11

Warandrevolution

JeffreyVerhey

Itisawarofsuchpowerandtensionastheworldhasneverseen.Allourphysicalandintellectualpowershavefusedtogetherinthiswar,areheightenedtotheirlimits.Naturalpowershavebecomeweaponsofdefenceanddestruction.Thewarisnotjustbeingfoughtinthefield.Thepress,trade,thecompleteeconomicandintellectuallifeisfighting;everythinghasbecomeattackanddefence.Inthenationsinvolved,allaspectsoflifeareatwar.Warhasbecomethetotalmeaningandtheonlypurpose…Wearenolongerthesamepeoplewewereatthebeginningofthewar,andwecannolongerreturntothosewewere,wemustmoveforward.Theoutbreakofthewarhituslikeanearthquake,shookourveryfoundationsand,asifbyaflood,wearebeingcarriedawaytonewshores.Wehavenoconnectionanymorewithwhowewere,withhowwelived.1

JohannesMüller,aProtestantpastor,wrotetheselinesinlate1914inhiscapacityaseditorofDieGrünenBlätter(TheGreenLeaves)—areligiousmagazinethatsoughttocounselchurchgoersintheirdailylives.Beforethewar,Müllerhadoftencommented,sometimesquitewhimsically,onthedangerstocivilizationposedbymodernity.In1914,likemanyofhiscontemporaries,Müllerembracedthewarasafascinatingexperience,asagreat,historicepoch:lifeforallGermanswouldneverbethesame.Müllerdidnotstate—asmostcontemporariesdidnot—howpeoplehadchanged,orwhatthefuturewouldbring.Indeed,in1914almostnoonepredictedwhatwastocomeorthattheywerewitnessingthedeathofImperialGermanyatwar.

Thespiritof1914:publicopinioninJulyandAugust

Ironically,thewarthatcontemporariessocorrectlyinterpretedas‘modernizing’Germanybeganasthelastwarofthe‘longnineteenthcentury’.InAugust1914,‘Germany’didnotdecideonwar.Thedecisiontogotowar—or,moreaccurately,thedecisiontoaccepttheriskofbecominginvolvedinaEuropeanwarbysupportingtheAustriangovernmentinitscampaignagainstSerbiawiththeinfamous‘blankcheque’—wasmadebyasmallcadreofdecision-makers,allofwhomhadbeenpersonallyappointedbyKaiserWilhelmII.ThesemenhadnodemocraticlegitimacyandwerenotinanywayrepresentativeofGermansociety.TheKaiserhimselfhasbeenaptlydescribedbythehistorianJohnRöhlasavain,unpredictableman.2Wilhelm’scivilianstatesmendeferredtomilitaryadvicewheneverquestionsofGermansecuritywerebeingconsidered.Accordingly,intheJulycrisisof1914themostimportantdecisionsweremadebythemilitarywithanalmostcompletedisregardforpoliticalconsiderations.YetasJohannesMüllerhadnoted,theFirstWorldWaratthetimewascalleda‘people’s

war’,andmostGermanswereawareofthisfromtheverybeginning.Whenon23JulynewspapersreportedthatAustriahadissuedSerbiaanultimatum,duetoexpireonSaturday,25July,at6:00p.m.,theGermanpeopledidnotneedtoberemindedthat,becauseGermanywasalliedwithAustriaandbecauseRussiatraditionallysupportedSerbia,GermanycouldbecomeinvolvedinawiderEuropeanconflagration.Inthelateafternoonof25July,vast

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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crowdsofcurious,nervous,excitedpeoplegatheredinthelargerGermancitiesatthesiteswheretheyexpectedthenewsoftheSerbianresponsefirsttobedistributed—incitysquares,infrontofnewspaperbuildings,indowntowncafes.Peoplegatheredtherebecausein1914specialnewspapersupplements(‘extras’)werethemediathatfirstinformedthemoftheirfate.AfterlearningthatSerbiahadrejectedtheultimatum,inBerlinandafewotherlargecities‘parades’ofenthusiasticyouthsmarchedthroughthestreets,singingpatrioticsongs.On1August,when‘extras’proclaimedthatGermanywasatwar,manyinthecuriouscrowdswhohadbeenwaitingtenselyrespondedwithhurrahsandpatrioticsongs.Yetmostpeoplewentquietlyhome.Inthefirsttwoweeksofthewar,asthetroopsmovedoutandGermanssaidgoodbyetotheirlovedones,publicopinionremainedtense.OnlytowardtheendofAugust,asthenewsofGermanmilitarysuccessesledmanytobelievethatthewarwouldsoonbewon,didpublicopinionchangesignificantlytoresembleanationwidepatrioticfestival.ManycontemporariescharacterizedthesecrowdsasevidenceofaGermanyunitedinwar

enthusiasm.ButthereweresignificantregionalandclassdifferencesinhowGermansrespondedtotheoutbreakofthewar.Thelargestenthusiasticcrowdswerefoundinthemajorcities,suchasBerlin,Hamburg,andMunich.Theywerecomposedmainlyofyouths,especiallyuniversitystudents.Intheworking-classdistrictsofthesecities—as,indeed,wasalsothecaseoutsidethelargercitiesanduniversitytowns—therewaslittleevidenceofenthusiasm,andnoneatallinruralareas.Thiswasnonationwide‘warenthusiasm’.Theredidneverthelessariseakindofnationalunity,whichtranscendedclassandregionaldifferences,insofarasmostGermansembracedasenseofnationaldutytopreservetheirfatherlandinawarofdefence.ThissensewasheightenedbytherealizationthatGermanystoodachancetowinthiswar—apeople’swar—onlyifeverybodystucktogether.Thissharedrecognitionofacommonfate,inwhichone’sownwellbeingdependedontheeffortsofallotherGermans,wasinitselfaprofoundchangeinpoliticaloutlook.Itisnotsurprisingthatmanycontemporarieshopedthatthisrecognitionwouldcontributetoovercomingthedeepinternaldivisionsbetweentheworkersandthebourgeoisie,thecityandthecountryside,andthedifferentreligions—divisionsthathadcharacterizedGermanpoliticalculturebeforethewar.Someevenhopedthatinthis‘spiritof1914’German‘society’wouldbecomeaGerman‘community’.NationalunityinadefensivewarfounditsmostpoignantexpressionintheGermanSocial

