the true function of the generalization argument

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The true function of the generalization argumentRoland Paul Blum aa Colgate University ,Published online: 29 Aug 2008.

To cite this article: Roland Paul Blum (1970) The true function of the generalization argument, Inquiry: An InterdisciplinaryJournal of Philosophy, 13:1-4, 274-288, DOI: 10.1080/00201747008601594

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Inquiry, 13, 274-88

THE TRUE FUNCTION OF THEGENERALIZATION ARGUMENT

Roland Paul Blum

Colgate University

An examination of its employment in ethical disputes reveals that the generalizationargument (the question, 'What if everyone did x?') is not based upon utilitariancalculation and that its effectiveness depends upon the existence of institutionscontrary to the ones it hypothesizes. The basis of moral valuation, therefore, remainsin the actual institutions presupposed by the generalization argument rather thanin the argument itself which is used exclusively against persons whose acts violatecurrent institutional rules. It seeks to discourage such acts by showing the un-desirability of institutions under which such acts would be permissible.

The thesis variously described as the 'generalization argument', the'principle of utilitarian generalization' or simply 'universalization' has,in recent years, elicited much discussion. Marcus Singer, in Generaliza-tion in Ethics,1 sought to prove that 'every case in which an attempt ismade to justify or give reasons for an action . . . presuppose[s]' theargument that '[i]f the consequences of everyone's doing x are un-desirable, then no one ought to do *' (p. 134). His project provoked anunusual number of responses culminating in David Lyons's Forms andLimits of Utilitarianism.2 Lyons's book defends a point of view diametri-cally opposed to Singer's. On the basis of an intricate theory of act-description Lyons concludes that 'utilitarian generalization' does notoffer an alternative to simple act-utilitarianism and therefore cannotstand as a distinct method of moral assessment.

It is surprising that none of the parties to the controversy haveattempted to buttress their positions by appealing to what is, after all,the obvious source of generalization: specific ethical disputes in whichthe generalization question is actually raised. An examination of suchcontexts will, I believe, reveal that current discussion has to a largeextent missed the point of generalization. The actual use of generaliza-

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FUNCTION OF THE GENERALIZATION ARGUMENT 2 7 5

tion shows that, while Singer's claims are greatly exaggerated, they arenot entirely wrong. Lyons's attack, however, fails completely because,contrary to what he and others assume, the argument is not primarilyan appeal to utilitarian calculation. I hope, therefore, to extract fromthe actual context of use what I take to be the 'logic' of generalization,that is, the necessary and sufficient conditions for its meaningfulapplication in ethical discourse. For the sake of precision I shall pre-sent my conclusions as a formal derivation in the first-order predicatecalculus.

I. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE

GENERALIZATION ARGUMENT

Under what conditions would generalization, i.e. the appeal to whatwould happen if everyone acted in a certain manner, be consideredrelevant? An important, though seemingly obvious fact is that it isnever used when the contemplated act follows the generally acceptedpattern of behavior. If no one or nearly no one is paying taxes, thenthe argument, 'What if everyone refused to pay taxes ?' seems point-less. It may in fact be true that the consequences of everyone's failingto pay taxes are undesirable and that the society in question is nowsuffering these consequences. This situation, however, does not makethe hypothetical any more pertinent. Under what conditions, then, isit used? Precisely when most people are in fact paying their taxes,voting or the like. Thus, 'What if everyone stayed home on electionday?', 'What if everyone cheated on his taxes?' are significant ques-tions only where the general pattern of behavior is contrary to thesupposition. The argument, therefore, is directed against the personwhose contemplated act is in opposition to what others generally aredoing or expected to do.

How, precisely, is the general pattern of behavior relevant to thegeneralization argument ? We must note that it is the general behaviorpattern which is at issue. Manifestly, a condition for raising theuniversalization question is not that each and every relevant personis paying his taxes or voting, but that a large though indefinite numberof persons are so doing. In effect, their behavior is treated as an indica-tion that in the society there exists what may be called an institution.For there to be within a society an institution of tax-paying or votingthere must exist a set of rules and expectations against which the actualbehavior of its members is judged. Thus, the institution of tax-paying

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276 ROLAND PAUL BLUM

requires of every citizen that he surrender part of his income to thestate treasury. A citizen who does not fulfil this requirement is penal-ized. Voting is also an institution though, in our society at least, a lessexacting one. Citizens are urged and normally expected to vote and thosewho do not are made to feel ashamed for their negligence. They could,conceivably, be penalized.

