Themes and DisclaimerThemes and Disclaimer

The best since Vietnam?Well led strategically.Recovery start point (1999) was lower.Current bar (nature of conflict) higher.‘Security provider’ and ‘security leader’

BUT …….

But …..Limited experience of joint offensive combat

operations.Current deployments valuable, but … Much in the ADF does not actually work!30 years of neglect (’72-’99) not yet

compensated by ten years (‘99-’07) of more appropriate spending. What of next ten years?

Our weaknesses compared to demands of modern war – Joint tactical combat operations and ‘Generalship’ (running campaigns).

Rhetoric is dangerous

BIG - sizeBIG - sizeGWOTGWOTOz/WPOz/WP

Australian Government View of the TaskAustralian Government View of the Task(Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Chief of Defence Force)(Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Chief of Defence Force)

PlanPlan military ops military ops

FindFind insurgent cells insurgent cells

Destroy Destroy those cellsthose cells

ProtectProtect the Coalition and the Iraqi People the Coalition and the Iraqi People

Carry out other tasks as directed by the Carry out other tasks as directed by the Commanding General MNF-ICommanding General MNF-I

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations = Chief of OperationsDeputy Chief of Staff for Operations = Chief of OperationsMNF-I = Multi National Force - IraqMNF-I = Multi National Force - Iraq

CHIEF OF OPERATIONSCHIEF OF OPERATIONS

An American Experience.An American Experience.

A war of necessityA war of necessitynot a war of choicenot a war of choice

20032003 20042004 20052005 20062006

Invasion

“Missed Opportunity”?

LearnFight

Build Institutions

Elections, transition &

fight

Sectarian Violence

VV

““Average counter-insurgency in 20Average counter-insurgency in 20thth C took 9 years” C took 9 years”

Surge – Comprehensive

20072007 20082008

Transition & Surprise?

Learning and AttritionStart of an effective COIN Campaign?

2011??2011??JIMJIM

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

A coalition of A coalition of 28 nations under 28 nations under

UNSCR 1546UNSCR 1546

IRAQI MILITARYIRAQI MILITARY

ISFISFANAANAOZOZ

“A Terrorist is someone who has a bomb but does not have an Air Force”

Complex Complex EnemyEnemy

LOAC - Mosques, Medical and Cultural

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

Sunni InsurgentsSunni InsurgentsAl Qaeda TerroristsAl Qaeda TerroristsShia MilitiasShia MilitiasCriminalsCriminals

Enemy Tactic

““War War Among Among the People”the People”

CHIEF OF OPERATIONSCHIEF OF OPERATIONS

Controlled operations of all forces Controlled operations of all forces across all of Iraq at the strategic level.across all of Iraq at the strategic level.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                                                                                             

Three Block War (plus One?)

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

Whither the light infantry force structuring option, indeed

The enemy had a say!The enemy had a say!

AL FALLUJAH-16 Districts w/in Perimeter

POLITICS IS A MEANS OF RECONCILING POLITICS IS A MEANS OF RECONCILING CONFLICT AMONG PEOPLECONFLICT AMONG PEOPLE

First Iraqi Election First Iraqi Election January 2005January 2005

SO WHAT???SO WHAT???

White PaperWhite Paper• White Paper defence policy is not defence

capability, it is only words:

– Self reliance

– ANZUS

– Warning Time

– Balanced Force

– DOA/Sea Air Gap

• Forty years of WP defence policy (words) produced the current defence force with all its problems.

Are we happy with the product of Are we happy with the product of White Paper defence policy = White Paper defence policy =

the 2008 ADFthe 2008 ADF::

Quality of manpowerNumbers in ArmySpecial ForcesPatrol BoatsSurface combatants?AirliftStrategic CommandOthers???

GeneralshipSubs

IntelligenceSurface combatants

Amphibious shipsFighters and F111 (Pilots)

Anti-submarineCombined arms land force

InfantryArmourArtilleryAviation

EngineersSustainment Stocks

“War among the people”Numbers in RAAF and RAN

Defence Industry

Can the ADF fight effectively in Can the ADF fight effectively in 2008?2008?

• Does Australia, as a sovereign nation, have a defence capability that is more than individual, single Service, dislocated capabilities that are allocated to low combat areas under the control of US/UK commanders, and then directed to conduct only limited defensive operations?

Conduct sophisticated ‘joint’ operations (combat and non-combat)in complex terrain (urban and littoral)

involving sustained operations and sustained combat

What should the ADF be able to do?

Will the ADF be able to fight Will the ADF be able to fight effectively at end of DCP (2018)?effectively at end of DCP (2018)?

• The ADF in 2018 should be able to conduct sophisticated joint operations in complex terrain (urban and littoral) involving sustained combat

IFIF

The major items in the DCP are maintainedRAAF and RAN receive manpower

The enablers and connectors are also obtained“War among the people” capabilities are developed

(Humint, Biometrics, CivMil, detention, police, TST)

There is an intellectual investment in commanders and commandThere is a statement of what we want the ADF to do (concept of operations –

the “HOW with WHAT”).

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