the state of the right the netherlands

8/6/2019 The State of the Right the Netherlands

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Its diversity is what most characterises the Dutch right: it spans Christian

democrats (Christian Democratic Appeal, CDA) and liberals (Peoples

Party or Freedom and Democracy, VVD), as well as populist parties,

whose strength is quite unprecedented in Europe. Populist parties have

increased their support signicantly since the early 2000s. They have

enjoyed real success, thanks in particular to Pim Fortuyn, whose pro-

vocative style boosted their popularity beore his assassination in May

2002. The radical and populist right is now embodied by Geert WilderssParty or Freedom (PVV). Founded in 2006, the PVVs orientation is

more nationalistic and less liberal than that o the Pim Fortuyn List; it is

vehement in its opposition to Islam and immigration. The Netherlands

also has many smaller political movements, including agrarian, natio-

nalist and ar-right parties. All these parties have relays in the media,

both in the press and on the internet, and their ideas are ormalised and

disseminated by a variety o think tanks and journals.

Despite this ragmentation, the Dutch right presents a united ideological

ront on many issues: with the exception o the Christian democrats, it

is generally Eurosceptic and avours strengthening the nation, at a time

when the countrys openness to the world is perceived as a threat rather

than an opportunity. Broadly speaking, the Dutch right supports strict

policies on immigration and the presence o Islam in the Netherlands,

refecting the growing political infuence o rightwing themes. In socioe-conomic terms, the right avours scaling back the state. But this conver-

gence is not enough to hide the rights underlying ragmentation, and

raises the question o its ability to overcome the tensions that plague the

country.

UMMarY


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iNTrodUCTioN

Since October 2010, the Netherlands has been governed by a centre-rightcoalition comprising Christen-Democratisch Appl (CDA, Christian

Democratic Appeal) and the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

(VVD, Peoples Party or Freedom and Democracy), representing the

liberal right. The minority government counts on the support o Geert

Wilderss populist Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party or Freedom). The

situation is remarkable in two respects.

First, it is not dissimilar to the state o aairs that has prevailed in

recent years in Denmark, where a centre-right coalition governs with

the support o the Danish Peoples Party. A situation o this nature is

truly unprecedented: no Dutch government had lacked a majority since

1945. During that period, minority governments only existed when a

coalition was deserted by one o its partners, and the resultant body

was known as a rompkabinet(rump government) or overgangska-

binet(transitional government) rather than as a minority government.

The second remarkable eature o the current situation is that theVVDs victory in the June 2010 parliamentary elections was ollowed by

the appointment o its leader, Mark Rutte, as prime minister. This was

the rst time since the end o the Second World War that the Netherlands

had ound itsel with a prime minister who did not hail rom the reli-

The sTaTe o The righT:

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gious parties or the social democrats. But while it may be rare or the

liberals to provide a head o government, the liberal movement has inva-

riably played an important role in contemporary Dutch political history.

The same goes or the Christian democrats.

For decades, the Netherlands has been governed rom the centre,making it something o a constitutional monarchy o the centre. Broadly

speaking, governments have been ormed by stable coalitions o between

two and our parties rom the centre-right or the centre-let. Majorities

have grown up around religious parties, with or without the social

democrats, or around the social democrats, with the support o the

liberal movement.

Coalitions and their lie are central to Dutch parliamentary demo-cracy. In the years ollowing 1945, governments were dominated by the

Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP, Catholic Peoples Party) and the Partij van

de Arbeid (PvdA, Labour Party), comprising Labour and social demo-

crats. The resultant governments were known as red-Roman coali-

tions (rooms-rode coalities). The 1958 parliamentary elections put an

end to such coalitions. From 1959 to 1973, with a brie hiatus between

1965 and 1967, religious parties governed with the support o the libe-

rals. Between 1977 and 1994, the Christian democrats (CDA), the partythat emerged rom the marriage between the Catholic party and two

Protestant groups, were the dominant orce. CDA was not exclusive,

governing as readily with the liberals as with Labour.

In 1994, the liberal parties overwhelming victory put a temporary

end to religious hegemony. Until 2002, Wim Kok led two purple coa-

litions (paarse coalitie or simplypaars), comprising liberal parties and

Labour.In 2002, ater the rise o the new populist right, behind the Lijst Pim

Fortuyn (LPF) banner, and the political crisis stemming rom its leaders

assassination on the eve o the parliamentary elections, the religious

parties returned to the ore, holding power in Jan Peter Balkenendes

our governments (2002-2010). CDA rst ormed a coalition with the

populists and Pim Fortuyns political successors. Ater the ailure o this

coalition, it managed to hold on to power with the support o social

democrats and the liberals.

For decades, Dutch political lie was characterised by a large measure

o stability and consensus. Governing requires common ground to be

ound, and ideological, political and maniesto dierences between let


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and right to be overcome. Today, the notion o convergence and coope-

ration the much-toutedpoldermodel(Polder model) that emphasises

the ability o Dutch politics to achieve the consensus necessary to orm

coalitions is giving way to what appears to be a new let-right divide.

The outcome o the June 2010 parliamentary elections conrmed this

trend: the vote resulted in a surge o the populist rightwing current and

gave it a stronger position on the political scene. As such, the new coa-

lition has given birth to a rightwing rather than a centre-right govern-

ment. The moderate let, which has been in crisis since the demise o the

purple coalition governments, nds itsel unable to ormulate credible

alternative policies or programmes.

To date, only very ew serious studies oering an overview o the poli-

tical and ideological right in the Netherlands have been published. A

good deal o general and journalistic writing, not to mention numerous

academic monographs, has been devoted to particular parties or ideolo-

gical trends, but very little analysis has been made o the right as a whole.

The same goes or the emergence o the new radical right, which has

caused such an upheaval in the Dutch political landscape in recent times.

This note covers the period spanning the post-war years to the present

day, with specic emphasis on the last decade.

deiNiNg The righT iN The NeTherl aNd

There is no single term to describe the right in the Netherlands, where the

notion actually encompasses a set o ideological and political positions

that sometimes dier widely. These positions emerged with the birth o

modern parliamentary democracy in the mid-19th century. Dutch parties

generally classed on the right include supporters o currents as diverse as

Christian democracy, liberalism and populism.

