the tibet factor in india-china relations

8/11/2019 The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations

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T H E TIB ET EACTOR IN INDIA-CHINA

RELATIONS

Rajiv Sikri

Tibet is a key factor in India-China reations. It is only after the 1950 Chinese

occupa-

tion of Tibet that India and China came to share the now disputed common border In

recentyears , China's military b uildup and infrastructure developm ent in Tibet, as

well

as

reported

plans to divert or dam rivers that rise in Tibet andfiow into India, have raised

India's anxieties. Conversely, China's insecurity about Tibet is an important driver of its

approach toward India. India has

been

unable to

assuage

C hina's fears about its

possible

use of thepresence of

the

Dalai Lam a in India and its large Tibetan refugeepopulation

of about 120,000 to create trouble for China in Tibet. TItepresence of

the

Dalai Lama

and a large com munity of Tibetan refugees in India has kept the Tibetan question

alive. G iven India's open democ ratic system and long tradition o f giving refuge to per-

secuted peoples, India will find it

politica y

impossible to m eet C hina's expectations on

the Tibet question without a significant qu id pro quo . Tlw breakdown of talks between

the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama does not augur well for

the future, and a post-Dalai Lam a situation cou ldbecome much more

compHcated

Of

ate, China's

aggressive

territorial claims on India, the

deepening

of the China-Pakistan

alliance and a shift in China's position on Kashmir has led to a hardening of India's

position on T ibet. India is now seeking satisfaction on w hat it considers to be the cor e

issues relating to India's sov ereignty and territorial integrity. India-China relations are

unlikey to be on an even

kee

untU this tangled knot is unraveled.

F

or thousa nds of

years

Tibe t was the buffer th at kep t India and Ch ina geograph-

ically apart and therefore at peace. It has only been for the last six decades or

so after China invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950 that India and China have

come to share a comm on border and with it the in here nt issues of border security

such as the delineation and demarcation of the border and the movement of people

and flow of trad e across it. However in the absence of any extensive historical

experience of relations with each other each country h as a poor un ders tand ing


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ajiv Sikri

countries beganto interact after India's independencein1947 and the Communist

Revolution

in

China

in

1949. Bo th were the n governed by proud n atio nali st leaders

who were imbued with an exalted senseof thegreatness, d estinyandmissionof

their respective nations , bu t who alsohaddeeply in grained grievances arisingout

of the humiliations they suffered under colonial rule. Given the vanities, egos and

different waysofth ink ingofthe leadersofIndia and China ,thelikelihoodofmis-

perceptionsandm isunde rstanding s was built intothesituation.'

Before

th e

S I N O - I N D I A N R E L AT IO N S ANDT IB ET P R E - 1 9 5 0

mirl 90tii rpntnrv Before the mid-20th century, India-China rela-

_,.,

tions were minimal. There was some overland and

ll lQld-v^lUllc i seaborne trade, as well as occasional exchanges of

r e l a t i o n s w e r e pilgrimsandscholars.^ Th e experienceof the Indians

min ima l

^ Chineseof the outside world was completely

different. Indiadid notindeed could notkeepout

foreign influences andideas. M acedo nians, Turks, Afghans, Persians, Mongolsand

assorted tribes from theEurasian he artla nd who invaded Ind ia overthecenturies

made

a

profound

and

lasting impact

on the

country.

The old

order was

not

swept

away. Rather,

a

newcompo site culture and society emerged as, over time, the

invaders settled down

in the

hospitable climes

of the

plains

of

India. Here they

livedinpeaceandprospered, eventually becoming indistinguishab le from, indeed

a part of, the local population.^ That was not the experience of the Chinese,

who remained self-assured that they were

the

Middle Kingdom

and all

others

barbarians. This patronizing approach persisted when India and China became

independent in the mid-20th century. China's attitude toward Indiawas one of

an elder brotheroruncle who was well established in theworld, giving adviceto a

younger relative struggling tomakehisway. Ind epend ence ofIndia was welcome,

but China,

as the

recognized great power

in

Asia after

the

Second World

War,

expected India

to

know

its

place. *

However, the Chinese also hada complex about India. Instinctively, many

Chinese people, including the communist leaders, understood that India was a very

advanced civilization from which China had borrowed much, including Buddhism.

India's spiritual and philosophical traditions were admired. MaoZedong himself

admitted to the Indian ambassador that, in China, therewas an oldbelief th at

ifa manliveda good life hewouldbereborn in India. 5 Former Chinese premier

Zhou Enlai also acknowledged that Chinahadlearned much from India.* Yet,the


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The ibetEactor in India China Relations

