikely ue o shortcomingsn hesystem f ncentvesndpenal-ties hatgovemmentsace n heareaofeducatoneform.Successfuleform doptons hus ontingentnaddressinghe ollowingolitical urdles: )con-centrationf costsona fewactors; ) ow ncidencef policy ntrepreneurshipi.e., hortcomingsin thesupply ideof reform); ) political isengagementf potential eneficiariesi.e., hortcom-ings n hedemand ide); nd4) political dvantagesf cost-bearingroups.Thispaper iscussesvarious ypotheses,ften aised xplicitlyr ndirectly y existng tudies, boutways o addresseachof thesehurdles.These resummarizedn Table . Thediscussionf eachhypothesise-ginswitha briefstatementboutwhy,at least n heory,he proposedypothesis ighthaveacausalmpact n the chances f reform doption.Next,examplesromoneor more ases reprovidedo illustratehe viability f the hypothesis. inally, aveats bout he validity f the hy-pothesesrepresented.

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Changes n Reformnype:* Combining ccess lements ith quality eformCorollary: olitical ompensationf hoseadversely ffected y reformmaybe more mportanthanmaterial ompen-sation* Following n ncrementalather hanall-encompassingpproach* Packagingducationeformswithother ype of reformsof he stateor he economy)

Efforts o Bolster he Supply Side:* Entrusting ducaboneformso ministries ith ow umover ates* Increasinginkswith heoutsideworldor globaleconomy* Creatingndependentro-reform dvisory ouncils

Efforts o Bolster he DemandSide:* Launching assivenformation isseminationampaigns* Involving otential eneficiariesn reformdesign ndevaluabon* In cases f decentralization,ranting reaterinancial utonomyo ocalentites

InstitutionalSetting Determinants f SocietalCooperationwith Reforms:* Teachers' nion or anycost-bearing roup) inkswith oppositon olitical artieshinder ovemment-unionooperatonCorollary: mproving xecutive-legislativeelations n he ssueof educationeformmoderates nionopposition.* Internal nion ragmentaton inders nion-govemmentooperabon;xtemalunion ragmentationiminisheshepower f unions* Preemptingtrategic oalitions etween ost-bearingroups nd othersocietal ctors

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IntroductionThere s widespreadonsensus orldwidehat mprovinghe performancef educationys-tems s necessaryo advance ocioeconomicevelopment,educe nequality, nhanceheeconomic ompetitivenessf nations nd possiblyortifygovemmentalnstitutions.Never-theless,meaningful ducationeforms ften ail o get approved r implemented, ostly orpoliticaleasons.Whatare someof thesepolitical bstacles?This papersummarizesecent cholarshipnthe political urdles hateducationeforms end o encounter. t also dentifiesheoreticallyinformed ypothesesased n recent uccesses nd ailures f reform.,The papers divided nto wo parts. Part1 discusseshe prevalencef politicalmpedimentsto reform,despite ecent ncreasen domestic nd nternational ressure rgingeducationreform. Part2 shows hat n a significant umber f cases, herehasbeensuccessful dop-tion of educationeforms, uggestinghatpolitical bstacles re not nsurmountable.t alsodiscusses ypothesesbout he political onditions nderwhicheducationeforms re morelikely o be approved.The mainargument f this paper s that reformsare more ikely oflourishf the following olitical bstacles re addressed: ) concentrationf costanddiffu-sionof benefits; ) deficientministerialommitmentevels i.e.,bolsteringhe supply ide);3)insufficient ocietal emandor reform i.e.,bolsteringhe demand ide);and4) institutionalfeatureshatmagnifyhe power fvetogroups.

1 For urposesf his aper,uccesssdefinednpoliticalratherhanechnical)erms,.e.,whetherhe e-forms ecomeoliticallyccepted,ollowingitheregislativepprovalr anexplicitact mongecognizedactors.his efinitionxpressesittle bout hetherhe eformschieveheirntendedducationalbjectives,e.g.,mprovingtudentnd eachererformances.1


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The Obstacles to Education ReformIn the 1990s, ducationeformhas emerged s a seeminglyop-priority oliticalssue nbothdeveloped nddeveloping ountres. mprovinghequality f education asbecomeassociated ith wo highlycherished oalsof modemstates.First improvinghe qualityof educations increasinglyeenas a sourceof intemational conomicompetitiveness.In a globaleconomy,ountries ompetewithoneanotheror markets,oreignnvestment,technologicalevelopment nd hostingof multinationalsseeStrange1992). A highlyeducated orkforces deemedo confer nedge n hiseconomic ompetition.Second, ighquality ducation asbecome ynonymousithself-sustainedomestic e-velopment, ot ust ntemationalompetitiveness. ince he 1970s,he mantraof educa-tion specialistsas been hat mprovingducations a necessary reconditionor higherliving tandards.However,ovemmentseldomistened. nstead,hey reated ducationmoreas a social ightor entitlementwhich heyprovideo citizens ependingn theex-tent of theirsocialcommitment,iscal esources, r inclinationo use he educationalys-temas a mechanismf political o-optation. oday,hisattitudes changing.Ratherhanviewing ducation nlya socialobligation f the state,govemmentsave begun o see tas a necessaryatalystor development n 1993, he WorldBankconcludedhata cru-cial actor n the economicuccess f EastAsia rom he 1970so the 1990swas nvest-ment n humancapital, speciallyhroughwell-targeted ducationalnvestments.Manygovemmentsre inallyaking hisconclusioneriously.Inaddifion o thisgrowing onsensus n the linkbetween ducationeformand he eco-nomicnterests f nations, xtemal ressureoreducationeform eached newhigh nthe 1990s. Multilateralendingnstitutions ow customarilyncludeeducationeformaspart of their package f economic ndstate eformnsCamoy 995). Educationeformsconsidered fundamentalxis of the "second tage"of reforms,.e., he next step afterachievingconomic tabilizatonnd liberalizatonseeWorld Bank1996:123-131;aim1995)2 n LatinAmerica,or nstance, uryear1997) dentifies n arrayof extemalorces

2 SeealsoGinsburg1991:12-20)ora discussionf howwoddsystemressuresiffer haveen-couragedrsifled ducationeform fforts.

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The Politics of Education Reforn

pushing or reform: he need to compete n a global economy; he availability f new ideasabout the negative economic effects of inefficienteducation;and the greater salience ofintemational institutions such as development banks, bilateral aid agencies, non-govemmental organizations NGOs) and consulting firms. In the 1998 Summit of theAmericas,where all heads of state and govemmentof the Westem Hemispheregathered,improvementof educationemergedas the top agenda tem.

Finally,education has become a top priority for both the political right and left in manycountries. Advocates of market economics concede that education, which promises omake labor markets more competitive, emains a legitimatearea for state action. Advo-cates of state involvement n the economy value educational eform as an opportunity oproduce progressive esults. Although heir views on strategy differ-the political ight a d-vocates greater school choice whereas the political eft supports more inclusionarystateintervention (see Plank and Boyd 1994)-there is universalconsensus on the need tomake schools more accountable.

In sum, education reform n the 1990s has enjoyeda new impetus n policy circles, bothdomesticallyand intemationally, nd across different deologies.

Three lmpeiment to ReformDespite this renewed mpetus, approvingand implementingeducation eforms remain aspoliticallydifficultas ever. Politicalobstaclescontinue o paralyze and distortwell-devisedreform nitiatives. To grasp he probabilityof education eform adoption, t is imperative ounderstand hree commonobstacles.

Conentrated Costs, Diffused BenefitsA useful startingpoint or studying he politicaldifficultiesassociatedwith education eformis a cost-benefitanalysis. Scholarsargue that when the costs of a particularpolicy all d i-rectly and intensely on specific nterest groups, and its benefits are too diffuse, policyadoption s politicallydifficult. For instance,Wilson (1973), using Olsonian logic, arguesthat policiesvary according o the extent to which their costs and benefitsare either di s-tributed or concentrated Table1). The more a policy generates concentratedcosts, .e.,when the costs are limited o a small numberof citizensor organizedgroups, he more dif-ficult the adopton. This is because negatively affected interest groups have a muchstronger ncentive o block he reforms han beneficiarieshave to support them. For ex-

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Part One

ample, mposing ncreasedsafety standardson automobilesproducesenormousconcen-trated costs on automobile makers, whereas the benefitsare diffuse, i.e., spread overmany citizensand organizabons.Consequently,he politics surroundinghis policy optionwill featurean oversupplyof veto groups andan under-supply f reform demanders.

Table 1: Policy Type, According to Costs and BenefitsDistributedCosts ConcentratedCosts

DistributedBenefits Raising axes o fundsocial security Safety equirementson automobilesQualityeducationrefofns

Concentrated Grant subsidies o farmers Allowinga few (rather han all) airlines he rightBenefts Accesseducationrefonms to service a particularmarket

Education eformscan be analyzed usingWilson's (1973) matrix. Generally, wo broadtypesof educational eformsexist: accessreformsand qualityreforms. Accessreformscall for increasing he availabilityof educationalprograms and opportunities.These re-forms normally involve investment to increasethe numbers of schools, classrooms,teachers, eachers'salariesand teachingsupplies. Accessreforms are commonlyunder-stoodas expanding he coverageof the education system. In this paper, however,"ac-cess reforms"are construedmore broadly,as any time additional esources are investedin the educationsystem so that the "reforms" produce gainsfor some or all partiesandlosses orvery few actors, f any.

Quality eforms,on the other hand, nvolveefforts o improve he efficiencyof invested e-sources, with the goal of improving he academicperformanceof students, ncreasingteacher productivity,reducing student drop-out or repetition rates, achieving optimumteacher/student ratios, penalizing teachers' inadequate performance,granting greaterautonomy o school boards,etc. (see Worid Bank1995;Savedoff 1998). The definitionof"quality reforms"used n this paper mplies eal or perceived osses or some stakeholders,in sharpcontrast o accessreforms as definedhere) n which partiesmostlygain.

