BHAA RMAKAHA’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NO-SELF
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PUBLICATIONS
EDITED BY
VOLUME XXXII
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THE SELF’S AWARENESS OF ITSELF BHAA RMAKAHA’S ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NO-SELF
Wien 2006
Sammlung de Nobili Institut für Südasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde
der Universität Wien Druck: Interpress Co. Ltd., Bécsi str. 67, 1037 Budapest, Hungary
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For
2. Secondary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.1. Early Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.2. Vaibh 'ikas, Sautr ntikas and the Pram &a School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.3. M dhyamikas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.4. V ts!putr!yas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.5. The Soul Doctrines of Ved nta, S %khya, Vai#e'ika and M!m $s . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2. "aiva Siddh nta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3. The Place of NPP within "aiva Siddh nta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.1. Extent and Manner of Engagement with Other Traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2. The Soul in "aiva Siddh nta and NPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3. Reliance on "aiva Scripture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4. Comparison with Pratyabhijñ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4. R maka&(ha’s Soul Doctrine in Relation to Those of the Br hma&ical Schools . . . . . 90
4.1. Ved nta and S %khya in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2. Ny ya and Vai#e'ika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3. S %khya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Excursus on R maka&(ha’s Ideas about Liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4. Knowledge of the Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5. Constitution of the Text of NPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.1. Editions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7. The Date of R maka#%ha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
8. R maka#%ha’s Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF NPP . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
CHAPTER 1: Can We Infer the Existence of the Self?
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
2. The Naiy yika Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Brief Remarks about the History of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Philosophical Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3. Vai!e$ika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.2. The Argument from Qualities to Quality-Possessor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Excursus on Ac k"u"apratyak"atva in Vai!e$ika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4. S "khya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.2. Cognition is Self-Illuminating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
CHAPTER 2: Can We Know the Self Through Self-Awareness (Svasa#vedana)?
1. Sadyojyotis’ Verse and its Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
2. R maka#%ha’s Own View. Is It Different from the Buddhist View? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
3. Does the Perceiver Shine Forth as Stable or Momentary (Sthiragr hakaprak !a or
Bhinnagr hakaprak !a)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
4. Is the Idea of Superimposition of a Permanent Perceiver Coherent? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
4.1. Sthiragr hakaprak !a is Internal, not External . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
4.2. Superimposition Cannot Be Carried Out by Something Momentary . . . . . . . . . . 238
4.3. Cognition Cannot Fool Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
4.4. Refutation of Self-Awareness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
CHAPTER 3: Can We Perceive the Self Through I-Cognition (Ahampratyaya)?
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
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3. Do Verbal Cognitions Have Real Referents? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
CHAPTER 4: The Equating of Self and Cognition
Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Philosophical Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
2. The Self’s Cognition and the Buddhi’s Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Excursus on the Pauru a-Bauddha Distinction in aivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
TEXT PASSAGES
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PREFACE
The present work is an attempt to understand the ideas of an author writing
over a thousand years ago in a civilisation profoundly different from our own.
Those who undertake to study the products of an alien culture, such as an-
thropologists, historians and philologists, will always have to confront the
question of whether the other’s thinking can be understood in the terms of
their own thinking. The fact that, in western scholars’ encounter with Bud-
dhism over the last two centuries, Buddhist authors have been interpreted as
Hegelian, Heideggerian, Wittgensteinian, Platonic, Stoic, transcendental ide-
alist, phenomenologist, and as akin to Husserl, Russell or Whitehead, 1 indi-
cates that, instead of letting the texts speak for themselves, we have a ten-
dency to superimpose on them perspectives with which we are more familiar.
This raises worrying questions about our ability to recognize what is unfamil-
iar as unfamiliar.
If we want the classical Indian traditions to reveal themselves, not our own
preconceptions, and the voices of their thinkers to come across louder than
our voices, our most powerful tool is philology. While we can never com-
pletely eliminate our own subjectivity, we can, as philologists, attempt to set
it aside to some extent by sticking closely to an observation of the texts them-
selves, and, when interpreting, allowing our analysis to be guided by concepts
and ideas derived from the text itself or other texts of the same general period
and tradition. By devoting energy to the recovery of the precise wording of
the author prior to the many copying mistakes that have entered the transmis-
sion—through gathering variants and parallel passages, and identifying and
solving corruptions—we can, as if turning the dial of a radio closer to the pre-
cise frequency of the station, reduce background noise and allow the voice to
come across with more clarity, and consequently with less distortion or blur-
1 See Kapstein 2001 3–8.
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The Self’s Awareness of Itself 10
ring of the thought behind the words. By accumulating more and more infor-
mation about the cultural, linguistic and religio-philosophical context of
authors/texts and by setting them more deeply in that context, we move fur-
ther from our own thought-world and closer to theirs. As we read more
sources, the back and forth of the hermeneutic process mean that the catego-
ries we apply to the texts are tested against richer and richer materials, shown
to be inadequate and hence repeatedly refined, such that we move closer and
closer to the author’s own perspective.
Therefore the approach of this book is primarily that of philology. I give the
Sanskrit text of those passages of R maka!"ha’s in which he discusses the
Buddhist doctrine of No-Self, having edited them with the aid of manuscripts
and parallel passages neglected by previous editors (as well as by following
certain emendations suggested by Sanskritists far more advanced than I with
whom I was fortunate to read), I give a translation that aims to be as literal as
possible without sacrificing readability, and I explain how R maka!"ha’s
points are related to points he makes elsewhere or to views found in earlier
texts of his own or other traditions.
But in order to avoid a certain one-sidedness, I have tried to balance this per-
spective with another. One could caricature the field of the study of Indian
philosophy as consisting of a continuum of publications running from those
written by self-effacing and erudite textual scholars attending arduously to
the primary sources but seeing them as mere pieces of a historical jigsaw
puzzle, to those written by more vociferous but less learned comparative phi-
losophers or historians of philosophy who are…