the year in special operations - 2012-13 ed

The Year in

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

2012-2013 EDITION

ANNIVERSARY EDITION

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The Year in

SPECIALOPERATIONS2012-2013 Edition

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Many anniversaries revolving around special operations forces (SOF) are taking place in t e ti e fra e enty ve years ago in passage of t e unn o en

end ent to t e old ater ic ols epart ent of efense eorgani ation ct created S Special Operations o and (SO OM) irty years ago a young r y of cer na ed

ryan oug ro n took a ne unit of lack a k elicopters and t eir cre s and taug t t e to y it split second precision using pri itive nig t vision goggles creating t e legendary t Special Operations viation egi ent t e ig t Stalkers ven furt er ack years ago in Octo er resident o n F ennedy visited t e S

r y s Special arfare enter at Fort ragg e result as t e creation in of S avy S ea s O and O and t e origins of t e odern S r y reen erets

is year is full of ot er special anniversary re e rances Seventy years ago t e S r y angers ere orn as ere t e fa ous Marine aider attalions at sa e year

sa i y oolittle lead is s off t e deck of t e aircraft carrier SS Hornet ( ) on erica s rst odern special operation and into istory o of t e S r y s Special Forces roups t e t and t ave t eir t and t irt days respectively t is year e th ivil ffairs rigade and th Military nfor ation Support Operations (M SO

syOps) are having their th irthdays as ell he ir Force s st Special Operations ing is years old this year and the Marine s st Force econnaissance o pany turns

n hat has argua ly een the ost successful period in the history of S SOF it is i por-tant not to lose sight of the past o see only the present day successes of SO OM ithout re e ering the long hard so eti es costly road to ould e oth shortsighted and disrespectful. So we dedicate this issue of The Year in Special Operations to all those in the special operations co unity who served in the past who are serving today and who will serve in the future.

huck Oldha ditor in hief

ohn . reshaonsulting ditor

Editors’ Foreword

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INTERVIEWS

10 Adm. William H. McRaven, USN Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command By John D. Gresham

54 Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr., USA Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the 1st Special Forces Regiment By John D. Gresham and Shawn E. Gorman

FEATURES

16 SOCOM Year in Review By John D. Gresham

26 AFSOC Year in Review By Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF (Ret.)

36 MARSOC Year in Review By J.R. Wilson

44 NAVSPECWARCOM Year in Review NSW Commander Rear Adm. Sean A. Pybus discusses the history, successes, and challenges for Naval Special Warfare Command in an exclusive interview By Scott R. Gourley and Chuck Oldham

60 USASOC Year in Review By John D. Gresham

72 International SOF Year in Review By Nigel West

80 With Half the Fleet: Progress Report on the CV-22 By Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF (Ret.)

Contents

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Contents

88 Naval Special Warfare ATV Training By Scott R. Gourley

94 Per Astra Ad Aspera: The Past, Present, and Future of Air Force Special Tactics By Maj. Paul D. Brister, USAF

100 SOCOM at 25 – Part I: The Battle for Capitol Hill By John D. Gresham

110 SOCOM at 25 – Part II: Desert Storm to Allied Force By Dwight Jon Zimmerman

120 SOCOM at 25 – Part III: USSOCOM Since 9/11 By Mike Markowitz

126 SOCOM at 25 – Part IV: The Future By Marc Ambinder

130 Winning: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines By Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF (Ret.)

140 The Battle of Roberts Ridge Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan 10 Years Later By Dwight Jon Zimmerman

148 50 Years of the U.S. Navy SEALs By Dwight Jon Zimmerman

156 Marine Raider Battalions: 70 Years Ahead of Their Time By Mike Markowitz and John D. Gresham

162 Rangers: Leading the Way for 70 Years By Mike Markowitz

170 50th Anniversary of the Modern Green Berets By John D. Gresham

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The Year in

SPECIALOPERATIONS2012-2013 Edition

10 www.defensemedianetwork.com

INTERVIEW

BY JOHN D. GRESHAM

Adm. William H. McRaven, USNCommander, U.S. Special Operations Command

The Year in Special Operations: You were a journalism major at the University of Texas. What drew you to that particular vocation, and how did you make the transition to becoming a special operator?

Adm. William H. McRaven: I got into the school of journalism in my junior year. I found out I could write and enjoyed the creative process of writing.

In high school, after seeing the movie The Green Berets, being a Green Beret was everything to me, so I had always wanted to go into the service. However, back then, there were no movies, no books, nothing about the SEALs. My sister was dating a Green Beret who told me he thought I should be a Navy SEAL. So I have to give credit to my being a SEAL to an Army Green Beret.

Are there any significant differences in the BUD/S course that selected, qualified, and trained you into a SEAL, as compared to today?

While all courses go through some changes, the core of BUD/S has always remained the same. That is, it teaches you the rules. It gets back to this point about doing the small things and doing the small things right. You need to do things right, even when you are tired. You learn at a very early stage in your military career you need to be precise. The instructors are very clear and they give you very specific guidance.

BUD/S then and now also teaches three other things:

The first is to know what your body can do. I went essentially six days without any sleep, and was cold and wet most of that time. You may be

tired, but there are some things that are more important than being tired. Whether you are from the SEALs or any of our SOF forces, you do the same sort of mental gymnastics to deter-mine whether you are on the threshold of known pain, or known fatigue. In the field I can ask myself, “Have I gone six days without any sleep?” Well, if I haven’t, then I’m probably okay because I did it in BUD/S.

BUD/S has also always taught not to quit. I think this is probably the most important thing. When we look back on our careers, we’ve all had moments when we said, “I’m tired” or “I’m wet, cold, and miserable,” or “I’m fed up,” or “I’m at the lowest point.” Those moments define us.

Another thing BUD/S teaches you is the guy that ends up becoming a SEAL is not always the strongest, the fastest,

Adm. William H. “Bill” McRaven is the ninth commander of SOCOM, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. He previously served, from June 2008 to June 2011, as the 11th commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Before his JSOC command, McRaven had served from June 2006 to March 2008 as commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). In addition to his duties as commander, SOCEUR, he was designated as the first director of the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center, where he was charged with enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of all NATO special operations forces (SOF).

McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as deputy commanding general for Operations at JSOC; commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group One; commander of SEAL Team THREE; task group commander

in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; task unit commander during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield; squadron commander at Naval Special Warfare Development Group; and, SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/SEAL Team FOUR.

His diverse staff and interagency experience includes assignments as the director for Strategic Planning in the Of ce of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council staff; assessment director at USSOCOM, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations; and as the chief of staff at Naval Special Warfare Group One.

McRaven’s professional education includes assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School, where he helped estab-lish, and was the rst graduate from the Special Operations/Low Intensity Con ict curriculum.

He recently took time to answer a few questions from The Year in Special Operations Consulting Editor John D. Gresham.

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and the bravest. He was the guy who just kept going. As Vince Lombardi said, “It's not whether you get knocked down; it's whether you get up.”

Those young soldiers, sai lors, airmen, Marines, and civilians who are supporting us out in Afghanistan, those are the ones who are really, really good. They’ve been knocked down a lot of times. They just keep moving.

Unlike many special operators who have avoided the media, you’ve embraced it, even writing a book called SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Can you tell us what made you do that, and has the book’s long-term success surprised you?

The funny thing is it was never meant to be a book. I never had any intention of

getting it published. I wasn’t interested in the mass market. I wrote it as my thesis for Naval Postgraduate School. I was approached by Presidio Press, who said they wanted to publish my thesis. They obviously were interested in the mass market. I was interested in the theory, which I had worked so hard to develop. They initially wanted to cut out the theory and said they wanted to sell the great stories. I said no and wouldn’t agree to it. To me, it was all about the theory, because that is what serious practitioners of special opera-tions would want to know. The fact of the matter is now I’m not sure if the serious practitioners really cared about the theory. But I did.

So, with that in mind, yes, I think the long-term success of the book still surprises me. Although in all

BUD/S has also always taught not to quit. I think this is probably the most important thing. When we look back on our careers, we’ve all had moments when we said, “I’m tired” or “I’m wet, cold, and miserable,” or “I’m fed up,” or “I’m at the lowest point.” Those

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INTERVIEW

honesty, I’m not sure how much of that success can be attributed to me as the author as opposed to the curiosity, and sometimes myth, which exists about special operations.

The books, movies, video games, and other things about special operations all seem to become wildly successful in their own way. If the book helps garner more support for or awareness of the bravery and sacrifice by our special operations warriors and their families, then that’s when I’ll feel the book has been truly successful.

This has been a long and very tough war for your command, which has taken its share of casualties and been busier than ever before. What has this almost decade-long conflict done to your command and warriors, and what kind of shape are they in today in 2012?

A decade of war coupled with a consistently high demand for SOF has exerted a physical and emotional stress and unsustainable pressure on our force and families. On any given day, USSOCOM has forces deployed in more than 70 countries worldwide. Deployment data from the last 10 years shows a constant demand for a “steady state” deployed force of nearly 12,000 SOF to support the requirements.

My top priority and directive is to win the current fight. But, we cannot win the current fight without preserving the force and its families. Our people are our most valuable asset. I am fully committed to doing everything I can to ensure our exceptional SOF warriors and their families are taken care of now and in the years to come.

I have appointed a brigadier general and my command sergeant major to lead the Preservation of the Force and Families Task Force, a program that takes a holistic approach to support and implement innovative solutions to improve the well-being of our force and families. Resiliency programs are facilitating early identification of underlying SOF issues relating to phys-ical, mental, and spiritual well-being. We’re examining new ways to add more predictability to SOF deployments and increase what I call “head on pillow time.” Predictability is a key element of long-term performance and resiliency. We are also looking at education oppor-tunities, training opportunities, along with pay and incentives.

The USSOCOM Care Coalition program provides outstanding support to

wounded SOF warriors and their fami-lies and is a model for patient advocacy within the Department of Defense.

When it comes to supporting our people, to me everything is on the table. Every opportunity I get I tell them I hear them, I am aware of the strain placed on them, and I am personally committed to alleviating the pressure on them and their families.

One hurdle we have to overcome is we have a force of Type A personalities who came into SOF because they are hard, tough men and women. Now we want them to come forward and expose their problems and fears. That's not easy for them to do.

What do you think the state of training is within the force today and what are the plans for improving training in the future?

In the 25 years since SOCOM was created, we have adapted and performed beyond expectations, but times are changing and our enemies are on the move. I think our combat skills are at an all-time high due to 10 years of multiple rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Where I see a need is in improving our leader development and educa-tion. In that regard we are developing programs designed to train, educate, and manage the career paths of our SOF leaders. These programs will result in a tailored SOF professional military education plan along with more training opportunities that will provide our leaders with the tools necessary to effectively operate in today’s complex environment, especially in language and cultural awareness.

We are working with the services to effectively manage career progression of SOF leaders, including assignments to key combined, joint, and interagency organizations.

SOF’s future success depends on the qualities and experiences gained by our force while working in diverse circumstances, not just working in diverse conditions and theaters. The key will be for us to remain adaptive so we can remain relevant. We will do that not by looking back at what we did well, but looking forward to how we can do it better.

What is the current status of the planned expansion of SOCOM? What will be the organization and strength of SOCOM when this program is completed?

We are currently at an authorized strength of approximately 66,000 personnel growing to approximately 70,000 by f iscal year 2015. The increased personnel authorizations are spread across our five subor-dinate component commands: the United States Army Special Operations Command; Air Force Special Operations Command; Naval Special Warfare Command; Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command; and the Joint Special Operations Command.

One of the USSOCOM SOF “truths” is that SOF cannot be mass-produced. Even with the Quadrennial Defense

The direct approach captures everyone's attention and imagination, but those operations only buy time and space. The broader indirect approach with an emphasis on building partner-nation capacity is what achieves enduring success.

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INTERVIEW

Review-directed expansion of the force, the increase in operational tempo to meet the current demand by the geographic combatant commanders has placed incredible pressure on the SOF force. Continuation of the QDR-directed SOF growth is essential to meeting this current and projected demand for SOF. As total forces start to draw down in Afghanistan, SOF’s specific capabilities will likely drive increasing requirements.

Over the last 10 years, the nation has recognized the value of SOF in this ambiguous operating environ-ment. Because our force is uniquely recruited, assessed, selected, and trained to perform these diff icult missions, the projected SOF growth rate through fiscal year 2017 is 3 to 5 percent.

What are your priorities for USSOCOM and SOF?

I have four priorities. The first is “Win the Current Fight.”By that I mean implementing a plan

where USSOCOM and SOF support the national military strategy. This clearly includes a heavy emphasis on Afghanistan, but it is not limited to operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. In order to effectively disrupt and degrade violent extremist organizations, we must continue applying the indirect approach to build partner-nation capacity in all of the areas where conditions make populations suscep-tible to the false promises of extremist ideologies. We also must be prepared to apply direct action when and where the national command authority deter-mines it is necessary.

The direct approach captures every-one's attention and imagination, but those operations only buy time and space. The broader indirect approach with an emphasis on building partner-nation capacity is what achieves enduring success.

My second priority is to expand SOF’s capabilities by working with the geographic combatant commands, our interagency partners, and allied special operations forces to strengthen the global SOF network.

The current fiscal reality has made this priority exceedingly important.

As a nation, we have to find new solutions to effectively provide for our defense in a fiscally constrained environment. SOF, with its ability

to operate with small, unobtrusive, cost-effective elements working with partner-nation forces, clearly is one of the solutions.

The genesis of the idea of strength-ening the global SOF network comes from my days as the Special Operations Command Europe commander. When I was the SOCEUR commander, we established the NATO Special Operations Coordination Cell, which eventually became today’s NATO-SOF Headquarters (NSHQ). The NSHQ has paid tremendous dividends by estab-lishing a vehicle to conduct NATO SOF-centric professional military education, combined training opportu-nities, and information-sharing oppor-tunities. This has proved invaluable to our efforts in Afghanistan, where the NSHQ’s success has led to an increase in our collective SOF partnering efforts and an expansion of overall SOF capa-bilities throughout ISAF [International Security Assistance Force].

To be effective, this initiative must be worked through and with the Joint Staff, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the State Department, and ultimately the geographic combatant commanders for which it is designed. But once in place, an expanded global SOF network will better enable our allies and partners to address a myriad of emerging threats to our collective national securities.

As I said earlier, in order to accom-plish the first two priorities, we must accomplish my third priority and that is preserving our force and families. We’ve been at war for over 10 years and the cumulative physical and emotional strain our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines and their families have experienced requires careful attention and immediate action.

Earlier I discussed some of the initia-tives the Preservation of the Force and Family Task Force is working on, but an underpinning of these initiatives is the need for the force to improve its communication – within its families and organizations. We are looking at a number of ways to fix this problem and are implementing a variety of tools such as Facebook and other social media programs as part of the fix.

As I mentioned earlier, our people are our most valuable asset and I am committed to doing everything I can to ensure our outstanding SOF warriors and their families are taken care of – now – and for years to come.

How is SOCOM positioned to build the global SOF network?

As an institution, SOF is well posi-tioned to strengthen a network that has been slowly built over the years. This network is a natural extension of what we have been doing for decades. Expanding the SOF network is about increasing and strengthening our partnerships throughout the global SOF enterprise. With current fiscal constraints, not only in the U.S. but worldwide, we have to find new solu-tions to effectively operate in the current strategic environment. In the U.S., and in particular over the last 10 years, the nation has recognized the value of SOF’s ability to work in an ambiguous environment.

I want to assist other nations’ SOF capabilities to help deal with the myriad of emerging threats. There is a clear recognition that devel-oping enduring partnerships is a key component of our long-term military strategy.

Again, all of these initiatives are and will be worked through the appropriate agencies and organizations like the Joint Staff, OSD, State [Department], and the geographic combatant commanders.

The f iscal year 2013 budget proposal for USSOCOM is only slightly smaller than the FY 2012 budget. The services, on the other hand, are facing larger reductions. Will reduc-tions in the service budgets cause a reduction in service-provided enabler support to SOF?

While we have experienced cuts, they have been relatively small, espe-cially compared to the cuts the services are facing. I trust the decision-makers who are required to make hard but necessary choices in an increasingly austere fiscal environment. However, the budget request for fiscal year 2013, if approved, is an essential step toward meeting the growing demand on SOF and sustaining our programs and initiatives.

The serv ices have been very supportive of SOF, and we will and must remain closely aligned with and supportive of the services. They provide SOF a great deal of support that we absolutely depend on. We need to be aware of how current budget challenges impact the services and if there will be a resulting impact on the services’ ability to support SOF.


SOCOM YEAR IN REVIEW

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A Marine with 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalion (MSOB), U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, conducts a high altitude, high opening (HAHO)jump at dusk as part of a double-bag static-line parachute course in Wendover, Utah, April 9 - 21. The course was taught by personnel from the 2nd MSOB paraloft and the Airborne Mobile Training Team, and is designed to give Marines a basic understanding of HAHO operations.


BY JOHN D. GRESHAM

Our review of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the past year begins with this statement: 2011 was the most productive, successful, and impressive year

in the history of the command. SOCOM personnel killed the most wanted man on Earth, Osama bin Laden, and starred in a blockbuster feature film, Act of Valor.

SOCOM Year in Review


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In the quarter-century that SOCOM has existed, the command and its professionals have often become the force of choice where presidents and other national leaders are concerned. It is frankly impossible to find another major military command in the history of the United States that has known such a meteoric rise in importance. The American defense reforms of the late 1980s may have shown the world how armed forces would need to be organized to fight the conflicts of the post-Cold War era we have lived through, but SOCOM has demonstrated to the entire world the “who,” “what,” “when,” and “where” of 21st century combat.

In 2012, SOCOM could be considered the most respected, and in many ways, the most powerful component in the U.S. military. From an orphan that the services did not want in the 1970s and early 1980s, special operations forces (SOF) have become one of the most-often used tools of the Department of Defense. Capable, with world-class leadership in charge, and acquisition processes and funding the envy of everyone in the U.S. government, SOCOM is trusted by everyone from suburbia to the White House as it begins to commemorate its 25th birthday in 2012.

Leadership

For some years, SOCOM has had a fairly consistent lead-ership pool in the Pentagon, at SOCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, Fla., and at the various SOCOM component commands. 2011, however, was a year of many changes in leadership within the U.S. SOF community, most of it due to promotions and retirements. The position of assistant secretary of defense (ASD) for special operations/low intensity conflict & interdependent capabilities (SO/LIC&IC), held by the Honorable Michael G.

Vickers until he was nominated and confirmed as the new under secretary of defense for intelligence, was finally filled in late 2011. His replacement is Michael A. Sheehan, a West Point graduate, noted author and counterterrorism expert, and former Army Special Forces (SF) soldier. Sheehan continues the recent trend of having the ASD for SO/LIC&IC be a SOF professional with strong credentials in other areas of unconventional warfare (UW).

On the military leadership side at SOCOM, the long and successful career of Adm. Eric T. Olson, USN, finally came to a close in 2011. Olson’s replacement, however, was another well-known Navy SEAL with his own set of professional credentials: Adm. William H. “Bill” McRaven, USN. McRaven, a lifelong naval SOF professional, commanded the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and has had tours commanding the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). A journalism major in college, McRaven is the author of SPEC OPS: Case Stidies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, considered to be the SOF handbook on planning and executing raids. McRaven had already been nominated for U

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A U.S. Air Force aircrew member watches for threats on the ground

exercise special operations components in urban and irregular warfare settings to support combatant commanders in theater campaigns.


the post when he was planning and executing the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, and that public success has made him more well known than the typical SOF professional, indicated by him being the runner-up for Time magazine’s prestigious “Man of the Year” title.

Replacing Deputy SOCOM Commander Lt. Gen. David P. Fridovich has been a bit more challenging. Though U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Commander Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland, Jr., was nominated in 2011, U.S. Senate confirmation of his nomination, along with those of numerous other flag officers, has been glacial, a situation that continues as of this writing. This slow confirmation process is becoming a real concern within SOCOM and the rest of the U.S. military due to the large numbers of nominations that are beginning to pile up on Capitol Hill in this election year. On a more positive note, Army Command Sgt. Maj. Chris Faris took over as SOCOM’s senior enlisted adviser, bringing his steady hand, keen mind, and sound judgment to the U.S. military’s most dynamic combatant command.

There have been other leadership developments within the SOCOM leadership components as well. These include:

was nominated and confirmed by the U.S. Senate in 2011 to replace Mulholland as commanding general at USASOC. He is awaiting his swearing-in ceremony while Mulholland is being confirmed as the new deputy SOCOM commander. USASOC’s senior enlisted adviser is Command Sgt. Maj. Parry L. Baer, a position he has held since 2010.

Donald C. Wurster, USAF, ended his storied career in 2011,

turning over command of AFSOC to Lt. Gen. Eric E. Fiel, USAF. Fiel’s senior enlisted adviser is Chief Master Sgt. William Turner.

command MARSOC. His senior enlisted advisers are Sgt. Maj. Thomas F. Hall and MARSOC Command Master Chief Tavita Feti Saelua.

There also is another set of commands in the American SOF community; those associated with regional special operations components of Unified Combatant Commands. There is a regular rotation between SOCOM’s headquarters and service components, the regional SOF components, which continues:

Michael S. Repass, USA, continues to command SOCEUR. US

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Special operations soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command demonstrate their skills during a capabilities exercise, April 25, 2012.



SOCEUR commands U.S. SOF forces who contribute to the NATO Alliance, and has a footprint that runs as far south as the Middle East, and north to the Arctic Circle.

(SOCCENT) – Based at MacDill AFB, the SOCCENT respon-sibilities were taken over in 2011 by Brig. Gen. Kenneth “Ken” Tovo, USA, when Cleveland left to command USASOC. SOCCENT’s senior enlisted adviser is Army Command Sgt. Maj. George Bequer.

by Maj. Gen. Norman J. Brozenick, Jr., USAF, when Rear

-tory; more than 40 percent of the Earth’s surface is in its area of responsibility (AOR).

Adm. Thomas L. Brown, II, USN, continues to command SOCSOUTH, and is assisted by his senior enlisted adviser

regional SOF component that continues to be a laboratory for new SOF missions and ideas, many of them relevant to other operations worldwide.

while not technically the SOF component of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), is the largest and best-established SOF organization in the region. In 2010, command of CJTF HoA passed to Rear Adm. Michael T. Franken, USN, and the command has been conducting operations ranging from

Africa and Nigeria.

SOCOM Title 10 Issues

buys everything from sniper riles to smartphones, the “big ticket” programs right now are the various

the “Commando II,” after the classic C-46 Commando

Osprey. Osprey production proceeds apace, with virtu-ally every aircraft delivered being sent immediately into squadron use, and often very quickly downrange.

program of what has been the most important SOF aircraft of the past decade: the MH-47 Chinook. The

off the line were delivered to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) this year. First

deliveries of the new MH-60M Black Hawk began in 2011, and the Army’s new Special Operations Aviation Command

MH-6 “Little Birds,” along with continuing to stand up more of the new MQ-1C “Gray Eagle” unmanned aerial vehicles

value and interest, with SOCOM becoming one of the largest operators of such systems.

Growth and End-strength

If there is a command-wide ethos at SOCOM, it can be found in the simple words, “Humans are more important

growth is continuing in 2012. The SOF schoolhouses around the United States are now turning out a continual stream

when they reach their new units. This is especially true in the Army special Forces Group (SFGs), where the “hollowed out” A-Teams of recent history have been made whole, SF

structure with greater staff and support personnel end-strength is being implemented. One SFG per year is being made more robust with this new structure, as are other

be the civil affairs community, which is scheduled for a 20 percent “plus-up” by 2017.

But more people mean that SOCOM needs places to put them when they are stateside, and that means using some of SOCOM’s budget for military construction and housing. The 7th SFG’s new garrison facility at Eglin AFB, Fla., is a

come too soon. Special Forces Command’s most-storied unit

facility modernization program is going to be continued at the present pace. Lean years are ahead for the Department of Defense, and even SOCOM is likely to feel the pinch. C

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Naval special operations forces operators from Norway, Romania, Ukraine and the United States conduct a visit, board, search, and seizure demonstration during a Jackal Stone 11 multinational special operations forces exercise held at Constanta Military Harbor Sept. 17, 2011. The purpose of the exercise, being held in Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, was to enhance special operations forces capacity and interoperability between the nine participating nations, while simultaneously building cooperation and partnerships.



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This means that there are challenges ahead for McRaven and his team at SOCOM in 2012 and beyond. There still are significant shortfalls in certain SOF personnel specialties, including the U.S. Navy SEALs and Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). Problems in recruiting, selection, qualifica-tion, and training still exist a dozen years after 9/11, and must be made good. Ranger units, among others, continue to be overcommitted to an operations tempo (OpTempo) that has never gone down since 2001. And the end-strength shortfalls and operational strains on the Reserve and National Guard components of SOCOM have gone almost completely unaddressed. Clearly, SOCOM needs continued manpower efforts to stay in the fight in the years ahead.

Downrange: Out With the Component Commands

Operationally, SOCOM had the busiest OpTempo during the past 18 months in its 25-year history, with a full schedule of combat, raids, deployment, training, and exercise operations, but SOCOM remained fully committed to training and exer-cises, as it has been for the dozen years since 9/11. In particular, chances to exercise and train with foreign SOF units and personnel have been taken up whenever real-world contingencies allow. Some of these in 2011 included:

Command’s premier SOF exercise, Operation Flintlock provides training for joint multinational forces to improve information sharing at the operational and tactical levels across the Saharan region, and develop-ment of improved military-to-military collaboration and coordination.

an annual large-scale exercise focused on rear-area secu-rity and stability operations, along with onward movement of critical assets to the forward area, special operations, ground maneuver, amphibious operations, combat air operations, and maritime action group operations.

Comando is a military skills competition between top military, police, and SOF teams from across the Western Hemisphere. Security forces from 19 countries have taken part in Fuerzas Comando, promoting military-to-military relationships, increased interoperability, and improved regional security.

Jackal Stone is designed to give U.S. SOF units the capacity to exercise the capabilities of current and future partner nations, and to promote interoperability between the participating forces.

scenario, legacy exercises still being run today, Panamax annually has SOF units from 17 partner nations, including Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Panama, and the United States training together in an exercise simulating a multinational effort to defend the Panama Canal.In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. SOF personnel are staying

busy training up SOF warriors for both those nations. In the Philippines, JSOTF Philippines continued training work,

conducting an exercise in July to build the maritime inter-diction skills of the Philippines Navy SEAL teams. JSOTF

clinics in 2011. Humanitarian disaster relief still made up a large chunk of

SOCOM’s downrange activities in 2011, much of it this time centered on the massive 9.0 earthquake/tsunami that struck

relief aid to the 300-mile long strip of the Japanese Pacific coast ravaged by the events of March 11, were the profes-sionals of AFSOC. AFSOC personnel, including elements of the 320th Special Tactics Squadron, landed their first MC-130s Hercules transports at Sendai Airport on March 16, and cleared runways for C-17 Globemaster IIIs to arrive four days later. In just 21 days of operations, U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers at Sendai Airport controlled more than 250 aircraft from the Air Force, Marines, Army, Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force participating in Operation Tomodachi. Those aircraft delivered more than 2.31 million pounds of humanitarian aid and more than 15,000 gallons of diesel and gasoline to fuel humanitarian convoys and recovery vehicles. Also part of Operation Tomodachi were the Special Operations Group, U.S. Marine Corps Task Force Fuji, Marine Logistics Regiment 35, and Army Logistics Task Force 35.

And then there was one more SOF rule, epitomized by

was a decoration ceremony for five soldiers of the 1/10th SFG in Stuttgart, Germany, for three actions on May 17,

Green Beret and an allied soldier were taken under fire and wounded while searching the home of a suspected

A Special Forces soldier provides security for inbound aircraft after completing a cordon and search of a suspected bomb making facility at a remote village in the Arghandab District Dec. 10, 2009.



able to fire with one hand, and with their vehicle being disabled for a time in deep mud, Staff Sgt. Jeffery Musgrave managed to withdraw with his injured allied partner. For this, Musgrave was awarded a Bronze Star.

In the second incident, a “worst case scenario” erupted during another multinational (U.S., Afghan, and French) operation in Afghanistan. Three French engineers, an inter-preter, two Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) mambers, and a Special Forces A-Team member were conducting a site assessment for future placement of an ANSF checkpoint when the team started taking enemy fire. One soldier was rendered unconscious by an IED blast, but recovered and repelled an enemy attack. Another soldier strained both his hamstrings carrying a slain French officer down a mountain, while still another SF soldier scaled up and down a mountain three times to save his comrade. One other SF soldier was shot in the arm three times, yet continued to aggressively engage the enemy, while another SF soldier ran through a burning building to evacuate its residents to safety. For their actions that day, Capt. David Fox, Sgt. 1st Class McKenna “Frank” Miller and Staff Sgt. Matthew Gassman received Silver Stars, and Musgrave was awarded the Bronze Star with Valor Device, as well as the Purple Heart.

The final incident, however, says everything about why U.S. SOF warriors are among our best citizens. While back at home base, a Special Forces soldier and his friend noticed a fire in a building in Böblingen, Germany. After directing his friend to call the German authorities, Spc. Willie Smith, Jr., next did something that he said was instinctive on his part.

“I ran up and down three or four stories to inform the people of what was going on,” Smith said. “I just wanted to ensure I got everyone out of that building.”

Going door to door, Smith attempted to alert the sleeping residents of the fire. By the time the fire department and Polizei arrived, most of the residents were evacuated, but the crowd mentioned there was still an elderly couple inside. Smith then ran back inside the building along with two members of the Polizei to retrieve the couple from harm.

“The gentleman did not want to leave his wife because she had problems walking, so he stayed in the building with her,” said Smith.

Moving through thick smoke, Smith and the rescue team located the couple, who were disoriented and having trouble getting out of bed. He took control of the handicapped, elderly gentleman and escorted him down the stairs, while the other rescue team members led the elderly woman to safety. Moments later the roof of the building collapsed. For his quick thinking, actions, and personal courage at risk to his own life, Smith, was awarded the Soldier’s Medal.

No one gets left behind. ...

The End of Osama bin Laden

Clearly the highlight of 2011 for SOCOM was the operation on the lips of every adult human being from Washington, D.C., to Hong Kong – the one that killed al Qaeda chief bin Laden. After more than a decade of trying to target the elusive al Qaeda leader, a National Security Agency “wireless wiretap” pulled a call from the mobile phone of a suspected courier who had been under observation for years since 9/11. This led to the creation of a task force to run the lead to ground, which turned out to be an unusual residential compound in the town of Abbottabad, Pakistan. Just a few

hundred yards from the Pakistani Army Military Academy, the entire compound was a bizarre mix of high walls, no outside communications, and suspicious activity.

While the CIA continued to watch the compound, then-Vice Adm. McRaven, was “read in” on the discovery, and was tasked to create a JSOC task force specifically to prosecute the target if bin Laden was found to be there. He also was asked to begin preparing a plan to actually conduct a raid into Pakistan, with the clear understanding that he would have use of the full range of conventional weaponry, equipment, and other systems in developing his plan. For the core of his task force, McRaven chose from personnel assigned to the SEAL Special Mission Unit (SMU) that is an organic component of JSOC. He also apparently tapped a previously unused avia-tion capability, a small force of low-observable SOF “stealth” helicopters, piloted by members of the 160th SOAR.

Over winter and spring 2010-’11, the task force practiced together, working out an assault plan that could stand up to real-world mission events and still provide the breach teams a good chance of clearing the three-story main building with minimum risk. Full-mission rehearsals had been conducted, and the task force was ready. By spring 2011, the CIA was saying that the compound probably was where bin Laden was hiding, and the decision was made to deploy McRaven’s task force to Afghanistan. The “go” orders came from President Barack Obama during the final days of April, and following a one-day weather delay, the operation was launched on May 1.

Of course, the raid succeeded, with bin Laden killed by one of the SMU SEALs. And while one of the stealth helicopters was lost to flight conditions during the final approach to the compound, the plan McRaven and his JSOC staff prepared adapted brilliantly to the emergency. No U.S. personnel were lost or seriously injured during the raid, and every mission objective seems to have been achieved. But the raid did not succeed because of split-second decisions on the objective, or even the high-technology tools that JSOC was able to throw at the problems presented. It succeeded because of ideas, sacrifices, and efforts of good men, some made decades ago, often before some of the JSOC personnel on the raid to Abbottabad were even born.

It succeeded because eight SOF warriors died in a pyre of burning jet fuel on a lonely stretch of Iranian highway in 1980, and good men who saw it promised themselves that they would never allow such a travesty ever to happen on their watch. It succeeded because visionary men like Doug Brown, Charles Beckwith, and Richard Marcinko asked, “Why not?” and then created units like the 160th SOAR, Special Forces Detachment-Delta, and SEAL Team SIX. It succeeded because statesmen like Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., Former Rep. William Nichols, D-Ala., Sam A. Nunn, D-Ga., and William Cohen, R-Maine said, “This is not good enough for our warriors, and they deserve our best.” But perhaps most of all, it succeeded because of all the sergeants, warrants, and chiefs who make up the bulk of SOCOM’s force structure, who stepped forward when called, and said, “Choose me, sir.”

The year provided proof that America has and is maintaining world-class special operations forces, with personnel and capa-bilities the envy of almost every other nation on Earth. And to the enemies of the United States, the operation was proof that they attack, oppose, and harbor America’s enemies at their hazard. From the low-water mark that was Desert One during Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, the United States has moved to the summit of the SOF world today.

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BY MAJ. GEN. RICHARD COMER, USAF (RET.)

“Our goal is to provide air mobility and specialized air support wherever special operations forces are engaged. When other SOF components are deployed, we should be there as well and will strive to make the members of the other components fully expect to see AFSOC people and aircraft wherever they are, anywhere in the world.” – Col. William West, 27th Special Operations Group commander, Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), N.M.

AFSOCYear in Review

AFSOC YEAR IN REVIEW

AFSOC YEAR IN REVIEW A 522nd Special Operations Squadron (SOS) MC-130J

New Mexico, Jan. 4, 2012. The 522nd SOS is stationed at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., and the MC-130J

aerial delivery resupply of special operations forces.


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Since late June 2011, Lt. Gen. Eric Fiel has commanded the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). He has continued his predecessor’s policy of deploying airplane support to any and all special operations missions at the earliest possibility. Hence, as AFSOC has acquired new airplane types, they deploy as soon as they have trained aircrews and enough aircraft to achieve initial operating capability (IOC). When asked in an interview about the risk of deploying aircraft as soon as they reach their first milestone of operational capability, Fiel called it an “operational necessity” and said that deployment early in an aircraft’s career will make the people flying and maintaining it more operationally oriented, some-thing he identifies as an essential trait for Air Commandos. Managing and mitigating risks, he said, will always be the priority of all AFSOC unit commanders. He added that the major happenings of the command in the past year are, naturally, fighting the wars, and also included Operation Odyssey Dawn, helping the Japanese after the tsunami in March, and the growth and development of the 27th Special Operations Wing (SOW) at Cannon AFB.

Continuous Cycles: Off to War/Welcome Home

Additionally, the AFSOC commander pointed out that the end of combat and of American deployments to Iraq has brought many of AFSOC’s Air Commandos home. “This will give some rest to the units which have carried the load in that theater, but it will also give us the chance to ensure the other theaters of the world see AFSOC aircraft and people more often.”

Throughout 2011, there have been regular, monthly, and same-week ceremonies of sending Air Commandos to the war zones on a contracted commercial airliner, and then welcoming home the people whom they replaced when they arrive at their home bases on the same aircraft four or five days later. Col. Jim Slife, the 1st Special Operations Wing commander at Hurlburt Field, Fla., said that in the latter part of 2011, more were returning home than were going out due to the end of deployments in Iraq. By the end of the year, AFSOC was considering how best to make aircraft and people available to previously neglected theaters.

Throughout the year for AFSOC, as with all of special operations forces (SOF), the constant was the wars. Missions by the gunships, Talons, and CV-22 aircraft were flown liter-ally every day and night in the war zones. The primary deploying units from the SOWs at Hurlburt and Cannon received significant augmentation from the overseas Special Operations Groups (SOGs): the 352nd at Mildenhall, England, and the 353rd at Kadena Air Base (AB), Okinawa. Special Tactics airmen from all AFSOC locations participated in almost every ground mission by accompanying Green Berets and Navy SEALs on their patrols and training engagements. As has been true since 2003, awards are written after rota-tional returns, and then the awards ceremonies await the return from subsequent deployments.

Notably, in 2011, one AFSOC airman was awarded the Air Force Cross for a mission that occurred in 2009. Staff Sgt. Robert Gutierrez, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), was severely wounded during a raid and continued to perform his duties in spite of a collapsed lung. Refusing relief from his duties, Gutierrez twice endured the needle re-inflation of his lung during the four-hour engagement.

Gutierrez called in air strikes that protected the team, deci-mated the enemy, and allowed the Americans to egress the area and rendezvous with medevac helicopters. Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz made the presentation of the medal at Hurlburt Field, calling Gutierrez and all of the battlefield airmen the “most forward, most joint combat arm of the air service.” Gutierrez spoke of his duties, his actions, and his injuries:

“I’ve seen injuries like that before and time isn’t your friend. You get it done. The mission comes first, so I figured I had a couple minutes to live before I bled out. So, I was going to do anything I could to bring the fight to the enemy and keep my guys safe.”

In 2011, and as far into the future as can be predicted, the special tactics/battlefield airmen remain the most deployed, and most decorated, of any career field in AFSOC.

A significant additional combat mission occurred in March through May 2011, when Operation Odyssey Dawn required a short-notice deployment of gunships, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) capability, CV-22s, and Special Tactics airmen to support the air campaign over Libya. Stateside units deployed to augment the 352nd Special Operations Group at Mildenhall, U.K., and then deployed forward to bases in the Mediterranean to support the combat zone. 352nd Group Commander Col. Gary “Chainsaw” McCollum worked as the SOF Air Component Commander of both Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) to prepare missions tasked from each direction. Gunship missions flown over Libya had the desired lethal effects on Libyan army units, aiding in protecting rebel population centers. Other aircraft of the SOF air component were held back at Mildenhall as national leadership decided not to allow ground units to support the rebels, and even to limit severely any advisory ground elements. The CV-22s remained in the U.K. until their scheduled May deployment date to proceed forward into Afghanistan.

Natural Disaster Mission Divert: Japan’s Earthquake and Tsunami

On the other side of the world and also in March 2011, AFSOC units had an unexpected mission interrupt the routine of training and augmenting the war in the Middle East. Col. Robert Toth, then the 353rd Special Operations Group commander at Kadena, Okinawa, had just deployed much of his group to South Korea for a training exercise when Japan experienced a severe earthquake followed by a devas-tating tsunami along its eastern coastline. As in the earth-quake situation the year before in Haiti, the Joint Special Operations Air Component to the Theater Special Operations Command had the first assets capable of deploying to provide aid. Unlike at Haiti, the Japanese government was intact and working to provide aid to the region, but like many natural disasters, lacked communications and knowledge of the disaster area due to widespread destruction. Toth sent aircraft and planners forward to Yokota Air Base, Japan, the day after the tsunami and followed a day later with the rest of his group staff. They established communications with the government of Japan through U.S. Forces-Japan headquarters at Yokota and began planning to find and use airfields near the disaster area where humanitarian aid could be delivered most effectively.



They combined with the Pacific Air Forces rescue helicopter unit also from Kadena, and the relief operation confronted terrible weather conditions and radiation warning areas to penetrate the area where cell towers, roads, and electricity no longer existed. They used an outlying airfield to deploy Special Tactics airmen with tactical vehicles to penetrate the affected area to conduct reconnaissance and to open and begin clearing Sendai Airport in eastern Japan. The Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen established face-to-face communications with Japanese officials at Sendai, cleared a 4,900-foot portion of the devastated airfield, and received the first MC-130P Combat Shadow aircraft from the 17th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) within a day of arriving and only three days after the tsunami. The Air Commandos quickly opened the airfield for C-130 operations of the Shadows and Combat Talons (1st SOS), and received people and equipment that could clear the rest of the field for more robust relief operations.