British influence.' ' Even Indian leaders understood that the Chinese regarded them

as tools or stooges of Anglo-Am erican diplomacy or strategy and th at Ch ina did

not regard India as a friend.^

The thinking of independent India's leaders about China was somewhat dif-

ferent. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister who almost single-handedly

guided India's foreign policy both before and after India's Independence, harbored

a generally benign view of Chin a an d its intenti ons in Tibet, despite being aware of

the inimical attitude of China's communist leaders toward India and toward him

personally' As a well-educated, widely traveled politician and intellectual, Nehru

had great und erstandin g, sympathy and adm iration for China.' He harbored

romantic, idealistic and somewhat nave notions of India and China as two great

Asian civilizations who, as independent nations, would learn from each other's

experience, forging a common destiny and promoting world peace in the 20th

cent ury. However, during the Chinese civil war, the liberal-mind ed Neh ru's sym-

pathies were clearly with the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek rather than with

the communists, something that would have hardly endeared him to China's new

communist leaders. There was mutual admiration, as well as close contacts and

correspondence between the two men.'^ Although Chiang Kai-shek, during his visit

to India in 1942, could not get the leaders of the Indian Congress Party to support

the Allied war effort, the position changed as soon as Britain decided to give India

its indepen dence . In July 1947, just six weeks before India gained its indep enden ce,

the United States and India signed a secret agreement that permitted the United

States to continue, even expand, its aerial missions in Tibet in support of Chiang

Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) forces against Mao's Red Army. This India-U.S.

agreement, initially valid for two years, was extended for an indefinite period in

Nehru's views on Tibet contributed to the deepening of Chinese mistrust, as

N eh ru believed Tibet should be an ind epen den t country.' * A separate invitation

was extended by India to Tibet for the Asian Relations Conference convened by

India in New Delhi in March 1947. Nevertheless, Nehru rejected any suggestion

that India should consider establishing an independent Tibet. He realized that if

the communists were to come to power, they would establish control over Tibet.'^

Although this would bring China's borders right up to India, Nehru did not convey

any concerns. O the r Indian leaders, however, held a somew hat darker view of

China's intentions.'^ Unlike them, Nehru was prudently hedging his bets. While

rejecting Anglo-American overtures to be more active in supporting the Tibetans,

Nehru cautiously approved giving a modest quantity of arms and ammunition to


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ajiv Sikri

wanting toassume allBritish rights andresponsibilities in regard to Tibet arising

outofthe 1904 Lhasa Convention. Under the agreement,theBritish secured rights

to establish trade marts atGyantse, YatungandGartok, andvirtually established

a British protectorate

on

Tibet. Nehru therefore accepted China's suzerainty over

Tibet. A tthe same time, hethought that Tibet should remain autonomousand

that any communist liberation ofTibet shouldbepeaceful. Clearly, Nehrudid not

want theissueofTibet to poison relations between India andChina. ^

Nehru did not

THE CHANGING

TIDE

want the issue of Historically, Tibet and China had fought with

rr-i.T ^ ^ each other. O ne of thefirst priorities of China's

1

lbet

to

poison

. u

^ u .

A

.u

^

communist leaders wasto bring lib et under their

re la t ions etWeen

control. From china's perspective, Tibet was vitally

India and China important

for

strategic

and

security considerations.^

Tibet isChina's backdoor, onethat has never been

totally secure.

In the

early 20th century,

at a

time when China

was

weak

and

the Manchu empire indecline, the British established their presence in Tibet.I t

seemed toChina that independent India under Nehru wascontinuing Britain's

policies toward Tibet. The Chinese communists imagined that there was

a

sinister

Anglo-American-Indian plot tocontrol Tibet.^^

China wasacutely aware that ifTibet remained outside China's control it

would inevitably drift closer to India, with which it

had

geographical proximity,

a deep religious and cultural affinity, andnohistory ofhostility.^^ Indeed there

has always been a two-way intensive religious andcultural interaction between

India andTibet. Tibetans regard India, from where Buddhism originated, as

their spiritual mentorandasAryahhumi the Landofthe Holy. Similarly, Mount

Kailash

and

Lake Mansarovar

in

Tibet are

the

holiest mountain and lake

of

Hindu

folklore and tradition, asthey areregarded as theabode ofLord Shiva. .''The

Tibetan variant ofMahayana Buddhism prevailsallacross thehigh rangesofthe

Himalayas in India.TheDalai Lama iswidely venerated in India.^ jjifact, India

has historically served asaplaceofrefuge forTibetanshalf acentury beforethe

present Dalai Lama fled toIndia,hispredecessor, thethir teen th Dalai Lama,had

sought

the

protection

of

British India when

the

Chinese army reached Lhasa

in

1910.^''

This is hardly surprising, sincetheoutside world's accesstoTibetand the

latter's principal economic links with

the

rest

of

the world have traditionally been

via India, as wellasNepal. The present Dalai Lama has goneso far as tostate that


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772e ibetFactor in India Ch ina Relations

Tibet. Tbe roads from Szecbuan via Kbam and from Gansu and Qingbai to Tibet

were completed by 1954.2^ In addition, Cbinese surveys showed tbat a relatively

easy access route to Tibet was from Xinjiang across tbe desolate and uninhabited

Aksai Cbin plateau. As tbis was a region to wbich India also bad a claim, the

Cbinese government adopted dilatory and obfuscatory tactics on tbe border issue

to lull India into a sense of complacency, wbile it simultaneously took steps to

establisb its position on tbe ground and made preparations to construct a road

across Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang with Tibet.29

India watcbed witb outward philosophic acquiescence as the Cbinese

imposed tbe Seventeen-Point Agreement on a young and hapless Dalai Lama in

May 1951.- Meanwhile, Nebru was taking out insurance policies to deal witb tbe

implications and consequences of a Cbinese occupation of Tibet. Cbina, Nebru

tbougbt, was bardly likely to launch an armed attack against India. However, he

realistically recognized tbat Chinese troops may well try to infiltrate or occupy

disputed areas.^' Thus, tbe Indian government set about taking steps to establisb

administrative control over tbe remote, sparsely populated Himalayan regions of

Ladakb and tbe Nortb-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)tbe present day state of

Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. Wbile India did not want to openly side

witb tbe United States and Britain in tbeir plans to destabilize Cbina's position

in Tibet, tbere was apparently connivance tbougb perbaps not collusion witb the

United States in the latter's efforts to undermine the Cbinese hold on Tibet.^2 Por

instance, in Marcb 1951, India and tbe United States signed a confidential mutual

defense assistance agreement.^^

India bad no other option but to diplomatically engage tbe Cbinese govern-

ment in order to fix an agreed border between India and Tibet. Altbough China's

unsatisfactory and evasive responses to Indian dm rches caused considerable

unease within Indian official circles, including at times for Nehru himself, India's

approach remained confused and weak. India's ambassador to China deliberately

ignored instructions from Delbi, and seems to bave unduly influenced Nebru's

tbinking in tbe direction of glossing over inconvenient facts and appeasing

Cbina.^'' Nebru insisted tbat tbe border was firm, well-known and undisputed and

tbat there was no room for controversy, map or no map. ^5 Decisions to publish

official maps were taken between 1953 and 1954, showing a clearly delimited

boundary between India and Tibet in all sectors.^^ Tbis was putting a gloss on

matters. The sections of tbe boundary in tbe western and middle sectors were

previously defined by custom, usage and tradition, not by treaty. In tbe eastern

sector, Nehru insisted that tbe McMahon Line, covering tbe area from just short


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ajiv Sikri

Chinese government

had not

ratified

it and

China's leaders

had

made it clear th at

they would never recognize thevalidity ofthe McMahon Line, which they said

had been imposed

by

imperialists. ^^ Th ere

was an

important reason

for

China's

obduracyon this matter. Chinese leaders understood very well that, were theyto

recognize the validity

of

the McM ahon Line,

it

would imply that Tibet

at

that t ime

wasan independent state with treaty-making powers. Fromapolitical perspective,

this

was

impossible

for

China

to

accept, since, unless Tibet was recognized

as an

inalienable part of China notonly in 1951 buthistorically aswell, the Chinese

takeover

of

Tibet lacked legitimacy

and

would always

be

considered

an

imperial

conquest.^^

Having forced

the

Dalai Lama into submission

forced the

^ ^

initiating road-building projects

to

improve

con-

D a

lili

Tamil intn

nectivity with Tibet, China then turned

its

attention

., . . _ ,. . toward weak ening Tibet's tradition al economic links

Submission ^nina

^j^j jj^^j^^

Nepal, eliminating India's extraterri-

turned its

torial rights inTibet and securing India's legitimiza-

toward ^^

^

china's takeover

of

Tibet.^^ These objectives

1 n r - i - ^ were achieved through

the

Agreement

on

Trade

and

w e a k e n i n g l i b e t s

, u r J- J ^ U- , ,nc.

o Intercourse between India

and

China

in

A pril

1954

traltlOnai andan

exchange

of

notes.''

In

keeping with Nehru's

economic links

ostrich-like approach to

the

matter, Indian nego-

AA ith T nH ia an

tiators

had

been specifically instruc ted

not to

raise

^ y I border issues in

the

negotiations.

At

a time whenit

r

* had

some strategic leverage, India m issed the opportu-

nity

to

gain

a

clear

and

explicit reco gnition

of

India's

borders with Tibet from China. Although thishascometo bepopularly know nas

the Panchsheel Agreement,

it

is

noteworthy that

the

so-called Five Principles

of

Peaceful Coexistence

are

only mentioned

in the

preamble,

not in the

main text

as

India

had

wan ted.'

In

fact,

the

Chinese preference was

for

these

to be

included

in

a mere joint press statement.

It

was

an

idealistic Nehru who deliberately exagger-

atedthepolitical significance ofthe Agreementasheraldinganewera inrelations

between IndiaandCh ina, w iththeFive Principlestoserve asamantra onthebasis

of which

not

only Sino-Indian relations,

but

relations among

all

countries

in

Asia

would develop.

The

Chinese w ent along with this charad e because it suited them ,

but it

is

noteworthy tha t whereas India

had

wanted

the

Agreement

to be

valid

for


7/18

The ibetEactor in India Ch ina Relations

help the Tibetans. In late 1956, on the occasion of the 2,500th birth anniversary

celebrations of Lord Buddha, the Dalai Lama managed to pay a visit to India after

receiving last-minute clearance from the Chinese authorities following Nehru's per-

sonal intervention. He explored the possibility of getting political asylum in India,

but was politely rebuffed by Nehru who was reluctant to antagonize the Chinese.