DemocraticParty’sdecisiontosupportthewar.Before1914theSPDhadbeeninternational,pacifist,andrevolutionary(atleastinitspartyprogrammes).InparliamenttheSPDhadnevervotedformilitaryappropriations;indeed,ithadfollowedapolicyofalmostcompleteoppositiontogovernmentpolicyonarmaments,imperialism,andmanyotherissues.InthelastweekofJuly,theSPDhadstagedmassiveanti-wardemonstrationsthroughoutGermany,whichwerelargerthananyoftheenthusiasticcrowds.Yeton4August1914,inthesittingoftheReichstagconvenedtoapprovewarexpenditures,theSocialDemocraticPartyvotedinfavourofthemilitaryappropriations.Thisday’ssittinghadbeenopenedbytheKaiserwiththephrase,‘Inolongeracknowledgeanyparties,IrecognizeonlyGermans.’ManycontemporariesdescribedtheSPD’sapprovalofwarcreditsasthemostamazing,

unexpectedresultofthe‘spiritof1914’.ThisnationalunitybecameknownastheBurgfrieden,orcivictruce(literally,peacewithinthefortress).Yetthevotewaslessabreakwiththepastthanitwasapublicacknowledgementoflongtermdevelopments.SocialDemocratsdidnot

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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wantGermanytolosethewar:theyfearedtheRussians,buttheyalsohopedthatwhattheycalledthe‘politicsof4August’wasmorethanjustapolicyforthecommondefenceofthefatherland.Byrejectinginternationalism,thesocialistsbelievedtheycouldrefutethegovernment’sandtheotherparties’chargethattheirpartywasnationally‘unreliable’,whichinturnwouldinspirethegovernmenttoundertakeaprogrammeofinternalreforms.Inthewordsofonetradeunionofficial,thegoalofthe‘politicsof4August’wasfortheworkingclassestohavethesameaccessandthesamerighttoworkingovernmentasallotherGermans.Weexpecttheendofalldiscrimination.Weexpecttherecognitionoftheworker’sindependentassociationsasthegivenrepresentativeoftheworkingclassinallaspectsofeconomicandsociallife.Andweexpectthestatetocontinuetobuildupandcompleteoursocialwelfarelegislation.3

Mostofthesegoalswouldberealized.

Militarydevelopments

Themilitaryhistoryofthewarcanbequicklytold.TheGermanmilitaryplanin1914,amodificationoftheso-calledSchlieffenPlan,wasaboldgambletoavoidatwo-frontwarbydefeatingtheFrenchinthewestbeforetheRussianscoulddeployinlargenumbersintheeast.ThewarplanwasanexampleofadangerousGermantendencytomakedecisionspurelyonthebasisofmilitaryconsiderations.TheSchlieffenPlanrequiredthattheGermantroopsmarchthroughBelgium,thusinvadinganeutralcountryandensuringthatGermanywasviewedasabrutalaggressor.Themilitarysimplybrushedtheseissuesaside.Atfirst,theplanwentquitewell.TheGermanarmyrolledthroughBelgium,threatened

Paris,andtheFrenchgovernmentfledtoBordeaux.However,wheninthefirsthalfofSeptembertheFrencharmyturnedbacktheGermansatthefirstBattleoftheMarne,theGermanshadthetwo-frontwartheyhadgambledsomuchtoavoid.AttheendofSeptember1914thearmiesinthewesthadsettleddownintotrenches.FromtheFlemishcoasttotheSwissborder,therewasacontinuousfrontofsome450mileswithupto8millionsoldiersengagedonbothsidesatanyonetime.TheWesternFrontwasessentiallylarge-scalesiegewarfare—agrindingconflictofattritionwithindustrializedkillingfieldswherethemachinegunandreinforcedtrencheshadmadethedefenceimmeasurablystrongerthantheoffence.Inawarofattrition,giventhevastnumerical,material,andeconomicsuperiorityoftheenemy,theGermanarmywouldhavetobeveryluckynottolose.PartofthereasonGermanstrategistsandtheGermanpopulationfailedtorecognizetheir

difficultsituationaftertheBattleoftheMarnewasbecausethewarintheeastwentwell.InAugustandSeptember1914,atthebattlesoftheMasurianLakesandTannenberg,theGermansdestroyedoneoftheRussianarmies.Germany’sarmywouldcontinuetodowellintheeastforthedurationofthewar,althoughitwasoftenrequiredtocometotheaidofitsally,Austria-Hungary.ButtheGermanArmySupremeCommand’smainfocuslayelsewhere,onthewesternfront.TrainedinthetraditionofKarlvonClausewitz,whohadtaughtthatthedestructionoftheenemy’sarmywasthemaingoalinwar,theSupremeCommandsoughtthedecisivebattleinthewest:in1916againstFrancewiththeattackonVerdun,andinearly1917againstEnglandwithunrestrictedsubmarinewarfare.Whatisperhapsremarkableaboutthesetwocampaignsisthatalthoughthetacticsweremilitary—theapplicationofforce—thestrategywas

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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psychological.TheSupremeCommanddidnotactuallybelieveGermanycouldannihilatetheenemy’sarmy;ithopedtoweakentheenemy’smoralesuchthatthepeoplewouldsueforpeace.AtVerdunGermanyattackedFranceatapointtheFrenchcouldnotaffordtolose,forcingtheFrenchtoenlistalltheirresources.TheaimofGeneralErichvonFalkenhayn,theheadoftheGermanSupremeCommand,wastoopen‘theeyesof[theFrench]peopletothefactthatinamilitarysensetheyhavenothingmoretohopefor’.4Hisplanfailed.GermanlosseswereashighastheFrench—togethertherewereabout700,000casualties—andonlyafewsquaremilesofterritorychangedhands.WhentheGermanSupremeCommandresumedunrestrictedsubmarinewarfareinFebruary1917,theyweregamblingthattheEnglishpeopleandtheEnglisheconomycouldbestarvedintosubmission.ButtheGermanNavydidnothaveenoughsubmarinestoachievethisgoal.ThefailureofthisgamblemeantthattheUnitedStates,withitsvastresourcesinmenandmaterial,joinedGermany’senemies.ByJuly1918theUnitedStateshadonemillionmeninEurope,withhundredsofthousandsmorearrivingeachmonth.ThefailureatVerduncostFalkenhaynhisjob.Hewasreplacedinlate1916withErich

LudendorffandPaulvonHindenburg,thetwoleadersresponsibleforthevictoryofTannenberg.Yetalthoughthebattlesinthewestin1916hadshownthattheAlliescouldout-producetheGermansinmunitions,machinery,food,andmen,LudendorffandHindenburgstillbelievedthatGermanycouldwin.Theythereforeopposedallfeelersforanegotiatedpeace.LikeFalkenhayn,theydidnotreallybelievethattheenemy’sarmiescouldbeannihilated.ButalsolikehimtheyconvincedthemselvesthattheenemywouldquitwhenhecametoacceptthattheGermanarmycouldnotbedefeatedinthefieldandthattheGermanhomefrontwouldholdout.