In Wilson's (1973) matrix, access reformsexemplify policies hat generate concentratedbenefitsand diffused costs,andquality eforms are the mirror mage. The beneficiaries faccess reforms includeenrolled studentsand parents, teachers and teachers' unions,constructioncompaniestbuilders nd bureaucratswhose budgets increase. At the samebme, the costs of access reformsare spread acrossa wide group (taxpayers). Qualityreforms,on the otherhand,generate diffusedbenefitsandconcentratedcosts. Society at

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The Politics of EducationReform

large and incumbentpoliticians draw some benefits (e.g., a more educated society), butthese benefitsare too general, spread across a large number of actors, and mostly per-cepbble n the long term. On their own, beneficiaries re unlikely o tum into powerfulchampions or reform. In additon, beneficiarieswho are better positoned o make politicaldemands-the middle sectors

3-often have exit possibilities, uch as private schoolsandprivate utoring,which lessen heir propensity o demand eforms.4

Cost-bearers,on the other hand, create huge stirs. They include unions that lose privi-legesand non-accountability; ureaucrats n he centralgovemmentwho give up decision-making authority;students (especiallyat the university evel) who lose subsidies or freeservices; providersof school suppliesand textbookswho lose contracts as a result of cur-riculum reforms; educabonofficialswho must accept the embarrassmentassociatedwithrecognizing ailings n the system; politicalpartfeswho might ose the capacity o disbursepatronage hrough he educationalsystem; and the local elite who will confront new localrivals as a result of decentralization see Crouch and Healey 1997:1-3).Almost bydefin -ton, systemicreforms such as the decentralizabon f educabonentail distributingcostsand reallocating oweramong hese groups (see Kemmerer1994).

Moreover, hose who may be adversely affected by educabon reforms-potential "los-ers"-are usuallypolitically ompetent o combat proposed reforms. Teachers'unions, orinstance, end to be highly centralizedand well organized,which allows them to resolvecollectiveaction problemsmore easily. n addition, hey oftenoperate n a monopsony i.e.,they face a single employer-the central govemment)and thus a single contract (Haus-mann 1994:179). Teachers'unions hus have a strong allure. Teachersare more likelythan workers n other sectors to join a union,which magnifies he politicalpower of teac h-ers' unions.

In sum, Wilson's (1973) cost-benefit/interest roup analysis points to several politicalproblems. Quality eforms generateconcentratedosers,who are likely to organizeeffec-tively to block reforms. While beneficiariesexist, hey have fewer incentives o mount asufficientystrong demand or reform o defeat he campaignsof potential osers.

3 In the 1950s nd1960s,modemizationheorists rguedhat he middle ectorswerebetterposi-toned hanother ectors f societyoplacedemands n govemments;heyhadbothmaterialncen-tivesand politicalesources.n he 1980sand 1990s,middlesectors roved o be serious ocietalchallengersf austeritymeasuresNelson 990).41 amgratefulo Yasuhiko atsudaor bringinghis o myattention.

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Part One

Less Powerful and Low Incidence of Policy Enrpreneurship in EducationA common solution o the problems associatedwith policies hat produce concentratedcosts anddiffusedbenefitss what Wilson (1986) labels policyentrepreneurs."These areactors,usuallyat the cabinet evel or with close links to the president,who find a way ofpulling ogether a legislativemajorityon behalf of interests not well representedn gov-emnment.Policy entrepreneursdramatizean issue,galvanizepublicopinion,and mobilizecongressional support' for policies that would not otherwise be approved (Wilson1986:440).

In the 1990s, governmentshave appointedpowerful ministersof finance eager to wagedifficultpolitcal battleson behalfof unpopulareconomicreforms, often knownas "techno-pols." (Dominguez1997; Williamsonand Haggard1994). How ikely s it that comparablepolicy entrepreneurswill emerge n the educationsector? The evidenceso far indicates:not likely. Reformczars are not as common n educationas they are in economics. Evenwhenthey do emerge, heir powersare not as sweeping. This is because he rise of pol-icy entrepreneursdependson governmentcommitment,which, despite the new drive to-wards education reform, continuesto falter. As Part 1 shows, govemments pursuingeducationreforms simply do not face sufficient ncentives o perseverewith quality re-forms, or high enoughpenaties for abandoning heir commitment.

Educatfon eform s.Economic eformIn the last 20 years, many developingcountries have adoptedpoliticallydifficultma rket-orientedand structuraladjustment eforms. Why have countriesbeen more willing o ab-sorb he politicalcosts of economic eforms han of education eforms? Part of the answeris that qualityeducation eforms,unlike macroeconomicadjustments,do not provide m-mediate, angiblepoliffcalgains to govemments. Vvhencountriesaddressserious mac-roeconomicproblems e.g.,high inflation),he resultsare often visiblewithin months, huspermittingpoliticianso capitalizeon these accomplishmentsn the near term. In contrast,

SThere renotable xceptons.n hemid-1980s,ordan's ingHussein ecame irectlynvolvednhiscountry's ducationeform, venentnustinghe CrownPrnceas he principal verseer f qualityreformsBerryman997). nNewZealand,hePrimeMinisterLange)ookoverhe education in-istryandappointed reform pecialistBallard)o lead he mplementationPerris 997). nEl Sal-vador,by inviting residentialandidateso participaten variousora to discuss he reformns,eformadvocatesucceededn making ducationeform primaryssue n the 1994presidentiallections(Reimers 997a). n Brazil,n order o signal ovemmentalommitment,auloRenatoSouza,heMinister f Educationuringhe irstadministrationf Femando enrique ardoso1994-1998),e-came he firstcabinetmembero be re-appointeduringCardoso'secondadministrabon1998-2002).

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The Politics of EducationRefom

manybenefitsof improvededucationare imperceptiblen the short term. Incumbentpoli-ticians are more ikelyto wage political battles hat offer immediate ather than long-termpolitical ewards see Geddes 1994). As such, hey are more ikely o devote attention omacroeconomic djustment han o education. This gap between he immediateelectoralconcemsof politiciansand the long-term esults of education eform underminesgovern-ment commitmento the issue of education.

Moreover,many govemrnmentsraditionally elied on educationalsystemsas mechanismsfor politicalco-optation. Teachingpositions are often treatedas a form of employmentoflast resort, very often in compensationor some type of political avor. Mexico is a goodexample. Following he 1968 massacreof students, he Mexicangovemmentattempted

6to alleviatestudentdiscontentby launchinga massiveexpansionof the educationsector.During he "lost decade' of the 1980s,as standardsof living declined, he govemment al-most doubled he membership n the main eachers'union, he SindicatoNacionalde Tra-bajadoresde la Educaci6n SNTE), rom 548,355members n 1978 o close to 1 million n1989 (see Torres 1991). There s no question hat the expansionof education n Mexico nthe 1970s-which coveredall three evels,not ust the universitysystem-was a responseto unmet demand. In 1978, or instance,approximately millionchildren acked accesstoprimary schools. However, t is difficult o deny that with this expansionof spending andunion size the state intended o score politicalpoints among the urban middle class, asector inwhich the ruling party was deemed o be losingelectoral steam. This unioniza-ton allowed he govemment o sheltersegmentsof the population rom the impactof eco-nomic adversity.Qualityeducation eforms eopardize he capacityof govemments o usethe bureaucracy or these ypes of politicalpurposes.

Moreover,althoughextemal pressures or education reform are at an all-time high, theyare still weaker than pressures or economicreform. This is because here are no hardand immediatesanctioningmechanisms or non-compliance. For instance, multilateralinstitutionsextend credit contingenton achievementof macroeconomic nd fiscal objec-tives, hus pressuringgovemments o persevere n economic reforms. In addition,erosionof macroeconomicundamentals an triggercapitaloutflows-a typeof intemational anc-tion for unsoundeconomicpolicy. It is difficult o find similar sanctions or non-deliveryof6The NationalAutonomous niversity f Mexico UNAM)was enlarged:ull-timeprofessorsn-creasedrom5,770 n 1970 o 30,000n 1980; he student odygrewby 78.3percentn 1972-1985;and he academic taffgrewby159.1 ercent. n addition, NTE, he main eachers' nion, ecameoneof he argest ureaucraciesn he country,atheringhe bulkof the ank-and-fileembershipnthe Federabonf StateEmployees, hich n tum s linked o the popular ector f the rulingparty(seeTorres1991).

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Part One

quality ducation. oanconditionalitys seldom tipulated n thebasisof stringent duca-tion reform ccomplishments.nvestors nd enders o not eavea country, t least n theshortandmediumerm, implybecause overnmentsostponeheirpromiseo enhanceeducation.This s not to say thatgovemmentsaceno incentiveso adopta pro-reform genda.Onthe contrary, pro-reformiscoursecores opularityoints or govemrnments,articularlytodaywheneducationeform njoys o muchprestige. Stateshus havea lot o gain by.appearing to implement' ualityeducationaleforms Weiler1994:45;Ginsburg t al.1991).Andwhilesomeministers f education avebeenable o capitalizen their eformachievements,the costsof faltering n thatcommitment-orof deliveringess hanwaspromised-isnot as high as in otherareasof reform.The esult s oftenempty hetoric;lofty eform oalsareannouncedut here s ittle ommitmento implementabon.

