Document of The World Bank

Report No: 33783

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-30850)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 35,200,000 EQUIVALENT

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA

FOR A

SECOND ROAD REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT

December 7, 2005

Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department Central America Country Management Unit Latina America and the Caribbean Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective April 1998)

Currency Unit = Córdoba (C$) C$1.00 = US$ 0.10

US$ 1 = C$ 10.00

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARI Institutional Reorganization Agreement IDB Inter-American Development Bank

Acuerdo de Reestructuración Institucional Banco Inter-Americano de DesarrolloAT Technical Assistance IERR Internal Economic Rate of Return

Asistencia Técnica IRI International Road Roughness Index

BM World Bank MCTE Emergency Relief Community Module

Banco Mundial MCTI Earthquake Relief Community Module

COERCO Regional Highway Construction Agencies MCTT Flood Relief Module

COV Vehicle Operating Cost ME Micro Enterprises

Costo Operativo Vehicular MTI Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency NMT Non-motorized Transportation

DGP Planning Directorate NPV Net Present Value

Dirección General de Planificación PAD Project Appraisal Document

DGTT Road Transport Directorate PCU Project Coordinating Unit

Dirección General de Transporte Terrestre PMS Pavement Management System

DGV Highway Directorate RED Road Economic Decision Model

Dirección General de Vialidad RMF Road Maintenance Fund

DRA Directorate of Road Maintenance SIAF Integrated Financial Administration System

FOMAV Road Maintenance Fund TPDA Traffic Demand

Fondo de Mantenimiento Vial Tráfico Promedio Diario AnnualHDM Highway Design and Maintenance Model UA Environmental Unit

ICB International Competitive Bidding Unidad AmbientalIDA International Development Association

Asociación Internacional de Fomento

Vice President: Pamela CoxCountry Director Jane ArmitageSector Manager Jose Luis Irigoyen

Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Emmanuel A. James

NICARAGUASecond Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 35. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 106. Sustainability 117. Bank and Borrower Performance 128. Lessons Learned 139. Partner Comments 1410. Additional Information 21Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 22Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 24Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 27Annex 4. Bank Inputs 28Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 30Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 31Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 32

Project ID: P053705 Project Name: NI TRANSPORT IITeam Leader: Emmanuel A. James TL Unit: LCSFTICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 7, 2005

1. Project DataName: NI TRANSPORT II L/C/TF Number: IDA-30850

Country/Department: NICARAGUA Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region

Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (82%); Central government administration (18%)

Theme: Rural services and infrastructure (P)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 12/19/1997 Effective: 11/09/1998

Appraisal: 03/25/1998 MTR: 03/30/2002Approval: 06/04/1998 Closing: 06/30/2003 06/24/2005

Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA/MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Pamela Cox Shahid Javed BurkiCountry Director: Jane Armitage D-M Dowsett-CoiroloSector Manager/Director: José Luis Irigoyen Jeffrey GuttmanTeam Leader at ICR: Emmanuel A. James Emmanuel A. JamesICR Primary Author: Oswaldo M. Patiño

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: HS

Sustainability: HL

Institutional Development Impact: SU

Bank Performance: HS

Borrower Performance: HS

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The objectives of the project were: (i) to improve efficiency of road transportation in Nicaragua; (ii) to improve management and implementation for road maintenance; and (iii) to strengthen the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure’s planning and programming capacity.

3.2 Revised Objective:Due to the extensive damage to the road network caused by Hurricane Mitch, in October 1998, the objective of assisting in the road sector reconstruction was incorporated. This change was made in response to a request from the Government of Nicaragua for help in financing an Emergency Program for key segments of the road network that had been damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Mitch. An amendment to the loan, just at the start-up of the project, was approved by the Bank's Board of Directors, and the equivalent of US$ 15 million was reallocated to finance this emergency program. Other characteristics of the project such as the disbursement categories, the implementation arrangements and the investment cost components remained unchanged throughout project implementation.

3.3 Original Components:To achieve the objectives described above, the project included the following components: 1. Road Rehabilitation. This component comprised the rehabilitation and improvement of approximately 120 km of the Managua – El Rama road. The works were to be carried out in two distinct sections, namely the Managua section from Portezuelo (km 5) to San Benito (km 34.3), and the Rama section, from Muhan (km 202.3) to El Rama (km 292.5). The intermediate sections between San Benito and Muhan, totaling about 170 km were to be rehabilitated under separate projects financed by DANIDA and IDB. 2. Road Maintenance. This component included provisions for implementation of both routine and periodic maintenance by contract. It consisted of: (i) piloting road periodic maintenance implementation by private contractors, and (ii) expanding the routine road maintenance program by micro enterprises. The latter sub-component included funds for training, promotional activities, training material, goods, equipment and technical assistance (TA). 3. Consultant services, TA, training and studies. This included consulting services to assist the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (MTI) in the supervision of civil works, preparation of engineering designs, and studies for road safety improvement and reforestation near the Rama section. The project also included technical assistance aimed at: (i) strengthening MTI’s planning and programming capacity through the implementation of 3-year rolling investment plans based on priorities defined by using the HDM model; (ii) improving the capacity of the MTI environmental unit; (iii) installation of a Pavement Management System within the Directorate of Road Administration (DRA); (iv) strengthening the management of road maintenance program by contract, including design, supervision and staff training; and (v) the establishment of a Road Maintenance Fund (RMF).

3.4 Revised Components:The revised component included the restructuring of project investments. Under the road rehabilitation component, the Rama Section from Muhan to El Rama was cancelled (but it was subsequently funded under the Third Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project CR-3464-NI). Then, the original funds were reallocated for the Emergency Program. This program consisted of developing a workable plan for reconstruction of affected transport infrastructure, specially focusing in road re-opening and repair plan for trunk roads and bridges.

3.5 Quality at Entry:The project's design was consistent with IDA’s Country Assistance Strategy and transport sector work and the Government’s transport priorities. Also, it was well coordinated with other donors such as the IDB and DANIDA. The project’s implementation arrangements were well conceived and detailed in the PAD and in

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the project’s operational manual. Design of the project was based mainly on the experience and lessons learned under the first road transport project (CR-2871-NI) which had been executed very satisfactorily. Furthermore, the project design had a certain degree of flexibility which allowed it to respond to changing needs.

This proved to be important to deal with emergencies, especially the contracting of local community modules for emergency road maintenance and stabilization works during difficult times in rural zones. Overall, the project was well designed and had adequate executing arrangements that were based mainly on developing MTI technical directorates and staff, rather than a group of consultants working in a typical Bank Project Implementation Unit.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:The achievement of project development objectives is rated highly satisfactory, because the project was very well implemented despite the fact that this was a time period when Nicaragua was devastated by natural emergencies as well as experiencing crippling economic and political crises. The original loan closing date of June 30, 2003 was extended twice. The first extension to June 30, was included in a 2004 amendment in order to ensure the full completion of the project, whose implementation phase was affected by natural disasters that were out of the control of the MTI and, at times, by the untimely provision of counterpart funds. Virtually all of the intended project outcomes and outputs have been achieved, including the implementation of the emergency program which had been broadened to include road restoration assistance after the Masaya earthquakes and drought in Las Segovias. The final extension to June, 24 2005 was needed to permit the orderly completion of various studies.

It is important to mention that the project objectives were not changed because of lack of disbursements or poor project performance, but rather in response to a crippling emergency due to Hurricane Mitch. The project achieved its outcomes highly satisfactorily not only in terms of the original components, which represented 53% of the credit amount, but also in terms of the Emergency Program, which represented 47%. Also, each component achieved effectively its outputs as planned and the IDA credit was fully disbursed.

(a) Improving the efficiency of road transportation in Nicaragua. This objective has been achieved very satisfactorily. The major civil works contract for the rehabilitation of the Pan American highway section between Managua and San Benito, which also serves as the first link of the Managua-El Rama corridor, was fully completed and in operation within the project implementation period and with no cost overruns. This highway section, which inter-alia links Managua to the International Airport, forms part of the strategic network connecting Nicaragua with other Central American countries, and is the principal road for exporting products to neighborhood countries. It is the most heavily trafficked road in Nicaragua, with upwards of 30,000 vpd in sections near Managua, and was a severely congested and highly inefficient transit arterial prior to the widening and reconstruction works carried out under the project. Therefore, its improvement responds to the original project objective to reduce transportation costs and travel times along key trunk roads. (b)Improving the management and implementation capacity for road maintenance. This objective has been achieved highly satisfactorily. The focus has been on improving the planning and prioritizing of annual rehabilitation and maintenance programs and on the training of MTI staff. The overall performance was very good given the legislative approval and subsequent beginning of operations of the Road Maintenance Fund (FOMAV), the continuation of excellent implementation of routine maintenance by

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microenterprises and the introduction of periodic maintenance by private contractors.

The project supported preparation, approval and startup operations of the Road Maintenance Fund (FOMAV) to help ensure sustainability of road investments in the sector. This has been a good achievement. Now, FOMAV is pooling resources not only from the government but also from other international organizations to carry out maintenance of core sections of the road network. Also, the project assisted in setting up the executive secretariat in charge of managing the FOMAV as well as provided technical assistance through the implementation of a pilot road periodic maintenance programs with private contractors. The efficiency of the sector has improved considerably and it is better off due to the creation of the FOMAV, which is fully operational, though not yet funded independently of the national budget.