Depending on the circumstances and the times, there have been cur-rents and undercurrents, some on the let, some on the right. Such cur-

rents sometimes coexist within one o the three main classic political

groups in the Netherlands, namely the social democrats, the liberals

and the Christian democrats, each o which has a right wing and a let


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wing. A distinction is generally drawn within the liberal current between

rightwing liberals (VVD) and the letwing liberals o Democraten 66

(D66, Democrats 66).

Liberalism and religious politics dominate the right, both ideologically

and politically. The Netherlands does not have a rightwing monarchistor Bonapartist tradition. The providential gure is or that reason lar-

gely absent rom Dutch political lie. Conservative, sovereigntist, (ultra-)

nationalist, racist and xenophobic currents exist, but they are generally

on the parliamentary and political sidelines.

Far rom being a precise and unchanging term, the scope o the right

has in act shited over the years. Without undertaking an essentialist

analysis o the right or the entire period covering the 19th

and 20th

cen-turies, we must clariy the big change that took place ater the Second

World War. This is when the political meaning o the word right

changed.

Until 1940, the let-right divide ollowed the split between religious

and non-religious parties. This put the social democrats and the libe-

rals on the let. The right was represented by Protestant and/or Catholic

parties, bearing in mind that Catholics accounted or up to 40% o

the population in the mid-20th century. Since the end o the 19th cen-tury, the religious parties had been central to the governing majority,

the so-called rightwing coalition. The classic divide was rst put

orward by Abraham Kuyper, whose Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP),

the Netherlands rst political party, ounded in 1879, represented the

anti-revolutionary and Protestant current. With ew exceptions, govern-

ment was dominated by the religious parties. The social democrats o

the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP), which accounted orroughly 20% o the electorate during the interwar period, had to wait

until 1939 to enter government. Communism has always been marginal,

ideologically, politically and culturally.

During the short post-war period, hope emerged that the Dutch poli-

tical map would be redrawn. The idea was to reconcile ormer ideo-

logical antagonisms. The social democratic and liberal currents gave

rise to new political parties aimed at attracting support beyond their

classic electorate: Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA, Labour Party) and theVVD. The classic let-right divide was thought to be ading, with a split

between conservatives and progressives taking its place. This explains

the increasing prevalence o governments comprising both religious par-

ties (right) and social democrats (let).


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However, the amed stability o the Dutch parliamentary system was

trompe lil. While it may not have experienced proound changes, the

Dutch political system has experienced several upheavals. Some have

involved the appearance o rightwing parties. This was the case in the

1930s, with the ascists o the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging inNederland (NSB). In the 1960s, the Boerenpartij (an agrarian party)

won a handul o seats. In the 1980s, Centrum-Democraten (CD, Centre

Democrats), a small ar-right party, made its breakthrough. Last but

by no means least, the new millennium has seen the emergence o new

populist orces, the new radical right, represented by the Pim Fortuyn

List (LPF), the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party or Freedom) and

Trots op Nederland (ToN, Proud o the Netherlands).

The MaiN CUrreNT aNd Their hiTorY

The liberal parties

Liberalism is a major ideological and political current in the Netherlands.In the mid-19th century, it dominated the political scene. As such, liberal

Johan Rudol Thorbecke was the artisan o the 1848 constitution, which

ushered in modern liberal democracy as it exists in the Netherlands

today. With the advent o religious and socialist currents in the second

hal o the 19th century, liberals were orced to structure themselves. Two

trends emerged: conservative liberalism and social liberalism.

Liberal conservatives support a system where the state takes a hands-o approach to economic matters (classic laissez-aire economics) and

only intervenes, in principle, in the areas o law and order, and deence.

They advocate respect or tradition, monarchy and national sovereignty,

and are generally reticent about reorming parliamentary democracy.

Social liberals want the state to promote and guarantee the rights

and reedoms o citizens. In contrast with classic liberalism, they tend to

advocate a system in which the state plays a vital role in the economy;

as such, they support public intervention. Their ideas are a synthesiso social democratic and liberal policies. But unlike the socialists, they

place the individual at the heart o politics. This current is also known

as vrijzinnig liberalisme, which translates as progressive or letwing libe-

ralism.


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Democraten 66 was ounded in 1966 (hence its name) by journalist Hans

van Mierlo and Hans Gruijters, o the VVD. D66 distanced itsel rom

its older liberal brother, and its support has varied widely throughout

its history. It had 7 seats in the 1967 parliament and 24 in 1994; its

score ell rom 17 seats in 1981 to just 6 in 1982. A party o the liberal

let (social liberals), its support peaked when it was part o two purple

coalitions (1994-2002) with the VVD and the PvdA. But the rise o

rightwing populism, Euroscepticism and criticism o multiculturalism

virtually wiped out D66 in the 2006 parliamentary elections, when

it took only three seats. However, under their new leader, Alexander

Pechtold, and in their role as opposition to the populist current embo-

died by Geert Wilders, the social liberals increased their support in theJune 2010 elections, winning ten seats.

The radical democratisation o society in general and the political

system in particular are among the ounding principles o D66. The

party has long ocused on the second objective, advocating the use o

reerendums, the abolition o the Eerste Kamer (Senate), the direct elec-

tion o the prime minister and city mayors, and the introduction o a

moderate system o districts. The party presents itsel as a reasonablealternative. It also seeks to promote a better understanding o economic

(kenniseconomie), environmental and social issues.

Its programme makes D66 the prolongation o the VDB o the early

20th century. Some o its members preer to be known as liberal demo-

crats. D66 is among the most strongly pro-European parties in the

Netherlands. Like the VVD, it is a member o the Liberal International

(an international ederation o liberal and radical political parties) and

the European Liberal Democrat and Reorm Party (ELDR).The VVD and D66 show the extent to which liberalism has been boo-

ming in the Netherlands in recent times. This trend is also refected in

the activity o think tanks and the emergence o new parties on the right

(PVV and ToN) and the let. In 2006, Liberaal Democratische Partij

(LibDem) was ounded by Sammy van Tuyll van Serooskerken. The new

party elded candidates in the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections,

but ailed to win any seats. It is also noteworthy that Femke Halsema,the leader o GroenLinks (Green Let), began positioning her party as a

social-liberal orce in 2004.