Implication1: Instability ndShortTenureat theMinistry evelEvidence f weak policyentrepreneurshipn the areaof educationmay be found n thehigh umover ates n ministries f education.Because eadsof govemment re disin-clined o engagen educationeform attes, heywill use he ministry feducationor a -temativepolitical urposes:o reward olitical upporters,o "park"political llieswhomtheywish o promote,o compensatepposition arties, tc. The result s high umoverrates n ministerialositons seeChart1). Appendix ists he ministers f educationndministersof economy/financerom 21 countriesn various egionsof the world thatlaunched ducationeform n the 1980s nd 1990s, nd hat are mentionedhroughoutthispaper.Someof these eforms dvancedoliticallyArgentina, ustralia, hile,El Sa-vador, ordan, ndonesia,Mexico,NewZealand,Romania, outhKorea,Spainand Uru-guay),whileothersstumbledColombia,iberia, akistan, apuaNewGuinea,Peru,P o-land,SouthAfrica,VenezuelandZimbabwe),s discussedater n thepaper.

7For instance,heMexicanresident,mestoedillo1994-2000),dvancedoliticallyfter ervingas theministerf educationnderPresidentarlos alinas e Gortari1988-1994).hecurrentpresidentalandidatef he uling oalibonn Chile, icardoagos, as lsoministerfeducationntheearly 990s.

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Chart 1: Ministers of Education and FinanceAverage Tenure in Office, 1978-1998ArgentinaAustralia_

Chile _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _Colorbiet_

El Salvador_Indornss

JordanUbe sMexico _

| NowZrmtandPakisttn' _ _|Finance

PapuaN4wGaLir | Education

Pord _Romxania

SoLthAfricsSouLh ora"

Spain -ThadandUruguay

Veneuea |*imb uumu -o 1 2 3 4 5 6

CasesExperiencingGreater olitical etbacksn QualityEducatonReformnn the 1990s.Source: ppendix1'.Threeobservationsemerge:

* There s a hightumover ate n the ministriesof education; n most cases, the averagetenure noffice s less than 2.5 years.

* In most cases, the average enure n office s lower or ministersof education han forministersof finance.

* Most exceptions o the above correlatewith quality efomnsn education e.g., Argen-tina, El Salvador,New Zealand,RomaniaandSouth Korea).

These resultsare inconclusivegiven the samplesize. However, hey are compatiblewiththe argument hat, despite the new impetus or education eform,shortcomingsarecom-mon in the supplyside in general and in comparisonwith the macroeconomicpolicy do-main in particular. (The extent o which he higher umover rate is a significant ndepend-ent variableof deep reform s a more complicated ssuediscussed ater n this paper.)

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Part One

Implication2:DiferentBargainingPowerbetweenMinistersand Teachers'UnionsThe weakness in the supply side has implicatons: t diminishes the govemment'sbar-gainingpower and its capacity o counterbalance eform opponents. This becomes evi-dent by comparing he incentivesand constraints acing politicianswho head ministries feducabonwith those of politcians who head teachers' unions. High ministerial umovermeans that education ministers,even those who would like to initiate sound quality re-forms, have relativelyshorter erms of office (Hausmann 1994). Insofar as ministersex-pect shorter enuresand quick moves o alternativepoliticalposts, heyare less nclined operseverewith costly and unpopular reforms, preferring conflict avoidance solutions n-stead. One result s a preference or yielding o pressures rom below.

Teachers'unions, on the other hand, are often led by professionalpoliticianswho maketheir careers in union activism. Compared o most ministers of education, eaders ofteachers' unions have longer "tenure" see Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank 1996:257,192-294).Moreover, eaders of teachers'unions end to come from leftist parties,whichplace a premium on challenging he state. For a leftist leader, conductinga successfulfight against the state constitutesa positive career move, in sharp contrast with ministersof education, or whom completing he term in office n peace is an optimal career move.Thus, labor eaders have incentives o provoke conflict,whereas education ministers aceincentives o avoid t.

Teachers'unionsalso have more advantages n challenging he state han unions n othersectors. The weapon available o teachers' unions-strikes--is highly discriminating:Kcreates enormouscosts or the government, he intended arget, but relatively ew disrup-tions to the rest of society. This contrastssharplywith strikes n other sectors such as uti-ity services,health and transportabon ectors. For nstance,when the workers of a utilityservice,such as a water supply company,go on strike, hey hurt the govemment,but alsosociety at large, which is indiscriminatelynconveniencedby the lack of running water.When nurses strike, hey punish he government,but they also punish innocent patients.When transportationworkers strike, hey also inconvenienceevery commuting citzen inthe country. However,when teachersgo on strike, he number of innocent citizens ncon-venienced is minimal. Students stay at home, which is an inconvenience mainly forhouseholds hat lack the capacity o supervisechildrenduring the day (and in developingcountries,where multple family membersoften reside n the same dwelling, his might be

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The Politfcs f EducationReform

a smallnumber f households). hus, eachers' nions an challengehe govemmentora long imewith esschance f losing ublic upporthanstrikersn manyothersectors.The magnetism nd high evelsof organization f teachers'unions, heirdiscriminatingweapon gainsthe govemmente.g., trikes),ogether ith a union eadership itha re-duced enure n office, areer ltemativesnd no aversiono conflict, xplain heirpoliticalpower.

Decentlizaonm The Mixed and Insincere Motivesof StatesThe likelihood f manyquality eforms o entailsome orm of decentralizationaisesawhole newset of political ifficulties.Decentralizationnvolves he transferof decision-making uthorty or planning,managementnd use of resourcesrom higher evelsofgovemmentcentral uthorities)o outeror lower iers suchas provinces,municipalities,localcouncils nd even schoolboards see Rondinelli t al. 1989;Rondinelli 981). Al-thoughmany govemments ave embarked n decentralizationrojectssince he late1970s,heircommitmentso the presumed bjectives f decentralizations oftendubious.As Weiler 1990) hows,he threemainargumentsor advancing ecentralization-redis-tributngpower,enhancinghe efficiency f publicservices nd mprovingeaming-con-flict directlywith he nherentnterest f states o centralize uthority.This clashbetweenthe inherentnterest f statesand he inherent oalsof decentralizationomplicateshepolitics f reform doptionhrough t east hreemechanisms.

First,govemmentommitmento decentralizations liable o be nsincere r at eastmoti-vated by the wrong easons. Weilerargues hat govemments ursuedecentralizationmostly or "compensatoryegitimation,".e., to regain egitimacy mong he electoratewhenever his egitimacys faltering, nd or "conflict voidance,".e., whenever entralgovemmentsace heightened onflicts hat they cannot esolve,and hence,seek totransfer hem o otherentities. Othersargue hat govemments ecentralize nly whenthey ack nformationbouthowbest o allocate esourcese.g.,de Groot1988).Yetoth-ersclaim hatgovemmentsursue ecentralizationimplyo favoronepolitical roupoveranother,eading o unnecessaryntemalbickering nd ncoherent olicies McGinn ndStreet1986). Absent heseconditions,ovemmentsose nterestn decentralizationndmayevenattempto undercut r reversehe decentralizationrocess.

8 For a similaranalysis, singdiffering ost-impactsnd bargaining owersof affectednterestgroups o explain he greater xtent f decentralizationn heakh han educationn Venezuela,eeGonzaiez1998).

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Part One

Second, he commitmentof mid-levelbureaucrats,he very same actors n chargeof de-centralizing,may be questionable.Decentralization hallenges he power and authorityofthese bureaucrats (Rondinelliet al. 1989). In addition, bureaucratsmay be a source ofinertia because he leadershipn bureaucraciesoften does not place a premium on indi-vidual initiative. Bureaucratsare expected o follow orders and procedures,but they areseldom rewarded or leaming, nitiatingreforms and solving problems(Berryman 1997).For these reasons, professionalbureaucratsoften stand as formidable obstaclesto re-form.

Third, he falteringcommitmentof centralgovernmentactors, especiallymid-evel bureau-crats, gives rise to an unexpectedpathology n the implementationof decentraization: ttums potentialbeneficiaries uchas local entities nto adversariesof decentralizabon.Lo-cal organsare often thought of as potental beneficiariesof decentralizabon,which freesthem from centralcontroland grants hem new prerogatives (Bird and Wallich1994:123).However,ocal organs are not unambiguousbeneficiaries f decentralization.Even whencarried out with the right intentions,decentralizabonomes with stings attachedand newresponsibilitiese.g., provisionof new services). Thus, local organs may be conditional,rather than whole-hearted,supportersof decentralization;hey welcomedecentralizationprovided hey obtainfinancial autonomy o carry out these new responsibilities Bird andWallich1994).

Central bureaucratsare well positionedo exploit he fragility of local-levelsupport or de-centralizabon.By denying ocal organs inancialresourcesand autonomy, hey can easilyquell this support. Without financialautonomy, ocal organs lose nterest n new responsi-bilities,becomingopponents ather handemanders,of decentralizabon.

In Venezuelaand Colombia n the 1980s,and in Liberiaand Zimbabwe n the 1990s,cen-tral bureaucratsbecame ethal reformadversariesby refusing o grant financial resourcesto local organs, hereby destroying ocal-levelenthusiasm or decentralizabon see Han-son 1989:44;Fiske 1996:18-19). n Zimbabwe, ocal councilsargued that without inancialautonomy, heywould not accept he responsibility f buildingnew schools. In Liberia,anintemationally upported plan o devolve authority o county and districtoffices also loun-dered. Localorgans receivednew officesand staff, but they never received he authority ohire, ire and ransfer eachers,nor o open, close or even certify schools. More mportant,they receivedno operating budget or means to raise funds (Kemmerer1994). In Vene-zuela, while all govemmentsbetween 1969 and 1988 proclaimeddecentralization f edu-cation, regional officials were never actually delegated he authority o managebudgets

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The Politbcs of Education Reform

(Hanson1989). In Colombia,municipalitiesultimatelyopposeddecentralization, ecauseit wouldhave entaileda greater inancialburden-the cost of providingeducation Camoyand Castro1997).