It must be emphasized that the context presupposed in a use of thegeneralization argument is not one in which the acts of each and everyrelevant person have been taken into account. If the question, 'Whatif everyone avoided taxes?' presupposes the institution of tax-paying,it does not presuppose that there are no tax delinquents. Thus, it isnot based upon a quick head-count of fellow citizens. It is not, forexample, telling us that since ten million citizens are paying taxes andonly ten thousand avoiding them, therefore there exists the 'institu-tion' of tax-paying. There may be ten million people who go to bed ateleven o'clock and only ten thousand who do not, but we could not forthat reason alone assert that in this society there existed the institu-tion of going to bed at eleven o'clock. All we could do would simply beto report the general pattern of behavior, perhaps calling it a 'prac-tice'. A practice would then be opposed to an institution in that itwould have no normative implications but would merely representdata on the frequency of certain acts.

In the context of the generalization argument, therefore, the generalpattern of behavior is important not as a 'practice' but as a sign thatthere exists an institution. The fact that most people are paying theirtaxes is an indication of a certain institution. Conversely, in what maybe called, following Singer, 'state of nature situations', the absence of acertain kind of behavior indicates the lack of an institution and con-sequently the inappropriateness of universalization. If no one is payinghis taxes we cannot use as an argument in favor of at least our friend'sdoing so the question, 'What if everyone refused to pay taxes?'

Another way of showing that it is the 'institution' and not the'practice' which is the relevant factor in the stage-setting for uni-versalization arguments is by an examination of the kinds of responseswhich are appropriate to universalization questions. A recalcitranttax-payer might assert that the small sum he was withholding wouldmake no difference to the general prosperity of the country, and justifyhis position by pointing to the millions who were paying their taxes.His assertion that 'My little bit won't make any difference' would, in asense, be correct. From a consequential, act-utilitarian point of view

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the loss of a few hundred or a few thousand dollars would have noeffect on the prosperity of the country. (We could furthermore assumesecrecy in order that there be no repercussions on others' attitudes.)The crucial point, however, is that this type of response would beunacceptable to the questioner. Why is this so?

Both the questioner ('What if everyone acted as you are acting?')and the responder ('My little bit won't make any difference') areseemingly basing themselves on the present behavior of other tax-payers. They both agree on the ostensible fact that almost everyone ispaying his taxes. How, then, is it possible for them to disagree on themorality of tax evasion ? The reason lies in the evader's taking the factof general payment as a practice whereas the questioner views it as aninstitution. The evader is looking, however grossly, at the sum ofindividual acts currently being performed and concluding that theireffects render his omission unimportant. He is therefore viewing themon face value in terms of their collective consequences. The questioner,on the other hand, views the present situation as a sign of what isexpected of every citizen. For him general tax-paying is merely anindication that an institution exists against which the acts of all rele-vant persons will be judged.

II . THE PERSUASIVENESS OF THE GENERALIZATION ARGUMENT

We see that the generalization question is raised when we want to dis-courage someone from violating institutional rules of his society.We point out to him that the hypothetical institution regulating hisproposed act would be undesirable. This negative fact is implicitlycontrasted with the desirability (or greater desirability) of the presentopposite institution. If he can be persuaded to reject the hypotheticalinstitution as the justification for his act, then, we assume, he will ipsofacto accept the actual one prohibiting it. Why, however, shouldrejection of one institution entail acceptance of another? How doesthe generalization argument function as a reason for acting in theaccepted fashion? In what way, precisely, is it expected to discouragedeviant behavior?

Generalization is used either when someone is unaware of a duty orwhen he refuses to acknowledge a duty. It is, for example, used withchildren who as yet do not know what society expects from them, andoften employed to encourage acts, such as voting, which may neverhave been completely accepted as duties. There are, therefore, two

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necessary conditions for the application of the argument: (1) Theexistence of an institution, and (2) the un-awareness or non-acceptanceof a particular duty or obligation by a particular person. The argu-ment, therefore, seeks to eliminate (2) by persuading the agent toacknowledge (1) as binding in the particular case in question.

