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1917: The Soviet Federalist Bargain

Elizabeth Gross

POLS 482: Independent Study

Professor Laible

21 March 2016

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Introduction

Social instability has a long record in ethnically fraught Eastern Europe. Deep Soviet

history recalls the tumultuous years of the 1920s when korenizatsiia (“indigenization”) allowed

formal support for the right of national self-determination, actually encouraging subnational

ethnic identities with the hope of addressing historic minority oppression (Connor 1984, 34).

Many scholars point to this overall federal structure as contributing to the ethnic mobilization

seen today – the policy of federalism that started in 1917 with the establishment of the Soviet

Union (Bunce and Watts 2005; Cornell 2002). However, others emphasize the long historical

nature of nationalism even before the Soviet Union, and that federal design is largely a result of

preexisting nationalism (Grigoryan 2016; Martin 2001). Is there any possibility of reconciling

these two disparate views? More generally, scholars of federalism underscore the need for

institutions to adapt if they were initially poorly conceived or simply became unsuitable over

time (Bednar 2009, 3). Bearing this in mind, is there a more constructive approach to

institutional change that diminishes the effects of nationalism? Understanding these

perspectives is important to trace the causes of a divisive institutional arrangement, and

ultimately to attain a clearer picture of viable options.

This research reframes the debate in terms of a bargaining framework. How does

instituting a federalizing process contribute to competitive ethnic behavior? What sort of

perverse incentives are present when a federation is being formed? This study focuses on

federalization’s effect of creating new ethnic minorities and majorities, who then compete for

their own respective language rights, territory, and administrative and workplace

representation (Martin 2001). This competition, in turn, contributed to the characteristic ethnic

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nationalist tensions. To demonstrate this theory, I pursue a small-n case study approach,

focusing on Tatarstan, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia from 1917-1930.

Literature Review

This section addresses the central debates concerning how federalism may or may not

promote nationalist tendencies. While proponents of federalism’s effect on nationalism

emphasize the mobilizational and identity-preserving function of a federal arrangement, critics

point to inconsistencies in federalism’s record and nationalism’s preexisting role in determining

a federal institutional arrangement. I then move to reconcile these opposing views, refocusing

the debate to determine what causes instability in federal bargains.

Ethnofederalism is a specific type of federalism that is defined as a federal political

system in which component territorial governance units are linked with ethnic content (Roeder

1991). In cases of ethnoterritoriality, territorial control is linked to ethnicity (Cornell 2002), but

jurisdiction of the governing body is primarily based on territory, as territory is only a proxy for

ethnicity (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). An alternative to this arrangement is ethnocorporatism,

in which jurisdiction of a regional governing body is solely limited to an assigned ethnic group,

and not necessarily every resident within the territory (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). A federal

system is generally characterized by a division of authority between central and regional

government, where the regional government possesses a high degree of decision-making

autonomy (Hale 2008, 294).

Nationalism is categorized into three types: “nationalizing” nationalism, homeland

nationalism, and minority nationalism (Brubaker 1996). “Nationalizing” nationalism is the type

outlined best in Anderson’s Imagined Communities (2006), where nation-building requires “a

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systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the

educational system, administrative regulations” (Anderson 2006, 163). This situation calls for

the recognition of a “core nation,” an acceptance that the core nation “owns” the polity, and

language and cultural promotion (Brubaker 1996, 83). Homeland nationalism assert states’

right to monitor the welfare and promote the rights and interests of “their” ethnic nationals in

other states, insisting that this right transcends state boundaries. Finally, minority nationalism

typically invokes state recognition or the assertion of collective cultural and political rights

based on their distinct ethnonational identity (Brubaker 1996, 5-6).

As for theorizing federalism’s nationalist effect, many scholars argue that the

autonomous institutions of a federal arrangement allows for mobilization and legitimizes

minorities’ grievances. Specifically, this federalized system grants minorities the institutional

resources and leadership necessary for later independence movements. These independence

movements are, in turn, encouraged by minority group isolation and intergroup distrust

characteristic of federal arrangements (Bunce and Watts 2005, 254). Moreover, the official

powers granted to minorities imbues their grievances with a degree of legitimacy – official

governments and parliaments give minorities a legitimate platform from which to challenge

state authorities for more decision rights (Cornell 2002; Roeder 2007, 63). Additionally, while

the platform of ethnic leadership provides something around which nationalists can unite, it

also is self-reinforcing, as leaders have a vested interest in maintaining nationalist sentiment to

augment their region’s own level of autonomy (Cornell 2002).

Another approach emphasizes the role of federalism in shaping ethnic identity. Suny

illustrates that, “rather than a melting pot, the Soviet Union became the incubator of new

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nations” (Suny 1993). Scholars argue that federalism establishes a distinction between

nationality and statehood or citizenship, and raises popular awareness of ethnic distinctions

(Brubaker 1996; Hale 2008). Issues such as administrative control of territory and land

ownership become intertwined with ethnic identity and sow division amongst ethnic groups

(Martin 2001, 42; Roeder 2007, 63). Some even argue that, in the case of the Soviet Union, had

oblasts been based on economic efficiency rather than nationality, nationalist challenges would

have been prevented (Roeder 2007). Autonomous institutions are argued to preserve identity

through specific mechanisms such as administrative appointments and economic opportunities

(Rothchild and Roeder 2005) and through their authority over education, cultural policies, and

local language media (Cornell 2002).