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The religious parties

Like liberalism, the religious current plays a preponderant role in Dutch

politics. Today, it is embodied by Christen Democratisch Appl (CDA,

Christian Democratic Appeal), as well as by the so-called Die klein rechts(the little right), which is made up o a handul o Protestant parties,

including CHU (Christian Historical Union) and SGP (a undamentalist

Protestant party).

CDA was ormed in 1980 rom the merger o three parties, namely

the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP, Anti-Revolutionary Party, 1879),

the KVP (Catholic Peoples Party) and the CHU, a reormed Protestant

party. The merger o Protestant and Catholic movements was part o asurvival strategy or the Christian current ater the 1960s, a period cha-

racterised by depillarisation 1(ontzuiling) and the more pronounced

secularisation o Dutch society. This was refected in the gradual decline

in the scores obtained by the CHU, the ARP and the KVP in parliamen-

tary elections.

CDA managed to stabilise its electoral support and remain at the heart

o political lie. In the 1980s, it won as many as 54 seats (out o 150).Its central position between let and right gave it a place in all coali-

tion governments, with the exception o two purple coalitions ormed

between the VVD, PvdA and D66 in 1994 and 2002. CDA can swing to

the let as well as to the right, and its support was oten critical in obtai-

ning a parliamentary majority. As such, it provided several prime minis-

ters, including Dries van Agt, Ruud Lubbers and Jan Peter Balkenende.

For decades, CDA enjoyed stable electoral support among rural, Catholic

(south and east o the country) and moderate Protestant voters.Considered both Christian democratic and centrist, CDA is made up

o Catholics as well as Protestants. In its programme, CDA states that

Christian democratic values and the Bible are undamental, man being

the servant o God. The state must deend nature and society as a whole,

and the ruits o creation belong to everyone equally. Justice, responsibi-

lity and solidarity are also among its values.

The Christian Democrats suered a crushing deeat in 1994, butresuraced in 2002, when Jan Peter Balkenende became prime minister.

They took back the reins o power, only to lose heavily in the June

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2010 elections. Alongside the PvdA, CDA is considered one o the most

experienced parties o government. During its history, it has elt a ew

conservative jolts. For instance, a CDA member, Dries van Agt, a ormer

justice minister and prime minister, called in the 1970s or an ethical

reawakening (ethisch reveil) and the reocusing o Dutch society on

Christian values.

Alongside the Christian Democratic Party, there is also the (orthodox)

Protestant current, embodied by two small parliamentary groups: SGP,

ounded in 1918, and ChristenUnie (CU). The latter was born o the

2004 merger between the Gereormeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV, 1948)

and the Reormatorische Politieke Formatie (RPF, 1975). Together, SGPand CU tend to hold between ve and eight seats in parliament. Their

electorate is located in the Bible Belt, an area that crosses the country

rom southwest to northeast and is characterised by the density o its

orthodox Protestant villages.

SGP is the most orthodox o these two small Protestant parties. While

women may join, they may not run as candidates. UC advocates posi-

tions that are traditionally associated with rightwing ethics (opposition

to euthanasia and gay marriage, support or authority and values) but is

closer to the let on social and environmental issues. Its participation in

the last government o Jan Peter Balkenende was a rst.

The populist parties

The Dutch right has been thriving since the turn o the millennium.

The most striking eature has been the appearance o the so-called new

radical right (nieuw rechts radicaal). Its main components are the LPF

(2002-2008) and Geert Wilderss PVV (2006). There is also ToN (2007),

the marginal party o ormer minister Rita Verdonk, and several smaller

and more ephemeral parties: En NL (Marco Pastors, 2006), Lijst

Vij Fortuyn (Ola Stuger, 2006) and Partij voor Nederland (Hilbrand

Nawijn, 2006).

The rst o these parties to achieve a breakthrough at the nationallevel was Pim Fortuyns LPF. A sociologist and publicist, a dandy and

populist liberal, Fortuyn rst came to the ore in 2002, as leader o the

new Leebaar Nederland current (Liveable Netherlands). This party,

which grew rom local actions and emerged at the national level in


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1999, supported the democratisation o political lie and political parti-

cipation, condemned bureaucracy and aimed to challenge asylum policy.

Ater a dispute in early 2002, Fortuyn let the movement to ound his

own party. His striking language and provocative style led the LPF to

victory in the 6 March 2002 local elections. In the ollowing weeks,the LPF moved higher in the polls. But on the eve o the May 2002

parliamentary elections, Fortuyn was assassinated by an environmental

activist. His party nevertheless won 26 seats (out o 150) and entered a

coalition with the VVD and Jan Peter Balkenendes CDA.

During his career, Fortuyn was not a man or tangible and radical

breaks with the past: his programme was based on the notion o gradual

change. His political belies were summed up in three words: liberalism,populism and nationalism. Criticism o the welare state was central to

his liberalism, disdain or the political elite central to his populism and

rejection o communalism and European integration to his nationalism.

At the same time, Fortuyn was an advocate o libertarian ethical rights.

In their name, he was violently opposed to Islamisation and immigra-

tion, and was prone to a sense o nostalgia with respect or the recent

past (the 1950s rather than 1968). He saw himsel as the adversary o a

public sphere that he considered to be dominated by the media and theletist intelligentsia.

The populist movement took on another dimension when Geert Wilders

burst onto the political scene, ounding the PVV in early 2006. In the

June 2010 parliamentary elections, the PVV became the Netherlands

third-largest political orce. It is dicult to characterise this current: ar-

right, ascist, nationalist, populist or neo-conservative. Wilders himselavoids all attempts to position his party. In the absence o scientic ana-

lysis, there is an abundance o terms.