(a) Unawareness of DutyLet us first examine a case of unawareness of duty. Assume that a

generally law-abiding citizen absent-mindedly starts walking across aforbidden lawn. In his case it would be sufficient to point out thatthere was a rule prohibiting Such an act. Why is this so ? Because as anadult, responsible person he recognizes and accepts the fact that heought to obey the rules of his society. Assume now that children areengaging in the same act. We might explain to them the rule forbiddingwalking on the lawn. Pointing to a rule, however, might seem toomuch like an appeal to authority. Especially with older children, onewould be more inclined to call upon the generalization argument. Wemight ask them to consider what would happen if 'everyone wereallowed to walk on other people's lawns?' In asking this question wewould expect a certain response, namely, the children's realization thatthe hypothetical institution was undesirable. Our expectation wouldbe based on the fact that since these were our children, they werebrought up in a society where private property in general and lawnsin particular are respected. Thus, the children's understanding andacceptance of the generalization argument is only possible to thedegree that they see themselves as members of the society. In order,for example, for them to understand why an institution of unrestrictedlawn crossing would be undesirable, they must be aware of what thelawn in front of their homes signifies. If they were brought up in a slumwith no playing areas except a few empty lots, then very probably theywould either not understand the question or perhaps even give the'wrong' answer.

Thus, for the child whose world includes lawns and private propertythe generalization argument serves as a catalyst precipitating anawareness of the conventions under which he has been intuitivelyoperating. He does not strictly learn anything new in thinking throughthe consequences of an institution in direct contradiction to the oneunder which he was brought up. Rather, he gains a first insight into theramifications of his own cultural background and an awareness of itsconnection to his proposed act.

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(b) Non-Acceptance of DutyAs a second example we may choose a person who understands what

others take to be duties but refuses to acknowledge them for himself.A typical example would be that of tax-paying. If someone cheatsextensively at taxes, then presumably he does not recognize that as acitizen he has a duty to pay them. He might, therefore, believe that aninstitution of non-tax-paying would be desirable. Certainly, manypersons hold such a view; they do not think it anyone's duty to pay taxesand proceed to practice what they preach. They are, obviously,challenging the entire institution of tax-paying. For such people,significantly, the generalization argument would have no hold. Askedto imagine a hypothetical institution in which no one was required topay personal income taxes, they would reply that such a situationwould be very desirable. Because people would have more money tospend, the economy would be greatly stimulated. Reduced publicspending would be financed through higher levies on imports. In viewof these facts they would view their refusal to pay taxes not only asmorally justified but as the most effective way to bring about theinstitution in which they believe.

(c) Individual and CommunityWe may conclude from our last two examples that one's attitude to-

ward the generalization argument is determined by one's view of therelationship between the individual and the community. If onebelieves that certain institutions are essential for the maintenance ofthe community, then one will necessarily find that their negationswould be undesirable. But the reason why acts regulated by currentinstitutions are considered morally binding is precisely that they areinstantiations of these institutions. The undesirability of a hypotheticalinstitution describable as the negation of a current one is a consequenceof the fact that it is the current one which is in force. Hence, the dutyderives from the actual state of affairs, not from the undesirability ofthe hypothetical one.

III . THE VALID USE OF THE GENERALIZATION ARGUMENT3

I have so far given an informal description of the circumstances underwhich the generalization argument is meaningful. What I should nowlike to present is a formal derivation showing how the argument isused. Such a method should help clarify precisely the conditions under

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which it is thought to be valid, and the kinds of assumptions it makesabout an individual's commitments to morally relevant actions and theinstitutional rules regulating them.

Domain: UniversalConstants: a, b, c, d, e.One-place predicates:

P: a person within the domain.A1... AH: particular actual or possible institutional rules

regulating the lightness or wrongness of an act.Q Cn: particular actions regulated by actual or possible

institutional rules.

Substitution Instances of Ax... An:F1...FH: particular institutional rules current within the

domain.Fv . .Fn: particular possible rules which would be the denial

of particular institutional rules current within thedomain. 'Fj is a rule denying 'FJ, 'F2' is a ruledenying 'F2\ etc.