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Overcoming Obstacles to ReformThe mainproblem ith heanalysisn Part1,which s based olelyon cost-benefitmpact,the powersand incidence f policyentrepreneurs nd the mixed motivesof centralauthorities,s that t overstatests case: t over-predictseformparalysis.The empiricalevidencen the ast20 yearscontradictshispessimistic rediction.Numerous asesofquality eformhave beenapproved nd mplementedhroughoutheworld. Table pro-vides ecentexamples.Whilenoneof the citedcases s complete r perfect, nd someentailmore meaningfuleforms han others,all entailsignificant hanges n the overallstructure f theeducationector hatchallenged estednterests f crucialpolitical ctors.

Table2: Examplesof RelativelySuccessful mplementationof Quality-basedEducation ReformsArgentina Thegovemmentecentralizedhe basiceducationystem.Provincesnd he mu-(1991-present) nicipality f Buenos ires ook over responsibilityor schools,eadingo a ministry"without chools."Spendingn basiceducaton as e-structured:n 1988,he gov-emment pent0.63percent f the GDP, nd he provincespent1.78percent.By1993he igures hangedo0.05and2.30 ercent,espectively.hegovemmentlsointroducedurriculumevisions,xtended ompulsorychoolingrom7 to 10 yearsandcreated ew estso measuretudent cademicttainmentseeGarcia e Fanelli1997).Australia Reformsmade he educationystemmoremarket rientede.g.,private niversities(1987-mid wereestablished).n someprovinces,ublicschoolseceived ite-based anage-1990s) ment,schools ndprincipalsecamemoreaccountable,undingollowed tudents,the sizeand authorityf the central ureaucracyas reduced, nd school ouncilsandprincipalsainedmore uthorityseePascoe ndPascoe 997).Chile A major fficiency-orientedeformincluding eepdecentralization,chool utonomy,(1990-present) student-basedunding ndsubsidized rivate chools),nitiatedn 1981underanauthoritarianegime, as or hemostpartpreservedy a center-leftoalition ovem-ment fter he ransitiono democracyn 1990 seeEspinola 997) ndcomplementedwithsignificantuality-orientedeformslonger chool ay, raining, upport etworksand performancencentvesor teachers); nd argeted upportor schoolsn low-income nd uralareas seeDelannoy000).El Salvador The govemmentmplementedeep decentralization,ncluding rantng parents(1991-present) greater ontrol verschool ovemance. undswere ransferredo Communitydu-cationAssociabons,hichwere n charge f hiring nd iring eachers ndschool i-rectors, nddeterminingeachers'alaries ndhiring ecisions,rovidingndadmin-istering ocial ecurity ystemsor eachers, ndmaintaininguildings,mong therthings Ministryf Educabon997).

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The Politcs of EducationReform

Jordan In 1985,afterseveralyearsof following narrow tep-by-stepeform, he government(1985-mid launcheda far-reaching eformpackage Berryman1997). Therewere increases n1990s) mandatory school years, new methods of assessing student performanceandsweeping reforms of the curriculum in favor of a core education for both academicallyindined and vocationally ndined students (Haddad 1994:98).Mexico Funding as shifted rom highereducabonthe norm hroughout abnAmerica) oward(11990s) the needierbasic education. Funding or higher educationhas been reallocatednfavorof innovative rograms nd researchncentives whereas asicoperabonalub-sidies have been kept to a minimum) see Kent 1997). A sweepingdecentralizabonlaw was approved see Schmelkes 997),and new performancencentivesor teach-ers were ntroduced.NewZealand A market-orientednd heavily ecentralizedpproachwas adopted. Schoolsbecame(1987-mid uself-managed"y boardshat includeelectedparentsand which are allowed o em-I 990s) ploy non-unionmembers s teachers. Budgetauthority assed o the schools,whichprocureprivatelymost servicesormerlyprovided y the Ministryof Education.Fund-ing ollowsstudentsn a transparentmanner.The ministryhasbeen streamlined, ndnow ocuseson holdingschoolsaccountableor outcomes, ather han controlling rdeliveringnputs.Romania In the first stage (1990-1991),he govemment chieved he de-communizabonf the(1990-present) curriculum, e-linked he system rom he CommunistParty, ntroduced ew academicstandards nd diversified econdary ducaton. In he secondstage (1993-1997),hegovemmentiberalized ducabonmarketsand established ssessmentests adminis-tered by a specialized gencyoutside he Ministryof Educabon Birzea1994;Birzea1996).Spain The government arriedout deep decentralizationf education, specially t the uni-(1980s) versity evel. Localcouncils groups onsisting f principals,eachers, ity officials ndparents)were established nd granted considerableauthority, ncludinghiring andfiring principals, esigning chool activitiesand approvingbudgetssubmfttedby theministryof educabon. Hanson1990). A series of accessand quality eformswereapprovedn the ate 1980s.SouthKorea After successfully ompletinga program of educationexpansion, he govemment(1980s-present) tumed o quality eforms. In 1994,more han 80 quality-orientedeformswere insti-tuted (e.g., enhancement f primaryand secondary ducation, ncouraging utono-mous decision-makingor admissiono higher educationand establishment f voca-tional rainingcenters). As of 1998,almost70 percentof these reformswere underimplementationMoon1998).Thailand In he 1970s,diversified ducation as ntroduced, nderwhich he existng vocational(1970s-1 80s schoolsbecamediversified nd secondary choolsand the teacher rainingcycle atand ate 1990s) upper secondary evel were o be phasedout. School ees were ncreasedsharply.Curriculumwas revised o reducedisparitiesn quality among egionsand o includebasic academic raining with practicalskills (see Haddad 1994). In a new set ofsweeping, uality-orientedeforms n 1999,compulsory choolingwas extended o 12years; the curriculumwas modernizedo stress math,science and English; ontrolover eacher hiring, iring and developmentwas decentralizedo the provinces; nd

the Ministryof Education as streamlined.Uruguay Access reformswere initiatedat the pre-schoolevel, and quality eformswere intro-(early1990s) ducedat thesecondaryevel. Secondary-leveleacherswere retrained.

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Part Two

The above illustrative ases were not randomlyselected. However, hey representmanyregions of the world and various evels of educationaland economic development. Theyshow that deep, systemic, quality-orientedeforms are politcally feasible, refuting somecommonnotions aboutpolitical mpediments o reform. For nstance, eformscan occur nboth democratic New Zealand) and non-democratic Jordan) settings, under center-left(Spain)and center-right South Korea)govemments,and in new democracies Romania)as well as old ones (Australia). They can occur simultaneouslywith sweepingpackagesof state and economic reform Argentina), r in isolation Uruguay).Reformsalso can oc-cur under he direction of the same politicalparty that in the past tried but failed to reform(Mexico),or they can survive despitea change n political egimes (Chile). Finally, eformscan occur in countriesemerging romviolenceand polarization El Salvador).

The analysis n Part 1 fails to predict hese cases of reform because ts focus s too nar-row. Concentrating xclusivelyon a cost-benefitanalysisof interest group politics,or onthe low probabilityof policy entrepreneurship n the supply side leaves unexplored hemany strategies hat executives can pursue and insttutonal factors that can be rear-ranged n order to overcome politicalobstacles. Lessons eamed from these and other,less-successful, ases may provide insight into conditions under which countries canovercome he political mpediments o quality eform.

Four Strategies for Overcoming Political ObstadesPart I identified hree broad politicaldifficultiesassociatedwith education reform.Any p o-litical strategy or institutionalsettng that addresses these problemsshould, in principle,enhance he likelihood of reform adoption. This part suggests hypothesesabout suchstrategiesand insttutional settings.

The hypotheses re grouped nto four broad categories:1) type and style of reform;2) po-libcalstrategies o bolster he supply of reform; 3) politicalstrategies o bolster he demandfor reform; and 4) institutional eatures hat magnifyor diminish he power of veto groups.The discussion of each hypothesisbegins with a brief statement about why, at least intheory, the proposed hypothesis might have a causal impact on the chances of reformadoption. Then, examples rom one or more cases are provided o illustrate he viabilityofthe hypothesis. Finally, ome caveats about he validity of the hypothesesare discussed.These caveats do not invalidate he hypotheses,but they raise issues that researchersand practitoners must consider. The discussion s not meant o establish conclusivelyhevalidity of the hypotheses, but to identify heoretically nformed hypotheses hat may or

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may not be confirmed by further research. Due to time and resourceconstraints, he dis-cussionof cases relies on secondarymaterials.Appendix 1 listsall cases discussed.

Reform TymHypothesis : Combining ccess lements nto quality eform nhances e-formadoption.

Argument:One way to diffuse he problemsassociatedwith quality eforms s to addressthe issue of concentrated osts/distributed enefit. Supplementing uality reform with ac-cess or expansion elements,which increase he resourcesavailable o key stakeholdersand thus are politicallymuch easier to adopt Berryman1997), mightachieve his.

Examples:n Chile after 1990, the new democrabccenter-leftadministration f PatricioAylwin increasedschool budgets and subsidies,and raised teachers'salaries (Espinola1997:5-8). The govemmentsought to gain support (and placate frustration) among keyactors n the educationsector who were dismayedover the govemment's ntention o pre-serve many of the quality eforms nitiatedby the previous authoritarian egime.

In Mexico, after various failed attempts o decentralize he educational system in the1980s, the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) implemented asweepingprogram or the modemration of educabon. By 1993 he govemmentwas ableto transfer 513,974 teachers, 116,054administrativeemployees, 1.8 million pre-primarystudents, 9.2 million elementary students and 2.4 million high school students rom na-bonal to state-levelurisdiction see Murilo 1999). An important omponentof the Salinasreform,absent n the reform efforts of the 1980s,was the use of access elements: eachersalary hikes were establishedabove nabonalwage ceilings; new pension benefits, andpay incentiveswere created (Murillo 1999). In addition, he govemmentcreated a fund forsocial spending (PRONASOL),which includedsubstantal spending on access educabonreforms. Interesbngly,his increasedspending occurred at the same time that the gov-emnment as carrying out market-oriented eforms and stabilization hrough fiscal andmonetary austerity. These access elements served as compensatorymechanisms orreform opponents n SNTE,which had rejectedevery previous attempt o change Mexico'shighlycentralizedsystem. Scholars have little doubt that the extra spending allocated or9 PRONASOLrovidedunding or building nd efurbishingchoolsand student rants. Politicalscientists rgue hat PRONASOLlayeda larger ole as a mechanism f political o-optationhaneconomic ompensationor economicosers seeComelius t al. 1994).