The PVV is considered a rightwing movement because o its ethnic

nationalism, which aligns it with Hans Janmaat and the ideas o

Centrum-Democraten (CD) in the 1990s. The PVV advocates strong

measures including a ban on building mosques or the introduction o a

tax or wearers o Muslim headscarves (kopvoddentaks), but it reuses

to withdraw the Dutch citizenship or civil rights o Dutch Muslims. Assuch, it does not support national preerence, and its representatives

do not expound racist views. The total absence o racial discrimination

one o the undamental characteristics o the ar right in its pro-

gramme eectively rules out classiying it with the ar right. Politically


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and culturally, Wilders is close to Israel, where he lived or more than

two years, and to the United States.

The PVV is considered to be a nationalist party, but Geert Wilders

preers to cast himsel as a patriot. Unlike the nationalists, he does

not place the nation, established as a state, at the oreront o politicaland social values. While the PVV may represent a orm o nationalism,

its nationalism is liberal, and has nothing in common with the extremist

and collective nationalism o ascism and National Socialism. Freedom

(Vrijheid) is seen by Wilders in its negative the individual must be ree

rom the state and sovereigntist the Netherlands must be ree rom

Europe dimensions. It is not a very consistent reading o liberalism,

since Wilders also advocates restricting reedom o expression and reli-gion, which brings his party closer to the nationalist and populist current.

The PVV also shares some ideas with populist movements the

populist nationalist right (the Flemish Vlaams Belang), liberal populism

(Leebaar Nederland) and letwing populism (SP). Wilders criticises the

political and cultural elites, and multiculturalism, and sides with the

middle and working classes, without stooping to use the collectivist and

homogeneous concept o people, which he eschews in avour o the

more liberal concept o citizens. The PVV also diers rom classicpopulism in that the concept o direct democracy has only recently

become a eature o its programme.

Wilders is above all a political strategist at the head o a motley

rightwing movement. The development o his political thinking and

ideology has seen three distinct phases: an initial conservative-liberal

period, a second neo-conservative period, ollowed by todays nationa-

list-populist period.There is no doubt that the years he spent in Israel between 1980 and

1983 count among Wilderss most critical ormative experiences. As

such, the Israeli-Palestinian confict and the broader Middle East are very

important or him, sometimes to the point o obsession. The period during

which he worked in the Ziekenondsraad (the central agency or health

insurance organisations) and the Sociale Verzekeringsraad (the central

agency or health insurance organisations), in the mid-1980s, uelled his

disdain or large bureaucratic structures and the misuse o social insu-rance benets, primarily the WAO, the workers disability regime.

In 1990, Wilders entered politics, as a member o the VVD. He ini-

tially ocused on social and economic issues. VVD leader Frits Bolkestein

became his mentor. Wilders espoused Bolkesteins neo-liberal economic


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views, his realism in oreign policy and his social and cultural conserva-

tism. He championed social security reorm (especially with respect to

WAO); well beore 911, he warned against the danger o Islam to the

West.

Subsequently, between 2002 and 2006, Wilders sought to highlighthis rejection o terrorism and Islamic extremism, two new themes that

are now central to political lie. He shited towards neo-conservatism, a

ashionable political current in the United States and the Netherlands,

where it was inspired by Bart Jan Spruyt o the Edmund Burke

Foundation (Edmund Burke Stichting). He became particularly critical

o progressivism, citing its hegemony over the political class and public

opinion, and heaping particular scorn on the letwing media.His criticism o the poldermodelwelare state, which he describes

as ossied, and Dutch communitarianism, is also very severe. Lastly,

Wilders also attacks the growing infuence o Islam, which he has made

his fogging horse (Feindmarkierung). While Wilders still seems to be

torn between conservative and neo-conservative liberalism, several ac-

tors suggest that neo-conservative themes and values now dominate his

thinking. Ater 2001, he became a staunch deender o the War on Terror

and backed US policy. With party colleague Ayaan Hirsi Ali, he backedthe idea o democratising the Middle East, sparking a political and intel-

lectual split with Bolkestein, a partisan orealpolitik. He combined this

issue with his rhetoric on law and order, and individual reedom. Wilders

also attacked Islamist terrorists, extremist imams and petty delinquents

rom Morocco.

His calls or strict and specic measures with respect to certain social

groups (Dutch Islamists) mark a shit away rom the VVDs traditionalconstitutional liberalism. His criticism o the liberal Dutch elite became

more virulent. He has accused them o denying the danger o Islam or

Dutch society and culture. And he clearly radicalised his rhetoric in

the 2002-2005 period, joining orces with Ayaan Hirsi Ali to call or a

liberal jihad in 2004. His expressive style is sometimes aggressive (in

expressions such as Stop the Islamist tsunami!). But his innovative

methods, such as the release o a video clip entitled Fitna, or Discord,

guarantees media attention.On immigration and Islam, Wilders goes urther than either Bolkestein

or Fortuyn, witness his proposal to ban the Koran (which he compares

to Mein Kampf) or to introduce a tax on the Muslim headscar. Wilders,

more than either the LPF or the VVD, is adamant that Muslim immi-


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grants in the Netherlands should assimilate ully. On the latter point, he

stands apart rom Bolkestein: while Wilderss mentor was the rst to say

that Islamic and Western values were incompatible, as early as 1990, he

was more conciliatory on the question o the assimilation o immigrants,

and always pushed or dialogue. Unlike Pim Fortuyn, who was rst andoremost a neo-liberal, Wilders sees economic policy as secondary to the

ght against the so-called Islamisation o the West.

Today, Wilderss thinking and political activities are ocused on the

desire to preserve the Dutch identity and his rejection o the growing

Islamisation o society (in reality, a broader rejection o immigration).

In August 2004, he let the VVD, which he deemed too ar let, crea-

ting the PVV in 2006. Some neo-conservative issues were dropped inavour o a more nationalist-populist stance characterised primarily by

a rigorous deence o national values, an outright reusal o immigra-

tion and the reusal o any surrender o sovereignty to international

bodies. Furthermore, Wilderss conception o politics sets the corrupt

elite against the virtuous people. He advocates the reorm o society,

the return o authority (state, police and judiciary) and opposes eco-

nomic globalisation and cultural diversity. Infuenced by the theories o

British historian Bat Yeor, namely the ideas she developed in her bookEurabia: the Euro-Arab Axis, Wilders has converted to ull-blooded

Islamophobia. The hard assimilation he advocated a ew years ago

has become a total rejection o Muslims although this does not mean

that he spouts overtly racist themes. His anti-immigration convictions

are aimed only at some origins. Wilders is married to a Hungarian

woman interethnic marriages are quite common in the PVV. He does

however complain about the presence o people o Caribbean origins(Dutch Antilles), as well as immigrants rom recent EU members, such

as Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians. Wilders ocuses his rhetoric on the

Netherlands and national identity, and he campaigned against Europe in

the 2005 reerendum. Turning his back on his early 2000s stance, Wilders

now demands an end to the Dutch military presence in Aghanistan.

