“The Strategic Alliance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE”

By Simone van Slooten

Under the supervision of Professor Stéphane Lacroix

Sciences Po

Spring 2019

This paper has received the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po

Student Paper Award

The copyright of this paper remains the property of its author. No part of the content may be

reproduced, published, distributed, copied or stored for public or private use without written permission

of the author. All authorisation requests should be sent to program.kuwait@sciencespo.fr

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SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates:AStrongFrontShowingCracks?

TheMiddle Eastern countries situated in thePersianGulf1 are characterisedbyoil-driven

economies, autocratic monarchical rule and wealth. The Gulf countries consist of Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,Qatar, theUnitedArab Emirates (UAE) andOman. The countries

are Islamic countries, in which Sunni Muslims make up the majority, except in Bahrain,

whichhasaShiitemajority,andOman,whichispredominantlyIbadi.Since1981,theyhave

beenunitedinaregionalorganisationknownastheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC),which

wascreatedasaresultofregionalinsecuritiesandinparticularbytheonsetofthefirstGulf

WarbetweenIraqandIran.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two powerhouses of the GCC and the wider region,

toutingthehighestpopulationnumbers,mostextensivemilitaries,andpoliticalcloud.Inthe

past decade, they have often worked closely together in political andmilitary coalitions,

especiallysincetheonsetof theArabSpringprotests in2011.Thetwo ‘partners incrime’

have joined forces inSyria, Libya,andEgypt forexample,and themost recentexample is

themilitaryoffensiveagainsttherevolutionaryHouthiforcesinYemen.2Furthermore,since

2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have, alongside Bahrain and Egypt, enforced a strict

blockadeonQatar,whotheyaccuseofsupportingterrorism.3

Aninterestingdimensionisbroughtbytheonsetoftwoyoungercrownprinces,theSaudi

MohammedbinSalmanbinAbdulazizalSaud(MBS)andtheAbuDhabianMohammedbin

ZayedbinSultanal-Nahyan(MBZ).Thesetwocrownprinces,seenasthekeydriversbehind

SaudiandEmiratiforeignpolicyandmilitaryinterventions,havechangedthecourseofthe

twocountriesinthepastfewyears.

DespitetheseeminglyflawlessalliancefrontthatSaudiArabiaandtheUAEliketocreatefor

theworld, cracksmay already be visible in the façade. Historical border disputes, power 1GulfcountriesprefertorefertothebodyofwaterastheArabianGulf,butintheworlditisgenerallyrecognisedasthePersianGulf,whichiswhyIwillemploythistermintheessay.2EllenLust,TheMiddleEast(ThousandOaks:CQPress,2017,fourteenthedition),p.1432.3PatrickWintour,“GulfplungedintodiplomaticcrisisascountriescuttieswithQatar,”TheGuardian(5June2017)https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism.

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struggles for regional dominance and differing strategies in the military interventions all

pointinthisdirection.Thequick-temperedpaceofcrownprincesMBSandMBZmaypush

theconflictbetweenthecountriesevenfurther,astheyaspiretodominatetheregionwith

theirowncountry.

Therefore, this essaywill investigate the strategic alliance between Saudi Arabia and the

UAE,drawingonhistorical instancesaswellaspresentcasestudies. Itwillargue that the

two allies are not as united as they like to make the world believe, but despite their

differences, their common interestsweighheavierand thealliance isunlikely to crumble.

Part I of the essaywill give a historical background of theGCC and the two countries in

particular, examining the similarities and differences. Part II will scrutinise the historical

borderdisputesbetweentheUAEandSaudiArabia.PartIIIwillthenmovetothepresent,

wherethealliancewillbeanalysedinlightoftwocasestudies.Lastly,PartIVconsidersthe

newerabroughtbyMBSandMBZandexploresthepotentialimplicationsfortheendurance

oftheallianceandthepowerdynamicsintheregion.

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PartI:AHistoricalBackground

TheGulfcountriesandtheGCC

TheGulfcountriesaremarkedbylimitedpoliticalrightsforcitizensandautocraticgoverning

styles.OfthesixGCCcountries,onlyKuwaitwasmarkedas‘partlyfree’byFreedomHouse

in 2018,4 due to the limited influence of the Kuwaiti parliament in decision-making

processes.Consequently, SaudiArabiaand theUAEare still seenas ‘not free’, since their

citizens are unable to elect their rulers and play a limited role in political participation.

Nevertheless,theGulfregimesonlysparinglyresorttoplaincoercion(incl.jailandtorture)

oncitizens,andinsteadrelyonsmallerdosesofconstantrepression,5supersedingtheneed

formoreegregiousformsofrepression.