Over the next two days, the 353rd SOG operation cleared the airfield of numerous wrecked aircraft, literally hundreds of destroyed automobiles, and a total of more than 300 tons of debris. By March 20, the airfield could receive C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy aircraft, greatly increasing the amount of humanitarian assistance that could arrive at the airfield. In all, over eight days of assistance before fully transitioning control of the airfield to the Japanese government, the 353rd SOG facilitated air delivery of more than 500 people, 2.5 million pounds of relief supplies, and 15,000 pounds of fuel.

Growth of the 27th Special Operations Wing at Cannon AFB, N.M.

The 27th SOW stood up at Cannon AFB in October 2008 with one aircraft and about 150 people. Growing steadily, it now has squadrons of AC-130Hs, MC-130Ws, CV-22s, two squadrons flying UAVs, two squadrons of small airplanes, and another of Special Tactics airmen. In 2010, it exceeded 2,200 people and was picking up aircraft more rapidly, reaching 40 by the end of that year. In 2011, the wing had nearly 80 aircraft and a population of 5,000. Col. Albert M. “Buck” Elton commands, and points out that his wing is programmed to exceed the population of the wing at Hurlburt, with end-strength of more than 6,000. He also said the maintenance and support squadrons of the base have grown accordingly, along with the stand-up of a training squadron to train new people before they move into their operations or maintenance squadron homes. Construction is booming on the base as C-130 hangars are going up, as well as several squadron operations buildings, dormitories, and warehouses, totaling 23 active construction projects at the end of 2011.

A Mission Matures: Remotely Piloted Aircraft/Unmanned Aerial Systems

A rapidly maturing mission in AFSOC is that of unmanned aircraft or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). In order to support SOF in the field with SOF airmen, AFSOC acquired two squadrons of RPAs: the 3rd SOS with MQ-1 Predators D

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and the 33rd SOS now with MQ-9 Reapers. Between them the squadrons have approximately 40 aircraft and support 10 continuous missions, or combat air patrols (CAPs). All of these missions are now controlled or flown from Cannon AFB or by the augmenting 2nd SOS Reserve Squadron at Nellis AFB, Nev. The actual aircraft are flying over classified loca-tions, and they constitute about one-third of RPA missions that are flown in support of SOF missions and targets.

When asked by email if and how RPA flight crews attain and maintain a relationship with the supported SOF ground units, Elton explained that is “one of the largest challenges we have within RPA. We all grew up within AFSOC building habitual relationships through countless exercises before we finally deployed downrange, where we employed our aircraft in direct support of the very same people we supported through exercises.

“Unfortunately, that is not how it works within RPA. One of the many nuances we have with this weapons system is that we fly nearly 100 percent of the time in actual combat vs. what you see in a ‘traditional’ flying squadron where you train 80 percent of the time and employ the weapons system in combat the other 20 percent of the time. Because we have our aircraft airborne almost continually (24/7/365), it gives us very few opportunities to accomplish any sort of

continuation training, which limits the opportunities we have to interact with our supported units to enable habitual relationships – not to mention the fact that we are not co-located with any of the teams we support.

“Recently we broke through this barrier with our Navy friends on the East Coast, where we have had their leadership, JTACs and intel folks out to Cannon to work through different target sets … we are visiting them (next week matter of fact) to continue to foster our working relationship. Additionally, we are working on building a communica-tions infrastructure between Cannon and our supported units that will allow our crews to speak with the teams on an instantaneous basis to help with crew/team interaction.”

The missions, classified in all cases, are critical to SOF success in the field and meaningful in participation to the flyers. Still, crews flying direct combat while working a normal duty day in New Mexico are separated from the urgency of the battlefield and assurances of the proper mindset to supported units can

only go so far. Eventually, AFSOC will probably develop means to deploy and co-locate RPA crews with SOF teams to ensure integration and relationships. Former 27th SOW Commander Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Clark, stated that the habitual relation-ships and face-to-face trust of SOF ground and air units must be achieved in all SOF aviation units. “Aircraft are aircraft,” he said, “whether the people flying them are aboard or not, and we need to consider deploying them, aircraft and people, in the same manner as any others.”

First-time Deployments for Two NSAVs – Non-Standard Aviation Aircraft Smaller than C-130s

In 2011, the Cannon wing received deliveries of two aircraft types that are new to AFSOC – and to the U.S. military. According to an AFSOC staff member, these aircraft are also “the simplest and easiest airplanes to fly.” In contrast to the high tech on most other AFSOC aircraft, the Sikorsky M-28 Sky Truck (manufactured by PZL in Poland) was designed for austere environments, short takeoffs and landings on rough terrain, and easy maintenance. Similarly, the mid-sized Dornier 328 is a commercial aircraft made to carry about 30 passengers with cargo and baggage while being inexpensive to operate.

LEFT: A U.S. airman with an Air Force Special Operations Weather Team gives a thumbs-up to a crew member aboard an Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter March 7, 2012, near Hurlburt Field, Fla. The airmen jumped out of the helicopter into the Gulf of Mexico during a training scenario as part of Emerald Warrior 2012, an annual two-week joint/combined tactical exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command designed to leverage lessons learned from operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders. BELOW: Members of the 320th Special Tactics Squadron arrive at Sendai Airport March 16, 2011, and begin to assess the damage and determine what they can do to help in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan.

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The wing leased aircraft before its newly procured aircraft were delivered, in order to accomplish crew training and reach IOC as quickly as the aircraft arrived. The 318th SOS, commanded by Lt. Col. Dave Cox, acquired its first three M-28s (of 11 programmed), configured and tested them for airdrops (something they could not do with the restrictions on leased aircraft), declared IOC, and deployed the three planes to Afghanistan.

Pilot Maj. Clayton Pasco commanded the deployment of the low, slow, and unpressurized airplanes that took more than 60 hours of flying time and made 17 refueling stops to cross the United States, the Atlantic, and 19 other countries to make their way to the combat zone.

Once there, Pasco and his crews conducted “customer visits and liaison” with the SOF units and the load riggers in order to begin their work of resupply and personnel movements. Previously, contractor aircraft, which were configured differently, conducted airdrops. Because of the short and rough terrain capability of the M-28s, more of the deliveries could be made by air-land methods, and they could also include personnel moves that the contractor could not accomplish. By September, the contractor was told there was no longer a requirement for them and the contract was cancelled, saving several millions of dollars each month.

Receiving the initial Dornier 328s is the 524th SOS, commanded by Lt. Col. Andrew Maas. Also deploying as soon

as reaching IOC, the squadron supports deployments to several places at once, sending the mid-sized mobility platform to locations in Africa and Latin America. With only five of the programmed 17 aircraft delivered by the end of 2011, four aircraft were sent to three separate deployments. At a couple of these, the larger Dornier is paired with the small Pilatus PC-12s of the 318th in order to provide both sizes of aircraft to service multiple locations of the overall deployments.

Maj. Chris Ayre led a deployment in Latin America, and Maj. Gary Howell took one to Africa. Both told of challenges of working with embassy country teams, of satisfying foreign militaries to obtain air traffic clearances, and of meeting all the mission requirements of the ground SOF units there to help train indigenous forces and build partner nation counter-insurgency (COIN) capability. They support when downrange from the theater SOC air component staffs, but have many mission tasks and local requirements to bring together to get

U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Corban Caliguire and Tech. Sgt. Aaron Switzer, 21st Special Tactics Squadron Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC), call for an A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft to carry out a show of force during a close air support training mission Sept. 23, 2011, at the Nevada Test

Air Force Weapons School students during the close air support phases of the Weapons School six-month, graduate-level instructor course.

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everything accomplished, with just one or two aircraft often to cover operations across three or four countries in strange environments with very young flight crews, about 60 percent of whom are on their first flying assignments.

Lt. Col. Keith Chauret calls these missions the best ones some of these crews will see in their flying careers. One airplane with a crew, getting the support they need without getting excessive oversight or scrutiny, are flying missions across exotic continents, learning about faraway cultures, and making their missions happen. “It’s great to have missions, reliable airplanes, and to be out there making the right things happen every day while juggling schedules, requirements, mission loads, and flying your monthly limit in flying hours.” As an aside, Chauret goes on to say that the most demanding self-deployment for some of the young pilots is “that eight-hour flight in a PC-12 from Alaska across the northern Pacific to the closest airfield in Japan. That’s a lot of cold water to look at for two young pilots with not a drop of extra gas and only one engine.” Even though single-engine ocean crossings are followed by rescue-equipped C-130s with Pararescue men (PJs) aboard, those long and lonely flights will rapidly age young crews.

AC-130W Combat Spear/Stinger II:

AFSOC deployed the MC-130W Combat Spear as a mobility platform and helicopter tanker for the first time in 2010. In 2011, the aircraft was reconfigured, achieved IOC, and conducted its first deployment – as a gunship. For a period of time, crews and maintenance of the aircraft were conducting combat missions

as a mobility asset, training crews in the gunship mission, and conducting tests on gunship modifications.

Col. William P. West, the 27th Special Operations Group commander, touts the (A)MC-130W as a developmental aircraft, bridging the gap between the H-model gunships developed during the Vietnam War and still in use, and the next-generation gunship, the AC-130J or J-Models now being developed and procured. West also said that the name “Combat Dragon Spear” might give way to a more gunship-oriented name, the “Stinger II,” if the USAF approves a requested name change. The W-models come to the war with new characteristics for gunships, including larger and higher-resolution sensors, precision munitions, and the ability to fly the gunship at higher altitudes.

The squadron commander of the W-models, Lt. Col. Donny Purdy, explained his squadron’s activities as multifaceted support to the current war effort and to future combat development efforts. “We have MC-130Ws flying combat every day and using the current weapons, our SOPGM [Special Operations Precision Guided Munition] and the 30 mm gun. The sensors and SOPGM [give] us the ability to fire on targets with a significant off-set. The aircraft is significantly lighter than the older gunships and can therefore fly higher.” Added to the weapons capability is that of the sensors. Sporting two larger EO/IR (electro-optical/infrared) sensors, the W-model gunship has greater resolution and can observe and spot targets farther away, enhancing gunship survivability and capability.

At the same time, aircraft at home are conducting crew training and currency, but also are developing the weapons suite that will be installed on the 16 J-model aircraft being


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procured to re-capitalize the Vietnam-era H-model gunships. That weapons suite will include precision weapons and the 30 mm of the Ws, but will also have a howitzer-style weapon. The testing being done now will accelerate and reduce the risk in development of the J-model weapon system.

Purdy said also that current W-model operations have allowed daytime gunship operations, which denies the enemy a safe haven time of day from gunships. The off-sets allowed by higher altitudes, higher-resolution sensors, and by longer-range weapons provide the added capability. He said his aircraft are well defended by altitude, placement over the battlefield, and on-board defenses.

Daytime ops enable new gunship missions. The MC-130W often provides support for troops on the ground as they perform village engagements as part of the population-centric COIN strategy in Afghanistan. “We’re part of the team when SF soldiers perform village engagements. We don’t think of the mission as ‘armed overwatch,’ which many still call it, but as being an integrated part of the mission, and enabling improved counterinsurgency. We’re ready to protect the SF soldiers and we can provide a deterrent to anyone who might want to pick a fight.”

Looking Forward: Future Posture Adjustment

Brig. Gen. Mike Kingsley, the current director of opera-tions for AFSOC, added that the command is also preparing for the post-war stateside training posture of AFSOC units. AFSOC has expanded its homegrown exercise program called Emerald Warrior into a national-level training event, last year attracting hundreds of aircraft and dozens of

units. “This exercise takes place every March, and last year included such things as Joint Tactical Air Controller training in Florida with Marine AV-8s [Harriers] and counter-IED training with convoy escort by gunships on the expanded Melrose Range conducted by the AFSOC people at Cannon.”

Near the end of 2011, Fiel announced plans to posture more of the command’s airplanes and people at forward bases on a more permanent basis as combat deployments reduce their requirements. His plan is to increase the numbers of aircraft at the overseas groups to 12 MC-130Js and 10 CV-22s at each. This represents a 40 percent increase in numbers, but approximately a doubling of mission-ready aircraft available to overseas combatant commanders. Fiel explained that when missions like Odyssey Dawn arise, augmentation of the overseas assets is almost always needed prior to mission start, but with the new posture, such augmentation will be the exception. Missions can begin and, if they still need augmentation, waiting for it will not be a show-stopper. Further, depending on the recapitalization of the gunships, it also might be possible to have a squadron of AC-130Js at each of the four AFSOC locations – New Mexico, Florida, Europe, and the Pacific. He feels this basing plan will best prepare AFSOC for whatever might be next in the command’s operational future.

The growth path that AFSOC has been on for the past few years is now paying off with greater airplane support for special operations missions around the world. AFSOC’s leaders are determined to push the aircraft to forward locations with a lean-forward attitude in performing the assigned tasks while maintaining readiness for whatever the nation might need them to do.

OPPOSITE: An AFSOC Sikorsky/PZL M-28 Skytruck lands on a road in Afghanistan.LEFT: An MC-130W

by the 73rd Special Operations Squadron

over at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., Sept. 11, 2011. The

of a ceremony that honored the victims of Sept. 11, 2001.


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A jumpmaster with U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, conducts a high altitude, high opening (HAHO) freefall jump during a double-bag static-line parachute course in Wendover, Utah, April 9-21.


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MARSOC units were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan even as the new command was being stood up, applying the knowledge and capabilities of Force Reconnaissance, the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), the 4th Marine Expeditionary Battalion (MEB), and the command and control (C2), tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and concept of operations (CONOPS) of the Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the heart of modern Marine Corps combat structure and operations.

In six years of combat in Southwest Asia, MARSOC quickly grew into the SOCOM command and operations structure while also deploying worldwide in support of SOCOM efforts in Africa, the Asia/Pacific, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. But it also has grown into a new kind of Marine Corps – and special ops – organization, seeking mediation among Afghan groups generally friendly to the United States and its coalition allies but historically hostile to each other, and conducting Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises in nations with militaries as sophisticated as Brazil and as new and evolving as many are in Africa.

“In the last 18 months, we’ve had about two-thirds of the regiment dedicated to Afghanistan. We continue to do company- and battalion-sized persistent deployments there, through MSOCs [Marine Special Operations Companies] and SOTFs [special ops task forces] in support of SOCOM and the TSOCs [theater special operations commands],” noted Col. Steve Grass, commander of the Marine Special Operations Regiment (MSOR). “We continue to support other SOCOM requirements, JCET programs, foreign SOF in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia.

“Our bread and butter today is doing village-to-village operations in Afghanistan. We’ve made some great gains in our understanding of the environment there, starting with

tactical actions and stretching through understanding the people to the point of acutely bolstering their defense forces and strengthening governance leading to transition.”

A key operation in Afghanistan in 2011-12 has been the creation and deployment of SOCOM advanced operating bases (AOBs), most under the command of a U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Special Forces A-Team (Operational Detachment-Alpha, or ODA) or a MARSOC MSOC, with elements from other SOCOM service components attached to them.

“When we deploy an MSOC, we have about 105 personnel. But SOCOM realized the MSOC can be the HQ for a much larger SOF, so we have taken the MSOC’s headquarters and three teams and attached under that one Navy SEAL platoon and two to three ODAs. Additionally, we took a standard unit – 1st of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne. When you add all those attached forces, you have more than 500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines oper-ating under one MARSOC commander, which is a substantial capability,” Maj. Andy Christian, commander of MSOC Alpha, 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion (MSOB), explained.

“The MSOC, with those maneuver elements, has SOTF-West above us, a battalion-level unit responsible for the U

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Coalition special operations forces members provide security during a two-day presence patrol with Afghan Commandos from the 9th Kandak in Sar-e Takht village, Farah province, Feb. 27, 2012. U.S. SOF personnel worked with the 9th Kandak Commandos to protect local communities and eradicate insurgent activity in the region.



largest chunk of real estate in Afghanistan. SOTF-W also has a similar company operating further west, so it is a larger snapshot of what we were doing [as an AOB], with the mission to command and control all special [operations] forces in the western section of the country.”

Christian’s Alpha Company was the first MARSOC-led unit (AOB-811), comprising a small multi-service group deployed to individual villages – some still controlled by the Taliban. Their job was a 21st century expansion of the “winning hearts and minds” concept employed by the Green Berets in Vietnam. While noting some inherent similarities with Vietnam, he said the biggest difference is the desired “end-state.”

“We are trying to expand security, governance, and development, but the most important element is connecting the villages to a district level of governance so there is a future for Afghanistan, with no more villages isolated from the rest of the nation. Once you accomplish that – and the challenge is to make sure that connection remains in place once you remove SOF from the equation – the Afghans themselves must stand up to continue the three operations critical to the long-term success of the model in Afghanistan,” he said.

“I think security will always be challenging, but building security forces in Afghanistan to a significant number that they will be credible and capable will have a major impact. Ultimately, of course, the citizens of Afghanistan will deter-mine the future of Afghanistan. But with this model in place, the government in Kabul should have a better relationship with and reach into these formerly isolated villages.”

While a major part of the AOB’s mission is to create and train local security forces, including tying them into the regional and national security structure, the most difficult jobs are using a fusion of intel from a variety of sources – along with the knowledge of individual SOF warfighters familiar with the area – to identify friends and foes (desig-nated white and red cells, respectively) in the villages, determine who will work with them, provide fair and firm local governance, and bring traditionally hostile local groups together to work peacefully toward a common goal.

“It really starts with trust and building credibility, which, quite frankly, takes time. We often are not greeted with open arms in the villages. Just like any population, it requires effective communications and building trust and cred-ibility. But once that is established, it’s like a light switch turning on. The village elders will work with and support the common objectives – and the village objectives – once you find that common ground,” Christian said.

“You literally have to ask the villagers what they believe to be the biggest problem – with security usually the No. 1 concern. So we spend a lot of time addressing that. But D

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Marines attending the MARSOC Individual Training Course conduct patrols during the seven-month course's culminating exercise, Raider Spirit.



often village security improved dramatically, so you had then to turn to other issues – sometimes agriculture, some-times employment – but basically long-lasting solutions and methods the locals think are sustainable.”

Such non-kinetic efforts are closer to combat diplomacy than combat itself – with combat diplomacy a skill and task few, including Afghan villagers and local leaders, immediately associate with U.S. Marines, much less Marine special operators. But both regular and SOF Marines today are receiving extensive training in languages, cultures, religions, and regional concerns, worldwide. Combined with MAGTF and MARSOC TTPs and CONOPs, that has created a far more multi-dimensional Marine, capable of both driving an enemy such as the Taliban out of a village or region and negotiating a peaceful, unified approach to future local, regional, and national governance.

In some ways, that also can be seen in the expansion of SOCOM-led JCETs outside of Afghanistan. TSOCs, working with geographic combatant commands (GCCs), determine the operational requirements of a given theater and which nations would most benefit from – and host – JCET exercises.

“JCET benefits SOCOM by working with international partners and bringing additional regional and theater envi-ronment experiences to our own operational capabilities. So in Indonesia, we can do amphibious training in a new and different environment – and doing it with a partner force makes it more realistic for us,” Lt. Col. Darren Duke, commander of the 3rd MSOB, said.

“From a MARSOC perspective, we have tried to become more regionally focused. We are a small component within SOCOM and can’t cover the globe the way USASOC can, so we try to bring more focus. In recent years, 3rd Battalion has operated in at least four locations – Indonesia; the Philippines; South America, especially Brazil; and Africa, including Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Kenya. Further back, we were in the ’stans [Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan] for JCETs. So we’ve been in a lot of locations, while 1st and 2nd MSOBs have focused on Afghanistan.”

To date, JCETs have been conducted individually by every SOCOM service component, with MARSOC and USASOC primarily. However, Duke said he would not be surprised to see multi-SOF programs in the future, especially those involving nations with multiple requirements – naval, coastal, urban, desert, mountain. Those differences in environment, along with cultures, governments, and military experience, require a different structure and goal for each JCET.

“In the Pacific, we’re dealing with large bodies of water and archipelago nations very skilled in boat movements and jungle patrols, where in Africa it is primarily opera-tions in desert environments quite different from Iraq and Afghanistan,” he said. “In other places, we are working with more developed countries, such as Brazil, which has a very professional force. So when we work with them, the balance of the exchange is probably more even.”

By law, a JCET must provide training for the U.S. mili-tary units and personnel involved, whether working with a modern, experienced host nation military or helping an evolving nation establish a capable internal and regional security capability. That is one reason JCETs do not include elements from other allied nations, such as NATO.

As with the AOBs, JCETs trace their origin to Vietnam. Duke said Green Beret efforts there were the foundation and genesis of SOCOM today, with the JCET also an outgrowth

of the winning hearts and minds concept employed there more than 40 years ago.

“It is important to establish a healthy rapport with partners who have their own security needs and work with them where we can to help them meet those where we share the same concerns,” he added. “It is more beneficial to have those coun-tries do the work themselves than have Americans come in and do it. So what we were trying to achieve in a narrow area in Vietnam has become a broad-based component of SOCOM today.

“In addition, the key part of our [internal MARSOC] training is to develop regional expertise, language, and cultural skills. JCET also will be an important vehicle for us to exercise our mobility capability. We’ve been fighting in the desert for a long time, so it will be a great opportunity to get back to the water and our maritime roots. And I think there will be greater interaction with the Marine Corps itself.”

Grass declined to speculate on where MARSOC and SOCOM will be through the rest of this decade and beyond, noting all of the variables involved could bring about major unexpected developments, just as was the case with the end of the Cold War and the start of combat in Southwest Asia.

“It will be interesting to see where SOCOM vectors us in the next five to 10 years. In the near term, we will maintain the focus of our training somewhat the same as we have – and the most important part of that is the multi-dimensional operator and leadership development. The better capable guy we have who can understand the battlefield and make impor-tant decisions on the battlefield will be able to survive in any environment,” he said. “As we re-task globally or regionally or within SOF skill sets, we will tailor our training pipeline and final exercises to ensure a team or company or battalion is individually capable and capable as a unit.

“Our current pipeline takes us through an MRX – mission rehearsal exercise – called the RAVEN, which prepares us D

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A member of the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command



for Afghanistan, or an operational readiness exercise that prepares us for other parts of the world. These training pipelines are tailored to the operational environment we expect to go to and the readiness exercise is the graduation exercise that says we’re ready. It’s likely in the future we’ll be preparing for more security force assistance missions and to maintain our capabilities for global crises.”

MARSOC was the last of SOCOM’s service components, created specifically for that joint command in 2006. By incor-porating existing SOF-like elements and capabilities, along with MAGTF structure, the Marines were able to adapt quickly to SOCOM’s operational and C2 requirements, including taking on more responsibility, at headquarters and in the field.

“For now, we plug in operationally at the team level and provide companies and SOTF at the battalion level which are expeditionary and task-oriented. We have focused on intel and ops integration, which is critical to the major fight we’re in right now. From a C2 perspective, we have SEAL platoons and ODAs working under our companies and we, in turn, work largely for Army-based SOTFs and will continue to do that as tasked.

“The most sweeping change will be as we progress out of Afghanistan to a more globally oriented force that will have to develop cultural and regional expertise. That probably will include a realignment of our language training and more operational flexibility in our TTPs. However, 60 percent of our skill set does translate to other environments, and individual operators at the grassroots level have reaped huge benefits that are translatable to many other missions and requirements.”

In a post-Southwest Asia environment, evolving the SOCOM-wide AOB concept to work with local villages and leaders anywhere in the world, combined with more MARSOC JCETs and training exercises with the big Corps, the Navy, other service SOF components and allies, will help MARSOC capabilities grow, both internally and within SOCOM. It also will help make the best use of additional funding and personnel approved for MARSOC and SOCOM as a whole – the only part of the U.S. military scheduled for growth as the overall defense budget declines and regular forces are reduced significantly through the rest of this decade.

“Every location has something to teach us. In Brazil, as they get ready for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, for example, the security challenges they face internally from criminal gangs are often akin to the insurgencies we have faced in Southwest Asia. So we talk to them about what we’ve learned there while they tell us about how they are dealing with the criminal organizations,” Duke said.

“In Africa, when you combine a desert with the unique way each ethnic group and culture has adapted to it and the particular threats operating in each environment, you find there are some real differences from Southwest Asia and we can learn a lot from those. The dynamics of West Africa and between the states there, with the Islamic Arab north and mostly Christian sub-Sahara, is a lot different from operating in the Shia-Sunni split in Iraq.”

While a primary focus of a JCET is to train and increase the knowledge and skills of U.S. warfighters, it also provides an opportunity to teach the host nation military in what-ever areas that government – and especially the TSOC and Combatant Command (COCOM) – believe important.

“I think JCET is invaluable. You can’t replace it with a classroom or even a simulated environment. It also gets us into other nations, with partners who gain a better

appreciation for what SOCOM is and develop long-lasting relationships that turn into cooperation in other areas. We can see from past years that they are beginning to benefit from JCET training, as have our people, giving both a deeper understanding of local and regional needs and security goals,” Duke added.

“During JCETs, in many places we are working to promote human rights. They also often ask us about our combat expe-riences, especially in nations without a lot of that. We talk about how we handle prisoners and treat non-combatants, which are great opportunities to expand on the area of human rights. For our part, language and cultural expertise do not develop overnight; they are hard-won, so the JCET effort is vital to our special operators being able to learn those and how to operate in these areas.”

As for the future of AOBs outside Afghanistan, Christian sees similar benefits, especially in terms of giving those with little true knowledge of America or experience with the U.S. military a better understanding of both, and as a significant factor in promoting peace and stability, both within individual nations and among neighboring states.

“We are a big bang for the buck, putting a small number of personnel on the ground – partnered with our [host nation] partners – and working with the local populace to make changes at the grassroots level,” he said. “We do a lot of bottom-up planning, because no one knows these villages better than the special operators working in and around them. That supports not only expansion of governance, security, and development, but also the objectives of the TSOCs and COCOMs.

“I think this is a model that can be applied to just about any situation we confront in the future. The ability to synchronize intel, the unique C2 capabilities, and combat service support, all in a task-oriented unit, bring both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities that are difficult to replicate in a traditional force. So having a tremendous amount of capability employed by a small group of individuals often leads to a tactical organization having a strategic impact.”

For MARSOC overall, the near future in Afghanistan looks little different from the past few years, according to Grass.

“In a very general sense, we’re still preparing, deploying, and redeploying roughly the same forces, in terms of battal-ions and companies working in Afghanistan. The coming drawdown of regular forces [in Afghanistan, but also the post-Afghanistan size of the U.S. military] means a greater demand in Afghanistan and across the globe in the future for SOCOM. So I expect our role will continuously expand,” he concluded, adding six years of inland desert operations for MARSOC has not meant abandoning their traditional role as Marines.

“As Marines first, we’ve never left our roots. Specifically, some of our mission sets around the globe still have us in the littorals and are still utilizing historic skill sets. As one area of focus for the future, we will continue our ability to be maritime, with the Marine Corps or maritime SOF with SOCOM. The bulk of our training is based on the mission, but we’re always looking for ways to keep those skills alive. We recently have done amphibious exercises with the MEFs [Marine Expeditionary Forces] to maintain those and worked in partnership with Navy SEALs, and as we stay somewhat wed to the [regular] Marine Corps, we will look for ways to maintain that training for maritime and amphibious capabilities.”

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BY SCOTT R. GOURLEY AND CHUCK OLDHAM

A career Naval Special Warfare (NSW) SEAL officer with multiple Joint Special Operations duty assignments, Rear Adm. Sean A. Pybus assumed command of U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) on June 30, 2011. Pybus recently sat down with The Year in Special Operations to share his thoughts on the evolution of the command as well as current organizational priorities and potential challenges on the horizon.

A Navy SEAL climbs up a ladder attached to the side of a gas and oil platform during training to

prepare for an upcoming deployment.

Pybus started by clarifying the differences in respon-sibilities between his command and operational /combatant commands.

“Manning, training, and equipping is the mission of Naval Special Warfare Command,” he explained. “That’s the mission of the headquarters and my mission as the commander. Then there is also an implied role to sustain the force as well. But really it is my obligation as the commander to provide capable, well prepared and trained forces out to the geographic combatant commanders – typically to the SOF commanders working underneath

NAVSPECWARCOM Year in Review NSW Commander Rear Adm. Sean A. Pybus discusses the history, successes, and challenges for Naval Special Warfare Command in an exclusive interview

NAVSPECWARCOM YEAR IN REVIEW

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...WHEN YOU NEED IT, EVERY TIME!



those combatant commanders. I provide those commanders with Naval Special Warfare forces and they ‘fight’ those forces. But it’s on me to do the man, train, and equip part.

“I try to be very clear with my other commanders about this. I don’t ‘own’ the war in Afghanistan, for example. I provide the best force I can so that it is successful and so that everyone who goes out has the best opportunity to come back,” he said.

“It’s clear in my mind what my role is,” he added. “I know that many out there may view the commander of the headquarters as ‘the guy in charge of the SEALs.’ But I take my man/train/equip role very seriously and do the best I can at that. And, having come from a theater special operations command, as a guy who has employed not only Navy but other SOF component forces, I also take the role of those theater commanders pretty seri-ously. They have the best view of what they need the forces to do. I just need to give them capable forces so that they can ‘fight’ them.”

Asked where he sees the challenges over the next several years, Pybus immediately pointed to “sustaining this force that’s been very busy for the last decade.”

“And the signals from around the world – not only Central Asia where we are currently fighting, but the rest of the world as well – look like demand will continue to exceed supply,” he said. “We’re not doing any unimportant work. Everything we do is part of somebody’s strategy and somebody’s plan. That is what we try to provide forces for.”

He continued, “The challenge is in sustaining not only the quantity but also the quality of the force that we currently have – a force that has now been pressured for 11 years.”

“We continue to be well-trained and well-equipped,” he added. “It’s now a matter of fatigue. The force has seen a lot, particularly on the combat battlefields. And that wears on a force. So, my priority is to get help to those who need it but may not be asking for it. And that help extends not only to the men in the force but also their families.”

Elaborating on the importance of families, Pybus offered, “There is very clear agreement on this among my fellow special operations component commanders: We view the family as part of the force. Because again, after 11 years of combat and loss, the elements of force and family are very tightly connected, and that is reflected in things like obliga-tions and capabilities. So we’re providing both sides – force and family – with a lot of support.

“As a Navy guy, I would offer that the United States Navy provides baseline support for not only our sailors but their families too,” he noted. “We lean heavily on the U.S. Navy to provide psychological counselors at different levels and then a whole array of other support services, ranging from financial to child care. Then Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] provides some niche support that is unique to special operations and Naval Special Warfare.

“And we’re taking a very hard look at this for the future, as I expect the requirement to provide that sort of holistic

support to both service members and their families to grow larger. As we continue to work hard with the same operational tempo, we’re going to need to provide more support,” he said.

Characterizing the current combat experience environ-ment as “unprecedented for the United States,” he recalled, “When I came into the force I was trained by those who had gone to Vietnam. And the guys who you had a great deal of admiration for had two, three, or maybe even four deployments. If you had four deployments to Vietnam, you were doing things well and you were very highly regarded.”

“But today you have men who have done ‘double digit’ deployments into combat that has been relentless,” he said. “That’s a whole different situation, and we are plowing new ground here in areas like how much a man can take or how much a mind can take and how you might be able to apply new tools in areas like resiliency, rehabilitation, or prevention. We are looking at a variety of different things and trying to understand what works best.”

He added, “Fortunately, there are a lot of people who are innovative; they are driven; and they are relentless. So there are some pretty good programs out there to provide support.”

While acknowledging a common misperception that every NSW operation involved direct action, Pybus was quick to characterize Naval Special Warfare as “a direct action-oriented force.” U

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A U.S. Navy SEAL Team member with Special Operations Task Force-South reviews a map of the objective area during the early morning hours of a village clearing operation in Shah Wali Kot district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan, June 25, 2011. Missions such as these are conducted in order to hinder Taliban


“We are small, relative to other components,” he said. “We have a combat legacy from early World War II in clearing beaches, harbors, and coastal reconnaissance with small numbers of men who were well conditioned for a tough environment and focused on what they had to do for the commanders. That’s our legacy.

“Our thought is that if you train for the toughest missions and for combat and direct action – and you get that right – then you can also teach others, engage in a mature and positive way with allies and partners, and you can fight,” he noted. “So we continue to focus on the direct action mindset, training, and equipping. But the fact of the matter is that we do a lot of foreign internal defense with partners and allies around the world. Afghanistan, like Iraq before it, gets the press. In fact, on a day to day basis somewhere between 50 and 60 percent of our deployed capability goes into Afghanistan.

“In addition to Afghanistan, we are also providing forces in Asia, where we have been in the Philippines for 10 years, in Mindanao, with our Army Special Forces brothers, parts of Air Force Special Operations Command, and the Marines,” he added. “We are in Africa, working with partners there to develop security forces that can begin to police not just threats within their countries but threats that might manifest back into the United States. We are in Latin America in small numbers, while there continue to be problems there with drugs and criminal networks. And we have some other long-standing relationships that we maintain with sister special operations units. So we are around the world.

“I think you are likely to see Afghanistan stay at about the same level of effort over the next several years. But I think we will find innovative new ways to get additional forces out to the other theaters; doing mostly Foreign Internal Defense but also some crisis response activities. There’s just a lot going on in the world and we want to make a difference,” he said.

Pybus believes that the U.S. strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific region will impact future NSW focus. Acknowledging his personal bias toward the region based on his previous tour as the theater special operations commander, he asserted, “there is a lot going on in that area.”

“For Naval Special Warfare there is a lot of water there, and some of it is contested,” he observed. “So increasingly there is a maritime focus and a lot of important activity there. And I want to make sure that we are providing the commander of Pacific Command with those maritime special operations forces that he may need, either in a contingency operation or to assist partners and allies, to a degree better than what we are doing today, because we just don’t have much capacity out there right now. But it is a place where, in the near term, we are going to try to provide more force, incrementally, through the theater special operations commander. So I understand the shift strategically. I agree with it, And, while we are limited as to what we can provide tomorrow, I think within the next two years you will see some increased presence of Naval Special Warfare into Asia.”

Pybus reviewed the role of NAVSPECWARCOM against a backdrop of overlapping historical anniversaries.

“Our ‘frogmen’ history dates back 70 years – to late ’41- early ’42. That’s 70 years as U.S. Navy frogmen; 50 years from the SEAL Teams being commissioned in January of 1962; and 25 years since Nunn-Cohen stood up U.S. Special Operations Command, with components to include the Navy component – Naval Special Warfare Command,” he began.

“Again, the headquarters serves as an instrument through which to resource the force with things ranging from individual equipment to both surface and sub-surface maritime platforms,” he said. “And we work closely with the SOCOM staff in that. In terms of training, the headquarters helps the Center to do a whole range of training – both basic [BUD/S – Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training] and advanced. And we make sure that the money that the nation is giving to naval special operations is spent wisely and efficiently to make the force as capable as possible.”

He asserted, “I think those are some of the important things that the headquarters does, thereby enabling the lower tier commanders to do their operational business – the real training and preparation for deployment – while the headquarters does things like making investment U

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decisions for the longer term while also responding to urgent needs that might arise.

“Over the years of frogmen history up until Nunn-Cohen, our future was not assured,” he admitted. “The Navy came close to terminating the whole program at a couple different points, primarily post-Vietnam. So we have to make sure that we continue to be relevant; that we continue to be a force that can be counted on to be successful. And I think the headquarters plays a role there. We have great commanders and senior advisors who continue to improve the capabilities of the force. If they can do that and we can continue to take some burden away through things like resourcing, then I feel good about what we are providing.”

Asked about recruiting and retaining the highest quality personnel, Pybus pointed to “a bit of a sine wave on recruiting more than retention.”

“Retention is extremely strong and has been throughout the war years. Recruiting ebbs and flows with the popula-tion coming out of high school in terms of numbers and talent,” he said.

“As far as recruiting numbers, today guys are knocking down the door for the opportunity to go into BUD/S,” he added. “So we have a great opportunity to be selective, maintain our standards, and continue to seek high quality kids coming in ‘the front door’ that will graduate to become SEALs and Combatant-craft Crewmen. And our quality D

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CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT: U.S. Navy SEALs train with Special Boat Team (SBT) 12 on the proper techniques of how to board gas and oil platforms from a moving vessel. SEALs conduct these evolutions to hone their various maritime operations skills. A Navy SEAL from Naval Special Warfare Group 1 out of Coronado, Calif., fast-ropes off of a U.S. MH-47 Chinook helicopter onto the helicopter deck of the AOE-59 Hwachun – a Korean naval refueling vessel – in Jinhae Harbor, Republic of Korea, March 20, 2012, as part of Foal Eagle 2012 – a multinational, joint-service exercise focusing on tactical-based warfare throughout the peninsula of Korea. Both U.S. and ROK Navy SEALs fast-roped out of the helicopter and performed a visit, board, search, and seizure drill to demonstrate the interoperability between the two forces.

The exercises educate operators and divers on the techniques and procedures related to the delivery vehicle and its operations.

CONTACT: [email protected]: (937) 490-2509

The Sensor Systems Divison of The O’Gara Group is a leading designer and manufacturer of Imaging, Beacon and Laser Systems for Special Operations Forces.

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remains extremely high. For example, one third of the graduates of BUD/S and then SEAL Qualification Training have a college degree. So if you are a young officer, that presents a real leadership challenge – but in a very good way. You need to be squared away to lead men with similar levels of education – or in some cases higher levels of educa-tion. And with officers, we have some guys coming out of the Naval Academy or ROTC who go to Cambridge for a year before coming into the program. These young men are some of the finest in America. They are all smart and this is what they want to do. I don’t doubt for a minute that our quality is really, really high.”

He continued, “Even though retention is strong right now, you also want to make sure that you are recognizing the efforts of the force through special pay, as an example. These men are working hard. They risk their lives. And they do get some compensation for doing that. Also, the outside economy right now is a pretty tough environment. So, although we are keeping folks at a pretty high rate, we watch those rates pretty closely.

“Another very important thing we do is work very closely with the Navy to try to get those key enablers – like commu-nicators and intel analysts – who make everything work,” he said. “Those numbers tend to be more in flux than our SEAL operator numbers. In fact, I actually have more concern with the numbers for some of the critical enablers than I do with the SEAL operators themselves.”

Expanding on the importance of those enablers, he observed, “They are the glue that holds the force together. They empower the force. For example, they do a lot of the ‘find and fix’ on enemy networks as well as the intel-ligence analysis – both near term and far term. So they are hugely important. But we get that talent from the U.S. Navy. Some of it ‘passes through’ the NSW commu-nity for three or four years and then onto a ship or next station. Some of it will stay in the community for a good period of time. And you have to make sure that peoples’ careers can continue by giving them every opportunity and compensating them properly.

“All of that said, I have a very close and, I think, very professional relationship with the Navy personnel leaders as well as with both the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and Vice CNO. They have made commitments to Naval Special Warfare that I deeply appreciate. So I am a big fan of the ‘Big Navy.’ They really support us. I just need to clearly articulate if I need things or what I am concerned about and they have always been responsive. So even though 90 to 95 percent of our resources – money and otherwise – comes through USSOCOM, what we get from the Navy is very important to me,” he said.

“I believe that the Navy will be ‘forward’ over the next 10 years and that we will also be ‘forward,’” he offered. “So it will be even more important to have both professional and personal relationships with the Navy leadership.”

Pybus added, “I think the past 10 years of conflict have actually contributed to bringing everyone together: One Team/One Fight. Quite frankly, we have done well, person-ally and as a force, deployed around the world, and I think that’s been recognized. And I also think the 50-year anni-versary of the SEAL Teams means that we should now be viewed as a ‘mature community.’ We have a reputation of maturity and success and I want to make sure that we continue to live up to that reputation.”

Pybus also pointed to change in some aspects of the indi-vidual operator over the past several years, noting, “We have invested a lot in training and there is now very little time that is not spent either improving yourself personally, as part of a tactical element or in a joint headquarters. By contrast, in the ’80s and ’90s the workloads were much more erratic – sometimes you had work and sometimes you didn’t. But for a decade now it’s been very much a constant cycle, with lots of training and lots of experience, and you are left with high-quality folks and a high-quality force. And that force is really exponentially much more capable than it was 20 or 30 years ago.