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Part Two

the educabon eform, at a bmewhenother sectorswere experiencing utbacks,was a po-litcal strategy o win the supportof unions.

Corollary: In addition o materialcompensation, ovemmentscanofferpoliti-calprivileges o reform adversaries.

Researchon the politicsof market-oriented eforms has found that govemrnmentshat grantpotentialpoliticalchallengers ertainpolitcal privileges e.g., centralizedcontrolover socialspending,special treabment uring electon periods, access to policy-making,accommo-dation of some concemsof dissidents)stand a greater chance of obtaining he coopera-bon of those actors (Corrales 1997-98). In Mexico, he Salinas administrabongrantedsimilar politicalprivileges o the SNTE. The Mexicangovemmentalloweddissidentswithinthe union to enter the nabonal eadershipby introducingproporbonal epresentation ndabolishing he automaticaffiliabonof the union with the ruling party (Murillo 1999). In NewZealand,although he govemment mposed some reformsagainst the wishes of teachers(e.g., grantingschools he right o hire non-unionizedeachers), t also yielded on a signifi-cant political ssue: urisdictionover teachers'salaries was not granted to the newly cre-ated school boards, remaining instead under the control of the central govemment(Gordon 1992).

Caveat: It is a mistake o assume that access elements,especiallywhen used for co-optation purposes, are unproblemabc. Sometmes the increase n spending nduced byaccess reforms creates opportunities or politicalpatronage see Gibson 1997; Weyland1996), which can upsetcivic leaders and the publicat large,and gives rise to accusationsof govemmentalcorrupbon. Pakistanprovides a good illustraabon.0 Two types of accessreform were attempted n Pakistan n the 1980s. One flourishedpolitically,while he othercollapsed hree years after its launch. The successful reform was an inibabve o openschools n mosques ocated n villages where there were no primary schools (mostlypoorareas). Funds were allocated o hire new teachers,provide a stpend to mosque eadersand acquire new school supplies and uniforms. The program became widely accepted.New users reached he hundredsof thousands.

The failed access reform was the Nai Roshni schools program, consistng of drop-inschools or childrenaged 10-14 who had left or never attended school. Like he mosqueprogram, he Nai Roshni eformmade use of existing acilites: schools were asked o ofler

' Thediscussionf Pakistan rawsromWarwick t al. 1990).

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The Politics of EducationRefonn

up to threehoursof extraclassesn theaftemoon.Significantnvestments ere made ohire eachers nd provide chool upplies.At somepoint, more han 390,000 tudentswere enrolled.However,he NaiRoshniprogramailedpolitically ecausehe publicbe-cameconvincedhat he government as using he programor political atronage.Theevidencewas hard o challenge.Federal-leveloliticians,ncludinghoseat the cabinetlevel,were givenenormous rerogativesver hiringdecisions." Teachers esiring p-pointments eeded ecommendationsrompoliticians. n addition, valuationeamshadvery close ies o the agencyn chargeof the program,he Literacy nd MassEducationCommission.Publicoutcry orced he govemmento terminate he program n threeyears.Why did the mosqueprogrambecomepolitically cceptable, hile he Nai Roshnipro-grambecame npopular?Whydid wo similar ccessprogramsn he same ountryandin he sameime period xperience uchpolitically ichotomousutcomes?The answermighthave o dowith he varyingevelsof decentralizationhataccompaniedach eform.The mosque programwas predicatedon the direct involvementof parents and religiousfigures the mams).1Thus, he mosque rogram rovidedocalstakeholderspportuni-ties o develop senseof ownershipn he program. ncontrast,he Nai Roshniprogramwas set upwitha maximumevelof interferencey central-leveloliticians. his made n-cumbents ppearas the soleowners andabusers) f the program,eavingno room orotheractors. Finally,he mosqueprogram onverted crucialactor-the clergy-into astakeholder f the reforms strategiesor mobilizing otential upporters re discussedlater). n short, ccess eformshatare notaccompaniedy reformshatenhance oliticalaccountabilityan be neffective.

Hypothesis2:An incremental ather han all-encompassing pproach en-hances he chanceof refonn acceptance.

Argument: Haddad 1994)argues hat education eforms hat ollowa moregradual,step-by-step pproach "incremental")end to encounter ewer politicaldifficultieshan" For nstance, federal gencytheLiteracy nd MassEducabon ommission)as authorizedomake30 percent f hiringdecisions. egislatorst thenational ssembly ereauthorizedo makean additional 0 percent f hiringdecisions; nd he PrimeMinister as permittedo make10 per-centof hiring ecisions.12 This nvolved trade-off.The high-profileole grantedo Imamsunderminedhe accountabilityandeffectveness f he program. mamsweregrantedhe inalwordon what s and s not done nthe mosque.Theywere hus n charge f hiring nd supervisingeachers,askswhichmanycritcsargue heydidnot perform rofessionally.

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PartTWo

more comprehensive,weeping eforms "synoptic").Accordingo Haddad, narrowscopeallows fficialso test heacceptancef the eforms nd s ess ikely o provokehemobilization f cost bearers. A piecemeal pproach voids he nationalspotightandkeeps o a minimumhe number f cost-bearers.

Examples:Haddadllustratesis argument y comparingeformsn Jordan 1970s) ndThailand 1960s)with those n Peru(late 1960s-early 970s). All three eformswerelaunched ndernon-democraticegimes.The Peruvianaseeven ncludedar more on-sultationwithcitizens.Yet, he Peruvian aseexperiencedhe mostseriousmplementa-tion difficulties. He argues hat a crucial explanation as that Jordanand Thailandadopted n incrementalpproach uring he irststageof reforms, hereasPeruplungeddirectlyntoa synoptic pproachHaddad 994:55-57).Caveats:Two caveats an be raised. First,as Haddad cknowledges,ncrementalp-proaches lso can generate olitical roblems. In Jordan, or nstance,he ncrementalapproach aveno incentiveor the govemmento investmuch n ermsof political apitalor other esources.Govemment ttentionwaned,eading o poorplanning, hich n tumled o implementationifficultiesHaddad 994:102).A second aveat s thatgradual p-proaches isk becomingess credible ver ime, eadingmanyactors o doubt he com-mitment f thegovemment hich, n tum,hurtssocietal ooperationn reform seeRodrik1989). Incrementalpproacheslsoallow eform pponentsmore ime andopportunitiesto organize nd mobilize llieson heirbehalf.Finally, n all-out ffortmightbe preferablebecauset allows hegovemmento expandhe number f actors nvolved eyondhosewhoare merely ffected y local eforms,herebyncreasinghe number f potential llies.BothJordan nd Thailand witchedo a synoptic pproach alfway nto heir eform roc-essesand managedo follow hrough.

Hypothesis3: Packagingeducation efonns with other types of reforms (of thestate or the economy)enhances he chancesof reform adoption.

Argument:Appending ducationeformso a widerpackage f reformsmightoffersev-eral advantages. t can generate reatercredibility y signaling trongcommitmentochanginghe statusquo,which s crucial or societal ndorsementf reforms. Commit-ment o other eformsmighthavespillover ffectso education.Andonce he country asgained ome eformmomentumnd seempositive esults,he public s more ikely o ac-cept urther eformsn otherareas.

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Examples: There are numerous examples of deep education reforms packaged withbroader publicsector reforms, ncluding hose in Australia,Argentina,Chile, New Zealand,Romania,Spainand, since he 1997crisis,Thailand.

Caveat: Appendingeducabon eform o broader politicaland economic reforms also cangive rise to new problems. Packaging educabon reforms with economic reform cansometimes amish the imageof education eforms. In Peru in 1991,combiningeducabonreformswith a programof economicstabilization nd adjustmentallowed he opposition omislabel all education reforms as 'neo-liberal" and IMF-mandated. Given the negativeconnotationsof these labels at the time, societal outcry against the reforms intensified(Graham 1999).

Or, govemments might devote more attention to the other components of the reformpackage. Education reforms may fall through the cracks, or be sacrificedon behalf ofother goals. In South Africa, he need to abide by democratic principlesand to create agovernment of nationalunity has placed brakes on education reforms. On the one hand,the rulingAfrican NationalCongress ANC) party has agreed to slow spendingand accessreforms in response to reservabons aised by the main opposition party, the NationalParty.3 On the other hand, he ANC has had to resist some populistdemandsby variousradical educationgroups, many of which have strong inks to the ANC, leading to violentprotests.' In response, he ANC sloweddown some efficiency-orientedeforms. The re-sult has been a reform mpasse. The exigenciesof consolidatinga democracy espectfulof minorityparties and economic restraintscreated obstacles for access reforms, whileradical pressuregroups affiliatedwith the ruling party blocked quality reforms see Pape1998).

In Poland, education reforms were launched simultaneouslywith democratizaton andeconomic adjustment The economic reforms produced a short-term ise in unemploy-ment. Given the education sector's role as employer of last resort, govemment officialsdecided o slow down education eform.

13 TheNabonal arty strongn CapeTownand represenbinghiteand upper-incomeolored on-stituents) pposed new undingmechanism hichmandatedhatonlydassesof 35 pupils n sec-ondary chools nd40 n primary chools ouldbe eligibleo receiveederal unding.Privatewhiteschools,many f whichhave mallereacher-studentatios,elt hat his eformeft hemout.14 ANC egislators aveopposed govemment roposalor the ntroductionf compulsorychoolfees on a sliding scale based on family income. The legislatorsdemanded ree educationnstead(see McGregor1996; Vergnani1993).