WhiletheGCCwasimaginedasaGulfcounterpartoftheEU,6 ithasnot liveduptothese

expectations in its almost 40 years of existence. This is predominantly caused by the

individualrulers’attachmenttotheirownauthority,whichtheyarenotwillingtogiveup,

especiallysinceit“[...]wouldamounttosurrenderingittoSaudiArabia,giventhatSaudiis

[...]thelargestmemberoftheGCC.”7Itdoesnothaveamonetaryunion,afterUAEbacked

outofthisideain2009,anddespitetheexistenceofaunifiedmilitarycommand,domestic

orbilateralmilitaryactionisstilldominant.8

TheUAE

The UAE is a federation of seven emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah,

Ajman, Fujairah, andUmmalQuwain)whichhavearound9million inhabitants, the large

majority of which are expatriates. Elections for a limited number of seats in the federal

4FreedomHouse,“FreedomintheWorld2018”FreedomHouse(2018)https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018.5Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1030.6SerajAssi,“TheEUandtheGCC:Twounionswithsimilaraspirations,butverydifferentrealities,”TheNewArab(11July2017)https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/7/11/eu-and-gcc-no-union-too-sacred-to-fail.7Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1036.8BrahimSaidy,“TheGulfCooperationCouncil’sUnifiedMilitaryCommand,”ForeignPolicyResearchInstitute(8October2014)https://www.fpri.org/article/2014/10/the-gulf-cooperation-councils-unified-military-command/.

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advisorybody areheld,9 but inpractice theexecutive, legislative and judicial power rests

withthehereditaryrulersoftheemirates,aspoliticalpartiesarebanned.Thoughtheseven

emirates are ruled by individual monarchies, the federation is dominated by Abu Dhabi,

whoserulingfamilycontrolsthepositionofpresident,andDubai,whoputsforwardavice-

president.10 Furthermore, civil liberties of citizens, such as freedom of expression and

freedom of assembly are highly restricted. Historically, the UAE were under British

influence, after theBritish signedanti-piracy treatieswith the sheikhdoms in the1820s.11

Afterthe“Truceof1853”,theemirateswerereferredtoastheTrucialStates.Despitethe

callsfromtheGulfrulerstotheBritishnottoleave,theUAEbecameindependentin1971

after domestic economic pressure drove the British towithdraw.12Nevertheless, the two

countrieshavemaintainedacloserelationshipeversince.

The foreign policy of the UAE is characterised by constructive engagement, based on

compromises, negotiations, reasonableness and a delicate balance of the needs of each

emirate.13Despite its small size, theUAE’s foreignpolicy,markedbyquietdiplomacyand

foreignaid,hashelpeditsurviveintheregion’sturmoil.14UndertheruleofSheikhZayed,

who was in power from independence until 2004, the foreign policy was influenced by

ArabismandIslamatfirst,whichpartiallygavewaytotheinfluenceofculturalfactorsand

security issues at a later stage.15 Since then, theUAE’s foreign policy goals have become

more ambitious, and the country has taken a more central role in the region and even

internationally.

SaudiArabia

Saudi Arabia is amonarchy led by theAl Saud family,which has been ruling the country

since1932. Forming a coalitionwith theWahhabistmovementon theArabianPeninsula,

9Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.102110KhalidS.Almezaini,TheUAEandForeignPolicy:Foreignaid,identitiesandinterests(Abingdon:Routledge,2012):p.25.11Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1037-1038.12Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1015-1016.13Abdul-Monemal-Mashat,“PoliticsofConstructiveEngagement:TheForeignPolicyoftheUnitedArabEmirates,”inTheForeignPoliciesofArabStates:TheChallengeofGlobalizationeds.BaghatKoranyandAliE.HillalDessouki(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairoPress,2008):p.458.14Almezaini,p.21.15Almezaini,p.50.

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the Al Saud family unified the country and named it after itself, intimately linking its

legitimacywiththeunityoftheStateandtheobedienceofitspeoplefordecadestocome.

It is one of the world’s premier oil exporters and heavily relies on the revenues for its

economy. The country is ruledwith an iron fist by theextensive royal family, though the

ShuraCouncil,anadvisorybodytotheKing,playsamarginalrole.16

Thecountryfindsitselfatthecrossroadsofitsorthodoxreligiousestablishment,theulama,

and itsWestern ally theUnited States (US). Theulama,whichhasbeenan indispensable

partofthelegitimacyoftherulingfamily,17standsinjuxtapositiontothemodernisingand

interventionistinfluenceoftheUS.EventhoughtheSaudiregimeandtheSalafist-Wahhabi

movementwere once nearly synonymouswith each other, they have started tomove in

opposite directions as the Saudi regime consolidated its modernising efforts. Since the

1990s,thereligiousmovementhasstartedtochallengethelegitimacyoftheSaudiregime

itself,breakingwithitspoliticallypassivenaturefromearlierdecades.18

SincecrownprinceMBS’sriseintheranks,SaudiArabiahasbeguneffortstodiversifyitsoil-

basedeconomy.Furthermore,thecrownprincehasattemptedtoportrayamoremodern

andprogressivedevelopment inhiscountry,whilealsocrackingdownoncriticalvoices in

theeliteandwiderpopulation,manifestinghisnewlyacquiredpower.19

Keysimilaritiesanddifferences

Securityinterests

In a region marked by political turmoil, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have converged with

respecttotheirsecurityinterests.EspeciallysincetherevolutionarysentimentsoftheArab

Spring,andtheunrestseeninneighbouringBahrain,thetwocountrieshavestartedtowork 16Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1184-1185.17BaghatKoranyandMoatazA.Fattah,“IrreconcilableRole-Partners?SaudiForeignPolicybetweentheUlamaandtheUS,”inTheForeignPoliciesofArabStates:TheChallengeofGlobalizationeds.BaghatKoranyandAliE.HillalDessouki(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairoPress,2008):p.344.18F.GregoryGauseIII,“TheFutureofU.S.-SaudiRelations:TheKingdomandThePower,”ForeignAffairs95,no.4(2016):1-9,p.4.19AdelAbdelGhafar,“MuhammedbinSalmanandthepushtoestablishanewSaudipoliticalorder,”BrookingsInstitute(9November2017)https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/11/09/muhammed-bin-salman-and-the-push-to-establish-a-new-saudi-political-order/.