Thehomefront

TheGermanhomefrontwasneverreallyisolatedfromthefighting.Germanstrategistsconcentratedonthedomesticmobilizationofmaterial,includinghumanmaterial,andonthemobilizationofwhatinGermanywasknownas‘nerves’ormorale.Thetwo,ofcourse,werecloselyintertwined.Moralewasafunctionnotonlyofhowwellthewarwasgoingbutalsoofthemoraleconomyathome.TheperceptionthatGermansocietywasfair,thatallhardshipswereequitablyshared,thatthecommunityofwarcreatedinthe‘spiritof1914’wasnotbeingexploitedbyanyinfluentialindividualorgroup—allthiswasanessentialpreconditionforfightingthiswar.Accordingly,fromtheverybeginningofthewar,censorsincluded‘harmingtheBurgfrieden’amongthelistofthingstobecensored:such‘negativism’allegedlyendangerednationalsecurity.Thedegreeofgenuinesocialcohesionimpliedbythe‘spiritof1914’wastested

immediatelybythemobilizationoftheindustrialandagriculturalresourcesneededtosupplyahugearmyofseveralmillionmen.Noonehadexpectedawarofthisscale,andstockpileswerequicklyexhausted.AlreadyinAugust1914WaltherRathenau,afutureforeignministerintheWeimarRepublicwhowasthenpresidentoftheGermanGeneralElectricCompany(AEG),wasabletopersuadethegovernmenttoestablishaWarRawMaterialsOfficewithintheWarMinistry,underhisdirection.Theagencyintervenedintheeconomyinordertosteer

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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adequatesuppliesofrawmaterialstothecompaniesinvolvedinwarwork.Asthewarcontinued,evermoreagencieswerecreated,andgovernmentexpenditure,whichbeforethewarhadneverbeenover10percentofgrossdomesticproduct,hadrisenby1918toover50percentofGDP.Inamomentofneed,marketmechanismswerereplacedwithplanning:thecapitalisticeconomicorderwassetaside.Indeed,manycontemporariesspokeof‘warsocialism’,althoughtheGermaneconomyremainedfarfromacommandeconomyinthelaterSovietstyle.Germanarmiesdidnotrunoutofmunitionsduringthewar.Yetthebureaucracycreatedwasinefficientandinadequate.ThusGermanywasnotabletotranscendtheveryreallimitstoitsownresources—ineithermaterialormanpower.TheselimitsbecameclearintheHindenburgProgramme,anambitiousschemeproposedby

themilitaryin1916.Thisprogrammeaimedtodoubletheproductionofmunitionsbyforcingeverypossiblememberoftheadultpopulationtojointheactiveworkforce.Centralplanningwouldcoordinatenotonlyissuesofsuppliesandinvestmentofcapitalbutalsomanpower.Becausethetradeunionsopposedthisinfringementofworkers’rights,thegovernmentwasforcedtomakeanumberofcompromisesinitsefforttogettheHindenburgProgrammepassedbytheReichstag.IntheAuxiliaryServiceLawofDecember1916,allmaleworkersbetween17and60yearsofagewererequiredtotakeupemployment;theywereseverelyrestrictedintheirabilitytoquitworkortoseekadifferentjob.Butthelawalsoestablished‘localworkers’committeesandcouncils’(Betriebsräte)infactories.Thesewerejointcommitteesoflabourandmanagementinwhichthetwosidescouldsettledisputesoverwagesandconditionsofemployment.ThegoalsoftheHindenburgProgrammewerenotmet:therewassimplytoolittleadditional

labourorrawmaterialsavailabletobemobilized.Thelaw,however,providesanexampleofthebroadmodernizationofGermany’spoliticalandeconomicinstitutionsduringthecourseofthewar,furtheringthedevelopmentofacorporatistmodelofstateandsociety.Asthestateexpandeditsroleintheeconomy,newgovernmentministriesandpowerswerecreatedandnewlawswereenacted.Manyoftheseinnovations,alldesignedtobolsterthewareffort,persisttothisday(forexample,inlocalworkers’committeesandcouncils).Thewaralsobroughtabroadexpansionofthewelfarestate,fromfamilyaidschemestothepayingofunemploymentbenefits.YetthemostimportantelementinthemodernizationofGermany’seconomicandsocialstructureswasrecognitionoftherightoftheworkingclassestogenuinerepresentation.Duringthewar,thegovernmentacknowledgedtheSPDandthetradeunionsaslegitimatepartnersinordertobebetterabletomanagelabour.Theworking-classmovementwasabletorealizeitsgoalofestablishinglocalworkers’committees;itwontherighttoorganizeinwarindustries;andforthefirsttimecollectivebargainingagreementsbecamelegallybinding.TheideathatpeacebetweentheclassescouldbeachievedinwartimeGermanylayatthe

heartoftheBurgfrieden.Yetchangesinpoliticalandeconomicinstitutionsweregreaterthaninsocialattitudes.Middle-classcitizenswerestillseldomseeninworkingclasspubs.Norwereworkersinvitedtomixwithexecutivesatsocialevents.True,thewardidbreakdownsomeoftheeconomicfoundationsofclassconsciousness.Ariseofover200percentinthecost-of-livingindexbetween1914and1918hurtthosewhosewagesdidnotkeepupwithinflation,includingcivilservantsandworkersnotemployedinawarindustry.Inflationalso