However, critics of the former theory emphasize federalism’s inconsistent record and

nationalism’s existence preceding Soviet federalism. Grigoryan makes a point of many Soviet

republics that seceded rather successfully, such as Russia itself. Other non-Soviet federal

successes include India, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland (Grigoryan 2016, 530-531).

Furthermore, some call attention to the reactionary approach to federalism in managing Soviet

republics’ nationalist tendencies. They argue surrendering a degree of sovereignty is not done

willingly, and that for a Marxist and therefore anti-nationalist government, federalism would

not have been their first preference; in this way, the causal arrow is claimed to be flipped

(Grigoryan 2016; Martin 2001). Grigoryan (2016) specifically makes the point that nationalism

had been a problem for the Russian empire for several decades before the creation of the

Soviet Union, and therefore is not a direct product of federalism. Moreover, resentment of

Russian cultural superiority was commonplace in many of the republics, and the policy of

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federalism was viewed appealingly as a form of decolonization (Martin 2001). In this way, the

choice of federalism was made as a compromise to placate preexisting nationalist sympathies

(Grigoryan 2016, 524-525). From the Soviet perspective, the policy of federalism was a

“necessary evil” even if it wasn’t desirable (Slezkine 1993, 421).

I would argue that both theories have their merits, and that they don’t have to be

mutually exclusive. While nationalism did predate Soviet federalism, that does not preclude

the nationalist-enforcing effect of a federalist arrangement. However, critics do have

something to offer – if a federal arrangement was chosen because of preexisting nationalism,

then that preexisting nationalism is the initial determinant of later events. In this way,

nationalism is the institutional environment Soviet bureaucrats had to contend with, shaping

what choices were available to them. State formation, then, was less about asymmetrical

dictates from above, and more of a bargaining framework, a give-and-take between Soviet

bureaucrats and ethnic minorities. Hale has started work on examining these bargaining

interactions, demonstrating how credibility of Soviet commitment to minority protection

affects the degree of separatism (Hale 2008). In addition, Rothchild and Roeder (2005) have

described how some features of federalism, such as mutual vetoes, can be used to begin a

game of brinkmanship, threatening a deadlock until one side grants concessions (Rothchild and

Roeder 2005, 37). However, this area of research is greatly understudied in political science.

Grigoryan (2016) states as much, saying students of federalism have been focusing on the

wrong question – “whether ethnofederalism ameliorates of exacerbates separatism and

conflict” – as if federalism is exogenous to separatism and conflict. Instead, Grigoryan

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proposes, scholars should focus on “what makes ethnofederal bargains stable or unstable”

(533).

If the question is refocused on the problem of stability, federalist literature has much to

offer in understanding what can induce change. Some scholars maintain that federal conflicts

are merely “surface manifestations” of deeper conflicts due to societal differences, and that

change is the result of slow shifts between cultural, lingual, religious, and economic cleavages

(Livingston 1956; Erk 2008). Others point to how formal institutions and informal routines in

federal systems are targeted for deliberate change, as the constitutional setup, separation of

powers, level of centralization, the presence and degree of symmetry in intergovernmental

relations all affect the nature of federal change (Benz and Broschek 2013). Another approach

focuses on the changing norms or ideas that actors use to interpret the social and political

environment (Beland and Lecours 2011), which can vary in the moral foundation of the state

constitution, an individualistic or communitarian political discourse, or the degree of self-

identification as a mono- or multiethnic community. A final approach focuses on the

arrangement of political actors, such as the varying strength and institutional resources of

territorial governments and political parties, which results in varied interactions (Scharpf 1997).

In this case, bureaucratic capacities, the scope of exclusive jurisdictions, and internal executive-

legislative relations can cause interactions to vary between unilateralism, coordination,

cooperation, or highly interdependent forms of decision-making (Bolleyer 2009). The degree of

vertical integration between federal and state levels of a political party can also impact how

federal change occurs (Hepburn 2009; Swenden and Maddens 2009; Jeffery and Wincott 2010).

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Without denying the merits of any of the preceding arguments, historian Terry Martin

contributes the theory that ethnic groups mobilized to avoid becoming a minority as territory

boundaries were being drawn and adjusted (Martin 2001, 56). In this way, federalization’s

problematic creation of new minorities and majorities contributed to Soviet nationalism in the

1920s and 1930s.

H1: The process of federalization creates new ethnic minorities and majorities, who

compete for and bargain with the central government for their own respective

language rights, territory, and administrative and workplace representation. This

competition tied to ethnic identity reinforced nationalism.

It is worth noting that the central government was only willing to cater to national identity

because it was the only choice to maintain the integrity of the state. As indicated by Grigoryan

(2016) and Martin (2001) ethnic identity was already a strong force to contend with upon

Soviet establishment. Moreover, even the central government competes with its national

republics for sovereign control of their republics (Martin 2001).

Methods

This research will be conducted through a small-n case study approach. This will be

both cost-effective and convenient, as it would be extremely difficult to retroactively reach and

interview people from this time period, and impossible to observe first-hand. Moreover, most

previous research addresses questions of nationalism from this methodological approach.

Grigoryan (2016) draws from the examples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to prove the

long-standing history of ethnic nationalism within each countries’ borders. Hale uses a single

in-depth case study of the Ukrainian republic to demonstrate how a varying levels of

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demonstrated credible commitment to minority protection affects Ukrainian nationalist

movements (2008). Cornell (2002) analyzes various ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus to

demonstrate the role of autonomy in ethnic mobilization.