In fact, Nehru had invited Zhou Enlai to India at the same time, an invitation that

Zhou willingly accepted as this gave him an opportunity to keep an eye on the

activities of the Dalai Lama. During several weeks between November 1956 and

January 1957, there were extensive bilateral discussions centering on the situation

in Tibet between the Dalai Lama, Nehru and Zhou Enlai.' '^

TEN SIO N S R ISE

Mutual suspicions and distrust between India and China mounted in the fol-

lowing years. In September 1957, the Aksai Chin road connecting Xinjiang with

Tibet was completed. India was naturally concerned and alert, but it did not reg-

ister a protest until the following year.''' ' However, China's attitude became increas-

ingly unfriendly There had been an invitation from the Dalai Lama to Nehru,

forwarded by Zhou Enlai in January 1958 to visit Tibet, but the Chinese began

dragging their feet over Nehru's visit. Incidents of infiltration by Chinese troops in

territory claimed by India began to take place more frequently, and China started

publishing maps that claimed large sections of the NEFA. A distinct deterioration

in Sino-Indian relations had set in.''5 It was evident that the steps being taken

by China to tighten its grip on Tibet led it to occupy and claim territory that

India also claimed or controlled. This naturally upset India.' ' For its part, China

resented India's complicity in U.S. efforts, as well as India's own actions to support

the Tibetan resistance movement in India.''' ' As the authorities tried to enforce

collectivization, there were large-scale uprisings in Kham and Amdo, where many

monasteries were destroyed and monks murdered. Hundreds of refugees streamed

into central Tibet and many fled to India as well. The steadily deteriorating situa-

tion in Tibet culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in March 1959.

In the face of widespread public sympathy and support for the Dalai Lama,

the Indian government had no option but to give asylum to the Dalai Lama. This

was regarded by Ch ina as a grave act of provocation. Vituperative prop aganda was

let loose against India in the Chinese press and relations with India continued

to deteriorate.''^ A number of serious border incidents and incursions took place

shortly thereafter. As Zhou Enlai was to later adm it, there was a clear link between


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ajiv Sikri

1959. They might have been worried about the kind of support that India, in col-

laboration with the United States, was suspected of giving the Dalai Lama to try to

fan the flames of rebellion in Tibet.^' Uncertain about India's attitude and fearing

that India could become a platform to launch attacks on Tibet, Zhou visited India

in April 1960. It is noteworthy that Zhou's discussions with all of his Indian inter-

locutors focused on Tibet. It would appear that the Indian side got caught up in

legal and historical arguments and missed Zhou's willingness to settle the border

problem within a broader political framework that, while finding a solution on

the basis of the status quo, would legitimize China's takeover of Tibet.^^ Although

Nehru was inclined to work out a compromise deal with China, his colleagues,

senior officials and the intense political pressure he faced in parliament tied his

hands and he felt that he had no option but to take a rigid stand.^^

Zhou, Mao and the other Chinese leaders must have certainly realized that

India had no intention of handing the Dalai Lama back to them. Their concerns

about the activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exiles in India, which had

already been conveyed by Zhou to Indian leaders during his visit to India in April

1960, intensified. Their fears were not groundless. As relations between India and

China deteriorated in the months and years that followed Zhou's failed visit to

India in April 1960, and especially after the India-China border conflict of 1962,

India's support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in exile underwent a dramatic

change. The Tibetans were allowed to set up a so-called government-in-exile in

Dharamsala, even though India has never acknowledged this. Over the last five

decades, considerable assistance has been given by India to the Tibetan com-

munity in exile, including allocation of land for the rehabilitation of the refugees

and funding for schools and Tibetan cultural establishments.^ * The official Ind ian

position has been that the Dalai Lama is regarded and respected by Indians as a

spiritual and religious leader who, as an honored guest, is welcome to stay in India

as long as he desires, and that the government of India does not allow Tibetan

refugees in India to engage in any anti-China political activity from Indian soil.

THAW IN RELATIONS

After the 1962 border conflict, India-China relations went into a freeze. The

thaw was very gradual, starting with the exchange of ambassadors in 1976, the

visit of the Chinese foreign minister to India in 1981 and exchanges at the level of

senior officials and special envoys, leading up to the visit of Indian prime minister

Rajiv Candhi to China in December 1988the first visit at this level since Nehru's


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The ibetFactor in India China Relations

had lapsed in 1962, China used the occasion of the Indian prime minister's visit to

get India to commit itself to recognizing Tibet as a part of China and to rein in the

Tibetans living in exile in India. Thus, in the joint press communiqu issued at the

en d ofRajiv G and hi's visit, Chin a flagged itsconcern over anti-C hin a activities

by some Tibetan elements

in

India, and India reiterated itslong-standing and

consistent policy that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China

political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil. ^^

In subsequent years, asIndia-C hina relations norm alized th roug h regular

exchange of high-level visits thesalience ofTibet in theIndia-C hina discourse

diminished.^'' China itself resumed

in

September

2002 aserious dialogue on Tib et wi th the envoys of

the Dalai Lama, after it was somewhat reassured that

A^PQ

r e

c

c

the Dalai Lama was

not

seeking

the

independence -

of Tibet

but

only genuine autonomy. Perhaps

the

improved atmosphere in Sino-Indian relations also normalized the

influenced th e Chinese decision. From th e Chinese Salience

of

Tihet

perspective, theIndia n position onTib et was reas- . i T I

/ ^^

. . .

. .r n . m theIndia-China

suring, though notentirely satisfactory. Chin agot

a little more comfort from

the

nex t shift

in

India's

QlS OUrSe

Tibet position, which took place during the visitof

diminished.