Furthermore, the project successfully reoriented the Regional Highway Construction Agencies (COERCO) to a role that is more complementay to the use of private contractors and away from the traditional priority accorded by MTI to execution by force-account thereby leading to a reduction of staff levels and to promoting a policy of contracting out road rehabilitation and maintenance works.

It is worth noting that with the restructuring of COERCO and the creation of FOMAV, the suppliers for road improvement and maintenance works are now primarily from the private sector. Periodic and routine maintenance is contracted for the most part. The road fund, underpins the financing and supports the maintenance of the main road networks. In general terms, the suppliers are the entities responsible for road improvement services, which include: design, construction and maintenance. These entities are selected competitively and supervised by MTI or a private consulting firm. This has been a great achievement under the first and second projects, considering the starting point of a socialist, command type economy where there were little or no roles assigned to the private sector in the early 1990s.

With regards to road routine maintenance by contract, the project has continued supporting the use of micro-enterprises for trunk roads through community organization. With project financing, eleven micro-enterprises have been created and are fully operational providing services after the emergency reconstruction phase and other road programs established by MTI.

(c) Strengthening the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure’s planning and programming capacity. This objective has been achieved satisfactorily. There was a strong training and institutional development component to strengthen the capabilities of MTI in all aspects of planning and programming. Personnel of several directorates of MTI, including those for land transportation, Dirección General de Transporte Terrestre (DGTT), and for highways, Dirección General de Vialidad (DGV), were the main participants of this component. The training programs covered inter alia project design and evaluation, environmental and social assessments, planning, programming, and management. Emphasis was placed also on organizing a program with a Nicaraguan University for about 23 staff members to complete a master’s degree in engineering and transport planning; this proved to be very well received and has left the MTI with a cohort of staff with advanced degrees who can more effectively carry out their roles. In addition, 14 staff have completed courses in the HDM and Road Economic Decision-making (RED) models and have developed the appropriate project analysis and appraisal skills. Introduction of poverty assessment and environmental screening as part of project prioritization were new areas for developing MTI capacity. Under the project, MTI also developed manuals of practice that covered the environmental and social aspects of road projects.

Technical tools such as geographic information and pavement management system and other tools for transport planning, budgeting and financial management were developed or improved during project implementation. One good example of technical assistance was the strengthening of the environmental unit

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within MTI with newly trained staff; as a result, all major investments in the sector must now include an environmental impact analysis. Originally, this was a very weak area, with few staff, inadequate budget, insufficient facilities, and not fully integrated into the project preparation and implementation cycle.

(d) Assisting the Government in the Road Sector Reconstruction through an Emergency Program. The project also achieved highly successfully and satisfactorily the implementation of the emergency program formulated after Hurricane Mitch. This rating is justified because (i) basic transit was rapidly restored in key corridor roads and included the design and rebuilding of several bridges and more extensive road rehabilitation, including the removal of debris and patching of road sections; (ii) communication was also restored on secondary roads, essential to resuming agricultural production as well as for the continuity of activities of various economic sectors in the country; and (iii) private companies and community members participated in the execution of works, generating short-term employment.

Another important outcome was the implementation of the Road Stabilization component of the Emergency Program, whose goals were to: (i) restore transport infrastructure in selected zones; (ii) support Nicaragua's poverty reduction strategy; and (iii) strengthen national private contractors. The IDA’s initiative in developing it through “adoquines” stabilization was not only an appropriate solution for connecting networks (secondary and rural roads) but also a mechanism to generate productive short-term employment, especially during difficult emergency situations. Other benefits included better quality of maintenance, participation of small businesses, use of local materials, and minimal environmental impact (see Box 1 below). These results were highly acknowledged by MTI and by other international institutions. The Government subsequently embraced the road stabilization program and expanded it considerably with the help of funds from other donors. Also, municipal authorities expressed their preference for this type of solution and offered support for the road stabilization program.

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Box 1. Adoquin (paving stone) roads can be targeted to the rural poor with significant spill-oversAdoquinado was used immediately after Hurricane Mitch to restore 70.3 km of secondary and tertiary roads in a cost-effective manner under the Hurricane Emergency program. The overall goal of the adoquine (small, octogonal pre-fabricated paving stones) stabilization approach was to restore, in a timely and cost-effective manner, formerly gravel paved secondary and rural roads that were literally shredded by Hurricane Mitch. Laying adoquines in the road bed is a readily disseminated technique which enabled local enterprises to pave the winding roads in the typically hilly terrain of the project areas in a manner consistent with road engineering requirements for complex horizontal and vertical curves, superelevation, load bearing capacity, etc. Similar to traditional asphalt paving, the adoquine program has yielded benefits such as reducing transport costs, eliminating health-threatening suspended dust clouds, improving rural accessibility and transport services, and facilitating access to health, educational and social services. Better still, adoquines provide most of these benefits at much less than half the cost of asphalt paving; they also offer a better all weather surface than gravel roads. Adoquines are also more appropriate than gravel surfacing for the transport needs of the poor because year-round the adoquined roads can more readily facilitate walking, bicycling, or other non-motorized transportation (NMT) modes. The most important economic advantages of adoquines are: (i) costs are lower than asphalt; (ii) roads require little maintenance; (iii) no major equipment is required either to build or maintain them; (iv) the adoquin roads can resist floods better than asphalt; (v) the technology is simple and the skills developed by local people can be applied to house building and/or community projects; (vi) supervision costs are about one-half of those for an asphalt or gravel paved road; and (vii) adoquin roads can be built faster than asphalt. In addition, both the production of adouqines and their placement on the road bed are highly labor intensive operations. For example, the labor content of their placement has been estimated to be as high as 45% of total cost. Unlike other pavement techniques, most of the labor force could be unskilled. Adoquinado proved to be more than a cost-effective solution to improve rural accessibility and reduce vehicle operating costs with little or no environmental impact. A beneficiary assessment highlighted the significant spill-over benefits of adoquin roads, such as increasing utilization of health and educational facilities, improving health status (by eliminating heavy dust clouds in the dry season and slippery/muddy surfaces in the rainy season) and promoting job creation.The adoquinado pilot also promoted local development by using local materials, labor and technology, and improved community and local involvement in planning and decision-making in sub-project selection and design, potentially increasing sustainability in the long-run. In sum, adoquinado increases the possibilities for providing all-weather roads for smaller, poorer population centers that would not normally have enough vehicular traffict to qualify for the more costly asphalt road. Source: Nicaragua Poverty Assessment Report No. 20488, 2001

As mentioned earlier, the Emergency Program was designed and implemented in the areas affected by Hurricane Mitch as well as for roads damaged in areas affected by the earthquakes in the Masaya region, and El Niño in Las Segovias. This component is rated so highly also, not only because of the excellent outcomes but also because Nicaragua's emergency road reconstruction program was one of the best implemented in a region where many of the countries that were affected by Hurricane Mitch also undertook such emergency programs.

4.2 Outputs by components:The overall assessment of the project outputs is rated as highly satisfactory. Under the Rehabilitation component, the rehabilitation of the Managua – San Benito – San Lorenzo – Muhan – EL Rama road (290 km) was to be executed under parallel financing of the IDA, IDB, and DANIDA, at a total cost of US$ 72.1 million. The IDA credit was intended originally to finance the rehabilitation components for the Managua – San Benito and the Muhan – El Rama sections, for which US$ 26.1 million were assigned. Following the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch, the section from Muhan to El Rama (90.5 km) was cancelled due to the need to reallocate funds for the emergency program, and only the road section from Managua (actually Portezuelo) – San Benito, totaling 29.3 km, was financed and completed very successfully under this project by the end of 2002. This road section a major segment of the Pan American Highway and had fallen into a state of severe disrepair; hence its rehabilitation was timely and economically important. It is also worthwhile mentioning that the entire Managua - El Rama road was

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eventually rehabilitated. The San Benito – San Lorenzo and San Lorenzo - Muhan sections were completed as planned under Danida and IDB-financed projects respectively, while the Muhan – El Rama section was completed under the Third IDA Project (CR3464-NI).

Under the road maintenance component, there were three sub-components: (i) routine maintenance by micro-enterprises (ME), (ii) periodic maintenance by private contractors, and (iii) maintenance works by FOMAV.

In relation to the first sub-component, the goal was to form an additional 10 micro-enterprises to the 12 established under the First Project (CR2871-NI) and to maintain an additional 600 km of roads. Eleven additional micro-enterprises were formed, serving slightly over 660 additional km per year. The performance of the microenterprises has been very satisfactory and the project's routine road maintenance goals are being met or exceeded. With regards to employment generation, the micro-enterprise program employed 352 people, and produced indirect benefits for about 2460 persons. Among activities carried out by the micro-enterprises are cleaning the roadway, clearing and building road drains, channeling run-off water, cleaning bridges, controlling vegetation and clearing gutters and landslides.