Tatarstan, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia were chosen as case studies for this paper.

Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, while drastically different territorial sizes, are both autonomous

republics and archetypal eastern “backwards” ethnic communities (Soviet terminology),

embodying the issues of border establishment and preferential hiring policies in the 1920s

(Martin 2001). On the other hand, Belorussia is a more legally distinct union republic, and one

of the key western ethnic communities demonstrating the language disputes of the 1920s

(Martin 2001).

The time period will be limited to the years 1917-1930, which is the period in which the

Soviet Union established itself as a federal state and struggled with questions of minority

inclusion (Martin 2001). This is an important time period to study, as path-dependence

indicates these institutions will not change as dramatically as time progresses (Pierson 2000);

what characterizes the beginning of a state can have a great deal of implications for its end.

However, in order to uncover direct causation, this study will not cover the entire history of the

Soviet Union – such an endeavor is far too large and unwieldy to find specific and meaningful

conclusions.

Federalist bargaining will be measured and defined as agreements between ethnic

groups and the central government, and bargaining stability will depend on the level of

nationalist protest and violence. Therefore, the case studies will trace for issues of political

competition between ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities resulting in nationalist protest and

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violence. Issues of competition will include, but are not limited to, language rights, territorial

holdings, and administrative and workplace representation.

Findings

Tatarstan

Tatarstan proved to have a considerable nationalist upsurge as a result of federalist

bargaining. Initially asymmetrical bargaining interactions by the central government gave way

to more conciliatory policies, but implementation remained inequitable in the eyes of some,

which resulted in more ethnic divisions and hostility.

However, these divisions were not because of a strong national identity before this

period; years preceding the Soviet Union, Turks were much more aware of shared religious

faith than any common ethnic origin. This manifested itself in 1905 and 1906, when the leading

representatives of the Moslem intelligentsia met in three successive congresses to declare the

unity of all Russian Moslems and establish a Moslem Union. In the Third Congress in August

1906, they adopted resolutions advocating regional autonomy in Russia, but did not specify

whether it was based upon national principle (Pipes 1997, 14). It wasn’t until May 1917 that

separation based upon nationality was introduced, when Muslims in the Russian Duma decided

to convene an All-Russian Moslem Congress in Moscow. There, a leader of the Azerbaijani

delegation, Mehmed Emin Rsul-zade, as well as the Bashkirs and Crimean Tatars, successfully

voted in favor of a federalist proposal of territorial self-rule for each nationality. However in an

instance of intergroup bargaining conflict, the Volga Tatars desired a more centralized

administration, as they lacked a separate territory, and were scattered among Russians and

Bashkirs (Pipes 1997, 77). Pipes notes that the All-Russian Moslem movement was generally

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weak, as their populations resided in scattered regions separated from one another (Pipes

1997, 79).

As weak as the indigenous movement may have been, the Soviet government was

keenly aware of its lack of influence in the Moslem borderlands, and in November 1917 Stalin

attempted to win favors with the All-Russian Moslem movement by reaching out to the

chairman of the Executive Council, Akhmed Tsalikov. Couched in Communist rhetoric and

offering him an advantageous position in the Soviet government, Stalin advocated a

“straightforward and loyal relationship, so that their united efforts on behalf of the Moslem

toiling masses may proceed at full speed.” The bargain initially failed when Tsalikov refused the

offer, strongly attacking the Soviet government for their treatment of the minorities. Stalin

ultimately found a willing Volga Tatar in Mulla Nur Vakhitov, to hold the chairmanship of

Stalin’s Commissariat of Moslem Affairs (Pipes 1997, 156-158). This Commissariat was

responsible to Stalin and, according to Pipes, “established to organize party cells, spread

Communist propaganda, and help the Soviet regime destroy independent parties and

organizations among Russian Moslems” (Pipes 1997, 158).

The National Assembly of the Islamic community, the Medzhilis, was meanwhile trying

to decide the appropriate type of autonomy for the Tatars. Ethnic bargaining was divided,

however, as a territorialist faction wanted an autonomous Volga-Ural state, while another, the

Turki faction wanted a system that would unite all the Turks of Russia. Eventually, an appointed

committee chose a Volga-Ural autonomous state in February 1918. However, this proved to be

an occasion where federalist bargaining failed and the Soviet government applied coercion –

Soviet authorities overturned the appointed committee’s decision by demanding all Moslem

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organizations, (i.e. the Medzhilis), subordinate themselves to the Soviet Moslem Commissariat.

Having refused, the central government was unwilling to negotiate, arrested key leaders, and

suppressed the All-Russian Moslem movement – all functions and properties reserved by the

Medzhilis were transferred to the Moslem Commissariat (Pipes 1997, 158-159).

In May 1918, Vakhitov convened a conference of Communists and sympathizers from

the Kazan area, to discuss the founding of a Tatar-Bashkir state. However, in the summer of

1918, a Czech rebellion resulted in the evacuation of the Kazan province, and Vakhitov was

executed in the process. Therefore, in November 1918 the Central Committee of the Russian

Communist Party convened a congress of Moslem Communists, and decided to dissolve the

Russian Party of Moslem Communists, subordinating it to the Russian Central Committee.