He claims to speak or the people ordinary Dutch citizens who have

been abandoned by the elite and are threatened by globalisation and

Islamisation. In 2010, the PVV started advocating direct democracy andthe introduction o reerendums as a political tool.

The recent shit has been most conspicuous on economic and social

issues. Wilders and the PVV have dropped the neo-liberal line either out

o principle or or expediency and have veered sharply to the let. They


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support social security in all its aspects, including the minimum wage,

and oppose attempts to ease labour law or increase the retirement age.

It would be over simplistic to classiy Wilders and the PVV as popu-

list nationalists or neo-cons. While Wilders may have personal links in

the United States and Israel the two nations he regards as riendly

including with ar-right gures like Avigdor Lieberman, ounder o

Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Is Our Home), and Arieh Eldad (Hatikva party

leader), the PVV paradoxically holds libertarian views on certain ethical

issues. It has come out in avour o abortion rights, euthanasia and

embryo selection. The PVV also supports the empowerment o women

and homosexuals. On these themes, Wilders has voluntarily distanced

himsel rom currents that would happily make PVV nothing more thanan extremist, racist and xenophobic protest party.

Other trends and rightwing parties

Apart rom the three major political movements that characterise the

Dutch right, there is a multitude o ideological currents with little or no

political clout or electoral support on the right. This relative absence

does not however mean that they lack infuence. In act, the reality isquite the opposite.

T cn cun

There is no true conservative party in the Netherlands. Conservatism

has never commanded strong support in bourgeois, commercial and

urban Dutch society. It does, however, have a strong position in the cur-

rents that have deended Calvinist Christian principles since the 19th cen-

tury (Abraham Kuyper, ounder o the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij) and

in anti-liberal currents: Dries van Agt (CDA member) is best known or

his call or an ethical reawakening in the early 1970s. In recent years,

the neo-conservative current has continued to exist, without having been

able to nd a permanent place in the political landscape.

The conservative movement is also refected in social democratic

thinking. Democratisch Socialisten-70 (DS70, the social democrats), a

centre-right labour party, was ounded in 1970 by a PvdA action. Itopposed Labours let turn on economic and oreign policy (such as its

support or Chiles President Allende). By contrast, DS70 supported the

anti-Communist policies o the United States and NATO, advocating

a strong deence and the end to the immigration o Surinamese natio-


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nals. DS70 enjoyed strong but feeting success: it took eight seats in the

1971 parliamentary elections and entered the governing coalition, but

declined rapidly and was dissolved in 1983.

T nn cunThe nationalist parties that emerged in the 20th century include the

Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Nederland (NSB, National Socialist

Movement in the Netherlands). Anti-parliamentary and authoritarian, it

was ounded by Anton Mussert in 1931. The NSB was originally ins-

pired by ascism and, to a lesser extent, National Socialism. The ideas

contained in Musserts maniesto were as ollows: strong state, organi-

sation o society and the economy in accordance with corporatist ideals;reduction o reedom o the press; leadership cult. While no racist or

anti-Semitic actions gured in its ounding maniesto, the NSB became

more radical in the second hal o the 1930s. In April 1935, it notched

up a great success, winning nearly 8% o the vote in regional elections.

While the NSB ound support in all social categories, the middle

classes made up the majority o its electorate. Its supporters cover all

political and cultural tendencies, including, in the early years, assimi-

lated Jews. Its success at the 1935 regional elections was not repeated atthe 1937 parliamentary elections, the established parties and the Church

(Catholic and Protestant) having joined orces to thwart the new party.

The NSBs decline ollowed its radicalisation. On the eve o the German

invasion in 1940, the NSB transormed itsel into a racist and anti-

Semitic party. It subsequently collaborated with the occupying Nazis

and was ultimately banned in 1945.

In the early post-war decades, the nationalist, authoritarian and xeno-phobic right ound itsel politically marginalised, with two exceptions:

the agrarian party in the 1960s and the ar right (Centrum-Democraten)

in the 1980s.

T n cun

While the agricultural world is represented in the Netherlands and

has great importance in the countrys economic and nancial lie, there

is no agrarian party. Historically, the agricultural sector has been repre-sented by CDA, which has traditionally provided the minister or agri-

culture. However, the 1960s saw the emergence o a rightwing agrarian

movement, the anti-establishment Boerenpartij. Founded in 1958, the

Boerenpartij gained parliamentary representation in 1963, and conti-


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nued to hold a ew seats until 1981. Its most amous leader was Hendrik

Koekoek. Between 1967 and 1971, it enjoyed a boom, with its seat tally

rising to seven, although it nevertheless remained in opposition. Ater

1981, it went into decline. In 1981, it was renamed Rechtse Volkspartij

(Rightwing Peoples Party), but ailed at the general election, caught

between a xenophobic party on its right and centre-right governments

on its let. It olded.

The Boerenpartij was conservative, liberal, monarchist and orthodox

Protestant. It has oten been classied with ar-right parties. However,

while it may have deended national values, and some o its members

may have hailed rom the NSB, the Boerenpartij was neither racist nor

extremist.Throughout its existence, the party opposed economic regulations

imposed on the agricultural sector by the state and the nascent Common

Market. More generally, it deended reedom economic, political and

spiritual as well as Christianity (Protestantism). This programme, which

was as vague as it was ar-reaching, explains the partys breakthrough in

1967, a period o conusion and turmoil in the country.