With regards to the second sub-component, the Managua – Jinotepe segment of the Southern highway was selected for periodic maintenance with participation of a private contractor. This was innovative for Nicaragua because periodic maintenance was carried out previously only by the COERCO. With technical assistance financed under the project, a feasibility study and standard procurement documents were defined. During the implementation and due to road´s functional and structural conditions and to the traffic demand (TPDA > 8000), it was decided to use new technologies, construction procedures and materials in order to achieve a more durable performance for crack-filling, patching, and asphalt-covering works. Works were concluded in April 2001 satisfactorily by the private firm, and periodic monitoring has been conducted through the MTI's Pavement Management Unit (PMS). With these new construction procedures, it can be stated that during the first two years no reflection cracks have appeared (with the traditional method, cracks would be visible within six months). Thus, the results of this sub-component were successful in terms of introducing the outsourcing for road periodic maintenance with the participation of the private sector and the introduction of new technologies.

In relation to the third sub-component, an important achievement was the approval of the Law for the creation of the Road Maintenance Fund (FOMAV) in late 2000. The establishment and initial operations of the FOMAV were subsequently carried out very well and it has attained a positive public image. There will be a gradual transfer of maintenance responsibilities from the MTI to the FOMAV and, so far, its road maintenance programs cover the periodic and emergency needs of about 40% of the core network and are co-financed partially by IDA and other donors. However, plans are underway to modify its enabling law so as to make provisions for funding its programs through a dedicated fuel surcharge. This will help to ensure the funding of FOMAV in a more predictable and sustainable manner and to extend its coverage to 100% of the core network.

Under the Emergency Program component. The Emergency Program comprised mainly: (i) cleaning and removal of bottlenecks along the damaged roads, so as to allow the resumption of land transport; (ii) completion of the restoration of some of the affected roads. Most of the funds assigned were used in restoring roads, bridges, and building temporary bypasses at or near former bridge sites. As mentioned earlier, a very important component of the emergency program was the secondary road stabilization program (implementation with adoquines). The emergency program was expanded to help restore and repair damages caused to the road network by the Masaya earthquake and by El Niño in Las Segovias. The restoration and repair strategy was geared to using unskilled labor. In order to implement this strategy, the

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Borrower and IDA made arrangements to use emergency community modules, developed by MTI. Some of the sub-projects or outputs developed are presented in the table below.

Subprojects Emergency Program OutputsNº of Private Firms

InvolvedUnits

(kms.)Estimated Total Cost.

(US$000)

Restoration of Secondary Roads 17 306.5 1,914.02

Strengthening of Corinto Sea Wall 1 15,000 m3 81.98

Cleaning and Reopening of Trunk and Secondary Roads through Community Emergency Works Modules (MCTE)

40 1,081.5 1,666.71

Restoration of the Izapa – León – Chinandega Road 1 5 1,273.61

Restoration of the Telica – El Jicaral – San Isidro Road 2 99 3,369.46

Bridge Protection at Tipitapa 2 934.64

Other Civil Works (bridges, bypasses, etc) 23 0.0 2,479.02

Restoration of Trunk and Secondary Rural Roads with MCTT Modules.

3 90.0 72.42

Pilot Road Adoquin Stabilization Phase I 46 52.0 6,842.52

Pilot Road Adoquin Stabilization Phase II 12 18.3 2,823.63

Restoration of rural tertiary roads 28 1,027.22 4,821.25

Restoration of Trunk and Secondary Roads with MCTI Modules

15 550 346.72

3,229.30 26,625.98

Considering Bank/IDA experience elsewhere with the typically slow implementation of post- emergency programs, the execution of the Nicaragua Hurricane Emergency Program was definitely an outstanding success.

Under the technical assistance and institutional strengthening component, there were two sub-components, one for goods and another for consultant services. The planned objectives of the TA, were accomplished through the strengthening of the management of the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU), the installation of a Pavement Management System, and the purchasing of equipment for the Environmental Unit. This component financed the purchases of: (i) the transportation equipment necessary to monitor rehabilitation and maintenance projects and emergency works; (ii) for PMS, specialized equipment -RONDAS- to measure roughness, vehicle counting equipment, odometers and mobile scales for weight control, in the road network; (iii) a Financial Administration Integrated System (SIAF) to improve project administration. This system comprised improved internal control of operations related to procurement, purchases, contracts, accounting, finance, disbursement, treasury, etc; and (iv) equipment for environmental management. For this sub-component, US$ 1.1 million was programmed, and only US$ 0.26 was executed. The actual executed amount is lower because priority was accorded to the emergency program.

Technical assistance for consulting services was focused mainly on: (i) technical assistance to the PCU; (ii) design and supervision of the road maintenance program; (iii) strengthening of planning and programming of MTI investment and maintenance plans; (iv) training and equipment for PMS, to supervise and analyze the condition of the road network; (v) consulting for feasibility studies and road design; (vi) studies for improvement of traffic safety, reforestation studies in the Rama area; and (vii) financial audits. For this subcomponent, US$ 5 million was assigned and US$ 6.58 million executed with credit resources, plus US$ 0.99 million of local contribution.

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Training and Institutional Strengthening component: the goals of this component were achieved very satisfactorily. Directorates of MTI for planning, programming, supervision, and environmental management (DGP, DGV, and UA) were strengthened. Their personnel has achieved experience in project management and assessment systems, specialized measurement equipment, procurement norms and procedures in compliance with IDA, and a strengthened PMS.

Also, micro-entrepreneurs were trained in road maintenance: organizational aspects, teamwork, administration, programming, costs, accounting, report writing, legal and tax affairs, and administration of their contracts. Apart from the advanced university training for a cohort of MTI engineers, an additional 34 national training events were conducted with an attendance of 342 people, and 13 international events with the participation of 29 MTI staff. For this component, US$ 0.8 million was programmed, and US$ 0.38 million executed for institutional training and US$ 0.19 million for ME training.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:Upon completion, the Borrower, having now developed the appropriate capacity, undertook ex-post evaluation analysis using the same methodology and parameters as employed in the PAD. The internal economic rate of return (IERR) for the road rehabilitation component was calculated and found to be higher than expected, confirming that the road rehabilitation component achieved an acceptable level of net benefits. For the Portezuelo – La Subasta, La Subasta – Airport, Airport – La Garita, and La Garita – San Benito sections, the IERR were 64.3%, 54.5%, 176.4% and 60.1% respectively (see statistical tables Annex 3 Economic Costs and Benefits). The IERR are higher because the traffic of these sections increased substantially from 10,000-20,000 vpd, on average, at appraisal to between 26,143 and 39,500 vpd. The principal benefits in the “with the project” compared to the “without the project” include savings in vehicle operating costs and in travel time for passengers, and in maintenance costs. Non-quantifiable benefits include improvement in overall planning and programming procedures at MTI directorates.

Also, there will be significant road safety benefits due to the provision of wider shoulders to allow easier access for motorists in location with high roadside vending activities and also to separate bicycle and non-motorized traffic.

Road Stabilization (Adoquin) Program. The ex-post analysis was conducted using the RED model. The data were derived by the Planning unit (traffic, irregularity, geometry and surface type) and by the Adoquin Program unit (investment and maintenance streams). As a result of the assessment, an IERR of 45% was determined, with a NPV of US$ 11.27 million at a discount rate of 12 percent and a 15-year period. The measured road surface improvement was attained by reducing the road roughness index (IRI) to 5.3 m/km in contrast to the IRI before adoquin stabilization, which was over 16 m/km. This translates into a considerable reduction in vehicle operation costs.

The program yielded positive results related to: performance, reduction of future maintenance costs, road stabilization and employment of local resources (materials and labor). the Government proposed that this component be expanded as part of the Third and proposed Fourth projects.

4.4 Financial rate of return:N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:Through this Second project, IDA gradually continued to provide a significant contribution to the institutional development of the transport sector in Nicaragua. In particular the project: (i) assisted in setting up the administrative mechanism for the Road Maintenance Fund that was approved in late 2000 by

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the Government, as well as the creation of an institution in charge of the fund; (ii) improved the planning, funding and implementation of the road maintenance system by introducing periodic and routine maintenance through private contractors – this marked a significant departure from the typical MTI approach of using only the state construction companies (COERCO) for periodic, routine and emergency works; (iii) improved pavement management through training and installation of the Pavement Management System; (iv) strengthened capacity to implement civil works and secured efficient private sector service delivery through competition; (vi) supported a pilot road safety improvement study in key zones with high levels of accidents, and (vii) supported the building capacity at MTI. In regard to the latter, the technical assistance component of the project assisted the MTI in strengthening its road network planning and programming, which allowed the staff to develop and manage, through private participation, an annual rehabilitation and maintenance program. Also, the technical assistance provided training on road economic analysis, environmental assessment and traffic safety analysis. As a result, MTI is carrying out road investment analysis, incorporating detailed economic analyses through the use of HDM and RED models, and carrying out environmental evaluations to define appropriate rehabilitation standards, their associated economic worthiness, and environmental conditions for sustainable management of road improvement and maintenance programs.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:Hurricane Mitch. Heavy and unprecedented rainfall due to Hurricane Mitch partially delayed start up of civil works of the Airport - San Benito section as well as other investment components during 1998-1999.

Deterioration of macro-economic situation contributing to shortage of local counterpart funds. After Hurricane Mitch, IDA and other donor agencies took several measures to assist hurricane-affected countries in dealing with their macro-economic situation, especially with their debt service obligations. Also, for the economy of Nicaragua, it took several years to recover from the disaster and therefore, there were some problems with the timely provision of the counterpart funds, that were particularly acute during 1999-2003 period.