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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lessenedthevalueofthesavingsofthemiddleandupperclasses—atrendthatwouldcontinueandaccelerateafterthewar.Nevertheless,classanxietydidnotdisappear.Quitethecontrary.Thosewhopreviouslyhadfeltthemselvestobestablemembersofthemiddleclass,suchasschoolteachers,sawtheirobjectiveeconomicpositionerodeandbecomemoreprecarious;subjectivelytheyperceivedthesedevelopmentsaspatentlyunfair.Thewarreshuffledsocialrelationsinmanyotherwaysaswell.A‘people’swar’spawned

anunprecedentedlevelofvolunteerisminsupportofthetroops.Middle-classwomenengagedincampaignsofnursing,welfarework,andsocialaid;intheprocess,manyfoundtheirreligiousfaithreinvigorated.Somemiddle-classwomenjoinedworking-classwomeninthefactories.(Itisoneofthemythsofthewarthatthewarforcedallwomentowork.Instead,thewarpromptedwomentoberedeployedintowarindustrieswhohadpreviouslyworkedinothersectors,andonlysomemiddle-classwomenworked.)Genderroleswerecalledintoquestionbywomenworkingasstreetcarconductors,postalworkers,orfactoryhands.Yetitisunclearhowmuchattitudesactuallychanged.Theeffectsofthewaronwomen,especiallyontheirself-perception,aredifficulttoassess:thoseeffectsmayhavebeenmorepsychologicalthansocial.Afterthewar,whentheGermanarmywasdemobilized,womenwhohadbeenworkinginfactoriesgavethereturningmentheirjobsback,almostwithoutopposition.Theseweredifficultstrains,yetwhattoremostatthefabricofGermansocietywasthelack

offood.Germanyhadbeenanetimporteroffoodbefore1914(approximately25percentofitsconsumption).TheBritishblockadeeffectivelycutGermanyofffromitsimports.AddedtothisdifficultywasadeclineinthenumberofhorsesavailableonGermanfarms(theyhadbeentakenbythemilitary),andthelossofmanyablemen.Accordingly,productiondecreasedbyasmuchas30percent.Asfoodbecamescare,priceswentup.Cropfailures,suchastheonethatstruckpotatoproductionin1916,werecalamitous.Thegovernmentwasinanimpossiblesituation.AsStateSecretaryoftheInteriorClemensvonDelbrücktoldameetingofthePrussianstateministryon25October1915,thegovernmentacceptedresponsibilityfor‘providingthepopulationwithsufficientfoodstuffsatreasonableprices’.5Toachievethis,thegovernmentsetpricecontrols.Whenthepricecontrolsledtoirregularitiesinthemarket,thegovernmentrealizedthewholeprocesswouldhavetobecontrolled,andturnedtorationing.BreadrationingbeganinMarch1915;inOctober1916meatrationingwasintroduced.Bytheendofthewar,virtuallyallfoodstuffswerebeingrationed.Thetroublewasthat,asthewarprogressed,rationsinevitablydeclined.Inpeacetime,Germanshadconsumedapercapitaaverageofabout380gramsofflourperday.AlreadyinJanuary1915theflourrationwasdownto225gramsperday.InMarch1917thegovernmentdecreasedtherationto170grams(itwouldgoupagainwhentheharvestcamein).Althoughtherationsweremiserable,oftenpeoplewereluckytoreceiveeventhesesmallamounts.Notonlyfoodwasrationed;coalwas,too.InthelonganddismalGermanwinters—andthewinterof1916–17wasespeciallyhardonbothcounts—thelackofheatingfuelturnedmiserytocalamityforinnumerableGermans.AlthoughnoGermansactuallystarvedtodeathduringthewar,manyweredesperatelyhungry.Suchhardshipscouldbesustainedaslongasasenseofjusticeprevailed.Asenseofhumour

alsohelped.Postcardsandhumoristsmadefunoftheterm‘substitute’(Ersatz),whichwasusedwithincreasingfrequencytodocumenttheshrinkingproportionofgenuinenutritionandflavourtobefoundinGermanfoodanddrink.YetGermanslosttheirsenseofhumourwhen

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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theybegantorecognizethatsociety’smoraleconomywasnolongerfunctioningproperly.ThepresumptionthatallGermansweresharingthenationalburdenequallywasnotbeingborneoutbyreality.Whenfarmersheldbacktheirgoodsinordertosellthemontheblackmarket,andthenwhenthestateintervenedtotrytoforcethemtobringtheirgoodstomarket,tensionincreasedbetweenfarmers,citydwellers,andgovernmentofficials.Whenthestatedemonstrateditsincapacitytocontroltheblackmarket—bytheendofthewarGermanswerepurchasingone-thirdofallfoodthere—confidenceinthegovernmenteroded.Thislossofconfidencewasespeciallymarkedamonglower-classfamilies,whospentalargeproportionoftheirincomeonfood.Asearlyas1915generaldissatisfactionfoundexpressioninspontaneousfoodriots,oftensetoffbyworking-classwomenwhohadbeenstandinginlineforhoursonend.Asthewarcontinued,thesespontaneous‘demonstrations’increasedinsizeandnumber.Underlyingallthedissatisfaction,ofcourse,wasthewaritselfandtheharshrealityof

death.Oneofthemostcommonexperiencesinfamilylifeduringtheseyearswasbereavement.Eveniftheysurvived,enlistedtroopshadtoputupwiththearroganceofofficers.Althoughtherecanbenodoubtthatinthethickofthefightingtherearoseastrongsenseofsolidaritywhichmomentarilyloweredsocialtaboos,soldierswhohadbeenschooledinthelessonsofSocialDemocracyhadtheirpre-warviewsofWilhelminesocietybroadlyconfirmedintheirpersonalrelationswiththeofficerclass.Thoseinteractionswereoftenfilledwithtensionandanimosity,andthesoldierssharedtheseexperienceswiththeirrelatives.Thusthebattlefrontandthehomefrontwereintertwined:howcoulditbeotherwisewhenaboutone-halfoftheGermansoldiersweremarriedandwhentherewasaconstanttrafficofsoldiersembarkingonorreturningfromfurlough?Somesoldiersevenwrotehometoasktheirfriendsandrelativesnottosubscribetowarloansbecausethiswouldonlyextendthewar.InNovember1917about10percentoftheGermantroopstransportedfromtheeasternfronttothewestusedtheopportunitytodesert.ThishasledthehistorianWilhelmDeisttospeakofa‘covertmilitarystrike’in1918,estimatingthatinthelastmonthsofthewarbetween750,000andonemillionsoldiersavoidedbattlebyfakingillness.6Nevertheless,despitethehorrorofwar,thearmyremainedlargelyreliable.Untilthelasttwoweeksofthewar,therewasnoopenmutinyastherehadbeen,forexample,intheFrencharmy.Thephysicalrealityofunparalleleddeathanddestructionhadanumbingeffect,butitdidnotleadtoopenrevolt.MostcontemporariesbelievedthatagreaterthreatfacedtheGermanarmy:thedangerofthe