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closer together toprevent similaruprisingsdomestically.20Moreover, thepoliciesofboth

countrieshavebecomeincreasinglymilitarised,asevidencedbythemilitaryinterventionsin

Bahrain, LibyaandYemen.21 Furthermore, the regionalpenetrationof archenemy Iran in

neighbouring countries, aswell as the threat of terrorist attacks launched by the Islamic

State,haveintensifiedtheSaudiandEmiratiparticipationincounterterrorismandsecurity

efforts.22Nevertheless,theEmiratiactionisdrivenevenmorebythefightagainstIslamism,

duetodomesticvulnerabilitiesrelatedtothefederalsystem.23

FunctionofReligion

IslamplaysacentralroleinbothSaudiArabiaandtheUAE.Thecountries’legalsystemsare

built on Islamic values and the religion constitutes the main ‘national’ character of the

citizens.24ThetwoholysitesofIslaminSaudiArabiahavebeenoneofthekeyfactorsthat

haveinfluencedthenationalcharacterofthecountry.Religionhasalessprominentrolein

politicsintheUAEthaninitsSaudicounterpart,wherethecreationoftheStatewasclosely

tiedtotheallianceofAlSaudfamilywiththeWahhabireligiousestablishment,resultingina

privilegedpoliticalrole.25

The countries’ attitude vis-à-vis Islamism, or ‘political Islam’, exposes a divergence.

Comparingtheextenttowhichreactionary Islamisshapingorconstrainingmodernisation

and reforms shows that Saudi Arabia and UAE are on opposite ends of the spectrum.26

Whereas Saudi Arabia, due to its own relationwith theWahhabi religious establishment,

canbeseentohavesomemeasureofsympathyforIslamistmovements,itwillonlysupport

those who are politically conservative and who oppose revolutionary initiatives.27

20NouraS.AlMazrouei,“TheRevivaloftheUAE-SaudiBorderDisputeinthe21stCentury,”JournalofBorderlandsStudies32,no.2(2017):157-172,p.157.21EmanRagab,“BeyondMoneyandDiplomacy:RegionalPoliciesofSaudiArabiaandUAEAftertheArabSpring,”TheInternationalSpectator52,no.2(2017):37-53,p.39.22TallyHelfont,“AMoreForwardRolefortheGulf?CombattingTerrorismatHomeandAbroad,”Orbis62,no.3(April2018):454-472,p.456-457.23Ibid.p.458.24Almezaini,p.23.25Lust,p.1033.26RashedLekhraibani,EmilieRutledgeandIngoForstenlechner,“SecuringaDynamicandOpenEconomy:TheUAE’sQuestforStability,”MiddleEastPolicy22,no.2(2015):108-124,p.112.27FredericWehry,“TheAuthoritarianResurge:SaudiArabia’sAnxiousAutocratcs,”JournalofDemocracy26,no.2(2015):71-85,p.72.

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Conversely,theUAEisvehementlyopposedtoanyformofpoliticalIslam,interpretingitas

ariskforthelegitimacyoftherulersandadriverofpopularpressuretoreformthesystem.

System

Anotherdifferencebetween the twoStates is tobe found in thepolitical system.Though

bothcountriesconsistofmonarchies,theEmiratishavesevendifferentrulingfamilies,allof

whomhaveasay–certainemiratesmorethanother–leadingtoamoreconsensus-based

andconstructiveengagementdomesticallyand internationally.Conversely, SaudiArabia–

morespecificallytheAlSaudfamily–beingthelargestcountryintheregionandakeyally

of the US, feels capable of a more brazen domestic and foreign policy, which might be

relatedtothefactthatthefamilydoesnothavetoconsiderdifferentpartsofafederation

liketheUAEisforcedto.

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PartII:Saudi-EmiratiBorderDisputes

Asaforementioned,theUAEwasbroughtundertheBritishsphereof influence inthe19th

century,formingthe‘TrucialStates’in1853.TheBritishandtheOttomanEmpiresignedtwo

conventionsin1913and1914establishingboundariesbetweentheOttomanprovinceand

the sheikhdoms protected by the British.28 After the fall of theOttoman Empire and the

creationof SaudiArabia, theBritish argued that itwas the successor-State and therefore

had to respect the boundaries.29 Nevertheless, this argument did not have basis in

internationallawandthebordersremaineddisputeduntiltheBritishforcefullypushedback

the Saudis in 1955 and unilaterally declared the border between Saudi Arabia and Abu

Dhabi.30In1968BritainannounceditwouldwithdrawfromtheUAEin1971.