Substitution Instances of Q . . . Cn:(?! . . . Gn: particular acts regulated by actual institutional rules.G1...GB: particular acts whose descriptions would be the

denial of the descriptions of Gx Gn and whichwould be regulated by possible institutional rules.•'Gi is a particular act whose description would bethe denial of 'G^, lGz' is a particular act whose de-scription would be the denial of 'G2', etc.

The predicates 'Fx . . . Fn* and ' i ^ . . . Fn' represent the only sub-classes of the class represented by the predicate 'Ax... An\ Thus, inset-theory notation: 'A1...An=F1 FttUF1. ,.Fn'. The classdenoted by 'F± FH\ is not merely the result of affixing ' —' to'JFJ — Fn' but represents, within A-1...An, the complement ofFx . . . FB, that is, another class of rules, and could be symbolized by anypredicate letter other than ' i^ . . . Fn\ I use the notation 'JPX . . . Fn\however, in order to emphasize the fact that the rules represented bythis predicate are the denial of those signified by ' /^ Fn\

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FUNCTION OF THE GENERALIZATION ARGUMENT 281

All rules symbolized by 'F1... Fn' will be the contraries (and notthe contradictories) of those symbolized by fFx.. .Fn\ Assume that'Fxa' stands for:' "a" is an institutional rule such that no one may breakpromises for self-interested reasons alone.' Because it is universal inform this rule will have an indefinite number of contraries. Thus,'F^' would mean:' "a" is the class of rules contrary to the institutionalrule that no one may break promises for self-interested reasons alone',and particular contraries within this class would carry the predicates'F\ . . . Fl'. Thus in 'Ax . . . An = Fx... Fn U Ft... Fn' any particularpredicate 'F^, 'Fs\ etc. would represent the class of contraries of thecorresponding rule: 'Fx, 'F2', etc. ('Fx would be the class of contrariesof 'Fi, 'F't the class of contraries of CF2', etc.) Thus, for the class ofparticular actual or possible institutional rules Alt 'Fx U Fx wouldrepresent the union of a current rule and all its contraries.

However, we will not need to refer to classes of contraries of par-ticular current institutional rules Ft... Fn. We will therefore taketF1... Fu* to refer simply to particular contraries of Fx... Fn. Thus'Fx will represent a particular contrary of FXi 'F% will represent aparticular contrary of F2, etc.

The predicates lGr... Gn' and ' G x . . . Gn' function more simply than'Fx . . . Fm' and 'Ft... Fn\ for tG1... 0n' represent the contradictories ofGx... GB and not the contraries. Thus, if 'GJ' signifies, ' "b" is theact of keeping a promise', 'Gjb' will mean, ' "b" is the act of breakinga promise'. The latter description is, of course, the contradictory of theprevious one.

Two-place predicates:S: 1 subscribes to 2.R: Us regulated by 2.

Three-place predicate:

B: 1 believes that 2 is less desirable than 3.Modal operators:

O: It ought to be the case that—O: It ought not to be the case thatInference rules:

1. Rule of institutional negation:

('3*) (Fr.. .Fjc)' can occur in a step of a proof only if '(3*)(i*1! . . . Fjcy has occurred in a previous step or in the same stepand similarly for c(3«) {G1... Gjc)* and '(3*) (Gx ... Gjc)\

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282 . ROLAND PAUL BLUM

This rule registers the fact that the generalization argument pre-supposes actual institutions. Thus, the question 'What if everyone wereallowed to break his promises for self-interested reasons?' couldmeaningfully be raised only in a society requiring the keeping ofpromises in spite of self-interest. It is for this reason that a rule allowingeveryone to break promises for self-interested reasons would be sym-bolized by 'Fja' rather than by some other predicate. Thus, ourinference rule simply exhibits the logical fact that a hypothetical ruleconceived as the denial of an institution presupposes the existence ofthat institution. Similarly, one's act cannot be described in negativeterms unless the positive act is current. 'Breaking promises' can be ameaningful act-description only where 'keeping promises' is predicableof acts.