homefrontcollapsing.Althoughgenuinepacifistswerefewandfarbetween—therewaslittlepublicoppositiontothewar—by1916discontentwiththewarwasdeepandwidespread.Ifthisdiscontent,andthesenseofsocialinjusticeuponwhichitfed,couldfindavoice,ifanewpoliticalgroupingweretoemergetochannelit,thesituationcouldbecomeverydangerous.By1917thereweresignsthatthingsweremovinginthisdirection.InApril1917theSocialDemocraticPartysplitintotwoparties,oneofwhichadvocatedcontinuedsupportforthe‘politicsof4August’,whiletheotherofferedcomplete,principledoppositiontothewar.InApril1917theannouncementofareductionofthebreadrationledtoastrikeinwhich300,000Berlinerswereinvolved.Massiveanti-warstrikeseruptedthroughoutGermanyinJanuary1918.YettheantiwarIndependentSocialDemocraticParty(USPD)wasunabletogaintheupperhand.TheleadersoftheMajoritySocialDemocrats(MSPD)successfullyfound

Imperial Germany 1871-1918, edited by James Retallack, OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/warw/detail.action?docID=829425.Created from warw on 2017-11-02 02:12:45.

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awaytoportraythemselvesastherepresentativeofthestrikers,thuscalmingthesituation.Butifthediscontentcontinuedtogrow,ifthewarcontinuedmuchlonger,theMSPDrealizedthatitcouldbeforcedtogivevoicetothepeople’sdissatisfactionwiththeexistingorder;inthatcaseitwouldhavetotakeonwhatitregardedastheunwelcomeroleofanoppositional,even‘revolutionary’party.Giventheimportanceofhome-frontmorale,itisnotsurprisingthatalreadybylate1915

therewereinnumerablediscussionswithinthegovernmentandamongpoliticallyactivecitizensonhowtoimproveit.Onepossibleanswerwasputforwardbyaselfproclaimed‘waraimsmovement’.MembersofradicalnationalistorganizationsbelievedthatvastterritorialacquisitionsweregoodforGermany;indeed,theybelievedthatproclaimingthe‘necessity’ofvastterritorialacquisitionswouldinitselfimprovemorale.‘Establishinghighgoals’,wrotethePan-GermanpublicistManfredKloss,‘awakenspowersandmakesapeoplecapableofgreataccomplishments.’7InSeptember1914,whenGermanystillseemedtobedoingwell,ChancellorTheobaldvonBethmannHollwegprivatelyagreedtoa‘SeptemberProgramme’ofannexationsinbothwesternandeasternEurope.However,inNovember1914Bethmann’sgovernmentforbadeanypublicdiscussionofwaraims:hewasworriedthattheLeftwouldrespondtothePanGermanchallengeandthatthisdebatewouldprovedivisive.Intheautumnof1916,asmoraledeclinedandtheRightclamouredforthegovernmenttoprovidearallyingcryforthenation,thegovernmentendeditsbanonthediscussionofwaraims.TheRightinitiatedavastpoliticalcampaign,evengoingsofarastofoundanewpoliticalpartyinSeptember1917.ThiswastheGermanFatherlandParty,whosesoleprogramme—orsoitsmembersclaimed—wastoensurepublicsupportforGermany’sterritorialexpansion.TheFatherlandPartywasfoundedinresponsetothePeaceResolutionpassedbytheReichstaginJuly1917,whichstated:‘TheReichstagstrivesforapeaceofunderstandingandthepermanentreconciliationofthepeoples.Withsuchapeace,forcedacquisitionsofterritoryandpolitical,economic,orfinancialoppressionareinconsistent.’Thegovernmenthadbeencorrect:thetopicwashotlydebated.MembersoftheextremeRighthadaverycompellingargumentontheirside:thewarcouldonlybewonwithasuperhumaneffortbyallGermansand(althoughtheyfailedtomentionthis)withagreatdealofluck.YettheRight’sinterestinwaraimswasalsoameanstodeflectthepublic’sattentionawayfrominternalpolitics.TheFatherlandPartyandgroupsaffiliatedwithitarguedvehementlyagainstanyattempttoreformauthoritarianprinciplesorpractice,torevisetheconstitution,ortodiminishthemilitary’sprivilegedroleinGermansociety.TheothersuggestionputforwardbymanyontheRightwastoestablishamilitary

dictatorshiponanew,massbasis.AfterLudendorffandHindenburgassumedtheleadershipoftheSupremeCommand,therewasagrowingtendencyonthepartofthemilitaryleadershiptodominatetheformulationofcivilianpolicy.Somehistorianshavetermedthisa‘silentdictatorship’.8LudendorffandHindenburgdidremoveofficialsandstoppoliciestheydisliked,especiallypoliticalandsocialreforms.YetLudendorffcouldneverquitebringhimselftoassumefullpoliticalresponsibility:herecognizedthatamilitarydictatorshipwastheendofthemonarchicalidea.PerhapsLudendorffalsorecognizedthat,inapeople’swar,adictatorshipwouldhavetobegenuinelypopularifthestateweretooperateeffectively,andthattheRightwouldbeunabletoachievethis.