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Part Two

Bolstering the Supply SideOne way to overcome mplementation ifficulties s to counteract he shortcomings n thesupply side of reform. The followingare three possibleways to do so.

Hypothesis: Entrustingducationeformsoministrieswithow urnoverratesenhanceshe chance f reform doption.

Argument: Lowering urnover rates or transferring eform esponsibilityo ministrieswithlow turnover rates resolves problems n the supply side such as lack of policy continuity,propensity oward quick fixes, little attention o long-term goals, preoccupationwith alter-native career plans, etc. Pension eforms have advancedmore than education eform nLatin America in the 1990s partly because he former have been led by more stable andpowerfulministriesof finance Nelson 1999).

Examples: In Australiaafter 1987 and Argentinaafter 1991, some responsibilities f edu-cation reform were transferred o ministriesof finance. In El Salvador, he governmentkept reformswithin the urisdictionof the Ministryof Education,but assured he continuoustenure of a strong minister. A comparisonwith Colombia,where ministerial umover atesremained high, llustrates he benefitsof lowering umover rates. Both countries aunchedmajor eforms n the 1990s,combiningboth quality and access elements,at a bme of po-liticalpolarizationand widespreadviolence. However, eforms in El Salvadoradvancedfarther. The govemment aunched he EDUCO program,an effort o enhanceschool cov-erage in rural areas. Local councils, which include parents, received he authority o runpublicschools and make hiring, firing and budget decisions. Remarkably,he reformerselicitedconsensusamong domesticactors,despite he prevailingpolitcal mistrustand d e-spitethe fact that EDUCO argeted rural areas, where conflictwas greater (see C6rdovaMacias 1996;Reimersand McGinn 1997;Reimers1997a; Meza 1997).

In Colombia,however,reforms an into trouble (see Montenegro1995). n 1989, Colom-bia's Congress approved egislationgiving municipalitiesa greater role in basic services.This culminated n the 1991 Constitution,which establishedone of the most ar-reachingdecentralizationmandates in Latin America,covering the education sector. Althoughsome reforms were implemented rom 1991 to 1994, the key components of the re-forms-approval of school autonomy and the municipalization f basic education-couldnot be implemented.Part of the explanationor this was the inclusionof recalcitrantanti-reform groups,whichcompromised he reform process. There also may be a simplerandmore undamentalexplanation: ower ministerial enure noffice. Between 1989and 1998,

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El Salvador has had two ministersof education-an impressivedegree of continuity. Infact, when the govemmentchanged n 1994, the ministerof educationand her staff wereasked to remain in office. Colombia, on the other hand, had seven ministers between1988 and 1997,almost one new ministerper year. 5

Caveat: First, ministerial umover ates might be neithera necessarynor a sufficientcon-dition for reform. Some cases of reform have occurred n contextsof high tumover (Aus-tralia, Jordan, Spain and South Korea). In other cases, ow tumover rates have not pro-duced major politicalbreakthroughs SouthAfrica). Second, high ministerial umover mayactuallybe a symptom, ather han a cause, of difficulties. High tumover rates may reflectexistingstate-society ensionsover the reform agenda; presidentsmay be changing min-isters as a response o difficulties n containingconflict within he sector. A more refinedhypothesiswould be that low ministerial umovermight act as an independent ariable-orat least as an inducement-of reform adoption,but its opposite-a high turnover rate-may be a reflection, ather han a cause, of such difficulties.

Hypothesis2: Greater inks with the outside world or the global economy en-hance the chance of reform adoption.

Argument: Given that part of the new impetus for reform comes from extemal sources(see Part 1), it would follow hat greater receptivity o the outsideworld results n greaterincentives o pursue quality education reform. Openness o global forces exposes coun-tries to the systemic mperativeof developinga competitiveeconomy,which encourageseducation mprovements. Extemal inks also can provide govemmentswith new politicalallies (intemational dvisors)and sourcesof advice and funding hat may stimulate eforminitiatives.

Examples: SoutheastAsian countriesare classicexamples of the presumedconnectionbetweenopenness o the globaleconomy and adoptionof quality reforms n education. Inthe 1960s,several SoutheastAsian countries adoptedan export-orientedmodelof devei-opment. Govemments hroughout he region reasoned hat in order to gain an exportingedge in highly competitiveworld markets, hey needed o raise the educational evel oftheir workforce. Any table of countries with outstandingeducationalperformance n thelast 20 years typically ncludesAsiancases such as Hong Kong,Japan, Singapore,South15Otherpossible xamples f dichotomousutcomes orrelated ith differentumover ates ndudeRomania-PolandndArgentina-PeruseeAppendix ).

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Part Two

KoreaandTaiwan seeWorldBank1993; ntemationalaborOrganization995).Sing -pore s a goodexample. ocompete gainst ounterpartsn intemational arkets, ing -pore n the 1980s nacted eformsntendedo producehe best-trainedabor orce n theregion.Thegovemmenttimulatedompetitionmong upilsby dividinghemaccordingto ability nd selectinghe mostacademicallyifted tudents t theage of nine. It encou -aged competition mong schoolsby publishing cademic esultsand permittingopschools o raise heir ees and becomesemi-independent. he govemment ven m-poseda punitiveax on foreign irmswitha highproportionf low-skilled orkers,herebyboosting rivatesectordemand or educated orkers Wooldridge 993). Similarly, nexplicitmpetusor Thailand's ewlyenacted 1999) ducaboneforms as adverse o m-parisonswith the education ystems n neighboringountries nd the threatof fallingcompetitiveness.It alsomay notbe coincidentalhat he riseof educationeform n the political gendas fLatinAmerica n he 1990soccurred imultaneously ith he region's mbrace f a moreoutward-orientedodel f economic evelopment,ncluding eep rade iberalizationseeMorrow 998;Edwards 995).Caveats: Extemal orcesare mportant, ut not decisive hapersof domestic eforms.Theycan help set he agenda, venstimulate eform. But outsideof the realmof eco-nomicstabilization,xtemalorcesare nsufficiento drive reformand cannotaccountorthe variation n outcomes crosscases,especiallyn administrativeeformsof service-providing ureaucraciesKaufman 999:361).Furthermore,ot all open-economyoun-triesspecializen he export f goods nd serviceshatdepend n high-skill orkers. Forexample,many countries n CentralAmericaand the Caribbean ave specializedncheap-labor xports uch as tourism, gricultural nd primarycommodities.For thesecountries, conomic pennesss not heprimaryncentiveor quality ducationeform.The prosandconsof involvingntemationalctorsn educationeform resimilar o thosein debates bout he merits f globalization. orsome,extemal iesaredesirableo com-bat provincialism,mprove tandards,ncrease ccountabilityf stateofficials, nd mbuereformswith legitimacy,olitical owerand resources, tc. For others,hese ies under-mine ocal nitiatives,ncourageoliticianso pursueoreign gendas, reate races o thebottom" ndgenerate ationalistacklashes.6

16 For a glance at this ongoingdebate,see Rodrik 1997)and Barber 1992).

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The Politics of Education Reform

Hypothesis: Independentro-reform dvisory ouncils olster hesupplyofreform.

Argument: Perhapsone of the most promisingways to compensate or shortcomings nthe supply of reforms s to establish independentadvisory/monitoring ouncils to advisethe ministryof education,debate and propose policy reforms, and monitor he implemen-tation process. By establishing roups of reform advocateswith onger ermsof office hanthose of the education ministers, hese councils maycompensate or one of the mainpo-litical obstacles o reformadoption-supply deficiency. Ideally,councils prevent nertia nthe ministryand introduce ontinuitydespiteministerial hanges. Like independent entralbanks, independent ouncilscan insulatedifficultpolicies rom politicalpressuresand e n-couragegovemments o upholddisciplinedespitepopularpressure. Unlike centralbanks,however,educationadvisorycouncils end to include representativesrom across society.As such, they can avoid the democraticdeficit associatedwith independent entral banks,which are always govemed by a single non-elected/non-representativeeader. In short,independentcouncils can help advance reforms because they can produce both policyimpetusand ties betweenchange eams and civil society.

Examples: Some of the most far-reaching eformers have establishedvarious forms ofindependentcouncils. In New Zealand, he Picot Commission,an independent ask forcecomposedof two educators, wo business peopleand various politicians,was establishedin 1987 with a broad mandate o propose reforms (Gordon 1992:7). The Commissionproposals nduded the creationof several ndependent nsttutions o sell the reforms andthe govemmentorganized ours of pro-reform ndividuals rom educabongroups includingparent representabves, nown as "cause champions," o speak at public fora on behalfofthe reforms. In additon, a group of evaluators, composed of eminent educators, metregularly o scrutnize the actvibes of the working groups and serve as the liaison o non-cabinetparliamentarymemberswith experienceor interest n educabon Perris 1997).

