the square of opposition: four colours sufficient for the “map” of logic
TRANSCRIPT
The square of opposition: Four colours sufficient for
the “map” of logicFrom the “four-colours theorem” to
the “four-letters theorem”
Vasil Penchev
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences: Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge: Logical Systems and [email protected]
“The Square of Opposition”, 5th World Congress
Rapanui (Easter Island), Chile, 10-15, November 2016
http://www.square-of-opposition.org/Rapanui2016.html
How many “letters” does the “alphabet of nature” need?
• Nature is maximally economical, so that that number would be the minimally possible one. What is the common in the following facts?
o (1) The square of opposition• (2) The “letters” of DNAo (3) The number of colors enough for any geographic al map
• (4) The minimal number of points, which allows of them not be always well-ordered
A note: the well-ordering of cyclic orderings
• Here and bellow, the term of well-ordering as to cyclic orderings means the option for any point in those to be able to be chosen as the “beginning”, i.e. as the least element in well-ordering
o This means that a cyclic ordering is well-ordered iff it contains a single cycle. Indeed, it can be opened anywhere
transforming into a normal well-ordering• This corresponds to the prohibition of „vicious circle” in
logic, which can be also always opened
Four!• The number of entities in each of the above cases is four though
the nature of each entity seems to be quite different in each oneo The first three facts share that to be great problems and thus
generating scientific traditions correspondingly in logic, genetics, and mathematical topology
• However, the fourth one (4) is almost obvious: triangle do not possess any diagonals, quadrangle is just what allows of its vertices not to be well-ordered in general just for its diagonalso Four elements seem to be necessary where one would describe a
structure, which is not well-ordered, i.e. the general case of structure
From Three to Four?• Thus, the limit of THREE as well as its transcendence by
FOUR seems to be privileged philosophically, ontologically, and even theologicallyo It is sufficient to mention Hegel’s triad, Peirce’s or Saussure’s
sign, Trinity in Christianity, or Carl Gustav Jung’s discussion about the transition from Three to Four in the archetypes in
“the collective unconscious” in our age• One can describe the dilemma “three or four” as the
alternative between a single well-ordering (i.e. a single linear hierarchy) and a set of arbitrarily many well-orderings (one might say “a democracy of hierarchies”), which is to be described relevantly
Our suggestion• The base of all cited absolutely different problems and
scientific traditions is just (4)o Thus the square of opposition can be related to those
problems and interpreted both ontologically and differently in terms of each one of the cited scientific areas as well as in
a few others• This means that the number of four is privileged as the least
number of the elements of a set, which admit not to be well-ordered therefore being able to designate any set, which is not well-ordered
The square of opposition
Four elements and theirunordered topological
structure
A
C G
T
A
C G
T
Four letters enoughto encode anything,e.g. DNA
Four colours enoughfor any map
A few arguments: Argument 1• Logic can be discussed as a formal doctrine about correct
conclusion, which is necessarily a well-ordering from premise(s) to conclusion(s)o To be meaningful, that, to which logic is applied, should not
be initially well-ordered just for being able to be well-ordered as a result of the application of logical tools
• Any theorem being a correct conclusion from the premises can be sees as a well-ordering from the premises to the statement of the theoremo Then any logic being a set of true theorems will be therefore
a set of well-orderings, irreducible to each other, but all reducible to the axioms
Comments to Argument 1• The usual viewpoint to a given logic pays attention first of all
to the rules of conclusion, which are different for each logico Therefore a set of true well-ordering turns out to be
supplied by a certain algebraic structure, usually a lattice• Then one can described that logic exhaustedly by
corresponding algebraic operations interpretable as valid operations to the elements of the set of true well-orderings such as a propositional calculationo Thus the usual focus of logical investigation addresses the
corresponding rules of conclusion and an algebraic structure as well as eventually in relation to other logics, but almost
never the set of all logic(s)
The standard approachto any given logic
The rules of conclusion defining implicitly a set of well-orderings (the true conclusions)
A set of well-orderings meant
Implicitly (as a featuring property)
Explicitly (as elements, i.e. well-orderings)
The problem of how that explicitly given set can be “coloured”
An algebraic structure(usually lattice) on that set
A few arguments: Argument 2• Consequently, the initial “map” (to which logic is applied)