Prime Minister Vajpayee toChina in2003. On that

occasion, inretur n for China implicitly recognizing Sikkim asanintegral pa rt of

India, India accepted tha t the Tibetan Autonomous Region ispart of the terri-

toryof the People's Republicof China. ^'' China expressed its appreciation for the

Indian position firmly opposing any attempt and action aimed atsplitting Chin a

and bringing about independence

of

Tibet. The twocountries also decidedto

fast-track border talks by appointing special representatives tasked with exploring

from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of

a boundary settlement.^^

The high point ofSino-Indian bilateral relations was reached d uring Chine se

prime minister Wen Jiaobao's visit toIndia inApril 200 5, when thetwo coun-

tries agreed to establish

an

India-C hina Strategic andCooperative Partne rship

for Peace andProsperity based on theprinciples

of

Panchsheel andsignedan

Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement

of the India-China Boundary Question. From the Indian perspective, one

of

the

mo st imp orta nt clauses was Article VII, which states that in reaching a bo und ary


10/18

ajiv Sikri

ments along tbe Line of Actual Control may be done wbile finalizing tbe border

in tbis sector.^

REVIVAL OF SUSPICION AND MISTRUST

Unfortunately, from tbe end of 2006 onwards, tbe relationship again began to

deteriorate. On tbe eve of President Hu Jintao's visit to India, tbe Chinese ambas-

sador to India made a statement to an Indian TV news cbannel claiming tbe whole

of Arunachal Pradesh asapart of Cb ina. Tb is was not acasual rem ark an d w as

confirmed wben Cbinese foreign minister Yang Jiecbi told bis Indian counterpart

in May 2007 tbat, contrary to tbeIndian under-

T h e h i n e s e h a v e

standing of tbe 2005 Agreement on tbePolitical

PfsistpH in thp ir

Param eters and Gu iding Principles for the Settlem ent

I .

p I of

tbe Ind ia-China Bound ary Q uestion,

the

mere

p o l i c y

o t

k e e p i n g presence of settled pop ulations did not affect Cbinese

under claims in A runa cbal Pradesb. To furtber em phasize

^^^

point, Cbina refused to giveavisa to an Indian

official from Arunacbal Pradesb on the grounds tbat,

as tbe state was a part of Cbina, the official did not need a

visa.*^'

Tbe Cbinese bave

persisted in tb eir policy of keeping India und er pressure. For example, tbe Cbinese

used periodic military provocations along tbe border including, unprecedentedly,

on tbe Sikkim-Tibet border, and blocked a loan from tbe Asian Development Bank

for a project in Arunachal Pradesb.^^ Meanwhile, China's rapid development of its

infrastructure in Tibet, wbicb would enable Cbina to have amuch stronger m ili-

tary presence in Tibet, and reports of Cbina's plans to dam or divert rivers rising

in Tibet and flowing into Soutb Asia, bave added to India's worries.*^^ Tbe water

issue is now a prominent one in India's higb-level interactions with Cbina as well

as in its public discourse.^''

Althougb tbe Chinese actions evoked considerable public outrage witbin India,

official Indian responses were initially low-key and bave gradually hardened over

tbe last tbree years. In January 2008, tbe document signed at tbe end of Indian

prime minister Manmoban Singh's visit carried no mention of

Tibet. 5

India's reac-

tion to tbe Marcb 2 008 troubles in Tibet confirmed tba t India bad subtly changed

its policy on Tibet. Contradicting tbe official Cbinese line, India's official statement

of 15 M arch 200 8 pointed ly talked of inno cent people having died in Lbasa. Tb e

statement drew attention to Tibet's autonomy, suggested that tbere was merit in

tbe demands of tbe Tibetans and went on to imply tbat it was for Beijing to find


11/18

The TibetFactor nIndia China Relations

In the face of tremendous Chinese pressure not to let the Dalai Lama visit Tawang

monastery in Arunachal Pradesh, India did not flinch and, much

to

China's

annoyance, the Dalai Lama was allowed to visit Tawang in November 2009. '''' In

August 2010, Manmohan Singh had a meeting with the Dalai Lama.''^ Following

the practice established during the Indian prime minister's visit to China in 2008,

the joint communiqu issued at the end of Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao's

visit to India in December 2010 also carried no mention of Tibet. Nor, for the first

time in recent years, is there any explicit mention of India's one China policy. ^

CONCLUSION

T J - x-

ndia s

reaction to

Where will matters go from here? Tibet is far from

. ^ . ^ Vi

pacified,

a

fact that the sudden and dramatic 2008 M arcn

revolt supports. This has revived China's dormant

trOUDleS

m

fears about Tibet. From a Chinese perspective, Tibet onfirmed th at

remains the single most important factor driving India had

Sino-Indian relations; that was Mao Zedong's view,

.

and seems to reflect contemporary Chinese thinking CliclllgcCI

lLi

too.'' The Chinese are aware that it is only because

O n

the Dalai Lama lives

in

India that he

is in

close

proximity to and can keep in touch with the Tibetan community inside Tibet.

The facilities that India has given the Tibetan community have enabled them to

preserve their distinct language, culture, history and traditions and to keep the

fire of Tibetan nationalism burning. Any political activity that the Tibetan groups

conduct around the world is possible only because they have a secure base in India.

Without India, Tibet cannot be kept alive as an international issue. Therefore what

India thinks about Tibet does matter. Given India's open and democratic system

and a long tradition of giving refuge to persecuted peoples, India will find it politi-

cally impossible to meet China's expectations on the Tibet question. At the same

time, India realizes that there is no way that China can be made to give up its

control of Tibet.