In Jordan n 1985,when KingHusseindecided o switch rom an incrementalo a synoptcapproach,he appointed he NabonalCommission o Assess EducationalPolices,a reformcommitteeheaded by the Crown Prince. The commission set up a central task force,comprisingboth privateand public sector representatives, nd appointed ield committeesto collect data. Overall, he committeemonitored he reform process, evaluatedpolicies,identifiedcost-effective nnovabonsand advised the ministry (Berryman 1997; Haddad1994:92-98). This advanced he reform process n a country notorious or a high tumoverrate in the ministryof education. Another independentcommission, he NabonalCenter

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for Educatfon esearch ndDevelopment,hich ncludedepresentativesromhigh-levelbureaucracies,ocationalrainingcorporations,niversities nd hink tanks as well aseconomists ndeducators asestablishedo monitorhe mplementation.In El Salvador, n advisory ouncilof 50 representaffvesrom30 different roups inclu -ing insurgents,lergyand echnical xperts)was created urng he assessmenttages.Stakeholdersere equiredo submit osition aperso the council, hichproved o suc-cessful n maintaininghe paceof reforms hat he initially kepticalminister ecidedoextend ts ife hroughouthe mplementationtages Reimers 997a).In Mexico, uality ontrol n higher ducation, n importanteatureof the 1990s eforms,has beendelegatedo bodies hat are either ndependentf ministerial ppointmentsrfunding, uch as CENEVAL,1or at least elatively utonomousboth rom the ministryand unions), uchas the peer eview ommittees.Thesebodieshave nfusedMexico'sreforms ince1988witha significant egreeof continuity,espite he ncreasen politicalturbulencen the national ceneandhighministerialumovern he 1990s Kent1997).In Thailandn 1974, heCouncil f Ministers stablished special ommittee f prominentand highly espected hai ntellectuals,igh-level ureaucrats,ducation xperts nd rep-resentativesrom civic organizations nd teachersunions Haddad1994:140). Thiscommission ucceededn gaining ocietalacceptanceor potentially olemicaleforms,such as the diversificabonf secondary chooleducation. More ecently,ndependentcommissionshairedby respected usinesseadersplayeda key role n the designofThailand's 999 eforms.Comparablendependent odies avebeencreated n Chile the BrunnerCommission),SouthKorea the Committee n EducationReform mplementation),omania theNa-tionalCouncilor Reform f Education)ndUruguaytheNational dministrationf PublicEducation,n charge f primary ndsecondary ducation).Certaincommonalitiesmerge rom these cases. To be effective,ndependent dvi-sory/evaluativeodies houldnclude ot ustpoliticians,utalso epresentativesromcivilsociety, espectedntellectualeaders, pinion-makersuchas joumalists nd hink-tank17 CENEVALCentro acionale Evaluaci6n)s a non-govemmentalnstitutionharged ithen-trance xaminationsor upper econdarychoolsndhigher ducation. ENEVALs allowedogeneratencomehroughhesaleofassessmenterviceso educabonalnstitutions,oth t homeandabroad.

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The Politicsof EducationReform

experts. In some cases (e.g., Uruguay), nvolving echnocrats rom ntemationalorganiza-tions such as ECLAC helped politically o signal impartiality and competence. In the1970s in Thailand,community eaders disseminatednformationconcemingschools andmade suggestions egardinghow schoolsmightcontribute o the community.

Independent advisory councils are not panaceas, but they can perform crucial politicaltasks. First, he respectability f council members nfuses he reformeffort with credibility,thus contributing o societal acceptance. Second, council members who are joumalistsand intellectuals stablish inks between reformersand the opinion-making ector, hus i n-creasing the chance that local commentatorsbecome both stakeholders and frequentwriters on the topic. Third, and most important,councils counteract expected shortcom-ings in the supplyof reform nitiatives. In some cases, for instance,heads of state instructtheir ministersof education o follow he directivesof these independent ouncils. Settingup a formally constitutedgroup with longer terms of office, nonevidentalternativecareerplans and interest n the reform can act as an effective counterbalance o the negativeside-effectof high ministerialumover.

Caveat: The effectivenessof independentadvisory/evaluative ouncilsmay depend onthe initial degree of commitmentat the executive evel. Initially, he chief executive mustbe committedenough o appoint he independentbody, and second, to instruct he minis-ter to follow its advice. Councils cannoteasily create govemment commitment o reformwhere it does not already exist. What the councils can do is to galvanizeexistingcom-mitment, give it direction, prevent t from waning during the implementationperiod, andestablishstronger inks between he state and society. Another problem s that, over ime,councils can become yet another vested interest group, more concemedwith defendingthe status quo than promotingaccountability. Finally,advisory councilsdo not easily ad-dress one of the most serious problems f education eform:opposition rom cost-bearers.Mechanisms or engagingsocietalallies and neutralizing eformopponentsare still nece s-sary.

Bolstering the Demand for ReformThe recent swellingof societaldemand for quality education reform might still be insuffi-cient. Left to themselves,quality reform beneficiaries e.g., parents,employersand citi-zens in general) are unlikely o coalesce nto strong pressure groups advocating eforms.A successful reform strategy requires mechanisms or counteractingweaknesseson thedemandside.

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Hypothesis: nfonnatfon isseminationtrategies olster hedemandor e-form.

Argument:Citizensend o minimizehe bme andenergy hey spend nforminghem-selvesaboutpublicaffairs. n a worldof limitedimeand resources,heymaysee ittle e-ward n investing nergyo understandncreasinglyomplexssuesoverwhich heyhavelittle nfluence"rabonalgnorance"). onsequently,itizensesort o nformationhortcutsto form heiropinions.They ollow ues rom echnical xperts,avoritepoliticians,eers,or goodmarketng ampaigns,ather hanactively esearch ll existingnformaton.Thiscan be eithera liability r an asset or changeeams. On the onehand, abonalgno-ranceand nformation hortcutsmakecitizens usceptbleo veto groups,whichmounteffective ndemotionalublic elation ampaignshat serveas informatonhortcuts.Onthe otherhand,f changeeamsmount heirownpre-emptivenformatonampaigns,heystanda chance f gaining itizens' upport. nformaton isseminationsmore ikely o beeffectivef it is backedby professional,cientific esearch see Reimersand McGinn1997).Examples:n NewZealand,he govemment stablished orkingparties composedfleadersromall nterest roups)whichmet egularly t the local evel o seekconsensuson reform mplementation.n ElSalvadorn the 1990s eformers sedboth nformatondisseminabonnd inclusion trategies.At a time when societalenthusiasmor the re-formswas waning,ocal eformers,ogetherwitha team rom he Harvardnsttute or In-temational evelopmentHIID), eld a seriesof meetings nd workshops ith ocalac-tors,civic eaders, usinesseaders,oumalists,ministerialtaff,etc. (Oneof thesemeet-ingsnvolvedhe presidental andidates.) s a result,heoppositionarties ndorsedhereform. In Uruguayhe reformerslsoconducted massivenformaton ampaignncethe reformprogramwas designed.Theseefforts ucceededn convincingitzensaboutthe need or extensiveeforms, ot a trivialaccomplishmentonsideringhat n the ate1980sewcitizensreated ducationeform s an urgentmatter.Caveats:First, high-profilepproachs notalways ppropnate. uring hegestatione-riod (e.g.,whenstudies bout he country's ducatonal eficitsare being onducted),low-profilepproachmightbewiser. At thisstage, he govemments ll equippedo win apublic elations ar, f one develops, articularlyince ts findings nd recommendabonsmaybe ncompleter not agreed r both. Engaginghe entre public n a policy ebate ta time when the reformershemselves re unsureabout heir positonscan backfire.

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Someauthors ven suggest hieldinghe reform eam rom outside nterferenceuringthis stage(e.g.,see Thomas1994). In Uruguay, l Salvador nd Nicaragua, fficialslaunchedmassivenformation-consultationampaigns nlyafter he diagnosticests npublic chools erecompleted ndproposalsor reformweredrafted.Second,nformationissemination ay bolster emand, ut t may be ineffectiven neu-tralizingoppositionrom cost-bearingroups. Adversely ffectedpartiesn the reformprocess o notalwaysaccept s valideven he most ransparentnformationrovidedothem (Reimers nd McGinn1997;see alsoHusen1994:18).For nstance,n a referen-dumamong eachers n he need orreform, 8 percent f teachersn Poland oted n a-vorof no eform, espitehegovemment'sll-outnformationampaignSabbat-Swidlicka1994). n Pakistan, team rom he HIIDconducted xtensiveesearch n theeducationneedsof he country, nly o discoverhateducation fficialswerecompletely nmoved ythe findings Relmers nd McGinn 997:xiv).Most ikely,he officials n,derstoodhe is-suesat stake,but nonethelessejectedhe nformation ecause hey had concreteea-sons o fear heirmplications-the eforms ouldcurtailhe power f centralbureaucrats.Inshort, n somecases, more uccessful trategymay be o keepa low-profilenforma-tion strategy uring he reformgestation eriod, hen switch o a high-profile trategy fdisseminationhenadvocates avea beKterdeaof needsand goals,supplementedystrategieso dealwith eform pponents.

Hypothesis2: Involvingpotential beneficiariesn reformn esign and evaluationenhances he chanceof reformacceptance.

Argument: Because eneficiariesacedistributedenefitss wellas various xitoptions,theydo notoftencoalescentoeffective ressure roups. ncorporatingotential enefici-aries n the reformprocessmight ounteracthis. The notion hat he nclusion f actorsenhanceseformacceptances paramountn theoriesof democratizationnd corpora-tism. Inclusion iveschangeeams he opportunityo address eservationsnd,more m-portant,o convertopponentsseeReimers 997b). nclusion an um passivebenefici-aries nto activestakeholders.nclusion lsoallows eformerso uncover nd respondoopponents'bjections. hus, an expandingodyof evidence upportsheconvictionhatincludingocalpersonnel, uchas teachers,n decisions bout mprovingchools ostersmoreeffectivemplementationf reforms" Thomas1994:1855;ee also Navarro t al.1998;Reimers nd McGinn1997;Crouchand Healey1997:1-15nd 1-17;Fiske1996;WorldBank1995:138-142;usen1994:8-9).