Moreover, the loss of Vakhitov’s leadership resulted in the Soviet government abandoning a

unified Tatar-Bashkir state, instead choosing to divide it into separate autonomous republics

based upon nationality (Pipes 1997, 159-161). This decision itself was due to the Bashkirs

collaborating with the Whites, but then experiencing growing dissatisfaction with the Whites’

unwillingness to commit to autonomy and grant their land demands. The Bashkirs therefore

recommitted to the Soviets, on the condition that they were willing to grant such concessions

(Pipes 1997, 161-162). Ironically, the Tatar Communists waited until the end of the Bashkir Civil

War in hopes of then establishing a single Tatar-Bashkir republic, but instead attained only a

separate Volga Tatar republic due to Moscow’s insistence on maintaining the preexisting

Bashkir Republic (Pipes 1997, 168).

In 1921, Tatarstan established a special government commission for the Soviet policy of

korenizatsiia (“indigenization”), which involved making the Soviet government better reflect

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their indigenous populations. To Lenin, this policy represented an overt carrot in a bargain to

compensate for historic minority oppression, in the hopes of gradually transitioning to

communist internationalism in the long term (Connor 1984, 34). However, maintaining a

narrow Tatar plurality in their own republic, as well as struggling against a deeply entrenched

Russian bureaucracy, Martin describes “perpetual political conflict along ethnic lines,” in which

the republic cycled through six Communist Party secretaries in the first five years of the policy

(Martin 2001, 58). In light of these divisions, linguistic korenizatsiia was only made possible in

1924 with raionirovanie, or further territorial divisions along ethnic lines at the subrepublican

level. This was done to promote unilingual local governments, for the realization of the Tatar

language (Chanyshev 1924, 141).1

Korenizatsiia also had implications for hiring and firing – in April 1924 the Central

Committee established a decree giving preference to persons knowing the local languages in

government hiring (Martin 2001, 135). However, some perceived implementation as

inequitable, exacerbating the competition for jobs. In particular, an OGPU report (the early

Secret Police) revealed that minority Russians were upset with the agreed policy of Tatarization

because the head of the Tatar department of the State Bank refused their applications,

answering that “we need Tatars first of all and can do without Russians” (Martin 2001, 137). On

the other hand, there were also concerns with the manner in which bureaucratic korenizatsiia

was carried out, as a “hole in the middle” resulted in indigenous populations being recruited

into leadership or menial positions, leaving the technical positions – requiring the most

extensive education – mostly to Russians. This was a problem because technical positions were

1 “…в целях создания единообразных волостей в отношении языка населения для удобства проведения в жизнь реализации татарского языка” (Chanyshev 1924, 141).

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the very jobs that entailed the most contact with native populations, and which proponents of

korenizatsiia would have targeted for indigenization to portray the government as native-run

(Martin 2001, 140). In fact, Tatar officials claimed that institutions were fulfilling their quotas

by hiring “cleaning women, doormen, guards and coachmen [kuchery], which led to the popular

anecdote in Tatarstan that the government “was not carrying out korenizatsiia but

kucherizatsiia” (Martin 2001, 141). Finally, there were also concerns that titular national

exploited korenizatsiia strategically rather than embracing it with gratitude – one Tatar, when

Russians threatened not to elect him, said “elect [me] or else you are a great power chauvinist”

(Martin 2001, 143).

Overall, nationalist outbreak was the language of protest against a perceived

inequitable federal bargain. For instance, Chuvash ethnic groups mobilized to avoid becoming

national minorities, and the Tatar republic granted two Chuvash national districts later in 1924

to address their grievances. However, these districts then petitioned to separate and join the

Samara government “due to bad service from the Tatar republic” (Martin 2001, 59). The

strategy worked in attaining greater concessions, as in 1926 and 1930, Tatarstan passed

extremely generous national minority legislation to appease the Chuvash. Nationalist

sentiment also arose when Tatar Communists passed legislation giving Tatar peasants

preferential access to desirable agricultural land, and started to tax Russian villages more highly

on ethnic grounds. Attempts to remove Russians peasants from their land went almost “so far

as to provoke an uprising (Martin 2001, 59). In the summer of 1925, Russian petitions to

separate from the Tatar republic – even in non-border villages – “took on a mass character,”

usually due to sense of second-class status (Martin 2001, 59). Faced with these aggressive

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protests, the Tatar government conceded and abolished their preferential policies for Tatar

peasants.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan holds the mantle for the republic with the largest nationalistic outbreak due

to anti-colonialist sentiment. Asymmetrical power dynamics in establishing the Kazakh republic

led to some initial conflicts over land and food distribution, which then gave way to conciliatory

land reform and hiring policies. However, as with Tatarstan, these reforms were far from being

equitable, and pitted various ethnic groups against each other.

Anticolonialism had its roots in a large influx of Russians beginning with the liberation of

serfs in Russia in 1861, which was only aggravated when the government itself undertook a

significant colonizing effort in the so-called Stolypin reforms from 1907 to 1911. Sharing

similarities to Tatars in their adherence to the Muslim faith, Kazakhs were traditionally nomadic

herders, relying on large expanses of land to sustain their livestock. Therefore, while the

colonization of the eastern steppe regions was meant to relieve pressure on overcrowded

Russian villages, it also had the consequence of expelling Kazakh-Kirghiz from the best grazing

lands. This resulted in attacks on Russian and Cossack settlements and indiscriminate murder

of officials in the 1916 Kazakh-Kirghiz revolt (Pipes 1997, 83).