Navy SEALs from SEAL Team EIGHT exit an MH-60S Seahawk helicopter during a military freefall training event as part of Special Operations Command Europe’s Jackal Stone exercise on Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania.

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“It is manned by the same kind of guy who is just as determined and just as well conditioned – the same type of relentless problem-solver who will get things done in unconventional ways. It is the same kind of guy who will do anything to win,” he said. “But he has just been exposed to so much more at every level.

“And I am amazed at how today’s younger force manages all of that technology so well,” he added. “They process it. They multitask. And again a key component of their success is those critical enablers I mentioned.

“To be successful in BUD/S, I think it is important that you take it one day at a time,” he said. “These guys come out of that initial training, learning and retaining all of these different weapon systems, communications, how to do planning, how to brief, how to work with an intel analyst to understand your challenges and to set the terms of engagement. I am very impressed at how they do it individually. And as a Team, it is incredibly powerful. I’m just always amazed at ‘how these guys roll’ – and win.”

In terms of messages he would like to share about NSW, Pybus began by expressing pride “in how the force contributes to the Navy, USSOCOM, and the nation.”

“I would like the public to know that almost every special operation involves a team effort. So, while there might be a ‘SEAL face’ on some of these operations, I assure you that we don’t do it alone. We routinely work with our SOF brethren, and there is a daily battle rhythm of coor-dination across both the military and the government to get things done,” he said.

“The American people can be very proud of all of their forces – that includes the conventional forces as well,” he added.

He continued, “Another thing I would like the public to know is that its special operations forces do a lot of things that don’t get press. We’re not all about the capture or killing of our adversaries. We prepare for that and we will do that. But we also do many other things around the world that don’t get the same publicity.

“To be honest, we are a little uncom-fortable with some of the recent publicity,” he noted. Following the operation that eliminated al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, a plethora of newspaper articles, magazine articles, and books covering Naval Special Warfare appeared, as well as

Act of Valor, a film in which serving NAVSPECWARCOM personnel played major characters.

“I want a force that has humility. And I think we do, for the most part. But we are in a new information age. There’s just a lot more information out there – and much of it can be sensitive.”

Pybus acknowledged that finding a balance between publicity, the public’s right to know, and reducing NSW’s public profile is not an easy task. “We have folks who will write books. Several other movies will be coming out.

“To the extent that I can, I’m trying to manage and, in some cases, reduce our public profile. One reason for this is that we are concerned about our families and information that might get out there. We have respect for our adversaries. They are to be taken seri-ously. So we have asked our families to be more vigilant and we have asked our members to limit what they provide to the public – either in uniform or in retired status.”

Pybus summarized, “Over the past year, we have been successful in what it is we have been asked to do. We suffered a horrific tragedy in August. [On Aug. 6, 2011, a CH-47 Chinook carrying 38 passengers and crew was shot down by a Taliban rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). All aboard perished, including 17 SEALs and five other Naval Special Warfare personnel.] But that has also galvanized the community, bringing it very close together as we continue to embrace our families that suffered those losses. And we will continue to ‘warrior through’ and do those things that Special Operations Command and the Navy ask us to do.

“For my part, I will continue to take my role very seriously to ensure that this force remains relevant; continues to improve itself; and continues to be able to deal with tough times, both individually and as a force,” he said.

“And that force does continue to improve itself, on both individual and tactical element levels,” he added. “That is critical because we have got to be very efficient in light of current fiscal constraints. So we have to work in priorities around the world and stick to those priorities. As I said earlier, we are not doing any unimportant work. Everything now is part of a command-er’s plan in some region of the world.”

Pybus concluded, “We’re very proud. After 70 years of history and 50 years of SEALs, this is a good place to be.”

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INTERVIEW

BY JOHN D. GRESHAM AND SHAWN E. GORMAN

Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr., USA Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Forces Command and the 1st Special Forces Regiment

Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr. is commanding general of U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) Command and the 1st Special Forces Regiment. He was commissioned in the Infantry through the Appalachian State University ROTC program in 1982.

His command assignments include platoon leader and weapons platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (Forward) in Germany; commander, Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in the Republic of Panama; and commander, Special Forces Operational Detachment-Bravo, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, N.C.

He served as deputy commanding of cer, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and commanded the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg. Reeder commanded the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and most recently commanded the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command in Afghanistan. His staff assignments include company execu-tive of cer and battalion ad utant with the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (Forward) in Germany.

He also served as the aide-de-camp to the commanding general, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the ground operations of cer at the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. Reeder served as the chief of J3 Plans and chief of J3 Training at the U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force in the Republic of Panama.

Reeder was a battalion and group operations of cer and group executive of cer for the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg. He was the assistant chief of staff, G3, for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg. Reeder also served as the executive of cer to the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla.

His combat tours include the National Civil Defense Advisor in the Republic of El Salvador in 1988. Reeder commanded Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha 786 during Operation Just Cause in 1989 with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) under Task Force Black in the Republic of Panama. He commanded Special Operations Task Force 32 (2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002 and again in 2003.

Reeder commanded the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (7th Special Forces Group) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007. He also commanded the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom from 2009 to 2010.

The Year in Special Operations’ John D. Gresham inter-viewed Reeder late in 2011 on the occasion of the President John F. Kennedy Wreath Laying Ceremony at the JFK grave site at Arlington National Cemetery. The event paid tribute to JFK’s vision of a dedicated counterinsurgency force. In a message to Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough in October 1961, JFK commended the men of the Special Warfare Center on their efforts to prepare a force of unconventional warriors to combat growing threats to our nation.

“The challenge of this old but new form of operations is a real one and I know that you and the members of your command will carry on for us and the free world in a manner which is both worthy and inspiring,” Kennedy wrote. To honor that foresight and the support Kennedy gave to the Green Berets, Reeder led a contingent of Green Berets from the 1960s to the present in the ceremony at Arlington. A wreath in the shape of a Green Beret was placed on Kennedy’s tomb.

The ceremony was a renewal of a tradition carried out for two decades following the assassination of Kennedy until being discontinued in the 1980s due to operational demands.


INTERVIEWD

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The Year in Special Operations: Gen. Reeder, can you give us your thoughts as the commander of the U.S. Army’s 1st Special Forces Regiment on where President John F. Kennedy stood with regard to special warfare the day of his visit to Fort Bragg?

Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr.: I think John Kennedy had some monu-mental global security challenges. He was a decorated veteran in World War II and saw in the Army Special Forces a force capable of dealing with the guer-rilla forces [of the day]. So the linkage of his vision was incredible, and we live it today. I think he would be proud of us.

Where were Special Forces insti-tutionally as Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg on Oct. 12, 1961, was coming together?

Prior to this we had three Special Forces Groups [SFGs]. They were iden-tified as “an elite counterinsurgency force.” But we really formed [up] under John Kennedy and his presidency. We activated the 3rd, 5th, 8th, 11th, 19th, and the 20th groups, [in addition to the three existing SFGs]. When you

look at how we define ourselves today, it really can to be understood with how we developed under Kennedy and what we did in Vietnam.

And running throughout the story of this visit 50 years ago is the name of one very special Army officer: Maj. Gen. William Yarborough. Tell me a little bit about Bill Yarborough.

I wish I had the opportunity to spend some time with him. The transforma-tion of special operations forces [SOF] – he was that guy. I think he had a vision for the forces.

Yarborough’s tenure as commander of the Special Warfare Center in the early 1960s is remembered with the SOF community today for its transfor-mational ideas and events. During this period, he created “Uniteam,” which became the basis for the 12-man Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), which is the basic unit of the Special Forces. Can you talk a bit about this?

I think the concept is the same, though I think what he did [when he altered the ODA structure] was that he

Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr., left,

commanding general of U.S. Army Special

Forces Command (Airborne) and 1st Special

Forces Regiment, speaks with Secretary

of the Army John McHugh and Joseph P.

Kennedy II (right), moments before the JFK

Wreath Laying Ceremony on Nov. 17, 2011, at

Arlington National Cemetery. The ceremony

marked a time-honored tradition to lay a

wreath at Kennedy’s gravesite in honor of his

support and advocacy of the Green Berets.


INTERVIEW

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made it a bit bigger, he gave it more capability. And of course we can [still split the 12-man ODA into smaller elements] – we [often] run three to six teams [downrange].

For all of the potential and capability present in SF early in the 1960s, that wasn’t a friendly time or environment for them. Can you give us a sense of what the environment was like for special warfare personnel at that time?

It’s funny because [when] Sen. Robert F. Kennedy came to the Special Warfare School, he had been talking to Command Sgt. Maj. Sam Ruddy, and what Ruddy said was, and I’m paraphrasing, “Wars can be fought with large battles where there are a lot of dead enemy, but wars are won on days where no one dies, because if you do your job as a Special Forces soldier, you isolate the insurgent, cut him from his support, both logistically and from the people, and that’s how we win this war.” And when you look at the OSS Jedburgh teams [that dropped into occupied Europe after D-Day], they were collecting intelligence and doing direct-action kind of [things.] But I think [our] transformation came from the question of how do you promote security in governments at the lowest level? How do you build capacity? How do you have a host nation take owner-ship of their own security?

Not to mention making SF a “full spectrum” force able to support every-thing from peacekeeping to supporting “big war” operations … correct?

Exactly!

So, in your opinion, the early 1960s was not exactly the most pleasant environment for special warfare operations?

No, I don’t think it was. I was reading some papers the other night about Gen. Yarborough trying to get the Green Beret – which was a metaphor for SF – approved as the official headgear for the Army Special Forces. The story has it that Gen. Yarborough and one of President Kennedy’s aides, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton (a West Point classmate of Gen. Yarborough’s) were talking about all the global conflicts of the time, and the global spread of communism. They thought it would be a good idea to have the president visit Fort Bragg in North Carolina, and part of his visit

would be to the Special Warfare Center. It’s interesting, because Gen. Clifton and Gen. Yarborough [discussed], “Do we wear the green berets or not?” Gen. Yarborough commented that he had been unsuccessful in getting the Army to adopt the green beret as the official SF headgear. Yarborough said, “If I wear it, and the president is for it, who is going to be against it?” So on Oct. 12, 1961, when the president visited Fort Bragg and had a conversation with Gen. Yarborough, he asked him, “So how do you like those green berets?” And the general said, “We like them, we’ve been waiting to wear them for a long time.” Prior to [the president’s visit], [Clifton sent Yarborough] some kind of communication ahead of time and it said, “The president wants to see the green berets.” So that kind of greased the skids a little bit for Gen. Yarborough.

Sadly, John Kennedy only had one real visit to the facility that now bears his name, and sometimes that incident involving the Green Beret is confused with all the other things the president and the people around him did to help grow the special warfare community. As you look back on the 50th anniversary of that visit, what do you see that came from it, more than just a great looking hat?

3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard)

soldiers (right), render honors during

the playing of “Taps” at a wreath-laying

ceremony at the gravesite of President John

F. Kennedy in Arlington National Cemetery,

Va., Nov. 17, 2011. The ceremony, hosted

by the U.S. Army Special Forces Command

(Airborne) and supported by The Old Guard,

commemorated the 50th anniversary of the

wearing of the green beret authorized by

Kennedy in 1961. This important visit and the

subsequent lasting partnership between JFK

and the Special Forces ensure that these

men will forever wear the green beret.


INTERVIEW

I think it was the fact that the presi-dent, in a letter of gratitude [written] to Gen. Yarborough that afternoon, makes a comment that the green beret is, “a mark of distinction in the trying times ahead.” Six months later he writes a memorandum to the Department of the Army and he makes reference to the green beret being “a symbol of excel-lence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.” So what I think that visit did was pretty much solidify that the Army Special Forces, the Green Berets, were a very unique force to … execute unconven-tional warfare and also fight the global spread of communism.

It’s 50 years later now, and the revo-lutionary things that were done under Yarborough at the Special Warfare Center are still with us – things like the basic structure of the Special Forces A-Team, and the fact that there is an SF qualification course (the “Q-course”) with a culminating exercise (“Robin Sage”). What was it that translated and lasted into the 21st century?

As I said, I didn’t know Gen. Yarborough, but [from] everything I’ve read about him, I think his No. 1 priority was the SF soldier. I think the training of that SF soldier, the equipping of that SF soldier, the education of that SF soldier, is the same priority I have today. When I took command, people would ask, “What’s the difference between a Green Beret now and then?” and I would say, “He’s in a lot better physical condition, he’s faster, and he’s smarter.” But honestly, the more I talk, the more I go around and meet the Green Berets from Vietnam, the more I realize that we are picking the same guy. It is still the same man.

Having known some of the great SF soldiers over the years, what is it about SF soldiers that make them disavow the word “impossible”?

I think we have all the faith and confidence that our SF soldiers can do the mission. Honestly, when you tell me that [something] is impossible, I look at the capabilities of a Special Forces A-Team and I know it’s possible, I know it’s doable.

Ten years ago, we had 49 days that defined the phrase “catastrophic success” for America and the world. What’s the next generation of SF soldiers going to do to keep creating

these successes and these amazing opportunities for America that often conventional forces just can’t do?

I am convinced that 10 years from now we will still be picking the right guys. When you go visit these guys [deployed SF soldiers], especially if you do battlefield circulation and you get out into combat and you see these guys, they are so impressive. They truly understand the human dynamics of warfare. I think a lot of times that really differentiates [the value] between a Special Forces A-Team and a general-purpose force unit in the field. The guy that understands the people, understands the inf luences in his areas, has a tremendous appreciation of intelligence, is pretty darned good at building capability.

I’ve been to Afghanistan a number of times, commanded [SOF forces there] five times, and I approved all the CONOPS for our SF guys. I never once approved a unilateral U.S. Army Special Forces mission. It was always with the host-nation forces, and building capa-bility, and we are truly about that. We are about building Afghan national security forces. We hold these guys to a combat model and [that] is: You make an assessment, you train them to a standard, you deploy them in combat, you come back, and you identify weak-nesses and you train to fix them – a constant cycle of making them better. I told Gen. [Stanley] McChrystal, when I was working for him in Afghanistan, that when you visit a Special Forces A-Team, ask them where their partner force is. Then ask the team sergeant what the weaknesses are of that partic-ular unit, and make them show you their training schedule so you know

they are getting trained to standard. If he can’t do that then he is wrong.

In addition to the fine soldiers you have, the nation has been blessed with some amazing leaders that have come out of the SF community. Right now, special warfare officers are the people you want out front doing all the heavy lifting, not just in SOCOM but also out in front of the rest of the forces. Do you still see the “bench” down there at the SFG commander level who will be able to continue this trend of trustworthy, capable, innova-tive, and dangerous leaders?

I do. I absolutely do because I’ve seen most of the battalion leaders in combat, and most of their companies go through combat. But I’ll tell you about the [leader] selection which even starts with the captains. [Every year,] we assess and we look at [some] 500 records, we send invitations to about 350 people to come try out. We only need about 150 captains a year, [and] last year we only picked 107, so we are very picky, and we can pick the best of the best. I tell you the Special Warfare School is doing an absolutely phenomenal job.

Your new SF soldiers are computer savvy, they are more fluent in languages than their predecessors, and they are coming from a wider variety of places. What do you see the SF soldiers 10 years from now being like when they talk about the 60th anniversary of President Kennedy’s visit?

I think, first of all, your point is well taken on [today’s SF] soldier – he is younger, he’s more adaptable to change, and I think he’s more innova-tive. He’s more technically savvy then we were 10 years ago. What is he going to look like in 10 years? I am telling you that 10 years from now, I am absolutely confident that the Special Forces will be in as good of a shape, if not better.

What is it that you would like to say about this anniversary and what it means to you and your command today?

I would say that in 1961, a young, very visionary president called upon the Army Green Berets to help stop the spread of global communism. Forty years later, the leadership of our great nation turned to those same Green Berets, asked them for an answer, and then a response to the attacks of 9/11 and the growing spectre of global terrorism. They went to the same guys.

“… the more I talk, the

more I go around and

meet the Green Berets

from Vietnam, the more

I realize that we are

picking the same guy. It

is still the same man.”

(1-800-645-4827)


USASOC YEAR IN REVIEW

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“Regardless of where along the range of capabilities one points, be it the ability to execute the most lethal, highly complex and sensitive special operations, wage unconventional warfare, conduct special operations rotary wing operations, or prosecute civil military and influence operations and tailored sustainment to it all, the world standard is found within our Army’s Special Operations Force.”– Maj. Gen. John Mulholland, USA, 2012 USASOC Command Statement


The past year was, by any standard, the busiest 12 months in the history of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) since 1944. Across the globe, more than 50,000 military and civilian personnel fought America’s clandestine battles, conducted discreet missions, and continued to select and train the next generation of SOF professionals. Once again, many of those SOF professionals were assigned to U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which represents about half of that force. From the Green Berets of Special Forces Command (SFC) to the world-class aviators of the new Army Special Operations Aviation Command (ARSOAC), USASOC covers the full range of U.S. SOF, as it has done for 60 years since a colonel named Aaron Bank formed 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) on Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg, N.C., an anniversary that is being celebrated this year.

It was a year of enormous change and growth within USASOC, from changes in leadership to the standup of new commands and organizations. Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland

A U.S. Army Special Forces soldier, with Special

Operations Task Force-South, scans the horizon

for enemy activity in Shah Wali Kot district, Kandahar

province, Afghanistan, during a clearing operation

Feb. 8, 2011, alongside Afghan Commandos

from 2nd Company, 3rd Commando Kandak.



was nominated to become deputy commanding general of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and Lt. Gen. (Select) Charles Cleveland was approved by the Senate to take over command of USASOC. Command Sgt. Maj. Parry L. Baer continued his duties throughout 2011, as did Deputy USASOC Commanding General Maj. Gen. Kurt Fuller. This strong leadership is helping USASOC grow in size and capa-bility as America enters its second decade of a global war.

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS)

JFKSWCS Commander Maj. Gen. Bennet S. Sacolick continued his leadership of a schoolhouse growing in size and capability, and commemorated its origins during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s famous visit to the center on Oct. 12, 1961. Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Ferdinand Irizarry also served throughout 2011, while the job of JFKSWCS senior enlisted advisor changed hands as Command Sgt. Maj. Peter J. Sabo handed over his responsibilities to Command Sgt. Maj. Ledford “JR” Stigall on Aug. 24, 2011. Finally, command of

the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (SWTG), the largest of the SWTGs within the JFKSWCS, was handed over by Col. Jack Jensen to Col. B. Ashton Naylor Jr. on June 2.

The pace of work at the JFKSWCS remained high in 2011, and went far beyond celebrations of the past. In fact, JFKSWCS is leading the rest of the U.S. SOF community into the future by training some of the first female special operations professionals. Beginning in 2010, JFKSWCS began to train the first female students in the Cultural Support Team (CST) course, with the first graduation actu-ally taking place on Dec. 10, 2010.

“This is a landmark moment,” USASOC Commander Mulholland said at the graduation ceremony. “This is a significant step that is long overdue, and this course has set a new standard of excellence that will be examined and copied over and over. It is my hope that CST becomes an enduring competency within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.”

“Women have been performing this job in the field because it is necessary to the mission,” said Master Sgt. Lita J. Fraley, one of the CST course graduates. “The CST course gives female soldiers the training they need to bring new capabili-ties to special operations teams. Women have a larger under-standing of the needs in their community. When the Army wants to understand the needs of an area, these women [in the communities] become a great source of information.”

In addition, JFKSWCS continued to grow its training base for the civil affairs (CA) community in 2011 by standing up a new company June 14, 2011, dedicated to training CA soldiers. D Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group will train officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to join the Army Reserve’s CA community to quickly and systematically identify critical requirements in the field needed by local citizens in war or disaster situ-ations. Maj. C. Shawn Keller, the new unit’s commanding officer, said during the ceremony, “While we do serve under [SWCS], we must always recognize that our customers are all the Army Reserve officers and NCOs who will come through this schoolhouse on their way to vitally important yet often dangerous assignments around the world. It is my intent to provide for them the most beneficial, challenging, and rewarding training that we possibly can.”

U.S. Army Special Forces Command (SFC)

Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr. continued to command SFC during 2011, though he is presently scheduled for a promotion to major general and appointment to command the JFKSWCS in 2012. SFC’s senior warrant officer, Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) Douglas D. Frank, also continued his duties in 2011, while Command Sgt. Maj. Mario G. Vigil was relieved as SFC’s senior enlisted advisor by Command Sgt. Maj. William B. Zaiser.

1st Special Forces Group

The big news for 1st SFG in 2011 was the standup of their new 4th Battalion on Aug. 29. But the soldiers of 4th/1st SFG did not wait for their new battalion colors to be uncased to get downrange. A number of 4th/1st SFG A-Teams were already overseas on missions to Thailand and the Philippines when the battalion stood up its headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McCord, Wash. With the addition of more than 400 U

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A coalition special operations forces team member inspects weapons and equipment found during a clearing operation in La’pur district, Nangahar province, Afghanistan, Nov. 4, 2011. Afghan Commandos, partnered with coalition special operations forces, conducted the operation to disrupt a known insurgent safe haven and promote security in the area.



new Green Berets, this will bring 1st SFG up to its planned strength of almost 1,700 soldiers.

3rd Special Forces Group

On Feb. 15, 2011, 3rd SFG commander Col. Mark Schwartz hosted a ceremony for Command Sgt. Maj. Jeffery Wright, where Wright relinquished his responsibilities as the 3rd SFG senior enlisted advisor to Command Sgt. Maj. Patrick Meffert. Schwartz hosted another ceremony two weeks later on Feb. 25, when 37 3rd SFG soldiers were recognized for their actions in combat in Afghanistan. Five soldiers received the Silver Star; 19 soldiers the Bronze Star with “V” device for valor; 18 soldiers the Army Commendation Medal with “V” device for valor; and five soldiers received Purple Hearts. Four battles involving members of the group were highlighted in presentations that recounted the actions performed by each man receiving a medal. One engagement with enemy forces led to the entire Operational Detachment – Alpha receiving an award for combat actions during a fire-fight. Of the Green Berets being decorated that day, Schwartz said, “Every valor award recipient who came across the stage today will tell you they are simply doing their job. As your commander, there is no greater honor than to recognize these men. All of them are warriors who represent the finest caliber of noncommissioned officers and officers that make up the ranks of our [Special Forces] group.”

Another mass award ceremony was held on Sept. 15, when more than 30 valor awards were awarded to soldiers of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). The decorations awarded included two Silver Stars, 22 Bronze Stars with “V” device, eight Army Commendation Medals with “V” device, and 11 Purple Hearts.

5th Special Forces Group

The 5th SFG had another full and eventful year in 2011. The 5th got a new commander when Col. Mark Mitchell relin-quished command of “the Legion” to Col. Scott E. Brower on Aug. 12, 2011.

“It is with great humility and pride that I watched this group of soldiers deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan time and again, accomplishing what no one else has dared to attempt,” said Brower. “You have deployed to locations on behalf of our nation, serving quietly in the shadows with no fanfare or recognition because that’s what is expected of you. I am confident that you will continue to meet each and every challenge that you face.”

On Sept. 21 at Fort Campbell, Ky., Brower presided over the 5th SFG’s weeklong 50th anniversary celebration of the group’s formation, which originally took place on Sept. 21, 1961, at Fort Bragg, N.C. It was a fitting celebration for the most decorated and storied of SFC’s groups, which is in the middle of building a new state-of-the-art campus of facili-ties at Fort Campbell. There was another celebration for 5th SFG in 2011, one in which it took a particular pride. On Nov. 11 in New York City, an 18-foot-tall statue called “De Oppresso Liber” (“To Free the Oppressed”) was dedicated in lower Manhattan near what has come to be known as “Ground Zero.” On this hallowed ground, a bronze statue of one of 5th SFG’s “horse soldiers,” Green Berets from ODA 595, was dedicated. ODA 595 and other SF teams operated on horseback with the Northern Alliance of Gen.

Dostum in the fall of 2001 in northern Afghanistan near Mazar-e-Sharif.


The 7th SFG completed the big move to its new garrison and home base at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Fla., after years of planning and construction since the announcement of its move by the Base Realignment and Closing Commission (BRAC). The first major event of note at the new facility was a change-of-command ceremony where Col. James E. Kraft Jr. handed over his responsibilities to Col. Antonio M. Fletcher on July 7. The official handover of the new garrison facility came on Sept. 14, with the final signoff to the contractors. Then, on Oct. 14, came a gala grand opening ceremony attended by numerous local and state dignitaries.

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On Jan. 19, 2011, four members of the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG, received awards during a ceremony for their valorous actions over the course of their last deployment to Afghanistan. During the ceremony one Bronze Star Medal for valor, two Army Commendation Medals for valor and one Purple Heart were awarded. Although all valor medals were presented for separate actions, the Special Forces soldiers to whom they were awarded came from the same detachment. Maj. Gen. Michael S. Repass, commander, Special Operations Command Europe, said, “We have the opportunity to recognize some of the valor and sacrifices these men have rendered in defense of their nation, and as members of the Special Forces Regiment. All the better that their families, friends, teammates, and associates are present to hear what they’ve done, since they most likely have never said much about it themselves.”

19th and 20th Special Forces Groups

SFC’s two Army National Guard (ANG) SFGs, the 19th and 20th, once again spent their year supporting cooperative training and combat missions. This often included performing duties in which their active-duty SF brethren would be involved in more peaceful times. The two National Guard SFGs have been key in keeping the critical Joint Cooperative Engagement/Training (JCET) program and the foreign internal defense (FID) mission alive within SOCOM and USASOC. The groups have worked hard to keep their own field skills sharp, as 2nd Battalion of the 19th SFG did while at Camp Atterbury, Ind., in May 2011. Meanwhile, more than 100 19th SFG Green Berets came home from a yearlong mission in Iraq on May 13, arriving home at the Utah Air National Guard Base.

The 20th SFG also stayed busy in 2011, with a number of the group’s Green Berets receiving the Croix de la Valeur Militaire (equivalent to the American Silver Star) from the French ambassador at his residence in Washington, D.C., on July 25. The decorations were for valor during a multinational 2009 combat mission in the Uzbin Valley in Afghanistan.

75th Ranger Regiment

Col. Michael E. Kurilla relinquished command of the regi-ment to Col. Mark W. Odom on July 26, while Command Sgt. Maj. Rick Merritt turned over his responsibilities to Command Sgt. Maj. Nicholas Bielich on Jan. 11, 2012. The regiment remained engaged throughout 2011 as it had in 2010, indicated by the number of combat decorations awarded. On Jan. 26, 2011, approximately 80 Rangers from the 75th’s 1st Battalion received medals for their recent combat actions in Afghanistan. But the regiment’s most important award ceremony of 2011 came on July 12, when President Barack Obama presented the first Medal of Honor to a Ranger since Vietnam. The decoration, only the second to a living recipient since 1975, went to Staff Sgt. Leroy Petry, who lost his right hand to an enemy grenade he had grabbed and was trying to throw away from his fellow Rangers. His act no doubt kept fellow Rangers from being severely wounded or killed by the grenade.

Today. Petry with the aid of a prosthetic hand, continues to serve on active duty with the Rangers, who began to celebrate their 70th anniversary in 2012.

CLOCKWISE FROM THIS PAGE, TOP: Lt. Gen. John Mulholland Jr., USASOC commanding general, and Command Sgt. Maj. Parry Baer unveil the Army Special Operations Aviation Command colors during an activation ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., March 25, 2011.

Aviation Regiment (Airborne) arrive at Fort Campbell, Ky. A team leader for a U.S. Special Operations Cultural

held at a local compound in the village of Oshay, Uruzgan

to SF teams. Mulholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and former commander of Task Force Dagger, addresses the audience during the dedication and unveiling ceremony for the “De

World Financial Center near Ground Zero, Nov. 11, 2011.

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Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Provisional)

The long-awaited christening of the Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Provisional) – ARSOAC took place March 25, 2011. ARSOAC is the result of the continued growth of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the development of USASOC unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities, and the need for infrastructure necessary to provide USASOC with its own highly specialized training, attack, and transport capabilities.

A result of the Department of Defense (DoD) 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), both SOCOM and USASOC sought and received approval to create a one-star (O-7) Army SOF aviation command. ARSOAC will provide the appropriate command and control, manning, and training for the complex and sensitive tasks required of expanded ARSOF aviation units and organizations. ARSOAC will be composed of four component units spread across the country. In addition to the existing 160th SOAR, ARSOAC will also have a U.S. Army Special Operations Command Flight Detachment at Fort Bragg, along with

the new Systems Integration Management Office and Special Operations Aviation Training Battalion, both at Fort Campbell. Two new companies of the 160th SOAR will operate the new MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs.

The names of ARSOAC’s first command team reads like a 160th SOAR history of the past several decades, with Brig. Gen. Kevin W. Mangum (an alumni of Task Force 160 back in the 1980s) standing up the command with ARSOAC’s Command Warrant Officer Five CW5 David F. Cooper, holder of the Distinguished Service Cross. In addition, ARSOAC in 2011 got its first senior enlisted advisor, Command Sgt. Maj. David Leamon, previously the command sergeant major of the 160th SOAR.

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

On Oct. 16, 1981, the DoD formed a special helicopter unit drawn from elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), dedicated to providing aviation support to the nation’s special operations forces. That small formation has today evolved into the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Thirty years later, with a reputation second to none, the “Night Stalkers” are justifiably considered among the most elite flying units in all of aviation history. On Oct. 21, 2011, veterans of the regiment gathered at Fort Campbell, Ky., including more than 50 Task Force-160 plank holders who were called to the stage individually and recognized for their role in shaping and defining the essence of “Night Stalking.”

“I couldn’t think of a better forum to ref lect on our roots and traditions than to provide a venue for our first and current generations of Night Stalkers to connect,” said current 160th commander, Col. John W. Thompson. “The standards that [plank holders] set 30 years ago are still embedded in every Night Stalker today. The future is sound because of the foundation [they] established. We take personal pride in furthering [their] legacy as we continue to lead and force change to maintain our ability to deploy worldwide and hit a target plus or minus 30 seconds.”

The 160th SOAR also got a new senior enlisted advisor when Leamon turned over his duties to Command Sgt. Maj. Gregory Chambers on June 10.

Other celebrations and ceremonies followed in 2011, including an awards presentation for the record books. On April 11, eight Night Stalkers were awarded Distinguished Flying Crosses for individual acts of heroism in a single night mission in Afghanistan flying MH-47 Chinooks. In addition, the 160th SOAR, along with the rest of the Fort Campbell military community, played host to Obama and Vice President Joe Biden on May 8, 2011. The visit followed the successful execution of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, about which the president said, “I want to acknowl-edge the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the Night Stalkers, for their extraordinary service. On behalf of a grateful nation, welcome home.”

ARSOAC’s emerging UAV capabilities turned operational in 2011, with the first overseas deployments of the 160th SOAR’s first unmanned aviation company: QRC 2. QRC 2 is composed of an MQ-1C system with four MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs, and two control stations. The first combat engagements of QRC 2 took place in early 2011, with spectacular success.

In addition, early 2011 was full of important milestones for the 160th’s manned helicopter fleet. On Feb. 2, the first two

U.S. Army Rangers from U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Airborne) conduct close-quarters battle drills at a range for CAPEX 2011 participants. A capabilities exercise, or CAPEX, demonstrates Army special operations forces’ diverse capabilities, uniqueness and importance to national security to key civilians and organizations with a desired end state of garnering enduring support from the command’s invited guests.

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USASOC YEAR IN REVIEW U

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new-production MH-60M Black Hawks arrived, beginning the badly needed replacement of the existing -K and -L model Black Hawks. By mid-September, the first full company of -M model Black Hawks had been formed into C Company, 2/160th SOAR. “This aircraft is a real game changer,” said Night Stalker test pilot CW4 Tracy Stapleton of the new aircraft. “This is good for everybody. It will provide an immense tactical advantage to the aviators and crews as well as the ground forces we support.” Likewise, on Feb. 10, 2011, the last of the remanufactured MH-47Gs, built from existing -D and -E model Chinooks, was delivered to the regiment.

4th Military Information Support Operations Command (MISOC)

For decades, the Army’s Psychological Operations (PsyOps) community has lived a seesaw existence, being grudg-ingly accepted in wartime and usually neglected during peace. But the “long war” of the past decade has finally convinced the Army leadership that PsyOps, now reflagged as “Military information Support Operations” (MISO) is a necessary mission in overseas operations, and has finally been shown some respect and financial attention. In 2010, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) was reflagged as the 4th Military Information Support Group (MISG), reflecting the DoD-wide shift to the MISO mission. MISO

is the dissemination of information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. policy and national objectives.

As big as 2010 was in the Army MISO community, it pales with what happened in 2011. As part of the SOF expansion plan that came about as a result of the 2006 QDR, the entire U.S. Army MISO community was finally consolidated into the Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne) (Provision) – or MISOC – on Aug. 4, 2011. Taking command during the standup ceremony was Col. Nils C. “Chris” Sorenson, who previously had been the USASOC deputy chief of staff G-3/5/7. His senior enlisted advisor is CSM Thomas W. Hedges Jr., who assumed the post on March 2, 2012. Hedges came to MISOC from Special Operations Command Forward-Yemen, where he had helped look after all the SOF personnel assigned there. Together, they command and operate the most impressive collection of PsyOps personnel and MISO units assembled since World War II.

Coalition special operations forces (SOF) sprint to board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during a mission in Chawkai district, Kunar province, Afghanistan, Feb. 25, 2012. The commando-led mission was to conduct reconnaissance for a future village stability platform where Afghan forces and coalition SOF can live and work with villagers.

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U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command

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INTERNATIONAL SOF YEAR IN REVIEW

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While by convention most operations involving special operations forces (SOF) are conducted under a veil of secrecy, 2011 saw a series of engagements that inevitably attracted considerable attention.

International SOFYear in Review

A Force Reconnaissance Marine goes over threat detection methods with a

group of Ugandan soldiers, Feb. 28, 2012. A small team of Marines were among other SOF in Uganda to train Ugandan

in Somalia and the hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Some were impressive successes, hard to conceal, such as the gallantry of 32-year-old Cpl. Benjamin Roberts-Smith of the Australian Special Air Service regiment, who, in January, was awarded the Victoria Cross in a ceremony at Campbell Barracks, Perth, for bravery displayed when the patrol he had led in Helmand province the previous June had come under heavy fire from the Taliban. Undeterred by the intensity and accuracy of the opposition, Roberts-Smith charged uphill through a fig orchard to engage two enemy machine gun squads and draw fire away from wounded soldiers of his platoon. Having previously won a gallantry medal in 2006, Roberts-Smith silenced both Taliban posi-tions and became only the fourth recipient of the Victoria Cross during a decade of conflict in Afghanistan.

In early March, as the Arab Spring swept through Libya, less welcome attention was focused on Special Forces as seven members of the British Special Air Services (SAS) Increment, the unit attached to the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), landed in a pair of Chinook helicopters on a flight from Malta to protect a negotiator sent to open a back-channel for the British government to the breakaway National Transitional Council’s leadership in Benghazi. Their local contact, waiting at the rendezvous near al-Khadra, 20 miles outside the city, was “Tom Smith,” a Welshman who had been operating in the area as an irrigation engineer on a 37,000-acre wheat farm for the past six months. As the nine men conferred, about to climb into Smith’s Toyota pickup, they found themselves surrounded and outgunned by a local militia. In compliance with their rules of engagement, the SAS soldiers laid down



their weapons and were handcuffed so they could be taken into custody at a local military base. Following the very public, televised intervention of the British ambassador, the group was released and evacuated to Malta on HMS Cumberland, a Type 22 frigate.

Libya would prove to be an unex-pected theater of operations for SOF units, with the British 22nd SAS, deployed initially in support of NATO air strikes, acting covertly as target designators on the ground, and then in a more overt role in support of the anti-Moammar Ghaddafi resistance fighters. As well as coordinating the NATO aircraft, operating from bases in Spain and Italy, the SAS trained and equipped the chaotic rag-tag groups of ill-disciplined volunteers who had marched on the regime’s strong-holds in Tripoli and Sirte, where they were confronted by a combination of African mercenaries and remnants of Ghaddafi’s elite Revolutionary Guard.

More special operations forces headlines were to be made in May as the U.S. Joint Special Operations

Command’s (JSOC) Navy SEAL Special Mission Unit (SMU) raided Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The operation had been planned for the previous eight weeks by Adm. William H. McRaven’s JSOC and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Surveillance on a Kuwaiti suspected of being one of the terrorist leader’s aides, a courier using the name Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, had led the CIA in August 2010 to a three-story building inside a 1-acre compound surrounded by an 18-foot-high wall and located just off Kakul Road in Bilal, a suburb of Abbottabad. Although the interior of the structure was unknown, aerial reconnaissance imagery was used to construct a replica site at Fort Bragg, N.C. The SMU personnel began prac-ticing an assault in March 2011 and in April, moved to Nevada to rehearse the tactics at a similar altitude and night temperature. Finally, at the end of April, the SEALs were flown on a C-17 Globemaster to Bagram.

The operation was delayed 24 hours by cloud cover over the target area, but on May 1, the unit moved to Jalalabad to embark on two modified MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters for the 90-minute flight to Abbottabad, 120 miles beyond Pakistan’s border. The SEALs were accompanied by a Pashtu interpreter and a dog, and supported by more troops in four MH-47 Chinooks, who were to act as a rapid response unit in the event a rescue was required. Two of the Chinooks waited just inside the Afghan border while the other pair landed in a secluded valley within reach of Abbottabad, available for instant intervention if the raiders, intent on neutralizing the target, codenamed Crankshaft, encountered problems with the Pakistanis.

In addition, a stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel drone, packed with sensors and a high-resolution video camera, would circle silently overhead at an altitude of 15,000 feet, recording the events on the ground. Launched from Kandahar, the stealth jet could loiter for a long duration over the target area, monitoring events in real time and relaying high-quality pictures to command posts in Washington, D.C., and other locations.

The original plan called for the two modified helicopters to land inside the compound as well as deliver six men onto the roof, but one of the aircraft encountered problems as it came in to hover, and so the pilot, wearing A

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Cpl. Benjamin Roberts-Smith VC, MG, with the Special Operations Task Group, moves away from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during preparation of the Shah Wali Kot Offensive.


night-vision goggles, crash-landed it close to the high wall. Despite this mishap, the SEALs approached the guesthouse in a corner of the yard, where they fatally engaged an armed al-Kuwaiti. They then entered the building and used C-4 charges to blow open two sets of steel cage doors that blocked their access to the higher stories, where they encountered al-Kuwaiti’s brother, Abrar, and Abrar’s wife, Bashrar, who were shot dead. So was bin Laden’s 23-year-old son, Khalid, who was firing an AK-47 down the well of the stairs at the intruders. Bin Laden’s fifth wife, Amal al-Fatah, appeared, screaming but apparently unarmed. She deliberately placed herself in front of bin Laden to protect him from the lead SEAL, who shot her in the calf before embracing her to stop the detonation of any suicide vest. Moments later, two 5.56 mm rounds killed bin Laden himself as he moved toward a weapon.

For the rest of the raid, while the Pashtun interpreter questioned the two women survivors and their five children, the SEALs recovered hundreds of computer thumb drives, DVDs, and CDs, a veritable intelligence treasure trove, before destroying the downed helicopter with explosives and climbing aboard a Chinook, with bin Laden in a body bag, for the perilous flight back to Jalalabad. The operation was acknowledged almost universally as a decisive event and a potential knockout blow to al Qaeda. A few days later, President Barack Obama said as much when he flew into Fort Campbell, Ky., to thank the SEALs and their helicopter crews. Meanwhile, CIA analysts studied the haul seized in bin Laden’s sanctuary and concluded the fugitive had been hiding in Abbottabad for the past five years, probably with Pakistani collusion, and evidently had been much more active in directing his organization and planning new atrocities than had been anticipated.