T - cunWhile the ar-right movement remained on the sidelines or decades, a

ar-right party did in act enter parliament in early 1980: the Centrum

Partij (CP, Centre Party). CP member Hans Janmaat held a seat in

Parliament during the 1982-1986 parliament. Openly racist and xeno-

phobic, the partys rallying cry was eigen volk eerste (our people

rst). On several occasions, its leaders were prosecuted and convicted

or their language, but the party was not outlawed. And while the CPonly ever had a smattering o representation in parliament and on muni-

cipal councils, and its ideas only ever appealed to a small minority, it was

well known and strongly opposed by the anti-ascist splinter groups o

the ar let. Janmaat also held a seat in Parliament rom 1989 to 1998.

The CP still takes 9% o the vote in municipal elections, especially in the

new dormitory town o Almere.

The original orce behind the CP, Nederlandse Volks-Unie (NVU,

Dutch Peoples Union), ounded in 1971, is a small group with neo-Nazi and anti-capitalist tendencies. Its programme includes the rein-

troduction o the death penalty, the outlawing o immigration and the

construction o mosques, and the closure o Jewish and Muslim ritual

abattoirs; the introduction o courses extolling the Dutch nation in


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schools; support or SMEs in the ace o multinational corporations; the

banning o drugs; an increase in social-welare benets; and, last but not

least, the Netherlands withdrawal rom NATO. In recent years, the CP

has resuraced and taken part in a ew local elections, with little success.

However, it draws attention to itsel rom time to time by means odemonstrations, oten banned by city mayors or strictly regulated by the

police, which attract the attention o ar-let movements and the media.

The dUTCh righT aNd The Ch alleNge o Th e 21st CeNT UrY

The European Union

Europe was largely absent rom the spring 2010 election campaign. Since

the no at the 2005 reerendum on Europe, declarations o support or

European integration and the enlargement o the European Union have

evaporated, while criticism o Europe and its institutions has grown. For

one o the EUs ounding members, a country that hosts many interna-

tional institutions, including the International Court o Justice in TheHague, the 2005 ballot was a real game changer.

The Dutch rights positions on Europe are not unanimous.

On the one hand, the new radical right, and the PVV in particular, is

ercely opposed to the European Union and all that Europe supposedly

represents. The radical right sees Europe as a oreign power and com-

munity, dubbing it die club van Brussel (the band o Brussels). TheEU stands accused o encouraging the Islamisation o the Old Continent

and plotting to end the Netherlands independence. It expresses the

ear that the Netherlands importance within the EU will increasingly

erode. The PVV aims to close the labour market to Poles, Bulgarians

and Romanians. It would be happy i Europe were limited to the ormer

European Economic Community (EEC). It believes it is necessary to res-

tore Dutch sovereignty in the ace o Brussels, especially on agriculture.

With respect to Europe and immigration, the new radical right is on thesame wavelength as the ar let, represented by the Socialistische Partij

(SP, Socialist Party o Maoist origin), another sovereigntist orce.

The moderate right and the centre-right do not share the new radical

rights views o Europe, and their policies t into the existing EU ra-


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mework. The liberals hope to make the EU more ecient and modern,

and aim to achieve better control o the EU budget. Among the major

rightwing parties, the Christian democrats are the most pro-European.

They aim to achieve joint management o asylum policy at European

level. They also see the Common Agricultural Policy as crucial, a signi-

cant proportion o their electoral support coming rom armers. The

Christian democrats also back the Lisbon agenda, and believe that pla-

cing the education and training o European citizens at the heart o the

European Strategy or 2020 will improve the Netherlands international

position in the elds o knowledge and innovation. They also want to

strengthen the EUs control over the nancial markets, the single market

and EU policy on renewable energy. In general, and unlike the radicalright, the Christian democrats see no contradiction between national

identity and international cooperation, especially within Europe.

Rightwing organisations in the Netherlands share the view that

meetings o the European Parliament in Strasbourg should be done

away with and that Turkey should not be allowed to enter the EU. On

the latter question, however their views do actually dier marginally:

the PVV categorically rules out accession or Turkey, with the slogan

EU: Turkije er in, er uit Nederland (EU: Turkey in, Netherlands out),

whereas CDA and the VVD would accept Turkeys entry i it ulls the

Copenhagen criteria.

Globalisation

Broadly speaking, large rightwing parties are currently ocused chiefy

on domestic issues, and openness to the world is seen as more o a

danger than a challenge.

The right agrees that aid to developing countries should be cut, that

border controls should be strengthened and that the recruitment o

oreign nationals should be regulated in order to protect domestic wor-

kers. The right also backs the idea o tighter control over immigration

policy. Its aim now is to attract highly skilled workers and deny entry to

disadvantaged immigrants or those with insucient training.

The positions and rhetoric o rightwing parties dier on other issues

related to globalisation. The radical right is the most adamant in its

vision o oreign policy and the global balance. In terms o security, it

would put the accent on law and order at home at the expense o mili-


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tary engagement abroad. It has also called or the end o the Dutch mili-

tary involvement in international missions, including Aghanistan, and

the intensication o the ght against violence and terrorism at home.

The PVV demands that international treaties signed by the Netherlands

be reassessed. The moderate right has dierent views. CDA theorists say

that the Netherlands is not an island. The Christian democrats propose

continued involvement in the international community, on the basis o

solidarity, justice and shared responsibility. The Liberals and Christian

Democrats avour Dutch presence in international missions.

To better enable the Netherlands to deal with globalisation, the right

agrees that investment in education and the knowledge economy willneed to be increased. It recommends upgrading the teaching proession

and raising the level o vocational schools.

Islam

Islam has had an important place in political and public debate in recent

years. As an issue, it has been pretty much sewed up by the PVV, but

rightwing Liberals have borrowed some aspects o the same rhetoric.The PVV sees Islam more as an ideology than a religion. Wilders

wants to see an immediate halt to the entry o immigrants rom Islamic

countries, the termination o subsidies to Muslim media and aid or

building mosques. He has called or a ban on Muslim headscarves in

the civil service. He has stressed the need to outlaw the burqa, has no

qualms about dismissing the Koran and denounces the practice o emale

circumcision. The PVV also advocates the requirement or immigrants

to sign assimilation contracts, and the introduction o quotas or asylum

seekers (1,000 per year).