In April 1917 native political figures such as Alikhan Bukeikhanov and Akhmed

Baitsursunov convened an All-Kazakh Congress in Orenburg, urging the return of all lands

confiscated by the previous regime, and the expulsion of all the new (post 1905) settlers from

the Kazakh-Kirghiz territories. In July 1917 another Kazakh-Kirghiz Congress met in Orenburg,

where the idea of territorial autonomy was first discussed and a national Kazakh-Kirghiz

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political party was formed, named the Alash-Orda. Alash-Orda sought the unification of the

three Kazakh-Kirghiz hordes into one autonomous “Kirghiz” state, the separation of state and

religion, and special privileges for the Kazakh-Kirghiz in the distribution of land (Pipes 1997, 83-

85).

Toward the end of 1917, the Cossacks allied with the natives, and the Kazakh-Kirghiz

held a congress in which their autonomy was proclaimed. However, the Bolsheviks gained

strength at the end of 1918, and through communist appeal won the support of military

garrisons, railroad workers, and colonists. Being nomadic, the Kazakh-Kirghiz did not fit neatly

into the Bolshevist rule of workers, soldiers, and peasants, so they would not rule, but be ruled

(Pipes 1997, 86). Nonetheless, the Soviet government still hoped its prestige and personnel

could secure the support of the Alash-Orda, and called upon the Kazakh-Kirghiz fighting for the

White cause to side with the Communists, bargaining with the promise of full amnesty and

complete forgiveness of past activities. They reaffirmed this promise by offering safe-conduct

to the Kazakh-Kirghiz (including those connected with Alash-Orda,) who desired to attend the

Soviet-sponsored Kirghiz Congress in Orenburg (Pipes 1997, 172).

As a temporary measure, the All-Russian Council of People’s Commissars appointed on

July 10, 1919 a Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee (“Kirrevkom,”) to rule over the provinces of

Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and part of the Astrakhan province. In addition, the

Council ordered all lands owned by Russian on Kazakh-Kirghiz territories be retained by their

present owners, and that all Kirghiz be subject to military duty (Pipes 1997, 172). Pipes notes

that from the beginning of Soviet occupation in 1919, Kirrevkom rested firmly in the hands of

officials selected by Moscow, among trust Communists and not local nationalists, leaving

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Kazakh-Kirghiz nationalists powerless to oppose Kirrevkom policies despite their “autonomy”

(Pipes 1997, 173). Therefore, in January 1920 the Soviet central government convened a

Kirghiz conference, at which a new Kirrevkom was elected to admit members of the Alash-Orda,

and to establish an autonomous Kirghiz state. However, this bargaining carrot failed when

Russian provincial institutions in the urban centers of Orenburg and Semipalatinsk opposed

these measures, with Russians refusing to accept the autonomous republic’s authority (Pipes

1997, 173).

By the spring of 1920, there were frequent quarrels over political and economic issues

connected with food distribution and preparations for the upcoming Congress of Soviets of

Kirghiziia. Native nationalists appealed by telegram to Lenin, urging him to establish genuine

autonomy for the natives by restraining “local, provincial, and regional imperialists,” to end the

theft of native properties, and to equalize the distribution of food. However, the first Kirghiz

Congress of Soviets retained the status quo, stopping further colonization of the steppe, but

allowing the Russian colonists already settled there to keep their lands (Pipes 1997, 173-174). A

subsequent famine in 1921 and 1922 likely prevented any considerable native popular

resistance to the Soviet regime during the early 1920s.

Meanwhile, in September 1920 in neighboring Turkestan – parts of which would later

become Kazakhstan – the ninth Turkestan Congress of Soviets passed a decree for the removal

of illegal settlers, the equalization of native and European land holdings, and the prohibition of

future settlement from outside Turkestan (Martin 2001, 60). As Lenin’s bargaining attempt at

disproving Soviet reputation for imperialism and gaining native support, the land reform took

place from January 1921 to December 1922 and resulted in the mass expulsion of Russian

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settlers and Cossacks (Kozlov 2012).2 Martin estimates a drop in Kazakhstan’s Russian

population from 2.7 to 2.2 million, but the Soviet center quickly realized that the process “took

place with excessive cruelty, and took on a character of revenge” (Martin 2001, 60). According

to one report, “the entire settlement of [Iurev], with 500 to 600 households, was driven out

into the frost” in a single day (Martin 2001, 60). Genis accounts for the reckless and foolish

offences against Russian peasants describing nightmarish demonstrative beatings of Russians in

the presence of Kirghiz (Genis 1998, 45, 48).3 The Soviet government viewed this as an

exceptional one-time measure and condemned the manner in which it was carried out. Having

failed to uphold humane treatment for all parties in their enactment of the bargain, Moscow

ended all expulsions in August 1922 and insisted on equal rights for all remaining Slavic settlers

(Martin 2001, 61).

However, from 1924-1927 the Kazakh government failed to equitably implement

Moscow’s commands, and encouraged a variety of illegal measures against Russian settlers by

refusing to punish native violators for their crimes, such as punitive taxation, false arrest, cattle

theft, armed seizures of land, the trampling of crops, and armed attacks with the intent to drive

Russians from their homes. As the OGPU monitored the mood of Russians in Kazakhstan,

Martin notes, “an almost universal call for the establishment of Russian national soviets,

preferably subordinated to the RSFSR, not Kazakhstan” (Martin 2001, 62). Kozlov notes open

confrontation in some places, such as in the Pavlodarsk District and Kustanaisk Okrug, with

Russians and Cossacks demanding an end to national discrimination, and even calling for their

2 “…доказать, что мы не империалисты…” (Kozlov 2012)3 “…бесшабашно и глупо обиженных русских крестьян … дикого террора с демонстративными кошмарными избиениями русских в присутствии киргиз и приказами последним бить первых” (Genis 1998, 45, 48).