JSOC’s success in May was followed by the catastrophic loss of a Chinook three months later on Aug. 6, which resulted in the deaths of all 38 aboard. In the worst incident of its kind in the decade-old war, 30 Americans, together with seven Afghan commandos and a civilian interpreter, were killed when their helicopter was shot down by the Taliban in the mountains of Wardak province, west of Kabul. Among the

American casualties were 22 members of the JSOC SEAL SMU had been on that particular operation. The twin-rotor CH-47 had probably been hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) while maneuvering at low altitude soon after takeoff during a night raid on the village of Sayd Abad, the kind of raid that has become almost routine. Good intelligence had indicated the assembly of Taliban guerrillas in an isolated house, and the plan was to engage them during a surprise ambush.

Reportedly, the RPG round had found its target through sheer luck in an encounter that was considered almost unique. Although two coalition aircrew had been injured when their CH-47F had been hit by an RPG a few days earlier on July 25, such attacks are rare, and most aircraft losses are attributed to pilot error in a very challenging landscape, poor weather conditions, or mechanical failure. Some 17 aircraft had crashed during the year, but the scale of this disaster was the worst single loss since 16 U.S. special operations forces personnel perished on June 28, 2005, when another helicopter was shot down in eastern Kunar province while on a mission to rescue four SEALs under attack by the Taliban; three of the SEALs being rescued were also killed and the fourth wounded. The August 2011 crash is the highest one-day death toll for Naval Special Warfare personnel since World War II and brought the total number of coalition deaths in 2011 to 365. Considering the total SEAL strength is estimated to be approximately 600, the rate of attrition has been daunting.

Despite the losses, JSOC, under McRaven’s command since June 2008, helped turn the tide in Afghanistan and trans-formed the environment from a terrain wholly advantageous to the Taliban, who could slip over the border into Pakistan’s tribal areas, into a free-fire zone for increasingly sophisticated P

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Afghan special forces demonstrated an insurgent arrest exercise during NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s visit to Camp Moorhead, Afghanistan, April 12, 2012.



unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which picked off targets – on either side of the frontier – selected by intelligence cells located thousands of miles away. In 2008, there were only 36 Predators assigned to the U.S. Army’s Central Command, of which most were in Iraq. By 2011, the balance of UAVs had been reversed, with the MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-170 Sentinel widely deployed across Afghanistan and making regular incursions over “boxes” in Baluchistan and Waziristan, with the tacit consent of the government in Islamabad. This change in strategy has proved so effective that the “jackpot” rate of confirmed hits on high-value targets has risen from 35 percent to 85 percent, thereby reducing the pressure on coalition special operations forces and releasing them for duties elsewhere. For JSOC, this has entailed a bigger presence in the Gulf of Aden, while the British began a wider withdrawal of the SAS to undertake security training for the 2012 Olympic Games.

The concentration on Afghanistan during 2011 was assisted by the withdrawal from Iraq, which was completed on Dec. 15, an event made possible by the development of a large Iraqi special operations capability. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Fadhel al-Barwari, the Iraq special operations force has undergone

eight years of training and mentoring with coalition special operations forces, and continues to conduct joint operations on a ratio of six Iraqis to one coalition trooper, usually on search-and-clear anti-terrorist missions against individual suspects identified by special operations intelligence cells. While the main, orthodox commitment ended with much ceremony, the special operations contingent are likely to remain in country for several years to come.

The major change in deployment for JSOC occurred in October, when special operators from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti were inserted into Uganda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) notorious leader, Joseph Kony. Up to then, U.S. special operations forces in the region had been restricted to insertion missions to recover bodies from Predator strikes for verification purposes, as happened on June 23, when a pair of al-Shabaab commanders were caught in a convoy by an armed UAV flown from Yemen, and again on July 6, when three strikes were undertaken in Kismayo, 300 miles from Mogadishu, and in Musa Haji.

The change in strategy, hinted at by Obama’s principal coun-terterrorism adviser, John Brennan, involved “surgical targeted strikes” and the promotion of “indigenous strike forces” with training, equipment, and headquarters support. The campaign against the LRA is based at the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu and from the National Security Agency of the Somali Transitional Federal Government at the Villa Somalia, also in the capital. Kony, now formally designated an inter-national war criminal, and his militia operate transnationally across the rainforest in several countries in the region, and is now a priority target.

Almost simultaneously, Kenyan troops crossed into the lawless provinces of southern Somalia while French special operators, fresh from an assignment in Ivory Coast in April, attacked the al-Shabaab stronghold of Kudai. Prior to the Kenyan offensive, allied special operations forces had been limited to occasional AC-130 gunship attacks on identified militant training camps and shore bombardments from the USS Chafee (DDG 90), but the deteriorating local conditions, with evidence gathered by Task Force Orange personnel based in Nairobi of an al Qaeda evacuation from Yemen to war-torn Somalia, prompted the escalation.

The withdrawal may have been caused by a successful drone strike in early May on the Mayfa’a district in Shabwah, a moun-tainous province in central Yemen that had been safe haven for al Qaeda. A car carrying two brothers, Musaed Mubarak and Abdullah Mubarak Aldaghery, both key terrorist commanders, was the target. Their elimination followed a period of unrest during which al Qaeda attempted to extend its influence, leaving only Sana’a in the government’s control. However, one unintended consequence of the disorder was a wider freedom for JSOC to pick off elected terrorists. Its first major hit was a Tomahawk cruise missile launched in December 2009 against an al Qaeda training camp in al Majalah, in Abyan province, which killed 14 militants. Then the organization’s leadership was decapitated, including Abu Basir al Wuhayshi; his second-in-command, Said Ali al Shihri; the military commander Abu Hurayrah Qasim al Raymi; the recruiter Ibrahim Suleiman al Rubaish; and finally, in September 2011, the group’s chief ideologist Anwar al-Awlaki. The American-born imam had been linked to numerous other terrorist incidents including the Fort Hood, Texas, shooting in June 2009 and the “underwear bomber” on Christmas Day 2009.N

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TOP: In October 2011, U.S. and British SOF units boarded the Italian bulk carrier Montecristo, taking 11 pirates prisoner. BOTTOM: On Nov. 28, 2011, RFA Fort Victoria was approached by a pirate skiff at speed as they attempted to board her. However, after Fort Victoria laid down warning shots using her miniguns, the pirates had a sudden change of heart and started to make a run for it. Fort Victoria gave chase and launched her boarding teams to stop them. While the boarding teams were dealing with the skiff, word came that a

After a 20-mile steam, the whaler was found and boarded, the ship’s

they were soon detained by the Fort Victoria boarding team.



Aerial reconnaissance flights were flown constantly over known terrorist sites in Aden, Marib, Abyan, and in the Alehimp and Sanhan districts of Sana’a, and several strikes were aimed at al Qaeda concentrations in Shabwah, Hadramawt, and Lahj provinces, thereby degrading the country’s reputation as a safe haven for al Qaeda in the Arabian Gulf.

The JSOC campaign in Somalia, codenamed Black Hawk after the catastrophe in Mogadishu in October 1993 that cost the lives of 18 U.S. soldiers, most of whom were special operations forces, has benefited from first-rate intelligence gathered under the leadership of John Bennett, once the CIA station chief in Nairobi, Kenya, but now director of the National Clandestine Service. The high-risk Task Force Orange teams developed rela-tionships with several Somali warlords who were willing to sell SAM-7/14/16/24 shoulder-held anti-aircraft missiles and identify foreigners linked to al Qaeda. To support their exceptionally dangerous missions, which began in the town of Ras Kamboni, in the Badhaadhe district, and spread north, JSOC practiced rescues from Djibouti, codenamed Mystic Talon, which required the insertion at short notice of troops by V-22 Ospreys.

While JSOC extended its activities on the mainland, Ocean Shield continued to present a challenge, with Somali pirates ranging at will across the Indian Ocean. The first sign of a more aggressive response to the growing problem of piracy was the appearance of French commandos at Garacad, near Eyl in the badlands of the northern Puntland province where a French yacht, Le Ponant, had been moored since it had been captured in April 2010. As soon as the 30-strong crew had been freed with the payment of a ransom, the amphibious assault began, resulting in the capture of six pirates and the death of two local Somali militiamen. Then, soon afterward, South Korean naval special forces operating off a South Korean destroyer, the Choi Young, freed 21 crew aboard the Samho Jewelry, a 11,500-ton chemical carrier on a voyage from the United Arab Emirates to Sri Lanka. As a Lynx helicopter flew overhead in support, the troops killed eight gunmen and took five pris-oners. The episode was probably connected to the seizure in November 2010 of another of the company’s vessels, the oil tanker Samho Dream, for which a ransom of approximately $9.5 million was paid. During 2011, it is thought that nearly $70 million was passed to the pirates and then shared with al-Shabaab.

In February 2011, four Americans aboard the yacht Quest were shot dead by their captors off the Oman coast while they were being monitored by U.S. Navy warships. After boat owners Jean and Scott Adam, accompa-nied by their friends Phyllis Macay and Bob Riggle, had been murdered, SEALs off of a U.S. warship intervened, killing two pirates and taking another 13 into custody aboard the USS Enterprise. All had come from the pirate safe haven village of Hobyo, but their likely destination was Manhattan, where the previous week Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse, the sole pirate survivor of the Maersk Alabama episode in April 2009, was sentenced to more than 33 years imprisonment.

The British Special Boat Squadron was also deployed to Somalia and reportedly spent two months on an extensive covert reconnaissance of the coast, entering Haradhere and Eyl in July to assess the rag-tag opposition that is lightly armed but well financed.

In October, British and U.S. SOF units successfully boarded the Italian bulk carrier Montecristo, which had just been seized 620 miles off the Somalia coastline. The 56,000-ton cargo vessel, with a crew of 23, who had secured themselves in a purpose-built panic room-like “citadel,” had been taken over by 11 pirates who surrendered as soon as the frigate USS De Wert (FFG 45) and the RFA Fort Victoria (A387) appeared on the scene, supported by a helicopter. The ship was liberated by Royal Marines without loss of life, and the pirates were detained in a multinational collaboration that is intended to protect the sea lanes off the Horn of Africa. On her second patrol as part of Ocean Shield, Fort Victoria soon afterward arrested a mother ship and delivered 14 pirates to custody in the Seychelles.

The introduction of citadel areas to sustain crews while under attack, with the more widespread employment of contracted armed specialists placed aboard vulnerable ships while transiting the Gulf of Aden, are tactics designed to deter the pirates who, though venturing farther away from the coastline, are in danger of losing their home bases. Successful criminal prosecutions in New York and Paris during 2011 appear to have eliminated the jurisdictional loopholes that had been exploited by the Somali pirates and ended the revolving door of instant release by the Kenyan authorities. Nevertheless, with the piracy statistics drop-ping during the year, the industry seems set to continue.

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With Half the Fleet: Progress Report on the

CV-22


On July 2, 1991, this writer, as a lieutenant colonel, briefed then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft on some heli-copter operations conducted during Operation Desert Storm. Scowcroft expressed surprise about the length of missions that had crossed half of Saudi Arabia before going north into Iraq. Cheney asked how we could make helicopters go faster. I told him that the best possibility I knew of was the tilt-rotor, the V-22, which he had recently ordered canceled due to its expense. He allowed that the aircraft would probably be useful for special operations, but would be too expensive to build just for the small fleet needed by special operations forces (SOF).

Two years ago, Lt. Gen. Don Wurster, then the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) commander, said the CV-22 was acquiring a good reputation among U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) components for its capability and performance. “The customer units like the speed and range of the aircraft, but they really like the crews,” he said. In December 2011, Lt. Gen. Eric Fiel had commanded AFSOC for six months, and when asked about what he thought were the command’s primary issues, he said the CV-22 is performing well – which is not an issue but is worthy of being noticed. He suggested the perfor-mance of the machine and its people merited more than a mention and perhaps a magazine article of their own.

Understood is the background that no airplane or helicopter was subjected to as much scrutiny and criticism as was the V-22. In 2000, two accidents occurred during the operational evaluation of the aircraft’s development, which almost resulted in cancellation. There was little love for the hybrid airplane and

helicopter tilt-rotor. However, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM stuck with it and got the aircraft procured and deployed.

The arguments for and against the aircraft are best expressed by Mark Thompson, who wrote “V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame” for Time Magazine in 2007 when the Marines sent their first contingent of MV-22s into Iraq. In 2010, Richard Whittle published The Dream Machine: The Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey. Thompson’s data came from the year 2000 and earlier, mostly ignoring any of the corrective actions and the more contemporary flying record of hundreds of aircraft and 50,000 flight hours. Whittle provided the counterargument with a balance of the reasons for the crashes, the fixes, and the results. Both authors mention the special operations version of the aircraft, but little more.

Now, the special operations version of the aircraft has a record, has begun its maturation with lessons on how it’s used, and has a pathway for further development with predictable results as the fleet grows to its full program.

The Aircraft and Self-deployability

Historically, two things define special operations air capability: an aircraft modified with special capability and crews selected from the conventional force for special training. The CV-22 is modified from the Marine version MV-22 by addition of terrain following, terrain avoidance radar, additional communications, added fuel tanks for range, and extra defensive systems for higher-threat air environments. At the end of 2011, about half of the CV-22s programmed to come to the U.S. Air Force and AFSOC had U

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been delivered: five of seven for the CV-22 schoolhouse in the Training Command and 21 of 43 for AFSOC operational units. Two of AFSOC’s planned CV-22 squadrons, the 8th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and the 20th SOS at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., have aircraft assigned to them and have both deployed operation-ally to exercises and to combat. It will be at least three more years before all of the aircraft are built and delivered to the four squadrons that are to possess and fly the aircraft.

Like other new AFSOC aircraft, the CV-22 deployed to combat as soon as it reached initial operational capability, or IOC, which was in 2009 with a deployment to Iraq. Since 2010, subsequent combat deployments have been to Afghanistan. Until 2011, there were not enough aircraft and trained people to sustain continuous deployment. Deployment schedules in 2011 were for a continuous deploy-ment to begin in the spring, with the 20th SOS beginning it and turning it over after four months to the 8th SOS.

In late March, world events intervened into the schedule when Operation Odyssey Dawn called for CV-22s to deploy to Europe. The 20th SOS aborted its planned desert train-up time and moved out on a 96-hour deploy order, deploying in three days and 30 hours flying time to Royal Air Force Mildenhall, England, to join the 352nd Special Operations Group in support of the operation. Decisions by the NATO Alliance not to use SOF ground teams to help the Libyan rebels resulted in a decision

for the 20th’s CV-22s to remain in Europe, and their planned train-up in the southwest United States became a European orientation to help accustom the people in the area around Mildenhall to the CV-22 – what it looks like, sounds like, and its flight profiles. This anticipates when the aircraft will be perma-nently assigned to Europe. The aircraft and crews completed their self-deployment to Afghanistan, after two days and 21 hours of flying time, to arrive at Kandahar on May 4.

Employment: Results and Metrics of Performance

Allowed to train unilaterally in the Afghan environment for a couple of weeks, the squadron began supporting oper-ational missions later that month. Lt. Col. Tom Palenske, the squadron commander, relates that from May until the squadron was relieved by the 8th SOS in October, it flew 99 missions with a 99.6 percent success rate on providing the desired numbers of aircraft. The supported Army units captured or killed 307 enemy insurgents, and the Army units had only good things to say about the CV-22, the aircrews, and its maintainers.

The 27th Special Operations Wing commander, Col. Albert M. “Buck” Elton II, said he has received great feedback from the Army customers, as had Fiel. Compliments made toward the people maintaining and flying the aircraft remark on the professionalism of planning and the standardization of procedures that make missions predictable, and actions on the objectives proceed without glitches on almost every mission. Said Palenske, “They like the speed of the aircraft, twice that of a helicopter, and that, like a helicopter, we aren’t limited to runways but can find LZs [landing zones] close to their targets.” The aircraft can range the entire area of operations in fairly short amounts of time; most targets are within 30 minutes of the launch point. Saved time can result

OPPOSITE: A 71st Special Operations Squadron (SOS) CV-22

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in follow-on missions if target exploitation gains information on another target. Speed of action and speed of follow-on planning to another mission can result in greater success if the enemy has less time to communicate and react. (The feedback given to both the wing and squadron commanders remains in the category of oral history; however, as emails and phone calls to Army users of the CV-22 did not result in any who wanted to see their names in print, the compliments to the aircraft and crews are verified, but not attributable.)

They’ve also dealt with the expected problems of brown-out/dust-out landings. Palenske related that the dust-outs are worse than in his helicopter experience, but the cockpit instrumentation and the stability of the CV-22 in a hover help to counter the negative effects. “We’ve had no problem landing on the desired LZs, and current capability of getting imagery and receiving it in our cockpit have ensured safe operation. We did have one operation where one aircraft landed on a berm and collapsed the nose gear. We inspected it closely before flying it out and it did not adversely affect the operation. We stayed low on fuel in order to carry everybody out on fewer aircraft.” He stressed training and crew skill at coping with the dust-outs as crucial to safety and operational success.

Dust isn’t all bad. On several of their infiltrations, the CV-22s received ground fire from buildings near their LZs. “The dust obscures where we are and we’ve not had a mission abort due to ground fire,” Palenske said. Only about 20 percent of the missions entail the aircraft landing “on the X” or the expected target location. Others have the aircraft landing 300 to 500 meters on an offset LZ.

There are limits to the aircraft on which Palenske and his people have to work closely with their customer units. “We are limited on high-altitude LZs. Above 5,000 feet, we have to carefully control loads and fuel. At high altitude, we will try to pull tankers closer to LZs in order to reduce how much fuel we have on board and may have to limit the aircraft load to six or eight passengers; whereas, at low altitude our loads are 20 to 25. We also look for short field roll-on or roll-off landings, which can help. Some missions we just cannot do and have to maintain our professionalism and safe operations by saying so.”

Improving Numbers and Improving Performance

Criticisms of V-22 operational suitability and sustain-ability can now be answered more authoritatively as the numbers of aircraft have grown to a sizeable enough fleet. When the CV-22 fleet was less than a combined 10 aircraft at the training unit and at the first operational unit, the metrics were dismal. Operationally ready rates were around 60 percent and they decreased when the aircraft deployed to desert environments. With five or six deployed of the 20 aircraft in AFSOC in 2011, operational readiness numbers exceed 70 percent. Still, it’s short of the desired 80 percent, but closing in on that goal.

The AFSOC A-4 and director of logistics, Col. Peter Robichaux, added in an interview that a large part of CV-22 in-commission rates depend on the experience level of the crew chiefs and specialists on the flight line. AFSOC, he said, has made the case with Headquarters Air Force that crew chiefs especially need to be guarded from assignment once they qualify on this aircraft. “We want to get them out of Tech School with two stripes on their arms, make them assistant crew chiefs, and upgrade them to primary over

time, and then not let them leave the aircraft at least until they are technical sergeants – five stripes. We’ll have them for three or even four assignments on the aircraft, and our in-commission rates will benefit.”

Robichaux also pointed out that the fleet size determines the logistics supply chain. As the fleet grows, supplies of parts become more robust as larger numbers make projec-tions of parts expenditures more accurate and reliable. “Our understanding of the aircraft parts, which ones will wear out over how much flying time, is much better than when the aircraft was new. Our people who inspect things are also better at it with experience. They know more what to look for and how to prevent problems. All of these trends are good and can be expected to continue to just get better.”

Engines: Stirring Dust and Software

The CV-22 engine eats dust and digests it poorly. In the first month of Palenske’s operations in Afghanistan, the squadron changed every engine on every aircraft. The problem was serious enough to bring technicians from the engine maker, Rolls-Royce, to Afghanistan. They discovered a couple of things, changed a part, and brought some fixes on the engine programming software. They changed the procedures and water content used on engine washes, making the washes more effective at cleaning engine compressor sections. They installed new intakes for the oil coolers that kept them from clogging in the dust. Then, they loaded new software into the engine programs, allowing greater exhaust temperatures, increasing the aircraft’s airspeed by 20 knots and giving some altitude improvements.

Lt. Col. Darryl Sheets, the AFSOC CV-22 standardization pilot, said the fixes so far haven’t increased the aircraft’s hover capability in helicopter mode. Since the engines are software controlled, new programs can be designed and tested fairly easily. He said there are software fixes now in the works that could give 250 more pounds of load and a possible increase in power, which will affect all mission scenarios and altitude capability. Full testing and development will take about six months before it can be fully ready for the fleet with all details of how it affects performance.

Looking Ahead

During the next year, the CV-22 will close in on its desired 80 percent in-commission rates, even in desert environments. It will also have people maintaining it and flying it with more experience and more ideas on how better to maintain it and to fly it. AFSOC will be opening the first operational CV-22 squadron overseas, and the fleet will be at 28 or 29 AFSOC aircraft. Maj. Gen. Mark Clark, the chief of staff at USSOCOM and also a past Marine helicopter and MV-22 commander, said that the CV-22s are doing great work and changing the way some things are done. He said that the AFSOC crews are doing very well and the units they support are calling for more, but it’s not yet known how far it can go.

“The CV-22 is new,” he said. “It isn’t a helicopter and it isn’t an airplane. Most of the people using it right now are used to helicopters and airplanes, and they use it like it was one of those aircraft. When we have people who have been in V-22s all of their careers and they are in charge of approving mission plans and designs, then we’ll see more creativity in how it’s used and in what it can do.”

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At first glance, a walk through Chris Haines’ motorcycle/all-terrain vehicle (ATV) adventure company in Lake Elsinore, Calif., appears similar to some other high-end off-road specialty facilities: well-organized work areas flanked by neat rows of racing and off-road motorcycles; a collection of saddle-seat ATVs; and a neatly parked assortment of Kawasaki side-by-side two-seat and four-seat ATV models. A background of mechanical activity surrounding some of the platforms adds an air of urgency to the modification efforts under way.

But it isn’t long before the eye catches a few unique discriminators, like the framed American flag that had previously flown over a special operations compound in Afghanistan, or the challenge coins displayed beside Haines’ desk.

“I’ve been in off-roading for a good part of my life, and I’ve had the off-road business for 26 years,” Haines explained. “I’ve raced in the Baja 1000 ‘20-some’ times and won the thing 13 times. So I guess with the experience that I had, the special operations folks kind of searched me out. They wanted somebody to train them to ride and drive offroad. They interviewed me and asked if I wanted to help train their operators in the field.”

Haines said that he originally started doing that training with the saddle-seat models, adding that the introduction of the Kawasaki Teryx® 750 side-by-side Light Tactical ATV (LTATV) into Naval

Special Warfare (NSW) inventories in the 2008 time frame led to an expansion of his training role to encompass the creation of pre-operation documentation and other supporting manuals for vehicle operation as well as the development of an additional training course covering mechanics training.

Haines noted that the majority of his motorcycle training activities currently involve both U.S. Army special operations forces and elements of the British Special Air Service, and that NSW is just starting to move into the motorcycle arena as well.

“But Naval Special Warfare’s main focus is on [the LTATVs] at this point,” he said.

Along with his NSW training activities on the West Coast, Haines also travels to the Virginia Beach, Va., area to provide training in that area as well.

For the LTATVs, Haines offers one-week courses of instruction for both operation/driving and mechanics. The operation/driving training typically takes place in the Mojave Desert, while the mechanics training takes place in a classroom at the Lake Elsinore facility.

Walking into the shop area, Haines pointed to several Kawasaki Teryx vehicles equipped with a series of military modification kits.

Teaching proper rock-crawling technique in an LTATV.

BY SCOTT R. GOURLEY

Naval Special Warfare

ATVTRAINING

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American Volunteer Group (AVG) pilots, better known as the Flying Tigers, run for their P-40B Tomahawks in a posed photo. The vastly outnumbered AVG had only 79 qualified pilots and 62 operable aircraft on Dec. 2, 1941, but they and their shark-mouthed P-40s became legendary for their achievements against the Japanese over China and Burma.

HIDDEN HISTORY

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“When we first started training with the saddle-seat ATVs for the rider training, they started talking about introducing these [Teryx] things,” he said. “And I bought this one and we’d take it along on the saddle-seat trainings in the desert. They would look at it, try it, and talk about it, and so we started evolving all those [kits] to make it what it is now.”

Past a row of civilian off-road and land speed racing bikes, the latter category including a 405-horsepower model capable of speeds of 240 mph on the salt flats, Haines entered the main classroom area used for both motorcycle and side-by-side mechanical training.

“Last week we had 12 students with six of these [Teryx] machines in here,” he said. “We dismantled them, put them back together, and went through all kinds of troubleshooting scenarios. We also have these bench motors where we can show the guys how to take the engines apart and put them back together – the whole deal.

“When we started this training, they gave us some requirement guidelines,” Haines recalled. “So we started with the requirements for their operators and then tried to introduce some new things. I think part of the reason they hired me was so that I could pass along all the things my eyes have seen in 20-some years of doing this stuff, where maybe I could educate them on things to watch out for in the desert, how to read the terrain, how to get out of a tough spot, how to jury-rig things in the field to get out of there, and those

kinds of things that you learn over the years.”

Characterizing the results as “unique skill sets,” he added, “You can go to classes that someone like me puts out, but there are no other places where you can learn some of those things unless you are doing it for a good part of your life. I mean, how can you tell somebody about some of those things unless you’ve lived it?”

He continued, “It’s also important to know that we are constantly evolving the courses with the feedback that we get from the students, because it is really important to us to teach information that is pertinent to what these guys do. So at the end of each course, we do a full critique where we get their input on what they thought of the course, what they learned, and anything they might have wanted to learn a little more about. Then each time that we get this information we are able to tweak the course going forward a little bit here and there to make it exactly what these guys need.”

Asked if he could offer a general example of the kinds of changes that have taken place within the course, he replied, “For instance, on the mechanical side of it, we had a lot of requests for how to troubleshoot in the field and if they had a problem how quickly they could evaluate the problem, fix the problem, and get going in the field. So we put a lot of focus on that now. That’s because a lot of the time ‘the team guys’ are way far away from the main base where they might

have the Seabee mechanics. These guys are out there on their own. They may not need to know how to change the pistons in the motor because they’re never going to do that. But if they are in the field and the belt goes bad, the valves get tight, or the thing doesn’t want to start, they need to know how to deal with it in the field and get going.”

The feedback mechanism is also reinforced by a supporting follow-up communications environment.

“Along with al l of the digital documentation, they have all of our contact information,” Haines said. “And sometimes our secretary walks out into the shop and says, ‘Hey there’s a guy on the phone from Afghanistan who wants to talk to you.’ And they’re calling on satellite telephones for advice about a particular issue. And we welcome those calls.”

In terms of training challenges, he observed, “Sometimes it’s a little bit of a challenge to get these guys to drive a little more conservatively. One of the reasons they have the job they have is because they are kind of special people to begin with. And many of them ‘want to go fast’ from the beginning. In fact, everybody wants to go really fast. But what we try to teach in our training is that you can go fast, but do it because you have the skill set to go fast – not just because you can. We teach that

Driving and operations training on the LTATVs emphasizes troubleshooting and repair in

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if you have all the skills for operating then the speed comes by itself. And you’re safe at the same time. So that’s our biggest challenge: Sometimes you have to go slow to go fast.”

Haines said that the operator course starts with driving basics, “because sometimes we have students that have never operated any vehicle offroad – whether it’s a motorcycle, ATV, or anything else. So we generally have to start out with some basic skill sets: how to read the desert terrain; when to use four-wheel drive or two-wheel drive; and when to use high range or low range. Most importantly, we teach them about knowing the vehicle capabilities so they won’t get themselves into a position that they can’t get out of. So if you come up to a big rocky hillside you would be able to evaluate whether or not it was something that your vehicle could do.

“We take them through the training with the vehicles both weighted and unweighted,” he said. “We do a lot of driving at night. With night vision, things appear a lot differently and you don’t have the depth perception you would have during the day. We also teach things like winching and rock crawling.

“So it’s all just about learning the vehicle, knowing what it can do, and having seat time to where you can react to any situation,” he said.

As an example of the “rock crawling knowledge” underlying the LTATV training, Haines noted, “A few years back we went with a couple of the master chiefs and took five of these [LTATVs] over the ‘Rubicon Trail’ [through the Sierra Nevada Mountains in Northern California’s Eldorado National Forest] and made it in two days with no failures. And that’s a tough deal with wheels that are this small. But we did it to show that it could be done and that the vehicles would survive a challenge like that.”

Completely separate from the training aspects of his business, Haines has also used community feedback in the development of a series of specialized hardware kits for modifying the platforms to tactical configuration.

“These are options and accessories that they have fitted onto the vehicles by different contractors,” he said. “But those are installed under another contract where a contractor gets the basic vehicle, then gets kits from me, tires from somewhere else, and

something else from someone else, and then assembles the vehicle.”

Examples of the LTATV accessories developed by Haines include: skid plates, quick-release fuel can mounts, exhaust shields, front bumpers, suspension modifications, storage shelf kits, GPS accessory crossbars, and spare wheel carriers.

“The tire rack system is probably our most popular kit,” he said. “Actually at this point, it is a requirement that they have to have it on the vehicle.”

One recent hardware activ ity involved the development of a new off-road trailer design.

“They said, ‘It would be neat if we had a trailer.’ So I’ve been working on it for about eight months,” Haines said.

“We have delivered two of them to Naval Special Warfare already,” he noted. “These are full-suspension trailers for the LTATVs. They have fold-down sides that use the same Teryx wheels as the LTATV. It’s got an adjustable tongue and we’ve used that to test the trailer behind a Toyota truck – because they use a lot of those now. And this will go behind one of those as well.

“We were trying to make it very strong and very light at the same time,” he added. “So most of the undercarriage is all carbon steel and everything above that is all aluminum for weight savings. For payload, it can carry a little over 500 pounds when it’s being towed by an LTATV, and if you pull it with a truck you can go up to 750 or 800

pounds. You could also do that behind the LTATV, but it would be challenged by the power and the brakes.”

Haines said that the user community is currently performing an evaluation on the two prototype trailers.

One possible glimpse into the future of the LTATV program could be seen in the presence of a new four-seat ATV model in Haines’ workshop.

Characterizing it as one possibility being explored by some elements in the special operations community, he observed, “It’s got 15 percent more power, a little bit bigger throttle bodies on the injection, and a little different engine management. But this thing goes pretty good, and with a longer wheelbase it has a little bit more stability [than the LTATV]. I’ve only had this thing about two weeks – but I’m taking it out with one of the team guys on Friday.

“We really take our training role very seriously,” Haines concluded. “It’s much more than a job to me. I’m an ex-Navy guy myself. I wasn’t in special operations but I really admire the commitment these people have. They make it possible for all of us to do what we do every day. Whether most of our population knows it or not, these guys are keeping the bad guys on the other side.”P

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Korengal Valley, Afghanistan: Four months into their deploy-ment, a joint special operations team moves to conduct a “key leader engagement” with tribal elders when they are suddenly ambushed. Pinned down in tortuous terrain, a “troops in contact” call is immediately declared over an established satellite communications network. Within minutes, an Air Force Combat Controller’s headset is buzzing with chatter from inbound F-15E Strike Eagles. Surrounded by chaos, team leader barking orders in the background, the controller surveys the situation, slows the scenario in his mind, and goes to work. Minutes later, the strike package turns inbound for their first bomb pass. The F-15s expertly place “bomb on coordinates” provided by the Combat Controller while he reassesses the situation and calmly prepares the aircraft for a second pass – simultaneously engaging the enemy in a ferocious gunfight. Meanwhile, Air Force HH-60 helicopters scream toward the objective to support a casualty evacuation mission for a wounded special operations teammate. Crouched in the back are Air Force Pararescuemen who have spent their entire adult life preparing to go into harm’s way to save lives. As aircraft stack overhead and the fight rages on, Special Operations Weathermen continue to fuse meteorological data to ensure weather complications do not overtake the team as they complete their mission. A savvy special operations forces (SOF) team leader, enabled by a small element of Special Tactics (ST) warriors, turns the tide in their favor and ulti-mately win the day.

Simultaneously, halfway around the world, State Department officials confer with military officers on how to provide much-needed disaster relief to a country destroyed by massive earthquakes and flooding. When told that political sensitivities demand a small military footprint, that the single airport near

Air Force Pararescuemen jump from an HC-130 aircraft Dec. 4, 2008, during a training exercise

off the coast of Djibouti. The airmen were with the 82nd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, which was

assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and based out of Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

BY MAJ. PAUL D. BRISTER, USAF

The Past, Present, and Future of Air Force Special Tactics

Per Astra Ad Aspera:


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the affected area is without electricity or communications, and that there will be no support available to any inserted team, a voice replies, “We can do that, send us.” Within hours, a small ST element jumps into the airfield, assesses the runway, sets up navigational aids, and opens an airhead for specialized aircraft to begin delivering humani-tarian aid. Survival specialists begin testing and treating water for the gath-ering masses, while Pararescuemen triage and treat the injured. Hope is brought to those who had resigned themselves to death.

Similar scenarios occur on a near-daily basis throughout the world. Although often overlooked, the ability to rapidly integrate specialized airpower and immediately alter the course of battle has remained a critical factor in innumerable SOF mission successes. This rapid and seamless integration of airpower did not happen overnight. It has been a long and difficult journey to achieve such decisive, surgical effects for special operations forces. Committed to remaining a valued member of the joint fight, the story of Special Tactics serves as a case study on adaptation, integration, and success in modern warfare.

The birth of Air Force Special Tactics can be traced to the disastrous July 1943 parachute drop into Sicily. The airborne infiltration phase of Operation Husky was, to put it bluntly, a complete fiasco. Less than 20 percent of the men made the drop zone, while many landed more than 20 miles away from their intended targets. A furious Col. James M. Gavin summarily decreed that airborne operations would there-after utilize methods to sharpen drop accuracy. The decree was answered in spades. Immediately following the acti-vation of the first Pathfinder units, the group proved its worth. Two hundred of these specially trained commandos jumped ahead of follow-on airborne forces during the September 1943 assault of Paestum, Italy. Follow-on jumpers landed safely on the drop zone, and the demand for these experts skyrocketed. Within a year, glider-borne commando teams were created to be “First There” behind enemy lines

and control the infiltration of follow-on forces. Simultaneously, more than 6,000 miles to the east, a pioneering group of young men – energized by Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold’s commanding words “… to hell with the paperwork, go out and fight” – began to wage shadow opera-tions in the Burmese jungles. While their cousins in the European theater were supporting large-scale conven-tional operations, small teams of Air Commandos in the Pacific were writing the book on integrating airpower into unconventional warfare.

Maturation of the Force

Following World War II, Special Tactics’ modest beginnings became further fused through turf wars between the Army and the Air Force. The Allied victory in World War II dictated a subsequent drawdown of American military forces, triggering a fight between the Army and fledgling Air Force over the control of these air integration specialists. After seem-ingly endless debate, the Air Force retained control, but like any young organization with new capabilities, it wasn’t entirely certain how to manage


or develop its unique assets. Time and operational adaptation would dictate that development. Vietnam would provide the venue.

Alongside brethren personifying the motto “These Things We Do, That Others May Live,” the small commando contingent was called upon to prepare for duty in Southeast Asia. Enthusiastic men of all stripes (one colorful indi-vidual kept a cougar for a pet) soon filled the ranks of Combat Control (CCT) and Pararescue (PJ). “Per Astra Ad Aspera” (roughly, “from the sky to do difficult things”) became an apt slogan for the men as they began operations in and around Vietnam. On a near-daily basis, CCTs and PJs wrote the book on joint air to ground operations. For instance, on Feb. 22, 1967, the first recorded joint-service combat jump occurred when eight Combat Controllers jumped alongside the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade near Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam. Pararescuemen, for their part, completely rewrote the book on combat search and rescue. The exploits of these men during Vietnam have become legendary, heroics best illus-trated by the posthumous awarding of the Medal of Honor to Airman 1st Class William H. Pitsenbarger (of the 38th Rescue and Recovery Squadron).

The bitter aftertaste of Vietnam tempered American military opera-tions for decades, yet battles within the Air Force raged over the future of these irregular blue-suiters. At various points, PJs and CCTs belonged to Tactical Air Command, Pacif ic

RIGHT: Navy Lt. Devon Jones, left, runs toward the Pave Low helicopter that rescued him during Operation Desert Storm. The 20th

and rescue since the Vietnam War. BELOW: As a Kaman HH-43F Huskie hovers,

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron

of Vietnam (ARVN) soldier. The soldier lost a

penetrator, I’ll straddle the guy, pick him up, and then you can lift me up." Risky, as everyone knew that the rotor wash could also set off the

Gallantry Cross with Bronze Palm for this action.

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Command, Air Mobility Command, European Command, Air Combat Command, and Mi l itary A irl i f t Command. The constant organizational shifts did little to stifle the innovative spirit of the community. Throughout the 1970s, CCT refined beacon bombing and gunship techniques in classified missions throughout Laos. During the 1970 Son Tay raid, air integration specialists proved their worth control-ling air support and the extraction landing zone site. On a parallel track, PJs continued to expand their full-spec-trum rescue capabilities supporting space shuttle recovery operations. Sadly, it would take yet another opera-tional disaster to bring these career fields together.

The failed Iranian hostage rescue prompted political leaders to recon-sider how irregular military skill sets could be better managed, synchronized, and developed. While American attention remained locked on America’s Cold War rival, a skel-eton command was taking shape that would codify and champion an alter-native style of warfare. U.S. Special Operations Command was activated on April 16, 1987, spurring services to rethink how to organize and catego-rize their irregular forces. In a flurry of reorganizations, the Air Force brought together two career fields with very different missions, but remark-ably similar employment techniques and equipment. In the early hours of Oct. 1, 1987, the 1720th Special Tactics Group was activated, combining PJ and CCT career fields and laying the foundations for an amalgamation of irregular skills that would later be dubbed battlefield air operations.

The 1990s was a fast and furious period for the new command – begin-ning an operational tempo that would only increase with the passing years. Special Tactics involvement in nearly every major military operation – from combat to humanitarian relief – during the 1990s is a testament to the dedi-cation and drive of the command. Operations Provide Comfort, Southern Watch, Northern Watch, Desert Strike, Sea Angel, and Uphold Democracy are but a small sampling of the opera-tions ST forces engaged and distin-guished themselves in at the onset of the decade. ST contributions were most pronounced, however, during Operation Desert Storm, when ST airmen expertly controlled more than

8,000 fixed- and rotary-winged sorties on established, highway, and even dirt landing zones. The rescue of Lt. Devon Jones in hostile territory exemplified the bravery of Pararescuemen in the conflict. Following the war, the 1720th was redesignated the 720th Special Tactics Group and soon drew a new set of capabilities – those of Combat Weather – under the ST fold.

On Sept. 11, 2001, tragedy would again touch the United States. As Americans recovered from the shock of the terrorist attacks, senior leaders sought out avenues to immediately take the fight to the nation’s enemies. Special Tactics was poised to answer the call. Within days, ST warriors, alongside Army Special Forces and CIA personnel, were linked up with Afghan Northern Alliance militias and directed to hunt down and decimate al Qaeda and Taliban forces. Climbing aboard whatever was moving toward the enemy, be it Chinook helicopters, Toyota Hiluxes, or Afghan stallions, Special Tactics personnel relentlessly pursued the enemy through Tarnak Farms, the Khyber Pass, the streets of Kabul, past the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, and deep into the Tora

Bora mountains. They haven’t stopped since. Credited with more than 10,000 enemy killed in Afghanistan, and more than 600 in Iraq, Special Tactics is also credited with saving hundreds of lives; including a daring hostage rescue at 10,000 feet in eastern Afghanistan. Though these numbers are impressive, they only touch on the significance of Special Tactics. What isn’t accounted for are the thousands of missions that were accomplished without incident due to ST involvement and integration from the very outset of mission planning.

The Future of Special Tactics

The official mission of Air Force Special Tactics is “to organize, train, and equip all Combat Control, Pararescue, Special Operat ions Weather, Tactical Air Control Party and support personnel assigned to Special Tactics units to integrate, synchronize, and/or control the elements of air and space power in the objective area.” It is a broad mission statement, but to those close to the Special Tactics community, it still falls short. To fully understand ST, one must understand the often unstated rationale behind why Special Tactics exists and what drives the community’s constant operational evolution. These principles are perhaps best articulated by 720th Special Tactics Group Commander Col. Robert G. Armfield. “We strive to remain at the razor’s edge of modern conflict and fulfill our role as a valued

AFSOC Combat Controllers direct air

after the January 2010 earthquake.

teammate in the joint fight. To this end, the Special Tactics community exists to push the boundaries of air-to-ground integration. We are constantly seeking innovative new ways to integrate all aspects of air power: through terminal attack control, assault zone survey and control, full spectrum rescue and recovery, meteorological forecasting, or mission sets that have yet to be named. At the end of the day, our skills provide commanders a multitude of options to achieve desired battlefield effects.”