Weak Capacity of Local Contractors and Consultants.At times virtually all local firms were employed on the various programs and it was difficult for them to respond to the unprecedented demand for their services. Even more demanding for them was the need to comply with IDA requirements. This became a bottleneck as the effective capacity of local firms was less than the volume of output required. Since those were small, scattered works were unnatractive to foreign firms and work proceeded well but slowly with the local firms.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:Frequent turnover of key staff. During the implementation of the project, there were 5 Ministers and 7 Vice Ministers of MTI, 6 Directors of Highways and 2 Directors of Planning. Overall combined staff turnover amounted to about 28 in the higher level staff in MTI dealing with the project. As a result, decision making and implementation processes were affected throughout project implementation period. It is worth noting that the changes in personnel did not weaken the Government's commitment to project objectives.

Continuity of the Project Team at the PCU. Though changes took place within the MTI, the head of the technical team in charge of the project execution was maintained, albeit in differing positions, ensuring continuity of project activities and implementation.

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5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:PCU ability to adjust to changing circumstances. The project´s execution was designed in such a manner that most of the work was supported and performed by the Ministry’s directorates. Thus, the PCU showed remarkable ability to adjust the project to face upcoming challenges not only due to changes in administration but also to effective use of the resources available through reprogramming components and planned activities accordingly due to the emergencies. This permitted successful progress in implementation and in the achievement of project objectives.

Strong and productive dialogue between the MTI staff, IDA team and Donors. The quality of the dialogue between the client and IDA and donors allowed the PCU to overcome the difficulties that appeared in the early stages of project implementation. Between IDA and MTI teams, it was possible to adapt and reformulate the project quickly and respond to the changing realities such as Hurricane Mitch, the earthquake in Masaya, and the drought in Las Segovias, adjusting components and designing strategies to overcome these problems.

5.4 Costs and financing:Project costs are given in Annex 2 (Project costs by Component). Despite the natural disasters that affected the project during its implementation, the project costs were not significantly affected. The final project cost was US$ 59.1 million distributed as follows: road rehabilitation, US$ 14.92 million; road maintenance, US$ 9.01 million; Emergency Program, US$ 26.63 million; goods and materials, US$ 0.41 million; and consultant services and training, US$ 8.20 million. Similarly, the project was financed broadly as originally envisaged during appraisal with IDA providing US$ 48.19 million (there was an appreciation of the SDR during the project period) or about 81%, and the Government providing US$ 10.98 million or about 19% of the costs.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:Sustainability of the project’s outputs and outcomes is highly likely. First, the roads rehabilitated under the project are economically viable and unlike in the past, there are arrangements in place for their maintenance through the creation of the road maintenance fund. Second, other aspects of sustainability of outcomes that are equally important were strengthened or put in place under the project; e.g., enhancement of local management, planning and programming capacity, adoption of viable sector management strategies with participation of the private contractors by MTI, capacity building at MTI directorates and the numerous qualified small micro-enterprises capable of maintaining secondary and rural roads rehabilitated under the project.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:Transition arrangements for the project’s future operation are well in place and are being currently secured by a Third and proposed Fourth Bank-financed follow-up projects. Funds for the road maintenance programs to be managed by FOMAV have been assigned not only from the government´s budget but also from IDA, the IDB and other donor organizations. Institutional strengthening for the management of road maintenance continues to be one of the priorities under the Third project. The Muhan-El Rama section of the Atlantic corridor, not rehabilitated under the Second project, was completed subsequently under the Third project. New micro enterprises have been created and staff training continues to be one of key actions to be performed under the third project. In addition, IDA continues to promote long-term sustainability of the FOMAV by supporting amendments to its enabling law that could help to assure its funding.

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7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:Satisfactory. Overall, the IDA's performance during preparation was satisfactory. It engaged in fruitful dialogue with the Borrower and together they prepared the Second IDA-financed operation drawn from lessons learned in the First project. Project design was based on economic and sector work and appropriately responded to Nicaragua’s priorities and policies. There was a strong IDA effort to coordinate its interventions in key road corridors of the transport sector with ongoing efforts from other international financial organizations, particularly DANIDA and IDB.

7.2 Supervision:Highly Satisfactory. In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch devastated Central America killing about 9,000 people, leaving over 1 million homeless, causing massive damage to social and economic infrastructure and severely impacting the productive capacity of affected countries, especially Nicaragua and Honduras. IDA and the project team reacted very quickly to this event and responded with a strategy that involved assistance for short to medium-term road restoration programs. The IDA team, from the first day following the emergency, worked closely with the Government and MTI staff and the donor community in assessing damages, determining priorities and identifying sources of emergency financing. The task team promptly reprogrammed the ongoing Second Project and reallocated the funds needed. The emergency program designed with government counterparts was very successful and the amount reallocated was fully disbursed and achieved its purpose of restoring transitability to the road network in Nicaragua. Moreover, the project team was very creative by carrying out the reconstruction of many of the secondary and rural roads damaged by the hurricane and earthquake through the adoquin stabilization pilot.

The IDA team carried out numerous missions, supervising project implementation while providing technical assistance and advice to MTI. IDAprovided training for the procurement and financial management team of the PCU, thus promoting fiduciary compliance during project implementation. Also, IDA provided especial training in the use of HDM and the RED models to perform economic analysis for the staff of the MTI.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:IDA performance was highly satisfactory. This rating is supported by the project results and the achievement of objectives. One notable aspect was the task team performance which included not only its prompt and successful response to the damages of the hurricane, an earthquake, and a drought at Segovia, but also its ability to retain the project objectives, and to maintain cost control and targets using project supervision despite external emergencies, political changes, and the adverse macro-economic climate that prevailed for most of the project´s implementation period.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:The Borrower’s performance during the preparation stage is rated highly satisfactory. This rating takes into consideration that the Borrower, through MTI, carried out all project preparation activities, such as engineering designs and procurement related activities. The evaluation of road components used methodologies previously designed and tested during the First road project.

In particular, good use was made of the HDM III and RED models for economic analysis of the proposed road segments. MTI staff showed their strong support and great commitment to this project from the start.

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7.5 Government implementation performance:The Government implementation performance was highly satisfactory. In terms of implementation of the emergency program, the Government showed good management and strong commitment to implementing it within a reasonable period of time. It also showed adequate capacity to coordinate both the emergency works as well as the implementation of Managua – El Rama Road with other donors. This required coordinating the financing and implementation of multiple donor supported projects over a 3 year period. Furthermore, the government response showed strong commitment to implementing the institutional reform required to: (i) reduce gradually the regional construction parastatals (COERCO), (ii) improve the organization and management of MTI and (iii) provide sustainable maintenance arrangements for the road sector through the creation of the FOMAV.

7.6 Implementing Agency:During the reconstruction phase and despite the devastation of the economic environment due to Hurricane Mitch, the overall project management effort of the implementing agency was very good, and is rated highly satisfactory. The MTI performed and acted very quickly and effectively in restoring the most important transport links during emergencies. MTI successfully coordinated the assistance provided by donor countries and international organizations.

Also, MTI was very proactive in addressing bottlenecks or other problems, finding solutions with suppliers and contractors, and informing of results to stakeholders. This managerial capacity was key in achieving the outcomes of the project. Furthermore, MTI organized workshops, training sessions with consultants, contractors, suppliers and private banks to share lessons learnt. It is important to note that this approach is now used widely for MTI projects, including those financed by other donors, throughout Nicaragua, generating employment and removing bottlenecks at every stage of the project cycle.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:Borrower performance was highly satisfactory. The borrower fully “owned” the project from beginning to end, despite changes in administration. The borrower managed the emergencies well and was a very effective coordinator for the different donor’s agencies involved with the programs needed to restore economic conditions.

Also, it helped to establish the road maintenance fund, and provided employment through its organization and management of emergency community modules and micro enterprises.

8. Lessons Learned

Importance of a continued presence in the transport sector. IDA continued presence in the transport sector helped to enhance the supervision effectiveness and deepen understanding of transport issues. IDA has had a presence in the sector only since 1997 but it has been continuous and in particular has pursued the same objectives. This continued presence has permitted to strengthen the transport sector across the board through the introduction of innovative road stabilization programs, sound highway periodic and routine maintenance policies involving private sector participation and improving gradually MTI performance as promoter, regulator and supervisor of the sector.

IDA proactive participation. Proactive supervision and restructuring of the project as soon as critical emergencies occurred were essential to achieve the development objectives; in this particular case, at the start up of the project, quick response for restructuring together with innovative solution for restructuring components after emergencies was key to achieve not only transitability in the road network but also providing the opportunity of generating productive short-term employment and deploying technologies that were appropriate to Nicaragua.

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Road Stabilization Adoquin Program. This type of program offers several important advantages compared to other traditional road gravel or asphalt rehabilitation work methods. It reduces maintenance costs, increases the participation of small local business, uses local technology, uses local materials and has a very low environmental impact. In addition, it can be used as a mechanism to generate productive short-term employment under difficult emergency situations such as the ones occurred under the project.

Relevance of Borrower’s capacity to carry out donor coordination. When there is proper coordination among donor agencies and institutional organizations, it can help to ensure that efforts are not duplicated while providing leverage for investments. This requires strong capacity from the borrower’s side. In the case of the project, part of the achievements can be attributed to a good coordination between the borrower and IDB, DANIDA, IDA and others. Thus, lending operations should take this aspect into consideration at the start up of the project.

