the uk future nuclear deterrent - the submarine - parlimentary report

8/6/2019 The UK Future Nuclear Deterrent - The Submarine - Parlimentary Report

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Initial Gate Parliamentary Report

The Submarine Initial Gate Parliamentary Report

The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent:

May 2011




1. Aim of the Report The aim o this report is to outline:

y The work that has taken place since the Parliamentaryvote o March 2007;

y The decisions taken at Initial Gate; and,

y The next steps that will be taken in the coming monthsand years to ensure the successul delivery o a successornuclear deterrent.




2. Background2.1 The 2006 White Paper

In December 2006, the Ministry o Deence (MOD) publisheda White Paper1 “The Future o the United Kingdom’s NuclearDeterrent”, which set out the conclusions o studies intowhether the United Kingdom still required a nucleardeterrent and, i so, how that nuclear deterrent might best bedelivered. The White Paper concluded that, whilst at the timethere was no nation with both the capability and intent to

threaten the independence or integrity o the UK, we couldnot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threatto the UK might re-emerge despite our work to counterprolieration. The White Paper also concluded that, o thepotential ways o delivering a nuclear deterrent capability,the most eective system was a urther class o submarinescarrying ballistic missiles. In March 2007 a Parliamentary voteendorsed the conclusions o the White Paper.

Since the 2007 Parliamentary debate the MOD hasundertaken design work with the aim o allowing a down-selection to a single submarine design at Initial Gate – therst key decision point in the MOD’s procurement process. The White Paper identied three main investment strands:the submarine, the warhead and supporting inrastructure.At the present time the replacement submarine is the mainocus o work and this report concentrates on the progress o that aspect o the programme.

2.2 Strategic Defence and Security Review andValue for Money Review

Whilst the Coalition remains committed to maintaining andreplacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent, one o the rst decisionswas to instigate a value or money review o the nucleardeterrent programme. The review was wide ranging,scrutinising the arrangements or the current nucleardeterrent as well as plans or the successor system. The reviewcovered: the replacement programme timetable, the numbero missiles, missile tubes and warheads required to deliver aminimum credible deterrent; the associated inrastructureand other support costs; and the industrial supply chain andcommercial arrangements.

The ull outcomes o the review, which saved or deerred over£3 Billion o expenditure over the next ten years, werepublished in Chapter 3 o the Strategic Deence and SecurityReview2. The outcomes most relevant to the next generationsubmarine were:

y A deerral o the delivery o the rst submarine rom 2024until 2028 and a deerral o the Main Gate decision point(which is also the most suitable time to decide on thenumber o submarines required) to 2016.

y A reduction in the number o operational missiles carriedto eight, which in total would carry no more than 40operational warheads.

y Agreement with the United States on the major

parameters o the jointly-developed common missilecompartment design that will be capable o carrying thecurrent Trident D5 missiles and any replacement missileonce the D5 reaches the end o its expected lie in the2040s.

y The instigation o a programme (known as the SubmarineEnterprise Perormance Programme) to reduce costs,improve perormance and ensure the sustainability o theUK’s submarine industrial enterprise.

1 The Future o the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (Cm6994) http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4e3-91a1-6a56b03c092/0/deencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pd

2 Securing Britain in an Age o Uncertainty: The Strategic Deence andSecurity Review (Cm7948) http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pd

http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b03c092f/0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf



http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf










3. Progress on the

Submarine Programme3.1 Initial Gate Decisions

The programme to replace the nuclear deterrent is one o thelargest and most complex the MOD has undertaken. TheDepartment has completed the initial phase o conceptanalysis, which addressed the technical issues associated withpotential designs and set out the work that will be required inthe next phase, known as the Assessment Phase. The keyareas covered were:

y The Submarine Design. A nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) such as the Astute Class is designed to bemanoeuvrable and ast. In comparison, nuclear-poweredballistic missile submarines (known as SSBNs) housingmissiles over 13 metres in length have historically beenaround twice the size o attack submarines. Nonethelessthere are similarities between the dierent classes o submarine and a number o systems rom the Astute Classdesign have been incorporated within the design o thesuccessor submarine. This ‘pull through’ o proventechnology reduces costs as well as design and delivery

risk or the successor deterrent submarine and ensurescommonality in training and maintenance.