There is something strangely powerful behind this vision. Typically, a military force will define itself by either the mission sets or the types of environ-ments for which they were designed. Not so for Special Tactics. Instead, the community defines itself by down-playing specific missions or operational environments and highlighting the inte-grative role it plays. The recent addi-tion of Special Operations Tactical Air Control Party and Special Operations Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape airmen broadens and deepens the already-impressive skill sets of the ST community. Whether it is opening the New Orleans airport to bring in disaster relief, supporting village stability operations in Afghanistan, conducting precision strikes during hostage rescue missions, providing full-spectrum rescue capability, or forecasting critical meteo-rological data, Special Tactics airmen continue to tailor their unique capa-bilities to meet the demands of modern conflict. This pioneering and innovative spirit will serve the community well in upcoming years.

With an era of f iscal austerity looming over the American military, political and military leaders must seriously consider the balance of future military forces. As services face across-the-board cuts, the ability and skills required to integrate and maximize the effects of leaner forces becomes increasingly more valuable. This is a sentiment not lost upon Lt. Gen. Eric Fiel, commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). “There is scant little room in modern warfare for things that do only one thing well. We need to seek out and empower personnel and weapons systems capable of out-thinking and out-adapting our enemies. Light, lean, lethal, and precise are the coins of the realm in the types of conflict we will continue to face. This is exactly what Special Tactics brings to the fight.”

Fiel’s approval of the 24th Special Operations Wing (SOW, slated for acti-vation in June 2012) is a watershed moment for both AFSOC and the ST community. The first of its kind, this command will be responsible for the training, equipping, and employment of all Air Force Special Tactics airmen. Fiel added, “The time is absolutely right to carry out this initiative. The 24th Special Operations Wing will finally consolidate our air integration special-ists under a single wing commander, amplifying their operational voice and allowing AFSOC to better support these unique warriors.” Armfield – tapped to be the 24 SOW’s first commander – echoes Fiel’s sentiments. “We strive to build upon the successes of our force and I anticipate the wing will help set the conditions for our forces to be even more effective in the future. At our best, ST will provide commanders finely-trained warriors that provide battlefield air operation skills – and I say this literally – wherever, whenever, and however the situation demands.”

The pending activation of the 24 SOW is, in large part, an acknowl-edgement of the combat success and unique role of the Air Force’s premier battlefield airmen. Not only are there research and development efficiencies to be gained through the consolidation of airpower integra-tions specialists, under a unif ied wing, the ST force stands poised to

dramatically alter methods in which airpower is integrated and employed. “Many factors have accelerated the rate of change as it pertains to armed conflict. Globalization, instantaneous worldwide communication, constant global media coverage, and the propagation of smaller, increasingly lethal weapons are but a few of these factors. If we intend to achieve success in this new environment, we have to be creative in how we employ and inte-grate specialized airpower. My task to the 24th SOW is to ensure AFSOC remains an innovative learning orga-nization that continues to push the limits of airpower employment.” The tasking set forth by Fiel is certainly a daunting one, but one the ST community appears ready to tackle. In the words of Group Operations Superintendent Senior Master Sgt. Davide Keaton, “We are here thanks to the dedication and sacrifices of those who came before us. We welcome this challenge and, like our predecessors, we will not fail.”

*The views expressed in this article are

those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, Air Force Special Operations Command, or the U.S. government. The author would also like to thank Faircount Media Group for its generous donation to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation on behalf of the Special Tactics community.


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BY JOHN D. GRESHAM

The Battle for Capitol HillThree decades ago, a campaign for the future of the U.S.

military was being fought in Washington, D.C. Upon this

battle depended the future of the American armed forces,

and how they would ght for more than a generation.

Like all wars worth ghting, it was fought by a small band

of idealists. In this case, however, the idealists’ sworn

enemies were those in their own country more than

happy to accept a mediocre status quo. And nally,

were the battle to be lost, America would lose the piece

of its armed services it would most need in the wars of

the early 21st century: special operations forces (SOF).

PART I

Gen. James T. Lindsay, commander in

chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM), receives the command

Command activation ceremony.

SOCOM AT 25

AWAKENING: VIETNAM AND AFTER

It is sometimes hard to remember what a gut-wrenching national experience the Vietnam era was for the United States. Not since the Civil War had America been so ideo-logically divided as it was over Vietnam, the Civil Rights movement, and Watergate. And seemingly taking the blame for all these ills was the U.S. military. It was not fair or right, but that was the way it was in the late 1970s. Ironically, the final U.S. military action, the bloody Battle of Koh Tang Island in 1975, was conducted by helicopters that would become the MH-53 Pave Low SOF airframes and would serve into the first decade of the 21st century.

With those responsible for the political decisions of Vietnam either dead or in public exile, the only visible entity for a disil-lusioned American public to blame was its military. It took the national shame of the Iranian hostage crisis and Ronald


SOCOM AT 25 – PART I



Reagan being elected president for America to once again be supportive of its military. But that alone did not make America’s armed services a credible fighting force. And that is where the story really begins. The late 1970s was an unlikely time to begin a period of innovative military thinking in the United States, but that is exactly what happened. One of the key characters in this intellectual revolu-tion was a freshman Republican U.S. senator from Maine, William S. Cohen, who had already served three terms in the House of Representatives prior to taking his senate seat in 1979.

Gaining assignments to both the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Intelligence Committee, Cohen got an especially good look at the military and intelligence communities at the end of the 1970s, a time when both were in bad shape. Like a number of young legislators, then-Sen. Cohen had a desire to rebuild America’s national security, a movement led by the legendary Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson, D-Wash., Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz. Fortunately, there was in Congress and around Washington, D.C., at the time, a group who tried to educate each other and exchange ideas. Today, Cohen remembers the Military Reform Caucus with fondness.

“As early as 1979 or 1980, there was a group of us on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees called the Military Reform Caucus,” Cohen said in an interview, “and it had people like Newt Gingrich, Gary Hart, and myself, along with a bunch of other folks, that were interested in military affairs. It really wasn’t a caucus as such, not getting together as a group or anything like that, but a loose affiliation of like-minded people saying, ‘Let’s challenge the way we are doing business, and see if we can do it better. Let’s see if we can’t get ahead of the curve, and see if we can’t do things differently than today. At least examine them and see if there is merit to changing what we are doing today.’”

Unfortunately, not everyone in Washington was happy with such an open conversation on the composition and structure of the American armed forces. The senior leader-ship of the armed services watched with concern as caucus members spoke to groups, appeared on television, wrote books and articles, and generally got people thinking about defense in general, and SOF in particular.

“I was rather surprised to find out that I, and those of us who went out and spoke about defense reform to the Rotarians and all the other service clubs, would about a week later find a high-level officer from one of the services coming out publicly and really criticizing us for our views,” Cohen said. “I remember thinking, ‘We’re trying to get a dialogue going. We’re not trying to disrupt things, we want to examine things!’ They were keeping track of all of us, where we were and what we were saying, and it struck me that ‘something is wrong with this picture.’”

It was the wake-up call that Congress in the 1970s and 1980s was not just going to hand the military a blank check without major changes to the way they fought and did business.

ROCK BOTTOM: DESERT ONE TO GRENADA

While Cohen and his peers were having their first real discus-sions on the potential of SOF in a reformed U.S. military, the spectre of the post-Vietnam cuts came back to haunt America.

In November 1979, Iranian “students” occupied the American embassy complex in Tehran and took the entire staff hostage. Then, just weeks later, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in a surprise airborne and armored assault, which took the entire world by surprise. For the United States, it was the beginning of an involvement in Southwest Asia that continues to this day.

The most immediate issue, the hostages from the American Embassy in Tehran, became the problem for an ad hoc Joint Task Force (JTF) at the Pentagon. The JTF’s hope was that the Army’s newly commissioned counterterrorism force, known as Special Forces Detachment-Delta (SFD-D), could be inserted into Tehran, free the hostages, and be extracted to freedom. Technically what became known as a “Special Mission Unit” or SMU, and also known as the “Delta Force,” SFD-D had just come online the day before the hostages, were taken, and went to work to get ready. However, as good as SFD-D was, it was a long way to Tehran, and getting the SMU in, and then retrieving them and the hostages, proved to be beyond the capabilities of the U.S. military in 1980.

When Operation Eagle Claw, the raid to free the hostages, was launched on April 24-25, 1980, almost everything went wrong that possibly could. Sandstorms caused severe navi-gational difficulties, and of the eight Navy RH-53D transport helicopters flying the mission, six arrived at the rendezvous point, known as “Desert One,” and one of them broke down there. With six helicopters considered the minimum force, it caused a mission abort. Finally, on departure, one of the helicopters collided and exploded on the ground with one of the Air Force C-130 tanker/transport aircraft, killing eight U.S. personnel. The rest of the rescue force got onto the surviving tanker/transport aircraft, leaving behind the helicopters and a treasure trove of classified mission data for the Iranians to find.

Eagle Claw was perceived as the worst U.S. failure since Pearl Harbor, and an outraged U.S. public and Congress wanted to know why. A six-man commission, led by Adm. James L. Holloway, III, USN (Ret.), a former Chief of Naval Operations, conducted an extensive investigation of Eagle Claw U

.S.

Air

For

ce p

hoto

A Marine and an Air Force Pararescueman of the 40th Aerospace

Rescue and Recovery Squadron (in wet suit) run for an Air Force

helicopter during an assault on Koh Tang Island to rescue the

U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez and her crew May 15, 1975.



and published a scathing report that was made public. The so-called “Holloway Report” laid bare for all to see both the shortcomings in U.S. multi-service (“joint”) operations doctrine and the absence of real SOF capabilities in the services. While few today truly understand the long-term significance of the Holloway Report, within it are the recommendations that created the modern U.S. military we know today, including U.S. Special Operations Command and many of its component units.

For Cohen and his fellow members of Congress, one of the key topics of interest rapidly became U.S. special opera-tions forces and their roles and missions within the American defense establishment. Like many others on Capitol Hill, what brought SOF to his attention were the tragic events at Desert One during Operation Eagle Claw.

“The thing that initiated it for me was how Desert One unfolded – the lack of unified command, integrated training, and the tragedy that took place and what it did to the country in paralyzing us for some time in terms of the hostages being held and the loss of our service personnel,” Cohen said. “That was followed by the invasion of Grenada, which, while successful, revealed a number of difficulties, once again in coordination. So I decided that I was going to focus on the ways in which we might create a command that would combine the SOFs like the Army Special Forces, that would put them at the tip of the spear for a variety of missions, one of which would actually be to prevent war from taking place. To have men and women who would be skilled in language, who could have studied the culture and history of a country, to be inserted in a very pre-emptive way, blend into the community, then gather and send back intelligence that might be used to make conflict unnecessary. But also to have a dual role to prepare the battlefield as such in case you did have to go in. To do that you had to have a very specialized type of command to coordinate the Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines so they could carry out that mission. So it was born out of tragedy.”

Operation Eagle Claw was not an isolated incident, nor the only stumble by the U.S. military. Desert One was followed by the invasion of Grenada, the Beirut Marine barracks bombing, and the hijackings of TWA Flight 847 and the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. In each case, f lawed command structures, a lack of joint training, and other factors made the results less than successful, or an outright disaster. And in three of the four, SOF units were unable to fulfill their missions due to their lack of needed command, control, communications, and intelligence resources.

Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, was a particular example of just how difficult resolving the shortcomings of the U.S. SOF community was going to be. Despite the addition of new SOF units like the 160th Aviation Battalion, which became the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR – the “Night Stalkers”), and a brand-new U.S. Navy SEAL SMU, along with improved command and control from the new Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, N.C., Urgent Fury was another series of SOF disasters. In fact, SOF units suffered more casualties in Grenada than during the Desert One fiasco. Perhaps the worst failure during Urgent Fury for SOF units was the almost immediate break-down of the joint communications structure, sometimes with deadly and absurd results. In one particular case, one of the D

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/U

.S.

Air

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ABOVE: RH-53Ds, painted in desert tan, aboard the U.S. Navy aircraft

carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68), in preparation for Operation Eagle Claw/

Operation Evening Light, the attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran.

a major spur to Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen. OPPOSITE:

Members of 1/75th Rangers are briefed on plans for a night patrol

during Operation Urgent Fury. An M60 machine gun, equipped

with a night sight, is mounted on their M151 light utility vehicle.


U.S. personnel on the ground in Grenada under heavy fire had to use a commercial telephone and a personal phone credit card to call Fort Bragg to call in an AC-130 fire mission. Clearly, the U.S. military in general, and U.S. SOF specifically, needed a new way to do business, despite the funding increases being authorized during the Reagan years.

BATTLE LINES DRAWN: THE DRIVE TO GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The breakthrough for defense reform came in 1985 when a panel of experts at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a land-mark study called, appropriatly enough, “Defense Reform.” In it was the roadmap for what would become the defense reform process in the late 1980s, and it was a milestone for reformers like Cohen:

“The study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] at Georgetown University provided us some real muscle in the reform debate with the Department of Defense [DoD],” Cohen said. “And we used that! We also had a real lineup of people who were knowledgeable, substantive, and lent weight to the effort. Otherwise, if you just take senators and congressmen to challenge the Pentagon on their own, you have a heavy road ahead. Remember, we spent a year studying defense reform before we ever sponsored a bill. Having CSIS and people of that caliber, and knowledgeable in military affairs, who were asking ‘how do we change DoD to make it a more efficient operations’ lent a lot of credibility to the effort.”

Just one year later, Congress proposed and passed a sweeping overhaul of the entire DoD command structure and how it would fight future wars. Opposed by the DoD leadership, both civilian and military, the legislation might have gone by the wayside but for its formidable chief sponsor, the legendary Sen. Goldwater.

“The Armed Services Committee members, especially Barry Goldwater, were open to it,” Cohen said. “In fact, he was in the forefront of the defense reform effort. Barry was very kind and generous to me, and no sooner was I on the Senate Armed Services Committee than he invited me to join the Senate Intelligence Committee. He was open to change, and he was very critical of what had happened at Desert One and Grenada. So he turned to me and some of the younger members of the committee, and told us to ‘run with it.’”

And run they did. The 1986 legislative package, known as Goldwater-Nichols for its key sponsors (Goldwater and Congressman William Nichols, D-Ala.), would take war-fighting command responsibilities from the Joint Chiefs, and instead give command responsibilities to regional commanders in chief, or “CinCs,” downrange. Goldwater-Nichols also streamlined the chain of command down from the president, introduced a number of other reforms meant to provide periodic DoD-wide force structure and moderniza-tion reviews (today’s Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR), and elevated the SOF community out of its stepchild status with the services. For the first time since the republic had been formed, the United States truly had reached consensus to create a joint and streamlined national military force. There were, however, some problems to overcome.

When Goldwater-Nichols passed, it was rightly hailed as the greatest piece of governmental defense reform since the 1947 National Security Act that had unified the services and created the intelligence community. But there were still significant problems for the SOF community ahead, because passing a law does not mean that people necessarily respect or comply with it. The various services had starved, and in some cases tried to kill, the various SOF components scattered throughout the DoD. The Air Force had worked hard to terminate the MH-53 Pave Low SOF helicopter program, despite the clear recommendations of the Holloway Report detailing the need P

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SOCOM AT 25 – PART IC

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for helicopters capable of penetrating deep into denied and defended territory. The Navy tried, and, thankfully, failed, to move its maritime SOF units, including the SEALs, into the Naval Reserve. Only the U.S. Army, which had institutional-ized SOF into its special warfare capabilities in the 1960s, showed any real desire for an organic SOF capability, and it did not even make Special Forces a branch until 1986.

SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE: NUNN-COHEN

Washington, D.C., is a town built around the “zero sum gain,” and when Goldwater-Nichols passed in 1986, the armed services fought back in the one place that they could: the SOF community. Already starved for funding and command authority, the various service SOF units had come under outright attack in the 1980s. So when faced with the SOF reforms mandated by Goldwater-Nichols, senior service leaders simply chose to ignore the legisla-tion, something that did not go unnoticed by congressional defense reformers like Cohen.

“I felt that Goldwater-Nichols really did not deal with the issues that I had been concerned with originally,” he said. “How do you take the talent of SOF warriors that we have, get ‘jointness’ of command for them, along with the training and study of language, culture, and history, and then insert them into a country that is a potential trouble spot? And do this well in advance, so that they have time to learn the customs of the people and the region? Then have those individuals gather information and report back to us, without it being just the examination of a single CIA agent in the field, but the observations of a trained mili-tary observer who may have to go into battle as the tip of the spear, either going after select targets, or serving the combatant commanders directly? I just did not feel that was coming through with Goldwater-Nichols.”

Realizing that the only way to force DoD and the armed services to respect and implement not only the mandate of Goldwater-Nichols but also the intent, Cohen and Nunn began to craft a set of additional DoD modifications and reforms in late 1986. What became known as the Nunn-Cohen Amendment was one of the most carefully crafted pieces of legislation to ever make it through Congress, and that it did is a testament to the tenacity of those legislators who sponsored

the bill, then voted for it. Responsible for much of the work on Nunn-Cohen was congressional staffer Jim Locher III, whose contributions were considered vital by Cohen.

“The key staffer in crafting the SOF legislation was, again, Jim Locher. And you need to keep in mind that he also was behind the creation of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict [SOLIC]. That also was hard fought. He was working with the staff members of the committees, which were open to him by virtue of what they had heard during the hearings into Desert One, the Grenada operation, and the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon,” Cohen said.

Cohen remembers Locher laying out the key points of the bill, which needed certain features were it to do what was intended.

“It comes back to the fractured command structure that we saw during Desert One,” Cohen said. “I was convinced you [have] to command created with a four-star officer in charge with budget authority, that could not be shoved aside by those in the parent services. This had to be a joint command unto itself. And from the beginning, I saw that money is power, so having budget authority means being able to control things. And once again, I think it was Jim Locher who came up with that feature in the legislation. I would turn to Jim Locher as our intellectual reservoir for putting together the research, and making sure we were apprised of all the pitfalls of what we were trying to do. Even if you are relatively knowledgeable as a senator on military affairs, you still have four other committees you are serving on and who knows how many subcommittees, and you’re spread pretty thinly. So you depend upon people like Jim Locher, staff members who are extraordinarily bright. Jim, coming from a West Point background, was a student of organizational science and history, and I would have to give him and those who worked with him a great deal of credit. I don’t profess to be at that level. The SOLIC position at DoD was the same kind of thing, and I have to give Jim credit for that as well.”

When the debate on Nunn-Cohen began in Congress, it was quickly realized that what the legislation was creating was a virtual fifth service, as it would potentially take all the SOF units from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines and place them under the proposed new U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Such a radical reorganization was unthinkable to many people in the DoD, Cohen recalls.

ABOVE: Retired U.S. Sen. Barry M. Goldwater listens to a presentation

during his visit to the U.S. Army Armor Center. RIGHT: Sen. Sam Nunn,

D-Ga., speaks during the commissioning ceremony for the nuclear-

powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Seated behind him is

Carl Vinson.

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DSGARMS



“I think that services felt that way, and that was the objection to it! They seemed to be saying, ‘You’re creating a whole new service here, and that is inconsistent with what we are trying to do.’ When what I was trying to say was, ‘No, what we’re trying to do is take your SOFs from the individual services, blend and unify them together in a way that they can carry out extraordinary missions.’”

In the end, the only real concession that was required to get Nunn-Cohen passed was an exclusion for the Marine Corps, which would not give up its force reconnaissance units. With the compromises made and the legislation passed, U.S. Special Operations Command was stood up on April 17, 1987.

Two decades later, having served as Secretary of Defense, Cohen looks back with pride upon his work on behalf of SOF in the 1980s.

“It [SOCOM] has gone beyond anything that either Sen. Nunn or I expected at the time,” he said. “We were primarily concerned with the lack of jointness, training, education, and cultural insight, and we wanted jointness really to become a reality. We felt we needed that ‘tip of the spear’ to be able to go into selected countries on very discreet missions. What has happened is that SOF has become the indispensable tool, and we have seen SOF become what we call a ‘low density-high demand’ kind of force. We actually want to see SOCOM expanded, which of course it is doing today. I’m really proud to have been associated with this effort, and I think it has been essential to the success we have enjoyed.”

So what exactly did Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen do that changed the landscape so radically for U.S. SOF? In essence, those two pieces of enabling law, along with subsequent legislation since 1986, have made U.S. SOF a de facto fifth military service, along with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. This includes:

headed by a four-star general or admiral, and has within its structure the various service SOF components, along with JSOC, the Special Operations University, and other headquarters functions. SOCOM is chartered to train, equip, and package SOF units for the other combatant commanders, along with being empowered to form and operate its own JTFs in an area of respon-sibility (AOR) in the world.

“Secretary of SOF.”

Nunn-Cohen, U.S. SOF units had been unable to procure SOF-specific weapons and equipment without have to beg for extended periods of time. Under Nunn-

budget, completely independent of the rest of the services and DoD.These three simple attributes have made SOCOM into the most respected and

powerful “service” in the U.S. military today, the go-to choice of presidents when the phones start ringing at 2 a.m. In particular, the SOCOM Title 10 funding line has become the command’s most powerful tool, able to rapidly procure timely and badly needed “stuff” in a fraction of the time needed by “normal” DoD/service procurement agencies.

The command drove straight from success on Capitol Hill into its first combat contingency, Operation Prime Chance (the Persian Gulf tanker escort/maritime lane protection effort) just a matter of months after SOCOM was created. Prime Chance was an unqualified success, showing the potential of the new joint command system laid out in Goldwater-Nichols as well as the potential of properly structured, equipped, and commanded SOF forces. The rapid organization, equipping, deployment, and commitment to action of this first Joint Special Operations Task Force was just the first of many such deployments in the quarter-century since.

SOCOM may have begun life as an unwanted bastard child following Vietnam, but that child has grown up taut, mean, and capable in a time when the world needs such qualities. The road to SOCOM’s birth followed a road of woe and potholes, and it is one reason why today’s special warfare professional reveres the men who walked that path before them.

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BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN

Desert Storm to Allied Force“The coming decade will, in particular, place a major

share of the responsibility for preserving our national

interests squarely on the doorstep of those involved

in special operations and low intensity con ict.”

James R. Locher III, Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Special Operations and Low Intensity Con ict)

Dec. , 1989

“SOF are considered an essential element for the CINCs’

successful implementation of national security objectives, and

in less than a decade these forces have proven themselves

the CINCs’ force of choice for many types of missions.”

GAO report, May 1 , 1997

PART II

Jumpmaster Brad Beauchamp, from A Company,

2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg,

N.C., performs a pivot-poised exit on a night jump

with oxygen and equipment at 25,000 feet above

Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station, Puerto Rico.

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SOCOM AT 25


SOCOM AT 25 – PART II

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At the risk of sounding trite, the fin de siècle of the 20th century was one of enormous transition. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, it seemed that the Cold War, which had dominated world politics for more than four decades, would finally – and peacefully – come to an end. The consequences were mind-boggling. Euphoric talk of a “peace dividend” – a cutback on Cold War-era defense expenditures – began being heard in the halls of power. But there were some who looked past the historic headlines, and what they saw was anything but a pacific sight. One month later, in December 1989 at the First Annual Symposium, SO/LIC Division, American Defense Preparedness Association in Alexandria, Va., Assistant Secretary of Defense James R. Locher III warned, “We as a nation will be tempted to conclude that peace is a global phenomenon, which it clearly is not.” He went on to say, “Armed conflict continues in Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador, the Philippines, Cambodia, and the Andean Region. While the last decade has seen a dramatic shift from totalitarian regimes to freely elected governments, more than 40 insurgencies continue around the world.” Conventional forces, configured to fight nation-states like the Soviet Union and its allies, were ill suited for this new reality. The last decade of the 20th century would reveal that the best weapon in America’s arsenal to overcome the challenges presented by low-intensity conflicts and military operations other that war – what has since been termed the “new normal” – was special operations.

At the time Locher made his speech, he had about 20 years’ experience in both the legislative and executive branches of the government. Crucially, he had been instrumental in crafting the two landmark pieces of legislation that reor-ganized the military command structure and established Special Operations Command (SOCOM), popularly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. He would remain active in matters concerning special opera-tions and low-intensity conflicts until he left government service in 1993, at which time he received the Department of Defense Medal of Distinguished Public Service, the depart-ment’s highest civilian award. But Locher’s warning was not universally embraced by the powers then in place.

Though Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen had made the necessary legal and administrative changes, changing attitudes and a culture that had consistently downplayed or marginalized special operations forces (SOF) would take time. That fact was emphasized when, on Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, annexed it as Iraq’s “19th province,” and appeared poised to invade Saudi Arabia. President George H.W. Bush responded with his “line in the sand” speech that called for Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, to order his army to leave Kuwait or be forced out militarily. Upon receiving permission from King Fahd to use Saudi Arabia as a base, Operation Desert Shield, the defense of Saudi Arabia by coalition forces led by the United States, began.

Central Command (CENTCOM), one of six regional warfighting commands and established in 1983, was responsible for the area that included Iraq and Kuwait. Its commander in 1990 was Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Unfortunately for SOCOM, as a result of some unfortunate experiences in the Vietnam War, Schwarzkopf disliked special operations forces. Because of Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen, Schwarzkopf was legally required to include a SOF component in his plans for Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (the offensive campaign

against Iraq). SOCOM Commander Gen. Carl Stiner saw the conflict as an opportunity for special operations to really prove its mettle under the new command structure, but he was stymied by Schwarzkopf’s negative bias. Schwarzkopf was determined to keep the number of special operations troops as low as possible, and they would operate on a short leash. Ultimately, out of almost a million coalition troops used in Operation Desert Storm, only about 9,000 special operations troops were deployed. In addition, whereas other command officers on Schwarzkopf’s staff were flag officers, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) Commander Jesse Johnson was a colonel, and thus the lowest man on the command totem pole.

Ironically, because of their rapid deployment capability, language skills, international joint operations expertise, and reconnaissance and communications experience, SOF units were among the first troops Schwarzkopf dispatched to the region. Though few in number, SOCOM was well repre-sented. The most notable units included SEAL Team TWO, a Special Boat Unit, 5th Special Forces Group, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and their support units. The tasks assigned these units ran the gamut: recon-naissance, training, and liaison with other nations’ forces, psychological warfare, and civil affairs, and they acted both independently and in coordination with conventional forces.

Some SOF units were immediately stationed along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border to conduct reconnaissance and act as a “trip wire” in the event of an Iraqi offensive. Others began training Saudi and other arriving coalition troops. Eventually about 30,000 troops from a variety of countries were trained in 44 subject areas, including armor operations, artillery use, communications, and vehicle maintenance.

SEALs were tasked with operations along the Kuwaiti coast as part of a deception to convince Hussein and his commanders of an imminent attack from the sea.

To keep Iraq at bay during the buildup of ground forces and logistics, Schwarzkopf ordered an intensive air campaign. Eventually more than 100,000 sorties would be flown. Though Iraq’s air force had been driven from the skies within hours of the launch of the air campaign on Jan. 17, 1991, Iraq’s extensive anti-aircraft defenses continually challenged coali-tion aircraft. This made combat search and rescue (CSAR) a high priority. SOF conducted CSAR missions, some deep in Iraqi territory. But of all the tasks assigned to it, SOCCENT’s most famous one was the “SCUD hunting” mission.

With his air force neutralized, Hussein attempted a stra-tegic end-around by attacking Israel with SCUD missiles. If successful in goading Israel to retaliate, he’d be able to transform the conflict into one pitting Israel against the Arab world, thus shattering the American-led coalition and ending the impending land offensive before it could begin. SOF teams inserted deep into Iraq were successful in dramatically reducing the number of SCUD attacks and convincing the Israeli government not to counterattack.

SOF psychological operations and civil affairs teams targeted Iraqi soldiers, stressing that the quarrel was with Hussein and not them and calling on them to surrender. When Desert Storm concluded, on Feb. 28, 1991, 86,743 Iraqi POWs were found to have in their possession surrender leaflets distributed by the teams. Following the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, SOCCENT civil affairs elements remained in Kuwait City for two months, coordi-nating and assisting in relief efforts.



What is noteworthy is the fact that the special operations CSAR missions, and all the special operations air force missions, were conducted by a SOCOM command created in the same year that Iraq invaded Kuwait. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) had as its initial component, the 23rd Air Force (AF), previously a part of Military Airlift Command and headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Ill. When the 23rd became a component of AFSOC, it moved to Hurlburt Field, Fla.

The administrative move making 23rd AF a part of AFSOC had another consequence. 23rd AF was tasked with CSAR for the Air Force. Its transfer to AFSOC left the Air Force without the specialized aircraft or aircrews trained to conduct those missions. With a war going on, AFSOC simply assumed that responsibility. Plans were made for the Air Force’s Air Combat Command to assume the combat

search and rescue role by the end of 1994, but that change never occurred, and AFSOC continued performing the CSAR mission for the rest of the decade.

As it turned out, the Desert Shield/Desert Storm campaign would be the 20th century’s last hurrah for traditional warfighting between large armies. In fact, the transition to the new normal began within weeks after Desert Storm concluded. When Iraq was defeated, Iraqi Kurds in the northern part of the country rebelled, hoping to create an independent Kurdistan. But Hussein retained enough mili-tary strength to crush the rebellion. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds fled across the border into Turkey. USSOCOM forces were dispatched to Turkey to oversee the refugee camps and humanitarian aid and assist in defense of the Kurds as part of Operation Provide Comfort. USSOCOM was U

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so successful that five months later, in July 1991, Provide Comfort was concluded.

Operation Provide Comfort revealed something that would become a chronic problem for SOF for several years: restric-tions imposed by the host nation making SOF personnel unable to train to the full range of required capabilities. What this meant in practical terms was that host nations expected SOF units to arrive fully trained, not to conduct training during deployment. In the case of Provide Comfort, Turkey limited Air Force SOF training flights to a maximum radius of 50 miles, and restricted the amount of flying hours, flight duration, and flight profiles (e.g., night and low-level flights). Eventually this would be partially solved by an increased stationing of SOF units within the United States to allow for such training.

Conditions in the Horn of Africa were rapidly deterio-rating in the early part of the decade. The weak government in Somalia proved incapable of supplying even the most basic of necessities to its people or protecting them from warlord militias. With more than 3 million Somalis facing starvation, in August 1992 Operation Provide Relief was launched, based in Kenya and part of the multinational United Nations humanitarian aid effort in Somalia.

When the situation in Somalia collapsed, the United States initi-ated in December 1992 Operation Restore Hope, an expanded joint effort with United Nations forces within Somalia itself. The success of the humanitarian effort was overshadowed and ultimately thwarted by Operation Gothic Serpent, the October 1993 mission that captured two of Somali warlord Muhammad Farah Aideed’s lieutenants in a safe house in Mogadishu.

ABOVE: Soldiers from the 9th PSYOPS,

Fort Bragg, N.C., ride in M998 high

mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

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10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.,

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security. This mission was in direct

support of Operation Restore Hope.

LEFT: The crash site of Super Six Four,

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Serpent in Mogadishu, Somalia.

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The mission was planned as a swift snatch-and-grab, using 19 aircraft and an armored convoy of 12 vehicles and 160 troops from Task Force Ranger. Commanders planned to be in and out of Mogadishu before the warlord’s militia could react, and they anticipated incurring no casualties. But, shortly after Aideed’s lieutenants were captured in the late afternoon of Oct. 3, 1993, two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, forcing a rescue operation. The task force faced an overwhelming Somali mob that necessitated them taking up defensive positions around one of the helicopter crash sites for the night. A mission expected to take no more than an hour didn’t end until well after dawn the following day.

Task Force Ranger suffered 17 killed in action and 106 wounded in what would be called the “Black Hawk Down” incident. Two SOF operators, Master Sgt. Gary Gordon and Sgt. 1st Class Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in trying to save one of the downed helicopter crews. In March 1995, U.S. presence in Somalia ended with Operation United Shield, in which U.S. forces conducted the evacuation of United Nations peacekeeping troops from Somalia.

Meanwhile, during the same month as Operation Gothic Serpent, Navy SEALs were participating closer to home in Operation Support Democracy, the blockade and embargo of Haiti, following a military coup that ousted freely elected Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. By 1994, SEAL

teams had boarded hundreds of ships attempting to smuggle cargo into Haiti. An expanded joint SOF and conventional force operation similar to the invasion of Panama in 1989 was planned to capture the Haitian junta when a peace effort led by former President Jimmy Carter successfully brokered a deal with the Haitian military leaders, causing the invasion to be cancelled.

The Balkans has historically been known as the “powder keg” of Europe. In 1991, Yugoslavia disintegrated into the autonomous republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In April 1992, the region erupted into a civil war between the rival ethnic states. Shocked by the violence, which included “ethnic cleansing” of regions, both NATO and the U.N. responded militarily and with sanctions. SOF forces were an integral part of the effort at every level, from military to psychological operations and civil affairs.

By 1995, the number and pace of special operations missions had increased to a point where SOF commanders began to express concern about high levels of operations

A U.S. Air Force 193rd Special Operations Wing EC-130E Commando

Solo departs after receiving fuel from a 100th Air Expeditionary

Wing KC-135 Stratotanker from Royal Air Force Base Mildenhall

while on a mission in support of Operation Allied Force.



tempo, or unit deployments, and their impact on personnel retention, family relations, and effectiveness in the field. Since fiscal year 1990, USSOCOM had an average annual operating budget of about $3 billion, and managed a force of almost 47,000 personnel: 30,000 active-duty service members, 14,000 Reserve and National Guard personnel, and 3,000 civilians. Of the 30,000 active-duty service members, 14,000 were special operations quali-fied personnel assigned to deployable units. When Gen. Henry H. Shelton assumed command of SOCOM in 1996, SOF operations had increased by more than 51 percent, and its operating budget had been reduced by more than 6 percent. With the peacekeeping commitment in Bosnia (Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard) as well as missions in Sierra Leone, Albania, and Liberia, and no end in sight regarding further demands on SOF, Shelton addressed the imme-diate frontline needs by having USSOCOM develop “force module packages.” Supplies were pre-configured for specific missions and packaged for quick-response delivery. This substantially pared down mission preparation time while still offering the correct force mix. The General Accounting Office or GAO (now the Government Accountability Office), would help USSOCOM address other needs.

The House Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security authorized the GAO to conduct a study to determine if SOF were “being used in a manner that best supports national security objectives.” Led by Mark E. Gebicke, director, military operations and capabilities issues, the GAO team spent 18 months, from October 1995 to March 1997, conducting its review.

The GAO team’s study was extensive. It visited and inter-viewed commanders and units in Washington, D.C.; Fort Bragg, N.C.; Florida; Coronado, Calif.; Virginia; Fort Carson, Colo.; Fort Lewis, Wash.; Hawaii; Panama; and Germany.

During its investigation, it distributed questionnaires to almost 200 senior-level officers and enlisted personnel. Its report, delivered on May 15, 1997, revealed an astonishing change in attitude among senior military commanders since 1991.

The report found that during an average week, between 2,000 and 3,000 SOF personnel were deployed on 150 missions in 60 to 70 countries. Most importantly the report noted, “Officials at the major commands we visited expressed a high degree of satisfaction with SOF support of their regional requirements. They said the CINCs [commanders in chief] consider SOF the force of choice for many diverse combat and peacetime missions. For example, officials at the European Command said that SOF are critical to the CINC’s ability to conduct engagement activities with an increasingly smaller force. For crisis response in the current low-intensity security environment, the staff considered SOF as the most important. Officials in both the European and Pacific Commands said they plan to employ SOF first when a potential crisis develops, forming a joint SOF task force to assess the situation, advise the CINC, and prepare the area for follow-on action, if neces-sary. More significantly, officials at the Southern Command said that nothing could be done militarily in the theater without SOF. They stated that the Command’s area of respon-sibility, which comprises many countries that do not commit much funding to their militaries, was ‘made for SOF.’”

The reasons CINCs made SOF their first responders was their extensive training, relative maturity, language skills, and cultural orientation. This made them well suited to perform a wide variety of missions, ranging from direct

action and rapid response to foreign internal defense, that supported CINCs’ peacetime strategies.

On the one hand, this transformation from being the redheaded stepchild of the armed forces to being the force of choice by CINCs was gratifying. But the title of the GAO’s report pointed out the downside: “Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse.” The report stated that “60, 56, and 86 percent of the Army, Navy, Air Force respondents to GAO’s questionnaire, respectively, said they believe readiness has been, or threatens to be, adversely affected by the current level of unit deployments” and “SOF unit leaders believe that SOF are performing some missions that could be handled by conventional forces.” SOF commanders generally agreed that the missions that offered the greatest potential for the use of conventional forces were humanitarian assistance, embassy support, and support to other government agencies. The Department of Defense received a draft copy of the report before it was submitted, agreed with its accuracy, concurred with the report’s recom-mendations on strategizing priorities, monitoring mission usage and training needs, and identifying missions that could be performed by conventional forces, and initiated changes by the time the report was formally submitted in May 1997.

While the GAO was conducting its study, AFSOC was addressing the need to develop a new air doctrine that had been delayed by Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the increasing number of mission demands made by the different commands: tactical combat air support, also known as close air support. Basically, AFSOC identified that existing doctrine, culminating with the “Broken Arrow” mayday call diverting all air assets in a theater to assist a ground unit in danger of being overrun by enemy forces, was itself broken. AFSOC revised and expanded the doctrine, integrating from the beginning air assets tasked with every anticipated need a ground mission would have.

“Our military objective is to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.” This statement, made by Secretary of Defense William Cohen on April 15, 1999, heralded the start of Operation Allied Force in the former Yugoslavia. As Operation Allied Force was primarily an air campaign, AFSOC was deeply involved. The 193rd Special Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, the only airborne psychological operations broadcasting unit, was an important part of the campaign. Its EC-130E Commando Solo, specially modified to make civil affairs broadcasts in AM, FM, HF, and TV, flew over Serbia and countered Serbian radio and television broadcasts, and its MC-130H aircraft conducted extensive leaflet drops. An AFSOC AC-130U provided armed reconnaissance. AFSOC’s special operators and aircraft played a significant role in bringing the conflict in Kosovo to an end. Following the conclusion of Allied Force, special operations civil affairs units entered the country to assist in recovery and restoration efforts.

Across the board, from combat, to embassy defense, to humanitarian missions, SOF made significant, and at times pivotal, contributions in the field and around the globe. Perhaps more impressive is the turnaround in attitude SOF caused among the service branches, occurring in less than four years. Though the increased tempo and wide variety of demands placed enormous stress on everyone, SOF personnel and SOCOM met and overcame every challenge. That decade-long tempering would prove invaluable within two years of the start of the new century and new millennium.


Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) combat controllers rushed to their units, while Army Special Forces (SF) soldiers began to pull out of overseas training missions and return to their home bases. What would become Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A) was built “on the fly” in just four weeks following 9/11.

Surrounded by countries usually hostile or indifferent to the United States, Afghanistan was the perfect hideout for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network. But worldwide outrage over the Sept. 11 attacks enabled Secretary of State Colin Powell to forge a global coalition against terrorism. Pakistan reluctantly became America’s partner, while Uzbekistan became the first ex-Soviet nation in Central Asia to allow U.S. basing.

Over 10 days, Bush administration officials hammered out the war plan. They quickly realized there would be no way to get conventional ground units into Afghanistan for months. Cofer Black, Central Inteligence Agency (CIA) deputy director for counterterrorism, is credited with the idea of a CIA/SOF-based insurgency campaign to bring down the Taliban and smash al Qaeda. He proposed sending CIA field operatives and SF teams to support the Northern Alliance, a ragtag group of ethnic warlords maintaining a precarious resistance to the Taliban in remote corners of Afghanistan. With American airpower, and resupply of weapons, ammunition, and other gear, the Northern Alliance could begin hitting back quickly, preparing the way for an offensive in the spring of 2002.