Success of micro-enterprises and indirect benefits. The micro-enterprises program was highly successful and enabled many previously unemployed rural families to obtain a steady income while carrying out economically justifiable road conservation works. Travelers and residents in the area have also supplied anecdotal evidence of the benefits of their work such as improved visibility around curves, improved sense of security, and less flooding from clogged drains. In addition the members of the micro-enterprises were often the only organized, trained and available work force present in many zones that were isolated after roads were severed by Hurricane Mitch. Their voluntary efforts not only in road clearing and opening, but also for other emergency relief tasks were indispensable to providing initial assistance to their devastated communities.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

I. Introducción

El presente documento constituye el Resumen Ejecutivo del Segundo Proyecto de Rehabilitación y Mantenimiento de Carreteras (Proyecto), correspondiente al Convenio de Crédito CR-3085-NI, suscrito entre el Gobierno de Nicaragua (Prestatario) y la Asociación Internacional de Fomento (AIF) del Banco Mundial (BM), el 08 de julio de 1998. Este documento ha sido elaborado sobre la base del Informe Final del Proyecto presentado por la Dirección General de Vialidad del Ministerio de Transporte e Infraestructura de Nicaragua en enero de 2005, el cual muestra las metas programadas y los resultados actuales del Proyecto en los aspectos, técnicos, ambientales, económicos y legales; así como, los costos, montos y adquisiciones realizadas para cada categoría y componente del Proyecto. También, presenta la opinión del Prestatario respecto de los logros alcanzados, e información del sector Transporte.

El conocimiento y la experiencia adquirida en virtud del primer convenio de crédito CR-2871-NI han sido la base para lograr las metas establecidas en este segundo Proyecto, en términos de la calidad de la gestión; conocimiento del documento del Proyecto (PAD), del contenido del contrato de crédito, las normas y procedimiento de adquisición de obras, bienes, consultorías, desembolsos, administración financiera y auditoria. Ello ha permitido una eficiente y eficaz implementación del Proyecto.

El Proyecto tuvo como objetivo principal mejorar la eficiencia del transporte terrestre en Nicaragua y, como objetivos específicos: (i) apoyar el programa de rehabilitación vial de Nicaragua, especialmente el mejoramiento del tramo principal que une a la región Atlántica, (ii) mejorar la administración e implementación del mantenimiento de carreteras, y (iii) continuar fortaleciendo la planificación y

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programación en el Ministerio de Transporte e Infraestructura (MTI).

Cabe mencionar que como consecuencia del huracán Mitch, que afectó Nicaragua el 20 de octubre de 1998, se produjo un período de lluvias intensas, cuyos resultados fueron miles de fallecidos, casi un millón de damnificados y un sector transporte que sufrió daños superiores a los US$ 150 millones. Frente a ello, la AIF y el Gobierno de Nicaragua elaboraron un Programa de Rehabilitación Vial de Emergencia para la reparación de puentes y carreteras de segmentos claves de la red vial destruida. El programa se oficializó en el Convenio de Crédito a través de una enmienda (Componente Obras Viales de Emergencia) aprobada y firmada por el BM y aplicada al Proyecto a partir del 1º de noviembre de 1998.

Igualmente, durante la ejecución del Proyecto, ocurrieron otros fenómenos naturales, como el terremoto de Nicaragua y la sequía de Las Segovias, por lo que se implementó programas de restauración de caminos y de adoquinado para estabilizar las vías de las zonas afectadas por estos fenómenos.

II. Valoración de los Objetivos de Desarrollo, Diseño y Calidad de Entradas

2.1. Objetivo original

Los objetivos del Proyecto son consistentes con el EAP Nº 17496 del 9 abril de 1998, cuyo objetivo general era el de mejorar la eficiencia del sector transporte, apoyando e implementando un proyecto de mejoramiento en la carretera principal, específicamente secciones del corredor Managua – El Rama; mejorando la administración e implementación del mantenimiento de carreteras de forma planificada y sostenible; continuando con el fortalecimiento de la planificación y programación de las actividades del sector transporte del MTI, con la finalidad de que la infraestructura vial funcione como impulsador del desarrollo económico de los sectores agropecuarios, comercio, turismo, etc. Asimismo, respaldar los esfuerzos del Gobierno de Nicaragua, para llevar a cabo la transformación hacía una economía de mercado con miras a obtener crecimientos sostenibles y reducir la pobreza.

2.2. Objetivo real

El Proyecto ha sido desarrollado de forma altamente satisfactoria. Se ha logrado los objetivos programados y las metas físicas, financieras, ambientales y sociales.

Se mejoró el nivel de servicios a los usuarios -en cuanto a capacidad funcional y estructural- en la carretera principal de Portezuelo – Aeropuerto – San Benito; se restauró rápidamente las vías dañadas por el Mitch, lo que evitó grandes perdidas a la economía del país; se logró las metas físicas de mantenimiento periódico y rutinario, contando con un mayor número de microempresas (28 en total) y con la participación del sector privado en las actividades de mantenimiento periódico; y aplicando nuevas técnicas y materiales. Además, se promulgó en el 2001, la Ley 355 del FOMAV como iniciativa para el establecimiento del mantenimiento vial de forma planificada; se logró la reducción de la COERCO, tanto en tamaño como en su campo de acción o competencia; se profundizó el fortalecimiento institucional del MTI, capacitando a su personal mediante el curso del HDM, de la maestría de Transporte y otros cursos relacionados con las tareas del MTI y con manejo ambiental; y se creó la Unidad de Adquisiciones en el citado ministerio; también, se realizó el fortalecimiento institucional de las microempresas, capacitando a sus miembros con el objetivo de que mejoren su organización y gestión.

Debido a la destrucción de vías principales y caminos secundarios producida por el huracán Mitch, se modificó el componente Rehabilitación de la Carretera Muhan – El Rama y se reasignó los recursos en función de la restauración de las vías declaradas en emergencia. El apoyo de la AIF ayudó a definir una

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estrategia en dos fases para: (i) iniciar de inmediato las obras de restauración en los puntos críticos de las vías; y (ii) completar las obras de restauración de dichas vías. Según la UCP, con recursos del crédito se restauró más de 3 000 km de carreteras y caminos secundarios; además, se contó con la participación de empresas del sector privado, microempresas, módulos comunitarios de trabajo de emergencia (MCTE, MCTI, MCTT), etc. También se dio inicio al plan piloto de estabilización de vías secundarias dañadas por el Mitch, por el terremoto de Masaya y la sequía de Las Segovias (52 km más 18 km), utilizando adoquines, técnica mediante la cual se da una respuesta de largo plazo a los caminos rurales, se genera empleo no calificado local, se disminuye los recursos para el mantenimiento y se impulsa el desarrollo del sector privado, entre otros beneficios.

III. El Proyecto y sus Componentes

El costo estimado al tiempo de la evaluación del proyecto fue de US$ 54.1 millones, de los cuales US$ 47.4 millones corresponden al convenio de crédito CR-3085 NI, estos montos no incluyen impuestos ni gastos operativos. El crédito fue distribuido en 5 categorías, de la siguiente forma: 1) Obras civiles: (a) Rehabilitación de la carretera Portezuelo – Aeropuerto de Managua (6.72 Km) y Aeropuerto – San Benito (23.03 Km.), para un total de 29.75 Kms. (b) Rehabilitación de la carretera Muhan – El Rama (90.3 Km.) no se realizó a causa de que estos recursos se utilizaron en obras de emergencias, (c) Mantenimiento periódico (30 Kms), (d) Mantenimiento Rutinario (1,100 Km.), (e) Mantenimiento por el FOMAV, (f) Obras de emergencias de restauración. 2) Bienes, 3) Servicios de Consultorías, 4) Capacitación Institucional y Microempresas y FOMAV, 5) No asignados.

Por parte del Banco mundial, las secciones de Managua – Aeropuerto, Aeropuerto- San Benito han sido finalizados con fondos del CR 3085NI, y la sección de Muhan – El Rama ha sido terminada con fondos del CR-3464NI. La sección de San Benito – San Lorenzo, ha sido finalizada con recursos de DANIDA (US$ 39.0 millones) y la sección de San Lorenzo – Muhan finaliza en el mes de Abril del 2005, con recursos del BID (US$ 26.2 millones).

Los resultados de la implementación de este Plan de Emergencia (PE), fue altamente satisfactorio, considerando que se cumplió con el objetivo primario de restablecer la comunicación a corto plazo en las vías principales, un ejemplo de esto es la construcción del Puente de Tipitapa en tiempo record de 10 días, permitiendo atender los aspectos sociales y la circulación de los productos agropecuarios en estas vías. También, se restauró la comunicación en las vías secundarias permitiendo que hubiera continuidad con la actividad en los sectores económicos del país. Igualmente, la implementación de programas con participación de empresas privadas grandes y pequeñas, ejecución de obras pequeñas con miembros de la comunidad, los cuales generaron mucho empleo (MCTT, MCTE, MCTI, ME), en consistencia de las políticas centrales de generación de empleo y combatir la extrema pobreza.