The radical right oten reers to the communitarian nightmare and

proposes tighter entry conditions or immigrants and limits on their

access to social security benets. In order to do away with the general

amnesty, it also proposes the systematic expulsion o illegal immigrants

and an end to dual nationality.

Setting itsel apart rom the PVV, the VVD stresses the importanceo liberal values, and says that society is or all its members, irrespective

o skin colour, religion or origin. The party is consistent in this respect

with its view that the individual the citizen should be at the heart o

society. The liberals believe it is important to stimulate the integration o


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immigrants through work. They would like to see integration courses,

currently organised by the State, entrusted to private providers.

The Christian Democrats deend the concepts o sustainable society

and shared interest, which requires the preservation o social cohesion.

Unlike the PVV, CDA continues to emphasise the importance o culturaland religious pluralism. Their view is that all religious communities must

adhere to the principle o equality beore the law. However, the party

proposes a reorm o the integration process, as well as active cultural

participation and the strengthening o the Dutch identity, witness its

proposed National History Museum.

The welare stateAll parties agree to the need to cut spending, and to reduce the number

o civil servants and government departments. While the liberals want to

cut red tape, the Christian democrats have called or a dynamic state

and the PVV a radical overhaul o Dutch institutions, namely the abo-

lition o the Senate and the reduction to 100 (instead o 150) o the

number o MPs in the House o Representatives. The radical right also

proposes the election o the prime minister and the senior judiciary byuniversal surage, whereas the liberals think it would be sucient to

extend this provision to mayors.

On health and education, the radical right proposes truly letwing poli-

cies. It believes that investment in healthcare and the social services should

be stepped up. The PVV also wants to end all payments o social welare

benets to non-Dutch recipients (amily allowances, or instance). There

is also debate on the retirement age: should it be kept at 65 or raised?

The right has a long list o reorms on its agenda. All rightwing partieswant to do away with large bureaucratic agencies, to promote the orga-

nisation o health and social services closer to users, to end the market

mechanism that was introduced in healthcare in the 1990s, to ban seve-

rance bonuses in this sector, to increase the number o caregivers and

to reduce the number o managers. In education, the right advocates a

return to smaller, upgraded schools, all points where its views converge

with those o the let.

Law and order

In recent years, the Dutch right across the board has adopted strong

rhetoric on law and order.


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The rightwing parties agree that crime should be punished more seve-

rely and that more money should be spent to increase the nancial and

human resources o the police. In case o social security raud, benet

payments should be stopped immediately.

The radical right and the liberals advocate ollowing the Americansystem on the right to strike, which translates as three strikes, maximum

penalty (or the VVD), and zero tolerance and three strikes and

youre out! (or the PVV). Moreover, they support increasing the

maximum penalty or criminals, and advocate reorming the police.

Finally, rhetoric against oreign criminals or immigrants is becoming

tougher. The PVV wants to expel the scum rom the Netherlands.

CDA agrees with the radical right on this issue.Under the ght against terrorism, individual rights have been under-

mined, particularly in terms o spying and preliminary investigations.

It has been proposed that preventive body searches be authorised

throughout the country; to date, tests have only been allowed at the

local level.

Lastly, it has been suggested that compulsory penal service or young

troublemakers be introduced (CDA), that re-education camps be esta-

blished (PVP) and that procedures or immediate trial be developed.

Media aNd NeTwork

Most rightwing parties have a political consultancy or research institute,

and publish research journals. The VVD has the Telders Foundation(Teldersstichting) and the journal Liberaal reveil. The letwing liberals

have a scientic bureau, Stichting Kenniscentrum D66, and publish a

journal known as Idee. CDA has set up the Wetenschappelijk Instituut

voor het CDA and the journal Christen-Democratische Verkenningen.

The CU works with the Mr. G. Groen van Prinsterer Foundation

and publishes Denkwijzer, while SGP works with the Guido de Bres

Foundation and publishes Zicht. The PVV is not at this time attached toany research institution or political journal.

Rightwing ideas are also expressed through a network o media,

websites and think tanks. The rightwing media include newspapers such

as De Telegraaf, the countrys largest national daily (populist right), and


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Algemeen Dagblad (popular right), which has a national edition and

an extensive network o regional editions. There are also the ree news-

papers, including Spits (distributed by De Telegraaf) and Metro, whose

editorial style and journalistic ethics t in with the populist movement.

The same goes or some opinion-based newspapers, led by the fagshipweekly Elsevier, centred on economic and political lie. Pim Fortuyn or

many years wrote a weekly column there, and neo-con Bart Jan Spruyt

now also has a column. HP/De Tijd, originally a centre-let publication,

swung to the let ten years ago.

Parallel to the conventional press, numerous websites and web

communities have emerged. They include websites such as www.hetvri-

jevolk.com and www.hetvrijewoord.org (which is also a oundation).The latter site was created by young people, and draws on the ideas o

Pim Fortuyn. Its president, Alexander van Hattem (1983), is involved in

politics and represents the LPF at local level. It is dicult to measure the

impact o these new media and platorms on public opinion.

Neo-conservatism has made great strides in the Netherlands since

2000. The Edmund Burke Stichting (Foundation Edmund Burke), a think

tank, plays an important role. It was created by philosophers and poli-

tical scientists Andreas Kinneging, Joshua Livestro and Bart Jan Spruyt.Originally close to the rightwing VVD, they now wish to dierentiate

themselves. Their aim is to provide the public sphere with a orum or

thought and debate on conservatism, and to contribute to the emergence

o a new conservative elite. The values they deend include the principle

o law and order, namely that the role o the state should be rolled back

to its basic unctions (deence, security, maintenance o public order)

and that the welare state should be prooundly reormed. Other neo-conservative proposals include curtailing immigration and keeping a

critical attitude vis--vis the European Union. Some ounding members

have expressed their support or Geert Wilders. The Foundation opened

an oce in The Hague in 2002, but had to close it in 2006 due to a lack

o nancial support. The Foundation nevertheless continues its activi-

ties, through debates, conerences and publications.