The Tibet issue has bedeviled Sino-Indian relations for sixty years. Both sides

sense that the endgame is near. Possibly in preparation for that, India has made a

significant hard-line shift in its Tibet policy in recent months. Essentially, India

has signaled to China that it is not prepared to give satisfaction to China on Tibet,

considered by China as

a

core issue, as long as China does not give satisfaction

to India on what India considers its own core issues. At a meeting in Wuhan in


12/18

Rajiv Sikri

Kashmirthe first time suchalinkage has been made by India. ' This position was

formally reiteratedinapolicy speechby theIndian foreign secretaryinDecember

2010, wherein itwasclearly spelled outindetail that China's role inPakistan-

occupied Kashmir, China's Jammu and Kashmir policy, and the China-Pakistan

security andnuclear relationshipare forIndia core issues that impingeonIndia's

sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also mentioned were India's concerns about

China's plan

todam

rivers rising

in

Tibet which would adversely affect India

asa

lower riparian.''^ Thejoint communiqu issuedatthe endofChinese primemin-

ister Wen Jiaobao's December 2010 visit

to

India also talks about mutual respect

and sensitivity foreach other's concerns andaspira-

os C h i n e s e tions. ''^

Had the

new policy simply been conveyed

to

rPT


13/18

The

ibet

Eactor in India C hina Relations

articulated

in

the past th at he may retire

in

the near future.'^ Th is would be the

first time since the communists took power in 1949 that they would have to deal

with such

a

situation. As

it

is, China's ruling elite has

a

negative perception of the

Dalai Lama. Matters could get more complicated if the Tibetan community selects

someone living outside China and Tibet as the new Dalai Lama. There

isa

high

likelihood

of

this happen ing. Tibe tans believe th at

a

new Dalai Lama

is

reincar-

nated

in

order

to

continue the w ork

of

his predecessor. Since the present Dalai

Lama is arefugee living o utside Tib et, it islogical

to assume that his successor should be born outside J

w i ll

be

Tibet to carry forward the unfinished work during his r)o lit icallv SUCdal

previous incarnation.''^ This will undoubtedly create a

^ T T

tricky situation for India since the Dalai Lama lives in

^ ^ ^ally lllQ ldll

India and there is a high probability that his successor

POVemment tO

will be reincarnated in India, perhaps in Dharamsala

p ivP C h in a

or even Tawang. Even if it is not in India that the next .

^ , . . . . ^ u s a t i s f a c t i o no n

Dalai Lama

is

reincarnated, India remains the main

base

of

active followers

of

the Dalai L ama w ho con-

J

l et W ltllOllt

stitute his main bodyofsupp ort. T he present D alai g e t t i n g a id

VTO

Lama has also said that he may well be the last Dalai

n jn

frnm

^\\

ina

Lama^ As opposed to this, the Chinese government

in

a

biza rre move has arroga ted to itself the absurd right to approve all reincarna -

tions

of

Tibetan lamas Thu s

a

post-Dalai Lama scenario

is

fraught w ith serious

misunderstanding and tension.

Is China likely tochange its presen t Tib et policy? One straw inthe windis

the convening of the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in January 2010. This rare strategy

meeting on Tibet, convened only four times

in

the last thir ty y ears (1980, 1984,

1994 and 2001), was attended

by

more than 300 ofCh ina's mo st senior party,

government and military leaders.Itwas made ab un dan tly clear th at T ibet is, for

the Party, acore issue, not one ofmarginal concern, not least because ofwater

and security issues. Although the meeting did not indicate any policy shift,

the

tone and approach were different, with

a

notable lack of virulent rhetoric against

the Dalai Lama and an unusual reference to "the material and intangible cultural

heritage of Tibet." Inaddition, itdealt with all Tibetan areas, not just the T ibet

Autonomous Region.^'

It

is extremely unlikely th at any fundam ental change will

be made as long as Hu Jintao holds the reins

of

power. It wo uld be unrea listic

to

expect him

to

adm it th at his Tibet policy, including th e ha ndlin g

of

the 2008

uprising in Tibet, isflawed. B ut the new C hinese leaders who come topower


14/18

Rajiv Sikri

next president, may change China's Tibet policy in the direction of giving Tibet

genuine autonomy.^^ Qne hopes so. Otherwise, the Tibet question, now linked

by India to China's position on Kashm ir and its relations with its all-weather

friend Pakistan, could dangerously spiral downward. It will require deft diplomacy,

political courage and enorm ous patience on bo th sides to unravel this tangled kn ot.

Without resolving the Tibetan question, the prospects of putting bilateral India-

China relations on an even keel look dim. ^

NOTES

' Ne hru himself recognized this when India-C hina relations soured in the late fifties. Th e Chin ese,

he said, had a one-track mind . See speech in Lok Sabha, 25 November 1959 in Jawaharlal N ehr u,

India s

Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September

1946-Aprit 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Divis

M inis try of Information and Broadc asting, Go vernm ent of India, 1961), 362 . See also T. N. Kaul, A

Diplomat s Diary (1947-1999): Chitia, Indiaand USA (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2000), 71.

2 Jawaharlal Ne hru,

Discovery

of hidia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 192-200.