At Special Operations Command (SOCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Fla., Gen. Charles R. Holland, USAF, and his staff faced the challenge of packaging SOF units and delivering them to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Everything had to be ready in days, not months: unit training and selection,

transportation, and logistical lines of supply into a landlocked region of roadless mountains and high desert. SOCOM also had to innovate new solutions to support the evolving war plan, which demanded a small, discreet footprint in the Islamic nations of the growing coalition. An example was the decision to “borrow” USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) from U.S. 7th Fleet, disembark most of her air wing, and use the flattop as a mobile SOF base in the Arabian Sea. Loaded with SOF helicop-ters, Rangers, and Special Mission Unit (SMU) personnel from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Kitty Hawk was invaluable as both an operating base and medical facility.

Units selected for initial deployment made up a rainbow of SOF capabilities: Navy SEALs and Special Boat Teams, AFSOC aircraft and Special Tactics personnel, Army SF, Rangers, and helicopters and flight crews from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). At the core of all this was the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG). Led by then-Col. John Mulholland, USA, and then-Capt. Robert Harward, USN, they would become Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (C/JSOTF-N) and -South (C/JSOTF-S) respectively. C/JSOTF-N, also known as Task Force Dagger, was based at Karshi-Khanabad (known as “K2”), Uzbekistan, on an old Soviet air base just 90 miles from the Afghan border. JSOTF-N’s facilities were built from an old garbage dump by USASOC signals and support personnel, and austerely supplied by long-haul airlift.

On Oct. 7, 2001, OEF-A opened with air strikes and cruise missile attacks from vessels in the Arabian Sea and B-2A bombers flying in from the United States, Diego Garcia, and Guam. This paved the way for SOF forces, inserted when the weather cleared later that month. On Oct. 19, helicop-ters from K2 lifted two SF Operational Detachment-Alpha

SOCOM AT 25

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BY MIKE MARKOWITZ

USSOCOM Since 9/11This was not an act of terrorism, but it was an act of war. – President George W. Bush

PART III

Even before the rst of the towers had fallen in New York City, and

with the Pentagon still smoldering, America’s special operators were

mobili ing for the war they had spent a half-century preparing to ght.


SOCOM AT 25 – PART III

U.S. Army (USA) special

operations forces (SOF) soldiers

on patrol aboard a high-mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicle

(HMMWV) with an M2HB .50-caliber

machine gun mounted on top in

Western Baghdad, Iraq, during

Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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(ODA) teams into Bagram and Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. They linked up with CIA personnel and set to work with their new partners, the Northern Alliance. Simultaneously, Rangers and SMUs dropped onto “Objective Rhino,” an airfield near Kandahar. After raiding Rhino, the Rangers and SMUs were flown by helicopter to Kitty Hawk, which became their base for the next several months.

Within hours, AFSOC combat controllers attached to the two ODAs began to call in precision air strikes against Taliban positions, many invisible to satellites or reconnais-sance aircraft. Strike fighters and heavy bombers began to pound Taliban and al Qaeda across northern Afghanistan, while Northern Alliance fighters were resupplied and trained by SF personnel. Realizing the beating the Taliban and al Qaeda were taking from American air strikes, and seeing the growing power of their resupplied forces, Northern Alliance leaders pressed to take the offensive in November at the stra-tegic city of Mazar-e-Sharif, where dug-in opposing forces had faced each other in a World War I-style stalemate for years. Mounting some of the ODAs on horseback for mobility, Northern Alliance forces swept into Mazar-e-Sharif on Nov. 9, and took the city and airfield by storm.

More ODAs were inserted into northern Afghanistan, along with several in the south by C/JSOTF-S. Everywhere in Afghanistan, cities surrendered, and whole battalions of Taliban fighters surrendered and changed sides. The demor-alized Taliban/al Qaeda forces began a disorderly retreat that ended a month later with the surrender of Kandahar. In just 49 days, with fewer than 300 sets of American “boots on the ground,” SOF achieved what 50,000 Soviet troops had failed to accomplish in almost 10 years. And while Soviet losses were more than 16,000, U.S. forces lost just three men. Despite the relatively low cost, what was accomplished was

neither simple nor easy. Every part of SOCOM made critical contributions, and the lack of any component might have doomed the rest of the campaign.

AFSOC’s combat controllers, integrated into SF ODAs, allowed bombers carrying heavy loads of precision-guided munitions to destroy enemy bunkers in close proximity to friendly troops – something unimaginable only a few years before. AFSOC Combat Talon tanker/transports flew some of the most difficult and dangerous flight profiles in aviation history. AFSOC AC-130 gunships delivered incredibly accu-rate fire on point targets, while helicopters like the venerable MH-53J Pave Low IVs (which entered service back in 1987) hauled teams and supplies over high mountain passes and were first responders for medical evacuation.

U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) joined in the fight also, with Harward’s C/JSOTF-S composed of SEALs, an SF battalion, Special Boat Teams, and SOF contingents from six allies (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, and Norway). C/JSOTF-S conducted operations in southern Afghanistan, along with sealing the maritime routes in and out of the region. Operating for only six months, from October 2001 to March 2002, the unit earned the coveted Presidential Unit Citation, awarded by Bush in December 2004, on the very day Hamid Karzai was sworn in as president of Afghanistan.

Some lesser-known components of USASOC were key to the success of the mission, such as the 160th SOAR and the 112th Signal Battalion. At one point, C/JSOTF-N’s entire lift capa-bility into Afghanistan consisted of just six MH-47E Chinooks, the only U.S. helicopters able to haul useful payloads over the mountain passes. At the same time, the 112th Signal Battalion provided critical communication and data links back to the rest of the world. Finally, civil affairs and psycho-logical warfare units helped prepare Afghans for the arrival of American forces, laying the groundwork to rebuild their ravaged country. Within three months of the Taliban surrender on Dec. 8, coalition forces secured control of Afghanistan. Vicious battles with the Taliban and al Qaeda followed in the mountains along the Afghan/Pakistan border. Despite losses, including eight SOF warriors during Operation Anaconda in March 2002, Afghanistan moved haltingly toward stability, with NATO taking control of the effort in 2006.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: OTHER FRONTS

In January 2002, SOCOM began to supply SOF units for anti-terrorist operations in the southern Philippines. Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic militant group affiliated with al Qaeda, had been kidnapping American businessmen and tourists and bombing commercial aircraft for some years. Supporting the govern-ment of the Philippines, the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P, also called Operation Freedom Eagle) in January 2002, commanded by then-Brig. Gen. Donald Wurster, USAF. Initially run as Exercise Balikatan 02-1, OEF-P grew into a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) of almost 1,200 U.S personnel.

The OEF-P JSOTF included NAVSPECWARCOM personnel, SF soldiers from the 1st Special Forces Group (SFG), helicop-ters from the 160th SOAR, and support and communications personnel. Based at Zamboanga City on Mindanao, JSOTF-P trains and advises Philippine troops on the island of Basilan and surrounding waters. Under the existing status of forces agreement and Philippine law, U.S. personnel are officially not U

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A Special Forces soldier uses an AN/PEQ-1 SOF Laser Marker

(SOFLAM) to designate a target for an air strike in Afghanistan

in 2001. The U.S.-led ousting of the Taliban was achieved by a

combination of special operations forces on the ground, allied

air power, and friendly Afghan soldiers. The SOFLAM was a

ubiquitous piece of equipment used throughout the campaign.



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allowed to engage in “direct combat.” OEF-P is a quiet and unqualified success, with active Abu Sayyaf fighters reduced from more than 1,000 to perhaps fewer than 300 to 400 today. A subsidiary effort, Operation Smiles, provides medical treat-ment to more than 18,000 Filipino civilians. Similar operations include Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa, (OEF-HOA) based in Djibouti; Operation Enduring Freedom-Pankisi Gorge (OEFPG) in Georgia; and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel. The largest of these, OEF-HOA, run under Joint Task Force Aztec Silence, combats terrorist activities in Somalia and Kenya. Under European Command (EUCOM), these efforts quietly work to break up terrorist networks.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Bush declared Iraq a member of the “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address, making it America’s top target following the Taliban surrender. By the spring of 2002, SOCOM was preparing for a new challenge. Along with a flood of new equipment, weapons, vehicles, and aircraft, SOCOM units also received the most important resource: new people. An infusion of newly selected, trained, and qualified SOF warriors began to arrive at units in mid-2002, filling out teams that had fought since 9/11 with what had been on hand.

For Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the United States and its allies assembled the largest collection of SOF ever committed, even bigger than the effort for Operation Overlord in 1944. This included most of SOCOM, along with units from Great Britain, Australia, and Poland. In OIF, SOF forces would undertake the following missions:

of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems;

Iraq from Kuwait and Turkey;-

tion, refining, and transportation facilities and bridges, dams, and public utilities;

Hussein, his family, and tribal members; and

Free Iraqi Force units.To accomplish these tasks, on Jan. 7, 2003, Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld established unprecedented new authorities. For the first time, SOF officers would be allowed to command Joint Task Forces (JTFs), as well as JSOTFs. In addition, conventional units could be assigned to JSOTFs, taking orders from the task force commander.

By early 2003, SOF forces had deployed to friendly nations in Europe and the Middle East. But before the Iraqi invasion could begin, the plan began to come apart. On March 1, 2003, the new Turkish parliament voted to deny U.S. access to Turkish ports, airspace, and territory. Then, on March 19, Bush ordered a preemptive strike against Saddam Hussein and his sons in Baghdad, which failed. The carefully crafted SOF infiltration plan was in a complete shambles.

Despite these problems, SOF units assigned to OIF prevailed. U.S., British, and Australian SOF units rapidly cleared the western third of Iraq. Though they failed to locate any WMDs, SOF forces under Mulholland captured airfields, bridges, and critical infrastructure. In the south, U.S. Navy SEALs, Polish GROM commandos, and British Royal Marines took oil platforms, the Faw Peninsula, and the

channel to the vital port of Um-Qasr in just a single night. From Kuwait, SF teams flooded into southern Iraq, seizing bridges and airfields, linking up with friendly Iraqis, and conducting special reconnaissance.

But SOF’s best performance came in the north, where the Turkish vote of March 1 had turned the situation on the ground into a potential nightmare. Then-Col. Charles Cleveland, commander of the 10th SFG, had to find a way to keep 16 Iraqi divisions north of Baghdad from attacking the Kurdish zone or heading south to help defend the enemy capital. Taking advantage of SOF’s newly acquired DoD authority, Cleveland, as commander of Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (C/JSOTF-N – Task Force Viking) would command the entire northern Iraq area of operations. His three SF battalions would receive conventional reinforcements, including the 173rd Airborne Brigade and tanks from 1st Armored Division flown in on USAF transports. With massive air support from USAF heavy bombers and U.S. Navy fighters, Cleveland launched an offensive to occupy the oil production center of Kirkuk. Using small SF teams to lead Kurdish Peshmerga militia bands,

TOP: A U.S. Navy SEAL member provides cover for his teammates

advancing on a suspected location of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in

eastern Afghanistan on Jan. 26, 2002. Navy special operations forces

were conducting missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

ABOVE: U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) and Philippine Scout Rangers lift

a wounded Scout Ranger into a Philippine Air Force UH-1H medevac

Sayyaf rebels in Upper Mangar, Philippines. USA SF are supporting

Philippine military operations during Operation Enduring Freedom.


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this offensive succeeded beyond all expectations. Mosul and Kirkuk were liberated without any damage to the oil production infrastructure, and Iraqi forces were mauled by SF/Peshmerga teams. Using a lethal combination of airpower, new Javelin anti-tank missiles, and light vehicles, Task Force Viking fought a series of brilliant small-unit actions.

The surrender of Baghdad came in early April. SOF units had accomplished everything asked of them and more. Their flexibility, mobility, and growing lethality derived from modern weapons and precision airpower overcame the loss of Turkish access and infiltration opportunities early in OIF. As OIF transitioned from combat to stability operations in late April, SOF units took on new roles, especially the SF and civil affairs (CA) units with critical language and cultural skills. As the occupation turned into a complex protracted insurgency, SOF units and personnel proved uniquely effective.

SOF professionals helped to capture Saddam Hussein and eliminated al Qaeda chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. SOF units led the retaking of major cities like Fallujah and Najaf when al Qaeda and Shiite insurgents tried to seize control in 2004.

SOF units also led efforts to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq, ravaged by three decades of Saddam’s neglect and mismanagement. Iraq, as one senior SOF leader put it in 2003, became a “Snake-eater’s Ball” for special operators, and a “flytrap” for global terrorists.

NEW CAPABILITIES AND EXPANSION

While fighting the global war on terrorism (GWOT) over the past decade, SOCOM also grew and transformed under the leadership of two commanders: Holland (October 2000 to October 2003) and his successor, Gen. Bryan “Doug” Brown, USA, (October 2003 to July 2007). Both made considerable use of SOCOM’s unique Title 10 funding line in the defense budget, which allowed the command to procure a variety of weapons and systems.

Along with weapons and platforms, SOCOM has also taken on its most difficult task of the GWOT thus far: growth. The first five years of the GWOT showed the shortcomings of the pre-Sept. 11 SOCOM unit structure, especially with regard to certain key types of units. In particular, there has been a strong need for additional SOF aviation capacity, along with an unceasing requirement for additional SF and SEAL teams. Thanks to these requirements being validated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, SOCOM was given authority to significantly increase the size of its personnel base by 2013. This includes five new active-duty SF battal-ions, enlarging the 160th SOAR, increased SEAL recruiting, and enlarging the various SOCOM component schools to accommodate the expanding personnel base, which now finally includes Marines.

For many years, Marine Corps leaders resisted the assign-ment of Marines to SOCOM, seeing it as a diversion of scarce resources from traditional Marine missions. This attitude has gradually changed, with a growing appreciation of the skills that Marines can bring to SOF missions. In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed the formation of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) as the Marine component of SOCOM. The Marines initially formed a unit of approximately 2,500 built around a special operations regiment of three battalions, which have focused on the foreign internal defense mission.

Despite the global conflict with terrorism, SOCOM has continued to supply teams for the Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs in more than 90 countries. SOCOM also supports continuing fights against narco-terrorists and human trafficking. Twenty years after the battle on Capitol Hill to create SOCOM, its value to the nation has been fully validated in both war and peace. Far from being just the administrative container for a diverse collection of SOF units, SOCOM is now the de facto leader in the continuing war against violent extremists, and in many ways the cutting edge of U.S. military power.

Even before 9/11, SOCOM and intelligence professionals had been hunting the elusive leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. In 2010, a lead obtained from an intercepted mobile phone call began the final lap in the hunt. It ended on May 1, 2011, with Operation Neptune Spear, a raid by JSOC SMU personnel into Abbottabad, Pakistan. SMU SEALs killed the al Qaeda leader and recovered his body for identification purposes, after which he was buried at sea. It was the end of what may have been the greatest manhunt in history, but not the end of the fight for SOCOM. That continues.

TOP: U.S. Air Force (USAF) special operations forces personnel and

a rescued U.S. military pilot depart a USAF HH-60G Pave Hawk

helicopter at a forward deployed location in southern Iraq after

a successful rescue mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

ABOVE: Special Forces soldiers on a joint operation with Iraqi

commandos in Baghdad, 2007. Part of U.S. strategy against

the insurgency has included having SF establish, train, and

operate alongside Iraqi special operations forces.


With 66,000 soldiers and civilians, SOCOM’s budget remains below $11 billion in FY 2012, slightly less than 2 percent of the total Department of Defense (DoD) funding base. Several thousand new billets will be filled over the next few years, but the SOCOM budget will not rise in proportion. So the elite of the U.S. elite will still be a force multiplier: relatively under-resourced and strategically over-committed.

Adm. William H. McRaven, USN (SOCOM’s commander), has spent the past decade engaged in combat, and when he wasn’t fighting, he was inventing the interagency struc-tures that SOCOM now uses to interface with the rest of the national security and intelligence establishments. Perhaps the most visible combatant commander since Gen. David Petraeus, USA (Ret.), McRaven has given the public a persona on which to project their enthusiasm and curiosity about special operations. This is a role that he clearly does not relish, but one that he does not take lightly.

A few weeks after he was sworn in as SOCOM commander, McRaven was in the Pentagon telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had the privilege to be commanding the best trained, most experienced, most well-resourced special operations forces (SOF) in the history of the planet. SOCOM has spent the past 10 years learning, often the hard way, how to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks; it has tested the limits of human endurance, as well as the stress that military families can reasonably bear. McRaven set his expectations high.

Presidents and their advisers since Ronald Reagan have relied upon SOCOM and the Special Mission Units (SMUs) of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in particular, as an immediate global striking mechanism. In the future, SOCOM will deploy more than 12,000 SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen overseas to strategically placed “Lily Pad” bases to operate near denied areas. Theater combatant commanders will be able to call on them, more, to solve urgent prob-lems that call for unique skills, and presidents will be able to call upon an expanded national missions force to focus on the conjoined problem sets of counterproliferation and

counternarcotics. Both have the potential to eclipse terrorism and violent extremism as potentially existential national secu-rity threats, and SOCOM is the likely “go-to” force that will be called to deal with them. In addition, SOCOM units and personnel will be commingling and co-mixing with general purpose forces. Indeed, the next generation’s joint billet may well be a headquarters or downrange assignment at JSOC, whose footprint continues to expand.

By 2013, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) will have increased the number of its ready battalions 20 to 25 percent from just five years ago, owing to a heavy demand for indigenous foreign internal defense (FID) missions. The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) have focused on achieving operational f luency with new platforms and technologies. The Air Force’s CV-22 Osprey has been relatively successful, while NAVSPECWARCOM’s efforts at an Advanced SEAL Delivery System have been less so. In the short term, however, no SOCOM component command will have the materiel support it will need to operate at full strength – which constitutes about 650 “teams” (including SEAL platoons, special tactics teams, and Operational Detachments-Alpha [ODA], three U.S. Army Ranger battalions, and a number of SMUs.

How then, to keep America’s SOF units truly special – capable, adaptable, and ready? In a word, policy. The shock of Sept. 11, 2001, allowed for an easy transition into the role of counterterrorism, but the next dozen years did not generate

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The FuturePART IV

So what is in the immediate future for U.S. Special Operations Command

(SOCOM)? Undoubtedly, SOCOM will be called upon to do a lot more for

the nation, with a few thousand more men and women operating in an

environment of both constrained resources and heightened expectations.

A U.S. Special Forces soldier from Special Operations Task Force-East

scans the mountainside for potential threats during a battle in the

Barge Matal district, Nuristan province, Afghanistan, May 20, 2011.

Special Forces conducted a clearing operation to rid the area of

insurgents and demonstrate the reach of the Afghan government.


SOCOM AT 25 – PART IV


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an equivalent event to react against. Only a series of diffuse irregular forces (jihadism, displaced peoples migration, the global narco-trade, etc.), and quasi-menacing nation-states (China and perhaps Russia), along with traditional enemies of the United States (Iran, North Korea, potentially Syria) presently stand on the scene to threaten America. Clearly in the near term, a smaller proportion of SOCOM deployments will fall under the U.S. Central Command’s purview. Most likely, Southern Command (for counternarcotics), Pacific Command (for counterterrorism and a variety of missions related to North Korea and China), and the joint task force in the Horn of Africa will see corresponding increases.

Still, Congress has spent little time devising a coherent force posture that fits SOF and SOCOM within the frame-work of these challenges, and the way the interagency processes have evolved to think about them. But it is no secret to close watchers of SOF that the command’s pres-ence in Washington, D.C., is more muscular than it ever has been. In Arlington, Va., SOCOM has a Joint Interagency Intelligence Task Force for national-level missions, as well as a command post for SMUs. As Congress has grown more interested in the scope of SOCOM’s intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, the authorizing and oversight committees have asked for more information, both as a way of keeping watch over the powerful entity SOCOM has become, and as a way to proactively help the command with needed adjustment to legislation and author-ities. McRaven and his deputies now brief more members of Congress on SOCOM missions of all types than ever before. His relationship with the intelligence and armed services committees is rock-solid and mutually respectful.

Having presided over much of the recent military intelli-gence convergence on the battlefield, McRaven will certainly work in the future to institutionalize so-called “Title 60” operations, where traditional intelligence collection and covert action conducted by the Central Inteligence Agency (CIA, under Title 50) will meld seamlessly, with Congress appropriately informed. In 2005, Congress expanded SOCOM’s authorities under the large umbrella of “opera-tional preparation of the environment” to such an extent that intelligence officers can recruit informants and directly train foreign fighters to act as paramilitary proxies to (specifically) combat terrorism. Clearly, new rules are going to be needed, given the range of competing authorities and the significant ramp-up of intelligence-gathering activities.

Since particular missions often (and historically) require the use of both military and intelligence assets, and since the intelligence community performs paramilitary activities under its own authorities, the challenge of such operations is less about the law, per se, than it is about perception and force fielding. It is in the interest of the United States to have a robust National Clandestine Service (part of the CIA) as well as a strong defense intelligence capacity. To the extent that presidents and policymakers can play chess with available resources, they ought to do so knowing that efficiency and effectiveness do not come without a price of conflating what are, and will remain, two separate functions of the state. With the new Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) coming online, and the consolidation of analytical functions into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Congress will be pressed to provide clarity and understanding of SOF in the years ahead.

The operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011 demonstrated the need for this fusion to the world, but at

an operational level, the CIA and SOCOM assets have never before worked more closely and with less friction. In Yemen, where SOF has several overt missions, including FID and training, its unacknowledged (at least officially) special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) pallettes are so closely coordinated with the agency’s pursuit of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that the two entities literally trade off resources; one day, the CIA might be responsible for an ISR asset, the next day, “white” SOF could use the same asset. Clearly, such deconfliction is an important priority of both SOCOM and the intelligence community.

McRaven in particular wants SOCOM to achieve dominance in three areas: information warfare (IW); family support; and “jointness” with the other services and allies. All are conventional concepts that previous SOCOM commanders have struggled to get their arms around, but McRaven is in a position to make lasting changes. Information warfare, broadly defined, involves the collection, utilization, aggrega-tion, visualization, and prioritization of all-source intelligence, made available to virtually everyone, at one time. Every time a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) pushes forward, McRaven wants to make sure that it never lacks for real-time intelligence reachback, communications spectrum bandwidth, and even a capacity for computer network defense (CND) and computer network exploitation (CNE).

The U.S. Cyber Command recognizes that SOCOM hungers for an advanced and command-wide integrated cyber capacity. At the moment, this type of support to the warfighter is rather intermittent, owing to the lack of policy


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guidance and the relative lack of an advanced cyber warfare strategy. Tactically, the next evolution in this field will be to bring sensor and tracking technology, which iterates about once a year, to any unit that requires their use. JSOC has been using tiny, unattended ground sensors that can be monitored by mini-satellites and feed data to operating units or tactical commands to track terrorists; the technology is relatively cheap, but the bandwidth and backbone are complicated and require command direction to sort out.

In a world where every explosion is “tweeted,” and everyone gives off an electromagnetic signature by way of their mobile phones and tablets, keeping SOF missions covert or clandestine will be challenging. And given SOCOM’s central role in national security, public and press interest in the way the command works will only increase. It is SOCOM’s job to tell the public the story of itself. The command’s global reach is both a pride and a limitation, as Americans are wary of war and have seen the effects of imperial meddling (even if the intentions were otherwise). JSOC’s true nature remains officially unacknowledged, but that’s more a nod to tradition. Its high-profile missions are dissected, some-times instantly, in public, jeopardizing tactics and even, on occasion, operational security. In the future, “white” SOF and “black” SOF units will operate jointly even more frequently than they did in Iraq and Afghanistan, which means, in essence, that SOF units will be constantly revising

and adapting rapidly, and often field testing the results. McRaven person-ally believes that the large blanket of secrecy that shrouds SOF missions ought to be thinned a bit. Secrecy often creates shadows that are unnecessary, and successes can be celebrated and brought to light in a way that protects the assets and operations that need protection without re-blacking the force.

Readiness is also an obvious and perennial obsession of SOCOM commanders. McRaven has added his personal endorsement: He has appointed his long-time Command Sgt. Maj. Chris Faris to head a task force that will develop standards for determining when formerly deployed personnel are ready to return to the battlefield. In essence, if a soldier or a sailor isn’t ready, if his or her family situation has deteriorated, if

there is evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder or psycho-logical stress, SOCOM will cancel or postpone deployments, doing so with the intention of helping the individual in ques-tion work his or her way back to full fitness.

Then there is “jointness.” The next several years will see a consolidation in SOCOM of information technology backbones, acquisition platforms, and program offices. And the command will encourage commanders in the field and back at headquarters to resist the temptation of service and cultural constraints, and develop a greater situational awareness of what other commanders are doing. But at the same time, McRaven wants each part of the SOF community to retain and enhance its own core competencies. Leadership and reliable, stable promotion schedules, along with more thoughtful resource deployments and pre-mission planning, will allow, in theory, each unit to do best what it does best, while playing even better with others. For example, with the expanded Army Special Forces, and the slow transition away from DA missions in Afghanistan, the Navy SEALs may slowly be able to concentrate more on the sea and their maritime missions. A big test for McRaven will be the integration of the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), the three battalions of which will be fully stood up by 2014. Today, MARSOC performs primary FID missions (they’ve been in about 40 countries) and are slowly synchronizing their training with SOCOM’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. A truly joint force can leverage the particular niches of each SOF tribe (the phrase is national security professional Michele Malvesti’s) in a way that a unit-based focus can’t. Instead of treating deployments as “activities,” Malvesti, the former senior director of the National Security Counsel’s Office of Combating Terrorism and the daughter of a legendary SOF warrior, has argued that they ought to be seen as components of a mission set, be it counterinsurgency or counternarcotics. Virtually every SOF competency can be used against a target, but in-lane thinking will reduce SOF’s ability to be a force multiplier. McRaven endorses this thinking, and conceives of SOF less as a set of discrete tools and more as a multi-faced (but single) entity performing a defined mission.

LEFT: A U.S. Army Special Forces soldier provides cover during Emerald

Warrior, Apalachicola, Fla., March 7, 2012. The primary purpose of

Emerald Warrior is to exercise special operations components in urban

and irregular warfare settings to support combatant commanders in

theater campaigns. Emerald Warrior leverages lessons from Operation

Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and other operations to

provide better trained and ready forces to combatant commanders.

ABOVE: Coalition special operations forces prepare to board CH-47

Chinook helicopters as part of a two-day presence patrol with Afghan

Commandos from the 9th Kandak in Sar-e Takht village, Farah province,

Feb. 27, 2012. SOF personnel work with 9th Kandak Commandos to

protect local communities and eradicate insurgent activity in the region.


OEF-P


Winning: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines

TABIAWAN, the Philippines – On the small jungle island of Basilan, success in the

ght against terrorism may hinge more on digging wells and building roads than

on training Philippine soldiers to shoot straighter and track elusive Muslim militants

across rugged terrain. For the past four months, the stated mission of 160 American

Special Forces soldiers here has been to train Philippine soldiers to ght a dwindling

band of Abu Sayyaf rebels who have operated on Basilan. But those American

Green Berets, as well as 3 0 Navy and Marine Corps engineers who arrived here

in April, have played an equally important role in mending roads, drilling wells

and clearing a 19 0s airstrip for cargo planes. This will not only improve life for

the 300,000 residents of the island, one of the poorest parts of the Philippines, but

may also help dry up popular support for Abu Sayyaf, American and Philippine

of cials hope. “When we leave, the improvements stay,” said Brig. Gen. Donald C.

Wurster of the Air Force, the commander of American forces here in the southern

Philippines. “Our strategy is to enhance the Philippine government’s legitimacy.

We want to eliminate the seed ground for the next generation of terrorists.”

– Eric Schmidt, The New York Times, June 1 , 2002


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Sometimes it’s hard to recall the atmosphere 10 years ago, in the year after 9/11. We live in the reverse of that universe now. Everything seems backward to the way it should be, and the way that most special operations forces (SOF) operators have felt comfortable. Then, we publicized aid missions that gave our allies the capability to win the allegiance of their populations and for them to do the killing inside their territory where that was necessary. Today, we go out of our way to publicize, or even over-publicize, the killing of high-value targets by American forces and by U.S. drones. We don’t publicize missions of building partnership militaries in 2012, fearing the work might be called “nation building” or “a waste of resources.” Indeed, focusing public attention on such missions 10 years later risks causing the end of a necessary and effective mission.

The mission of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) does continue, however, and the success of that mission and these three interviews provide a persuasive argument for population-centered counterinsurgency (COIN). Wurster was a brigadier general and commander of Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC) when 9/11 happened. David P. Fridovich was a colonel and commander of the 1st Special Forces Group (SFG). The two men planned, led, and executed what has become the most successful (and unclas-sified secret) example of American indirect COIN warfare. Their strategy evolved over time as they learned what worked and what influenced the people of the Philippines to take the side of the Filipino government against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of radical Islamic separatists. The third interview was conducted by email through the current SOCPAC commander, Maj. Gen. Norman J. Brozenick Jr., and answered by the commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), Col. Fran Beaudette, who also commands the 1st SFG. (The active-duty response came through the U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] public affairs office, while both Wurster and Fridovich retired as lieutenant generals in 2011.)

From October 2001 until the present, the U.S. public, and the Pentagon leadership, concentrated on the Central Command Theater of Operations with its various commanders, stra-tegic adjustments, and very kinetic operations. OEF-P began at the same time as assistance to the Philippines in order to free two American hostages. An assault by Filipino special forces in June 2002 resulted in the rescue of one and the death of the other hostage. The quiet mission continued throughout the summer and into the fall, when the leader of the ASG was killed. After that, the mission has continued with various exercise names, as required by the Philippine constitution for the past 10 years. Over time, Fridovich’s success and promotions eventually made him the SOCPAC commander, and the mission in the Philippines enjoyed the most consistent strategic philosophy ever achieved, while the direct actions of the Americans involved remained almost completely non-kinetic. This mission has aided in making the Filipino military respected in its own country and lethal to its enemies. The quiet battle in the Philippine Islands continues today, as the legitimacy of the government and the allegiance of its people grow and individual islands become places where the insurgency draws less and less popular support and gradually starves out.

Then-Brig. Gen. Rustico Guerrero, commander of Armed Forces

of the Philippines (AFP) Joint Task Force Comet, Army Maj. Scott

Malone, commander of Task Force Sulu, and Army Col. William

Coultrup, then-commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force-

Philippines (JSOTF-P), pass a key to Kagay Barangay Chairman Ganih

Nur, Jan. 14, 2010. The AFP and JSOTF-P partnered to build a road

and an elementary school designed to bring economic prosperity

and aid in the educational opportunities for the children of Sulu.


OEF-P

LT. GEN. DONALD C. WURSTER, USAF, (RET.)

Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF (Ret.): What was the condition of the partner nation at the beginning of OEF-Philippines?

Lt. Gen. Donald C. Wurster, USAF (Ret.): The overall situation was that there was a low-energy insurgency in the Philippines in a Muslim area of the country. The insur-gency was Muslim and the Philippines are mostly Catholic Christian, so there was a good deal of suspicion and distrust of the government on the part of the people of the region of Zamboanga and Basilan Island. The Abu Sayyaf Group had taken hostages months before 9/11, and the situation was pretty much a stalemate.

When you and Joint Task Force 510 (JTF 510) executed OEF-Philippines, what were the most important things you did that helped the TF succeed?

My primary task every day was to keep the strategic dominoes in line. The host government of the Philippines [GOP] had significant unease that we would in some way violate their sovereignty and disrespect their constitution. The people in the villages suspected that we were there to establish American bases and to re-establish the American empire in the Pacific. There was also little credibility for the government on the part of the common people in remote areas. I had to keep the strategic train on the track. The need also existed to make sure all members of the deployment understood those strategic dominoes. I met every airplane and attended the in-brief of new people in the deployment and I told them, “We have to not lose while we set the condi-tions to win.” I made sure that every American deployed knew that our mission was to support the GOP.

What was the mission you began with and how did it evolve?We worked the mission statement hard and had to get it

right. We had to thread the needle with it to ensure we did not make it an American mission for the American military to perform on Filipino soil. Our mission was expressed in terms of “by, with, and through.” We were to train and advise the Filipino military to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. It was not stated that they would then rescue the Burnhams [a missionary couple held hostage by Abu Sayyaf], but that was an unwritten part of the mission. That mission had to be the Filipino mission in order for their government and military to succeed and gain any credibility from accomplishing that mission.

Frido [then-Col. David P. Fridovich, commander of the 1st SFG] and the Green Berets worked the training and develop-ment of the Filipino military and taught them a lot. We were limited to working at the battalion level and were never able to get down to the company level in working with them. I learned a lot from Frido while we were there about how the Green Berets go about their training and building partner capacity missions.

Frido concentrated on training and developing capability with the Filipinos, concentrating on their tactical skills and on establishing joint operations in the Filipino military, which did not previously exist. The need for cooperation and mission unity across the air and sea services among the Filipinos meant better ability to keep pressure on the enemy. They also needed to learn how to rotate their forces so that fresh troops were always conducting pursuit and could hand

off operations from unit to unit. Their upper echelons of command had to learn to share forces through changes of operational and tactical command in order to keep up on pursuits and make mission success more important than owning forces or internal turf battles.

How did the mission evolve? Were there things you did that you did not expect to do in the planning and deploy-ment phases?

The Naval Construction Task Group [NCTG] played a crucial role. They deployed into the country in late April. They built a lot of the things we needed and built things which the people of the region needed. They won the day with the people. We didn’t expect to do that when we began. I had said early on to many of the village leaders, “Let us show you by our actions that we are here to support you.” It was the Naval Construction Task Group that proved to them that we kept our word. They saw roads being repaired and what we would call civil affairs projects coming together and they began to trust us. They saw tangible changes in their lives and reacted positively toward us and toward their government.

Could you explain that further? How did you get that Task Group and how did you justify those projects?

Initially, our projects supported security and mobility – roads and boat docks to help us with mobility on land and coastal patrolling had benefits to the population, enhancing their economy centered on market days and fishing. We had to spend Title 10 money on the right things, but we were able to derive collateral benefits which the people saw and understood as reactive to some of the things they told us [and the Filipino military and government representatives] were needed. Later, we requested humanitarian assistance funds for other projects, like digging wells, rebuilding and remodeling schools and hospital clinics. The people saw us as providing the road to get their kids to new schools and to take their sick to new clinics. It helped them decide which side to take, and before too long the Abu Sayyaf Group had no friends and they had to leave Basilan Island just to survive.

They [NCTG] also contracted at least 51 percent of every project with local labor. This also served to create and enhance the local economy. We may have hired a number of people who were unsure of whom they supported or were even leaning toward the bad guys. When they got their jobs and paychecks from us, they took their own side and knew what was working for them. The bad guys lost their support and they couldn’t live on Basilan without that popular support.

There was a corresponding information campaign which came about naturally. The press wanted statements virtually every day and we could publicize what we were doing many days and it became good press for us when these projects were visible to everyone. I had a liaison officer in the embassy as well who attended a number of meetings in Manila with the Filipino hierarchy and we kept them informed of every-thing we were doing and prevented surprises.

This came in handy at one point early on in the deploy-ment. We had a couple of soldiers who had to have cash money to get things started during the initial deployment. They had to go to town in Zamboanga to get some money from an ATM. They were armed, in accordance with the ROE [rules of engagement], and we made sure they were accom-panied by Filipino military guys, also armed. The next day we saw a picture in the local paper of an American in civilian


OEF-P

clothes, standing at an ATM with an M16. The photographer worked his way around so that the American was alone in the picture even though he was standing as part of a group of two Americans and four Filipinos while his partner was getting money. It caused a stir and a Filipino general said at the meeting in Manila that Gen. Wurster had already called and apologized for the incident and promised to be more aware and wary of the press. I’d said no such thing. Heck, I didn’t even know about it at the time of the meeting in Manila, but the Filipino general was already covering for us. I was going to correct it, but Dave Mobley, our liaison at the embassy, told me to just let it go as it would cause more of a stir to retract the supposed apology.

At one point, the Early Bird [publication] back in the states was printing articles from one of the communist publications in the Philippines. They had made up a story about how our JTF was placed under the command and control of the GOP. It wasn’t true, but I got a call from a joint staff person at the Pentagon asking me how it was going to work so they could answer questions at a meeting. I told them it wasn’t true and they should tell the Early Bird folks to stop printing things from that source. Later on, I confronted the reporter from that publication and offered her a chance to have lunch then learn and print the truth. In exchange, she would have to stop making things up in order to file stories.

The mission was authorized for six months, but continued after the rescue of the hostages. What was the continuing mission?

It didn’t end with the rescue of Mrs. Burnham. Her husband was killed during the rescue, which was a real tragedy. There was still an insurgency and the people of the Philippines were still threatened. The first exercise name was Balikatan, meaning “shoulder to shoulder.” We considered the mission to be OEF-Philippines, but for political reasons, it was an exercise to the Filipinos. It was scheduled to end in July and the Burnham rescue attempt was in June. The Filipinos evaluated the results of the first six months and they decided that the effort was doing good U

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ABOVE: Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

meets with then-Brig. Gen. Donald C. Wurster, commander, Joint

Task Force 510, at Edwin Andrews Air Base in Zamboanga. Myers was

During his visit to the Philippines, he toured JTF 510 Operations in

Zamboanga and on the island of Basilan, where American forces

were assisting and advising the armed forces of the Philippines in

their ongoing operations against terrorist forces. OPPOSITE: A Special

Forces soldier conducts security assistance training for members of

the Philippine army’s 1st Infantry (TABAK) Division on March 20, 2003.


OEF-P

things, getting good results, and that it should continue. The second exercise then resulted from a Filipino request.

How did you convince the folks in Washington to allow all these things to happen without demanding results? At this time, the Department of Defense and the National Command Authority were notorious for demanding results quickly, so how did you convince them to allow your efforts time to work?

They were focused elsewhere. The War on Terror was in Afghanistan, then in Iraq as far as they were concerned, and that’s where they were looking. We weren’t involved in regime change – in fact the opposite of that. Early on, we also had some crucial visits from the senators from Hawaii and Alaska, who asked us what we needed and gained an understanding of the need to spend some Title 10 money on the projects and to follow it up with some humanitarian assistance money. Later on, DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz] and Gen. [George W.] Casey, the joint staff J5 [deputy director of strategic plans and policy] at the time, visited and under-stood what the Green Berets under Frido were doing and expanded our authorities to deal with things there as well. In the summer of 2002, Robert Kaplan, author of Imperial Grunts, came to visit. He spent a good bit of time looking at things and he talked on the phone with someone in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] who said that OEF-P

wasn’t killing many terrorists. Kaplan said something to the effect that we were winning, so what we were doing should get some attention.

LT. GEN. DAVID P. FRIDOVICH, USA (RET.)

Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF (Ret.): What would you say were the primary reasons for success of OEF-P?

Lt. Gen. David Fridovich, USA (Ret.): One of the big take-aways is that we succeeded, in part, because of all the other things which were going on in the world at the time. We were granted authorities and clearances which might not have come as easily in other times.

What was the balance of the mission between hostage rescue of the Burnhams, the missionary couple held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the mission of building the capacity of the Filipino military to conduct counterinsurgency operations on its own?

When we began, I’m sure that if you asked that question separately to Don Wurster and to me, you’d get very different answers as to the emphasis on the rescue mission from him and the focus on the Filipinos from me. I believe that our primary mission was to help the Filipinos develop their own capabilities, but hostage rescue was the mission that got us there and enabled pursuit of the longer-term mission.D

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Adm. [Dennis] Blair [U.S. Pacific Command commander at the time] was doubtful of the Filipino military and of the Filipino government as a strategic partner. We had performed training missions prior to 9/11 with the Filipino Light Reaction Company, a counterterrorist unit. The admiral was concerned that equipment which had been provided by FMF [foreign military finance] money had been pretty much worn out, was poorly maintained, and not taken care of generally. We were now going into the mostly Catholic Philippine Islands to root out an insurgency in a Muslim area of Muslim extremists. It was a situation which had grown up in the country during a time of little American and Filipino contact.