After the UAE’s independence, it had to withstand Saudi interference in its domestic

relations with the objective of undermining them.31 The newly formed UAE was not yet

recognised by Saudi Arabia, and the latter showed itself willing to use military force to

destabilisethefederation.32ThedisputedborderrevolvedaroundKhoral-Udaid,aninletat

the Qatari border.While the UAE claimed that its border extended to this location, the

SaudismaintainedthatitwastheonlycountrywithalandborderwithQatar,meaningthat

EmiratishadtopassthroughSauditerritorytoreachQatar.33

In1974,thetwocountriesfinallysignedatreatydelineatingtheirboundaries,theTreatyof

Jeddah,whichbecamepubliconly in1995.34SheikhZayedofAbuDhabisignedthetreaty

primarilytoensuretheUAE’ssurvivalintheregion.35Nevertheless,thetreatyputtheUAE

atasignificantdisadvantage,sinceitgrantedSaudiArabiaacoastlineoffifteenmileseastof

Khor al-Udaid, directly contradicting theUAE’s claim. Conversely, theUAE still shows the 28NouraSaberAlMazrouei,TheUAEandSaudiArabia:BorderDisputesandInternationalRelationsintheGulf(London:I.B.Tauris,2016):p.4.29Ibid.p.5.30Ibid.p.6-7. 31EmirateRasal-KhaimahonlyjoinedtheUAEin1972,allegedlyafterhavingexperiencedagreatdealofSaudiinterference.32Ibid.p.8.33RaminSeddiq,“BorderDisputesontheArabianPeninsula,”TheWashingtonInstituteforNearEastPolicy(15March2001),https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/border-disputes-on-the-arabian-peninsula.34SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates,TreatyofJeddah(21August1974),UnitedNationsTreatySeries17333,no.1-30250,https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201733/i-30250.pdf.35AlMazrouei,“TheRevivaloftheUAE-SaudiBorderDisputeinthe21stCentury,”p.158.

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territory as its own on itsmaps and national ID cards. Furthermore, the agreement gave

Saudi Arabia the right to all income from the Shaybah-Zarrarah oil field in the disputed

area.36ThoughtheEmiratishaveattemptedtorenegotiatethislastpoint,SaudiArabiahas

firmlymaintainedthatitisnon-negotiable.37Tensionshaverisenseveraltimes,forinstance

in March 1999, when the UAE boycotted a Saudi-led meeting of GCC oil ministers and

instead organised an inauguration of the Shaybah oil field by crown prince Abdullah.38

Furthermore,when theUAEpulledoutof theGCCMonetaryUnion in2009,SaudiArabia

responded by closing the Saudi-UAE border at Al Ghwaifat, preventingUAE citizens from

entering.39

Even though the UAE-Saudi border disputes have not been settled and continue to be a

stumblingblockforbetterrelationsbetweenthetwocountries,sincetheinstabilityofthe

Arab Spring, the rise of Islamic State, and the increasing penetration of Iran in thewider

region, the UAE and Saudi Arabia seem to have put these border disputes on the back

burnerinfavourofincreasedsecuritycooperation.Indeed,thecountriesannouncedanew

military andpolitical alliance in late 2017,40which calls intoquestion the functioning and

necessityoftheGCC.

36Seddiq,“BorderDisputesontheArabianPeninsula”.37 AlMazrouei,“TheRevivaloftheUAE-SaudiBorderDisputeinthe21stCentury,”p.161. 38 Seddiq,“BorderDisputesontheArabianPeninsula”. 39AlMazrouei,“TheRevivaloftheUAE-SaudiBorderDisputeinthe21stCentury,”p.168. 40PatrickWintour,“UAEannouncesnewSaudialliancethatcouldreshapeGulfrelations,”TheGuardian(5December2017),https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/05/uae-saudi-arabia-alliance-gulf-relations-gcc.

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PartIII:TheSaudi-EmiratiAllianceinQatarandYemen

ThispartwillscrutinisetheSaudi-Emiratiallianceinlightoftheircooperationinenforcing

a blockade on Qatar and the Coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.

Though other contexts could be explored, such as Syria and Egypt, this current paper

doesnotallowforanextensiveanalysisoftheseinterestingcases.

Qatar

Qatar, situatedbetween SaudiArabia and theUAE, has attempted todistinguish itself

fromitsneighbourssinceitsindependence.ThecountryisruledbytheAlThanidynasty

andhasoneofthehighestpercapita incomesintheworld.Furthermore,thecountry’s

rulers adhere to the same sect of Islam as Saudi Arabia, namely Wahhabism.