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TheLeft,bycontrast,arguedthatmoraleonthehomefrontcouldbestbesustainedthroughpoliticalandconstitutionalreforms.Itisthusamistaketosay—asAlliedpropagandadidatthetime—thatthiswasawartomaketheworldsafefordemocracy.TheprocessesofdemocratizationhadalreadymadeimportantadvancesinGermanylongbefore1914.Germanywasaconstitutionalmonarchy;membersofitsnationalparliamentwereelectedaccordingtoasuffragelawwhichwasasprogressiveasanyintheworld(moresothaninEngland,forexample);andtheReichstaghadtherightandthedutytoapprovetaxes,expenditures,andlaws.YetthereisalsoagooddealoftruthintheassertionthatspecificaspectsofGermany’spoliticalsystem,andGermanpoliticalcultureingeneral,wereundemocratic.GermanywasaptlycharacterizedduringthewarbyHugoPreussandMaxWeberasanauthoritarianstate(Obrigkeitsstaat):astateinwhicharational,intelligentbureaucracygoverns,unencumberedbythewhimsofanirrational,masspublicopinion.IfGermanywastobecomeastrongerstate,onethathadabetterchanceofsustainingmoraleandthusofwinningthewar,then—stillaccordingtoPreuss,Weber,andothers—Germanymustundertakemeaningfulconstitutionalreform:onlyaparliamentaryregimecouldprovidethenecessaryfoundationandlegitimacytotheideaofapeople’swar.InthewordsofacontributortooneofMunich’sleadingnewspapers,‘theGermanpeoplecannolongerberuledaccordingtothesystemsetupfiftyyearsago;thepeople’spatriotism,testedinatimeofneed,demandsadifferentsystem,onewhichupholdsaclosercommunitybetweenthegoverningandthegoverned’.9ChancellorBethmannHollwegtriedtosteeracoursebetweenretrenchmentandreformwith

his‘policyofthediagonal’.TothepoliticalRight,BethmannHollwegofferedtheprospectofannexations;totheLeft,hepromisedinternalreforms,whichhecalleda‘neworientation’ofPrussianpolicy.In1917,BethmannHollwegbegantomakemoreandmoreconcessionstotheLeftinordertoupholdinternalunity.HedidsomostfamouslyintheEasterMessageof1917,inwhichhehadtheKaiserpromisereformofPrussia’sreviledthree-classsuffrage.Althoughthe‘neworientation’wasanattempttoreforman‘unpolitical’Germanstateinwaysthatleftmostconservativeprivilegesintact,manyconservativesfeltthesereformswenttoofar.In1917,intriguesledbyHindenburgandLudendorffforcedtheKaisertoreplaceBethmannHollwegaschancellor,firstwithGeorgMichaelisandthenwithGeorgvonHertling.Bothofthesemenwereweakpoliticians,andinthelastyearandahalfofthewartheywereunabletoputupmuchoppositiontothemilitaryleadership.Althoughtheywereinchargeofthecivilianadministration,theywerescarcelyinapositiontochallengethemilitaryleaderswhenitcametotheconductofthewar.AsaresulttheywerealsounabletochartapoliticalcoursepremisedonanymorerealisticassessmentofGermany’spredicamentthanthegenerals’stubborninsistencethattotalvictorystilllaywithinGermany’sgrasp.

Propaganda:givingmeaningtothewar

Whenwarsarefoughtasbitterlyoverideasasoverterritory,anyaccountoftheconflictcannotdismisstheimportanceofpropaganda.After1914,inallbelligerentnations,fewintellectualsremained‘abovethefray’(touseRomainRolland’sfamousphrase).InGermany,asintheothernations,intellectualsimmediatelyputthemselvesattheserviceoftheirnation.AsthehistorianFriedrichMeineckenotedinSeptember1914,‘fromnowoneveryoneofushasto

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regardhimselfasonlyapartofthegreatapparatusofthestate,andifaweaponisnotpresseddirectlyintohishand,hehasonlythechoiceoffindingthespotwherehecanhelpmostquicklyandmosteffectivelytostrengthenthemoraleandphysicalpowerofthenation’.10Yetthe‘ideasof1914’wereunimpressive.Awarbetweenpeopleswaswidelyinterpretedasawarbetweencultures,evenbetweencivilizations.IftheRussianswerehalf-barbarians,iftheFrenchweresuperficial,nationalistic,atheistic,frivolous,andegotistical,iftheEnglishwereindividualistic,capitalistic,a‘landofshopkeepers’,thenGermanswereheroes,whosespiritualvaluesstoodinoppositiontotheshallowcommercialismofWesterncivilization.Afewphilosophersevenwentsofarastoseeintheideasof1914theunfoldingofahistoricaldialecticthatstretchedbacktotheideasof1789:finally,itwasthought,GermanOrdnungwouldreplaceFrenchliberty.WhatwasinterestingandmodernaboutGermanpropagandawasnotitscontentbutits

breadth.Theyears1914–18sawanexplosioninthesheeramountofpersuasionbeingdoledouttotheGermanpublic;somecontemporariesevensawthewarasthebirthofpropaganda.Inthefirstmonthsofthewar,innumerablepamphletswerepublished,innumerablespeechesweregiven;ministerspreachedthepatrioticmessagefromthepulpiteverySunday.Themostimportantmediumremainedthenewspaper.Mostofthecontentwasdevelopedbyprivatecitizens,butbecausethestatecontrolledandcensoredthenewsmedia,thestatecouldputitsownspinonthemessage.Schoolswereprobablythemosteffectivesiteforthedisseminationofpropagandaintheearlyyearsofthewar.Asonecontemporarywrote,‘onereachedtheparentsthroughthechildren—indeed,thechildreneducatedtheirparents.Atnotimehavetheschoolshadagreaterinfluenceathomethenintheearlyperiodofthewar.Thechildrentoldothers,verysuccessfully,todotheirpatrioticduty.’11In1915theGermangovernmentcreatedaWarPressOfficewithanunlimitedbudget.Its