^ Rajiv Sikr i, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India s Foreign Poliey(New Delhi: SAGE, 200 9

245-46 .

' ' K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Metnoirs of a Diplomat(London: George Allen & U nwin, 1955)

26-27. See also Nehru quoted in S.Copa\,JawaharlalNehru: A Biography,Volume Two 1947-1956 (Del

Oxford University Press, 1979), 229.

5 Ibid., 80.

T. N. Kaul,Diplomacy in Peaceand War (Ghaziabad, India: Vikas Publishers, 1979), 51.

'' K. M. Pa nikk ar (1955), 100-101.See also Girilal Jain,Patiehsheela andAfter

A

Re-Appraisal

ofSino-

Ittdian Relations

in

the Context

of

the Tibetan Insurreetion

(Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), 7-9.

^ Indian H ome Minister Vallabhai Patel's Note of 7 November 1950 to Indian Prime M inister

Nehru, reproduced in Subramanian Swamy,hidia s China Perspective (New Delhi: Konark Publishers,

2001), 165-66.

' Neville Maxw ell,India s China War (Dehradun, India: Natraj Publishers, 1997), 259-63.

' Speech at ban que t held in honor of Zhou Enlai on June 26, 1954, in Nehr u (1961), 30 6- 12 ; See

alsoGopal (1979a), 230.

No te on Ch ina and Tibe t date d 18 Novem ber 1950, reproduced in Swamy, 173. See also Gopal

(1979a), 139.

'^ Ma ulana Azad, India Wins

Freedom

(Madras: Orient Longman, 1988), 41-45. See also Jawaharlal

Nehru,

An

Autobiography (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1982), 608; and Jawaharlal Nehru,

A

Butieh of Old Letters (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1958), 440-45, 466-68, 484-86.

'3 S. M ahm ud AH, Gold War in the High Hitnalayas: The U SA, Ghina and South Asia in the 1950s

(Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1999), 185, 190-96.

' * Jawaharlal Ne hru,

Glimpses

of

World History

(New De lhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 842 .

'5 Gopal (1979a), 105.

'^ Claude Arpi, The Fate of T ibet: Wlien Big Insects Eat Small bisects (New D elhi: H ar-Anand

Publications, 1999), 274.


15/18

The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations

War ren W. Smit h, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations

( N ew

Delhi: Harper Collins India, 1997), 161.

2 Speeches in Parliament, December 6 and 7, 1950 reproduced in Nehru (1961),

3 0 2 - 0 3 .

See also

N o t e

on Ch in a and Tib et dat ed 18 Nov embe r 1950, repr oduc ed in Swamy (2001), 170-74.

2 ' Pan ikka r, 105. See also Maxwe ll, 70.

22 Jain, II , 18 ,2 0.

23

Sikri 95-6.

2'* Mo ha n Gur usw amy and Zorawar Daulet Singh, India China Relations: TIte Border Isstie and Beyond

(New Delhi: Viva Books, 2009), 39.

25 Ne hr u (1961), 313.

2^ Tenzin Gyatso, My Land and My

People

Memoirs of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama (New Delhi: Shristi,

1997) , 76.

2' ' Tenzin Gyatso,Freedom in Exile: Tite Autobiography of the Dalai Lama of Tibet (London: Abacus, 1992)

113, 123, 165.

28 Sm ith , Jr., 375 .

29 Maxwell , 87- 9.

Tser ing Shaky a, TIte Dragon in the Land of the Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (London:

P im l i c o , Ran dom House , 1999), 44 9- 52 , Appe ndix I.

3 ' Gop al (1979a), 176.

32

Shakya , 75.

33

AH, 187, 19 9- 20 0.

3 Gopal (1979a), 1 7 6 - 8 1 . See also. Maxwell, 74-86.

35

C. V. Ran gana than and Vinod C. Kh ann a, India and China: TIte Way Ahead after Mao's India War

(New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), 28.

36 Ibid., 28 -3 0.

. 37 Swamy, 41 -4 3; K. Nat war Singh,

My China Diary 1956-88

(New Delhi : Rupa & Co., 200 9), 100.

38 Sikri , 96.

39 Shak ya, 1 33- 35 ; See also Smith , Jr., 133 -3 5, 378 .

'' Lok Sabha Secre tariat , Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha

Secretariat, 1959), 103-09.

' Thes e are I. Mut ual respect for each other's territo rial integrit y and sovereignty; 2. Mut ual n on-

aggression; 3. Mu tua l non-inte rference in each other's intern al affairs; 4. Equal ity and mutu al benefit;

and 5. Peaceful coexistence.

''2 Kaul (1979), 99 -1 03 , 106; See also, Shak ya, 119-2 1.

'^^ Gyats o (1992), 113-34 . See also Gyats o (1997), 139-54 ; and Shak ya, 151-56.

'*'' Nehr u's state men t in Rajya Sabha, on 31 Aug ust 1959 in Ne hr u (1961), 33 1- 34 .

5 S. Go pa l, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume Three 1956-1964 (New Delh i: Oxford University

Pre s s ,

1979),

7 8 - 8 1 .

' ^ Gopa l (1979b), 82 -8 3.

''7 AH, 64, 91 -92 , 93 -9 6, 239 -4 4; See also Nehr u's stat eme nt in th e Lok Sabh a on March 30 1959,

reproduced in Nehru (1961), 313-17.