However, we must also be mindul o the opportunitiespresented by technological developments since thedesign o Astute and the requirement to sustain thecapability throughout the lie o the submarine out untilthe 2060s in order to deliver a design optimised to theunique role o a nuclear-armed submarine. Thereore, weare taking the opportunity to incorporate a new nuclearpropulsion design as well as ensuring there is sucientfexibility and accommodation in the design to deliverthrough-lie upgrades.

y The Propulsion System. The Pressurised Water Reactors(PWR) used in submarines work by using nuclear ssion togenerate heat, which is then used to turn water into steamto turn the main turbines that propel the submarinethrough the water. There were three PWR options:

- PWR2 is used in the Vanguard and Astute submarineClasses. It is a sae and reliable design that hasserved, and will continue to serve, the Royal Navy

well but it is based on design eatures andtechnology that can now be improved upon;

- PWR2b is a development o PWR2 seeking to increasePWR2’s perormance urther. However the cost o these improvements is roughly the same as the cost o developing a new design, PWR3; and,

- PWR3 is a new design that exploits technology thatwas not available when the Astute design wasnalised. Through simpler design it is easier to operate,has a longer in-service lie and lower through-liemaintenance costs. In addition the introduction o thenew design means that it is practicable to implement

urther improvements to saety.When considering options a number o actors were takeninto account including:

- Capability: The ability o the options to meet therequired capability (a 25 year lie with the option o atleast a ve year extension and suitably lowdetectability);

- Availability: The complexity and maintainability o thepropulsion plant (and thereore the submarine);

- Saety: The Health and Saety at Work Act places a legalobligation on MOD Duty Holders and IndustrySuppliers to ensure that the risk to the public and

employees is reduced As Low As ReasonablyPracticable (ALARP);

- Cost: Both in procurement and through-lie costs; and,

- Schedule: The condence o delivering the option tothe required timeline.

Ater careul consideration PWR3 was chosen. PWR3 providessuperior perormance over PWR2. In availability terms thesimplicity o PWR3 and the application o modern designpractices and newly matured technology will signicantlyreduce periods in upkeep and maintenance. A particularlyimportant issue was saety. Nuclear propulsion plants areextremely sae and our nuclear systems are assessed by the

Deence Nuclear Saety Regulator to ensure this remainsthe case. However, this is a new design o submarine andunder Health and Saety legislation we are required to look at whether perormance can be improved even urther. Inthis case PWR3 oers improvements over PWR2. Thatdoes not mean that current systems are unsae. All ourpropulsion plants meet the stringent saety standards thathave been set by the Deence Nuclear Saety Regulator, butas we move to a new class o submarine the requirement tocontinually improve our perormance and to meet ‘ALARP’ isonly met through PWR3.

In terms o cost, submarines with PWR3 are around

£50 Million per boat more expensive to buy and operate overdesigns incorporating PWR2 over a 25 year lie but wouldbe cheaper i we were to operate the deterrent submarinesor longer because o PWR3’s longer lie. We judge that thisinvestment is worth making given the perormanceand wider benets oered by PWR3.




y The Common Missile Compartment (CMC). We use the

same Trident D5 ballistic missile as the US and there iscommonality between systems used in our currentVanguard Class and the US Ohio Class submarines or thestorage and ring o those missiles. In 2007, with the UK and the US both in the process o replacing our existingnuclear-armed submarines, it was agreed to develop aCMC that could be tted to both our replacementsubmarines. By working collaboratively with the US, theUK is able to share the costs o designing, building andintegrating a missile compartment and ensure bothcommonality with the current Trident D5 ballistic missileand any potential replacement missile.

Our successor submarines will have only eightoperational missiles but it is clear rom work to date thatthe cost o the missile compartment will be minimisedby keeping as much o the design as possible commonwith the US. The baseline design or the CMC is a 12 tubeunit and work is ongoing with the US to look at how bestto include our requirement or eight operational missilesinto this design.