Los servicios de consultoría y asistencia técnicas programadas son las siguientes: i) Asistencia técnica al EAT, ii) diseño y supervisión al programa general de mantenimiento de caminos, iii) fortalecimiento a la planificación y programación de los planes de inversión y de mantenimiento del MTI, iv) Capacitación y equipamiento al PMS, para supervisar y analizar la condición de la red vial, v) consultoría para los estudios de factibilidad y diseños de carreteras, vi) estudios para mejorar la seguridad vial, estudios de reforestación en el sector del Rama y vii) auditorias administrativas financieras externas.

Para el fortalecimiento institucional, los resultados generales son los siguientes: se realizaron 34 eventos nacionales con la participación de 342 participantes y 13 eventos internacionales con la participación de 29 funcionarios. El total es de 371 participantes con 47 diferentes cursos, seminarios y talleres.

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En cuanto a la capacitación de las microempresas se han capacitado más de 352 socio de la ME de mantenimiento vial. Los temas importantes de estos cursos y seminarios, están relacionados a los aspectos organizativos, trabajo en equipo, administración, programación, costos, contabilidad, preparación de informes, aspectos legales de impuestos y administración de sus contratos. De manera general podemos mencionar que ha habido más de 28 cambios en 7 años, del personal de la Dirección Superior, Direcciones Generales y Específicas. A pesar de ello, estos cambios no inducieron afectaciones sustanciales para el funcionamiento del MTI., ya que la capacitación ha sido continua a todos los niveles, y los técnicos del MTI, permanecieron al frente de las tareas más importantes de la gestión vial y del MTI.

La evaluación económica de los tramos: Portezuelo –La Subasta nos indica una TIR de 64.3%; para La Subasta – Aeropuerto la TIR es de 54.5%; para Aeropuerto – La Garita es de 176.4% y para La Garita – San Benito de 60.1%. De acuerdo a otra configuración del mismo tramo, se calculó que para el tramo Portezuelo – La Garita la TIR es de 182% y para La Garita – San Benito la TIR es de 60%, superiores a lo 47 y 22% que se calcularon inicialmente.

La rentabilidad global esperada con los proyectos de inversión contemplados en el convenio CR-3085 NI con un monto de US$ 26.7 millones de dólares se estimó en 23.5% de TIR con un VAN de US$ 14.8 millones. En cambio, la situación real refleja que habiendo invertido US$ 15.392 se obtienen indicadores en el orden de 71.2% de TIR y US$ 67.143 millones de VAN

Para los caminos rurales estabilizados con adoquines, se procedió a realizar el análisis haciendo uso del modelo RED. Para dicho análisis se utilizó información suministrada por el PMS (Tránsito, Irregularidad, Geometría y Tipo de Superficie) y Oficina del Programa de Adoquinado (Costo de Construcción por kilómetro). Como resultado de esta evaluación se obtuvo una TIR de 45% con un VAN de 11.274 millones de dólares a una tasa de descuento del 12% y un período de 15 años. Obteniéndose una mejoría en irregularidad de hasta 5.3 m/Km. en contraste del IRI inicial antes del adoquinado que es superior a 16.0 m/Km., representado una disminución considerable en los costos de operación vehicular.

IV. Experiencias y Resultados Obtenidos Durante la Implementación del Proyecto

El Proyecto logró todas las metas y objetivos planteados en términos de rehabilitación, mantenimiento y fortalecimiento institucional; a pesar de un inicio dificultoso debido a los daños sustanciales existentes en la red vial primaria y secundaria.

En cuanto al componente Rehabilitación de la Carretera Portezuelo – Aeropuerto - San Benito, se ha obtenido muy buenas experiencias relacionadas con los procesos constructivos (reciclaje y estabilización) y el tipo de material utilizado; ello ha permitido obtener costos menores en comparación con los procesos tradicionales. Se ha podido introducir, en este tipo de proyecto, el manejo de los impactos sociales por medio de un estudio especifico de impacto social, lo cual evitó que el Proyecto tuviera efectos negativos; También, se implementó obras para mejorar la seguridad vial, tanto de los peatones como de los vehículos motorizados y no motorizados.

Respecto al mantenimiento periódico, se ha obtenido mejores rendimientos de los materiales utilizados, lo que permite duplicar la vida útil de este tipo de intervención. Se introdujeron nuevas tecnologías para Nicaragua como el uso de emulsiones asfálticas con un aditivo látex para el sellado de grietas, y para el bacheo y el revestimiento asfáltico, mezclas asfálticas en caliente con asfalto AC-20 más un aditivo para mejorar la adherencia del mismo.

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El fortalecimiento y la continuidad de los programas de mantenimiento rutinario por medio de microempresas permite atender más de 1 800 km de carreteras y generar empleo permanente a más de 450 cabezas de familia y beneficios indirectos a más de 2 500 personas. Con relación al fortalecimiento de la empresa privada, tanto contratistas como consultores han adquirido mayores experiencias y conocimientos en proyectos viales. La capacitación del personal del MTI redundó a favor de su fortalecimiento institucional, pues se demostró calidad en la gestión de sus funcionarios (y de los del BM) para atender situaciones de emergencias (huracán Mitch) y sus daños colaterales, en términos de comunicación, coordinación y manejo de los contratos. Al finalizar el Proyecto, el MTI tiene más de 23 ingenieros capacitados mediante la Maestría de Transporte, más de diez funcionarios capacitados en el HDM-3 y 4 y a través de múltiples cursos y talleres, lo cual permite que el personal brinde una mejor atención y que los resultados sean de mayor calidad, considerando el tiempo y costo.

Otros logros son el fortalecimiento de la Unidad Ambiental y la formación de la Unidad de Adquisiciones en el MTI; la promulgación de la Ley del FOMAV; el diseño e implementación del sistema integrado de administración de proyectos; el estudio de la reforestación de la microcuenca de Mohagany, como una medida compensatoria por los impactos producidos por la rehabilitación de la carretera Managua – El Rama; y el fortalecimiento del área de planificación del MTI.

V. Papel del Banco Mundial

El papel del BM en el fortalecimiento del sector transporte ha sido importante; en especial, respecto al desarrollo y modernización del la red vial, como un factor indispensable para el progreso económico y social del país. La participación del BM ha sido excelente durante las fases de identificación, implementación y evaluación final del Proyecto, el cual contiene los elementos indispensables para el desarrollo del sector: rehabilitación, mantenimiento, fortalecimiento institucional, etc.

Durante la emergencia producida por el Mitch, el BM apoyó el diseño y la gestión de la estrategia para la restauración de las obras, de la asignación de recursos y de las misiones de evaluación y supervisión. En la preparación del Convenio de Crédito, participaron más de siete de sus especialistas, bajo la coordinación del Task Manager del sector transporte para Nicaragua. Durante la implementación del Proyecto, se realizó más de 31 misiones de evaluación, supervisión y de identificación; de las cuales nueve estuvieron relacionadas con el Mitch. El apoyo del BM fue determinante en la restauración de las vías en corto tiempo y, consecuentemente, en el reinicio de la comunicación y la disminución de los impactos sociales.

La comunicación con los especialistas del BM ha permitido fortalecer los conocimientos y adquirir experiencias útiles para el sector transporte.

VI. Papel del Prestatario

El papel del Prestatario durante la implementación del Proyecto fue satisfactorio: participó con los funcionarios del BM y con los consultores externos en la preparación e implementación del Convenio de Crédito y en la adecuación de los objetivos del mismo -en términos de categoría, componentes y subcomponentes- a los objetivos del gobierno central. Igualmente, su participación durante la etapa de legalización del crédito y cumplimiento de las condiciones previas al primer desembolso fue muy efectiva y posibilitó que a finales de 1998, se realizara el primer desembolso para poder hacer frente a los costos de las obras de emergencia.

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El Prestatario logró las metas físicas y financieras, cumpliendo con las normas y procedimientos del BM e incluyendo los aspectos ambientales en los procesos constructivos de los proyectos ejecutados.

Los atrasos iniciales en el Proyecto -consecuencia de los daños producidos por el Mitch- llevaron al Prestatario, a través del MTI, a solicitar que se postergue la finalización del Convenio de Crédito, de junio de 2003 al 24 de junio de 2005. Esto le ha permitido cumplir principalmente con el componente de la Rehabilitación de caminos.

El Prestatario ha cumplido en términos de fomentar y aprobar la Ley del Fondo de Mantenimiento Vial (FOMAV), como parte de los objetivos planteados originalmente en el Convenio de Crédito. No obstante, es necesario reformar dicha ley para garantizar el recurso financiero que permita la sostenibilidad del sistema total de gestión vial.

Asimismo, el Prestatario ha dado una especial atención entre los años 1998-2002 a la red vial, lo cual se observa en la asignación de recursos al sector transporte para restaurar los daños del huracán Mitch, cubrir la contrapartida local para los créditos con los donantes y el mantenimiento vial El detalle de los recursos asignados se encuentra en el Informe Final del Proyecto.

Cabe mencionar la gestión de la UCP fue altamente satisfactoria en la administración de los componentes del proyecto y en la continua coordinación interna y externa con las dependencias de la DGV, para ejecutar los componentes del Proyecto y tratar los correspondientes aspectos de planificación, ambientales, fortalecimiento institucional y conservación vial durante la implementación del Proyecto.