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CoNClUioN

The Dutch right has enjoyed growing support since the start o the new

millennium. It currently appears that, in its various components, it is

oering better responses to the challenges o globalisation, mass immi-gration, European integration and the ght against terrorism.

The most spectacular eature o this development has been the surge

in support or the new radical right, whose ideology combines popu-

lism, nationalism and neo-conservatism. The new right goes against

the openness to the world that characterised Dutch politics or so long.

Todays society is increasingly ocused on itsel. A second point to note is

that rightwing populism has ostered a new pillarisation, more socio-cultural than socioeconomic.

The emergence o new political groupings (LPF, PVV, ToN) and the

decline o the traditional centre parties (Christian democrats and social

democrats) show how Dutch politics is going through a phase o rag-

mentation. It remains to be seen whether the new rightwing coalition,

comprising the rightwing liberal VVD and the Christian democrats o

CDA (with the support o PVV), will hasten the collapse o the centre

and whether, ater several years o upheaval (rom Pim Fortuyn to GeertWilders, not orgetting Ayaan Hirsi Ali), the right will achieve political

stability.


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abbreviaTioN

CDA : Christen-Democratisch Appl (Christian Democrat Appeal)PvdA : Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party; Labour, social democrat)

SP : Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party)

VVD : Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Peoples Party or Freedomand Democracy)

PVV : Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party or Liberty)

GL : GroenLinks (Green Let)

CU : ChristenUnie (Christian Union)

D66 : Democraten 66 (Dmocrats 66)

SGP : Staatkundig Gereormeerde Partij (Calvinist Party)

PvdD : Partij voor de Dieren (Party or the Animals)

LPF : Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List)

ToN : Trots op Nederland (Proud o the Netherlands)


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reCeNT PUbliCaTioN

Water: global challenges, French perspectives,

Grard Payen, March 2011Water management: towards new models,Antoine Frrot, March 2011

Irrigation or sustainable agriculture,Jean-Paul Renoux, March 2011

Water: rom volume to value,Jean-Louis Chaussade, March 2011

Water: how to treat micro-pollutants?,Philippe Hartemann, March 2011

Agricultural productivity and water quality,Grard Morice, March 2011

The state o the right: Austria,*Patrick Moreau, February 2011

The Franco-German Tandem conronts the Euro crisis,*Wolgang Glomb, February 2011

Prot-sharing in the service o employment and purchasing powerJacques Perche and Antoine Pertinax, February 2011

2011, World Youths*Fondapol, January 2011

Public service 2.0Thierry Weibel, January 2011

The state o the right: Bulgaria*Antony Todorov, December 2010

The return o sortition in politicsGil Delannoi, December 2010

The Peoples moral abilityRaymond Boudon, November 2010

Achieving a new Common Agricultural Policy*Bernard Bachelier, November 2010

Food Security: a global challenge*

Bernard Bachelier, November 2010

The unknown virtues o low cost carriersEmmanuel Combe, November 2010

Overcoming the Deense budget issueGuillaume Lagane, October 2010


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The State o the Right: Spain*

Joan Marcet, October 2010The virtues o competitionDavid Sraer, September 2010

Internet, Politics and citizen CoproductionRobin Berjon, September 2010

The state o the right: Poland*Dominika Tomaszewska-Mortimer, August 2010

The State o the Right: Sweden and Dennmark*Jacob Christensen, July 2010

What is the police up to?Mathieu Zagrodzki, July 2010

The State o the Right: Italy*Soa Ventura, July 2010

Banking crisis, public debt: a German perspectiveWolgang Glomb, July 2010

Public debt, public concernsJrme Fourquet, June 2010

Banking regulation or sustainable growth*Nathalie Janson, June 2010

Four proposals to renew our agricultural modelPascal Perri, May 2010

2010 regional elections: where have all the voters gone?

Pascal Perrineau, May 2010The Netherlands: the populist temptation*Christophe de Voogd, May 2010

Four ideas to boost spending powerPascal Perri, Avril 2010

The State o the Right: Great Britain*David Hanley, April 2010

Reinorce the regions economic role

Nicolas Bouzou, March 2010

Reorming the Constitution to rein in government debtJacques Delpla, February 2010

A strategy to reduce Frances public debtNicolas Bouzou, February 2010


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Iran: civil revolution?*Nader Vahabi, November 2009

Catholic Church policy: liberty vs liberalismmile Perreau-Saussine, October 2009

A panorama o action in avour o green growthValry Morron and Dborah Sanchez, October 2009

The German economy on the eve o the general election*Nicolas Bouzou and Jrme Duval-Hamel, September 2009

2009 European elections*Corinne Deloy, Dominique Reyni and Pascal Perrineau, September 2009

The Nazi-Soviet alliance, 70 years on

Stphane Courtois, July 2009The administrative state and liberalism: a French storyLucien Jaume, June 2009

European development policy*Jean-Michel Debrat, June 2009

Fighting age discrimination in the workplaceElise Muir, June 2009

Academics: deending their status, illustrating a status quoDavid Bonneau and Bruno Bensasson, May 2009

Civil service vs civil societyDominique Reyni, March 2009

Stemming the protectionist tide in Europe*Nicolas Bouzou, March 2009

Higher education reorm in France: lessons rom Australia*Zoe McKenzie, March 2009

Reorms and social confict, a surveyJanuary 2009

Working on Sundays: Sunday workers perspectivesDominique Reyni, January 2009

Greening economic growth: towards a global strategy or EuropeElvire Fabry and Damien Tresallet, November 2008

US elections and trade policy: redening EU-US relations?Julien Tourreille, October 2008

Deence, immigration, energy: Franco-German viewsElvire Fabry, October 2008

*T tt mk wt n tk vb n en

Read our news and publications at www.ondapol.org


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To reinorce its independence and carry out its mission, the Fondationpour linnovation politique, an independent organisation, needs the

support o private companies and individuals. Donors are invitedto attend the annual general meeting that denes the Fondationsorientations. The Fondation also invites them regularly to meet its staand advisors, to talk about its publication beore they are released, andto attend events it organises.

As a government-approved organisation, in accordance with thedecree published on 14 April 2004, the Fondation pour linnovationpolitique can accept donations and legacies rom individuals and

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