Nevertheless, Qatar has gone its ownway, embracing a less rigid interpretationwhile

also embracing political Islam around the world through its support for Islamist

movements,41theverythingthatworriestheSaudisandEmiratis.WhereasSaudiArabia

andtheUAEareconservativeanddefinethemselveslargelythroughtheiroppositionto

Iranian influence and Muslim Brotherhood activity, Qatar has embraced Hamas, the

MuslimBrotherhood and even the Taliban.42 It supported the Egyptian fraction of the

Brotherhoodand its presidentMorsiwith$8billion,whichdidnotprotect it from the

EgyptianarmytakingoverpowerwithAl-Sisi.43

Thecoordinationofactions takenagainstQatar for these reasonsbySaudiArabiaand

the UAE can be seen on several occasions. Firstly, inMarch 2014, the two countries,

alongside Bahrain,withdrew their ambassadors fromQatar, stating as a reasonQatari

meddling in internal affairs.44 More specifically, the three States denounced Qatar’s

41Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1055.42JoshuaS.Krasna,“It’sComplicated:GeopoliticalandStrategicDynamicsintheContemporaryMiddleEast,”Orbis63,no.1(2019):64-79,p.74.43SimeonKerr,“FallofEgypt’sMohamedMorsiisblowtoQatarileadership,”FinancialTimes(3July2013)https://www.ft.com/content/af5d068a-e3ef-11e2-b35b-00144feabdc0.44BBCNews,“GulfambassadorspulledfromQatarover‘interference’,”BBCNews(5March2014)https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26447914.

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supportfordomesticIslamistmovementsanditsnewsnetworkAljazeera.45Afternearly

eight months of dispute, the four countries set aside their differences – though

superficially–andtheambassadorsreturnedtoDoha.46

Illustrating the unfinished business and remaining grievances, the 2017 blockade

imposedonQatarbySaudiArabia,theUAE,Bahrain,andEgyptcitesimilarconcernsas

the 2014 incident, and add new allegations of Qatar’s sponsoring of terrorism. The

blockade and diplomatic crisis commenced in June 2017, when the group issued an

ultimatumwiththirteendemandsthatQatarhadtocomplywithintwoweeks.47Among

the demands were the closure of Aljazeera, suspension of contact with the Muslim

BrotherhoodandsupportfortheAl-NusrafrontinSyria,hand-overindividualsaccusedof

terrorism,anddissolutionofcommercialanddiplomatictieswithIran.48

ThealliancebetweentheUAEandSaudiArabia inthecontextofQatarhasso farheld

strongly.TherivalrybetweenSaudiArabiaandQatarintheareasofWahhabistIslam,the

position in the regional and international community, and the disagreement over the

preferredwayofdealingwith Iranhasresulted inahegemonicstruggle,49 inwhichthe

UAEhasunequivocallysidedwithitsSaudineighbourduetoitsfearforthestimulation

of Islamist sentimentdomestically.Since these issuesarenot likely todisappear in the

near future,bothcountriesareadamantonunderminingQatar’sposition intheregion

and its ties to Iran and political Islam, despite the arguable failure of the blockade’s

achievementoftheseobjectives.

45DavidD.Kirkpatrick,“3GulfCountriesPullAmbassadorsFromQatarOverItsSupportofIslamists,”TheNewYorkTimes(5March2014)https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/middleeast/3-persian-gulf-states-pull-ambassadors-from-qatar.html.46Reuters,“SaudiArabia,UAEandBahrainendriftwithQatar,returnambassadors,”Reuters(16November2014)https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-summit-ambassadors/saudi-arabia-uae-and-bahrain-end-rift-with-qatar-return-ambassadors-idUSKCN0J00Y420141116.47Wintour,“GulfplungedintodiplomaticcrisisascountriescuttieswithQatar,”https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism.48AlbertoNegri,“GulfRegionalCrisis:Qatar-SaudiArabiaRivalry,TensionswithintheGulfCooperationCouncil,”IEMedMediterraneanYearbook(2018):244-246,p.246.49SamuelRamani,“TheSaudi-UAEAllianceCouldBeWeakerThanItAppears,”TheNationalInterest(11December2017)https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-saudi-uae-alliance-could-be-weaker-it-appears-23606.

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Yemen

AstarkcontrastwithQatar,Yemenisoneofthepoorestcountriesintheworldandhas

known a conflicted history, finding itself partly under British rule and uniting as one

Yemenin1990,ledbyPresidentAliAbdullahSaleh.50Thecountry’spopulationisgrossly

madeupof theZaydiShiiteMuslims,primarily found innorthernmountainareas,and

theShafi’i SunniMuslims, residing in southernandcoastal areas.51 Thepopulationhas

resorted to civil war before the Arab Spring of 2011, when revolutions began anew,

voicingdiscontentwiththeSalehregime.Afterseveralmonthsofprotests,Salehagreed

tostepdownandhisvice-PresidentHaditookover–throughthefacilitationoftheGCC–

to reformthepolitical system inYemen.52Nevertheless, severalgroups in thecountry,

the Shiite Houthis and Al-Qaeda affiliates, contested his authority, and after Saleh

returned as an ally of the Houthis, the country descended into a political crisis. In

September 2014, the Houthis took Sana’a and Hadi was forced to flee to Aden.53 On