Our relationship and training missions with the Filipinos had ceased with the eruption of Mount Pinatubo … and had not restarted until the year 2000. By the time we arrived in 2000, the FMF-provided funds and equipment were depleted, no work at all had been done on advancing training or doctrine, and things had stagnated. We also began the relationship again from scratch and with some distrust on each side. That we had begun before 9/11 helped us a great deal. The Filipinos seemed to think that they only needed some new equipment and did not want us. My feeling was that they needed us and our thinking and approach more than they needed our stuff.

How important was the concept of “Global Scouts” and having Green Berets who already had some expertise in Filipino culture and language?

I can’t stress enough how important that is to such an effort. I was a team leader and a young captain right out of the Q course [qualification course] when the 1st SF Group

was reactivated. My company commander was Joe Rozek [now a retired colonel], who taught all of us so much about learning the culture and knowing the people of the area we were to orient ourselves toward. My team was primary for the Philippines and secondary to Thailand. I made my first trip into the Philippines within the first six months of joining 1st Group and was in country at least twice a year for about five years. That was when we still had bases in the country – Clark Air Base and the naval base [Naval Station Subic Bay] – and before Mount Pinatubo blew up and we left the PI [Philippine Islands].

Back to OEF-Philippines, what actions or events most contributed to success?

We made a decision from the start that it would be impor-tant to protect the sovereignty of the Filipinos. We found them to be suspicious of our motives even before 9/11, and we had only begun to work with them when the attacks happened in the United States. So, from the first, we were focused on convincing the Filipinos that they were equal partners with us in decision-making and developing plans.

Lt. Gen. David P. Fridovich, then a major general and commander

Eugenio Cedo, commander, Western Mindanao Command,

on May 5, 2007, in Zamboanga during a trip to the region.


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We had political and legal constraints coming from the U.S. and from the Filipinos. I told my guys, “These things are never an excuse not to succeed.” We had to find ways to overcome any problem and to succeed. No excuses.

We supported the Filipino constitu-tion in tangible ways. For instance, when we were first setting up the ISB [intermediate staging base] in Kadena and the FSB [forward support battalion] in Zamboanga, we had a meeting with a couple of Filipino flag officers, a one-star and a two-star. I was a colonel at the time and I had to show the proper respect as these two gentlemen gave me some very strong orders about how we were to call the operation an “exer-cise.” As it turned out, we read their constitution and it expressly limited foreign military to training exercises inside their territory. We defined our deployment as a training exercise in that case as our primary purpose was to provide training, seen from the Filipino viewpoint.

We had a much more substantive disagreement about a requirement for two weeks of cultural training before deploying into Basilan Island, the FOB [forward operating base] and home of the ASG. On this one, I argued that we were deploying seasoned Special Forces soldiers, not young soldiers on their first assignment. All of our soldiers had

time in the Philippines before, most had language skills, and certainly all were attuned to the need to respect Filipino culture. I told them that “a lot of good things will happen because we’re here, but none of that will happen if you stop this deployment.” We settled on a four-hour training session.

Much of what we did was negoti-ated at each stage. It was important to respect the Filipinos and move things at their pace, giving them the ability to control what was happening in their country – both to provide them say-so on what we were doing and to provide them with the ability to control their territory by taking it back from insurgents.

During this mission, what did you do that you did not expect to do during planning and pre-deploy-ment? I’ve heard about building roads and boat docks, for instance. Were those things part of the plan you wrote before the deployment?

The deployment did evolve based on what we learned. One of the most important things happened when we first went to Basilan along with our Filipino military counterparts. We went into the villages and asked the people what was needed, what they wanted to see from their government. We expected to gain ideas from the people.

An Army Special Forces medic passes out toothpaste and toothbrushes to

Philippine children during a local government-organized dental awareness

and care initiative Feb. 22, 2010, in Marawi, Philippines. Dentists saw more

than 70 patients and gave out more than 500 toothbrushes.


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I was surprised to hear one village elder who said, “No one from my govern-ment has ever asked us what we need before. This is the first time this has ever happened.” It was instructive to me that we could have a great impact.

From these interviews, we saw the need for the people to see their government in action for their benefit. Some of our security projects were to build roads to improve access, or to build boat docks to improve coastal patrolling. These things had ancillary benefits to the local economy. We also contracted for local labor. All these things which were done were done so as to enhance the Philippine govern-ment’s image with its people and to enhance the local economy. As we were a team with the Filipino military, we were careful to have these projects come to the people from their national military and not so much from the U.S.

Whereas we did not set out to express and execute a population-centric strategy as we were to concentrate on training the Filipino military, it evolved into a population-centric mission. We knew it was the people who mattered, and victory truly depended on them coming to see their government as legitimate and on their decision to support it. The process of learning how to separate the people from the insurgents made the mission become population-centric. This was something we learned together with the Filipino military.

We had plenty of visitors along the way. DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz visited. We ensured the visitors from Washington understood … the actions we planned and for which we requested funding, so that when we asked for resources the folks back there saw how it made sense to do what we wanted.

Much later, after the death of the Abu Sayyaf leader and after the people of Basilan had given us a great deal of help, the Filipino four-star told me, “The greatest thing you taught us is that we should treat all of our people like all are our people.” He was Gen. Roy Cimatu.

Gen. Cimatu was also the man in charge when I went to the PI to do the original assessment right after 9/11. I was there with a small team to do that assessment from mid-October until the 4th of November of 2001. I remember out-briefing our assessment with the Filipinos. It was a frosty reception in that room from all corners, but when we finished, Gen. Cimatu said to me, “Colonel, we will see you again, soon.” After that, I went back to Hawaii to brief the assessment to PACOM and soon after we were given the mission to go to the PI to mount a classic UW [unconventional warfare] mission to build partner capacity for counterinsurgency and the ‘Indirect Approach.’

I have to emphasize that the mission continues today, and should continue. It was not just a capture/kill mission. We made commitments to the Filipino military and to the Filipino people. It continues to be important that we main-tain our commitments and keep our promises. When Karen Hughes of the State Department visited and I was now the SOCPAC commander and a two-star [major general], she asked if the mission was over and ending if we killed or

captured five of the top Abu Sayyaf people. I said no, not at all. Our mission would continue over the long term until the Filipinos were a capable and self-sufficient member of the coalition against extremist/terrorist groups. It’s a long-term thing based on a long-term conflict of ideologies and not dependent on the elimination of a few people.

JSOTF-P AND 1ST SFG COMMANDER COL. FRAN BEAUDETTE, USA

Maj. Gen. Richard Comer, USAF (Ret.): What is the current relationship with the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) to its people in outlying islands where the insurgency is stronger?

JSOTF-P Commander Col. Fran Beaudette, USA: The overarching strategy for the GRP is the Internal Peace and Security Plan [IPSP], where they are evolving from a military centric strategy to what they themselves describe as a “whole-of-nation” approach. The Internal Peace and Security Plan is the way ahead for the Filipino people to join together to pursue peace and security for the future of the entire country. Their focus is on winning the peace rather than defeating the enemy. It involves all stakeholders in the pursuit of internal peace and guided by adherence to human rights, international humanitarian law, and the rule of law.

How do you help the GRP combat the insurgency today?The foreign internal defense mission is more complex than

just training, advising, and assisting the Philippine military. In support of the GRP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan, JSOTF-P works with the U.S. Embassy country team, NGOs, Barangay leaders, religious authorities, interagency part-ners, and more to bolster the U.S.’s three-pronged approach of focusing on diplomacy, development, and defense.

Hundreds of government leaders, representatives from the armed forces of the

Philippines, and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines gathered for the

opening of a new road in Barangay (community) Kandayok Nov. 28, 2009.


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While the Philippine government and its people are the primary catalysts behind the AFP’s [Armed Forces of the Philippines] successes, JSOTF-P’s assistance to the AFP has made a visible impact in the Southern Philippines. Ten years ago, JI [Jemaah Islamiyah] and ASG controlled vast territories in the southern region.

Today, we know of no international terrorist attacks linked to the Philippines since 2003, and the severity and frequency of attacks within the Philippines has been rela-tively low. JI and ASG are regionally contained lawless elements that control little territory and are primarily engaging in criminal activity. They are not as strongly tied to ideological goals or international terrorist groups.

What do you consider absolutely critical to the mission? The relationships with our partners, cultivated over time, builds trust and confidence in each other’s ability to support all aspects of the campaign. Our successes are their successes.

Millions of dollars, thousands of subject-matter expert exchanges, veterinarian and medical civic action programs, and civil engineering projects have made a difference ... Not just for the access and development of the Philippine Security Forces, but for the men, women, and children in the villages, barangays, towns, and outlying locations. Their lives are better today because of the measurable progress of the AFP and PNP [Philippine National Police]. They are truly the protectors of the population.

How well engaged is JSOTF-P, at this time, at each level of war: tactical, operational, and strategic? How so?

JSOTF-P continues to train, advise, and assist the AFP and PNP in Mindanao, Basilan, and Sulu to support

peace and development. Our close partnership with the Philippine Security Forces (AFP and PNP), allows us to advise and assist their efforts where they are located – on Philippine government bases, compounds, and outposts in jungle, vi l lage, and urban areas. At the strategic level, we maintain continuous engagement with joint and unified HQ’s counterparts ranging from ops and intel to civil military operations. Our focus is to sustain the AFP counterterrorism capability to maintain their secu-rity advantage, and support, within the boundaries of the Visiting Forces Agreement, the AFP and PNP as they continue to degrade, disrupt, and defeat transnational terrorists’ threats. We will continue to play our role in the U.S. interagency approach as reliable strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region. We’ll do this through continued assistance, exercises, and specialized training events, as we’ve accomplished throughout our long history of mutual defense. We remain committed to our alliance with the government of the Philippines and our close and valued partnership with the Filipino people.

U.S. Army Capt. Charlie Claypool (center), team leader for Civil Affairs

team 735 and assigned to Joint Special Operations Task Force-

Philippines, assists Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Rear Adm.

Alexander P. Pama, commander Naval Forces Western Mindanao, and

Brig. Gen. Eugenio N. Clemen, commander 1st Marine Brigade, in a

ground-breaking ceremony for the Tipo-Tipo-Sungkayot-Matata road

construction project in the Barangay Bohe Pahu. The AFP’s 1st Naval

Construction Brigade was building the bridge with materials provided by

JSOTF-P. The road will facilitate access to Basilan’s southeast coastline,

enabling residents to move south and transport goods and services.

National Guard painting by Keith Rocco140 www.defensemedianetwork.com

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN 10 YEARS LATER

OEF-A

OEF-A

The Battle of Roberts Ridge BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN

"The Battle of Takur Ghar" by Keith Rocco. Operation Enduring Freedom, the military action against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, was the catalyst for the largest mobilization of Air National Guard personnel since the Korean War. It also marked the

air combat controllers, were used to support joint ground combat operations. As part of Enduring Freedom, in March 2002 a joint military operation named "Anaconda" was mounted in Paktia province to surround and defeat Taliban forces hiding in the area.

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OEF-A

On March 2, 2002, Operation Anaconda, the largest set piece battle in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), was launched. Its objective was the destruction of the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist bands that had taken refuge in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in Paktia province, Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border. Though it ended successfully, Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander of CENTCOM in 2002, later wrote in his autobiography, American Soldier, that the operation’s plan “didn’t survive first contact with the enemy.” When Maj. Gen. Franklin Hagenbeck, commander of Task Force Mountain, who oversaw the operation, realized that battlefield conditions threatened to tip the initiative in the enemy’s favor, he ordered two SEAL teams inserted – one on a high ridge on the north side of the valley and another at Takur Ghar (High Mountain), a mountain on the valley’s southeast border, where they would set up observation posts, identify enemy positions and movement, and direct air strikes. The mission inserting the SEAL team at Takur Ghar resulted in the bloodiest action of the operation: the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

The Shah-i-Kot (Place of the King) has historically been a guerrilla haven and bastion. A small valley with a base eleva-tion of 7,500 feet and limited access, the mountain ridges that border it contain countless caves, crevasses, and other natural features that make it a defender’s dream and an attacker’s nightmare. Twice in the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, the Red Army launched major offensives against the mujahedeen hiding there. Both times Soviet troops were driven out in defeat. Would American forces, equipped with the latest technology

and advanced weapon systems succeed where the Red Army had failed? So far, it had. The unprecedented use of U.S. special operations forces (SOF), assisted by special operations troops from other nations, U.S. Air Force and Navy air assets, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance Afghan militia, had successfully overthrown the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan within weeks of the launch of OEF-A in October 2001. The focus had since shifted to the more difficult and demanding hunt-down of the surviving Taliban remnants and al Qaeda terrorists.

In January 2002, intelligence reports indicated that the two groups were marshaling forces in the Shah-i-Kot. Attempts to gather hard information about the terrorists were hampered by the valley’s inaccessibility, rugged terrain, and the enemy’s skill in camouflaging its sites. This resulted in a paucity of facts that led to an intelligence estimate overly dependent on guesswork and recent past experience. The estimate deter-mined that the valley contained 200 to 300 lightly armed, demoralized terrorists living among the 800 to 1,000 Afghan civilians in the valley’s four villages. The belief was that after a brief battle, the terrorists would cut and run, or surrender.

The plan to eliminate the enemy in Shah-i-Kot was called Operation Anaconda, a deliberate reference to the constrictor that coils its body around its victim before crushing it. As originally drafted, Anaconda was to have several concentric outer rings composed of U.S. SOF, friendly Afghan militia, and special operations personnel – from Australia, England, and other nations – who would surround the valley. Once Shah-i-Kot had been isolated, the Afghan militia would advance into the valley as a “hammer” that would drive the Taliban and al U

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Strategic map for U.S. Army Operation Anaconda. The area outlined in blue is the Shah-i-Kot Valley, about 100 hundred miles south of Kabul, Afghanistan, near the Pakistani border.


Qaeda into the “anvil” composed of entrenched American forces. The plan anticipated the opera-tion would take three days, with the heaviest fighting occurring on the first day. As it turned out, Anaconda lasted 17 days.

The plan began falling apart when the inadequately trained and inexperienced local Afghan militia, demoralized by a friendly fire incident, inadequate bombing of al Qaeda positions, and stiffer-than-expected opposition, stopped fighting and returned to its base within hours after the battle had started. It was now up to the American troops to be both hammer and anvil against an enemy that they had discovered was stronger, better armed than predicted, and determined to fight it out.

In the early morning hours of March 4, 2002, Chief Warrant Officer Al Mack, piloting Razor 03, an MH-47E Chinook of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) – the Night Stalkers – lifted off from his forward base at Gardez. In the cabin behind him were members of Mako 30 – a team of six Navy SEALs – and Air Force Combat Controller Tech. Sgt. John Chapman.

Razor 03 was late. Mack’s orders originally called for him to insert Mako 30 at the offset landing zone near Takur Ghar hours before, but maintenance problems with the original helicopter assigned to the mission and a B-52 bombing mission near Takur Ghar that interfered with the insertion had delayed him. As the on-scene commander, Mack, a 16-year veteran, had the authority to abort the mission and reschedule it for the following night. But the hard fighting in the valley had come as a nasty surprise and it was critical for the observation post to be up and running as quickly as possible. Mack decided he would take Mako 30 in, however there would be a change of plans. Instead of touching down at the offset landing zone and Mako 30 walking to its objective, in order to complete the mission before dawn, Mack would insert Mako 30 on the summit of Takur Ghar itself.

CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT: Tech. Sgt. John “Chappy” Chapman in theater. Chapman was killed on Takur Ghar.

From left to right, Tech. Sgt. Keary Miller, Senior Airman Jason Cunningham, and Staff Sgt. Gabe Brown about three weeks before the battle. Behind them is an MH-47E, the same type of helicopter that took them to Takur Ghar. Staff Sgt. Kevin Vance, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller, engaged the enemy with his M4 carbine and worked with Army Capt. Nate Self and Staff Sgt. Gabe Brown to bring close air support into the battle. Vance made critical recommendations on how close to bring in the air strikes. Razor 01, an MH-47E Chinook helicopter, sits atop Takur Ghar, the site of a battle between U.S. special operations forces and al Qaeda

U.S. Navy SEAL (SEa, Air, Land) Aviation Boatswain’s

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OEF-A

At 10,469 feet, Takur Ghar is the tallest mountain bordering the Shah-i-Kot. Its commanding view of the southern half of the valley made it a perfect location for an observation post. As Mack began his approach, he requested that the patrolling C-130 gunship sweep the summit prior to the insertion. A few minutes later, the gunship’s pilot was back on the radio saying that he had done so and that the site looked clear. Then the pilot said he had to leave and support “troops in contact.” Razor 03 would do the insertion with only its electric-powered mini-guns for defense.

As Mack flared the Chinook and prepared to land, he saw at his 1 o’clock position an unmanned Russian DShK anti-aircraft machine gun. As the helicopter began its vertical descent, Mako 30 prepared to deploy. Suddenly the helicopter gunners began calling out warnings – they saw people and other signs of human activity. The next thing everyone knew, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) shot past the Chinook. It was followed a moment later by a second RPG that ripped through the helicopter’s fuselage and exploded, rendering the mini-guns useless. Now a gigantic, hovering, defenseless bull’s-eye, Razor 03’s fuselage was perforated with automatic weapon and machine gun fire.

The Chinook slewed in the air as Mack fought to keep the crippled helicopter airborne and fly it out of harm’s way. Sgt. Dan Madden, the rear right ramp gunner and crew chief, tried to raise the ramp that had been lowered in anticipation of touchdown, but the shot-up hydraulics, drained of fluid, refused to respond.

Suddenly the Chinook lurched and Petty Officer 1st Class Neil C. Roberts, a 12-year veteran, lost footing and started sliding down the metal ramp made slippery by spilled hydraulic fluid. Madden, secured to the heli-copter by a flexible harness, managed to grab the SEAL by a boot, but when the Chinook violently shuddered, the crew chief lost his grip. Roberts, carrying an M249 machine gun and 80-pound pack and weighing a total of about 300 pounds, fell 10 feet before landing on his back in the snow.

When Mack heard what had happened, he tried to guide the helicopter back to rescue Roberts, but with control fading fast, he had to abandon that effort. Mack managed to crash-land Razor 03 in the valley about 4 miles away from Takur Ghar.

Everyone who was not injured in the bone-jarring landing rushed out and formed a defensive perimeter. Thirty to 45 minutes later, Razor 04, after having inserted its SEAL observation team and alerted to Razor 03’s plight, arrived with the rest of Mako 30.

After a quick discussion, the group decided that Razor 04 would take Mako 30 up to the summit, rescue Roberts, and pick up the Razor 03 crew on the return leg. But recon-naissance from an Orion P-3 countermanded that plan. An enemy force of about 40 was rapidly approaching. The combination of helicopter weight limits and thin atmo-sphere meant that Razor 04 had to take everyone back to Gardez, drop off the Razor 03 crew, and then return with U

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A U.S. Army MH-47 Chinook helicopter, assigned to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), takes off as a special operations soldier from Poland provides security and overwatch during fast-rope insertion/exertion system training in Kovachevo, Croatia, as part of the Jackal Stone 2009 exercise. The Chinook has become the workhorse helicopter in Afghanistan, but is a big target.

“ONE OF THE TEAM GUYS IS ON THE LZ!”– Sgt. Dan Madden, crew chief, Razor 03


OEF-A

Mako 30 to Takur Ghar. Razor 04 flew as fast as it could, but each minute felt like an eternity for everyone aboard.

During Razor 04’s transit, an AC-130 gunship arrived to reconnoiter and identified what the crew thought was Robert’s body leaning against a tree. But they couldn’t deter-mine if he was alive or dead. Not long after that, a Predator drone carrying two Hellfire missiles took position above Takur Ghar. By the time Razor 04 returned to the mountain, every headquarters on the net from Bagram in Afghanistan to the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Florida was monitoring the visual feed.

At 0458, Razor 04 began its final approach. When the Chinook was about 40 feet above the ground, the pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Jason Friel, saw the DShK about 75 feet away at his 11 o’clock position take aim. Ignoring the stream of heavy machine gun fire striking his helicopter, Friel dropped the Chinook into a protecting swale near the summit. The ramp went down, Mako 30 dashed out, and Razor 04 raised its ramp and banked out of range. Friel remained nearby only a few minutes. Low on fuel, he flew Razor 04 back to Gardez, where it was declared non-mission capable.

Meanwhile, Mako 30 found itself pinned down, its air controller, Tech. Sgt. John “Chappy” Chapman, dead. The rescuers were now themselves in need of rescue.

As Mako 30 fought for its life, air assets were assigned for CAS – close air support. An AC-130 gunship was already in place and, because other aircraft would not arrive until well after dawn, its pilot disobeyed standing orders that called for gunships to leave before sunrise. For 30 minutes in the early morning light, the gunship fired on enemy positions before breaking away.

Then, an hour and 15 minutes after Mako 30 had landed, the cavalry, in the form of two Chinooks, Razor 01 and 02, containing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of 35 Rangers led by Capt. Nate Self, arrived. Razor 01, carrying “Chalk 1,” composed of 10 Rangers and four Air Force controllers, was the first to go in. As its pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Greg Calvert, made his final approach, it appeared to him that the gunship had done its job well – he saw no sign of the enemy. But, like Razor 03 and 04, just as he was about to land, the well-camouflaged enemy sprung its ambush. Machine gun fire began stitching the helicopter. Sgt. Phil Svitak, the right forward mini-gunner, managed to fire a couple of bursts before he fell, mortally wounded. An RPG round exploded in the right engine, wrecking it. Plummeting at 500 feet per minute, Calvert somehow landed the heavily damaged Chinook in a natural bowl just below the summit.

Concentrated fire from every direction and at point-blank range rained on the helicopter, igniting its insulation and wounding Calvert and his co-pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Chuck Gant. While some of Razor 01’s crew battled the flames, the Rangers and Air Force controllers rushed out the rear of the helicopter. Ranger Spc. Marc A. Anderson never made it. Pfc. Matthew A. Commons and Sgt. Bradley S. Crose were cut down on the ramp.

As soon as the men of Chalk 1 were outside the helicopter, they spread out, found whatever cover they could, and began returning fire at a bunker located at the top of the 55-degree slope and other enemy positions.

Meanwhile, combat controller Staff Sgt. Gabe Brown found a shallow defilade behind the helicopter. There he set up his SATCOM radio. With bullets whizzing above and around his head, he began calling for help. Moments later he announced

he had two F-16 fighters armed with guns and bombs. The decision was to go with guns first.

Brown issued instructions to the two F-16s, call signs Clash 71 and Clash 72. With about 100 lateral feet separating the combatants, the F-16s’ strafing runs would be closer than danger-close. After an orienting dry run, Clash 72 roared in cleared hot and a stream of 250 rounds of 20 mm tore up the summit. In a second pass, Clash 72 emptied its guns. Flying lower, Clash 71 repeated the process. They then dropped three bombs before receiving orders to return to base.

Now it was the Predator’s turn. Guided by laser pointers aimed at the bunker, the Predator fired both its Hellfire missiles. The first missed, the second didn’t. Self imme-diately attempted an assault, but halfway up the slope, he aborted the attack, deciding he needed reinforcements from Chalk 2.

When Razor 02 lost contact with Razor 01, it returned to Gardez to wait for further orders. Almost two and a half hours after Razor 01 had come under attack, Razor 02 arrived and inserted the 10 members of Chalk 2 at a landing site about 2,000 feet below Chalk 1’s position. As Chalk 2 began its ascent, the men saw above and off to their right Mako 30 descending with its wounded. The SEAL with Chalk 2 left to assist his fellow SEALs. Ongoing communica-tions problems and the fog of war had combined to prevent the Rangers and SEALs from coordinating their efforts. In fact, the SEAL presence came as a surprise to the men of Chalk 2. The result was an ad hoc decision by both groups that it was more practical for the two forces to continue operating independently.

Two and a half hours after they had landed, the men of Chalk 2 linked up with Chalk 1. With Chalk 2 providing cover, at 10:45 a.m., Self ordered an assault of the summit. Within 15 minutes, the Rangers had overrun the enemy positions and began securing the area. During their search, they found the bodies of Roberts and Chapman. The Rangers had barely completed their search when the enemy launched a powerful counterattack. A half-hour later, after Navy F/A-18s had dropped bombs on the enemy positions, the counterattack was over. But the Rangers had to deal with a new crisis. Two of their men, squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner Spc. Christopher M. Cunningham and medic Sgt. 1st Class Cory Lamoreaux, were seriously wounded. As the other medics fought to keep them alive, repeated calls were transmitted throughout the day to headquarters requesting, demanding, finally pleading for a medevac. But with two helicopters already shot down, a fluid tactical situation, and insufficient air assets avail-able for medevac escort, the commanders at headquar-ters decided the summit of Takur Ghar was too hot for a daylight extraction of the seriously wounded. At 6:10 p.m., as the sun began to set, Cunningham died from his wounds. About two hours later, four helicopters, three for Chalks 1 and 2 and one for Mako 30 in the valley, arrived to carry everyone, living and dead, away. The 17-hour Battle for Roberts Ridge was over.

The Americans had suffered seven dead and four wounded, the enemy an estimated 200 dead and an unknown number wounded. Hindsight is always 20/20, and an after-action review was able to identify communications and command problems that dogged the effort from the very beginning. The result was a revision of how such operations would be conducted in the future.


In the 50 years of their existence, the SEALs have gone from being a unit unknown outside the military to one squarely in the international spotlight. The irony is that men who are members of the SEAL community do not seek to call attention to themselves. But their high-risk/high-reward missions also contain high drama, and that has made them world famous.

SEAL heritage has its roots in World War II with four units: the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders, who conducted amphibious reconnaissance and commando operations in Europe and the South Pacific; the Naval Combat Demolition Units (NCDU), who were assault demolitions experts and cleared the beachheads for Operations Overlord

and Dragoon; maritime operators of the Office of Strategic Services; and prob-ably the most widely known group, the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), who were combat swimmers who conducted hydrographic recon-naissance and pre-landing beachhead obstacle demolition in the Pacific.

In the postwar downsizing that affected all military branches, only the UDTs survived – barely. And even their value was questioned. UDT exis-tence was saved by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In addition to reaffirming the crucial contribution UDTs provide to amphibious opera-tions, the Korean War also revealed the need to expand UDT capability. In the mid- to late 1950s, studies were begun ISEALs from SEAL Delivery

Vehicle Team (SDVT) 1 swim back to the guided-missile submarine USS Michigan (SSGN 727) during an exercise

SEAL Delivery Vehicle operations in the South

exercises educate operators and divers on the techniques and procedures related to the delivery vehicle

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to identify what those capabilities should be and what would be needed to accomplish these new goals. In order to expedite the process, the ranks of the new unit, named SEAL for SEa, Air, and Land, would initially be composed of UDT members. By the time two SEAL teams were authorized in January 1962, enough of the doctrine, training regimen, and material requirements were in place so that SEAL Team ONE, based in Coronado, Calif., and SEAL Team TWO, based in Little Creek, Va., were able to become fully operational within days of authorization.

But nobody outside of a select few on the “need to know” list was aware of the SEALs. The SEALs would finally “go public” in 1967, when television

“I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity. My nation expects me to be physically harder and mentally stronger than my enemies. If knocked down, I will get back up, every time. I will draw on every remaining ounce of strength to protect my teammates and to accomplish our mission. I am never out of the fight.” – Excerpt from the SEAL creed

50 YEARS OF THE U.S. NAVY SEALS BY DWIGHT JON ZIMMERMAN


Why Choose Campbell? Convenience: On Post Classrooms NO Application Fees or Placement Tests We accept all forms of military transcripts as well as CLEPs and DSSTs Member of SOC: Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges We offer Army ROTC program We have over 15 degree specializations to choose from including a Bachelor of Health Science degree We are a private, local university who caters to lives of the working individual, military family and veterans. Full time Veterans Affairs representative on site. National Testing Center is located at our Pope Office

CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY FORT BRAGG/POPE AIR

FIELD‘For YOUR educational needs’

For more information please contact one of our two offices on post!

Fort Bragg Office: Bldg 2-1105, Stack B 2nd Floor PH:910.436.3242/3243

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documentaries and newspaper arti-cles about them and their missions were approved.

At first, SEAL teams used a lot of equipment, weapons, and transport developed for UDTs. But because their scope of operations was broader than that of the UDTs, they began to design and purchase an inventory suited to their specific needs. This included specialized underwater breathing apparatuses, surface and subsurface transport vehicles, parachutes, and other systems. Though some SEALs had participated in parts of Operation Mongoose against Cuba, it was in Vietnam that SEALs came into their own.

SEAL operations in Vietnam came about as a result of findings made by Lt. David Del Giudice and Ensign Jon Stockton, who visited MAAG-V (Military Advisory Assistance Group-Vietnam, the predecessor to Military Assistance Command Vietnam-MACV)

in order to establish liaison with the command and to identify requirements for SEAL involvement in country. Upon their return to the states, Del Giudice and Stockton made a series of presen-tations to their superiors, and in March 1962, SEAL Team ONE personnel began arriving in South Vietnam. At this stage of the conflict, the role of SEALs was that of training and advising their South Vietnam military counterparts, which they did from 1962 to 1964 as part of guerrilla operations targeting sites in North Vietnam, part of Operation Plan 34A.

Following the Tonkin Gulf incident that resulted in the escalation of American military operations in the region, SEALs were administratively transferred to the joint unconventional warfare task force called U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (USMACV SOG). As its name suggests, it was responsible

for all covert and special operations missions in the theater. SEAL opera-tions dramatically increased and spread throughout the country. They came to include reconnais-sance patrols, direct action missions, Operation Bright Light POW rescue missions, Phoenix Program missions against Viet Cong cadres, and more.

As the months passed, SEAL missions began shifting south to the Rung Sat Special Zone just 7 miles south of the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City), a longtime communist stronghold.

On Oct. 28, 1965, a mortar barrage killed Cmdr. Robert J. Fay, making him the first SEAL to die in Vietnam. On Aug. 19, 1966, Radarman 2nd Class Billy Machen was killed on a mission in the Rung Sat, the first to die in a combat mission. Eventually 46 SEALs would give their lives in Vietnam. Aggressive patrolling by SEALs in the Rung Sat

CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT: SEAL Team TWO shown as they prepare for possible action during the Cuban missile crisis. Two U.S. Navy SEALs pause during Operation Crimson Tide, a planned operation in Vinh Binh province 67 miles southwest of Saigon, Vietnam, December 1967. Members of U.S. Navy SEAL Team TWO move down the Bassac River in a SEAL Team Assault Boat (STAB) during operations along the river south of Saigon in November 1967.

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resulted in a dramatic decrease in communist Viet Cong guerrilla activity. That success resulted in the request for more SEAL teams, particularly in the Mekong Delta, another region that was a longtime communist strong-hold. The demand for SEALs eventu-ally outstripped supply capabilities from SEAL Team ONE, and by 1967, members of SEAL Team TWO were conducting missions in South Vietnam.

SEALs became so effective that the Viet Cong called them “The Men with Green Faces” out of respect, and posted cash bounties for the killing of a SEAL. Vice Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Vietnam and the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam, was so impressed that he wanted “hundreds” of SEALs in Vietnam. By the time the war ended, given the relatively small number of personnel stationed in the country, the SEALs were one of the most highly decorated units in the war, with members receiving three Medals of Honor, two Navy Crosses, 42 Silver Stars, 402 Bronze Stars, two Legions of Merit, 352 Navy Commendation Medals, and three Presidential Unit Citations.

Following the end of the Vietnam War and another drawdown of the military, SEALs survived an adminis-trative attempt to budget them out of existence thanks to the fact that their friend Zumwalt had become Chief of Naval Operations.

Operation Eagle Claw, the 1979 failed rescue attempt of American

hostages in Tehran, Iran, set the stage for another important event in SEAL history: the creation of SEAL Team SIX, founded on Oct. 1, 1980.

The driving force behind the creation of SEAL Team SIX was Cmdr. Richard Marcinko, a polarizing figure in the community. Because it was designed to operate as a larger assault unit (30 to 40 men) than typical SEAL teams (platoon-sized or smaller), it greatly expanded SEAL mission capability and became the maritime component to the national mission force that conducts the majority of direct-action raids to kill or capture terrorists, insurgents, and pirates.

The creation of the SEALs did not automatically end the existence of UDTs, and for two decades the two units co-existed. But by the early 1980s, the distinction between the two groups had become so blurred that, in 1983, the parent organization was incorporated into its offspring unit when the four UDT teams were formally integrated into the SEALs.

The integration came just in time, because the SEALs needed the addi-tional manpower. Two teams, SEAL Teams FOUR and SIX, were going to be an important element in Operation Urgent Fury, the lash-up campaign to free American student hostages on the Caribbean island of Grenada.

A joint operation launched at the end of October 1983 under the overall command of the Navy, Operation Urgent Fury went from drawing board to troops on the beach in 10 days. The U

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SEAL teams were tasked with four missions: pre-assault reconnaissance of the Point Salines airfield; pre-assault beach reconnaissance near Pearls Airport; the capture of the Beauséjour radio station; and the rescue of the British Governor General Sir Paul Scoon and seizure and defense of his residence, Government House. Because insufficient time was available to train for all the missions, the Point Salines mission was a failure that resulted in the deaths of four members of SEAL Team SIX. Fortunately, all the other missions ended successfully, as did the operation itself. Operation Urgent Fury exposed weaknesses in the existing joint command structure with regard to use of special operations units. That deficiency became the basis for the next major chapter in special opera-tions, and thus SEAL, history: Special Operations Command – SOCOM.

In 1987, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Defense Reform Act of 1986, more commonly known as Goldwater-Nichols after sponsors Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Congressman William Nichols of Alabama. It was the most significant piece of legislation affecting the mili-tary since the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols established the framework for joint commands and their implementation. A year later, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, named after sponsors Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia and William Cohen of Maine, completed the revision of the military command structure by creating U.S. Special Operations Command, with its own funding and a four-star billet. This

placing of SOCOM on the same level as the other branches in effect created a “fifth service” within the Department of Defense. Administratively, the maritime component of SOCOM was now Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM).

It turned out to be a prescient move fortuitously timed.

NAVSPECWARCOM’s first combat test in asymmetric warfare, which has since been called “the new normal” in military operations, came in July 1987 with Operations Earnest Will and Prime Chance. By this time the Iran-Iraq War was in its seventh year and military operations in the Persian Gulf by the two belligerents were seriously threatening freedom of navigation, particularly for oil tankers.

Iran was the most important threat, and to counter its asymmetric warfare activities, which included patrol boat attacks and extensive mine laying, two Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Task Units, which included SEALs, explo-sive ordnance disposal teams, and helicopters from Task Force 160 (later the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment [SOAR] – the Night Stalkers). Operating from leased oil barges, the teams quickly began turning the tables on the Iranians, capturing and destroying mine-laying boats and the oil platforms that were being used as

observation and operations bases. When Operation Prime Chance concluded in June 1989, Iranian threats to naviga-tion had ceased. Six months later, SEALs were back in action again, this time on the other side of the world, in Panama.

When relations between the United States and Panama deteriorated to the point where American strategic inter-ests and the security of the Panama Canal were threatened, President George H.W. Bush authorized Operation Just Cause, launched on Dec. 20, 1989.

Personnel from SEAL Teams TWO and FOUR were organized into Task Force White. TF White was further divided into four task units. Two task units were assigned to secure the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean entrances to the canal. A third task unit was directed to seize or destroy any boat in Balboa Harbor that Panamanian dictator Gen. Manuel Noriega might try to use to escape. And the fourth task unit was given a similar mission at Paitilla Airfield where Noriega kept his private aircraft. As with Urgent Fury, some missions went well and others didn’t. Securing the canal zone entrances went smoothly. Though SEALs encoun-tered some resistance at Balboa Harbor, they were able to rapidly accomplish that mission. At Paitilla Airfield, the SEALs encountered their most serious opposi-tion. Though ultimately victorious, they suffered heavy losses, with four SEALs killed and eight wounded.

These operations turned out to be the special operations force (SOF) under-card event for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 1990-1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait – a campaign in which, had it not been for Goldwater-Nichols, SOF would have been denied participation.

CENTCOM Commander Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., had a dislike of SOF dating back to the Vietnam War, the result of some negative experiences with special warfare “Snakeaters.” During the planning stages of Desert Shield he tried to block SOF participa-tion, but was prevented from doing so by Goldwater-Nichols.

Then-Capt. Ray Smith of Naval Special Warfare Task Group-Central (NSWTG-C) had an uphill battle selling Schwarzkopf on his unit’s capability and usefulness. As it turned out, NSWTG-C was the first significant unit deployed in Saudi Arabia. It was tasked with foreign internal defense training to help Saudi and free Kuwaiti forces learn how to coordinate tactical air war operations and worked

Naval Special Warfare operators inspect a shipping container aboard Iraq’s Mina al Bakr Oil Terminal during an operation to secure the oil platform from being destroyed by the Iraqi military.

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with the growing influx of coalition mili-tary personnel starting to arrive.

Though Schwarzkopf never entirely overcame his antipathy toward SOF, he was smart enough to recognize jobs done well, and once NSWTG-C proved itself, Smith’s men were rewarded with expanded roles. These included the clearing of ports and shipping lanes of Iraqi sea mines, coordinating harbor security, and a successful combat search and rescue mission of a downed coalition airman. The SEAL role in Operation Desert Storm included a series of beach reconnaissance and maritime deception missions, including the capture of a small Iraqi island and its garrison of Iraqi troops.

Simultaneously, events at the Horn of Africa were unfolding, whose conse-quences continue today. In late 1990, the fragile government in Somalia collapsed. Rival militias and local warlords began battling for power and position, with the diplomatic corps caught in the crossfire. When January 1991 rescue attempts by the Soviet Union and Italy failed, Bush authorized Operation Eastern Exit. Over a period of nine days, elements of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Air Force Special Operations Command, and a nine-man SEAL team safely evacuated onto U.S. Navy warships a total of 281 diplomatic personnel and their dependents from 30 nations.

A year later Somalia’s transforma-tion into a failed nation-state wracked by internecine conflict was complete. Two major efforts involving SEALs and other NSW personnel as well as other SOF units and conventional forces, Operation Restore Hope (1992) and the Black Hawk Down Battle of Mogadishu (1993), failed to improve the situa-tion. Finally, in 1994, SEALs and NSW personnel were part of a multinational force that participated in Operation United Shield, the evacuation of all U.N. peacekeeping troops from Somalia.

Given that it didn’t look like condi-tions in Somalia would improve soon and the country’s strategic location near one of the busiest sea lanes in the world, it would only be a matter of time before SEALs returned.

The al Qaeda Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil initiated a new phase in special operations. President George W. Bush’s declaration of global war on terrorism as official national security policy laid the foundation for a watershed SOF offensive: Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan.

Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan was a campaign in which special operations assumed the leading role rather than a supporting one. NAVSPECWARCOM, through Task Force Sword/K-Bar, initially conducted interdiction missions against al Qaeda/Taliban forces and their leadership in southern Afghanistan and the Pakistan coast. SEAL commitment in direct action and special reconnaissance missions soon expanded to include the full range of SOF missions during the campaign.

Such missions did not come without cost. In early March 2002, during Operation Anaconda, SEAL Petty Officer 1st Class Neil Roberts was killed after being thrown from a heavily damaged 160th SOAR MH-47 Chinook attempting to land a reconnaissance team on the summit of Takur Ghar. The Battle of Roberts Ridge, as the ensuing action was called, ended with seven additional SOF personnel killed and two SEALs wounded.

In 2005, the SEAL and SOF commu-nity suffered an even worse loss. During Operation Red Wings (named after the NHL team), a four-man SEAL special reconnaissance team operating in Kunar province was attacked by a superior Taliban force. Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell was the only survivor. Luttrell and two of the dead SEALs received Navy Crosses. The team’s commander, Lt. Michael Murphy, received a posthumous Medal of Honor for his gallant attempt to save the team. The MH-47 Chinook containing a Quick Reaction Force to rescue them was shot down by an enemy RPG, killing all 16 aboard, making it what was then the greatest loss of life in a single incident in SOF history.