16/18

Rajiv Sikri

Kaul (2000), 70.

^' Shakya, 20 5-0 6.

52

S i n g h , 8 9 - 1 1 0 .

53

K a u l ( 2 0 0 0 ) , 6 8 - 6 9 ; Se e a l so M a xw e l l (1 9 9 7 ) ,

1 5 6 - 6 3 .

5' '

S e e I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f or S u s t a i n a b l e D e v e l o p m e n t w e b s i t e a t h t t p : / / w w v v . i i s d . o r g / 5 0 c o m m /

c o m m d b / d e s c / d 4 6 . h t m .

G u r u s w a m y

a nd S ingh , 143 .

J. N.

Dixit,

My

South Bloek Years Memoirs

of a

Foreign Secretary

(New

Delhi:

UBS

Publishers

Distributors, 1996), 233-234.

5^ See text of De claration on Principles for Relations and Com prehensive Coope ration between th e

People's Republic of China and the Republic of India , 23 June 2003, reproduced in Guruswamy and

Singh, 160.

5^ Dec laration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Coope ration between the People's

Republic of China and the Republic of India , in Guruswamy and Singh, 160.

59 Ibid., 164-7 8.

Sujit Dut ta, Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunac hal, Strategic Analysis 32:4 (July

2008), 551; former C hinese Ambassador to India Cheng Ruisheng quoted in Guruswa my and Singh,

160.

' ' Du tta (2008), 55 5-5 6.

^2 P. Stob dan, Revisiting Sino-Indian Relations,

Strategic Analysis

32:5 (September 2008): 704-07

and Is China Desperate to Teach India Another Lesson? Strategic Analysis 34:1 (January 2010), 15;

Na mrata G oswami, China's Territorial Claim on Aruna chal Pradesh: Crafting an Indian Response,

IDSA IssueBrief 25 October 2010.

''^ Monika Chansoria, Trendlines in China's Infrastructure Development in Tibet, GLAWSJournal

(Summer 2010), 173-87, and Water Security for India: The E xternal Dynamics, IDSA

Task Force

Report 3 (September 2010),

44-51.

M inist ry of External Affairs, India. Niru pam a Rao, Indian Foreign Secretary address on India-

China relations at ORF on China, 3 December 2010, http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=530116760,

and Joint Co mm uniq ue of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of Chin a, Dece mber 2010,

http://mea .gov.in/m ystart.php? id=10 00168 79& pid=1 921 (accessed 11 Februay 2011).

Indian Ministry of External Affairs website at http://mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/

declarestatement/2008/01/l4js01.pdf.

^^

Sikri, 100.

See Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh's response to questions at press conference after

meeting with Chinese prime minister on 25 October 2009 available on Indian Ministry of External

Affairs website at http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id= 5101152 63&.flg=l.

Report of Ma nmo han Singh's meeting with Dalai Lama, http://w\vw.dnaindia.com/india/report_

dalai-lama-s-meeting-with-pm-manmohan-singh-was-nothing-unusual-aide_ 1426535.

^ Text of com mu niqu . Available on Indian M inis try of External Affairs website at http://mea.gov.

in/mystart.php?id=190016879.

^ Gu rusw amy and Singh, 84; See also Che n Jidong,The Tibet Issue and Gurrent Sino Indian Relations i

Isabelle Saint-Mezard a n d James K. Chin eds . ,China

an d

India Political anil Strategic Perspectives Centre

of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2005) xvii-xviii, 113-24.

''' Sidd har th Varadarajan, India Tells Ch ina: Ka shm ir is to Us W ha t Tibe t, Taiwan are to You, Th e

Hinduof 15 November 2010, http://ww w.hindu.com/2010 /ll/15/stories/2010111562471200.htm.

2 See text of India n foreign sec retary N irupam a Rao's address on India -Ch ina relations at ORF on


17/18

TheTibetEactor in India-China Relations

' '' ' See state me nt by Lodi Gya ri, Special Envoy of the D alai Lama at the In stitu te of South A sian

Studies, Singapore on 24 N ovember 2010, available at http://www .tibet.net/en/index.php? txtSearch=

talks-Hwith-l-Chinese4-government#.

^5 For a deta iled discussion of possible scena rios, see Sikri , 98 -9 9.

^'' Rep ort on special meeting of Tib etan s in exile held in Dhara msa la, India from 17-22 Novemb er

2008, http://wwvv.mcllo.com/Reportage.%5BMcllo.com%5D.html.

' '' ' Aba nti Bhattacharya , Chinese Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet,

Strategic ttalysis

31, no. 2

(March 2007), 258-61.

''8 Report in Asian Age 22 November, 2010, http://www.asianage.com/india/dalai-lama-says-he-

contemplating-retirement-vvithin-months-399.

^9 Gyatso (1992), 23 7-3 8.

8 Rep ort on special mee ting of Tib eta ns in exile held in Dh aram sala, India from N ovembe r 17-22,

2008,

http://www .mcllo.com/Reportage.%5BMcllo.com% 5D.html.

8' Internation al Tibet Network Report (29 January 2010), http://www.tibetnetwork.org/node/826.

82 W illy Lam, Hope for a Better Tibet Policy,

Ear Eastern Economic Review

(April 2008), 13-16.


18/18

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