should be “coloured” at least by four different types of propositions, e.g. those kinds in the “square of opposition”o They are generated by two absolutely independent binary oppositions: “are – are not” and “all – some”, thus resulting
exactly in the four types of the “square”• In fact, those “colour” oppositions are chosen in tradition:
the tradition, which can be traced back to Aristotleo Any two logically meaningful oppositions (therefore
internally disjunctive) independent of each other (therefore externally disjunctive) would be relevant as “four colours”
for the “map of logic”
Comments to Argument 2• Indeed one can involve a certain general structure of a set of
well-orderings of the elements of an initial seto It can be also considered as a partly ordered set, in which all
(maximal) well-orderings are separated as a special class of subsets
• Any logic and any geographical map share the same mathematical structure
o Then and particularly, one can defined any logic as that description of a corresponding “map” of e.g. propositions,
which is inventoried by the characteristic property of the set of all linear neighbourhoods in the map (a rather
extraordinary way for a map to be depicted)
A partially ordered set
A set of well-orderings (i.e. well-ordered
subsets of another set)
Any geographical map
Any logic A “map” of propositions needing not more than four
colours to be coloured such as those of the “square of
oppositions”The “four-colours theorem”
A few arguments: Argument 3
• Five or more types of propositions would be redundant from the discussed viewpoint since they would necessary iff the set of four entities would be always well-orderable, which is not true in general
o Consequently, the “four-colours theorem” might be alternatively interpreted by means of the following
formulation: three colours is the maximal number of colours, which are not enough to colour any map
• The three elements of a set are always well-ordered being incapable to constitute different cycles more than one
Comments to Argument 3• Consequently, one can unify and therefore generalize the
problems how a map should be uniquely coloured or a logic described, by the following question:o How many “letters” are necessary for any partially ordered
set to be described unambiguously?• The usual confusion preventing that fundamental and
generalizing problem question to be asked consists in the following:o The “map” misleads to be interpreted right topologically complicating redundantly the problem by enumerating all
possible topological cases
Still a few comments to Argument 3• That number of topological cases though finite is so huge
that only computers can manage ito In fact, that non-human approach is not necessary if one
generalizes all topological cases to a partially ordered set and proves the theorem about it
• This means that the four-colours theorem should be interpreted in a non-topologically to be proved in a “human way”, ant its “obvious” topological definition is seeming and misleading
o Then, any logic can be described in the same way
Both approaches for proving the “four-colours theorem” illustrated
Topological As a problem in the foundation of mathematicsAn interpretation as the “four-
letters theorem”
The “four letters theorem”on the bridge between
The infinity of set theory
The finitenessof arithmetic A human
proof
Enumerating a huge thoughfinite number of cases
Software programs for proving in any case
A “computer proof”
A few arguments: Argument 4• Logic can be discussed as a special kind of encoding namely that
by a single “word” thus representing a well-ordered sequence of its elementary symbols, i.e. the letters in its alphabeto The absence of well-ordering needs at least four letters to be
relevantly encoded • The four letters are just as many (namely four) as the “letters”
in DNA or the minimal number of colours necessary fora geographical mapo Two “letters” such as “0” and “1” are sufficient to encode any
linear string: then, the string, which is not well-ordered, needs at least two dimensions …
Comments to Argument 4• Any logic is defined as a set of well-orderings and thus it can
be in turn well-ordered in a second dimensiono Consequently any logic can be represented as a well-
ordered set of binary strings• Two different letters are necessary for any binary string
o Still two different letters are necessary for any two neighbouring strings to be designated differently
• The present argument addresses the core of the proof of the four-letters theorem: the axiom of choice should be applied
in a way to conserve the partial ordering so not to call a total linear well-ordering
1
A theorem
2
A
C
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
Lo
gic
The axiom of choice allows ofall theorems to be always well-
ordered
If the number of theorems isfinite, the axiom of choice is not
necessary
Then still two additional coloursare sufficient for any neighbouringtheorem to be coloured differently
If any well-ordered string can beunambiguously encoded as binary,
any partial ordering needs four “letters” or “colours”1
2
G
T . . .
. . .. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .Another theorem
. . .. . .
. . .. . .. . .. . .
. . .. . .. . .. . .
. . .. . .. . .. . .
. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .
Any logic is a partial orderingneeding only four “colours”
A few arguments: Argument 5
• The alphabet of four letters is able to encode any set, which is neither well-ordered nor even well-orderable in general, just to be well-ordered as a result eventually involving the axiom of choice in the form of the well-ordering principle (theorem) o It can encode the absence of well-ordering as the gap between
two bits, i.e. the independence of two fundamental binary oppositions (such as both “are – are not” and “all – some” in
the square of opposition)• If one represents infinity as a gap such as that between two
dimensions, four letters are sufficient to encode any infinite set including the finite subsets
Comments to Argument 5• Quantum mechanics offers a relevant conception for how any
unorderable in principle entity may be anyway studied and therefore represented by partially ordered sets (i.e. logically)
o Any coherent state before measurement is unorderable in principle for the theorems about the absence of hidden
variables in quantum mechanics• Nevertheless, it is ordered after measurement, but by a
randomly chosen ordering as an unconditional principleo Thus any unorderable entity can be represented equivalently
as a statistical ensemble of well orderings corresponding to certain partial orderings equivalent to logics
The “things by themselves”A coherent superposition
of all possible states and thus unorderable in principle
Any measurement reduces themto a finite and well-ordered set, but
always randomly chosen
A statistical ensemble (mix) of the randomly chosen well-orderings
That statistical mix is equivalentand even identical
to the “things themselves”according quantum mechanics
It can be considered as apartially ordered structure
Then it is encodable by four letters(“colourable by four colours”)
Logical and mathematical introduction into the problem
• All logics seem to be unifiable as different kinds of rules for conclusiono Thus any logic is a set of correct well-orderings (i.e. sequences
from the premise to the conclusion)• The axiomatic description of logic consists in explicating the
characteristic property of that set so that one can decide for any well-ordering whether it belongs or not to that seto To be a well-ordering ‘correct’ means just that it belongs to the
set defined by its characteristic property as a certain kind of logic
The set of all logics and its property
• Then, the characteristic property of the set of all logics seems to be the set of all sets of well-orderings in a class identifiable as language as a wholeo The advantage of that definition is that one can “bracket” (in
a Husserlian manner) the latter class being too fussy, unclear, and uncertain
• It is substituted by the set of all natural numbers perfectly sufficient for representing all well-orderings. Indeed, this is the sense of the well-ordering principle equivalent to the axiom of choice
Language: the enumerated• The initial class of language can be interpreted as what is
enumerated, then “bracketed” and “forgotten”o This follows the essence (though not literally) of Gödel’s
approach for the arithmetical “encoding” of all meaningful statements being true, false, or undecidable
• However, the enumeration suggests a single dimension such as that of the well-ordered natural numbers: their order is a single one
o However, if that was the case, the words or terms in a language would be also well-ordered, which is no true even to the artificial, computer languages created intendedly by
humans to be unambiguous
The map of a logic• If all logics as that set of all sets of well-orderings of natural
numbers are granted, one can define the concept of the ‘map’ of any given logic as the graph of all correct conclusions in the logic at issue
o The vertices of the graph are natural numbers• Just four colours are enough to be coloured that graph so
that any two neighbouring vertices to be coloured differently according to the direct corollary from the “four-colours” theorem
o Then the maps of all logics share the same property
Colours, letters and … amino acids• One can choice any four certain and disjunctive “colours” for
all maps, e.g. those of the square of opposition according to the tradition, or the “A-C-G-T” alphabet of DNA
o Nature always simplifying maximally has also “proved” the “four-colours” theorem as to DNA
• One may speak rather of the “four-letters” theorem than of “four-colours” theorem in that caseo The sense is: the DNA itself can be encoded by four letters practically realized by the four amino acids designated as A,
C, G, and T: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine
A generalization of the “four-colours theorem”
• The “four-colours” theorem seems to be generalizable as follows:
o The four-letters alphabet is sufficient to encode unambiguously any set of well-orderings including a
geographical map or the “map” of any logic and thus that of all logics or the DNA (RNA) plan(s) of any (all) alive being(s)
• Then the corresponding maximally generalizing conjecture would state: anything in the universe or mind can be encoded unambiguously by four letters
Formulating the “four-letters theorem”• That admits to be formulated as a “four-letters theorem”,
and thus one can search for a properly mathematical proof of the statement
o It would imply the “four-colours theorem”, the proof of which many philosophers and mathematicians believe not to
be entirely satisfactory for it is not a “human proof”, but intermediated by computers unavoidably since the necessary
calculations exceed the human capabilities fundamentally• It is furthermore rather unsatisfactory because it consists in