In 2003, at the invitation of the Philippine military, SOCOM initi-ated Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, the campaign against Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic terrorist group allied with al Qaeda. SEALs and other NSW personnel conducted a wide variety of counterinsurgency training missions with their Philippine coun-terparts. OEF-P has since become the model for implementing and achieving counterinsurgency intervention.

SOF success in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan opened the doors to expanded SOF use in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). SEAL missions ran the gamut: clearing port facilities, seizing and holding the strategic Rumaila oil field and Mukarayin Dam, direct action,

special reconnaissance, POW rescue missions (most notably assisting in the rescue of Pvt. Jessica Lynch), and more. Following the capture of Baghdad and the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime, SEAL activities included assis-tance in the “Anbar Awakening” alliance between sheiks and tribes to defeat al Qaeda in Anbar province.

Somalia returned to the headlines when Somali pirates began their raids on shipping transiting the Horn of Africa. In April 2009, pirates attempted to hijack the container ship M/V Maersk Alabama. U.S. Navy ships were deployed. The pirates, with the ship’s captain, Richard Philips, as hostage, attempted to escape in one of the container ship’s powered lifeboats. When it appeared that the pirates were going to kill Philips, three SEAL snipers positioned on the fantail of the destroyer USS Bainbridge – in a demonstration of superb marksman-ship – shot and killed the pirates. Philips was rescued unhurt.

The year 2011 bookended the SEAL experience with its greatest achieve-ment and its greatest loss. On May 1, 2011, a Joint Special Operations Command Special Mission Unit of SEALs and other SOF personnel launched. Flying in specially modi-fied helicopters, the teams entered Osama bin Laden’s secret compound in Pakistan, killed him and several followers, and avenged 9/11 and subse-quent al Qaeda attacks.

The glow of that triumph was dimmed when, on Aug. 6, a Taliban rocket-propelled grenade exploded in an Army National Guard Chinook, killing all aboard. Included in the group were 17 SEALs and five NSW personnel, worse even than the 2005 shootdown of the Chinook speeding to the aid of Murphy’s team.

Today, SEALs are arguably the most famous of all the special operations units. They are the subjects of articles, newspaper and television news stories, documentaries, books, movies, and computer games. It is fame they more endure than accept, for, as they say in their SEAL code, “I humbly serve as a guardian to my fellow Americans, always ready to defend those who are unable to defend themselves. I do not advertise the nature of my work, nor seek recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept the inherent hazards of my profession, placing the welfare and security of others before my own.”

MARINE RAIDER BATTALIONS: 70 YEARS AHEAD OF THEIR TIMEBY MIKE MARKOWITZ AND JOHN D. GRESHAM


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February 2012 is the 70th anniversary of the Marine Raider Battalions, a brief but glorious episode in the long history of the Corps. Because they existed only two years, one might downplay their influence on the U.S.

Marine Corps (USMC) U.S. special operations forces (SOF). However, as we look back on the Marine Raiders seven decades later, one can see that they were simply a good idea whose time had not yet come. Their story is a compelling one that deserves to be told.

In the months following Pearl Harbor, there was enormous political pressure to somehow strike back at the Japanese, but resources in the Pacific theater were few. Facing similar pressure after Dunkirk, Winston Churchill had ordered the creation of the British Commandos, elite volunteer units designed to conduct coastal raids on Nazi-occupied Europe, and which were the origin of the British Royal Marine Commandos, the Parachute Regiment, the Special Air Service, and the Special Boat Service. The senior leadership of the U.S. Marine Corps was initially skeptical of the idea of creating similar units, feeling that all Marines were already elite volunteers. They were reluctant to see their best riflemen, senior NCOs and junior officers pulled out of regular USMC rifle units for high-risk adventures. Nevertheless, the idea of Marine commando units found supporters in the United States.

Among those intrigued by the idea of forming an American version of commandos were President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his eldest son, Capt. James Roosevelt, USMC Reserve. One serious proposal was to appoint William J. Donovan, a prom-inent Republican, Army colonel and World War I hero, as a Marine briga-dier general to lead the new units.

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U.S. Marine Raiders gathered in front of a Japanese dugout in January 1944 on Cape Torokina, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, which they helped to take.


This proposal came to nothing, though Donovan would go on to form and lead the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Eventually, the Corps chose two very different lieutenant colonels with expe-rience observing the Japanese army in action in China: Evans F. Carlson (1897-1947) and Merritt A. “Red Mike” Edson (1897-1955). Gen. Thomas Holcomb, the 17th commandant (1936-1943), chose the name “Raiders.”

Carlson was a visionary, deeply influ-enced by the months he spent in the field with Chinese Communist guer-rillas and their leaders, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. When

he took command of the 2nd Raider Battalion, he implemented an unorth-odox style of egalitarian leadership, breaking down the sharp class distinc-tions between officers and enlisted men, and introducing “ethical indoc-trination.” An expert marksman, he led Marine rifle and pistol teams that won national competitions.

Edson’s 1st Raider Battalion stood up as part of the Atlantic Fleet on Feb. 16, 1942, initially with a headquar-ters company and four rifle compa-nies. Carlson’s 2nd Raider Battalion stood up in the Pacific Fleet three days later, with Maj. James Roosevelt U

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CLOCKWISE FROM TOP: Warping the USS Nautilus (SS 168) into dock at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, with men of Col. Evans F. Carlson’s Raiders aboard after the Makin Island raid.

Col. Merritt A. “Red Mike” Edson, center, commander of the 1st Raider Battalion, briefs Lt. Gen. Thomas A. Holcomb (left) and Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandergrift during Holcomb’s inspection on Guadalcanal.

Bloody Ridge, where Edson’s Raiders destroyed a Japanese battalion in October 1942. Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, USMCR (left), and Maj. James Roosevelt, USMCR, receive the congratulations of Brig. Gen. H.K. Pickett, USMC (right), on their return from the Makin Island Raid.


as executive officer. By summer 1942, both units were deployed to the South Pacific, ready for action.

Their first action came when two companies of the 2nd Raider Battalion were rushed to reinforce the garrison of remote Midway Island, where they participated in the successful defense against Japanese air attacks June 4-6, 1942. Their next action was at Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, as a diversionary operation in support of the Guadalcanal landing. Two compa-nies of Edson’s 2nd Raider Battalion (13 officers and 208 enlisted men) raided the Japanese base there on Aug. 17, 1942, transported by the subma-rines USS Nautilus (SS 168) and USS Argonaut (APS 1). Fire from the subs’ 6-inch deck guns sank a patrol boat and transport in the lagoon, and two attacking Japanese aircraft were shot down. The Raiders engaged the small garrison in a protracted firefight and destroyed a fuel dump and a radio transmitter. But in the confusion, nine men left behind were captured and later beheaded by the Japanese.

Marine casualties totaled 18 killed and 12 missing. Lessons learned from this raid would prove to be of great value in planning future amphibious assaults.

The Raiders’ next contact with the Japanese on the ground came on Aug. 7, 1942, at Tulagi, a tiny but strategic islet in the Solomon Islands chain. The 1st Raiders, along with three other Marine battalions, stormed the island, surprising and quickly eliminating 900 Japanese defenders. They later moved to Guadalcanal, where they anchored the defense of Henderson Field. Edson’s Raiders, along with Marines of the 1st Parachute Battalion (together about 840 troops), fought an epic defense of a key ridge overlooking the airfield Sept. 12-14, smashing repeated night frontal assaults by Maj. Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi’s 35th Infantry Brigade. During the nightlong battle, Edson remained standing about 20 yards behind the Marine firing line on Hill 123, exhorting his troops and directing their defensive efforts. Said Marine Capt. Tex Smith, who was in position to observe Edson for most of the night,

“I can say that if there is such a thing as one man holding a battalion together, Edson did it that night. He stood just behind the front lines – stood, when most of us hugged the ground.”

The Marines counted 500 Japanese dead; hundreds more died later of wounds. About 80 Marines were killed in the action, and Edson was awarded the Medal of Honor for this action, which is known by two names in Marine Corps battle history: “Bloody Ridge” and “Edson’s Ridge.” On Nov. 4, 1942, Carlson’s Raiders also landed on Guadalcanal, deep behind Japanese lines. Over the next month, in an epic jungle march, this “Long Patrol” killed more than 500 Japanese troops and knocked out the infamous “Pistol Pete” – a pesky 75 mm mountain gun that had been shelling Henderson Field – while losing only 16 dead and 18 wounded, although malaria and other tropical diseases took a heavy toll on the unit.

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Carlson’s Raiders display Japanese war trophies after their return from the Long Patrol. Carlson is kneeling at center front.


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The successes of these first two units were such that the 3rd Raider Battalion was activated at Samoa on Sept. 20, 1942, and the 4th Raider Battalion on Oct. 23, 1942, at Camp Pendleton, Calif. Then, on March 15, 1943, the four USMC Raider battal-ions were organized into the 1st Marine Raider Regiment at Espiritu Santo, with Col. Harry B. Liversedge as commander and Carlson as the executive officer. In December 1943, command of the 1st Raider Regiment passed to Lt. Col. Samuel D. Puller, younger brother of the legendary “Chesty” Puller. The regiment left New Caledonia on Jan. 21 and landed on Guadalcanal three days later, ready to deploy for combat. Through the end of 1943, the Raiders took part in the grueling Solomons campaign, fighting on and around the islands of New Georgia and Bougainville.

Marine Raiders were issued an Americanized version of the British Commandos’ Fairbairn-Sykes stiletto, designed for silent killing. Its fragile point and corrosive zinc-alloy handle made it unpopular, and most Raider Mar ines preferred commercia l “Bowie” knives, or durable, short jungle machetes. Weapons platoons carried the air-cooled M1919A4 .30-caliber machine guns and light

60 mm mortars. Other weapons listed in the 1942 Table of Equipment for the 1st Raider Battalion included 14 British .55-caliber bolt-action Boys anti-tank rifles, 66 M1911 .45-caliber pistols, and 40 M1903 Springfield .30-06-caliber sniper rifles. Raiders also received some of the first U.S. reversible camouflage uniforms, with jungle pattern camouf lage on one side and sand color on the other. The Marine Raiders experimented with a wide variety and combinations of weapons and small unit organiza-tions, such as a three-man fire team equipped with a Browning Automatic Rifle, a Thompson submachine gun, and an M1 Garand rifle. Some carried new Reising submachine guns, weapons rushed into mass-produc-tion in 1940. The Reising fired the same .45-caliber ACP cartridge as the Thompson, but was much more likely to jam in combat due to its delayed blow-back action being easily fouled by dirt. Edson reportedly had Reisings issued to his unit dumped into the Lunga River on Guadalcanal.

In 1972, an official Marine histo-rian wrote, “… by early 1944 the face of the Pacific war had changed and the demand for Raider units was not sufficient to justify maintaining special units for the purpose. Senior Marine officers had never really taken to the concept of separate ‘elite of the elite’ units, and as the requirement for such units came into question, this opposi-tion became more effective.”

Therefore, early in 1944, the Raider battalions were disbanded. Their Marines were mostly transferred to the new 4th and 5th Marine divisions. During the war, 8,078 men, including 7,710 Marines and 368 sailors, served in Raider units. Raiders received seven Medals of Honor, 136 Navy Crosses, and 2,406 Purple Hearts. Including those who died of wounds or were MIA, 892 Raiders gave their lives.

Although the Raiders were disbanded in 1944 and the Marines seemed firmly wedded to the concept of heavy infantry as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) for Marine amphibious assault, the idea of elite “light” infantry for special missions persisted. As early as the 1930s, Scout Sniper platoons had been attached to Marine regiments to provide standoff fire and reconnais-sance. Highly skilled in field craft and marksmanship, snipers delivered

U.S. Marine Corps Raiders on an obstacle course.


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long-range precision fire on selected targets from concealed positions. During the war, Marine amphibious reconnaissance units had been formed in the Atlantic and Pacific regions, and the 2nd Amphibious Recon Battalion was revived in December 1950 at Camp Lejeune, N.C. No great amphibious assaults were attempted after Inchon, but there were continuing small wars, guerrilla wars, irregular wars, and covert wars demanding precisely the tactics, techniques and procedures that Marines practiced around the world for two centuries, and that the Raiders had honed to a sharp edge over the course of just a few months.

Then, in 1985, following Marine operations in Grenada and Lebanon, the 28th USMC commandant, Gen. Paul X. Kelley, authorized the creation of Marine Amphibious Units (Special Operations Capable) from the existing af loat battalions. Built around a reinforced rifle battalion, this force included a variety of helicopters, heavy weapons, and even a tank platoon. In 1988, Gen. Alfred F. Gray (the 29th commandant) changed the name to "Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)" or MEU (SOC), a term with deep resonance in Marine history and tradition. Seven of these units were formed, each with a strength of about 2,200 personnel, usually commanded by a colonel. The MEUs (SOC) deploy anywhere in the world aboard Navy amphibious assault ships, and are trained for a variety of unconventional missions including:

shutdown.Over the decades, these have proven

to be some of the most useful units in the U.S. military, conducting hundreds of missions. The 24th MEU (SOC) rescued Air Force Capt. Scott O’Grady in Bosnia in 1994, and the 15th and 24th deployed to Somalia. However, the MEUs (SOC) never belonged to the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

When the Department of Defense established the joint SOCOM on April 16, 1987, the Marine Corps opted out of having a Marine component as part of

the new command. Kelley felt that the Corps should not fund special warfare capabilities outside the Fleet Marine Force. The Corps rejected the idea of any "elite" within the Marines, who already considered themselves elite within the armed forces. But after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the demand for increased irregular warfare and unconventional capa-bilities became irresistible. So, on June 20, 2003, Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment One activated at Camp Pendleton, Calif. This company-sized unit, with about a hundred Marines, revived the lineage and legacy of the Raiders. Detachment One's insignia included the Raider's blue patch with a skull and stars.

Following a successful deployment to Iraq, the detachment was disbanded on March 10, 2006. But shortly before this, on Feb. 24, 2006, the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) activated at Camp Lejeune, N.C., as the Marine component of SOCOM. With core capabilities in direct action, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense, MARSOC can also conduct counter-terrorism, infor-mation operations, and unconventional warfare. It includes a special operations regiment with three battalions of SOF Marines, an intelligence battalion, a logistic support group, and the Marine Special Operations School. These units proudly wear distinctive blue patches with the five stars of the Southern Cross, recalling the emblem devised for the Marine Raiders back in 1942. So while the Marine Raider Battalions existed for only two years 70 years ago, today they have been reborn with what looks like a great future.


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Back in the Age of Muskets (1600-1850), every military commander knew that peasants made the best infantry: stolid, inured to hardship, and condi-tioned to obey their social superiors. But armies also needed soldiers of a different kind – agile, aggressive men, able to think fast and act with little supervision – for raids, night fighting, and other “special” missions. The best of these soldiers were recruited from professional hunters, gamekeepers, foresters, and frontiersmen. In German, they were called Jäger; in French, Chasseurs; in English, Light Infantry; or in Britain’s American colonies, Rangers.

During the North American Colonial Wars, English colonists slowly learned to combine the superior lethality of their firearms with the irregular tactics of their Native American adversaries. Col. Benjamin Church of the Plymouth Colony in New England formed the first American Ranger company during King Philip’s War (1675-1678), later leading it on expeditions against the French and their native allies in Maine and New Brunswick. As the global conflict between French and British empires escalated in the 18th century, Maj. Robert Rogers of New Hampshire organized a militia regiment of nine companies (about 600 men) on the New England frontier. It became renowned as “Rogers’ Rangers,” America’s first real special operations forces (SOF) unit.

Today’s U.S. Army Rangers trace their historic lineage to this unit, which was active during the French and Indian Wars. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress autho-rized eight companies of sharpshooting riflemen, commanded by Dan Morgan and known as the Corps of Rangers.

Francis Marion built and led another famous Revolutionary War Ranger element known as Marion’s Partisans, continuing the fight against the British long after the Continental Army had been driven from South Carolina. Marion became known as “the Swamp Fox” for his ability to melt away into the Carolina swamps after attacks on the British.

Interestingly, the Queen’s York Rangers, a reservist unit of the Canadian Forces, raised by Rogers himself to fight the American rebels in 1776, also claims descent from Rogers’ Rangers. Rogers’ Rangers specialized in winter raiding, fighting several skirmishes on snowshoes. In 1759, Rogers codified his system of irregular warfare in “28 Rules of Ranging,” still preserved in the standing orders given to soldiers in U.S. Army Ranger School.

Highlights of Rogers’ rules include:2. … if your number be small, march

in a single file, keeping at such a distance from each other as to prevent one shot from killing two men …

3. … encamp … on a piece of ground that may afford your sentries the

advantage of seeing or hearing the enemy some considerable distance, keeping one half of your whole party awake alternately through the night.

10. If the enemy is so superior that you are in danger of being surrounded …, let the whole body disperse, and every one take a different road to the place of rendezvous appointed for that evening …

21. If the enemy pursue your rear, take a circle till you come to your own tracks, and there form an ambush to receive them …

Veterans of Rogers’ Rangers fought on both sides in the American Revolution and the War of 1812.

In the American Civil War, the most famous irregular unit was Virginia’s 43rd Battalion of “Partisan Rangers,” led by “the Gray Ghost,” Col. John Singleton Mosby. Although he opposed secession, Mosby volunteered as a private in the

Confederate Army at the outbreak of hostilities. Impressed with his ability as a scout, Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Robert E. Lee’s cavalry commander, promoted him to lieutenant, and in 1863 sent him to organize a mounted unit oper-ating behind Union lines in northern Virginia, which became known as “Mosby’s Rangers,” “Mosby’s Raiders,” and ultimately “Mosby’s Confederacy.” In the decades after the Civil War, the U.S. Army saw little need for specialist Rangers. “Small wars” were left to the U.S. Marine Corps, while the Army prepared for the next “big war.” There simply was no interest within the U.S. military for unconventional warfare and units from 1865 until the start of World War II. However, World War II would provide a fertile venue for unconven-tional soldiers with their own ways of fighting, especially the Rangers.

In 1940, after the heroic evacuation of the British army from Dunkirk, Winston Churchill ordered the creation of volun-teer raiding units that could strike back at the edges of Nazi-occupied Europe. He chose the name “Commando” for

these units, recalling the Afrikaner mounted riflemen of the Boer War. When the first U.S. troops were sent to England in 1942, volunteer units were formed to train and fight alongside the Commandos, and the historic title of “Ranger” was revived for these battal-ions. William Orlando Darby, a young lieutenant colonel of artillery, was chosen to lead the first of the Ranger battalions, which stood up in May 1942 in Northern Ireland. The Operation

RANGERS: LEADING THE WAY FOR 70 YEARSBY MIKE MARKOWITZ

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United States troops of the Ranger Battalion in training with British Commandos,

somewhere in the United Kingdom. U.S.

British Commandos at Dieppe in 1942.

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Torch landings in North Africa, on Nov. 8, 1942, were the first major U.S. opera-tions in the European theater; the 1st Ranger Battalion was part of the landing force. Darby’s Rangers led the way at Arzew, a port on the Algerian coast, conducting a difficult night assault to seize Vichy French gun batteries.

In Sicily and Italy, three Ranger battalions fought until the Anzio land-ings in January 1944 on the Italian coast south of Rome. The 1st and 3rd Ranger battalions, trying to infiltrate through the German lines, were trapped in the hill town of Cisterna by an entire German division and nearly wiped out. Of the 767 men in the 1st and 3rd Ranger battalions, six returned to the Allied lines and 761 were killed or captured. Historians argue over whether the disaster was simply the result of faulty intelligence, or wheter the presence of many inexperienced replacements in the ranks of Ranger units who had been kept in front-line combat for too long also contributed to the disaster. The surrender at Cisterna was the darkest day in Ranger history, something the community has spent

every day since making sure never happens again. Just a little more than five months later, they began getting payback for their Italian losses.

The Normandy invasion (Operation Overlord on June 6, 1944) was the most carefully planned assault in history. Planners were particularly concerned about a cliff-top German artillery battery at Pointe du Hoc, where six 155 mm guns in concrete revetments were positioned to pour devastating fire onto the beaches. The point was pounded from the air by heavy bombers, leaving a cratered landscape, but reconnaissance could not confirm that the guns were knocked out. The 2nd Ranger Battalion drew the assignment of making sure that the guns were spiked. On the 40th anniversary of Overlord, President Ronald Reagan retold the epic story:

The Rangers looked up and saw the enemy soldiers at the edge of the cliffs, shooting down at them with machine guns and throwing grenades. And the American Rangers began to climb. They shot rope ladders over the face of these cliffs and began to pull themselves

up. When one Ranger fell, another would take his place. When one rope was cut, a Ranger would grab another and begin his climb again. They climbed, shot back, and held their footing. Soon, one by one, the Rangers pulled themselves over the top, and in seizing the firm land at the top of these cliffs, they began to seize back the continent of Europe. Two hundred and twenty-five came here. After two days of fighting, only ninety could still bear arms.In fact, the German guns had been

pulled back inland and hidden under camouf lage netting, where they were soon found by the Rangers and destroyed. In addition to their actions at Pointe du Hoc, Rangers were key in getting U.S. forces off of the killing ground of Omaha Beach. Especially at the eastern end of Omaha, where 29th Division soldiers were fighting for their N

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U.S. Rangers defend a captured gun position at Arzew Harbor, Algeria, during


lives, the 5th Ranger Battalion led the way off the beach and found the way inland. But the European theater was hardly the only place in World War II where Rangers served.

Early in the Pacific War, the Japanese invaded Burma, driving the British back into India and cutting the Burma Road, a tenuous supply line that kept China – just barely – in the war. The rugged mountains and thick jungle of northern Burma were exceptionally difficult terrain for conventional warfare. Late in 1943, a secret Ranger unit was formed and began training in India for operations against the Japanese in Burma. The regiment-sized “5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)” was soon nicknamed Merrill’s Marauders, after its commander, Maj. Gen. Frank Merrill. A West Point graduate, Merrill earned an engineering degree from MIT and learned Japanese, serving as a mili-tary attaché in Tokyo and later as an intelligence officer. In February 1944, 2,750 Marauders, in three battalions, arrived in Burma and began a 1,000-mile march behind Japanese lines. The Marauders, usually outnumbered, always inflicted many more casualties than they suffered as they harassed Japanese lines of supply and commu-nication and raided their rear areas.

In August 1944, on their final mission against Myitkyina, the only all-weather airfield in the region, the Marauders suffered 272 killed, 955 wounded, and 980 evacuated for sickness. Merrill refused evacuation after a heart attack before falling ill with malaria. By the time Myitkyina was secured, fewer than

200 Marauders were left out of the original 2,750 who had marched into Burma six months before.

As the war in the Pacific drew to a close, U.S. officials began receiving reports that the Japanese were massa-cring Allied prisoners of war (POWs) whenever Allied invasions were pending. Intelligence sources reported that more than 500 starving POWs, including survivors of the Bataan death march, were facing death at a prison camp near Cabanatuan on the Philippine island of Luzon. On Jan. 28, 1945, 121 picked troops of the 6th Ranger Battalion, led by Lt. Col. Henry Mucci, infiltrated 30 miles behind Japanese lines with the help of Philippine guerrillas and stormed the camp, defeating strong counterattacks, and successfully evacuating the sick and weak prisoners to safety. It was, at the time, the largest hostage rescue opera-tion in history.

Despite their record of success, the Rangers suffered the same fate as much of the U.S. military following World War II. Faced with radical postwar downsizing, the Army was not keen to keep its Ranger units because they had suffered such high casualty rates of excellent soldiers that generals preferred as small-unit leaders for regular units. The Army continued training individual soldiers at Ranger School, established in 1950 at Fort Benning, Ga., who then returned to their original units to

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ABOVE: Rangers at Pointe du Hoc, June 6, 1944. BELOW: Soldiers of the 2nd Ranger Battalion get ready to attack deeper into Germany.


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provide leadership and subject-matter expertise. Also, during the Korean War, 16 Ranger companies were organized for special missions, though quickly disbanded when the war ended.

As the number of U.S. troops deployed to Vietnam grew during the 1960s, the Army saw a need for long-range reconnaissance patrols – soldiers skilled in jungle and mountain warfare who could operate deep in enemy-controlled territory. In 1969, these units were organized into the 75th Ranger Regiment, composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ranger battalions and headquartered at Fort Benning, and revived the distinctive insignia of Merrill’s Marauders. It would be more than a decade, however, before the 75th was able to show its capabilities and skills to advantage. Through the 1970s, the 75th Rangers evolved their own new roles and missions, including airfield seizure and assault modeled on the Israeli raid on Entebbe.

In October 1983, a violent military coup, with Cuban support, endangered a group of American medical students. As part of Operation Urgent Fury, the first major U.S. military operation since Vietnam, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Rangers (1/75th) parachuted at dawn onto Point Salines, Grenada, where Cuban troops were constructing an airfield. By 6:30 a.m., following a vicious firefight, Rangers had the

runway cleared for the arrival of reinforcements. When Grenadian BTR armored personnel carriers attacked, Ranger recoilless rifle gunners knocked them out. This fine performance in battle ensured that when the U.S. SOF community was consolidated a few years later, the Rangers would be a major force in that evolution.

When the Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen legislation was passed in the late 1980s, creating the U.S. Special Operations Command, the 75th became a major unit in the new U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and was quickly called to arms. By December 1989, an escalating series of violent incidents made it clear that Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega was on a collision course with the United States. As part of Operation Just Cause, the U.S. invasion of Panama to depose Noriega, 837 men of the 2nd and 3rd Ranger battalions parachuted in dark-ness onto Rio Hato Airfield to neutralize two companies of the Panama Defense Force (PDF) and secure the runways. But the PDF had been alerted, and, jumping from 500 feet, the Rangers landed in a hornet’s nest of gunfire. By daylight, the airfield was secured, with only four Rangers killed and 44 injured, mostly with jump-related injuries.

Over the next few years, the Rangers continued to evolve their roles and missions, including cementing their

relationship with the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), charged with anti-terror and other “special” national-level responsibilities. The Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, October 3-4, 1993, is perhaps the most well-known JSOC Ranger mission; Bravo Company of the 3/75th provided force protection to a force of Special Mission Unit (SMU) personnel tasked to seize several senior advisers to Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was attacking United Nations peacekeepers and obstructing delivery of relief supplies. After two U.S. helicopters of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR – the “Night Stalkers”) were downed by rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a fierce firefight broke out around the crash site. During the hours of fighting, 18 U.S. personnel were killed in action and 73 were wounded. Hard lessons were learned from the Battle of Mogadishu, which resonated throughout the U.S. military.

The coming of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 meant that the 75th Rangers had a global war to fight, and fight it they have. On the night of Oct. 19, 2001, Bravo Company of the 3/75th once again led the way, as they jumped and seized Objective Rhino, an airstrip near Kandahar, Afghanistan. Along with JSOC SMU personnel, they raided a hunting camp belonging to Osama


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bin Laden before being recovered by helicopters of the 160th SOAR. The 75th did a number of other combat jumps and seizures prior to the Taliban surrender in early 2002, though their operations in Afghanistan continue to this day. These operations, however, have sometimes had a high cost.

Takur Ghar is a 10,469-foot peak that commands the Shah-i-Kot Valley of Paktia province in eastern Afghanistan. During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, a Navy SEAL team was assigned to establish an outpost on the mountaintop. When the SEALs came under Taliban attack, a platoon-sized Quick Reaction Force of Rangers was airlifted to support them in two 10th SOAR MH-47 Chinook helicopters. One of the helicopters was struck by RPG fire and crash-landed on the peak, while the other MH-47 deliv-ered its team of Rangers farther down the mountainside. They climbed a steep slope covered in three feet of snow, weighted down by their weapons, body armor, and equipment. Takur Ghar was eventually secured, but eight Americans were killed, and many were wounded. Rangers have taken some hard losses over the past few decades, but never at the expense of their primary mission of leading the way for other U.S. forces on the battlefield.

When U.S. forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, it was essential to capture the Haditha High Dam on the Euphrates

River. Destruction of this dam would cause disastrous flooding downstream and cripple the country’s precarious electricity supply. The Rangers had already performed several combat para-chute jumps to seize Iraqi airfields, when 154 soldiers of Bravo Company of the 3rd Ranger Battalion drew the assignment of seizing, securing, and holding the heavily defended dam. Enduring eight days of heavy artillery bombardment and beating off constant counterat-tacks, the Rangers held until relieved. Rangers received five Purple Hearts, four Silver and 26 Bronze Stars, and 71 Army Commendation Medals for the Haditha Dam action. The airfield seizures and the Haditha Dam seizure were among hundreds of actions, large and small, that Rangers of the 75th fought in Iraq, along with others across the globe.

To a Ranger of the 18th century, today’s Ranger would be instantly recognizable as a soldier, though he might be amazed by the automatic fire of the M4 and baffled by the tech-nologies of radio, GPS, body armor, and night-vision goggles. Similarly, the Ranger of 2050 will probably still be recognizable to us as a soldier, though we would probably be amazed by his personal equipment. Whatever the advances in technology, there will be a need for soldiers as long as there are conflicts among humans, and Rangers will continue to lead the way.

FROM LEFT: Troops of the 5307th Composite Unit rest during a break along the jungle trail near ‘Nhpum, Burma, April 28, 1944. General view of the 92nd Evac. Hospital, Giumba, Luzon, P.I., showing some of the men of 6th Ranger Battalion in front of buildings after their rescue of POWs at Cabanatuan. Rangers return to

mission during Operation Urgent Fury. BELOW: Rangers of 2nd Platoon, B Company, had to clear the nine-story administration building during the Haditha Dam seizure. By the end, they had run out of breaching charges and shotgun shells, and had resorted to hurling fully loaded Rangers at the locked doors.


Beginning late in 2011, a special event from their past began to be celebrated by the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF – the Green Berets): the 50th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy’s visit to the Special Warfare Center (SWC) at Fort Bragg, N.C. This single visit by the young president was the seminal event that launched the transformation of the Special Forces and began the creation of the modern Green Berets as we know them today. Though often told, the story of this event is much more than just the tale of how the Green Berets got official Army permission to wear their signature headgear. On the contrary, it is the story of how a promising force of special men were able to evolve into the elite fighting force known to Americans today.

Nov. 17, 2011, was a raw, icy, rainy morning at the gravesite of JFK, where hundreds of military and government officials, guests, and Kennedy family members gathered to remember the one and only visit by the president to the school that today bears his name: the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) at Fort Bragg. Hosted by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), the Honorable Michael G. Vickers, the event recalled Kennedy’s Oct. 12, 1961, visit to the SWC, where he met then-Brig. Gen. William Yarborough, USA, and his SF soldiers. Of the event, Vickers, himself a former Green Beret and CIA operative, said, “ … It’s very rare that an element of the [U.S.] armed forces gets singled out by a president like that, and so this is a special thing to honor and I was glad to be part of it … both my alma maters, if you will, the [Army] Special Forces and the CIA

[Central Inteligence Agency], both grew out of the [World War II] OSS [Office of Strategic Services] tradition and share that heritage today. But it really wasn’t until the 1960s with President Kennedy that [we saw] one of the periods of great growth in Special Forces, and it really put us on a path that we remain on to this day. There really is a lot of continuity in it. Missions have changed a little bit, and tactics have changed, but the path that was set forward in the early 1960s really remains with us today.”

The popular history of Kennedy’s v isit primari ly revolves around Yarborough’s efforts, involving the Presidential Military Aide Brig. Gen. Chester V. “Ted” Clifton Jr., USA, to get official U.S. Army permission for his soldiers to wear their distinctive green berets as an official piece of uniform headgear. Yarborough had encountered considerable resistance from Army leadership on the matter, and had arranged through Clifton, a West Point classmate, for Kennedy’s help in overcoming the opposition. Kennedy, always a lover of snappy fashion, had asked officially to see Yarborough’s SF soldiers with “their green berets,” during his visit. Army leadership, seeing the presidential interest in the headgear, soon after approved it as the official headgear of SF, and thus Special Forces’ trademark name was born. But there was much more going on that sunny October day than a fashion show: There was a transformation taking place within the special warfare community itself.

In 1961, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and clandestine warfare capabilities were a mere shadow of what they had been at the end of World War II in 1945. Legendary SOF units and communities like the OSS, the Rangers, the 1st Special Service Force, Marine Raiders, Air Commandos, and others were rapidly disestablished as part of the postwar demobilization. Within a few years however, the discarding of American clandestine/discretionary

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Special Forces Green Beret soldiers from each of the Army’s seven Special Forces Groups

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Kennedy, Nov. 17, 2011, at Arlington National Cemetery. The ceremony marked a time-

honored tradition of recognizing Kennedy for his support and advocacy of the soldiers who

would be known simply as “Green Berets.”

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50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MODERN GREEN BERETS BY JOHN D. GRESHAM


warfare capabilities began to be felt, and gradually made good. It began with the establishment of the CIA in 1947, and continued with the establishment of the Army Ranger School during the Korean war, and the standing up of the first SF group, the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) in 1952.

By the start of the 1960s, the U.S. Army had grown the Special Forces with several additional SFGs, but had done little to incorporate them insti-tutionally or assign them formal roles and missions in U.S. military strategy. SF tactics, doctrine, and organization had advanced little since 1944, when the OSS Jedburgh teams had been part of Operation Overlord. SF teams were fine as intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) elements and “stay-behind” elements to work with resis-tance or partisan forces, but had little capability against the rising spectre of rural or national insurgency. The 1950s had seen a number of such movements rise and overthrow their former colonial governments, along with some of the despotic dictators who had taken over during World War II. In particular, the successes of Communist insurgencies on Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and in Cuba under Fidel Castro were proving difficult to counter, and growing in popularity around the world.

Enter President John F. Kennedy in 1961.

Kennedy came to the job of president with a very different worldview than his processors. Born into wealth and privilege, Kennedy’s wartime experi-ence had not been a conventional one. Where Dwight Eisenhower had commanded an entire theater of war, the U.S. Army, and NATO, Kennedy’s view of World War II had been from the deck of a motor torpedo (PT) boat with responsibility for a dozen sailors. Perhaps more important, however, had been the fact that Kennedy had been part of the “junkyard” Navy, and usually fought apart from the rest of the fleet. The littoral areas of the Solomon Islands had been where Kennedy had done battle, fighting up-close and, unconventionally, apart from the fast carriers and battlewagons of the “big” Navy. So when Kennedy came to office, it did not take him long to notice the rising threat of Communist insurgen-cies, the handful of SOF units in the U.S. military, and a possible strategy. By the spring of 1961, Kennedy had spoken to a joint session of Congress on the matter, and was looking to enlarge America’s SOF community. There were already plans to create a maritime SOF force, which would become the U.S. Navy SEa, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams, and organize more Army SFGs.

At the same time, at SWC at Fort Bragg, Yarborough had had similar ideas, though his were perhaps more granular than those of a president still smarting after the CIA’s failure at the Bay of Pigs, and the Berlin Crisis.

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ABOVE: Then-Brig. Gen. William Yarborough (left) meets with President John F. Kennedy on Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1961. This meeting has been commemorated in a statue, dedicated in a ceremony April 5, 2012, that stands outside Kennedy Hall on Fort Bragg. BELOW: A group of soldiers from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with 5th Special Forces Group soldiers, Vietnam, September 1968.

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Yarborough had a number of ideas about new capabilities and improve-ments for the Army’s SF force, some of which would take it well beyond the modest ISR or stay-behind missions. In his vision of SF, Yarborough saw teams able to cover the full “rainbow” of warfare missions, from peace-keeping to nuclear combat. They would become America’s most capable soldiers, ambassadors with language and cultural skills as effective as their abilities with combat rifles and explosives. Perhaps most important of all, this rainbow of capabilities would be organic in the dozen soldiers in each new SF team, a concept he called “Uniteam.” But to make it all happen, he would need a powerful friend with the power to move the Army bureau-cracy into seeing that a transformed SF force was in the best interests of the Army and the nation.

It was Clifton who helped connect the parallel goals and interests of Kennedy and Yarborough into the SWC visit of Oct. 12, 1961. The results for both men were impressive and

still resonate today. Kennedy got the Navy SEALs, more SFGs, and the Air Commandos, and his vision led to the re-establishment of the Rangers and Marine SOF, among others. These would be among the most effective U.S. units in Southeast Asia in the coming wars there, and all continue to serve America today. In a presidency cut short by assassination, Kennedy’s creation of the modern special warfare community must be marked, along with the lunar landing program, as one of his great achievements. And for Yarborough, Kennedy’s visit provided the inertia and support to make the SF community into everything he envisioned and more.

The Uniteam concept became the basis for the Operational Detachment-Alpha, or “A-Team,” which has been the basic

building block of SF for a half-century. Yarborough also was able to turn the SWC, renamed after Kennedy’s assas-sination as the JFKSWCS, into the finest such school in the world. And perhaps most cleverly of all, these ideas were implanted and codified into the minds of Army leaders and the public by a bril-liant public relations campaign person-ally orchestrated by Yarborough. He allowed well-known author Robin Moore to write a book about the Special Forces, which became the international best-seller and feature film The Green Berets. He also was instrumental in the creation of Staff Sgt. Barry Sadler’s No. 1 hit song, “The Ballad of the Green Beret.” These ideas and images cemented the Special Forces into the Army in a way that allowed them to survive the difficult years following Vietnam and made them the “go-to” force after 9/11.

So the past few months spanning 2011-2012 have become a celebration of Kennedy, Yarborough, and what they did on Oct. 12, 1961, with a key event recently taking place on April 5, 2012. As part of the scheduled graduation of U

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A statue honoring President John F. Kennedy and then-Brig. Gen. William Yarborough's 1961 meeting, where the green beret was


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Special Forces Class 267, there was a dedication of a new statue celebrating the 50th anniversary of Kennedy’s visit. Commissioned by computer magnate H. Ross Perot, himself an honorary Green Beret, the bronze depicts Kennedy and Yarborough during the visit, down to the last detail.

“I wanted it done just exactly the way Fort Bragg wanted it,” said Perot, “and it has been done that way. We had a great sculptor, Paul Moore of Norman, Okla., who I think did a perfect job and got the faces just right and everything. You can go back to the original photo-graph [from that day].”

In front of hundreds of family members and guests, Perot handed each new SF soldier his Green Beret, and urged them to reach their full potential in the honorable profession to which they had all aspired.

“We were looking for an appropriate time when everything would come together, we could get the people here, and we could set something like this up,” JFKSWCS Commander Maj. Gen.

Bennet S. Sacolick said about the ceremony. “So, the actual graduation ceremony today was not too dissimilar from all the previous ones – the move-ments, the timing, everything, but I wanted to leverage Ross Perot. And I kind of wanted to make it about the soldiers and not necessarily about the statue. This is a classroom facility. Soldiers meet out here every day. This is where they have their formations. They walk by it two or three times a day, so it’s perfectly located.”

Looking back on Kennedy’s visit in 1961, Sacolick had his own thoughts on the long-term significance of what Kennedy and Yarborough started that day.

“I think it was huge,” he said. “And it was just the beginning for Special Forces at that point. You know the SF force was back then totally kind of subordinate to the ‘big’ Army for our equipment, manpower, and even our relevance, quite frankly. It wasn’t until we became a branch, truly, in 1986 that we truly were in charge of our own

destiny. I was a captain in 1986 when I came in here. I came in as an infantry officer and it was about three months later where we had to decide whether I wanted to stay in the infantry branch or go with the Special Forces. And I chose SF and an A-Team and I’ve never had another job outside of that in my life. So, I mean, I loved it.”

It is debatable whether Kennedy or Yarborough were thinking about how significant their few minutes together on Oct. 12, 1961, would be at the time. Both men were trying to help create capabilities for the American military and nation they believed were needed and required. What that meeting did, though, was change the course of world history, with results that are being seen today.

Special Forces soldiers ride on an ATV/Quad bike with a MK47 40 mm grenade launcher mounted on it in Jalrez, Afghanistan, November 2009.

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