VII. Resumen de los Resultados

En general, las estrategias, políticas, objetivos y metas propuestos en el Informe del PAD, con sus enmiendas, fueron implementados altamente satisfactorios. Las obras civiles de rehabilitación, restauración y mantenimiento contribuyeron a la expansión y mejoramiento del servicio de transporte, reducción del COV (Costo Operativo Vial), seguridad en la red vial principal y secundaria. También, se ha logrado un relativo fortalecimiento técnico y gerencial del MTI.

El análisis económico de los proyectos de obra civil muestra que se logró las tasas de crecimiento y la rentabilidad de forma aceptable y que las tarifas de transporte disminuyeron en términos reales. También, la seguridad y los aspectos ambientales y sociales se han cumplido.

Durante la ejecución del Proyecto, el MTI ha implementado mejoras en su organización al fortalecer la Unidad Ambiental, crear la Unidad de Adquisiciones, fortalecer la planificación, el PMS, etc. y capacitar a sus recursos humanos para mejorar la atención de los usuarios y hacer más competitivo el sector transporte.

VIII. Operaciones Futuras

Actualmente, se ejecuta el tercer Convenio de Crédito CR-3464NI, por un monto de US$ 75 millones. Mediante éste, se modernizará y rehabilitará carreteras principales en los tramos Las Piedrecitas – Izapa y Muhan – El Rama; se realizará obras de mantenimiento rutinario, periódico, AT, asesorías para el diseño y supervisión, el fortalecimiento de las funciones de planificación y la estabilización de vías rurales (adoquinado).

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También, se está diseñando una cuarta operación de crédito similar a la anterior, cuyos objetivos guardan relación con el mejoramiento del transporte terrestre que se necesita para el desarrollo de clusters lecheros, de carne, turísticos, etc., para mejorar el desarrollo económico, generar empleo y fortalecer el sistema de mantenimiento de caminos.

IX. Factores que Afectaron la Implementación y Resultados del Proyecto

Entre estos factores, se encuentran: (i) debilidad de los procesos de planificación. Es necesario fortalecerlos integralmente para atender los proyectos con los temas ambientales, sociales, costos, indicadores económicos adecuados, en consistencia con lo señalado en la fase de factibilidad; (ii) baja incidencia, durante la fase de diseño del proyecto, en la utilización de procedimientos constructivos y nuevos materiales. Ello haría obtener mejores resultados en el costo, tiempo y calidad; (iii) revisión insuficiente de los documentos de licitación en correspondencia con las normas del BM y la Ley 323 de Nicaragua; (iv) los consultores de diseños y supervisión de obras no se hacen responsables por sus resultados y productos; (v) la capacitación en el MTI no se realiza continua y permanente, lo cual es necesario debido a la rotación del personal para garantizar la transmisión de conocimientos; (vi) la asignación de recursos de aporte local para los créditos con la AIF no siempre se realiza en correspondencia con la asignación o ejecución de fondos externos del crédito; (viii) falta aprobar la reforma de la Ley del FOMAV (355 del 2000) para establecer las fuentes de financiamiento de forma segura, sustancial y continua; y (viiii) hace falta la asignación de recursos financieros por parte del Gobierno de Nicaragua para el mantenimiento rutinario por medio de microempresas.

X. Relación del Proyecto con la Estrategia del Banco Mundial en el País y en el Sector

El Proyecto fue consistente con la Estrategia de Asistencia de País al atender la red vial de forma integral para que sirva de apoyo a los otros sectores de la economía, además de disminuir el desempleo y así contribuir a la lucha contra la pobreza. Cabe destacar que el Proyecto ha ayudado a recuperar y conservar el patrimonio vial y al fortalecimiento institucional del MTI.

XI. Relación del Proyecto con el Plan de Gobierno del Prestatario en el Sector

El Gobierno de Nicaragua dirige sus esfuerzos a desarrollar planes en la infraestructura del país para fomentar el desarrollo económico, establecer programas para reducir los índices de pobreza urbana y rural y utilizar los recursos en forma efectiva y eficiente.

Como paso fundamental, a través del MTI, el Gobierno de Nicaragua ha adoptado programas de mantenimiento rutinario con módulos comunitarios y el programa de adoquinado propuesto por la AIF, ya que éste permite la estabilización eficiente de las vías, reduce los costos de mantenimiento futuros y utiliza recursos nacionales, como mano de obra calificada y no calificada. En términos macroeconómicos, esto implica una reducción de la utilización de divisas, pues sólo el programa de adoquinado se cubre con recursos locales en un 84 por ciento.

También, se ha estado cumpliendo con el Acuerdo de Reestructuración Institucional – ARI, el cual fue suscrito por funcionarios del Gobierno de Nicaragua y funciona bajo la Vicepresidencia de la República. El ARI incluye entre otros compromisos: (i) la reingeniería de los procesos institucionales; (ii) el inventario de la infraestructura de transporte; (iii) el programa de capacitación institucional; (iv) la reestructuración y modernización de la COERCO; (vi) la implementación del Sistema de Evaluación de Servicios; y (vii) la implementación del FOMAV. El MTI ha cumplido con estos compromisos y se espera llegar a profundizar en ellos.

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XII. Supervisión del Banco Mundial Durante la Ejecución del Proyecto

El BM ha efectuado más de 31 misiones de evaluación, supervisión y control, gestión y apoyo, el prestatario manifiesta que el apoyo prestado ha sido excelente en los varios proyectos de rehabilitación y mantenimiento vial a la fecha. Además, cabe mencionar que frente a los desastres naturales, la Misión del BM actuó inmediatamente y apoyó intensamente en la reestructuración del Convenio CR-3085- NI, en la asignación de fondos para programas de emergencias y en la ejecución de las actividades de emergencia, logrando resultados altamente satisfactorios.

XIII. Situación Actual de los Compromisos Contractuales y del Plan de Acción Adquirido por el Gobierno ante el Banco

Se cumplió todos los compromisos y metas incluidos en el Convenio de Crédito. Se sobrepasó las metas en varios aspectos, ya que se incluyó nuevas actividades y se expandió las metas físicas. Específicamente, en el programa de mantenimiento, se implantó los módulos MCTE, MCTI, MCTT y se creó más organizaciones comunitarias, de lo previsto inicialmente, para el mantenimiento rutinario.

Igualmente, se estableció las bases para un programa de estabilización de vías secundarias utilizando adoquines, lo que posibilitó la atención de los caminos secundarios en las zonas de emergencia, utilización de materiales locales, generación de empleo y fortalecimiento del sector privado.

(b) Cofinanciers:N/A

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):N/A

10. Additional Information

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Annex 1a Annual Road Maintenance Targets

Item 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (prop)

1. MTI Road maintenance budget (US$ mill)

Target 12 14 16 20

Real 21.2 32.7 22.6 8.4 9.58 13.7 11.52. Amount allocated to contracts (US$ mill)

Target 2.4 4.6 6.4 10.0

Real 8.7 14.9 9.5 5.0 2.4 4.2 2.03. % Budget allocated to contracts Target 20 30 40 50

Real 41.0 45.6 42.1 59.7 25.1 30.7 17.44. Km. maintained by contract4.1 Routine Maintenance4.1.1 Paved Microenterprises Target 400 1,000 1,500 2,000

Real 819 1,065 1,954 1,972 1,885 1,954 1,367 Other Target 150 200 400 600

Real4.1.2 Unpaved Microenterprises Target 100 200 300 400

Real 1,593 341 424 813 396 437 201 Other Target 400 400 600 1,000

Real 1,043 1,409 45Total Target 1,050 1,800 2,800 4,000

Real 3,455 2,815 2,423 2,785 2,281 2,391 1,5684.2 Periodic Maintenance4.2.1 Paved Target 50 100 130 200

Real 99 18.5 16 23 96.64.2.2 Unpaved Target 75 100 125 200

RealTotal Target 125 200 255 400

Real 99 18.5 16 0 0 23 96.65. Cost by contract (US$ Mill)5.1 Routine Maintenance5.1.1 Paved Microenterprises Target 0.4 1.0 1.5 2.0

Real 0.7 1.0 1.6 4.4 2.0 1.9 1.1 Other Target 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0

Real 2.05.1.2 Unpaved Microenterprises Target 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Real 1.9 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 Other Target 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.6

Real 1.2 10.7 4.9Total Target 1.0 2.1 3.3 5.0

Real 5.8 12.4 6.9 5.0 2.4 2.3 1.35.2 Periodic Maintenance5.2.1 Paved Target 1.0 2.0 2.5 4.0

Real 2.9 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.75.2.2 Unpaved Target 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0

RealTotal Target 1.4 2.5 3.1 5.0

Real 2.9 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.7

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Annex 1bKey Performance Indicators/Log Framework

Key performance indicators Appraisal Estimate

Restructured Actual

A. Road Rehabilitation Km. Km. km.Managua Section Portezuelo – San Benito 29.3 29.3 29.72El Rama Section Muhan – La Gateada 20.0 Cancelled Cancelled La Gateada – Esperanza 61.3 Cancelled Cancelled Esperanza – El Rama 8.9 Cancelled CancelledB. Road MaintenanceKm maintained by contract Routine maintenance 9,650 17,718 Periodic Maintenance 980 253C. StudiesTechnical Assistance to the Technical Support Team ExecutedDesign and supervision of the overall Contract Maintenance Program ExecutedImprovement of planning and programming in the MTI Study 1 Study PerformedInstallation of the Pavement Management System ExecutedPreparation and updating of detailed engineering and for the supervision of components A and B

3 Study 3 Study Executed

Road Safety improvement Study Study PerformedReforestation near the Rama Section Study 1 Study PerformedInstitutional strengthening to MTI Training 47 Seminars

371 participantsExecuted

Microenterprises and RMF Training 1,118 participants28 ME, 40 MCTE, 3 MCTT y 15 MCTI

Executed

ME: Microenterprise, MCTE: Emergency Relief Community Module, MCTT: Earthquake Relief Community Module, MCTI: Flood Relief Module.