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accession to Siberia (Kozlov 2012).4 The OGPU took seriously the possibility of a Russian

uprising in Kazakhstan, reporting hostile threats and desires of revenge against the Kirghiz. In

November 1924, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee formed a Commission under Avel

Enukidze “on the Question of Regulating the Position of Russians in the Autonomous Republics

and Oblasts” (Martin 2001, 62). Seen as the only solution to ethnic hostilities, the Enukidze

commission endorsed a recommendation for ethnic segregation into separate national soviets

in February 1926.

Around the same time as the formation of the Enukidze commission, a question of

Cossack hostility to Soviet nationalities policy was raised at an October 1924 Politburo meeting.

Similar to the Enukidze commission, Sergey Syrtsov suggested at the April 1925 Central

Committee Plenum the formation of separate Cossack districts. This bargaining carrot was

carried out a year later in North Ossetia and Chechnya, and served to intensify an already

strong movement for Cossack autonomy in Kazakhstan (Martin 2001, 63).

Also in October 1924, the Central Executive Committee formed a commission headed by

Serafimov, devoted exclusively to directing land reform in south Kazakhstan and Kirgiziia. This

commission was given the task of overseeing the formation of national soviets for Russians and

Cossacks in Kazakhstan. Serafimov proposed forming four Russian noncontiguous okrugi

(“districts,”) which would be combined to form the Kalinin Autonomous Oblast, and

controversially subordinate to the Central Committee in political matters and to the RSFSR

Agricultural Commissariat in agricultural matters. This proposal and other ideas like it in the

bargaining process intensified the Kazakh leadership’s resistance, who equated it with the right

4 “…открытые столкновения между казахами и крестьянами-переселенцами. Жители станиц и деревень требовали прекращения национальной дискриминации…” (Kozlov 2012)

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to secession even for territorially dispersed Russians. Therefore the Kazakh leadership refused

to cooperate (Martin 2001, 64). According to Martin, this bargaining failure “created an

environment of uncertainty that encouraged ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict,” with

Serafimov claiming to have received 1500 separate complaints from local Russians (Martin

2001, 64). Martin is careful to specify that this was not solely the result of elite manipulation,

but also popular conception, citing Kirghiz taunts against Russians as guests that should be

forced to leave, and Russian statements resenting their role reversal (Martin 2001, 65).

While Kirgizia, Bashkiria, and the North Caucasus autonomous regions finally agreed to

form Russian soviets, Kazakhstan continued to hold out because they feared legitimizing

existing Russian colonial presence, and in doing so invite another massive influx of settlers. The

Central Committee formed yet another commission under its own secretary Kiselev, with the

explicit backing of the central Soviet government and the purpose of attaining concessions in

Kazakh preferential land policy and control of immigration. Pressure from the central

government finally worked, and split the native Kazakh leadership in 1927, allowing Filipp

Goloshchekin to form a weak majority. Kazakhstan began forming Russian national soviets in

late 1927, and repealed preferential land policies and opened itself to immigration in April 1928

(Martin 2001, 66; Kozlov 2012).

This asymmetrical bargaining tactic did not end the hostilities however, but simply

reversed them, as Russians felt their time for vengeance had arrived. Mass repressions of

Kazakhs occurred in Semipalatinsk in the spring of 1928, and in the Cossack town of Sergiopol

later in 1928. On December 31, 1928, hostility broke out into a pogrom in which over four

hundred Russian workers engaged in a mass beating of Kazakhs (Martin 2001, 66-67).

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The Central Committee’s 1924 decree about preferential hiring bargain with native

populations held true in Kazakhstan as well, drawing native Kazakhs and minority Russians into

direct competition with one another. In a report on korenizatsiia, Kazakhstan boasted that

“almost all commissariats, krai, and guberniia institutions have established a rule for every new

opening in the apparat, a Kazakh should first be invited and only when that position cannot be

filled by a Kazakh should it be given to a Russian” (Martin 2001, 135). However, low literacy

rates meant minimally qualified candidates, as in 1927 there were only 960 reported literate

Kirghiz in the entire republic. Already in 1927, Goloshchekin reported that he had recruited “all

the literate and half-literate Kazakhs we have” (Martin 2001, 136). In addition to that, a limited

number of job openings meant that they had to replace Russians directly with titular nations

(Martin 2001, 137). It was reported that Russians were being given “a certificate that they were

fired ‘as a result of korenizatsiia [and they] spread their understandable discontent among

other employees” (Martin 2001, 137).

As a result of this discontent, Stalin tasked Goloshchekin with managing korenizatsiia

and addressing the grievances it produced. In May 1926, Goloshchekin introduced “functional

korenizatsiia” in which general quotas would be replaced with a list of specific jobs

(nomenklatura) to be fulfilled, the old standard of basing selection upon ethnicity would be

replaced with the standard of Kazakh language mastery, and specialized short-term courses

would be introduced (Martin 2001, 143-144). In this way, Goloshchekin’s reforms limited the

number of jobs where korenizatsiia applied, Russians could keep their jobs as long as they

learned the Kazakh language, and improved preparation for technical workers with courses

(Martin 2001, 145).

