theory of optimum tenure system for timber forest management
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Theory of Optimum Tenure System for Timber Forest Management. Kei Otsuka In Beijing on January 24, 2010. Missing Issue in the Natural Resource Management Literature: Role of “Care”. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Theory of Optimum Tenure System for Timber Forest
Management
Kei Otsuka
In Beijing on January 24, 2010
Missing Issue in the Natural Resource Management Literature: Role of “Care”
• In the common property literature, emphasis has been placed almost exclusively on the excessive use of resources, e.g., tragedy of the commons.
• In order to produce valuable timber, management activities, such as planting, pruning, thinning, singling, and weeding, are required. Such “care” is ignored in the theoretical literature.
• Note that silvicultural operations are unnecessary in the management of miscellaneous trees producing minor forest products because non-timber trees can grow and re-grow like weeds.
Major questions now are: (1) whether community management is effective in timber forest management, and (2) if not, what management systems would be most conducive to efficient management of timber forests?
• Hypothesis 1: Community management is more efficient than private management for protection or regulated use of resources.
• Hypothesis 2: Community management is less efficient than private management for “care” of trees, as the work incentives are stronger in the latter than the former.
• Hypothesis 3: The optimum system is a “mixed” system in which protection is carried out communally and care is carried out individually.
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Hypothesized relationships among cost of protection, management intensity, and efficient land tenure
systems (p. 48)
Management intensity
Low High
Cost
of
protection
Low
Shifting cultivation/any property rights system
Agroforestry, crop fields for continuous cultivation, timber forest in DCs
High
Non-timber forests Timber forest in LDCs
Four Types of Management Systems in Inner Tarai Region of Nepal
• Timber Plantations:(1) Small-scale private plantations on former agricultural fields(2) Large community plantations on degraded (portions of) natural forests under traditional “collective community management,” in which all community members participate in protection and management and are expected to receive fair shares of future benefits.
• Natural Timber Forests:(3) “Collective community management”(4) “Centralized management,” in which all community members participate in protection, but forest user group committee hires wage workers for management. Community members can purchase tree products at lower prices and the committee receives the residual profits. This system was voluntarily created by the community and approved by a staff of department of forestry in Dang district.
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Hypotheses on Private, Collective, and Centralized Management in Nepal
1. Collective community management is less costly than private management for the protection of timber tree plantations (because of scale economies in protection).
2. A larger amount of labor is allocated to the management of planted trees under private management than under collective management (because of stronger management/profit incentives).
3. Centralized management is more profitable than collective management in the management of natural timber forests (because of stronger management/profit incentives and lower cost of coordination).
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Table 9.1 Comparison of three types of forests in inner Tarai
Private Plantation
Community Plantation
Community Natural Forest
Total forest/plantation size (ha) 0.72 64.7 166.2
Size of planted area (ha) 0.72 15.4 16.3
Plantation rate (percentage) 100 81.8 15.7
Number of users per forest/plantation (mean)
1 130.4 304.0
Forest/plantation area per household (ha) 0.72 0.35 0.86
Years since plantation (mean) 7.4 8.6 5.9
Years since handing over (mean) 5.6a 4.0 2.9
Walking time to forest/plantation (minutes)
13.7 14.8 15.4
Percentage of Brahmin households 36.0 12.5 13.8
Number of samples 25 25 52
a Years since registration. 7
Table 9.2 Characteristics of private and community plantations in inner Tarai
Private Plantation
Community Plantation
Chi-Square and t-Statisticsa
Previous use of land (percentage)
Agriculture 80 8b 26.30**
Grazing land 20 68 11.68**
No use or barren land 0 36 10.98**
Soil type (percentage)c
Gravel 20 52 5.56*
Sandy loam 4 40 0.00
Loam 32 32 0.00
Clayey loam 20 36 1.59
Proportion of sisso species 91.4(11.3) 77.5(17.7) 3.32**
Planting density (number per ha) 3,093(1,520) 3,035(3,261) 0.08
Seedling first-year survival rate (%) 80.3(16.1) 73.4(15.7) 1.53
Number of samples 25 25
a Person’s chi-square test statistics for the first seven comparisons and t-statistics for the last three. bUsed as agricultural land because of encroachment. cTotal becomes more than 100% because some plantations have more than one soil type. *.05 level **.01 level
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Table 9.3 Comparison of protection cost between private and community plantations in inner Tarai
Private Plantation
Community Plantation
t-Statistics
Use of fences (%) 80.0 28.0 13.61**a
Labor cost to build fences (rupees/ha)b
3,642(4,358) 6.27(31.37) 4.17**
Material cost for fences (rupees/ha) 2,081(9,055) 0(0) 1.15
Maintenance cost (rupees/ha/year) 806(1399) 30.5(90.8) 2.77*
Use of watchers (%) 72 100 6.94**a
Number of watchers per hectare 2.08(2.62) 0.25(0.28) 3.47**
Watcher cost (rupees/ha/year)b 13,885(24,642) 1,818(2,036) 2.44*
Number of samples 25 25
a Pearson’s chi-square test. bBoth family labor users’ participatory labor are included.