2. The standard rules and notation as given by Benson Mates inElementary Logic.1

Meta-axiom:

& Ci . . . C-j & (%vO(%)))^W((A-. • AnZ &

This formula expresses the requirement that if any person Subscribesto an act regulated by an actual or possible institutional rule, or if itought to be the case that any person subscribe to such an act, then, forany institutional rule regulating that act, it ought to be the case thatthat person subscribe to it. Thus, if one believes that breaking apromise for reasons of self-interest is morally justified, or if it ought tobe the case that one believe that breaking a promise for reasons ofself-interest be morally justified, then it ought to be the case that onesubscribe to institutional rules regulating such an act. Similarly, if onebelieves that one is morally justified in keeping a promise to thedetriment of self-interest, one ought to subscribe to the institutionalrules governing such actions.

The expression 'ought to be the case that' must be read as a criterionof rational morality. The first disjunct in the antecedent allows thatsomeone might be subscribing to an act without subscribing to theinstitutional rules regulating that act. The point of the theorem is thatif he subscribes to the act, then he ought to subscribe to the rules.Similarly, the second disjunct in the antecedent says that if, for someunspecified reason (either beliefs or states of affairs), it ought to be the

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case that a person subscribe to an act, then he also ought to subscribeto the institutional rules regulating it.

This meta-axiom can take two sets of substitutions depending onwhether the act in question is one regulated by institutional rules orone whose description would be the denial of an act regulated byinstitutional rules. In the first case we would substitute Gx Gn forQ . . . Cm in the second Gx... Gn. Given these conditions it is evidentthat the substitution instances of A1... An must be correlated ac-cordingly. Thus, if we substitute G±... Gn for Cx... Cn, we mustsubstitute Fx Fn for Ax .. . An and similarly, a substitution ofGx... GnforCx.. .CB requires a substitution of Ft...Fnfor At... An.Subscripts must in their turn also be correlated: to 'C^f must corre-spond 'A2z' and if iG1y

> is substituted for the former, then 'FiZ* mustreplace the latter.

Axioms:II. (x)(y)((Px & Gt... Gny & O{Sxy)) o &)& ...Gnz->

-O(SxZ)))

This axiom states that it is a necessary and sufficient condition of thefact that a person ought to subscribe to an act regulated by actualinstitutional rules that he ought not to subscribe to its denial. Thus,accepting that a promise overrides self-interest is equivalent to re-jecting self-interest as a justification for breaking that promise. Putmore precisely, if, for unspecified reasons (either beliefs or states ofaffairs) it ought to be the case that one subscribe to the keeping of apromise in spite of self-interest, then it ought not to be the case thatone subscribe to self-interest as a justification for breaking that promise.

III. (x)(y)((Px & Fx . . . Fny) -> fcXfo . . . F n z & Bxzy) --O(Sxz)))

It is in this axiom that the generalization argument plays a role. Itwill be remembered that the argument asks us to envisage an insti-tution contrary to the one which is in force. The expectation is that wewill find it less desirable than the present one. The theorem states thatif we believe that it is less desirable, then we ought not; to subscribe to it.

We can now proceed to show, through a formal derivation how, inany particular case, the generalization argument is used to persuadesomeone that he ought to act in the manner required by the insti-tutional rules of the society of which he is a member.

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Derivation*IV 1. (3u)(w)(x)(y)(z)(Pu & Gxw &

Fxx & Rwx & G^y & Fiz &i2y ; & Suy) Premise*

V 2. (w)(x)(y)(z)(Pe & G > & Fxx & i?a>* &G^y & JPX^ & i?y ; & Sey) Premise

V 3. Pe & Gxa & FJ & i2ai & Gxc &

I

I

i,vi,vIVIII

III,VIII,IV,VI

i,vI,III,IV,VII

I,II,III,IV,VI

I,II,III,IV,VI,II,III,IV,VI,II,III,IV,VI,II,III,IV,V

I,II,III,IV,V

I,II,III,IV,V

I,II,III,IV

4.

5.

6.7.8.9.

10.11.12.

13.14.15.

16.17.

18.19.20.21.

22.

23.

24.