March 25th 2015, he fled to Saudi Arabia, after which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and a

coalitionofsevenotherArabStateslaunchedamilitaryintervention,operationDecisive

Storm.54Anotherkeyreasonforthe interventionwastheperceivedIraniansupportfor

the Houthis, which was unacceptable for Saudi Arabia.55 Though Iran has fervently

denied its participation, the Houthis have used Iranian-made missiles during the

fighting.56

EventhoughSaudiArabiaandtheUAEarethemainplayersintheCoalition,ideological

divisionshaveemergedbetween thepartners.Since thebeginningof the intervention,

the UAE has had four security dimensions: regime stability, counterterrorism, local

trainingandhumanitarianassistance.57TheUAEhasthreecentralmissionsthatdiverge

50Reuters,“Timeline:Yemen’sslideintopoliticalcrisisandwar,”Reuters(17June2018)https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-timeline/timeline-yemens-slide-into-political-crisis-and-war-idUSKBN1JD0BX.51Lust,TheMiddleEast,p.1445-1446.52Ibid.p.1431.53Ibid.p.1431-1432.54Ibid.p.1432. 55MeganSpacia,“HowYemenBecameaHumanitarianNightmare:UntanglingaComplexWar,”TheNewYorkTimes(13June2018)https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/world/middleeast/yemen-war-explainer.html.56Ibid.57EleonoraArdemagni,“UAE’sMilitaryPrioritiesinYemen:CounterterrorismandtheSouth,”ISPICommentary(28July2016):1-3,p.1.

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fromitssupportfortheSaudi-ledCoalition:first,tocounterpolitical Islaminanyform;

second,tocontroltheRedSeacoastline,whichisofstrategicimportance;third,develop

andstrengthenitsownspecialforcesinordertosuperviseproxytroops.58Tothisend,it

has dedicated ground troops, mainly consisting of Special Forces, which have trained

troopsintheSouthofYemenmeanttocrushtheAlQaedapresenceintheregion.59Thus

unlikeSaudiArabia,theUAEhasaclearstrategy,trainingandfundingprivatearmiesto

crush jihadistsandal-Islahaffiliates. Furthermore, in theSouth ithaspartneredwitha

separatistmovementopposedtotheHouthisandtheHadigovernment,buildingwhatis

essentiallyaparallelstateincludingmilitarycampsandsecretdetentioncentres.60While

SaudiArabiahasnotcommittedgroundtroops,itisconcernedbytheinfluentialroleof

theUAEinYemeniterritory,bytheEmiratis’militarypresenceonstrategicSocotraIsland

intheRedSea,andbytheirincreasingroleinnavalsecurityintheRedSeaaswellasthe

ArabianSea.61

On a deeper ideological level, the UAE rejects Saudi Arabia’s sectarian approach to

conflictsintheregion,preferringinsteadaforeignpolicyvisionthatprioritisessecularism

and the creation of non-ideological coalitions.62 Consequently, the conflict between

SaudiandEmiratiapproachescentresonthedisagreementsàproposthethreatposed

by Shia actors and the political legitimacy of religious extremist groups. The UAE is

vehementlyopposedtocollaborationwithfactionsfromal-Islah,theYemenisympathiser

oftheMuslimBrotherhood,whileSaudiArabiahasmadefrequentuseofitsalliancewith

theparty.63

58GhaithAbdul-Ahad,“Yemenonthebrink:howtheUAEisprofitingfromthechaosofcivilwar,”TheGuardian(21December2018)https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war.59BelTrew,“InsidetheUAE’swaronal-QaedainYemen,”TheIndependent(15August2018)https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uae-yemen-civil-war-al-qaeda-aden-dar-saad-gulf-saudi-arabia-conflict-a8492021.html.60Abdul-Ahad,“Yemenonthebrink:howtheUAEisprofitingfromthechaosofcivilwar,”https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war.61ZacharyLaub,“HowtheUAEWieldsPowerinYemen,”CouncilonForeignRelations(22June2018,interviewwithNeilPatrick)https://www.cfr.org/interview/how-uae-wields-power-yemen.62Ramani,“TheSaudi-UAEAllianceCouldBeWeakerThanItAppears,”https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-saudi-uae-alliance-could-be-weaker-it-appears-23606.63Ibid.

15

Thishasresultedininefficientwarfare,tosaytheleast.Forexample,UAE-backedforces

foughtfightersloyaltoHadi,whomarebackedbySaudiArabia,atbasesandfacilitiesin

Aden.64 Furthermore, the contrasting objectives are visible in the city of Ta’iz, where

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are fighting the Houthis, but through supporting different

militia.WhileSaudiArabiahasbackedfightersalignedwithal-Islah,theUAEusestheAbu

al-AbbasBatallion,whose leaderwasplacedontheUnitedStates’ terror list forhaving

links toAlQaedaandthe IslamicState.65Thesetwomilitiashavebeguntobattleeach

other for power in Ta’iz, weakening the Saudi-UAE alliance against the Houthis

significantlyandcontributingtoamilitarystalemate.

However,theEmiratismightbewarminguptoal-Islah,asillustratedbyarecentmeeting

betweenMBZandtheheadsofthepartyinAbuDhabi.66Thisdevelopmentmightsignal

thattheEmiratisandSaudisaredevisingamethodtoendthewarinYemen,whichwill

bechallenginggiventheintractabilityoftheconflict.

Inconclusion,theSaudi-UAEalliancehasbeenstrong inthecontextoftheblockadeof

Qatar. The partners share the same objectives to rein in Qatar’s support for Islamist

movementsandcounteritsrelationshipwithIran,andgiventheassertiveforeignpolicies

ofMBSandMBZ,theywilllikelycontinuetoopposeQatarinthisway.Furthermore,the

blockadeanddemandshavelargelybeenwrittenoffashypocritical intheinternational

community,andlooseningthereinsmightentailahugeblowtothecredibilityoftheUAE

andSaudiArabia,whichtheynaturallywanttoavoid.