* .05 level ** .01 level 9
Table 9.5 Comparison of labor input between private and community plantations in inner Tarai
Private Plantation
Community Plantation
t-Statistics
% of hired labor in total labor input 54.2(45.7) 11.8(32.1) 3.53**
Weeding labor (person-days/ha/year) 11.0(11.0) 6.0(9.6) 1.60
Pruning labor (person-days/ha/year) 7.2(7.6) 0.9(2.0) 3.98**
Thinning labor (person-days/ha/year) 0.2(0.6) 0.04(0.2) 1.03
Total labor input (person-days/ha/year)
18.3(16.6) 6.9(10.3) 2.84**
Number of samples 25 25
** .01 level
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Table 9.10 Characteristics of centrally and collectively managed community forests in inner Tarai
Centralized Management
Collective Management
t-Statisticsa
Forest characteristics
Total forest area (ha) 173(151) 160(146) 0.31
Forest area located on slopes (%) 66.7(36.8) 60.4(41.4) 0.57
Land use in 1978 (1 for forest)a 0.71(0.46) 0.79(0.42) 0.63
Walking time to forest (minutes) 14.8(9.22) 16.0(10.4) 0.42
Years since handing over 2.63(1.61) 3.04(1.73) 0.88
Forest conditions
% of good-shaped trees 69.1(23.2) 59.2(25.4) 1.46
Regeneration rate (100 plants/ha) 63.0(51.5) 41.4(47.7) 1.59
Village characteristics
Number of user households 363(452) 253(256) 1.10
Growth rate of household (%) 33.1(24.9) 56.5(102) 1.07
Traveling time to market (minutes) 68.7(60.1) 107(75.2) 1.94
% of Brahman households 19.5(20.6) 8.84(841) 2.37*
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Table 9.10 (continued)
Centralized Management
Collective Management
t-Statisticsa
Cash flow of forest management in 1996
Total revenue (1,000 rupees) 53.8(56.9) 43.2(87.6) 0.51
Total expenditure (1,000 rupees) 26.2(23.6) 13.9(9.4) 2.41*
Gross profit (1,000 ruees)b 27.6(43.0) 29.4(84.7) 0.91
Gross profit per hectare (1,000 rupees) 0.29(0.65) 0.12(0.34) 1.32
Gross profit per user (1,000 rupees) 0.17(0.34) 0.07(0.18) 1.38
Number of samples 24 28
a If the current community forest area used to be covered by forest in 1978, this land use variable is unity, and otherwise it is zero. This dummy variable is constructed based on the interpretation of aerial photographs. bGross profit is defined as total revenue minus expenditures for forest management and protection. *.05 level
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Difficulties in our study of community timber forests in Nepal
• In the collective community forest management, user group committee does not know the amount of “free” labor contributions. We need household surveys.
• Trees were immature so that the value of tree sales was not good indicator of “output.” We need new data now.
• I wish that the Maoists did not harvest timber trees in our study site.
Characteristics of Japanese Timber Forests after WWII
(1) Drastic reduction in demand for firewood, charcoal, and grasses and (2) Sharp increases in timber prices in the 1950s and 1960s.
⇒ (A) Plantation of timber trees became active and (B) some parcels of community forests were allocated for individual management and some community forests were completely privatized.
⇒ Sharp reductions in timber prices because of the appreciation of Japanese yen since the early 1970s. Cost of harvesting exceeded sale revenue, so that no harvesting took place since the 1980s in my sites.
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Findings on Collective vs. Individual Management of Timber Forests in Japan
1. Timber trees are more actively planted under individual management than under collective management.
2. Thinning is more actively carried out under individual management than under collective management.
3. Management of larger forests tends to be individualized, primarily because of the larger coordination costs of collective management.
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Concluding Remarks1. While the economic literature exclusively focuses on
“protection of common property resources” or “prevention of their excessive use,” investments in those resources or “care” activities are often important in practice.
2. Private management or centralized management is more efficient than collective management in “management” or “care” of trees.
3. Collective management is more efficient than individual management in protection of timber trees, where demand for minor forest products exists.
4. Social forestry or community forestry projects, in which all the community members participate in protection and management and share benefits equally, are likely to fail to produce high-valued timber, because of the inadequate management incentives.
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Concluding Remarks (continued)5. Given that distributional justice of centralized
management is unclear, the socially best system is combination of collective and private management, in which protection is carried out collectively and management is carried out individually by allocating use rights of tree planted parcels or ownership rights of trees equally to individual members.
6. The establishment of efficient or profitable institutions for tree resource management is important from the global point of view, as active tree planting is needed to reduce global warming.
7. I believe that it is worth testing my hypotheses in a variety of settings.
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