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Examples: n Pakistan, ne easonor he success f the mosqueprogramwas he n-corporation f thereligious ector,he Imams,whoweregivena direct ole n he schools.In Thailandn the 1970s,he govemmentncludedocalproviders ndconsumers f edu-cation n the mplementationrocess Haddad 994:157).Teachers ndschooladminis-tratorswerebroughtn to helpdesign diversifiedurriculum;dministrators,arents ndstudentswere calledon to assess ts success. Schools fferedrainingand awarenessprograms, rovidingownand village wellers pportunitieso observehe newschoolsnaction. In El Salvador, ewZealand ndNicaragua, arentswere givena role as votingmembersn newly reated chool-levelouncils r boards f trustees, harged ithschoolmanagement In NewZealand, tudent epresentativesere also givenseats,and a1991 evision f the by-laws llowed nyone, ot ust parents,o be elected o boards ftrusteesn order o encouragenvolvementf otherpotential eneficiaries,.g.,businessleaders.Caveats:As with nformation isseminationtrategies,nclusionmightbe ineffectual-maybeeven counterproductive-in ealingwith reformopponents. Reformopponentsmay ake advantage f their nclusionn policydeliberationso derail he reformprocess.Opponents o notgiveup heiroppositionimply ecausehegovernmentistenso them.In Argentina n the 1980s,reform opponents ncluded n public debatesblockedmeaningfuleform. The new administrationf Raul Alfonsin 1983-1989), lected ftersevenyearsof authoritarianovemrnment,ttemptedo mprove elations ithactors n heeducabon ectorand pave he way or qualityeducationeformsby adopting policyofchangehrough itizenparticipation.hegovemmentonvened Pedagogical ongress,madeup of localprovincial nd national ssemblieso meetover he courseof severalyears o reacha consensus n a neweducationaw. "[E]veryone as o have he right oparticipate,"ncluding ctorswitha vested nterest n the statusquo (Hanson 996:309).After our yearsof constant ebate,no meaningful onsensus merged. Cost-bearinggroups,ncludingeacher nions ndclerical nterests,ookadvantage f their nclusionnpolicydeliberationso waterdown he reformistmpetus.Colombia'seforms n he early 1990s,whichcalled or one of the most ar-reachinge-centralizationsn LatinAmerica, ere blockedn partby the eading eachers' nion F E-CODE),a highlyorganized nd centralized nionwith more than 200,000members.Govemment fficials evermanaged o persuadeFECODE. Inclusion f FECODEnpolicydeliberationsndedup mpedinghe deepening f reforms. Moreover,t sent hewrong ignals o congressionaleaders. t led hem o overestmatehedegreeof societal

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The Politicsof EducationReform

opposition o reform. As a result, both Congress and the ministerof education began oquestion he desirability f some reforms Fiske 1996; Montenegro1995). New legislationadopted n 1993 and 1994 did not provide schools he autonomy o select, hire or sanctionpersonnel.

In Poland n 1993, the 300,000-strongPolish eachers' union (ZNP) resisted he govern-ments attempt to decentralizesecondaryeducationand introducea performance-basedpromotion system for teachers. To placate his opposition, he govemment appointed aZNP leader as deputy prime ministerof education n 1994 and promised o raise eachersalaries. ZNP opposition emainedas unyieldingas ever,eventually orcing he ministerofeducation KazimierzMarcinkiewicz)o resign see Sabbat-Swidlicka 994).

In short, nclusion may be an insufficient tep. It does not address he main reason thatvetogroups oppose reforms. It also ails o protect change eams from the actions of vetogroups.

Hypothesis: n casesof decentralization,ranting reater inancial utonomyto ocalentities nhancesocal-level emand or reform.

Argument:To bolster ocal-leveldemand or decentralization,t is necessary o generate"localempowerment," .e.,grant ocal organs he appropriateauthorityand means o man-age resources Kemmerer1994:1415; ee also Rondinelliet al. 1989). Without autonomyover budget, ax collection,and personnel matters, ocal entties will see decentralizabonmore as a burden han an opportunity, ossibly uming against he reforms.18 Conversely,accompanyingdecentralizationwith increased inancial ransfers or revenue powers canincrease he chance of local support or education eform.

Examples: In Spain n the 1980s,a social democratic govemment camiedout a quasi-devolutionof decision-making uthority n education o 17 newly createdquasi-federal e-gions, calledautonomous ommunities, ome of which harboredstrong pro-independencemovements Hanson 1990;Hanson1989). The centralgovemmentgranted ocal councilsauthorityover school staffingand budget issues. The six communities hat were grantedcompetencias, .e., decision-makingauthorty plus financial transfers, willingly acceptedthe new decentralized reforms. In Papua New Guinea, provinces received both theauthority o run schools and considerable ontrol over expenditures. Local entities thus18Forefficency ains ssociated ith ocalbudget utonomy, eeSavedoff1998).

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became trong lliesof reform-mindedfficials ecausehey eceivedoth ights ndnewresponsibilites.n Argentinan 1991,at the timeof the decentralizationecision, rov-inces eceived significantncreasen fundingo manage ducation,acilitatinghe ap-provalof the 1992FederalEducation aw. Predictably,hen hese evenues egan odeclinen 1995, ensions etweenhe centralgovemmentnd he provincesesurfaced(Garcia e Fanelli 997:99-102).Caveats:The iterature n the benefits ndshortcomingsf decentralizations vast,sug-gesting hatdecentralizations not a panacea.Leaving side he controversialuestionoverwhether ecentralizationroduces etter earning,hereare politcal isks ssociatedwith decentralization. ecentralizationightreduce, ather han ncrease,he account-ability fthe ocalelite. Decentralizednstitutions ight eflect, ather han esolve,egre -sivesocialpractices.n Bijnor,ndiadecentralizedocalschoolsncorporaterovincial i s-criminatory ractices,iscouragingccesso schools y Hindu irlsand Muslimminorities(Jeffery ndJeffery 998). Moreover,rantingiscalautonomyo localentitiesmaybe n-sufficiento address largerpolitical roblemwithdecentralization-equivocal,nsincere,or mixedcommitmentn the part of centralauthorities,s discussedn Part1. Theseproblems ill persist ven after ocalentities ecome trong eform dvocates.Once heoriginalactorshatmotivatedhe state o decentralizeubsideinformationnd iscaldefi-cits, egitimacy eeds,nter-tier r nter-bureaucraticolitical onflicts), entralauthoritiesmaybe emptedo reverse ecentralization.

Neutraliing ReformOpponentsby Overcoming nstitutionalObstaclesOften, eto groupswillbe unswayed y strategies f inclusion,nformation,r compensa-tion. It may henbecomenecessaryo thinkof strategieso reduce he politicaleverageof theseveto groups. Teachers' nions an beone suchgroup. Teachers'nionsoftenperceive uality eforms s extracting eriousmaterial ndpolitical acrificesn theirpartComparedo othercost-bearers,eachers' nions njoycomparativeolitical dvantagesas pressure roups seePart1). Theiropposition an seriously ndermineeformproc-esses. For hese easons, eformapproval nd implementations contingent n the co-operation f teachers' nions, r at least,preventinghem romderailinghe reformproc-ess.Undercertain onditions, ovemments ay be powerlesso do this. Union ooperationmay dependon institutionalactorsbeyond he controlof reformers.Underothercondi-tions,however,overnmentsansignificantlyffect he propensityf unionso cooperate.Thissection xaminesomeof these onditions.

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The Politics of Education Reform

Hypothesis : Theaffiliationof teachers' nions or anycost-bearingroup)withopposition olitical arties indergovemment-unionooperation.

Argument:Many political cientists tress hat publicpolicy s greatly hapedby thecharacteristicsf domestic oliticalnstitutionsseeKaufman 999;Crowson t al. 1996).The eatures f the partyare critical.n fragmented nd polarized olitical artysystems,govemmentsacegreater oveming roblemsHaggard nd Kaufman 995;Mainwaringand Scully1995). It follows hat unionswith strong nstitutionalinks o opposition artiesin polarized r fragmented artysystems re ikely o tum uncooperative. f oppositionpartieshave a strongpresencen the legislature, nionresistances likely o be evenstronger.A symbioticelationshipetweenhe two actorsemerges. Partiesn the egis-laturewith inks o unions eem hem o beworthdefendingn ear hat ossof union up-portwill damage e-electionrospects.Simultaneously,nions hatexpect he support fthe legislaturere more ikely o adopta recalcitranttand; hey shoutbecausehey ex-pect o be heard. Thispressuresegislatorso beeven more ttentiveo union emands.Examples:n Poland n 1994,once he leading eachers' niondeveloped losed inkswith the main opposition arty, he Democratic eftAlliance, he reformprocess loweddown. Similarly,n Argentina etween 983and1989, he govemmentsKtempto reformthe stateandstabilizehe economy enerated normousension etweenhe rulingparty(the UCR)and he main opposition arty the Peronists).When, n 1986, he PeronistParty ook eadership f a teachers' nion CTERA) way rom he rulingparty, overn-ment-teachers'nions elationsumed ncreasinglyostile. In the 1990s,he govemmenthas had roublentroducingniversityeformsn partbecause f the stronginksbetweenuniversitytudent ssociationsnd heopposition arties Garcia e Fanelli 997).Caveats:Whileunion affiliation ith opposition artiesmighthindergovemment-unioncooperation, nionaffiliation ith he rulingparty s no guarantee f unioncooperation.Unions an use heir ies o ruling arty eaders,manyof whomoccupynfluenbalositionsin government,o advance heir political references.This s one reason hatefforts odecentralizeducationn Mexico n the 1980s ailed. The SNTEopposednegotatingworkingconditions nd other maKters ith 31 separategovemmental ntities (Fiske1996:18).A seriesof unionstrikesollowed.Checkmateccurredwhenunions egan ouse their inkswith otheranti-reformulingparty memberso block he reformsointly.Rulingpartyaffiliationhus acilitatedhe rise of a formidable nion-bureaucratoalitionthat orced he Mexicanexecutiveo retreat McGinn nd Street1986:486-488;orey1995;Perissinotto983).

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Corollary: Improvingexecutive-legislativeelationson th

the_politics_of_ed_reform_en98

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