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Korenizatsiia in the industrial workplace proved to be the most controversial among

certain parties of the federalist bargain, pitting native Kazakhs against minority Russians. In

1926, Kazakhstan instituted a preferential hiring policy towards Kazakhs, despite Communist

preferences to keep the proletariat a purely international group (Martin 2001, 147). Once

again, a Central Committee investigation found other nationalities were commonly fired and

replaced with Kazakhs, and that as a result, “Russian workers have become embittered against

Soviet power and against the unions” (Martin 2001, 148). The Andreev commission

condemned this policy but did not call for abandoning the quota system since functional

korenizatsiia was unsuited for the hiring of unskilled industrial labor. By 1927, Central Asian

OGPU reports began to emphasize “growing interethnic hostility based on the battle for work”

(Martin 2001, 148). Martin notes that violence was not restricted to outbursts in the face of

injustice, but also a strategic form of resistance. At a mill in Kazakhstan, the GPU reported a

comment advocating giving “the Kazakhs a good whipping” to “put a fright into them and

others” in response to firing some of the Russian workers (Martin 2001, 150). Here again,

nationalist outbreak is the language of protest against the current policy arrangement.

Grigol Ubiria is careful to point out that ethnic lines during this time period were not an

objective reality, otherwise the delimitation debates about the correct “nationality” of various

ethnic groups would not have been so fierce. Instead, he describes the national-territorial

delimitation as artificial and Soviet-led (Ubiria 2016, 126). Indeed, Ubiria’s scholarship confirms

that Central Asian communities did not identify with nationality, but religion, and that the

Soviet government overlooked this factor and formally categorized the native populations along

nationality lines (Ubiria 2016, 134). This generated strategic ethnic identification, as people

Gross 23

chose the narodnost’ that would ensure better social and economic opportunities (Ubiria 2016,

137). Indeed, Lenin’s policy of preferential hiring policy probably encouraged greater

identification with titular republic nationalities, as korenizatsiia required firing hundreds of

Russian or Slavic administrative and factory workers in favor of Kazakhs from 1923 to 1926

(Ubiria 2016, 150). In some cases it wasn’t even a matter of authentic nationality, but a means

to avoid ethnic harassment from the local government, which is extremely pertinent in the case

of Kazakhstan (Ubiria 2016, 137).

Belorussia

The Belorussian movement developed slowly in comparison to other republics, and in

general lacked strong nationalist tendencies due to the lack of a constant independent party

apparatus. However, some ethnic rivalry arose when the central government moved to add a

portion of the RSFSR to the Belorussian republic, particularly in regard to language rights in the

region.

Belorussia’s first moment of ethnic consciousness began at the start of the twentieth

century with its first newspaper in Belorussian, Nasha niva (Pipes 1997, 11). The first

Belorussian national party Hromada, founded around the same time in 1902, demanded federal

relations with Russia, with territorial autonomy for the provinces adjoining Vilna and national-

cultural autonomy for all minorities in the region (Pipes 1997, 11-12).

By 1917, Russian and Jewish socialist parties still dominated the political scene, but a

Belorussian National Committee was formed, which pressed for federal relations with Russia

and the granting of an autonomous status to Belorussia. Hromada gained the upper hand by

the summer, and merged with the Belorussian Military Council, renaming itself the Great

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Belorussian Rada. Its goal was agrarian policy reform, in which landowners were excluded from

the right to participate. In December 1917 Hromada convened in Minsk a Belorussian National

Congress to discuss the repercussions of the Bolshevik coup, and then on December 17-18,

proclaimed the independence of Belorussia. Still, Pipes is careful to note that the Belorussian

nationalists lacked a strong popular following – one month before the Hromada’s participation

in the elections to the Constituent Assembly consisted of polling a mere 29,000 votes in an area

populated by several million (Pipes 1997, 73-75).

In addition, Minsk Bolsheviks commanded the pro-Soviet troops by the end of

December 1917, disbanded the Belorussian National Congress in an asymmetrical move, and

proclaimed the rule of the Bolsheviks (Pipes 1997, 150). Minsk communists’ authority extended

only to regions occupied by pro-Communist regiments and to the major cities, and lasted only

100 days. German troops marched east to occupy the region, and established a puppet

government under the title of an “independent” Belorussian National Republic. The Republic

applied to Kaiser for moral support and material aid, and Germany replaced some socialists and

nationalists with more conservative authorities. However, under German rule the urban

proletariat and peasantry became very restless, and in some areas took arms, resulting in the

1918 agrarian revolts (Pipes 1997, 151). This and other occurrences of resistance benefitted,

and was in fact encouraged by underground Communists (Pipes 1997, 152).

German troops evacuated in November 1918, leaving no nationalist organization

capable of assuming political authority. Therefore, authority was left to the soviets dominated

by Russian and Jewish parties (Pipes 1997, 152). At the congress of the Northwestern Regional

Committee of the Russian Communist Party meeting in December 1918 in Moscow, the Soviet

Gross 25

government decided that they were going to make Belorussia into a national republic

composed of left-wing adherents of the Belorussian National Committee that had returned to

the Communists after the end of German occupation. Request for a purely Belorussian

Communist Party was denied, restricting nationalist access even further (Pipes 1997, 152).