4. Future Work

4.1 The Forward Work Plan

During the Assessment Phase a considerable amount o work is required to mature the submarine design and prepare orthe building o the submarines. Work is split into theollowing strands:

y Design and engineering: In line with best practice a

design level o around 70% maturity will be reachedacross the overall submarine design so that build cancommence ater Main Gate without the expectation o having to redesign, which then adds delay and cost.

y Long lead items: As with almost all large-scale complexprogrammes it will be necessary to procure some parts inadvance to ensure their availability or when thesubmarine build is commenced so the boats can bedelivered to schedule. Spend on long lead items hasbeen minimised and we expect to spend:

- £380M or the rst boat split between the propulsion,main boat systems and steel;

- £145M or the second boat or propulsionsystems; and,

- £6M or the third boat also or propulsion systems.

No long lead parts will be procured or the ourth boat as adecision will not be required or this boat until Main Gatein 2016.

y Production preparation: The replacement submarinesare considerably larger than the Astute Class submarinescurrently being built. Some increases will be required inthe shipyard’s workorce, acilities and equipment.

y Technology development: There are some areas wherenew or emerging technology is planned includingcommunications, tactical weapons systems, batteries andstructural materials. Work will start to develop thesecomponents so that they can be incorporated into thedesign at an acceptable level o risk.

y Inormation and knowledge management: Improvementsin design sotware and shared working environments will

enable secure exchange o data between all parties, manyo whom are located in diverse geographical locations,including our missile compartment team which is basedin the US.

y Project management: An Integrated ProgrammeManagement Team (IPMT) will be established to overseethe work schedule, costs and risks and to managerelationships between MOD and the main industrypartners. We will also look to develop improvedcollaborative arrangements with the three Tier 1 industrialpartners (BAE Systems, Babcock and Rolls-Royce).

The ability to work coherently and collectively across all

elements o the delivery team and industry will be key tosuccessul delivery o the programme. The utureprogramme control arrangements are thereore centredon the IPMT which will combine the key technical andprogramme decision makers rom MOD and our industrypartners. The IPMT will align cost and schedule processesacross the MOD and our industry partners, and will:

y Deliver the successor submarine to a single IntegratedMaster Schedule;

y Take the agreed concept through design, manuactureand into service;

y

Control the cost and certainty o delivery; and, y Incentivise joint working.

4.2 Working with Industry

Whilst the replacement submarine programme is signicantin its own right it is important to place it in the wider contexto the overall submarine industrial enterprise.

Working with our industry partners will be key to deliveringthe successor deterrent programme to the agreedperormance, cost and time. Under the Submarine EnterprisePerormance Programme (SEPP) initiative the three Tier 1industrial suppliers will work collaboratively with the MOD to

transorm the submarine enterprise’s ability to delivereectively. Our key objectives are:

y Sustainability Secured: We must retain the capability todesign, build and support nuclear submarines and meetthe commitment or a successor to the Vanguard Classsubmarines;

y Cost Down: We must realise signicant savings throughrationalisation o acilities and an inclusive approachto design, build and support through improvedcontracting; and,

y Perormance Up: We must work together to improvedelivery in terms o perormance, cost and time.




Industry will be incentivised to share project risk throughnew collaborative commercial arrangements or the design,

build and through-lie support o nuclear submarines andassociated nuclear reactor plants. It is estimated thatsuccessul implementation o SEPP across the submarineenterprise will deliver at least £900M in savings over thenext ten years.

4.3 Cost of the Next Phase

Since Parliamentary approval to replace our nuclear deterrentin 2007 the MOD has spent around £900M (at outturn prices)on the Concept Phase o initial submarine design work, theprogression o the CMC work with the US and the investmentin design, programme management and construction skillsthat will allow us to build the submarines eectively.

Between now and Main Gate in 2016 (the decision point atwhich contracts or building the submarines will be placed) we

expect to spend a urther £3Bn at outturn prices on the work plan set out in section 4.1 (including the long lead itemspreviously highlighted). We thereore expect to have spentsome £3.9Bn on reaching Main Gate, or around 15% o theoutturn cost o the submarines (based on a our boat feet). This is in line with the MOD’s approvals guidance, whichadvises that programmes should expect to spend 15% o their budget in reaching Main Gate. This ensures thatprogramme risks are understood and managed, buildcontracts are based on suitably mature designs, and there iscondence that sucient preparation has been made todeliver to time and cost.