Fxd & Red & See(Pe & Gxc & (Sec v O(Sec))) -*{(F^ & Red) -* O(Sed))(Pe & Gxc & Sec) -• ((Frd &Red) -> O(Sed))(Fxd & Red) -* O(Sed)O(Sed)Bedb(Pe & FJ) -+ ((F^d & Bedb) -*—O(Sed))(Fxd & 5 ^ ) -> -O(Sed)—O(Sed)(Pe & ^ c & F±d & iJcrf) -*(~O(Sed) -»• —O(iSec))—O(5'ea') -»• —O(Sec)—O(Sec)(Pe & Gxa & O(â)) o(5 l C _> —Oêc))O(5"ea)(Pe & Gjfl & O(5ea)) -»((i^J & Rab) -*• O(Seb))(Fjb & Rab) -» Oêi)0(^6)O(Seb) & Oâ)Pe & Gra & FjA & Oêi) &O(Sea)(y)(z)(Pe & Gjj & Fxz &O^cy) & O'(Sez))(3x)(y)(z)(Px & Gjj & Iv : &O(%) & O(^))(Zx)(y)(z)(Px&G1y&FlZ&.O(Sxy) & O(&c ;))

2; U.S.

I; U.S.

4 ; T3,5; T3,6; TPremise**

III; U.S.3,9; T3,8,10; T***

4; T****3,12; T11,13; T

II; U.S.3,14,15; T

I; U.S.3,16,17; T3,18; T16,19; T

3,20; T

21;U.G.

22; E.G.

1,2,(8),23;E.S.• Starred steps (1,8,11,12) are explained in the text immediately following the

derivation.

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*Step 1 of the derivation should be read, 'There is a person « whosubscribes to an act y which would be regulated by a possible insti-tutional rule z and whose description is the denial of the description ofan act w regulated by a current institutional rule [x, contrary to apossible institutional rule] z'-

**'Bedb' is placed here in order to render more clearly the actualprogression of the argument. What it says is that, as a result of applyingthe generalization argument, e (appearing in a premise in line 2 butactually specified from '/V in line 1) believes that institutional rule d(appearing in line 3 and specified from line 2) is less desirable thaninstitutional rule b (appearing in line 3 and specified from line 2). HadI observed strict form, lBedV would have been the result of specifyinga general form 'Buzx' appearing in line 1, which then would haveread:

(3a) (w) (x) (y) (z) (Pu & Gxw & Fxx & Rwx & Gxy & Fxz &Ryz&Suy& Buzx)Had 'Buzx' thus been included in line 1, the movement of the argu-ment would have been obscured. Line 1 of the derivation tells us thatsomeone subscribes to an act whose description is a denial of thedescription of an act current in the domain. The fact that if he sub-scribes to this act he rationally must subscribe to any institutional ruleregulating it is not revealed until step 7. It is only then that the general-ization argument is applied in order to persuade him, in line 8, thatthe proposed institutional rule would be less desirable than the oneactually in effect. Thus, placing 'Bedb' in line 8 is an attempt to reflectthe actual progression of the argument. It should be clear that thismethod, though unorthodox, does not violate the rule that one cannotexistentially specify more than once to the same constant.5

***'—O(Sed)' contradicts line 7. The derivation could thereforecome to an end here. We would then have an R.A.A. proof denyingpremise IV (lines 1 & 8). We would thus have shown the impossibilityof e's rationally subscribing both to an act whose description would bethe denial of an act regulated by an institutional rule current withinthe domain and holding that an institutional rule which wouldregulate his proposed act was less desirable than the current insti-tutional rule. However, I continue the derivation in order to show howit follows from steps 1-10 that e should not subscribe to his proposedact (step 12) and that he (step 19) or anyone in his position (step 22)should subscribe to the opposite act and the current institutional ruleregulating ft.

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****12 can be derived from 4 in the following manner: Thecorresponding SC sentence for 4 is:-

{A & B & (Cv D)) -> ((£ & F) -* G)

where A = Pe, B = Gxc, C = Sec, D = O(Sec), E = i V , F = Red,G = O(Sed).