The Belorussian republic was merged with Lithuania in February 1919, and in March the

Communist parties of both regions were also combined, causing resentment at being used as a

mere tool for Soviet expansion. In April 1919 Poland conquered Lithuania and Belorussia, and

the Polish government offered Belorussians federal ties with Poland. However, Poland showed

little concern for social radicalism of the masses or nationalist tendencies of the intelligentsia,

returning land confiscated by the Communists to original landowners, and introducing Polish as

the official language (Pipes 1997, 153). In August 1920, Communists finally reestablished

control of Belorussia and reestablished the Belorussian Soviet Republic, but the idea of a

combined Lithuanian-Belorussian state was abandoned (Pipes 1997, 154).

By 1921, some Soviet party members expressed concern that the party was “artificially

cultivating” a Belorussian nationality which would not exist otherwise, but for reasons of

maintaining a buffer between the Soviet Union and independent Poland, as well as a

counterbalance to the Ukrainian republic and demonstration of commitment to non-Russians,

Stalin sustained the policy (Hirsch 2005, 150). In the fall of 1923, the Politburo decided to

enlarge the Belorussian republic, and organized a Commission on the Enlargement of the

Territory of Belorussia under the leadership of Aleksandr Osatkin-Vladimirskii, who was the

head of the Belorussian Communist Party (Hirsch 2005, 151). The proposal involved removing a

part of the RSFR to unite it with Belorussia, but concerns about forced introduction of the

Gross 26

Belorussian language in former RSFR territory caused residents to want to remain in the RSFR.

Here, competition over language rights emerged, but residents’ concerns were largely ignored.

Subcommission members argued that national self-determination did not necessarily apply to

political choices, and that despite “Russified” Belorussians not knowing their “true identity,”

they were entitled to Belorussian nationhood – in an asymmetrical fashion, whether they

wanted it or not (Hirsh 2005, 154-155).

Belorussia began forming national soviets in 1924, and initially denied Russians national

minority status. However, unlike neighboring Ukraine, foreign colonists were more dispersed in

Belorussia, so it was possible to form only a single Polish district. After the 1926 annexation of

Gomel guberniia, Belorussia dealt with Russian minority pushback, although Martin does not

describe further. By 1933, there were 40 Polish soviets, 24 Jewish soviets, 15 Russian soviets, 5

Latvian soviets, 2 German soviets, 6 Ukrainian soviets, and 1 Lithuanian soviets, for a total of 93

national soviets (Martin 2001, 48-49).

Conclusion

In general, the cases of Tatarstan, Kazakhstan, and to a certain extent Belorussia

demonstrate the effect of federalization in strengthening ethnic identity, by setting nationalities

against each other in competition for administrative territory, language rights, and jobs in

industry and bureaucracy. Nationalist outbreak was the language of protest against perceived

institutional injustice, a means of expressing dissatisfaction with an inequitable federal bargain.

Indeed, while other minorities did protest titular nationality favoritism, Russian minority protest

seemed to be the most consistent theme, given their perceived loss of status outside of the

RSFR. Kazakhstan proved to be the strongest case of this, given its history of colonization by

Gross 27

the Russian Empire. In this way, historic issues of nationalism do tend to lead to further issues

with nationalism down the road, but a lack of strong national identity previously – as in

Belorussia – tends to reduce the chance of problems.

Belorussia is also a strange case given the great power struggle that occurred at its

inception. The perpetual transition between Russian, German, and Polish authority, as well as

the overall lack of nationalist consciousness, did not allow its own strong national party system

to thrive. This likely dampened the degree of nationalist protest that republic experienced.

Furthermore, Richard Pipes’ research demonstrated a surprising amount of coercion by

the central government in the formation of the republics. Contrary to my optimistic

predictions, the central Soviet government often overrode minority political parties and

preferences in asymmetrical bargains, or perhaps, more aptly named, bargaining failures. This

was seen in Kazakhstan’s Alash-Orda, Tatarstan’s Medzhilis, and Belorussia’s Rada. The Soviet

government wanted to portray public support for national minorities, as long as they were

amicable Communist minorities. When the central government saw no room for agreement or

bargaining, they intervened decisively. In addition, in some cases failure to fairly enact the

agreed bargains resulted in outright ethnic violence, as with the Kazakh land reforms, or more

mildly, Tatar “kucherizatsiia”. Still, reforms to korenizatsiia and the policy of korenizatsiia itself

demonstrated a responsiveness on the part of the Soviet government to minority needs in a

federalist bargain, even if reforms to korenizatsiia centered mostly on the needs of Russian

minorities. The initial federalist arrangement was not permanent, but a flexible institution that

was at least partially open to input from the people it governed – if only to maintain sovereign

control over the extent of Soviet territory.

Gross 28

In fact, this conflict between maintaining centralized authority and addressing ethnic

grievances is a recurring theme through the course of Soviet history. It is no accident that the

Soviet Union under Gorbachev disintegrated along ethnic republic lines. Federalization based

on regional ethnic characteristics served to institutionalize this conflict between center and

ethnic periphery, as further centralization necessarily meant disempowering titular nationals.

In addition, simply addressing ethnic issues at the republic level immediately becomes

politicized when one ethnic group lays claim to the republic it has been granted – and giving

titular nationals authority over policy enactment in this area can be dangerous for reasons of

revenge or agency slacking. Especially when ethnic minorities are interspersed and border

delineation is unclear – as it was in the Soviet Union – federalism only serves to bring statewide

ethnic conflict to the substate level. While Soviet leaders could not have anticipated these

policy implications, history can be a useful guide for those considering various options for

addressing interethnic strife. In dealing with matters of ethnicity, a federal bargain is

vulnerable to great instability.

Gross 29

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