InYemen,thecollaborationhasbeenrockier,duetoobjectivesthatonlyoverlappartially

andsupportfordivergentlocalproxiesthatcountertheeffectivenessofthefightagainst

theHouthis.Nevertheless,sincethestartoftheintervention,theconflict inYemenhas

unravelledevenfurther,andSaudiArabiaandtheUAEarelookingforawayoutwithout

losing face or leaving potential security hazards in place. Therefore, it is in both their 64DanielByman,“SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmiratesHaveaDisastrousYemenStrategy,”Lawfare(16July2018)https://www.lawfareblog.com/saudi-arabia-and-united-arab-emirates-have-disastrous-yemen-strategy.65SudarsanRaghavan,“InancientYemenicity,violenceturnsinward,”TheWashingtonPost(6December2018)https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/12/06/feature/the-merchants-of-despair/?utm_term=.70a1047b10ca.66HusseinIbish,“There’sActuallyHopeforanEndtotheYemenWar,”Bloomberg(16November2018)https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-16/yemen-war-u-a-e-and-saudi-arabia-look-for-a-way-out.

16

interest to remain united in a strong alliance, especially to counter Iran’s increasing

sphereofinfluence.

17

PartIV:TheNewEraofMBSandMBZ

TheriseofcrownprincesMBSandMBZhashad important implicationsfortheforeign

policiesofSaudiArabiaandtheUAErespectively,andhaspotentiallysignalledanewera

forthetwoStates,inwhichtheybothaimforthemostinfluentialpositioninthewider

region.

MBS has fundamentally changed the functioning of the Kingdom since his rise in the

ranks fouryearsago, includingchallengingthealliancebetweentheal-Saudfamilyand

theWahhabireligiousestablishment,theveryfoundationofSaudiArabia.67Sincethen,

thecrownprincehastightenedhisgriponthesecurityapparatusandhassentimportant

warningsignals,ifnotpurged,thehigheliteofindividualsandrivalswithmasseconomic

andpoliticalpower.68WhileMBSisstillyoungandcantakemoretimeforhisgoals,the

social fabric of the Saudi state is more conservative andmarked by bureaucratic and

theologicalinertia,andtherapidchangethatMBSwantstoeffectcanhaveanunsettling

outcomeforthecountry.69

MBZ, twentyyearsolder thanMBS,hasexercised influentialpositions in theUAE fora

longer period of time. He became crown prince of Abu Dhabi in 2004 and deputy

supreme commander of the UAE armed forces in 2005. Furthermore, after the 9/11

attacks,whichfeaturedtwoEmiratihijackers,agovernmentcrackdownonIslamistsand

in particular on al-Islah took place, which included aministerial purge.70MBZ derived

muchofhispowerandhiscentralpositionindecision-makinginthisprocess,becoming

themajorplayerinsecurityandforeignpolicy.71

The two crown princes are also close allies themselves. For instance, MBZ played an

importantroleinpresentingMBSasthedesirablecandidatefortheSaudicrowninboth

Saudi and international circles – particularly aiming to convince Washington of his

67Helfont,“AMoreForwardRolefortheGulf?CombattingTerrorismatHomeandAbroad,”p.457.68UfukUlutasandBurhanettinDuran,“TraditionalRivalryorRegionalDesignintheMiddleEast?”InsightTurkey20,no.2(2018):81-105,p.86.69SimonMabon,“It’saFamilyAffair:Religion,GeopoliticsandtheRiseofMohammedbinSalman,”InsightTurkey20,no.2(2018):51-66,p.63.70Helfont,“AMoreForwardRolefortheGulf?CombattingTerrorismatHomeandAbroad,”p.458.71Ibid.

18

suitability.72ThetriangleUS-UAE-SaudiArabiahassolidifiedwiththeTrumppresidency,

which has pursued warmer relations withMBS andMBZ than undertaken during the

Obamaera.73

Thenewforeignpolicy

The era of MBS and MBZ power has been marked by assertive and aggressive

interventions in the region, often with military means. The atypically assertive

intervention inYemenhas illustrated“[MBZ’s]willingness touse forcedecisivelywhen

confronted with a problem related to regional security.”74 Furthermore, neither the

Saudisnor theotherGulf Statesdeployed theirmilitary forces in suchaproactiveand

aggressivemannerasinthelargeoffensiveoperationinYemen,whichmarksanewera

inSaudiforeignpolicywithlong-termimplicationsforlargerGulfpolitics.75However,the

worldalreadygotasneakpeekofthisdecisiveuseofforcewhenSaudiArabiaandthe

UAE intervened militarily in Bahrain in 2011 after the onset of popular protests

demandingachangeof theAlKhalifa regime.76Thiseventwarnedregionalneighbours

andsetaprecedentthatwasrepeatedin2015withYemen.