staffhungpostersinwaitingrooms,inrestrooms,andonadvertisingbillboards.Theydistributedpamphlets,books,andbrochurestochildrenatschoolorwhenpeoplepickeduptheirrationcards.Theyevenprintedslogansonmatchboxesandonthetoiletpaperusedingovernmentbuildings.NorwastheWarPressOfficetheonlygovernmentagencyengagedinpersuadingGermans.Onecontemporaryestimatedthatoversixtydifferentgovernmentagencieswereengagedinpropaganda.TheCentralBank,forexample,conductedamassivepropagandacampaignonbehalfofthewarbondsprogramme.Anewgovernment-runfilmcompany,BUFA,wasfoundedin1917;by1918itsuppliedover50percentofthemoviesshowninGermancinemas.(BUFAlaterbecomeUFA,theGermanfilmcompanythatproducedthemostfamousGermanfilmsofthe1920s.)Then,inJuly1917,besidestheseexistingorganizations,themilitarylaunchedyetanotherpropagandainitiative,theso-called‘patrioticinstruction’programme,whichlargelyduplicatedexistingefforts.TheseorganizationalattemptstomobilizeGermanmoraleweresowidespreadthatin1916,whengovernmentministersaskedeachotherwhatelsecouldbedone,thePrussianministerofculturerespondedthathedidnotbelieveanythingmorewaspossible.12Bytheendofthewar,almosteveryaspectofpublicandprivatelifehadbeentouchedbythis‘battle’towintheheartsandmindsofordinaryGermans.Itisnotclearthatthesepropagandaeffortswereveryeffective.Themostimportantidea

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pushedbyGermanpropagandistswasthatGermany’sdeterminationtocontinuethestruggle—theeffortitself—wouldbringultimatevictory.Thus,ifGermanycouldonly‘holdout’,itwouldwin,andifitwonitwassuretoenjoythefruitsofitsvictory.Bycontrast,lackofwill,failuretokeepthefaith,wouldbringimmediatedefeat,anddefeatmeantonlyruinanddestruction.Germany’spropagandamachinecontinuedtostay‘onmessage’untiltheendofthewar:notanegotiatedpeacebuta‘victoriouspeace’(Siegfrieden)wouldbetheonlyacceptableoutcometothestrugglesandsacrificesalreadyendured.Theproblemwiththismessagewastwofold.First,theclaimthatGermanywaswinningthewarbecamemoretransparentlyfalsewitheachpassingyear.Second,theclaimthatwhichevernationhadmore‘will’towinwouldinfactachievevictorywasaninsidiousargument:itledpeopletobelievethatthepoweroffaithalonewouldallowGermanytodefeatthenumericallyandeconomicallystrongerenemy.Conversely,ifGermanyweretolose,itsdefeatwouldnotbetheconsequenceofanymilitaryorpoliticalinadequacybutcouldbeascribedinsteadtoinsufficientlypatrioticelementsathome.

Makingpeace,makingrevolution

In1917,Germannewspapersreportednothingnewonthewesternfront.Thewarintheeastwasgoingmuchbetter.ThefirstRussianRevolutioninFebruary1917raisedhopesthatRussiawouldsoonpulloutofthewar.Thesecond,BolshevikrevolutioninOctober1917andthecontinuingdisintegrationoftheRussianarmiesledtotheTreatyofBrest-Litovskinthespringof1918,whichmovedGermanborderstotheeast.ThisinturnallowedtheGermanSupremeCommandtomovetroopsfromtheeasterntothewesternfront.TherelativestrengthoftheenemyinthewestshouldhavemadetheSupremeCommandrecognizethattheywouldnotbeabletoannihilatetheenemy:thesituationcalledforanegotiatedpeace.Yetthecombinationofmilitaryoverconfidenceandthepublic’sunwillingnesstorecognizethetruesituationinspiredthemilitaryleadershiptoattemptonelastgamble.Itwasabigone:agreatoffensiveinthewest,designedtosnatchvictoryfromdefeatbeforetheAmericansbegantoarriveinlargenumbers.InMarch1918,Ludendorff’soffensive(OperationMichael)began.AsinAugust1914,theoffensivehadinitialsuccessand,asinSeptember1914,itultimatelyfailed.On15July1918,theSupremeCommandcalledahalttotheoffensive.TheAlliescounterattackedthreedayslaterandneverlosttheinitiative.On8August1918

AlliedarmiesbrokethroughGermanlines.AlthoughtheGermanarmywasabletoregroup,themilitaryleadership,recognizingthatthewarwasmilitarilylost,toldtheKaiserinthenightof28–29September1918thathemustappealtoU.S.PresidentWoodrowWilsonforpeace,basedonWilson’sfamousFourteenPointsofJanuary1918.Falselybelievingthatthiswouldleadtoabetterpeaceoffer,themilitaryalsocalledforthecreationofaparliamentarygovernment.Adecreetothiseffectwasissuedon30Septemberandanew,‘democratic’governmentwasformedon3October1918withPrinceMaxvonBadenaschancellor.ButtheAlliesrefusedtoofferbetterterms.HindenburgandWilhelmGroener,whohadreplacedLudendorffintheSupremeCommand,thereforetoldthecivilianleadershiptoacceptunconditionalsurrender—thearmycouldnolongerfight.Finally,on11November1918,at11:00a.m.,itwastrulyallquietonthewesternfront.Inlateryears,Ludendorffwouldclaim

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thatthehomefronthadstabbedthearmyintheback.Notwithstandingthepredictionsofmoststrategists,thetruthwasthatthewarhadbeenlostbytheGermanarmyinthefield.Thehomefront,althoughgreatlystrained,hadnotcracked;ithadheldoutforaslongasthereseemedtobeachanceofvictory.Therewas,however,onelastepisodetobeplayedout,anepisodewhichallowedmany

post-warobserverstolendcredencetothestab-in-the-backmyth.On28October,Germannavalofficers,withoutthegovernment’sknowledge,orderedtheHighSeasFleettosailoutandseekbattle.ThesedesperateofficerswereawarethattheAllieshadpromisedtodestroytheGermanNavy;someofthemsoughtaromanticendtotheircareers,andafewevensuggestedthatKaiserWilhelmmightappropriatelysharetheirfate.Butthesailorsundertheircommandrefusedtogoalong.AboutathousandnavalmutineerswerearrestedatWilhelmshaven.Butothersoldiersandsailorswhowereconcernedforthefateoftheircomradesralliedandtookchargeoftheships.By5NovemberaredflagflewatopeveryshipinKiel.AsnewsoftheeventsinKielspread,sodidtherevolution—toHamburgandLübeck,toHanover,Cologne,Magdeburg,Braunschweig,Leipzig,Dresden,Munich,andfinally,on9November,toBerlin.Bythispoint,defeatonthebattlefieldconvincedawar-wearyandembitteredcivilianpopulationthatanyfurthersacrificewaspointless.ThemilitaryandpoliceforcesofImperialGermanysurrenderedeverywhere,virtuallywithoutresistance.Inthelatemorningof9November,asmassesofdemonstratorsmarchedthroughthestreetsofBerlinandassoldiersjoinedthemovement,MaxvonBadenannouncedtheKaiser’sabdication,althoughtheKaiserhadnotyetagreedtothis.PrinceMaxalsoannouncedhisownresignationandtheappointmentoftheSocialDemocraticleader,FriedrichEbert,aschancellor.Germany’sNovemberRevolutionwaslargelypeaceful.Itwasnotaplannedcampaignby