BAE Systems Barrow

Devonport Naval Base

DE&S Abbey Wood

Rolls-Royce Raynesway




Faslane

5. The Wider Deterrent

Programme The submarine is only one aspect o the replacement plansset out in the 2006 White Paper. There are two other areasthat are outside the scope o the Initial Gate decision onsubmarine design but are crucial to the wider programme toreplace our nuclear deterrent:

y Warhead: The value or money review concluded that adecision on whether to replace our current warheaddesign could be deerred until the next Parliament as weare able to maintain our current warhead designin-service or longer than previously assessed. The currentwarhead design is now planned to continue in serviceuntil the 2030s.

The SDSR reviewed the UK’s deterrence criteria andconcluded we could reduce warheads carried ondeterrent patrols rom 48 to 40, carried on eightoperational missiles. Consequently the UK will alsoreduce its stockpile o operationally available warheadsrom ewer than 160 to not more than 120 and our overallstockpile rom not more than 225 warheads to not morethan 180.

The 2006 White Paper also noted that investment in a

replacement ballistic missile would eventually be neededand that investment at the Atomic WeaponsEstablishment would need to continue. We currentlyexpect the Trident D5 missile to remain in service untilthe 2040s and no work is currently being undertaken on areplacement. Work at Aldermaston was reviewed duringthe value or money review with the aim o ensuring thatwe have the appropriate acilities and programmes inplace to support the current warhead and eventually, theinormation required or a decision in the nextParliament on a replacement warhead. We alsoannounced in the SDSR that we could minimise costsby cooperating with the French on our research

programmes and would develop a joint test acility.

y Inrastructure: The value or money review also examinedthe inrastructure and command and control acilitiesthat support our deterrent and concluded that nosignicant investment was needed in the immediateuture. The successor submarines are being designed ormaximum compatibility with existing inrastructure mucho which has been recapitalised during the last 20 years.We will spend around £8M over the next three years tostudy in detail the requirement or investment in ourinrastructure and will continue to look or opportunitiesto drive down running costs and any new investment.




6. Cost Estimates6.1 Submarine Costs

The 2006 White Paper estimated that the cost o thesuccessor deterrent system would be £15-20Bn(at 2006/7 prices) o which £11-14Bn would beattributed to the cost o the replacement platorm. Theseestimates were stated at 2006/7 prices to provide anunderstandable way o explaining the cost o thereplacement deterrent at a constant price base. MODinvestment approval is normally made at outturn prices i.e.the sum o the expected spend in each year includinginfation and the gures provided earlier in the report aremade on that basis. However, expressing costs at 2006/7

prices remains an important way o demonstrating how weare perorming and we will continue to provide comparisonsagainst the White Paper estimate. This equates to £25Bn atoutturn prices or the successor submarines.

Our assessment is that, assuming a our boat feet, thereplacement submarines will remain within the £11-14Bnestimate. Further work needs to be done between now andMain Gate to rene this estimate, particularly on the benetsto be achieved through SEPP.

This estimate includes programme risk. The MOD andindustry operate a joint risk management approach and

have developed comprehensive risk registers using thecombined experience o Government and industry. This hasdrawn on the experience rom other similar programmessuch as Astute and has ensured that lessons identied inthose programmes are incorporated into the SuccessorProgramme.

6.2 Wider Programme Costs

Work on the Trident replacement programme has so arconcentrated on the submarine. The SDSR concluded that itwould be possible to deer decisions on the replacement o both the warhead and inrastructure elements o theprogramme with a consequential deerral o spend over the

next ten years. Over the next ew years concept studies willbegin to rene potential programmes and costs. In particularwe expect that it may be possible to reduce the cost o supporting inrastructure but at this stage the estimatesgiven in the 2006 White Paper o £2-3Bn or each o the twoelements stand.




GlossaryALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable

CMC Common Missile Compartment

IPMT Integrated Programme Management Team – a joint MOD and industry team

MOD Ministry o Deence

PWR Pressurised Water Reactor

SDSR Strategic Deence and Security Review

SEPP Submarine Enterprise Perormance Programme

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