Annex 1cCondition of the Road Network

Type of surface Year KilometersLength Good Fair Bad

Paved 1998 1,717 103 464 1,1502004 2,096 985 657 554

Unpaved – Transitable all year 1998 7,152 418 1,936 4,7982004 9,033 78 1,610 7,345

Unpaved – Transitable in dry season 1998 8,277 - - 8,2772004 7,429 - 614 6,815

Total 1998 17,146 521 2,400 14,2252004 18,658 1,063 2,881 14,714

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Annex 2a Project Costs Estimated at Appraisal

Component AppraisalEstimate

Restructured ActualEstimate

Percentage of Appraisal

1. Road Rehabilitation 30.7 10.6 14.92 140.07Managua Section 10.6 10.6 14.92 140.07 Portezuelo-Airport 3.4 3.2 7.71 240.9 Airport-San Benito 7.4 7.4 7.21 97.4El Rama Section 20.1 0.02. Road Maintenance 11.1 11.0 9.01 81.9(a) Road Stabilization 4.0 4.0 4.92 123(b) Routine Maintenance 4.1 4.1 4.09 99.7(c) RMF Works 2.9 2.9 0.03. Goods and Materials 0.7 1.3 0.41 31.54. Consultant Services and Training

7.0 5.9 8.20 139

5. Emergency Plan 17.6 26.63 151.36. Unallocated 5.2 8.1 0TOTAL PROJECT COST 54.5 54.5 59.17 108.6

Annex 2b Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million)

Expenditure Categories Procurement MethodAppraisal Estimate

ICB NCB Other NBF Total1. Rehabilitation 33.6

(28.6)33.6

(28.6)2. Maintenance 7.6

(6.5)4.5

(3.6)12.1

(10.1)3. Emergency Plan4. Equipment 0.2

(0.2)0.5

(0.4)0.7

(0.6)5. Consulting Services 8.1

(8.1)8.1

(8.1)TOTAL 33.6

(28.6)7.8

(6.7)13.1

(12.1)54.5

(47.4)

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Annex 2c Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual Estimate) (US$ million)

Expenditure Categories Procurement MethodActual Estimate

ICB NCB Other NBF Total1. Rehabilitation 14.92

(12.40)14.92

(12.40)2. Maintenance 4.92

(3.35)4.09

(2.95)9.01

(6.30)3. Emergency Program 26.63

(22.08)26.63

(22.08)4. Equipment 0.20

(0.12)0.21

(0.14)0.41

(0.26)5. Consulting Services 8.20

(7.15)8.20

(7.15)TOTAL 14.92

(12.40)5.12

(3.47)39.13

(32.32)59.17

(48.19)

Annex 2d Project Financing by Component (US$ million)

Component Appraisal Estimate Restructured ActualIDA Govt. Total IDA Govt. Total IDA Govt. Total

1. Road Rehabilitation 26.1 4.6 30.7 9.0 1.6 10.6 12.40 2.52 14.92

Managua Section 9.0 1.6 10.6 9.0 1.6 10.6 12.40 2.52 14.92 Portezuelo-Airport 2.7 0.5 3.2 2.7 0.5 3.2 6.95 0.76 7.71 Airport-San Benito 6.3 1.1 7.4 6.3 1.1 7.4 5.45 1.76 7.21El Rama Section 17.1 3.0 20.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02. Road Maintenance 9.2 1.9 11.0 9.2 1.8 11.0 6.30 2.71 9.01 (a) Road Stabilization 3.4 0.6 4.0 3.4 0.6 4.0 2.95 1.14 4.09(b) Routine Maintenance 3.3 0.8 4.1 3.3 0.8 4.1 3.35 1.57 4.92(c) RMF Works 2.5 0.4 2.9 2.5 0.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.03. Goods and Materials 0.6 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.2 1.3 0.26 0.15 0.414. Studies and Technical Assistance

6.1 0.0 6.1 5.0 0.0 5.0 6.58 0.99 7.57

5. Training 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.56 0.06 0.63Staff Training 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.38 0.02 0.40Microenterprise & RMF Training 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.19 0.04 0.236. Emergency Program 17.6 0.0 17.6 22.0 4.5 26.5Repairing of Roads and Bridges 15.9 0.0 15.9 22.08 4.55 26.637. Unallocated 4.7 0.4 5.1 4.7 3.4 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0TOTAL PROJECT COST 47.4 7.1 54.5 47.4 7.1 54.5 48.19 10.98 59.17

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Annex 2e Financing (US$ million)

Estimated % Actual %IDA 47.4 86 48.19 81Local Counterpart 7.1 14 10.98 19TOTAL 54.5 100 59.17 100

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Estimate Actual

Component Km. Costs (US$ thousands

/Km.)

NPV (US$

million) IERR

Costs (US$ thousands

/Km.)

NPV (US$ million) IERR

A. Road Rehabilitation

Portezuelo – La Subasta 3.2 1450.47 17.009 64.3

La Subasta – Airport 3.5 1099.15 14.158 54.5

Airport – La Garita 3.60 220.00 2.0 87 298.13 14.224 176.4

La Garita - San Benito 19.70 200.00 3.2 22 298.13 28.233 60.1

Muhan - La Gateada 20.00 160.00 3.0 25

La Gateada - La Esperanza 61.30 150.00 5.5 20

La Esperanza - El Rama 8.90 175.00 1.1 22

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation11/24/1997 3 SECTOR LEADER (1);

COUNTRY DIRECTOR (1); CONSULTANT (1)

01/19/1998

02/02/1998

1

1

HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1)

CONSULTANT (1)

Appraisal/Negotiation03/25/1998 2 TASK MANAGER

(1);LEAD COUNSEL (1)

05/10/1998

06/06/1998

05/17/1998

05/25/1998

06/23/1998

2

1

1

1

1

MISSION LEADER (1); CONSULTANT (1)

I.T. TRANSPORT (1)

GIBBS CONSULTANT (1)

CONSULTANT (1)

CONSULTANT (1)

Supervision

01/16/1999 2 TASK MANAGER (1); PROCUREMENT ANALYST (1)

S S

05/14/1999 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S06/22/1999 2 TASK MANAGER (1);

PROJECTS ASS'T (1)S S

10/10/1999 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S04/01/2000 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S02/09/2001 1 TASK MANAGER (1) S S06/15/2001 2 TASK MANAGER (1);

PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1)

S S

05/17/2002 1 ENGINEER (1) S S11/15/2002 3 ENGINEER (1); SOCIOLOGIST

(2)S S

04/28/2003 4 FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); CONSULTANT (3)

S S

12/05/2003 3 FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); ENGINEER (1)

S S

08/18/2004 2 FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); S

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CONSULTANT (1)S

11/12/2004

04/18/2005

2

2

TASK MANAGER (1);ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALIST (1); CONSULTANT (1)TASK MANAGER (1);

S S

ICR04/14/2005 1 CONSULTANT (1)

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 11.3 62.2Appraisal/Negotiation 2.8 8.7Supervision 61.64 310.42ICR 9.93 58.03Total 85.67 439.35

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

PAD del 28 de abril de 1998.1.Convenio de Crédito 3085 NI, del 8 de julio de 1998.2.Informe de Evaluación Final, Segundo Proyecto de Rehabilitación y Mantenimiento de Carreteras, 3.Crédito CR-3085-NI, enero 2005 Plan Nacional de Transporte 1998.4.Censos Nacionales 1995 INEC5.Estudios de mejoras y Rehabilitación Vial en Nicaragua JICA 1994.6.Enmienda de obras de Emergencias, de noviembre de 1998.7.Enmienda del 18 de junio del 2002.8.Ayuda Memoria: Misión de Evaluación de la Administración Financiera; Managua, Febrero de 1998.9.Modelos de Cobros de Usuarios de Carretera - Costos de Usuarios de Carreteras, Nicaragua, Enero de 10.1998.Evaluación Socio Ambiental de la Rehabilitación de la Carretera Muhan - El Rama; M. Basterrechea, 11.Programa de Rehabilitación Vial; Managua.Programa de Rehabilitación Vial: Managua – El Rama, LAVIAL, versión 15 de febrero de 1998.12.Estudio de Factibilidad para la Rehabilitación de la Carretera Managua - El Rama, Informe Final, 13.Vols. I, II, III; enero 1997, Consultores CARL BRO Internacional A/S en asociación con CISCONCO Ingenieros Consultores.Actualización del Estudio de Factibilidad para la Rehabilitación de la Carretera Managua - El Rama, 14.Sección Santo Tomás-El Rama; junio 1997, Consultores Louis Berger Internacional Inc.Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Carretera Managua - El Rama; Implicaciones para Traslado de Carga 15.Marítima; Evaluación del Personal del Banco, marzo 1998.

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