Furthermore, MBS and MBZ have also encouraged the expansion of their spheres of

influenceintoEastAfrica,whichisofstrategicrelevance.SaudiArabiaandtheUAEhave

madeuseofmilitarybasesandports incountriessuchasDjibouti,Eritreaandtheself-

declared republic of Somaliland to launch strikes into Yemen.77 The twoallieswant to

appearasa“regionalstabilizingactorandpeace-brokerintheRedSeaandtheHornof

Africa[…]skilfullycombiningeachother’srelationsandassetsintheHorn.”78Theirrole

in the rapprochementof EritreaandEthiopiamayhavepositive stabilisingeffects, but

theirbattleforhegemonicinfluence–asopposedtoQatarandTurkey,forexample–can

72UlutasandDuran,“TraditionalRivalryorRegionalDesignintheMiddleEast?”p.8673Mabon,“It’saFamilyAffair:Religion,GeopoliticsandtheRiseofMohammedbinSalman,”p.58.74Helfont,“AMoreForwardRolefortheGulf?CombattingTerrorismatHomeandAbroad,”p.458.75MayDarwich,“TheSaudiInterventioninYemen:StrugglingforStatus,”InsightTurkey20,no.2(2018):125-141,p.126.76RexBrynen,PeteW.Moore,BasselF.SalloukhandMarie-JoëlleZahar,BeyondtheArabSpring:AuthoritarianismandDemocratizationintheArabWorld(Boulder:LynneRiennerPublishers,2012):p.79.77InternationalCrisisGroup,“TheUnitedArabEmiratesintheHornofAfrica,”CrisisGroup(6November2018)https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa.78CamilleLons,“SaudiArabiaandtheUAELooktoAfrica,”CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace(23October2018)https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77561

19

havefurtherdestabilisingeffectsandlacksadurablelong-termstrategy.79Therefore,one

oftheprincipalmotivesforexpansionof influenceintotheHornofAfrica istocounter

other regionalpowers from filling the spacebefore theSaudisandEmiratis cando so.

ThistrendhasincreasedevenmoresincethefalloutbetweenthetwoalliesandQatarin

2017.

Thus,bothMBSandMBZhavelaunchedambitiousprojects,fundamentallychangedthe

foreignpoliciesoftheircountriesandareunderwaytoalterthesocialnormsintandem

withthis.However,sinceitisclearthatbothcrownprinceswanttoassertthestatusof

theirownState,andaspire tobe thegreatestplayer in thewider region,howwill this

affecttheiralliance?Onlyoneplayercanbethedominantone–whichhasupuntilnow

been Saudi Arabia – and continuing developments might strain their relationship.

Nevertheless,aswehaveseen,thetwocrownprincesalsohelpandsupporteachother

in their respectivepositionsandpolicies.Maybe, then, the ‘brotherly competition’will

nothaveagraveeffectontheirallianceandtheywillworkoutamethodtosharepower

atthetop.

79Ibid.

20

Conclusion

Inconclusion,thisessayhasarguedthatthepoliticalandmilitaryallianceofSaudiArabia

andtheUAEisnotwithoutflawsorhiccups,buthasremainedofasolidcharacter.This

stability iscausedbythepartners’shared interests,whichhavetakenprecedenceover

theirinternaldisagreements.SecuritythreatsintheregionlinkedtoIslamistmovements,

the increasing manifestation of Iran on the regional stage, and popular calls for

democratic liberalisationhaveallpresented incentives forSaudiArabiaandtheUAEto

deepentheirstrategiccooperationinordertoretaintheirauthorityandregionalpower.

Theblockade enforcedonneighbouringQatar since June 2017 is an expressionof the

robustnessoftheSaudi-UAEalliance,showingnocracksinthefrontastheycontinueto

espouseanti-Qatarterminologyandaccordingbehaviour.

Nevertheless, the internal divergences risk harmful consequences in the longer term.

This can be seenmost pointedly in the context of themilitary intervention in Yemen,

where Saudi and Emirati objectives are not fully aligned andwhich has resulted in an

ineffectivewareffortinapracticalsenseandapotentialdestabilisingfactorforyearsto

come.Furthermore, theexistingdisputebetweenSaudiArabiaandtheUAErelatingto

theirborderdelineationsatKhoral-Udaidandcontrolofprofitableoil fields, thougha

mostly dormant issue at the time of writing, has the potential to cause future

disagreement,whichcanunderminethesolidityoftheallianceinitsturn.

TheriseintheranksoftheyoungergenerationhasproducedcrownprincesMBSinSaudi

ArabiaandMBZintheUAE,signallinganambitious,bold,andpotentiallyrecklessturnof

policies and strategies. The two friendly princes have so far deepened the strategic

allianceoftheircountries,launchingtheirparticipationintonewregionalinitiativesand

interventions, whether positive for the longer term or not. Despite their friendly

demeanour in their bilateral relations, both aspire to be the leader in the relationship

andinthewiderregion,whichcanresultinfrictioninthealliance.

ItremainstobeseenwhatthenextdecadeoftheSaudi-UAEalliancewillbring,giventhe

youthfulandexpansionistspiritsofthecrownprinces.Theirmodernisationefforts,their

waronglobalIslamistmovementsandonarchenemyIran,andthemilitarisationoftheir

increasinglyambitiousforeignpoliciescouldmeanthelossofpopularandinternational

21

support and domestic stability, or the further consolidation of their dominance in the

Gulfregionandtheautocraticrulingstyleoftheirnations.

22

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