We perform the following tautologous transformations:

{A & B & D) -> {{E & F) -• G){-A y -By -D) v ((E & F) -* G){-A v -By -D) y(-Ey-FyG)—A y —B v —D v —E v —F v G(—4 v —5 v —Ey —F) v Gv —D(A&B &E&F) -* (Gv -Z))(4 & 5 & £ & F) -» ( -G - -D)

this last representing the corresponding SC sentence for 12.In following the derivation it should be noticed that we cannot pass

from the requirement that rationally one ought to subscribe to a certainact to the fact that one does subscribe to it. In spite of the argument,one may wish to act non-rationally, in which case he will continuesubscribing to the denial of the accepted act.

The derivation demonstrates effectively the way in which thegeneralization argument seeks to, as it were, bring a person back intothe fold of society. We show him the logical consequences of hisbehavior by pointing out that to perform an act of a certain kind is toaccept an institution of a certain kind. If he rejects the institution, thenhe must reject the act.

It is important to note that the person in question may balk at twopoints in the argument, and, of course, against this attitude there is nodefense. He could find the alternative institution as desirable or moredesirable than the present one. Unless, therefore, other assumptionsare brought in, such as, for example, the concept of fairness, he wouldseem to be rationally justified in going about his business. On the otherhand, as stated earlier, he could agree that the alternative was lessdesirable and yet persist in performing the deviant act. Here it couldonly be said that he had renounced any rational justification for hisact. In the context of the generalization argument's use, therefore, lies

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the double assumption that rationality and desirability are goodreasons for acting in a certain manner. If both of these are rejectedthen, of course, the argument has no force.

IV. CONCLUSION

I conclude that 'utilitarian' generalization is not strictly a utilitarianargument. If the appeal to hypothetical consequences is really anattempt to show someone the significance of the actual institutions ofhis society, then it is in relation to them that the problem of obligationis set. One ought to pay taxes or keep promises because one hasacknowledged membership in a society of which these institutions areessential conditions. Without taxes no modern, capitalistic state couldsurvive; without promises and truth-telling no society at all would bepossible. Thus an individual's obligations arise directly from hissubscription to the general institutions whose rules determine theseobligations. As Socrates said in the Crito, it is always open to one toseek out other societies. In the same way, one need not become alawyer or a doctor, but upon entering these professions one assumesthe duties constitutive of them. In both cases utilitarian considerationsenter only when there is a question of the institution as a whole. I maybecome a doctor because the consequences are desirable, and for thesame reasons a society may adopt taxation. But I am no more underan obligation to become a doctor than a society is to impose taxes.However,' once I become a doctor or once the society in which Iacknowledge membership adopts taxation, my obligations relative tothese two domains begin.

Of what use is the generalization argument? If we recall both theway in which it is employed with children and the fact that it is rarelycalled upon for such universally acknowledged obligations as promisingand truth-telling, though often used in questions of voting or tax-paying, we arrive at the following conclusion. The generalizationargument is essentially a device for making persons aware of 'theirstation and its duties'. An act such as truth-telling which is performedevery day, or one such as the taking of marriage vows whose con-sequences are constantly being felt, rarely becomes associated with thegeneralization argument. When a person lies or commits adultery heknows he is acting wrongly because the concept of obligation is somanifestly part of the meaning of the rule he is violating. He does notneed the generalization argument to remind him of the immorality of

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the situation. On the other hand, the payment of taxes is only anoccasional and highly disagreeable act. Furthermore, it is not some-thing which one has formally undertaken to perform. As a result, theobligations which members of a society have to perform such an actmay not always be evident to them. It is precisely in such circum-stances that an appeal is made to generalization. The argumentattempts to make the person realize that he is a member of a society inwhich such obligations are current. He comes to this realization by asort of intellectual rebound. Acknowledging the undesirability of noone's paying his taxes or no one's voting makes him aware that payingtaxes and voting are indeed duties he ought to perform. He under-stands that he could not form a negative judgment about the alter-native practice unless he held the actual practice to be binding. Thus,generalization has helped him to recognize what in a sense he knewall along.

N O T E S

1. Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1961.2. David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1965.3. I would like to thank my colleague Peter Klein for his many helpful suggestions

regarding this part of my paper.4. Benson Mates, Elementary Logic, Oxford University Press, New York 1965.5. Mates, op. cit., p. 117.

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the true function of the generalization argument

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