revolutionaries,butanundertakinglaunchedspontaneouslybyapopulationunwillingtopressthedeadlyconflictamomentlonger.Itslegitimizationcameintherecognitionthattheoldeliteshadproventhemselvesincapableofruling.TheodorWolff,editoroftheliberalBerlinerTageblatt,wroteon10Novemberthattheauthorities’admissionofdefeatfullysurprisedtheGermanpeople:uptothatpoint,theyhadbelievedoverlyoptimisticofficialpropaganda.Whenthepeoplerealizedthattheyhadbeenliedto,theydidnotjustquitthewar;theiroutrageathavingbeentreatedasunthinkingsubjects(Untertanen)ofauthoritarian,presumptuousleadersledthemtorejectasystemthathadfailedtorespecttheirbasicdignity.13Buttherevolutionof1918waslimited.Politicalinstitutionsweretransformed;yetsocial

relations,theeconomy,andprevailingattitudesaboutnationalaffairswerenotgenuinelyrevolutionized,atleastnotintheshortrun.Therewereno‘ideasof1918’.Germany’sNovemberRevolutioncanthereforebebestunderstoodasthelastactofalostwarratherthanasanewbeginning.Therealironywasthattheargumentsfordemocracythathadbeenmostoftenandmostpowerfullyputforwardduringthewarhadbeenprovenfalsebydefeatinwar.ThewriterThomasMannhaddeclaredin1915that‘thosewhotodaydemandademocraticGermany…raisethisdemandnotfordoctrinaire,theoreticalreasons,butforcompletelypracticalones:firstsothatGermanycanlive,andsecondsothatshecanlivepowerfullyandmasterfully’.14Butthewardidnotcreatepopularsupportfortheideasofdemocracyandrepublicanism;whatbecametheWeimarRepublicwaschosenduringtherevolutionaryexcitementofNovember1918becauseitwastheformofgovernmentthatdividedGermans

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leastandbecausetheAllieshadpromisedtotreatGermanybetterifitbecamearepublic.Makingthedemocraticideagenuinelypopularwasleftuptothepoliticianswhofollowed.

Thelegacyofthewar

ThelegacyoftheFirstWorldWarhungheavyovertheWeimarRepublic.Germanyhadlostover2millionkilledandover4.1millionwounded(outofatotalpopulationofabout65million).ManysoldierswhohadbeenmaimedbecamepartofthestreetsceneineveryGermancity:disabledveteranstowhomsocietyhadanobligation.Germanyhadspenttheequivalentofapproximately40billiondollarsonthewar,mostofwhichhadbeenborrowedfromitsowncitizens.Almostalloftheseloanswouldneverberepaidbecausethestatewentbankruptinthehyper-inflationof1923.IntheTreatyofVersailles,grudginglyacceptedbytheGermangovernmentinJune1919,Germanylost13percentofitsterritory,includingitscolonies,andwasrequiredtopay33billiondollarsasawarindemnitytothevictors.Thesephysicalandmonetarylosseswereenormous;butjustasimportantwerethepsychologicaleffectsofthewar.TomanyGermans,thewarseemedtodefyanyattempttospecifyitscauses.ItseemedtoundobeliefinajustandcaringGod.Anditseemedtodisprovethewisdomofbringingupafamilyresponsibly,ofsavingforthefuture,indeed,ofbelievingthefuturewouldbebetterthanthepresent.Arationalist,optimistic,progressivephilosophy,whichhadbeensomuchapartofImperialGermansociety,layinruins.ThewarhadreshuffledthedominantnormsandvaluesofGermany’sculturalandsocial

traditions.Itwasaprofoundmodernizer.Themonarchicalideadiedaquietdeath:itwouldnotreturnwithanystrengthduringtheWeimarRepublic.TheeconomicinstabilitiesthatafflictedWeimarGermany,theexpandingroleofthestate,thenewemotionalinvestmentinthenationratherthaninone’shometown—allthiswasaconsequenceofchangesthatbeganoracceleratedduringthewar.Yetdespitethewar’smodernizingeffect,manyGermansfounditdifficulttomoveforward.Inthe1920s,thewarhauntedpeople’smemories,thoughitdidsoinmanydivergentways.‘Conservativerevolutionaries’developedtheideaofavölkischdictatorship,andindoingsotheylookedbackto(andkeptalive)thestab-in-the-backlegend.Thishadverydangerousimplications,asthehistorianMichaelBalfourhasnoted:‘byexaggeratingtheextenttowhichtheGermanfailurein1918hadbeenduetoafailureofwillratherthantomaterialinferiority,theyencouragedthebeliefthatgreaterwillpower,derivedfromamoreferventconviction,wouldbyitselfbeenoughtoproduceadifferentresult’.15Butthiswasnottheonlyattempttorewritehistory.OfcoursethehopesofAugust1914hadbeenunrealistic.Thatdidnotmakethemlessreal—ashopes,asapoliticalprogramme.Manymiddle-classGermanswhohadembracedthe‘spiritof1914’wouldlatersuccumbtothehollowidealofthe‘people’scommunity’(Volksgemeinschaft)propagatedbytheNazis.AmongsuchGermanswasPastorJohannesMüller,whosereflectionsin1914werecitedattheoutsetofthischapter.ForMüllerandformillionsofhiscountrymen,theturntoNazismin1933wasmadepossiblenotonlybythewaritselfbutalsobytheirunsuccessfulattempttounderstanditsmeaningandacceptitslegacy.

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