enumerating and proving all cases one by one
The “four-colours” theorem: a corollary from the “four-letters theorem”
• Sometimes, a more general theorem turns out to be much easier for proving including a general “human” method, and the particular and too difficult for proving theorem to be implied as a corollary after certain simple conditionso The same approach will be followed as to the four colours
theorem, i.e. to be deduced more or less trivially from the “four-letters theorem” if the latter is proved
• Indeed, anything in the universe is codable by four letters, then of course, the mutual position in a map is also codableby four colours as those necessary four letters for anything
The approach for the four-letters theoremto be proved
• The idea consists in representing any partial ordering as a well-ordered set of well-orderings therefore involving two dimensions of well-orderingo The problem is not so the well-ordering itself as it to be stopped
before to reduce all to a single well-ordering for the axiom of choice is valid
• That approach needs a certain “gap” such as that between two dimensions, over which the axiom of choice not to be able to transfer its ordering
o However, the boundary between a subset and the set of corresponding subsets used above is not reliable enough as that
“gap” serving rather for illustrating the idea
The approach for a proof (continuation)• A gap reliable enough and furthermore utilized already in the
dual foundation of mathematics by both arithmetic and set theory is that between ‘finiteness’ (after the natural numbers in arithmetic) and ‘infinity’ (after the infinite sets in set theory)
o Indeed, the axiom of induction implies that all natural numbers are finite (1 is finite, adding 1 to a finite natural
number, one obtains a finite number again)• Set theory (e.g. ZFC for certainty) does not include the axiom
of induction, but the axiom of infinity postulating the existence of infinite sets as well the axiom of choice able to order well any infinite set
The approach for a proof …
• Then the two “bases” of mathematics, both arithmetic and set theory, is not quite simple to be reconciled as to finiteness and infinity
o The Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) might be considered as the demonstration of those difficulties
• A visualization of how arithmetic and set theory can be reconciled by the axioms of induction and of choice is suggested on the next slide
The approach for a proof… visualized
The natural numbers: finite arithmetic
Sets infinite in general: set theory
The axiom of choice reducing
to a single, but transfinitewell-ordering
The axiom of inductiongenerating a finite well-ordering of finitewell-orderings, i.e. a
two-dimensional, but finite one
Two letters: “0” and “1”
Four letters:“A”, “C”, “G”, and “T”
The approach for a proof …• From the viewpoint of the finiteness of the natural numbers (i.e.
by the axiom of induction), one will observer a finite well-ordered set of also finite well-ordered sets divided by gaps as the infinite mathematical universe, which will be represented as a partial orderingo From the viewpoint of the infinite mathematical universe of set
theory (i.e. by the axiom of choice), one will observes a single well-ordering of all
• Then the former partial ordering will need four letters for its description in two dimensions forced by the gaps, unlike the only two letters necessary for the latter, single well-ordering of all because of the absence of any gaps
The three “whales” of the new gestalt necessary for a simple proof of the “four-
letters” theoremА: A generalization from the four-colours theorem to the four letters theorem
Б: A set-theoretical and arithmetical rather than topological approach
В: A viewpoint from the well-ordering to the partial orderings to be revealed the partial orderings as two-dimensional well-ordering rather than reducing an any-dimensional partial ordering to a two-dimensional one
The structure of the paper instead of conclusions
• Section 2 exhibits a general plan for the method, in which the four-letters theorem might be proved, including all successive steps considered one by one in detail in the next sections
o Section 3 discusses the separable complex Hilbert space and its interpretation in quantum mechanics and in theory of (quantum)
information• Section 4 demonstrates the correspondence between classical
information and quantum information as the correspondence between the standard and nonstandard interpretation (in the sense of Robinson’s analysis) of one and the same structure
The structure of the paper instead of conclusions
• Section 5 elucidates the link between that last structure and Skolem’s “relativity of ‘set’” (1922) as the one-to-one mappings of infinite sets into finite sets under the condition of the axiom of choiceo Section 6 deduces the “four-letters theorem” and interprets the
theorem as to the physical world after any entity in it might be considered as a quantum system
• Section 7 interprets the theorem as to mind seen as the set of all logics by means of representing the well-orderings in the separable complex Hilbert space
The structure of the paper instead of conclusions
• Section 8 discusses the unification of the physical world and mind under the denominator of the “four-letters theorem”. o Section 9 deduces the four-colours theorems from the four
letters theorem including the case of an infinite number of domains by attaching ambiguously a wave function to any
map (the axiom of choice may be excluded for any finite number of domains)
• The last, 10th section summarizes the paper, suggests conclusions and direction for future work